Military Control in Pakistan-The Parallel State ,Mazhar Aziz

February 26, 2017 | Author: Anonymous | Category: Virtualization
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Military Control in Pakistan-The Parallel State ,Mazhar Aziz /Editor data available Price: $150.00 , ISBN: 978-0-415-43743-1 ,Binding: Hardback

Book Review by Agha.H.Amin,November 11, 2008 Published by: Routledge ,Publication Date: 24th October 2007 ,Pages: 160 Mazhar Aziz’s book on military and politics in Pakistan is a new addition to books dealing with civil military relations in Pakistan. Mazhar Aziz Mazhar Aziz (PhD, University of Nottingham, 2006) is a former Pakistani civil servant and an independent scholar with research interests in democracy and political representation, civilmilitary relations and foreign policy. He is an outsider to the Pakistani military having observed it as a civil servant who at times are junior partners in the civil military nexus in Pakistan barring few exceptions like the old fox Ghulam Ishaq or the half military half civilian Iskandar Mirza. Aziz in words of a reviewer “introduces the concept of institutional path dependency. According to him, the institutional innovations of the formative years of Pakistan’s history (1947-54) created a form of path dependency that has been responsible for thwarted democratisation, military intervention and post-military withdrawal crises.” Aziz however fails to define this concept of ” Institutional Path” precisely and also fails to connect it with the negative British colonial military legacy particulary the British Imperial policy in Punjab from 1849-1947. Under the British the Punjab the preferred British recruiting area for the army from 1857 till 1947 had a special status.It was a non regulation province where the deputy commissioner was far more

powerful than in any British province and most of the initial deputy commissioners were ex army.It was a province where the feudals and the British had a special relationship.It was a province where the vast bulk of British intelligence resources were employed as its location was the most strategic in entire British India.It was a province which had the closest link and the largest contribution to the British war effort as far as 1857 ,First World War and Second World War were concerned. While the Indian Army and notably the Punjabis , and most particularly the Punjabi Muslims were the closest collaborators of the British immediately after partition the Pakistani Army particularly its pro British generals were the most valuable political asset of the British.The Pakistani generals led by Ayub Khan soon out of personal ambition became the self styled guardians of Pakistans territorial and ideological boundaries.Ayub Khan with open support of civil servants like Ghulam Mohammad and the military cum civil servant Iskandar Mirza on his own started negotiating with USA and boasted that the US Director CIA was his best friend.At this point in time Ayub was propelled to do so by personal ambition and by the declared intention of safeguarding Pakistan and the army’s institutional interests on the pretext of acquiring US weapons.In this case he was however not alone.The initial move for US aid was made by Mr Jinnah and later by Liaquat Ali Khan and Ghulam Mohammad.From 1954 onwards however Ayub was picked out by USA as USA’s best bet.India was too large to be manipulated and India’s Congress too formidable a party to be messed with.In Pakistan however manipulation was simpler because of the pre partition feudal military civil service connection.Thus in case of Ayub the mafia was not military alone but civil military West Pakistani feudal with Punjabis in lead and all conspiring to reduce the Dravidian Bengalis politically.What followed was a joint conspiracy by the army with a linguistically Punjabi chief in league with Punjabi feudals and civil servants to snatch legitimate political power from the Bengalis.Mazhar Aziz misses this point or has practiced selective distortion.

The Yahya takeover of 1969 was the most credible intervention by the army done out of national interests.General Yahya did make an honest attempt to introduce direct franchise and provincial autonomy.Unfortunately he failed because all of pakistan’s rulers starting from Jinnah had mishandled the Bengalis and the situation became unmanageable. Zia on the other hand acted out of personal motives because he feared that Bhutto wanted to sack him and the top army generals feared Bhutto who was a popular leader.Again a case of class interests rather than institutional interests. Aziz misses the point that the army or its top clique was used by the USA to achieve its geopolitical ends in Pakistan.Every military takeover in Pakistan had some link with USA or became a servile instrument to further US geopolitical objectives. Aziz also fails to note that initial military takeovers were more personality oriented while starting from Zia the army’s generals very correctly called the trade union of generals acted out of class interests.After 1977 it became the stated objective of the Pakistan Army’s top generals and its intelligence agencies to destroy all independent political leadership in Pakistan.Thus every political party was penetrated and every effort made to destroy independent political leadership.The Punjab again was the centre of these efforts and the emergence of Nawaz Sharif in 1988 was the high point of these covert efforts. General Zia’s successor General Beg did hold the elections of 1988 but failed to control the ISI pursuing a parallel policy or simply ignored what it was doing thus destabilisng and removing the first PPP government in 1990.In 1990 Mr Nawaz Sharif was the best choice of the army’s ruling clique but he was removed in 1993.In this case again the matter was not entirely or even 50 % institutional but a collusion of a Pashtun president and a Pashtun army chief to remove a Punjabi PM who was becoming too assertive.Their natural choice was a Sindhi lady .This move again

was unconstitutional and motivated by personal and ethnic motivation rather than institutional motivation. In 1999 the Musharraf coup was again motivated by personal considerations rather than any institutional considerations.Many generals supported Musharraf because they had been fired by Nawaz Sharif notably General Mahmud Corps Commander Rawalpindi. After 2001 however Musharraf got a great opportunity to play the role of USA’s best collaborator.Again a continuation of the Punjab loyalty to British of 1857 and Ayub loyalty to USA in the Cold War or Zia loyalty to USA in 1979-1988. It would be more correct to describe the army in Pakistan as a mixture of institutional and class loyalty with personal motivation and ambition of the army chief as the main catalyst.The army is divided into many classes and the real culprits are the top 150 or 200 generals around the chief.Their ambition distorts the whole scenario and their selfish actions cannot be called institutional interests. Unless their is total defeat as happened to the Russian Army in 1917 the hegemony of the army signified by these top 150-200 windbag generals would continue come what may ! Now how to bell the cat.Only defeat in war can reduce the army’s role in Pakistan.The same happened in Russia in 1905 and 1917.In Turkey in 1918.In Japan in 1945,Alone the Pakistani politicians cannot do it.They are the test tube babies of many army intelligence agencies. It appears that change is round the corner.The army is facing internal fractures.Its lower ranks for the first time in its history were involved in at least two major assassination attempts against the army chief and these included many soldiers from Musharraf’s own SSG commandos.The army is being challenged by Islamists and its credibility is being reduced.Conventional war is out but the secret war at covert levels continues.India

intelligence knows that the war never ended and so does the Pakistani intelligence.For the first time in West Pakistan’s hopeless history the army is being challenged in NWFP and Balochistan and the threat has not been contained.This is an ethnic war as its a Punjabi Army with junior Pashtun auxillaries like the Yusufzais and Khattaks fighting the Baloch and tribals . The army is trying to sell itself to USA as its best bet but it appears that the USA has decided that some structural changes are needed in the Pakistan Army. The bottom line however is not the Pakistani generals but US policy , at least at the Defence Department,State Department,CIA and DIA level.They want the Pakistani generals.They do not trust the Pakistani politicians and that’s the main reason why the Pakistani generals and only the top 20 are guarding their class interests .A small class by numbers but very influential and destructive. Only defeat in war or Balkanisation will reduce the role of Pakistani generals.Mazhar misses this point. To conclude Aziz fails to present a comprehensive case for the Instutional path theory although he makes many repetitions in the core 100 pages of his book.

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