NASAKOM: SOEKARNO\'S FAILED POLITICAL MOVE | Fransiskus ...

NASAKOM: SOEKARNO’S FAILED POLITICAL MOVE

Fransiskus Borgias M. Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung

(This Article has been published in En Arche, Indonesian Journal of Inter-Religious Studies, Volume 1, Number 2, 2012, pp.125-148; ISSN: 2088-8228; Published by ICRS-YOGYA STUDENT COUNCIL).

Introduction Twenty years after he was appointed as president of Republic of Indonesia, Sukarno falls down from his power. Those years were not easy for him and also for Indonesia in general because almost all the time there were a lot of problems, criticisms, and also oppositions from his political opponents. That is why in 1965 Sukarno made a political movement to unite all Indonesian political power by putting forward three attempts: 1) Creating the strong feeling of opposition to colonialismimperialism, especially western imperialism in it various new forms; Sukarno called it nekolim, stands for neokolonialisme-imperialisme (new colonialism-imperialism). 2) Strengthen national love, cherish, and appreciation of Pancasila as Indonesian state ideology. 3) Creating a new political attempt to unite all ideologies in Indonesia by coining NASAKOM.1 In my historical reading the first two attempts are more or less succeeded because Indonesian people agree with the opposition to nekolim and support state ideology, Pancasila. But to unite three elements in one bundle is a different matter. This paper is about the political movement of Soekarno at the beginning of sixties to unite the different streams in Indonesia so that the whole energy of the nation could be allocated to the establishment of the common good of society. This is a political movement of Sukarno aimed at the unification of the country. According to Anderson, “The Nasakom-politique, pursued by Sukarno during the period of Guided Democracy, was designed to encourage mutual trust and cooperation between the groups and parties normally classified under each of these three rubrics”.2 This move is known in an acronym, NASAKOM, stands for Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunis (Nationalism, Religion, and Communism). I call this an “experiment” because this is a kind of political creativity of Soekarno in his public appearance as a Demagogue. In such position he created some political slogans, acronyms. For instance: Manipol USDEK, Ganefo, NASAKOM, Nekolim, and including the slogan taken from Latin, Vivere in Periculoso. This is a kind of rhetoric art used by Soekarno in his political speeches.3 Initial Historical Analysis of the Three Elements NASAKOM consists of three fundamental elements. They are Nationalism (Nasionalisme), Religion (Agama), and Communism (Komunisme). The element of religion (Agama) has appeared since a long time in Indonesian history. That is why I put it in the first sequence. We can trace this element from various indigenous religions up to the coming of Indianization, Arabization, and Europanization process, each of which brings their own religions: Hindu and Buddha from India, Islam from Arabia (at the beginning via Northern and Southern India, later on directly from Arab), and finally Christianity (Catholicism and Protestantism) from Europe (some historians talked about the coming of Christianity before its coming from the West, even before the coming and the

1

See Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, “Religion, Violence and Diversity: Negotiating the Boundaries of Indonesian Identity”, in Religion, Civil Society and Conflict in Indonesia, edited by Carl Sterkens et.al. (Berlin: LIT Verlag Dr.W.Hopf, 2009), 10-11. 2 See Benedict Anderson, Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 29, footnote 31. Also B. J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 41. 3 For information, see B. G. Setiono, Tionghoa Dalam Pusaran Politik (Jakarta: Elkasa), 273, 723, 782, etc. (on MANIPOL). On MANIPOL USDEK, see 785. On NASAKOM see 723, 788, 789, 809, 818. On GANEFO, see 802, 818, on NEKOLIM see 827, 828, 831, etc. Also Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 595, where he gives explanation of NASAKOM (the Unity of Nationalists, Religious People, and Communists). Also Boland, The Struggle of Islam, 101-102, during the period of his Guided Democracy (1959-1965).

spreading of Islam). So, the element of religion has already existed since the beginning of the history of Nusantara.4 It is difficult to trace the historical awakening of national awareness and movement in the history of Nusantara. In general it is said that there is “tribal” awareness among local kings of Nusantara, although it is still limited to its locality; it existed as the awareness of Javanese, Sumatera, Borneo, or Celebes, etc,. Even within those great islands there were also some small and competitive sultanates. But such initial-local awareness is adequate as a basis for the movement to resist European imperialism (Dutch, British). In its historical development the national awareness was based on tribal awareness. It starts as a tribal awareness, but in its historical development it transforms, thanks to the transformative effect of modern-western education and pesantreneducation system, into national awareness. Such a national awareness started to live at the beginning of twentieth century.5 Since that time it exists as a great unity among various groups of the nations. Since that time the sense of nationalism started to exist and become a significant factor in the history of national movement toward independence. Communist factor is a “new” element in the combination. In Europe Communistic ideas have existed after the industrial revolution in England. Its great figures are Karl Marx and Engels who in 1848 proclaimed their Communist Manifesto. Communism and Marxism develop throughout Europe including the Netherlands. In Russia it became the official ideology of the state and governmental system after Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. From Dutch people this idea came to and spread in Indonesia. One of the main actors to bring this idea to Indonesia is a Dutch man name H.F.F.M.Sneevlit; he arrived in Indonesia in 1913. Only one year afterwards (1914) he established Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging in Surabaya.6 A few years afterwards there were also some Indonesians who are inspired by this idea during their stay for studying in Netherlands. This happens for Tan Malaka. Since 1917 Communism started to exist in Indonesia. It becomes one of the factors in the struggle for independence.7 There is a great difference between those three factors in the initial history of modern Indonesia. The three factors have influences in the map of Nusantara’s politics toward independence. The synthetic category of this political-ideological triangle has been made since the beginning by Soekarno. In 1926, Soekarno has written that there are three compounds of main ideology that unite all political organizations in Indonesia. Those three great ideologies are Nationalism, Islam (represents Religion), and Marxism (Communism).8 But at the time this was only depicted as a map of global and general outline of Indonesian political thinking. It is in the sixties that Soekarno proclaims the synthetic ideological-idea as a new political doctrine, in a form of acronym, NASAKOM. Soekarno initially designed it as a binding ideology for the Nation in the making. But finally we know that this political experiment collapsed. This paper tries to answer the following questions: 1) Why does the great idea of syntheticpolitical NASAKOM proclaimed by Soekarno proved to fail?; 2) Does Soekarno not realize that there is a great difference between those three elements in NASAKOM that he blended them in one 4

See Nicholas Tarling (editor), The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Volume One, From early times to c.1500 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Chapter 5 “Religion and Popular Beliefs of Southeast Asia before c.1500” by J.G.de Casparis and I.W.Mabbett). Also the short survey of J. Titaley in his “From Abandonment to Blessing: the Theological Presence of Christianity in Indonesia,” in Sebastian C. H. Kim, Christian Theology in Asia (Cambridge: CUP, 2008), 71-88. 5 See Setiono, Tionghoa, 323-362 (Kebangkitan Nasional 1900-1927 or National Awakening). Also M. C. Ricklefs, Sejarah Indonesia Modern (Yogyakarta: Gajah Mada University Press, 1998), 352-360. Also Anderson, Language and Power, 243-245. 6 See Ricklefs, Sejarah, 370. 7 For short information see M. C. Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese Society: Islamic and Other Visions (Singapore: NUS Press, 2007), 230-238; 241-244; also Setiono, Tionghoa, 347-362. 8 See H. Feith and L. Castles, Pemikiran Politik Indonesia 1945-1965 (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1988), iiv.

ideological synthesis and proclaim it to be a way out of the historical crisis in the process of nation building? Actually Soekarno really aware of their difference but it seems that he behave as if they can be amalgamated in a melting-pot of his great mind as a charismatic founding father of the republic; 3) After PKI was eliminated from Indonesia, I still have an extra question that maybe will not elaborated fully in this present paper. The question is this: Is there any certainty that there will be no more elimination of other two elements of Nationalism and Religion? In this study I will use historical criticism. Historical criticism is a methodological approach that tries to read history critically by making periodization of history and recognizing respective characteristic of those periodizations. In this approach I have made those steps: First, I made a survey of bibliography and collecting the literary resources from library and make a critically study of them. Having read the materials I realize that the historical problem I want to study can be divided into three periodizations. I will describe this periodization deeply in the later part of my paper. I will convey this historical criticism with the help of hermeneutical philosophy. In hermeneutical philosophy we recognize one of the principle of hermeneutics called as “Reading as way of reproducing and reconstructing meaning.” This is a hermeneutical principle connected to F.Schleiermacher, P.Ricoeur, and H.G.Gadamer. Those hermeneutical principles are developed more extensively in a practical way by Wolfgang Isher in his book, The Act of Reading.9 I will use this approach in reading the resources related to the phenomenon of Nationalism, Religion, and Communism, in history of Indonesia’s struggle for independence. One of the important chapters in the book of Isher is the “Phenomenology of Reading” in which he develops his theory of critical reading.10 Based on this theory of reading some feminist and third world liberation theologians develop their own theory of reading, by saying that when we read, first of all, we read the lines. Then we have to read also between the lines. The most radical and creative theorist of reading even go further by saying that in reading activity we must also read the lies. Here we see the creative play of words: lines, between the lines, and also the lies. I will use all this approach in my reading resources. Three Historical Periodization of Indonesian Existence I will divide this part in three subparts: first I describe the situation in the twentieth; secondly I describe the situation in the thirtieth and fortieth. Thirdly, I describe the situation in the late fifties and the sixtieth. Let me start with the first sub-part. Having read the historical materials related to my topic I come to know that in the process of national awakening there are three great components in Indonesian political life. They play a significant role in the national struggle toward independence. There are an inter dynamic between those three great components. Based on their dynamic relationships, I make a historical periodization. I hope that this periodization will able to describe historically the dynamic interrelationship between them. These are three great historical pillars which characterize their dynamic movements. The first historical pillar related to the twenties. The second historical pillar related to the sixties. Between those two great pillars there is one transitional pillar which I consider a third pillar; this pillar related to the forties and fifties. This third pillar was related to the wars for independence, the proclamation of independence. There are some important observations related to each period in which those three elements of political life of the nation took places. The first, it is clear that Communism made rebellions in those three periods. In the year of 1926 and 1927 there was a rebellion against the colonial

9

See W. Isher, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1987). 10 See ibid., especially Part III “Phenomenology of Reading”, 107-162.

government; the consequence was that the colonial government suppress the rebellion.11 Secondly, communism also made a rebellion in the year of 1948, but this time within the organization of military which has been penetrated by communism. This rebellion was triggered by the coming back of Musso in August 1948 from his exile in Soviet Union; he was one of PKI leaders from the twenties. This time, the new country of Indonesia can overcome the rebellion but still do not ban the ideology.12 Thirdly, communism in the year of 1965, once again made a rebellion. This time there is no forgiveness for them. No second opportunity. They are banned and the party was prohibited throughout Indonesia. It is strengthened by an official-formal decision made by MPR in 1966. To be honest, Religious group also made many rebellions even since before the related period we are dealing with. The nearest rebellion (started as a protest against the land reform, but then became a war in the name of religion) was the rebellion of Banten Peasants in the year of 1888.13 At the beginning of nineteenth century there are some rebellion based on religion: for instance, the Java War,14 Padri War, and Aceh War. Even this last war, lasted until the beginning of twentieth century with the great name Cut Nya’ Dien. After the proclamation of Independence there were also some rebellion based on religion. For instance, the separatist rebellion made by Islamic rebels like Daud Beureueh (Aceh), DI and TII of Kartosuwirjo (West Java), and Kahar Muzakar (South Sulawesi).15 There is also the rebel of RMS (Republik Maluku Selatan), and GAM. RMS still becomes a problem until the present. GAM can only be resolved in the year 2005 after the natural disaster of Tsunami in Aceh.16 Those groups, although they are prohibited, are not banned. Their destiny is better than Communists. Finally in my observation, the nationalist group was the “innocent” one. They do not commit a rebellion. But maybe this observation is not wholly true, because the entire struggle toward the independence basically was supported by the ideology and the sense and the awareness of nationalism. And this is right. But to be sure there is no rebellion against their nation after the war for independence. In the history of national movement and awakening in Indonesia, we can see some important components which play a significant role in the whole process of struggling. The national awakening was agreed upon by historians to have been started at 20 May 1908 which was characterized by the establishment of an organization named Budi Utomo, with the main orientation toward nationalism (nation state). In general it can be stated that there are three great components. The first is the component of Nationalism with the main orientation toward the nationalism and the nation state. It started with Budi Utomo, but later on it was mainly represented by PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia). The second is the component of Religion; of course the religion here means Islam, religion of majority, although it is not excluding other religions. The third component is socialism-communism. Their basic idea was to establish Marxism and communism as the ideology of the state. Those three components play their important roles in the process of developing the national awareness and they also have participated in the process of struggle for independence. There is a great difference in their

11

See Ricklefs, Polarizing, 241-243. The most interesting document related to this issue see H. J. Benda and R. T. McVey, The Communist Uprisings of 1926-1927 in Indonesia: Key Documents (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969). 12 See Setiono, Tionghoa, 643-660 (on Madiun Incident). See Ricklefs, Sejarah, 479-482. 13 See Sartono Kartodirjo, The Peasants’ Revolt of Banten in 1888: Its Conditions, Course and Sequel, A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia (N.V.De Nederlandsche Boek – En Steendrukkerij v/h H.L.Smits ‘SGravenhage, 1966). 14 For a good historical description of Java War, see Peter Carey, The Power of Prophecy: Prince Dipanegara and the End of an Old Order in Java, 1785-1855 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007). 15 See A. F. Bakti, “Collective Memories of the Qahhar Movement”, in Mary Zurbuchen, Beginning to Remember: The Past in the Indonesian Present (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005), 123-149; also Boland, The Struggle, 62-64. 16 See Ricklefs, Sejarah, 727-28; 735-36.

ideological orientations. The first tries to idealize the ideology of nationalism. The second tries to idealize the ideology of religion. The third tries to idealize the ideology of Marxism and Communism. If they are considered based on their ideological background it is clear that the three are so different from each other. But for the time being such a great difference do not make so many difficulties and problems because their focus was to confront the colonial power. In this context they are united to expel the colonial power from Indonesia. So, they are united because they have the same enemy; it is an external enemy. This kind of unity is not coming from inside, flow from the interest of their respective ideology. This is a kind of time bomb. Boland called it “the period of relative unity-in-the-struggle.”17 It is a unity because they are in struggle toward the same ideal of nationalism and struggle against the same external imperialist oppressive power. Tragedy of PKI in the Twenties After PKI’s rebellion in 1926 and 1927, both failed, the party was banned by colonial power. The rebellion was suppressed by the Dutch in a strict way. The rebellion was not so adequately organized because there is no strong leadership. At that time their leaders were in exile; most of them were going abroad because they are included in the list of the people that should be arrested by police. At that time Semaun went to Russia, Tan Malaka fleed to Manila (Philippines). According to the historical analysis of Benda and McVey, there was actually a great difference between Indonesian PKI agenda and the agenda of International Communism. The later did not support the idea of making revolt but Indonesian PKI still insist on the idea of rebellion.18 But this is not the end of the story of PKI in Indonesia. PKI tries to survive in a secret way; it works in a clandestine in some cities, in Surabaya, and Madiun. Musso works in secret clandestine in Surabaya between the middle of 1935 to the middle of 1936. So it means they started to work again almost a decade following the failed rebellion. Musso worked with the aim to revive an organization of communism directed by Moscow. This is called later on PKI Muda or Illegal PKI.19 But the movement was quickly known by the government so in February 1937 it was once again banned by government. But Musso succeeded in recruiting some new young cadre for this party. From those new followers only Pamoedji can escape the arrest undertaken by government. He also worked in a secret way to recruit some new and young activist to enter into the clandestine organization. According to an oral tradition, Amir Syariffudin “joined” this Illegal PKI because of the recruitment of a young activist of Eastern Java, Widarta, a follower of Pamoedji. This happens in the second Conggres of Gerindo in July 1939.20 It is stated by van Klinken that Amir Syarifuddin never become the core member of the Party.21 Whatever his case is and the actual problem of the matter, there is one thing which is clear that is PKI never died. After the first ban in the end of twenties and also the ban at the end of the thirties, PKI still exist and active in the political sphere of life of Indonesia. Disappearance of PKI during the Struggle for Independence The elimination of PKI (communism), in a certain sense has been made in the process of the formation of BPUPKI/PPKI. Those institutions are given a special task to make preparation necessary for Indonesian independence. It cannot be denied that since its early existence in Indonesia, 17

See Boland, The Struggle, 40. See Benda and McVey, The Communist Uprisings, xxix-xxxi. Also Ricklefs, Sejarah, 384-385. 19 See Gerry van Klinken, Minorities, Modernity and the Emerging Nation: Christians in Indonesia, a Biographical Approach (Leiden: KILTV Press, 2003), 147. 20 See ibid, 148. Van Klinken only cited oral tradition and do not mention any written tradition concerning Amir Syariffudin’s official membership to PKI. Maybe he means something with this way of writing. Van Klinken, in this case, quotes Leclecq: 1993:33. 21 See discussion in van Klinken, Minorities, 148; in this case, he cites Poeze: 1984:169. 18

communism, like or dislike it, have played a role in the process of struggle toward Independence. It cannot be denied that PKI, in the end of twenties have made a rebellion toward a colonial government, something that at that time must have been appreciated as a form of nationalism and nationality. They are, therefore black-listed by the Dutch government. But, in the situation in which the sense of anti-Dutch was strong, the rebellion of PKI must have been considered a form of patriotism and nationalism. Almost twenty years later, in the process of the plan to prepare the independence for Indonesia, under Japanese’s coordination, communism element was not represented. It can be understood because PKI as a political party was only reestablished in October 1945;22 it means that its reestablishment takes place some few months after the preparation and proclamation of Independence. That is why they did not participate in the preparation for independence though historically they are actively involved in national movements and struggles. This historical fact has a clear consequence in the whole process of the meetings of BPUPKI especially concerning the ideological foundation of the state. All those represented in these institutions are only the delegates of the Nationalist Islam, Islamist itself, and Christian Nationalist. That is why the result of the meeting on the formulation of Pancasila as the ideological foundation of the state was finally accepted and acknowledged, though it is through a long process of debates and discussions. The formulation of Pancasila which becomes the ideological foundation of the state was the formulation which we come to know in the preamble of the Constitution of 1945. As the endorsement of the Religionist wing of the institution, the accepted first principle of Pancasila was the principle of Ketuhanan Yang Mahaesa.23 It is clear that in one of the important event of the history of Indonesian independence, communist party was not represented in the preparatory body. It means that communist element was slowly eliminated from Indonesian politics. Later on it will be totally eliminated. Or to use the political term of Soeharto, PKI will be totally eradicated from Indonesia.24 This happens after the failed coup d’etat in 1965.25 I will not describe in detail this tragedy. I just mention the fact that a year after this event, PKI was totally banned from Indonesia. With the formal-official decision of MPR in 1966, PKI was prohibited from all aspects of Indonesian life. PKI got a bad labeling or stigmatization. They are considered a bad moral people. They are not given the opportunity to live here in Indonesia. Even their children and offspring have so many difficulties in their daily life. Toward the Formulation of NASAKOM In this part I discuss the final elimination of PKI from Indonesian political life. In this connection I take much inspiration from the book of Herbert Feith and Lance Castles.26 Feith and Castles, mention that there are five streams in the Indonesian political thinking in the fifties and sixties. They drew a picture of political struggle in Indonesia. My explanation in the following part of this paper should be read based on the illustration given by this picture.27

22

See Ricklefs, Sejarah, 465. This is a difficult term to be translated into English. There are some suggestions: Believe in one God Almighty. But in the formulation of Pancasila there is no such word as believe. I consider the proposal of B.Adeney Risakotta. He proposes the following substitute: “The Great Unity of Deity.” See Adeney-Risakotta in Religion, 11. 24 See Soeharto’s writing (“Mengakhiri Tiga Penyelewengan”) in Feith, The Decline, 132-135. 25 See Anderson and McVey, A Preliminary Analysis. 26 See H. Feith and L. Castles, Pemikiran, iv. 27 I take this picture from Feith’s and Castles’ book, ibid., iv. 23

In that picture they draw five circles representing five streams of political way of thinking in Indonesia. Within those circles there are four boxes representing the details of political thinking and ideology in Indonesia. In the extreme left there is the circle of the leftist. In this circle there is a box in which they wrote the words of PKI and Communism. In the middle (central position) there is the circle of the “middle way”. In this circle there is also a box in which they include the political stream of PNI, and Radical Nationalism. And on the extreme right we saw the circle in which there are two boxes. The circle itself was characterized as Islam’s circle. The two boxes represent the Islamic tendencies. On the far right extreme we see that they put the box of Masyumi. And near to the central position we see the box of NU. There is the fourth circle which connects the left circle, the central circle and the right circle. They give name for this fourth circle Traditionalisme Jawa (Java Traditionalism). This fourth circle only includes those three circles and the two boxes of the middle (PNI, Nasionalisme Radikal) and of the right wing (NU), but do not include the far leftist box of PKI and Communism. On the other side we saw the fifth circle, which connect the central circle and the right wing circle. They name this fifth circle Sosialisme Demokrat (Democratic Socialism). This fifth circle only includes the central box of PNI and Radical Nationalism and the extreme right box of Masyumi, but did not include the box of NU in the soft-moderate right. Finally, beside those five circles and four boxes with their dynamic interconnections, we still find another two elements from outside. From below we saw the influence of traditions; here they put the Hindu-Java traditions and Islamic (traditions). But it is clear also that Hindu-Java traditions give their influence to the leftist wing and the Islamic traditions give their influence to the right wing of these political tendencies. From above we saw the influences of Western political and ideological thinking. This element from above orients its influence to both sides, to the left and to the right wings. It is in this context that Sukarno formulated his thinking on NASAKOM. Anderson said that this formulation was aimed at the unification of all political stream under one political umbrella, NASAKOM in one hand of Sukarno. Bernard Adeney-Risakotta also supports the same idea. As indicated in the title of this paper, this NASAKOM formula failed. But why it failed? It is this matter that I describe in the following part of my paper. Focus on Various Reasons for NASAKOM’S Failure

Why NASAKOM failed? Based on those historical explanations I have to say that the reason for NASAKOM’S failure is very complicated. It is impossible to point only to one factor as its main cause. Actually there are a lot of factors behind this failure. There is an economical factor. During that period of time there is an economical and financial difficulty in Indonesia.28 Most of Indonesian people live under the line of dire poverty. Poverty always became the fertile field for communism, which always promises the justice for all, the improvement of life, and even also the promise of land reform. There is also an international political factor; at that time the international politics was characterized by a Cold War after the Second World War between East Block (Soviet Union and its allies including China) and West Block (United States of America and its allies including some European countries). West Block has their own pact of military defense well known in its abbreviation: NATO. East Block has also their own pact of military defense well known in its name Warsaw Pact. Indonesia under the leadership of Sukarno tries not to be trapped within those existing Blocks and together with some Third World leaders he tries to establish a Non-Aligned Movement. His friends at that time were Gamal Abdul Nasser (Egypt), Josef Tito (former Yugoslavia), and Jawaharlal Nehru (India). They succeeded in starting this movement. This was Sukarno’s international political movement together with other Third-World leaders. Nationally, however, “Sukarno himself was a nationalist who tried to unify the country in his own person by affirming the value of both Islam and Communism.”29 In the meanwhile there was also a factor of competition between military power and nonmilitary power in Indonesian political society and in our political life. As a non-military man, Sukarno tries very hard to strengthen the civil supremacy in Indonesian government over military power. Of course this is not an easy attempt at all. In this matter Sukarno was supported by PKI but at the same time he was challenged and opposed by military (especially the army).30 There is also a special historical factor in Indonesia which displays a great difference and conflict between three elements within the idea of NASAKOM. A cultural factor also could not be simply neglected. Indonesia with various tribes, also have various cultures with its various physical expressions in language, customs, life style, rituals, arts, etc. Even in Java itself there are already a great cultural differences between Javanese and Sundanese. This is not to talk about the condition outside of Java to consider the aspects of life, for instance, in Borneo, Celebes, Papua, West and East Nusa Tenggara. In the meanwhile PKI itself as a political party was internally broken into many streams and factions. Such tendency toward factionalism was already started and existed since the beginning in Indonesian history. For instance, there was a difference between Semaun and Tan Malaka. Even PKI in Indonesia did not want to follow the advice of international Commintern in the year of 1926, and 1927. International Commintern wanted that there is no need to make a rebellion, but PKI in Indonesia finally still made a rebellion. The fractionalization of PKI continues to exist until the year of 1960.31 The other factor is the tendency toward internal conflict of Indonesia; this fact also should be taken into account. Indonesian historians said that actually the tragedy of Indonesian killing Indonesians are higher and more tragic and tremendous in numbers compared to the killings by the Dutch colonial power. There is a repertoire of violence in Indonesia as it is said by Benedict Anderson. In 1965 people still remember of Madiun Affair 1948, “...in which there were thousands 28

See Adeney-Risakotta, in Religion, 11; See Ricklefs, Sejarah, 554. See Adeney-Risakotta, in Religion, 11. 30 See Ricklefs, Sejarah, 533-586 (the project of Guided Democracy); also Setiono, Tionghoa, 779-790 (the project of Guided Democracy). Boland, The Struggle, 99-104. 31 See Benda and McVey, The Communist Uprisings, xxviii-xxxi. Also Anderson and McVey, A Preliminary Analysis. The whole book describes this fact of fractionalization of PKI in sixties. 29

of santris were killed by abangan communist in a failed coup attempt against the nationalist movement.”32 NASAKOM finally failed. There are a lot of complicated factors. Actually Sukarno knew very well this complicated matter. So the question is “Whether Sukarno was naive with the thinking that NASAKOM can be united within Indonesian society?” Realizing all these factors I would like to put forward a hypothesis that maybe there was something wrong in Sukarno’s way of political thinking. The answer can be YES but also can be NO. But after reading and exploring some resources books I tend to answer this question affirmatively (YES). It seems that Sukarno tries to enforce the idea of NASAKOM while in fact it is difficult to synthesize them. Following Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, I would like to say that “Sukarno’s attempt at NASAKOM failed.”33 Conditions Afterwards Feith and Castle did not mention explicitly what happen with this map of political struggle in Indonesia. Of course there was a competition between them to gain and retain political power and influences, but there is no clear elaboration about the result of this competition. But I find the answer to this case in Heffner’s book. Having read the book of Robert Heffner, especially chapter five on “The Modernist Travail,” I come to the awareness that after Masyumi and PSI were banned by Soekarno (August 17, 1960) because of the black-campaign of PKI, the struggle for the Islamic state was not fully passed away from the Indonesian political discourse. It seems that PKI was given the space by the power. That is why PKI as if receive a broad space to launch their political ambition via their fierce Communist propaganda. Heffner mentions that PKI aims at HMI and PI. Even also they target the business leaders. Because of the campaign of PKI, then Masyumi “sank into bitterness and despair” something that cannot be imagined in the early 1950s. So it can be said that Masyumi was pressured and suffocated by the Old Order.34 Because they fail under the Old Order, they put very much hope in the New Order regime. They also try to get the support of the military. Their struggle in the Constituent Assembly, together with some other small Islamic parties was the demand that the constitutional bases of the nation become Islam. But this is not so easy because Islam itself is also plural. It is not easy to unite them into one boat. So because they fail in the time of Soekarno, they try once again in the time of Soeharto also with the same agenda, to Islamize the state. But others think that this is a foolish campaign and others think that Islamic state was an ideological mirage only. Here we see that there are already two wings in political life of Indonesia as described by Herbert Feith and Lance Castles. On the extreme left there is Communist, while on the extreme right there is Muslim separatist. In this context the military plays their game. To ban the PKI, military use the Muslim power. This give rise to the new hope for the Islamic parties that now they are on the side of the power. Because of those two extremes the military feel that they alone can unite the whole country. Military will not give the opportunity at all to those two extreme wings. It means that there is no opportunity also for the Masyumi remnants in the time of Soeharto which was dominated by military power. They try to find another form of political action. They try to avoid the direct confrontation with the political power. Now they try to do the religious predication or dakwah as a certain political activity. Later on they realize that the so-called political Islam will not able to realize their political agenda to Islamize the country. So they took another strategy. They took the so-called cultural Islam. This is a new and modern approach. It seems that this approach was succeeded at least at the last decade of Soeharto’s rule. Soeharto, in his last decade of his regime, finally realizes that he cannot control again military. So he tries to establish a new ally with the new front. This time the new ally was with Islam. This is 32

See Adeney-Risakotta, in Religion, 11. See ibid., 12. 34 See Heffner, Civil Islam, 423. 33

called as the Islamization of the New Order at the last decade of its existence. This ally grows stronger and stronger. One of its important characteristic was the establishment of ICMI under the great figure of B.J.Habibie. If since the beginning of New Order’s existence, only CSIS was the think tank of the New Order,35 but since the beginning of the nineties there are a lot of Islamic think tanks. It seemed that CSIS was abandoned and the regime tries to look to new allies, for instance to ICMI. ICMI has their own newspaper, Republika; also has their own think-tank, CIDES.36 If at the beginning of New Order it seems that Soeharto looks like more Javanese, in the beginning of the nineties he became more Islamist with his making a Hajj to Makkah, together with Tien Soeharto, also his changing of name by putting Muhammad in front of his original-Javanese name. It seems that at the last part of his rule Soeharto was more incline to Islam rather than to Nationalist-Javanese. For me it also means that nationalist at least its Javanese version of idealism was eliminated also from the political discourse in Indonesia. We saw that the element of Communism has been eliminated in the sixties. And now the element of (Javanese)-Nationalism was also eliminated in the nineties. What happen afterwards? We still do not know. We still have to wait. But one thing is clear; again to quote Bernard AdeneyRisakotta: “Diversity was eliminated by the physical slaughter, imprisonment and repression of a sizable portion of the Indonesian population. Even today, tolerance for diversity does not extend to communist or atheists. Religious freedom only applies to those who hold a recognized, “universal” religion, not to those who do not.”37 Conclusion As a conclusion, I put forward the following three points. First, Soekarno’s ideological experiment of NASAKOM failed because there are so many complicated factors and reasons. Sukarno thinks that he can unite the whole Indonesia in his great synthetic mind and thinking, as it is supposed by B.Anderson in his book Language and Power.38 Secondly, his great idea of NASAKOM also failed because he seemed to underestimate the great differences between those three elements. Thirdly, related to the third question in the research question: the process of elimination did not stop with the elimination of PKI. The process of elimination was going on in the new disguise of movements. If in the early history of Indonesia the political Islam have a very strong drive and ambition to make Indonesia as an Islamic state, but it is fail so far, so in the seventies, under the frustrating experience of New Order, they change their policy, from political Islam to cultural Islam. It seems that this strategy was succeeded in converting the Nationalist wing of the Republic. The nationalist are now subdued and absorbed into new kind of Islamic strategy. We do not know yet what happened after the nationalist wing being absorbed by Islam. I hope that the next step was not the elimination of the Religion element, especially religion outside of Islam, in the very idea of NASAKOM. Bibliography Anderson, Benedict R. and Ruth T. McVey. A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia, Interim Report Series, Modern Indonesia Project Southeast Asia Program. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971. (Known in its popular name, Cornell Paper).

35

See Setiono, Tionghoa, 989-1000. See Ricklefs, Sejarah, 668. 37 See Adeney-Risakotta, in Religion, 12. 38 See Anderson, Language and Power, 29-30. 36

Anderson, Benedict R. O’G. Language and Power, Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990. Bakti, Andi F. “Collective Memories of the Qahhar Movement” (pp. 123-149), in Beginning to Remember: The Past in the Indonesian Present, edited by Mary Zurbuchen. Singapore University Press, 2005. Benda, Harry J. and Ruth T. McVey. The Communist Uprisings of 1926-1927 in Indonesia: Key Documents, Translation Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969. Boland, B. J. The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982. Feith, Herbert, and Lance Castles. Pemikiran Politik Indonesia 1945-1965. Jakarta: LP3ES, 1988. Feith, Herbert. The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978. Heffner, Robert. Civil Islam, Islam dan Demokratisasi di Indonesia (The original title: Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, translated by Ahmad Baso). Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2001. Isher, Wolfgang. The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1987. Kartodirjo, Sartono. The Peasants’ Revolt of Banten in 1888: Its Conditions, Course and Sequel; A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia. N.V.De Nederlandsche Boek – En Steendrukkerij v/h H.L.Smits ‘S-Gravenhage, 1966. Kim, Sebastian C.H. Christian Theology in Asia. Cambridge: CUP, 2008. Van Klinken, Gerry. Minorities, Modernity and The Emerging Nation, Christians in Indonesia, a Biographical Approach. Leiden: KILTV Press, 2003. McVey, Ruth T. The Rise of Indonesian Communism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968. Ricklefs, Merle C. Polarizing Javanese Society, Islamic and Other Visions (c.1830-1930). Singapore: NUS Press, 2007. Ricklefs, Merle C. Sejarah Indonesia Modern. Yogyakarta: Gajah Mada University Press, 1998. Setiono, Benny G. Tionghoa Dalam Pusaran Politik. Jakarta: Elkasa, (without year). (There is a reference by the author in the preface of the book, in which it is mentioned the year 2002; but this is only a personal note from the author). Sterkens, Carl et. al. (Eds.). Religion, Civil Society and Conflict in Indonesia. Berlin: LIT Verlag Dr.W.Hopf, 2009. Tarling, Nicholas (Ed.). The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Volume One: From Early Times to c.1500. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.