Program Studi : Ilmu Hukum Kekhususan Hukum tentang Ekonomi ...

UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA

Analisis Yuridis Penggunaan Hak Retaliasi dalam Penyelesaian Sengketa Perdagangan Internasional (Studi Kasus Tuduhan Dumping Terhadap Produk Kertas Indonesia oleh Korea Selatan/ Kasus DS312)

SKRIPSI

SARAH PATRICIA GULTOM 1106056226

FAKULTAS HUKUM PROGRAM SARJANA ILMU HUKUM DEPOK JANUARI 2015

UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA

Analisis Yuridis Penggunaan Hak Retaliasi dalam Penyelesaian Sengketa Perdagangan Internasional (Studi Kasus Tuduhan Dumping Terhadap Produk Kertas Indonesia oleh Korea Selatan/ Kasus DS312)

SKRIPSI Diajukan sebagai salah satu syarat untuk memperoleh gelar Sarjana Hukum

SARAH PATRICIA GULTOM 1106056226

FAKULTAS HUKUM PROGRAM STUDI ILMU HUKUM i

i

HALAMAN PERNYATAAN ORISINALITAS

Skripsi ini adalah karya saya sendiri, dan semua sumber baik yang dikutip maupun dirujuk telah saya nyatakan dengan benar.

Nama

: Sarah Patricia Gultom

NPM

: 1106056226

Tanda Tangan:

Tanggal: 10 Januari 2015

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FHUI, 2015

ii

HALAMAN PENGESAHAN

Skripsi ini diajukan oleh

:

Nama

: Sarah Patricia Gultom

NPM

: 1106056226

Program Studi

: Ilmu Hukum Kekhususan Hukum tentang Ekonomi dan Bisnis

Judul Skripsi

: Analisis Yuridis Penggunaan Hak Retaliasi dalam Penyelesaian Sengketa Perdagangan Internasional (Studi Kasus Tuduhan Anti Dumping Terhadap Produk Kertas Indonesia oleh Korea Selatan/ Kasus DS312)

Telah berhasil dipertahankan di hadapan Dewan Penguji dan diterima sebagai bagian persyaratan yang diperlukan untuk memperoleh gelar Sarjana Hukum pada Program Studi Ilmu Hukum Kekhususan Tentang Hubungan Transnasional Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia Dewan Penguji: Pembimbing: Brian Amy Prastyo., S.H., M.L.I.

(……………..)

1.

Penguji: Abdul Salam, S.H., M.H.

(……………..)

2.

Penguji: Wenny Setiawati, S.H., M.LI.

(……………..)

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FHUI, 2015

iii

KATA PENGANTAR Puji syukur kepada Tuhan Yesus Kristus. yang telah memberikan berkat kesehatan, kekuatan, kesempatan, kesabaran, dan kemampuan sehingga skripsi ini dapat diselesaikan tepat pada waktunya. Penulisan skripsi ini dilakukan dalam rangka memenuhi salah satu syarat untuk mencapai gelar Sarjana Hukum Jurusan Ilmu Hukum pada Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia. Saya menyadari bahwa, tanpa bantuan dan bimbingan dari berbagai pihak, dari masa perkuliahan sampai pada penyusunan skripsi ini, sangatlah sulit bagi saya untuk menyelesaikan skripsi ini. Oleh karena itu, saya ingin menyampaikan rasa terima kasih dan apresiasi saya kepada: 1.

Tuhan Yesus Kristus yang telah memberkati saya selama menjalani masa perkuliahan, yang memberkati kedua orang tua saya sehingga dapat membiayai pendidikan saya, yang memberikan kesehatan sehingga

dapat

menjalani

perkuliahan

dengan

lancar,

yang

memberikan saya teman-teman dan lingkungan yang membawa manfaat positif, yang memberikan inspirasi, kekuatan, kesabaran, dan keyakinan sehingga saya dapat menyelesaikan skripsi dan perkuliahan dengan baik. I can do all things through Christ who strengthen me. 2.

Papa dan mama yang selalu mendukung serta memberikan kepercayaan atas segala keputusan yang saya ambil, yang selalu ada untuk memberikan masukan, nasihat, dan doa di saat saya membutuhkan, yang mengajarkan saya untuk menjadi dewasa namun tidak lupa untuk memperhatikan saya.

3.

Bang Brian Amy Prastyo, S.H., M.L.I. selaku dosen pembimbing. Terima kasih Bang Brian karena telah membimbing, memberi masukan-masukan, dan membantu saya dalam menyusun skripsi ini. Terima kasih atas waktu serta cemilan yang disediakan selama bimbingan. Tanpa Bang Brian, tidak mungkin skripsi saya ini selesai dengan cepat dan dapat tersusun dengan baik.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FHUI, 2015

iv

4.

Para narasumber dari Kementrian Perdagangan Republik Indonesia, yaitu Pak Christhophorus Barutu (Kasubdit Fasilitasi dan Aturan Perdagangan),

Pak

Jeremy Albert Gabriel Kumajas

dari

bagian

Direktorat Pengamanan Perdagangan, Direktorat Jenderal Kerjasama Perdagangan Internasional, Mas Budi, Mas Bayu, Mas Afri yang dengan ikhlas meluangkan waktu untuk berdiskusi dan menjawab pertanyaan-pertanyaan saya. Tidak lupa saya ucapkan terima kasih kepada Bang Ryan Abraham sebagai abang yang paling berjasa dalam membantu saya untuk bertemu dengan para narasumber. Sukses untuk perdagangan Indonesia. Jesus bless you all. 5.

Tim pengajar PK4 FHUI yang telah mengajarkan saya tentang hukum ekonomi dan bisnis serta terima kasih secara khusus kepada Ibu Rouli Anita Valentina selaku dosen pengajar mata kuliah hukum perdagangan internasional karena telah memberikan inspirasi dalam penulisan skripsi ini dan Bang Hadi Purnama yang telah meluangkan waktu untuk berdiskusi.

6.

Kim Taeyeon, Kwon Yuri, Choi Sooyoung, Kim Hyoyeon, Lee Sun Kyu a.k.a. Sunny, Jung Soo Young a.k.a. Jessica, Tiffany Hwang, Seo Joo Hyun, dan Im Yoona (Girls’Generation) yang selalu memberikan semangat dalam mengerjakan skripsi. Saranghaeo unnies. OT9 is always OT9!

7.

Teman-teman kesayangan, Rindi Danika Sari yang menjadi teman curhat mengenai artis-artis Korea di saat sedang lelah mengerjakan skripsi (we’re K-Popers and we proud of it), Nabella Annisa Putri yang selalu berhasil membuat saya ingin makan (my mom must be very grateful to you because you make me not like a chopstick anymore), Permata Mis Lusitania yang entah mengapa selalu berhasil membuat otak saya ‘encer’ kembali jika saya mendapat kesulitan dalam pengerjaan skripsi (I’ll miss that RSCM, coffee toffe and GI Universitas Indonesia

Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FHUI, 2015

v

moments!), Benji, dan Mbak Ditha a.k.a Girls’ (out of) Generation. Setelah lulus nanti, gue pasti akan kangen sama lo semua. 8.

Archie Michael Hasudungan Batubara yang memberikan dukungan moral, rela jadi editor skripsi di tengah kesibukan sebagai lawyer ibu kota, dan segala dukungan lainnya. 감사합니다 ^ ^

9.

Ario Pamungkas dan Muhammad Rafiqi Ramadhan yang selalu menemani selama bimbingan, teman ngelawak-ngelawak garing di saat galau skripsi, dan teman curhat selama pembuatan skripsi, dan teman pas ngejar-ngejar Bang Brian. Meskipun kalian sering bilang gue bawel, tapi gue yakin kalian seneng dibawelin sama gue. Makasih banget banget banget buat kalian berdua! 사랑해

10.

Anak Bang Brian: Ario Pamungkas, Rafiqi Ramadhan, Karina, Fachrunisa ‘Bundo’, Bang Sigit, Sonia, Prisi, Shabrina, dan temanteman sesama bimbingan yang lain yang saya tidak ingat namanya. Terima kasih atas dukungannya. I’ll miss “RS Bunda Margonda moment.” ^ ^

11.

Mikha Chandra Tampubolon yang selalu bersedia jadi tempat curhat di kala galau melanda. You always have hundred ways to cheer me up! Cepetan jadi dokter yang sukses ya bang supaya bisa bantu anak-anak di Pulau Seribu. Jesus bless you.

12.

Teman-teman PK 4 yang super! Semoga kalian semua lulus dengan nilai memuaskan dan menjadi juris masa depan yang tidak hanya cerdas tapi juga memiliki hati nurani. Masa depan bangsa ada di tangan kita, Kawan.

13.

Teman-teman yang tersebar di segala PK yang secara tidak langsung berjasa selama perkuliahan saya di FHUI. Terima kasih kepada Joshua Vincent (lo masih ada utang traktir sama gue ya), Tiffany Efny, Sri B. Praptadina, Reinhardt William Damping, Julie, Amy, Letycia, Septuti Universitas Indonesia

Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FHUI, 2015

vi

Mega, Camila, Adit, Shara, Fian, teman-teman course HDR angkatan 15, dan teman-teman lain yang tidak sempat disebutkan namanya. Semoga sukses untuk kalian semua. 14.

Partai Libra! Teman-teman kosan yang super baik, seru, sabar dan benar-benar kayak keluarga Adel, Meutia, Nina, Rima, Fitri, Ace, Lita, Kak Kiki, dan Kak Meike! Terima kasih ya, kalian buat aku bahagia di kosan.

15.

Kepada teman-teman SMA Taruna Nusantara angkatan 19 (Lentera) khususnya Arya Khresna yang sudah membantu mencarikan sumber bacaan dan segenap keluarga Ikastara. Thanks for being my second family. Semoga sukses untuk kita semua dan semoga kita semua dapat selalu memberikan karya yang terbaik bagi masyarakat, bangsa, negara, dan dunia.

16.

Kepada Biro Pendidikan sub-program S1 Reguler, Prof Satya Arinanto selaku Pembimbing Akademik, dan seluruh jajaran.

17.

Kepada Pak Jon PK4, bapak-bapak foto copy dan print Barel, serta kepada pihak-pihak lain yang tidak dapat disebutkan satu persatu. Terima kasih atas segala bantuan dalam penulisan skripsi ini.

Akhir kata, saya berharap Tuhan Yesus Kristus berkenan membalas segala kebaikan semua pihak yang telah membantu. Semoga skripsi ini membawa manfaat bagi pengembangan ilmu. Sekali lagi terima kasih kepada semua pihak atas doa dan dukungannya bagi penulis. May Jesus bless you all. Depok, Januari 2015

Penulis

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FHUI, 2015

vii

HALAMAN PERNYATAAN PERSETUJUAN PUBLIKASI TUGAS AKHIR UNTUK KEPENTINGAN AKADEMIS

Sebagai Sivitas Akademik Universitas Indonesia, Saya yang bertanda tangan di bawah ini: Nama NPM Program Studi Program Kekhususan Fakultas Jenis Karya

: Sarah Patricia Gultom : 1106056226 : Ilmu Hukum : Hukum tentang Ekonomi dan Bisnis : Hukum : Skripsi

Demi Pengembangan ilmu pengetahuan, menyetujui untuk memberikan kepada Universitas Indonesia Hak Royalti Non-Ekslusif (Non-Exlusive Royalty-Free Right) atas karya ilmiah saya yang berjudul: Analisis Yuridis Penggunaan Hak Retaliasi dalam Penyelesaian Sengketa Perdagangan Internasional (Studi Kasus Tuduhan Anti Dumping terhadap Produk Kertas Indonesia oleh Korea Selatan/ Kasus DS312) Beserta perangkat yang ada (jika diperlukan). Dengan Hak Bebas Royalti NonEkslusif ini Universitas Indonesia berhak menyimpan, mengalih media/formatkan, mengelola dalam bentuk pangkalan data (database), merawat, dan mempublikasikan tugas akhir saya selama tetap mencantumkan nama saya sebagai penulis/pencipta dan sebagai pemilik Hak Cipta. Demikian pernyataan ini saya buat dengan sebenarnya. Dibuat di

: Depok

Pada Tanggal : 15 Januari 2015 Yang menyatakan,

(Sarah Patricia Gultom)

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FHUI, 2015

viii

ABSTRAK

Nama

: Sarah Patricia Gultom

Program Studi

: Ilmu Hukum

Judul

:Analisis Yuridis Penggunaan Hak Retaliasi dalam Penyelesaian Sengketa Perdagangan Internasional (Studi Kasus Tuduhan Anti Dumping Terhadap Produk Kertas Indonesia oleh Korea Selatan/ Kasus DS312)

Kegiatan perdagangan internasional yang timbul akibat adanya globalisasi tidak hanya bermanfaat untuk memenuhi kebutuhan negara namunnya juga berdampak pada timbulnya sengketa ketika terjadi benturan kepentingan antara negara yang melakukan hubungan perdagangan. Untuk itu World Trade Organization (WTO) telah mengakomodasi dalam hal terjadinya sengketa perdagangan internasional melalui mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa yang diatur dalam Understanding On Rules And Procedures Governing The Settlement Of Disputes (DSU). Salah satu ketentuan mengenai mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa yang diatur dalam DSU adalah mengenai retaliasi. Retaliasi yang secara khusus diatur dalam Pasal 22 DSU adalah hak bagi negara yang dimenangkan oleh putusan Panel Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) untuk melakukan tindakan balasan terhadap negara yang dinyatakan kalah oleh putusan Panel DSB dalam hal tidak adanya implementasi putusan Panel DSB dalam jangka waktu yang wajar. Terdapat beberapa pandangan negatif terhadap ketentuan retaliasi, salah satunya mengenai ketidakefektivitasan retaliasi apabila dilaksanakan oleh negara berkembang dan negara terbelakang yang bersengketa melawan negara maju. Namun dalam praktiknya, terdapat negara berkembang yang berhasil melaksanakan retaliasi terhadap negara berkembang, yaitu dalam kasus Byrd Amendment. Indonesia sebagai salah satu negara anggota WTO yang tergolong negara berkembang juga pernah terlibat sengketa perdagangan internasional dengan negara maju, yaitu Korea Selatan dalam kasus tuduhan dumping terhadap produk kertas Indonesia (Kasus DS312). Panel DSB dalam putusannya memenangkan Indonesia dan oleh karena itu Korea Selatan harus menyesuaikan ketentuan anti dumping dengan Anti Dumping Agreement (ADA). Terhadap putusan Panel DSB tersebut, Korea Selatan tidak melaksanakannya sampai jangka waktu yang wajar. Dari kasus di atas, skripsi ini akan menganalisis mengenai legalitas Indonesia berkaitan dengan hak retaliasi yang diatur dalam Pasal 22 DSU serta pertimbangan-pertimbangan yang diambil Indonesia dalam hal tidak dilaksanakannya retaliasi dalam Kasus DS312. Kata Kunci: Perdagangan Internasional, GATT, WTO, anti dumping, Korea Selatan, dispute settlement, retaliasi.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FHUI, 2015

ix

ABSTRACT

Name

: Sarah Patricia Gultom

Study Program

: Law

Tittle

:Juridical Analysis In Using of Retaliation Rights in International Trade Dispute Settlement (A Case Study of Dumping Accusation Against Indonesian Paper Products by South Korea / Case DS312)

International trade arising from globalization is not is beneficial only to fulfill needs of the country but also have an impact on the possibility of disputes when there is a conflict of interest between countries that conduct trading activities. Hence the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been accommodating in terms of international trade disputes through the dispute settlement mechanism set out in the Understanding On Rules And Procedures Governing the Settlement Of Disputes (DSU). One of the provisions on dispute settlement mechanism set out in the DSU is about retaliation. Retaliation which specifically provided for in Article 22 DSU is right for the country, which was won by decision of the Dispute Settlement Panel Body (DSB) to retaliate against countries that lost by decision of the DSB panel in the absence of implementation of the DSB panel decision in a reasonable time period . There are some negative opinions against retaliation provisions, one of the less effectiveness of retaliation if implemented by developing countries and least developed countries in the dispute against developed countries. However, in practice, there is a developing country that successfully implement retaliation against developing countries, ie in the case of the Byrd Amendment. Indonesia as one of the WTO member countries classified as the developing countries has also been involved in international trade disputes with developed countries, ie South Korea in case of dumping charges against Indonesian paper products (Case DS312). DSB panel in its decision won Indonesia and therefore South Korea should adjust the anti-dumping provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA). In practice, South Korea did not implement the decision of the DSB panel until a reasonable time period. From the above case, this thesis will analyze the legality of Indonesia with regard to the rights of retaliation under Article 22 DSU and the considerations taken by Indonesia in terms of non-performance of retaliation in case DS312. Keyword: International Trade, GATT, WTO, anti-dumping, South Korea, dispute settlement, retaliation.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FHUI, 2015

x

DAFTAR ISI

HALAMAN PERNYATAAN ORISINALITAS ................................................i HALAMAN PENGESAHAN .............................................................................ii KATA PENGANTAR ........................................................................................iii HALAMAN PERNYATAAN PERSETUJUAN PUBLIKASI ..........................vii TUGAS AKHIR UNTUK KEPENTINGAN AKADEMIS ...............................vii ABSTRAK ..........................................................................................................viii ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................ix DAFTAR ISI .......................................................................................................x DAFTAR GAMBAR ..........................................................................................xiii DAFTAR SINGKATAN ....................................................................................xiv BAB I PENDAHULUAN ..................................................................................1 1.1. Latar Belakang ...........................................................................................1 1.2. Pokok Permasalahan ..................................................................................13 1.3. Tujuan Penelitian .......................................................................................13 1.3.1. Tujuan Umum ..................................................................................13 1.3.2. Tujuan Khusus..................................................................................14 1.4. Manfaat Penelitian .....................................................................................14 1.4.1. Manfaat Teoretis ..............................................................................14 1.4.2. Manfaat Praktis ................................................................................15 1.5. Tinjauan Pustaka........................................................................................15 1.6. Definisi Operasional ..................................................................................18 1.7. Metode Penelitian ......................................................................................21 1.7.1. Bentuk Penelitian .............................................................................21 Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FHUI, 2015

xi

1.7.2. Tipologi Penelitian ...........................................................................21 1.7.3. Teknik Pengumpulan Data ...............................................................22 1.8. Sistematika Penulisan ................................................................................23 BAB II TINJAUAN UMUM MEKANISME RETALIASI DALAM PENYELESAIAN SENGKETA PERDAGANGAN INTERNASIONAL ...25 2.1. Tinjauan Umum Retaliasi dalam Perdagangan Internasional ....................25 2.2. Ketentuan Retaliasi dalam GATT .............................................................28 2.2.1.Ketentuan Penyelesaian Sengketa dalam GATT .............................29 2.2.2.Ketentuan Retaliasi dalam GATT ....................................................34 2.3. Ketentuan Retaliasi dalam DSU ................................................................38 2.3.1.Retaliasi DSU sebagai Penyempurnaan Ketentuan Retaliasi GATT38 2.3.2.Retaliasi dalam DSU .......................................................................39 2.3.2.1.Ketentuan Penyelesaian Sengketa dalam DSU ....................39 2.3.2.2.Ketentuan Prosedur Retaliasi dalam DSU ...........................43 2.3.3. Tujuan Retaliasi DSU.......................................................................47 2.3.4. Ketentuan Tingat Pelaksanaan Retaliasi (Level of Suspension) .......54 2.3.5. Berakhirnya Retaliasi .......................................................................55 2.4. Tinjauan

Singkat

Mengenai

Penerapan

Retaliasi

yang

Berhasil

Dilaksanakan oleh Meksiko Melawan Amerika Serikat dalam Kasus Byrd Amendment ................................................................................................60

BAB III KASUS POSISI TUDUHAN DUMPING TERHADAP PRODUK KERTAS INDONESIA OLEH KOREA SELATAN (KASUS DS312) .......66 3.1. Latar Belakang Kasus DS312 ....................................................................66 3.2. Proses Konsultasi .......................................................................................69 3.2.1. Argumen Indonesia ..........................................................................69 3.2.2. Argumen Korea Selatan ...................................................................70 3.3. Proses Sidang Panel Pertama .....................................................................72 3.3.1. Argumen Indonesia ..........................................................................72 3.3.2. Argumen Korea Selatan ...................................................................78 Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FHUI, 2015

xii

3.4. Proses Sidang Panel Kedua .......................................................................85 3.4.1. Argumen Indonesia ..........................................................................85 3.4.2. Argumen Korea Selatan ...................................................................90 3.5. Pendapat Pihak Ketiga ..............................................................................94 3.6. Kesimpulan dan Rekomendasi Panel.........................................................99 3.7. Implementasi Hasil Panel DSB oleh Korea Selatan ..................................104 3.7.1. Sidang Panel Pelaksanaan Pasal 21 ayat (5) DSU ...........................104 3.7.2. Tindak Lanjut Hasil Panel Pelaksanaan Pasal 21 ayat (5) DSU ......106 3.7.3. Perpanjangan Pengenaan BMAD oleh Korea Selatan .....................108 3.8. Alur Waktu Penyelesaian Sengketa Kasus DS312 ....................................111

BAB IV ANALISIS DASAR PERTIMBANGAN INDONESIA TERHADAP TIDAK DILAKSANAKANNYA RETALIASI DALAM KASUS DS312 ...115 4.1. Dasar Pertimbangan Negara-Negara Anggota WTO Melakukan Retaliasi dalam Proses Penyelesaian Sengketa Perdagangan Internasional .............115 4.1.1. US-EC Bananas Case (Kasus DS27) ...............................................116 4.1.2. Mexico-US Offset Act/ Byrd Amendment Case (Kasus DS234) ....117 4.1.3. US-EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products/ Hormones Case (DS26) .....................................................................................119 4.1.4. Dasar Pertimbangan Dilakukannya Retaliasi dalam Kasus DS26, Kasus DS27, dan Kasus DS217 .......................................................120 4.2. Pertimbangan Indonesia Terkait Retaliasi dalam Kasus DS312 ...............127 4.2.1. Legalitas Pengajuan Ppermohonan Otorisasi Retaliasi oleh Indonesia ..........................................................................................................127 4.2.2. Analisis Pertimbangan Indonesia Terkait Retaliasi dalam Kasus DS312 ...............................................................................................128 4.2.3. Pertimbangan dari Aspek Kekuatan Perdagangan ...........................129 A. Gambaran Perdagangan antara Indonesia dan Korea Selatan .....129 B. Pertimbangan Indonesia untuk Tidak Melakukan Retaliasi dari Aspek Kekuatan Perdagangan .....................................................136 4.2.4. Aspek Politik ....................................................................................137 Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FHUI, 2015

xiii

A. Gambaran Hubungan Politik antara Indonesia dan Korea Selatan .....................................................................................................137 B. Analisis Pertimbangan Indonesia untuk Tidak Melakukan Retaliasi dari Aspek Politik ........................................................................139 4.3.Upaya Pemerintah dalam Mengembalikan Kerugian Eksportir Kertas Indonesia Pasca Pencabutan BMAD .......................................................141

BAB V PENUTUP .............................................................................................143 5.1. Kesimpulan ................................................................................................143 5.2. Saran ..........................................................................................................145

DAFTAR REFERENSI ....................................................................................148 LAMPIRAN .......................................................................................................161

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FHUI, 2015

xiv

DAFTAR GAMBAR

1. Bagan Proses Retaliasi dalam GATT ................................................................... 37 2. Bagan Proses Penyelesaian Sengketa dalam WTO ............................................... 58 3. Bagan Proses Retaliasi dalam Sistem Penyelesaian Sengketa WTO .................... 59 4. Bagan Proses Penyelesaian Sengketa Kasus Dumping Kertas Indonesia dan Korea Selatan di WTO ................................................................................... 114 5. Diagram Komposisi Negara Utama Pengimpor Korea Selatan Tahun 2008......... 132 6. Tabel Data Ekspor Non Migas Utama Indonesia ke Korea Selatan Periode 2003-2008 ............................................................................................................. 133 7. Diagram Komposisi Negara Utama Tujuan Ekspor Korea Selatan Tahun 2008 .. 135

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FHUI, 2015

xv

DAFTAR SINGKATAN

1.

AB

Appeallate Body

2.

ACP

Africa, Caribbean, Pacific

3.

ACWL

Advirsory Centre on WTO Law

4.

ADA

Agreement on Implementation Of Article VI of The

General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/ Anti Dumping Agreement 5.

AF

April Fine

6.

Atperindag

Atase Perindustrian dan Perdagangan

7.

BMAD

Bea Masuk Anti Dumping

8.

CBP

United States Customs and Border Protection

9.

CDSOA

The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000

10. CMI

Cakrawala Mega Indah

11. CVD

Countervailing Duty

12. Deperindag

Departemen Perindustrian dan Perdagangan

13. DPP

Direktorat Pengamanan Perdagangan

14. DSB

Dispute Settlement Body

15. DSU

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing The Settlement of Disputes (Dispute Settlement Understanding

16. EC

European Community

17. GATS

General Agreement on Trade and Services

18. GATT

General Agreements on Tariff and Trade

19. JTF-EC

Indonesia-Korea Joint Task Force on Economic Cooperation

20. KPI

Kerjasama Perdagangan Internasional

21. KTC

Korea Trade Commission

22. PPC

Plain Paper Copier

23. SCM

Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures

24. SMG

Sinar Mas Group

25. SPS

Sanitary and Phitosanitary Agreement

26. TRIMs

Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures Universitas Indonesia

Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FHUI, 2015

xvi

27. WF

Uncoated Wood-Free Printing Paper

28. WLTF

Working Level Task Force

29. WLTFM

Working Level Task Force Meeting

30. WTO

World Trade Organization

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FHUI, 2015

BAB I PENDAHULUAN

1.1. Latar Belakang Setiap negara di dunia memiliki karakteristik masing-masing yang berpengaruh terhadap segala aspek kehidupan, salah satunya adalah terhadap pemenuhan kebutuhan domestik dari negara yang bersangkutan. Perbedaan karakteristik ini juga mendorong setiap negara untuk bekerja sama untuk memenuhi kebutuhan masing-masing negara. Untuk itu dibutuhkan globalisasi sebagai penghubung kepentingan antar negara tersebut. Globalisasi saat ini merupakan hal yang tidak asing lagi bagi masyarakat internasional, tidak terkecuali globalisasi dalam bidang ekonomi. Robin Cohen dan Paul Kennedy berpendapat bahwa konsep globalisasi dipahami sebagai seperangkat transformasi kultur antar bangsa yang membentuk jaringan mendunia serta saling memperkuat dunia dalam bidang (1) perubahan dalam konsep ruang dan waktu seperti internet serta alat komunikasi global lainnya; (2) peningkatan interaksi kultural melalui perkembangan media massa; (3) meningkatnya masalah bersama seperti masalah lingkungan, masalah kriminallitas dan lain sebagainya; serta (4) pasar dan produksi ekonomi berupa pertumbuhan perdagangan yang berakibat pada ketergantungan lintas negara1 Lebih lanjut, Joseph Stiglitz, seorang ahli ekonomi dari World Bank, mendefinisikan konsep globalisasi sebagai: “The closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world has been brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flow of goods, capital, knowledge and (to a lesser extent) people across border” 2 1

Jacob Tagarirofa dan David Tobias, “Globalisation and Development Inequalities: Challenges and Prospects for ‘A Just Development’”, http://www.gjournals.org/ GJSC/GJSC%20PDF/ 2013/May/022613499%20Tagarirofa%20and%20Tobias.pdf, diunduh tanggal 12 September 2014. 2

Erman Rajagukguk, “Globalisasi Ekonomi dan Perdagangan Internasional” dalam Modul Hukum Perdagangan Internasional, (Jakarta: Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia, 2011), hlm. 1.

1

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

2

Reduksi batas antar negara di satu sisi membawa keuntungan bagi masyarakat internasional, yaitu dapat memenuhi kebutuhan domestik melalui perdagangan antar negara. Namun di sisi lain juga dapat membawa kerugian terutama ketika terdapat benturan kepentingan dan perbedaan kebijakan di bidang perdagangan di antara masing-masing negara sehingga menimbulkan sengketa. Oleh karena itu, dibutuhkan sebuah mekanisme yang mengatur kewenangan menangani perkara dalam hal terjadinya sengketa antar negara, khususnya di bidang perdagangan. General Agreemments on Tariff and Trade (GATT) 1947 sebagai agreements pertama yang khusus menangani bidang perdagangan internasional, telah mengakomodasi kebutuhan negara-negara yang terikat di dalamnya (CONTRACTING PARTIES) untuk menyelesaikan sengketa perdagangan internasional yang terjadi di antara mereka. Ketentuan tersebut secara khusus diatur dalam Pasal XXII dan Pasal XXIII, walaupun ketentuan mengenai penyelesaian sengketa juga tersebar di pasal-pasal lainnya. Sistem penyelesaian sengketa GATT merupakan salah satu pilar utama dalam sistem perdagangan internasional karena sistem inilah yang menjaga ketertiban dalam kegiatan perdagangan internasional melalui penerapan komitmen yang dirumuskan secara internasional 3 . Terkait dengan tujuan utama dari penyelesaian sengketa GATT, John Howard Jackson mengungkapkan pendapatnya bahwa dalam penerapannya, harus dipertimbangkan kembali apakah tujuan penyelesaian sengketa adalah untuk tujuan jangka pendek berupa penyelesaian secara singkat atau untuk tujuan jangka panjang yaitu dengan meningkatkan integritas negara anggota dalam mematuhi komitmen GATT4.

3

H.S. Kartadjoemena, GATT, WTO, dan Hasil Uruguay Round, (Jakarta: UI-Press, 1998), hlm. 314. 4

Jackson mengungkapkan bahwa penerapan penyelesaikan sengketa harus mempertimbangkan apakah “A number of interesting policy issues are raised by the experience of the [dispute settlement] procedure, not the least of which is the question of what should be the fundamental objective of the system - to solve the instant dispute (by conciliation, obfuscation, power threats or other means), or to promote certain longer-term goals... The historical question is whether the GATT preparatory work and practice through its decades establishes a goal of dispute-settlement more oriented toward “conciliation and negotiation” or toward “rule

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

3

Pasal XXII GATT menegaskan bahwa setiap sengketa diselesaikan dengan konsultasi dan perundingan untuk mencari pemecahan masalah yang terbaik bagi pihak-pihak yang bersengketa atau dengan kata lain, mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa dalam GATT menghindari dilakukannya tindakan pembalasan (retaliasi) secara sepihak, khususnya dari pihak yang merasa dirugikan. Namun di sisi lain, dalam Pasal XXIII ayat (2) GATT di bawah judul Nullification or Impairment, justru mengakomodasi tindakan retaliasi tersebut. Pada awal penerapan GATT, terdapat pertentangan mengenai pelaksanaan retaliasi. Pandangan pertama menyatakan bahwa retaliasi tidak memerlukan pengaturan. Pendapat ini didasarkan pada kasus Dairy pada tahun 1995, yang mana dalam menyelesaikan masalah, contracting parties (dalam kasus ini adalah Belanda) yang merasa dirugikan dapat melakukan pembatalan perjanjian terhadap violating parties (dalam kasus ini adalah Amerika Serikat) agar kebijakan nasional terkait perdagangan internasional dapat diterapkan secara optimal. Pendangan kedua menyatakan bahwa pelaksanaan retaliasi harus diatur dan diawasi, mengingat meskipun dalam Pasal XXIII telah mengatur ukuran dari kerugian itu sendiri. Namun tidak ada mekanisme yang memuaskan untuk meninjau pelaksanaannya dan dengan demikian, negara yang dirugikan tidak memperoleh ganti rugi yang sesuai dengan kerugian yang mereka derita5. Terlepas dari kedua pandangan tersebut, GATT telah mengakui adanya konsep retaliasi dan mengatur pelaksanaan retaliasi. Retaliasi 6 menurut GATT adalah tinakan penghukuman berupa penangguhan atau pembatalan kewajiban oleh contracting parties yang dirugikan terhadap violating parties apabila tidak diberikan kompensasi atas kerugian yang dideritanya 7 . Dalam pelaksanaannya,

integrity”, Chad P. Bown, “The Economics of The Trade Disputes, The GATT’s Article XXIII, and The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding”, http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbown/papers/ dispute.pdf, diunduh tanggal 12 September 2014. 5

Ibid.

6

Ketentuan Pasal XXIII GATT menggunakan istilah penangguhan konsesi (suspension of concessions) untuk mendefinisikan konsep retaliasi. 7

General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947 Pasal XXIII ayat (2).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

4

retaliasi jarang sekali digunakan 8 . CONTRACTING PARTIES pada umumnya lebih memilih menggunakan tekanan moral (moral pressure) daripada langkahlangkah hukum koersif untuk memaksakan violating parties agar melaksanakan kewajibannya9. World Trade Organization (WTO) yang merupakan final act10 dari Uruguay Round 1986-1993, merupakan penyempurnaan dari mekanisme perdagangan internasional yang sudah diatur dalam GATT11, termasuk di dalamnya mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa perdagangan internasional. Hal ini disebabkan karena terdapat beberapa kelemahan dalam penyelesaian sengketa yang diatur dalam GATT, yaitu12: 1.

Mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa GATT dianggap memakan waktu terlalu lama, terutama saat penyusunan Panel. Selain itu, adanya berbagai perjanjian khusus yang meskipun diadministrasikan oleh GATT, namun hal tersebut merupakan perjanjian tersendiri dengan mekanisme penyelesaian yang tersendiri.

2.

Adanya perbedaan pemahaman mengenai mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa pada berbagai forum sehingga proses tersebut memakan waktu yang lama hanya untuk memperdebatkan mekanisme apa yang akan digunakan.

8

Brian V. Kennedy, “Law and Its Limitation in the GATT Multilateral Trade System by Oliver Long” dalam Maryland Journal of International Law, http://digital commons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol11/iss1/9/, diakses tanggal 12 September 2014. 9

Anwarul Hoda, Dispute Settlement in the WTO, Developing Countries, and India, (New Delhi: Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, 2012), hlm. 13. 10

The Final Act merupakan hasil dari Uruguay Round yang terdiri dari final act itu sendiri, The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (The WTO Agreement) dan perjanjianperjanjian yang menjadi annexnya. Final Act yang mulai didistribusikan sejak tanggal 15 Desember 1993 menggunakan istilah Multilateral Trade Organization tetapi sesuai kesepakatan negara peserta, istilah tersebut diubah dalam final act dan seluruh annexnya dengan sebutan World Trade Organization (WTO). 11

Marc L. Busch dan Eric Reinhardt, The Evolution of GATT/ WTO Dispute Settlement, Jurnal Hukum Unversity of Georgetown, hlm.176. 12

Maslihat Nur Hidayati, “Analisis tentang Sistem Penyelesaian Sengketa Dagan Internasional dalam WTO dan Manfaatnya bagi Indonesia,” (Tesis Pasca Sarjana Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta, 2009), hlm 6-7.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

5

3.

Seringkali timbul kesulitan untuk mencari anggota Panel yang tepat untuk kasus yang timbul. Hal ini mengingat belum adanya pemahaman yang merata mengenai isu dalam dunia perdagangan internasional.

4.

Lambatnya pemutusan dari Laporan Panel yang diserahkan kepada Council yang bertindak atas nama CONTRACTING PARTIES.

5.

Pihak yang kalah dalam sengketa dapat mencegah diterimanya Laporan Panel kepada Council karena adanya ketentuan bahwa keputusan Council yang diambil secara konsensus, juga melibatkan negara yang bersengketa dalam proses pengambilan keputusan terkait kasus yang sedang dibahas.

6.

Adanya anggota Panel yang dalam Laporan Panel mengemukakan pandangan secara tidak jelas sehingga menimbulkan keputusan yang tidak berlandaskan pada argumentasi hukum yang kuat.

7.

Adanya tekanan yang tidak wajar serta pengambilan langkah-langkah yang bersifat unilateral dari salah satu pihak yang bersengketa, khususnya jika pihak tersebut merupakan negara besar 13 . Hal ini terjadi mengingat adanya posisi yang tidak seimbang di antara CONTRACTING PARTIES.

8.

Pihak yang bersengketa selalu dapat menunda proses pemeriksaan oleh Panel atau pengambilan keputusan oleh CONTRACTING PARTIES14.

9.

Kurang efektifnya penerapan sanksi15.

10.

Pihak yang kalah mengambil waktu yang terlalu lama untuk menyesuaikan ketentuannya dengan ketentuan dalam GATT walaupun

13

Tim Kerja Badan Pembinaan Hukum Nasional (BPHN), Pengkajian Hukum tentang Masalah Penyelesaian Sengketa Dagang dalam WTO (Jakarta: Badan Pembinaan Hukum Nasional, Departemen Kehakiman RI, 1997/1998), hlm. 23-24. 14

Hata, Perdagangan Internasional dalam Sistem GATT dan WTO, Aspek-Aspek Hukum dan Non Hukum, (Bandung: PT Refika Aditama, 2006), hlm. 116. 15

Ibid., hlm. 117.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

6

telah berjanji untuk melakukannya pada waktu sidang penyelesaian sengketa16. Selain itu, proses penyelesaian sengketa melalui GATT, khususnya pada sekitar tahun 1960, menitikberatkan pada proses diplomasi 17 . Bahkan pada akhirnya, usaha pemerintah untuk mengangkat persoalan perdagangan internasional dari segi hukum pun ditentang. Penurunan penerapan penyelesaian sengketa ini diperburuk dengan maraknya proteksionisme 18 yang membahayakan sistem perdagangan liberal yang telah berusaha ditegakkan oleh GATT19. Pengaturan mengenai penyelesaian sengketa setelah terbentuknya WTO, diatur lebih khusus dalam Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Dispute Settlement Understanding/ DSU) 20 . Sebagai peraturan yang menyempurnakan GATT 21 , DSU tetap mencantumkan prinsipprinsip-prinsip perdagangan internasional di dalamnya, di samping peraturanperaturan

baru

yang

tidak

diatur

dalam

GATT.

Sebagai

ketentuan

16

John Howard Jackson, Restructuring the GATT System, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1990), hlm. 65. 17

Maslihati Nur Hidayati, Op.cit., hlm.7.

18

Robert E. Hudec berpendapat bahwa peran kewajiban GATT adalah untuk "meningkatkan kekuatan politik" secara luas, mengatur kepentingan domestik yang mendukung liberalisasi perdagangan. Salah satu cara untuk melaksanakan kewajiban tersebut adalah dengan memberikan argumen hukum dan kebijakan untuk pejabat pemerintah dan pihak berkepentingan lain yang berusaha untuk mengatasi kekuatan proteksionisme, Jeffry L. Dunnof, “Hudec’s Method’s and Ours,” Minnesota Journal of International Law, http://www.minnjil.org/?p=1061, diakses tanggal 12 September 2014. 19

Hata, Op.cit., hlm. 108.

20

DSU dianggap sebagai pencapaian yang paling signifikan dari negosiasi Uruguay Round. DSU ini diharapkan mampu menerapkan sistem penyelesaian sengketa yang paling maju di setiap rezim perjanjian yang ada, Marc L.Busch dan Eric Reinhardt, Op.cit., hlm 154-155. 21

Penyempurnaan mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa dalam DSU terlihat dalam mekanisme yang terstruktur dan tata cara yang seragam yang sebelumnya tidak ada dalam GATT. Dalam sistem yang baru juga memasukkan prinsip-prinsip yang dapat mempercepat jangka waktu penyelesaian sengketa, memudahkan jalannya proses penyelesaian, memunculkan eksistensi Badan Banding (Appelate Body), serta menentukan bahwa keputusan maupun rekomendasi yang dihasilkan akan mengikat para pihak yang bersengketa, H.S. Kartadjoemena, GATT dan WTO: Sistem Forum dan Lembaga Internasional di Bidang Perdagangan (Jakarta: UI Press, 1996), hlm. 314-315.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

7

penyempurnaan, maka ketentuan mengenai retaliasi dalam DSU juga mengalami penyempurnaan. Pengaturan mengenai retaliasi dalam DSU diatur dalam Pasal 22 di bawah judul Compensation and the Suspension of Concession 22 . Perbedaan pengaturan mengenai retaliasi dalam DSU dan GATT adalah pelaksanaan retaliasi dalam DSU sebagai tindakan balasan dalam hal terjadinya non implementation23 dari putusan atau rekomendasi dari Panel Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)24 dan dalam pelaksanaannya harus terlebih dahulu meminta otorisasi kepada DSB 25 . Sedangkan pengaturan retaliasi dalam GATT, ketentuan mengenai adanya otorisasi justru merupakan inisiatif dan CONTRACTING PARTIES setelah melihat dan mempertimbangkan adanya keadaan yang mengakibatkan kerugian yang cukup serius 26 akibat tidak dilaksanakannya kewajiban dalam perjanjian oleh violating parties. Hal ini didasarkan pada perbedaan konsep mengenai sengketa dalam GATT dan DSU27. Dalam konteks DSU, retaliasi yang diakomodasi dalam 22

Meskipun GATT dianggap kurang efektif dalam mengatur perdagangan internasional, namun GATT telah berkontribusi besar dalam hal pembentukan konsep dasar dari perdagangan internasional itu sendiri. Hal itu terbukti dengan tetap dicantumkannya GATT dalam Annex 2 DSU. 23 DSU, Pasal XXII ayat (2). 24

Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) WTO adalah institusi khusus yang dibentuk untuk menjalankan aturan dan prosedur penyelesaian sengketa dengan kewenangan yang meliputi pembentukan dan pengangkatan Panel serta menjaga dan mengawasai pelaksanaan keputusan dan rekomendasi Panel, Adijaya Yusuf, “Prinsip-Prinsip GATT dan WTO Dispute Settlement Body,” (makalah disampaikan dalam Rangkaian Lokakarya Terbatas Masalah-Masalah Kepailitan dan Wawasan Hukum Bisnis Lainnya, Jakarta 15-16 September 2004), hlm. 160. 25

DSU, Pasal XXII ayat (4).

26

“...If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances...” (Pasal XXIII ayat (2) GATT) 27

Sengketa menurut DSU adalah ketika suatu negara anggota menetapkan suatu kebijakan perdagangan tertentu yang bertentangan dengan komitmennya di WTO atau mengambil kebijakan yang kemudian merugikan kepentingan negara anggota lain (Robert Read, “Dispute Settlement, Compensation, and Retaliation under WTO,” http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/staff/ecarar/ dispute%20settlement.doc, diunduh tanggal 12 September 2014 dan Yetty Komalasari Dewi, “Penyelesaian Sengketa (Dispute Settlement) di World Trade Organization” dalam Modul Hukum Perdagangan Internasional, (Jakarta: Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia, 2011), hlm. 109). Sedangkan konsep sengketa menurut GATT terjadi dalam hal ketentuan dalam GATT tidak dilaksanakan atau dihambat pelaksanaannya atau hasil yang dicapai dari tujuan perjanjian terhalangi karena (1) kegagalan dari anggota lainnya dalam melaksanakan kewajiban menurut perjanjian ini, atau (2) pelaksanaan dari anggota lainnya dalam mengambil berbagai tindakan yang

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

8

Pasal 22, digunakan sebagai upaya terakhir terhadap pihak yang dinyatakan kalah dalam putusan atau rekomendasi Panel DSB agar putusan tersebut dapat dilaksanakan dengan optimal dan efektif. Mengenai penggunaan retaliasi dalam rangkaian proses penyelesaian sengketa perdagangan dalam WTO, terdapat pertentangan pendapat dari para ahli terkait efektivitas pelaksanaan retaliasi khususnya apabila retaliasi ini diterapkan oleh negara berkembang yang berkedudukan sebagai negara penggugat (Complainant Party). Terdapat 2 (dua) pendapat utama yang sering menjadi pembahasan dalam berbagai literatur28, yaitu: a.

Pendapat ahli yang setuju dengan pengaturan retaliasi serta menitikberatkan retaliasi sebagai concessions rebalancing. Pendapat ini berfokus pada tujuan retaliasi untuk menyeimbangkan kembali antara kerugian yang dialami oleh Complainant Party akibat tindakan negara tergugat (Defendant Party) yang tidak melaksanakan putusan atau rekomendasi Panel DSB.

b.

Pendapat ahli yang menyatakan bahwa pengaturan retaliasi kurang tepat. Adapun hal-hal yang menyebabkan pengaturan retaliasi dianggap kurang tepat antara lain29: i.

Retaliasi pada akhirnya akan cenderung sebagai tindakan proteksi daripada liberalisasi perdagangan. Jika retaliasi digunakan untuk mendorong kepatuhan, maka retaliasi dapat membantu mencapai tujuan WTO. Namun hal tersebut akan menjadi kontraproduktif jika penggunaan retaliasi yang difokuskan lebih untuk mendorong kepatuhan karena unsur

bertentangan dengan ketentuan perjanjian ini atau kehadiran situasi lainnya (GATT, Loc.cit., Pasal XXII ayat (1)). 28

Jide Nzelibe, The Case Against Reforming The WTO Enforcement Mechanism, Jurnal Northwestern University - School of Law, hlm. 1. 29

Robert Z. Lawrence, Albert L. Williams, dan Research Associate, “Crimes and Punishments? An Analysis of Retaliation Under The WTO”, hlm. 4-6.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

9

pemberian sanksi yang kuat (strong punitive elements) justru dapat memicu perang perdagangan.

ii.

Retaliasi tidak sepenuhnya berhasil untuk meningkatkan kepatuhan negara anggota. Hal ini dapat dilihat dari sering terjadinya

sengketa

perdagangan

internasional

yang

melibatkan Amerika Serikat dan European Community (EC). Perilaku kedua negara tersebut akhirnya menimbulkan pertanyaan kemampuan WTO untuk menerapkan sistem perdagangan yang berbasis pada aturan. Selain itu sifat retaliasi yang tidak berlaku surut menyebabkan Defendant Party memperlambat proses penyelesaian sengketa.

iii.

Retaliasi dapat melemahkan kedaulatan nasional dengan proses penyelesaian sengketa yang mendorong aktivisme yudisial yang.

iv.

Retaliasi dianggap sebagai sistem yang tidak adil. Hal ini didasarkan pada adanya bahwa tindakan retaliasi cenderung tidak efektif atau bahkan mitra dagang mereka mungkin membalas melalui perdagangan atau cara lain. Hal ini dikarenakan retaliasi yang didasarkan pada persuasi kekuasaan dan bukan kekuatan persuasi.

Mengenai pandangan negatif tentang efektivitas penerapan retaliasi, lebih jauh diungkapkan bahwa retaliasi dianggap kurang efektif apabila dilaksanakan oleh negara anggota yang tergolong negara berkembang dan negara terbelakang karena30:

30

Chad P. Bown dan Joost Pauwelyn, ed., The Law, Economics, and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement, (New York: Cambridge Press University, 2010), hlm. 4-16.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

10

a.

Dari segi tujuan retaliasi Apabila sebuah negara menerapkan retaliasi, maka tindakan tersebut sama halnya dengan shooting yourself in the foot, yang artinya apabila sebuah negara menerapkan retaliasi, hal tersebut justru dikhawatirkan tidak akan membawa keuntungan dan bahkan menambah kerugian bagi negara yang melakukan retaliasi (Retaliating Party).

b.

Dari segi mekanisme pelaksanaan retaliasi Adanya anggapan bahwa sangat sulit memperoleh ukuran yang tepat dalam menentukan tingkat pelaksanaan retaliasi (level of suspension).

c.

Penerapan oleh negara berkembang dan negara terbelakang Retaliasi tidak dapat dilaksanakan secara efektif meskipun negara berkembang

atau

dimenangkan oleh

negara Panel

terbelakang

menjadi

pihak

yang

DSB dalam sengketa perdagangan

internasional. Terhadap pandangan ini, Nottage menyatakan setuju bahwa aturan mengenai retaliasi dalam DSU tidak seimbang terhadap negara berkembang dan terbelakang sebagai sarana untuk meningkatkan kepatuhan negara-negara anggota WTO lainnya, khususnya kepatuhan dari negara-negara maju. Namun di sisi lain, Nottage juga tidak setuju bahwa kelemahan dari retaliasi tersebut menghilangkan fungsi dari sistem penyelesaian sengketa WTO bagi negara berkembang. Alasan utama untuk pendapatnya tersebut adalah bahwa dalam praktik penyelesaian sengketa GATT dan WTO, menunjukkan tingginya tingkat kepatuhan terhadap putusan penyelesaian sengketa bahkan ketika negara-negara berkembang berada dalam posisi sebagai Complainant Party31. Apabila melihat penerapan nyata dari retaliasi tersebut, sejauh ini dari 17 (tujuh belas) otorisasi untuk melaksanakan retaliasi, 8 (delapan) diantaranya dilakukan oleh negara berkembang. Salah satu contoh negara berkembang yang

31

Ibid., hlm. 9.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

11

menerapkan retaliasi dalam penyelesaian sengketa perdagangan internasional adalah sengketa antara Meksiko (Complainant Party) dan Amerika Serikat (Defendant Party)32 dalam kasus Byrd Amendment33. Sebagai negara berkembang, Indonesia telah menunjukkan sikap positif terhadap pengaturan perdagangan internasional. Hal ini dibuktikan dengan keanggotaan Indonesia dalam GATT

pada tanggal 24 Februari 1950 dan

kemudian resmi menjadi anggota WTO serta meratifikasi perjanjian perdagangan internasional tersebut dengan Undang-Undang Nomor 7 tahun 1994 tentang Pengesahan The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. Dengan ratifikasi tersebut, maka secara hukum, semua perjanjian dan ketentuan WTO wajib dilaksanakan, termasuk juga ketentuan penyelesaian sengketa. Indonesia sebagai negara anggota WTO yang digolongkan sebagai negara berkembang juga pernah terlibat dalam sengketa perdagangan internasional melawan negara maju, yaitu dalam kasus tuduhan dumping yang dilakukan oleh Korea Selatan terhadap produk kertas yang diimpor dari Indonesia sehingga merugikan produsen kertas domestik Korea Selatan. Akibat adanya tuduhan tersebut, 4 (empat) eksportir kertas Indonesia ke Korea Selatan dikenakan Bea Masuk Anti Dumping (BMAD) oleh Korean Trade Commission (KTC). BMAD yang dikenakan oleh Korea Selatan kepada eksportir kertas Indonesia ini merugikan Indonesia dan menghambat perdagangan kertas Indonesia ke Korea Selatan. Kasus ini dimulai pada bulan September 2002, di mana 5 (lima) produsen kertas domestik Korea Selatan memohon kepada KTC untuk melakukan penyelidikan dumping terhadap impor kertas jenis business information paper dan wood-free printing paper yang berasal dan Indonesia dan Cina. Terhadap 32

Ibid., hlm. 10.

33

Byrd Amendment adalah hukum Amerika Serikat yang mengatur distribusi bea masuk impor hasil dari anti dumping (AD) atau countervailing duty (CVD) yang dimohonkan oleh para pemohon dan pihak lain yang berkepentingan dalam penyelidikan terkait dengan adanya dugaan praktik anti dumping oleh importer dari negara lain. (Jeanne J. Grimmett dan Vivian C. Jones, “CRS Report for Congress: The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (“Byrd Amendment”)”, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/57503.pdf, diunduh tanggal 13 September 2014.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

12

Indonesia, KTC mengirimkan kuesioner kepada 4 (empat) perusahaan kertas Indonesia, yaitu PT Pindo Deli Pulp dan Kertas Mills (Pindo Deli), PT Riau Andalan Kertas (April Fine), PT Indah Kiat Pulp and Paper Tbk. (Indah Kiat), dan PT Pabrik Kertas Tjiwi Kimia (Tjiwi Kimia). Terhadap pengenaan BMAD tersebut, Indonesia merasa keberatan karena karena pihak Indonesia berpendapat bahwa 4 (empat) eksportir kertas Indonesia tersebut tidak melakukan dumping sehingga tidak tepat apabila Korea Selatan mengenakan BMAD terhadap 4 (empat) eksportir kertas Indonesia tersebut. Setelah perundingan bilateral antara Indonesia dan Korea Selatan terkait sengketa ini tidak menghasilkan kesepakatan, Indonesia akhirnya memutuskan untuk membawa sengketa ini ke WTO34. Dalam sengketa tuduhan dumping ini, Panel DSB memenangkan Indonesia karena Indonesia terbukti tidak melakukan praktik dumping sehingga Korea Selatan harus mencabut pengenaan BMAD terhadap 4 (empat) eksportir kertas Indonesia namun pada kenyataannya, Korea Selatan tidak melaksanakan putusan tersebut sampai batas waktu yang ditentukan. Terhadap tindakan Korea Selatan ini, Indonesia dapat menggunakan haknya untuk melaksanakan retaliasi namun pada kenyataannya, Indonesia tidak melakukannya untuk memaksa Korea Selatan agar melaksanakan putusan Panel DSB tersebut. Oleh karena itu, penulis menyusun Skripsi dengan judul "Analisis Yuridis Penggunaan Hak Retaliasi dalam Penyelesaian Sengketa Perdagangan Internasional (Studi Kasus Tuduhan Anti Dumping Terhadap Produk Kertas Indonesia oleh Korea Selatan/ Kasus DS312)" untuk dapat mengetahui apa yang menjadi dasar pertimbangan dilakukannya retaliasi berdasarkan kasuskasus sengketa perdagangan internasional khususnya yang melibatkan negara berkembang melawan negara maju, sehingga dari pertimbangan-pertimbangan tersebut, dapat ditarik kesimpulan mengenai apa yang menjadi pertimbangan Indonesia untuk tidak melakukan retaliasi dalam kasus DS312. Dari pertimbangan-pertimbangan tersebut juga dapat dilihat efektivitas ketentuan

34

Nur Suci Savitri, “Pengaruh Sengketa Dagang Indonesia dan Korea Selatan Terhadap Ekspor Kertas Indonesia 2002-2004,” (Skripsi S1 Institut Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik Jakarta, Jakarta, 2012) hlm. 3-4.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

13

retaliasi dalam penggunaannya untuk penyelesaian sengketa perdagangan internaional yang selama ini telah terjadi dan di masa yang akan datang. Dengan mengetahui dasar pertimbangan penggunaan mekanisme retaliasi sebagai salah satu upaya bagi negara anggota WTO dalam mengoptimalkan hasil putusan DSB perdagangan internasional WTO, maka negara anggota, khususnya negara berkembang dan negara terbelakang, dapat memperoleh pilihan lain dalam membela kepentingan negaranya dalam lingkup perdagangan internasional. Penyusunan Skripsi ini adalah dalam rangka menelaah ketentuan retaliasi dalam Pasal XXII dan Pasal XXIII GATT serta Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) sehingga penerapan ketentuan yang berupa hukum tertulis tersebut dapat mewujudkan keadilan dan kepastian hukum bagi pengusaha Indonesia selaku negara anggota WTO serta negara yang termasuk dalam golongan negara berkembang dan negara terbelakang.

1.2. Pokok Permasalahan 1. Bagaimana pengaturan mengenai retaliasi dalam GATT dan WTO Agreement? 2. Bagaimana putusan Panel DSB terhadap Indonesia dalam kasus Tuduhan Dumping terhadap Produk Kertas Indonesia oleh Korea Selatan (Kasus DS312)? 3. Apakah yang menjadi dasar pertimbangan Indonesia sehingga Indonesia memutuskan untuk tidak melakukan retaliasi?

1.3. Tujuan Penelitian Adapun tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah sebagai berikut: 1.3.1. Tujuan Umum Secara umum penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui mekanisme retaliasi sebagai upaya bagi negara anggota WTO dalam mengoptimalkan hasil putusan DSB dengan cara ‘memaksa’ kepada negara yang dinyatakan Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

14

kalah dalam putusan DSB untuk melaksanakan putusan dengan efektif sehingga DSB sebagai lembaga penyelesaian sengketa perdagangan internasional tidak hanya berfungsi untuk menyelesaikan sengketa melalui putusan-putusan yang dikeluarkannya tetapi juga dapat menjamin bahwa putusan yang dikeluarkannya tersebut dapat dilaksanakan secara patuh oleh Negara anggota yang kalah dalam sengketa yang bersangkutan. Penelitian ini juga menelaah hal-hal yang menjadi pertimbangan Indonesia untuk tidak melaksanakan retaliasi dalam kasus tuduhan dumping produk kertas Indonesia oleh Korea Selatan (kasus DS312). Untuk itu dalam penelitian ini akan dibahas mengenai nature dari retaliasi sebagai salah satu mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa perdagangan internasional, tujuan adanya mekanisme

retaliasi

dalam

penyelesaian

sengketa

perdagangan

internasional, serta pentingnya mengetahui tujuan retaliasi sehingga pada akhirnya dapat terwujudnya kepastian hukum serta dapat diterapkannya asas-asas dalam ketentuan perjanjian internasional secara konsisten oleh negara-negara anggota WTO.

1.3.2. Tujuan Khusus 1. Mengetahui pengaturan mengenai retaliasi dalam WTO Agreement dalam GATT dan WTO Agreement. 2. Mengetahui putusan Panel DSB terhadap Indonesia dalam kasus Tuduhan Anti Dumping terhadap Produk Kertas Indonesia oleh Korea Selatan (Kasus DS312). 3. Menjelaskan hal yang menjadi dasar pertimbangan Indonesia sehingga Indonesia memutuskan untuk tidak melakukan retaliasi.

1.4. Manfaat Penelitian 1.4.1. Manfaat Teoretis Manfaat teoretis adalah manfaat penelitian bagi pengembangan ilmu pengetahuan. Dari pengertian tersebut, penelitian ini bermanfaat bagi pengembangan ilmu Hukum Perdagangan di Indonesia khususnya mengenai Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

15

penyelesaian sengketa perdagangan internasional oleh DSB secara umum serta tindakan retaliasi sebagai salah satu upaya pelaksanaan putusan sengketa perdagangan internasional demi terwujudanya asas kepastian hukum dan penerapan prinsip-prinsip perdagangan internasional secara konsisten dan terciptanya Hukum Perdagangan Internasional yang adil baik bagi semua negara anggota WTO, baik negara maju, negara berkembang, maupun negara terbelakang.

1.4.2. Manfaat Praktis 1. Penelitian ini bermanfaat bagi pemerintah Indonesia khususnya Kementrian

Perdagangan

Republik

Indonesia

agar

dapat

mengambil langkah yang tepat serta tetap mempertahankan kepentingan pengusaha dalam negeri/ domestik dalam hal terjadinya sengketa antara Indonesia selaku negara anggota WTO dengan negara anggota WTO lainnya.

2. Penelitian ini bermanfaat bagi para pengusaha dalam negeri/ domestik sehingga mendapatkan kepastian hukum apabila terjadi sengketa perdagangan internasional antara Indonesia selaku negara anggota WTO dengan negara anggota WTO lainnya. 3. Penelitian ini bermanfaat bagi masyarakat sebagai konsumen produk barang, baik yang produk impor maupun produk ekspor, sehingga tidak menimbulkan dan mengalami kerugian yang mungkin timbul apabila sengketa perdagangan internasional antara Indonesia selaku negara anggota WTO dengan negara anggota WTO lainnya tidak dapat diselesaikan dengan baik.

1.5. Tinjauan Pustaka Dalam penelitian ini, penulis menggunakan beberapa buku dan literatur yang menjadi referensi yang terkait dengan penyelesaian sengketa perdagangan internasional dalam WTO, baik penyelesaian sengketa secara umum maupun Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

16

penyelesaian sengketa yang khusus membahas mengenai retaliasi. Referensireferensi tersebut antara lain: a.

Prasukma Kristioadi dalam skripsinya yang berjudul Analisa Yuridis Terhadap Tindakan Retaliasi dalam Sistem Penyelesaian Sengketa WTO (World Trade Organization) membahas tentang tinjauan umum mekanisme retaliasi yang diatur dalam GATT dan WTO. Dari mekanisme tersebut, dijelaskan pula mengenai alasan retaliasi kembali diatur dalam Pasal 22 DSU serta penerapannya setelah WTO terbentuk, implikasi dari tindakan retaliasi bagi negara berkembang khususya Indonesia dalam kaitannya dengan kepentingan perdagangan internasional. Skripsi ini juga membahas membahas tentang tinjauan umum WTO dan pengaturan WTO dalam bidang perdagangan internasional khususnya di bidang penyelesaian sengketa, termasuk di dalamnya dibahas mengenai pembentukan WTO yang bertujuan untuk menyempurnakan sistem perdagangan internasional yang diatur dalam GATT. Terkait dengan penyelesaian sengketa, skripsi ini membahas mengenai

faktor

penyebab

timbulnya

sengketa

perdagangan

internasional serta bagaimana WTO menyelesaikan sengketa tersebut terhadap negara secara umum dan ketentuan khusus bagi negara berkembang, yaitu mulai dari konsultasi dan cara damai, panel, banding, serta pengawasan terhadap pelaksanaan putusan. Terkait dengan pembahasan retaliasi, skripsi ini hanya membahas tentang mekanisme retaliasi dalam sistem GATT dan WTO, serta perbedaan retaliasi dalam WTO dan GATT dan terkait dengan penerapan retaliasi, skripsi ini hanya membahas mengenai tinjauan umum dari penerapan dan akibat bagi negara berkembang dengan mengambil contoh kasus penerapan retaliasi dalam rezim importasi, penjualan dan distribusi Pisang Uni Eropa, dan implikasi penerapan retliasi terhadap kebijakan dan kepentingan perdagangan nasional bagi negara berkembang khususnya Indonesia baik dari segi positif maupun negatif. Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

17

b.

Ellyzabeth Media Joanne Caroline Maitimo dalam skripsinya yang berjudul Penyelesaian Sengketa Dagang dalam Kerangka WTO untuk Kasus Tuduhan Dumping Korea Selatan Terhadap Produk Ekspor Kertas Indonesia (2002-2007) membahas mengenai mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa dagang dalam kerangka WTO untuk kasus tuduhan dumping Korea Selatan terhadap ekspor kertas Indonesia periode 2002-2007. Adapun secara khusus pembahasan dalam skripsi ini bertujuan untuk menelaah masalah sengketa dagang yang pernah melibatkan Indonesia dalam hal ini kasus tuduhan dumping terhadap produk kertas indonesia oleh Korea Selatan, memahami sistem perdagangan internasional secara umum, mengetahui mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa dagang secara umum di WTO. Dalam skripsi ini hanya membahas mengenai pengaturan mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa yang diatur dalam WTO khususnya dalam kasus tuduhan dumping produk kertas Indonesia oleh Korea Selatan dan terkait dengan retaliasi sendiri, tidak ada pembahasan mengenai retaliasi.

c. Hata dalam bukunya yang berjudul Perdagangan Internasional dalam Sistem GATT dan WTO: Aspek Hukum dan Non Hukum membahas mengenai perdagangan internasional secara umum. Pembahasan dalam buku ini meliputi faktor-faktor, baik sosial maupun politik yang mempengaruhi perdagangan internasional serta aspek hukum dari pengaturan perdagangan internasional dalam GATT maupun WTO. Mengenai penyelesaian sengketa perdagangan internasional juga dibahas dalam buku ini namun yang dibahas mengenai penyelesaian sengketa dalam buku ini hanya seputar perkembangan pengaturan penyelesaian

sengketa

yang

berawal

dari

GATT

hingga

penyempurnaannya dalam WTO yang meliputi sejarah prosedur penyelesaian sengketa, beberapa perbedaan paham dalam memandang proses penyelesaian, serta proses-proses yang dilakukan dalam menyempurnkan mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa. Terkait dengan Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

18

penyelesaian sengketa begi negara berkembang khususnya Indonesia, buku ini hanya membahas mengenai proses diterimanya instrument internasional dalam sistem hukum nasional negara berkembang, mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa perdagangan internasional yang ditinjau dari segi hukum penyelesaian sengketa internasional secara umum, serta bagaimana pengaruh serta kontribusi dari pengaturan penyelesaian sengketa terhadap masa depan perdagangan internasional secara umum serta pengaruh dan kontribusi terhadap perekonomian Indonesia secara khusus. Dalam buku ini juga menjelaskan tentang kontribusi

Indonesia

dalam

perdagangan

internasional

dan

penyelesaian sengketa perdagangan internasional secara umum dan tidak menjelaskan kasus yang pernah dialami oleh Indonesia dalam perdagangan internasional.

1.6. Definisi Operasional Dalam penelitian ilmiah, definisi operasional digunakan untuk menjadi batasan dalam membahas objek penelitian serta menjadi dasar dalam pengumpulan data sehingga tidak terjadi kerancuan terhadap data yang dikumpulkan. Secara praktis, definisi operasional digunakan untuk mencegah terjadinya bias dalam mengartikan suatu ide atau menyampaikan maksud dalam bentuk tertulis. Adapun definisi yang akan digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah definisi dari ketentuan hukum yang berlaku di Indonesia, maupun melalui instrumen hukum internasional yang terkait. Definisi tersebut yaitu: 1.

Perdagangan Internasional adalah pertukaran barang dan jasa berupa ekspor dan impor antar negara yang mempengaruhi perekonomian dunia, di mana harga atau penawaran dan permintaan, mempengaruhi dan dipengaruhi oleh peristiwa-peristiwa yang terjadi global. Dalam penelitian ini, perdagangan internasional dibatasi oleh perdagangan barang yang dilakukan oleh negara-negara anggota WTO berdasarkan ketentuan GATT dan WTO serta instrumen-intrumen internasional terkait lainnya. Universitas Indonesia

Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

19

2.

Ekspor adalah salah satu fungsi perdagangan internasional dimana barang atau jasa yang diproduksi di suatu negara dikirim ke negara lain untuk dijual di dalam pasar domestik negara lain tersebut dengan tujuan meningkatkan pendapatan negara yang melakukan ekspor. Dalam penelitian ini, perdagangan internasional dibatasi oleh perdagangan barang yang dilakukan oleh negara-negara anggota WTO berdasarkan ketentuan GATT dan WTO serta instrumen-intrumen internasional terkait lainnya.

3.

Impor adalah salah satu fungsi perdagangan internasional dimana suatu negara membeli produk barang atau jasa yang diproduksi oleh negara lain dengan tujuan untuk memenuhi kebutuhan akan barang atau jasa yang tidak dapat diproduksi dalam negara pengimpor. Dalam penelitian ini, perdagangan internasional dibatasi oleh perdagangan barang yang dilakukan oleh negara-negara anggota WTO berdasarkan ketentuan GATT dan WTO serta instrumen-intrumen internasional terkait lainnya.

4.

Dispute Settlement System adalah pilar utama dari sistem perdagangan internasional 35 berupa mekanisme yang efektif untuk menegakkan kewajiban negara anggota WTO melalui peyelesaian sengketa perdagangan internasional sehingga dapat meningkatkan nilai praktis dari komitmen perdagangan internasional yang telah disepakati dalam suatu perjanjian internasional36

35

“Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes (A Unique Contribution)”, http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm, diakses tanggal 26 Agustus 2014. 36

“Dispute Settlement System Training Module: Chapter 1 Introduction to the WTO Dispute Settlement System” http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu_e/disp_settlementcbt e/c1s1p1e.htm, diakses tanggal 26 Agustus 2014.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

20

5.

Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) adalah badan yang dibentuk untuk melaksanakan peraturan dan prosedur terkait dengan perdagangan internasional kecuali ditentukan lain dalam perjanjian tertutup, ketentuan hasil konsultasi dan ketentuan penyelesaian sengketa perjanjian tertutup, serta berwenang untuk membentuk Panel DSB, Adopt Panel dan Appellate Body, melakukan pengawasan pelaksanaan putusan dan rekomendasi, dan wewenang penangguhan konsesi dan kewajiban lainnya berdasarkan perjanjian tertutup37.

6.

Sengketa Perdagangan Internasional adalah sengketa yang timbul apabila salah satu negara anggota WTO mengadopsi kebijakan perdagangan internasional atau mengambil beberapa tindakan terkait perdagangan internasional yang dianggap oleh negara anggota WTO lain melanggar perjanjian WTO, atau kegagalan negara anggota WTO dalam melaksanakan kewajiban perdagangan internasional38.

7.

Retaliasi adalah tindakan pembalasan yang merupakan konsekuensi final, bersifat diskriminatif, dan paling serius hanya bagi negara anggota WTO yang tidak melaksanakan putusan Panel DSB berupa penangguhan

konsesi

dan

kewajiban

lainnya

yang

dalam

pelaksanaannya diterapkan secara selektif oleh salah negara anggota satu terhadap yang lain serta membutuhkan persetujuan terlebih dahulu oleh DSB39.

37

DSU, Pasal 2.

38

“Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes (A Unique Contribution)”, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm, diakses tanggal 26 Agustus 2014. 39

“Dispute Settlement System Training Module: Chapter 6 The Process - Stages In A Typical WTO Disputes Settlement Case,” http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp _settlement cbt _e/c1s1p1_e.htm, diakses tanggal 26 Agustus 2014.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

21

8.

Anti dumping adalah tindakan yang dilakukan oleh negara anggota terhadap produk yang diekspor oleh negara anggota lain apabila berdasarkan hasil investigasi 40 produk tersebut dijual dalam pasar domestik negara anggota pengimpor dengan harga kurang dari harga normal dari produk tersebut atau dengan harga yang lebih rendah dari harga apabila produk tersebut dijual di dalam negeri negara anggota pengekspor yang menyebabkan kerugian atau ancaman kerugian bagi negara pengimpor atau menghambat industri dalam negeri negara anggota pengimpor41.

1.7.Metode Penelitian Penelitian ini disusun berdasarkan pada metode penelitian dan penulisan hukum42: 1.7.1. Bentuk Penelitian: Bentuk penelitian yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah penelitian yuridis-normatif yang bertujuan untuk menjawab rumusanrumusan masalah di atas. Penelitian yuridis-normatif ini dilakukan dengan metode kepustakaan terhadap bahan-bahan hukum yang terpercaya, baik bahan hukum primer, bahan hukum sekunder, serta bahan hukum tersier.

1.7.2. Tipologi Penelitian: a.

Menurut Sifatnya, penelitian ini merupakan penelitian deskriptif yang bertujuan untuk memberikan data yang seteliti mungkin tentang manusia, keadaan atau gejala-gejala lainnya. Dalam penelitian ini, gejala yang dicari adalah penerapan retaliasi sebagai

salah

satu

penyelesaian

sengketa

perdagangan

40

Agreement On Implementation Of Article VI Of The General Agreement On Tariffs And Trade (DSU), Part 1 Anti Dumping Code Pasal 1. 41

GATT, Pasal 6 ayat (1).

42

Sri Mamudji, et al., Metode Penelitian dan Penulisan Hukum, (Jakarta: Penerbit Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia, 2005), hlm. 3-6.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

22

internasional khususnya dalam kasus anti dumping produk kertas Indonesia oleh Korea Selatan.

b.

Menurut Dasar Ilmu yang Dipergunakan, penelitian ini merupakan penelitian monodisipliner, yaitu penelitian yang didasarkan

pada

satu

jenis

ilmu

pengetahuan

dengan

menerapkan metodologi yang lazim dilaksanakan oleh ilmu yang bersangkutan. Dalam hal ini, penelitian ini merupakan penelitian hukum yang berfokus pada ilmu Hukum Perdagangan Internasional. 1.7.3. Teknik Pengumpulan Data: Jenis data yang akan digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah data sekunder berupa literatur dan sumber bahan hukum lainnya. Sumber bahan hukum yang digunakan dalam peneletian ini terdiri dari bahan hukum primer, bahan hukum sekunder, dan bahan hukum tersier. Data sekunder yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini, antara lain: a.

Bahan hukum primer, yaitu bahan-bahan hukum yang memiliki ketentuan mengikat. Dalam penelitian ini bahan hukum primer yang digunakan adalah GATT tahun 1994, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) dan peraturan lainnya yang terkait dengan ketentuan WTO terkait perdagangan internasional.

b.

Bahan hukum sekunder, yaitu bahan hukum yang memberikan penjelasan mengenai bahan hukum primer, meliputi berbagai literatur yang berkaitan dengan ketentuan Pasal 22 dan Pasal 23 GATT 1994 dan Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) serta artikel-artikel dan jurnal-jurnal ilmiah yang terkait serta bahan pustaka lainnya yang

berupa

buku-buku

seputar

Hukum

Perdagangan

Internasional. Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

23

c.

Bahan hukum tersier, yaitu bahan hukum yang memberikan penjelasan atas bahan hukum primer ataupun sekunder seperti kamus, ensiklopedia, indeks kumulatif, dan lain sebagainya.

1.8. Sistematika Penulisan 

BAB I PENDAHULUAN Pada Bab I, penulis akan membahas mengenai latar belakang pemilihan topik dan tema penelitian, permasalahan yang akan dibahas dalam penelitian ini, tujuan dan manfaat penelitian, batasan penelitian, metode penelitian yang akan digunakan dalam penelitian ini, serta sistematika penulisan skripsi.



BAB

II

TINJAUAN

UMUM

MEKANISME

SEBAGAI PENYELESAIAN SENGKETA

RETALIASI

PERDAGANGAN

INTERNASIONAL Bab II berisikan tinjauan umum terhadap ketentuan penyelesaian sengketa perdagangan internasional dan ketentuan pelaksanaan retaliasi oleh DSB yang diatur dalam GATT dan dalam Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). Pada bagian pertama akan dijelaskan mengenai konsep penyelesaian sengketa secara umum serta perkembangannya sejak pengaturan dalam GATT hingga pengaturan dalam WTO. Selanjutnya akan dibahas mengenai mekanisme pelaksanaan retaliasi yang diatur dalam GATT dan WTO. Pada bagian ini akan dibahas mengenai konsep retaliasi secara umum dalam perdagangan internasional dan selanjutnya akan dibahas mengenai perkembangan prosedur retaliasi serta di akhir bab akan dijelaskan secara singkat mengenai penerapan retaliasi pertama yang berhasil, yaitu dalam kasus Byrd Amendment.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

24



BAB III KASUS POSISI TUDUHAN DUMPING TERHADAP PRODUK KERTAS INDONESIA OLEH KOREA SELATAN (KASUS DS312) Bab III berisikan penjabaran mengenai kasus dumping kertas Indonesia oleh Korea Selatan (Kasus DS312) berdasarkan Panel report (laporan Panel DSB). Kasus posisi akan dijelaskan mulai dari awal munculnya sengketa antara Indonesia dengan Korea Selatan, proses penyelesaian sengketa oleh DSB, hingga putusan yang dikeluarkan oleh DSB serta bagaimana penerapan dari putusan tersebut hingga saat ini. Di akhir bab ini juga akan diberikan rangkuman singkat proses Kasus DS312.



BAB IV ANALISIS PENERAPAN RETALIASI DALAM KASUS DS312 Bab IV berisi tentang analisis pertimbangan Indonesia untuk tidak melakukan retaliasi dalam Kasus DS312 berdasarkan kasus sengketa perdagangan internasional lain yang pernah menerapkan retaliasi. Bab ini akan menjabarkan bagaimana apakah retaliasi tepat dilakukan dalam kasus ini sehingga dapat diambil kesimpulan mengenai

efektifitas

retaliasi

sebagai

bagian

dari

sistem

penyelesaian sengketa WTO. 

BAB V PENUTUP Bab V berisi tentang kesimpulan tentang pelaksanaan retaliasi dalam Kasus DS312 serta saran yang dapat dilakukan oleh pemerintah Indonesia khususnya kementrian perdagangan apabila di masa yang akan datang mengahadapi masalah yang serupa dengan kasus ini.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

BAB II TINJAUAN UMUM MEKANISME RETALIASI DALAM PENYELESAIAN SENGKETA PERDAGANGAN INTERNASIONAL

2.1. Tinjauan Umum Retaliasi dalam Perdagangan Internasional Ketentuan penyelesaian sengketa perdagangan internasional, baik yang diatur dalam GATT maupun WTO tidak secara tegas menggunakan istilah retaliasi 43. Menurut H.S. Kartadjoemena, seorang mantan Duta Besar RI untuk GATT mengatakan bahwa istilah retaliasi adalah istilah yang lebih lunak daripada istilah penangguhan konsesi 44. Secara umum, retaliasi45 dapat diartikan sebagai tindakan suatu negara untuk menangguhkan konsesi/ kemudahan yang telah diberikan kepada negara lain dan telah dinikmati oleh negara lain tersebut, sebagai balasan akibat adanya tindakan kebijakan perdagangan dari negara lain tersebut yang merugikan kepentingan perdagangannya 46 . Dalam sistem perdagangan internasional, penggunaan retaliasi dapat dibagi menjadi 2 (dua), yaitu:

43

Pasal XXII DSU menggunakan istilah “Suspension of Concession” sementara dalam Pasal XXIII ayat (3) GATT, istilai retaliasi dapat disimpulkan dari kalimat “…suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement…” 44

Kartadjoemena, Op.cit., hlm 328.

45

Dalam Laporan Panel untuk Kasus sengketa US-EC terkait Import Measures on Certain Products from The Eurpoean Communities (WT/DS165/R) tanggal 17 Juli 2000 menyatakan bahwa terminologi “retaliation” atau “to retaliate” sering digunakan oleh Amerika Serikat. Terminologi “retaliation” atau “to retaliate” menurut Webster New Encyclopedia Dictionary didefinisikan sebagai “to return like for like, to get even” sedangkan menurut Black Law Dictionar (6th Ed.) retaliation merujuk kepada terminologi “Lex Talionis” yang berarti “The Law of retaliation; which requires the infliction upon a wrongdoer of the same injury which he has caused to Another (an eye for an eye principle)” Retaliasi juga berlaku dalam hukum internasional secara umum namun dalam hukum internaional, retaliasi tunduk kepada persyaratan tertentu seperti yang diatur dalam International Law Commision terkait dengan state responsibility, contohnya proporsionalitas, dll. Namun retaliasi dalam kerangka WTO tunduk terhadap apa yang diatur dalam DSU saja. (WT/DS165/R, hlm. 24). 46

Prasukma Kristioadi, “Analisa YuridisTerhadap Tindakan Retaliasi Dalam Sistem Penyelesaian Sengketa WTO (World Trade Organization),” (Skripsi S1 Universitas Indonesia, Depok , 2003), hlm. 56.

25

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

26

a. Retaliasi yang digunakan oleh negara anggota secara sepihak (unilateral) terhadap negara anggota lain; dan b. Retaliasi yang dilakukan berdasarkan prosedur penyelesaian sengketa Baik retaliasi yang dilakukan secara sepihak maupun retaliasi yang dilakukan berdasarkan prosedur penyelesaian sengketa, tujuan utama dari retaliasi adalah untuk mengamankan perdagangan negara anggota yang bersangkutan. Hal ini dapat dilihat dari beberapa contoh penerapan retaliasi pada sengketa perdagangan internasional, misalnya dalam kasus Banana 47 yang dimulai pada tahun 1995 mengenai kecaman terhadap kebijakan European Community (EC) yang sangat rumit dalam perdagangan pisang dimana EC memberikan kekhususan dalam impor pisang dari negara bekas koloni negara yang tergabung dalam EC serta memberikan perlakuan khusus kepada importir pisang dari negara-negara bekas koloni tersebut. Pada bulan September 1995, Amerika Serikat, Guatemala, Meksiko dan Honduras mengajukan permintaan konsultasi kepada DSB yang kemudian dilanjutkan dengan pembentukan Panel DSB. Panel DSB tersebut kemudian mengeluarkan laporan yang isinya secara umum menyatakan bahwa EC dengan peraturan impor pisang telah melanggar beberapa peraturan yang diamanatkan dalam WTO. Terhadap laporan dari Panel DSB tersebut. EC kemudian mengajukan banding ke Appeallate Body (AB) atas laporan dan kesimpulan yang dihasilkan oleh Panel DSB. Di tingkat banding, AB mendukung keputusan yang telah dihasilkan oleh Panel DSB, dan memperkuat putusan tersebut di dalam Laporan AB sehingga dengan adanya keputusan tersebut maka EC harus memperbaiki peraturan impor pisang agar sesuai dengan ketentuan dalam WTO. Kasus ini juga sempat dilanjutkan ke tahap arbitrase untuk menentukan jangka waktu bagi EC dalam menyesuaikan peraturan impornya dengan ketentuan WTO. Arbiter memutuskan waktu yang diberikan bagi EC untuk menyesuaikan ketentuan impornya adalah 15 (lima belas) bulan. EC setuju untuk memberi 47

Freddy Josep Pelawi, “Retaliasi dalam Kerangka Penyelesaian Sengketa WTO,” http://ditjenkpi.kemendag.go.id/website_kpi/images/Bulletin/Bulletin%2046.pdf, diunduh tanggal 20 September 2014.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

27

keringanan pada peraturan impor pisangnya namun negara-negara penggugat mengajukan permintaan kompensasi kepada EC dalam bentuk imbalan yang jumlahnya sebesar kerugian potensial yang dialami negara penggugat. Terhadap EC, negara penggugat khususnya Amerika Serikat meminta konsesi dagang kepada EC sebesar US$ 191,4 juta. Terhadap jumlah tersebut Amerika Serikat pada tanggal 19 April 1999 mengenakan tambahan tarif sebesar 100% untuk beberapa produk impor dari EC dalam suatu daftar produk dimana pengenaan tambahan tarif tersebut memiliki total nilai sebesar US$ 191,4 juta. Daftar produk yang dikenakan tarif tambahan oleh Amerika Serikat ini adalah suatu bentuk retaliasi yang dijalankan oleh Amerika Serikat mengingat sengketa yang dilakukan antara EC dan negara mitra dagang lainnya tidak menghasilkan kesepakatan bahwa EC akan merevisi ketentuan impor dagangnya khusus untuk produk buah pisang. Selain pembagian pelaksanaan retaliasi berdasarkan penggunaannya, berdasarkan Pasal 22 ayat (3) DSU, bentuk pelaksanaan retaliasi juga dapat dibagi 3 (tiga), yaitu: a.

Retaliasi yang dilakukan terhadap produk yang sama;

b.

Retaliasi yang dilakukan terhadap produk berbeda namun tetap sektor dan bidang yang sama48; dan

c.

Retaliasi yang dilakukan terhadap produk dari sektor dan bidang yang berbeda dengan bidang dimana negara yang bersangkutan dirugikan (cross retaliation)49. Cross retaliation ini dibagi kembali menjadi 2 (dua), yaitu:

48

Pasal 22 ayat (3) huruf a DSU mengatur bahwa “…the complaining party should first seek to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to the same sector(s) as that in which the panel or Appellate Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment” 49

Pada prinsipnya, pelaksanaan cross retaliation harus diawali dengan pelaksanaan retaliasi pada sektor yang sama dan kemudian dapat dilanjutkan dengan retaliasi terhadap sektor yang berbeda namun masih di bawah perjanjian yang sama (cross-sector retaliation). Apabila tindakan cross-sector retaliation masih tidak efektif dan jika terdapat kondisi yang cukup serius, maka pihak dapat dapat melaksanakan retaliasi terhadap perjanjian yang berbeda (cross-agreement retaliation). Terhadap kedua istilah tersebut, baik cross-sector retaliation maupun cross-agreement retaliation ini lah yang dimaksud dengan cross retaliation (YE Siyu, “The Legal Analysis of The Cross-Retaliation Under the WTO Framework,” (Thesis LLM Gent University, 2012), hlm.10.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

28



Retaliasi yang dilakukan terhadap produk dari sektor yang berbeda namun tetap di bawah perjanjian yang sama50;



Retaliasi yang dilakukan terhadap produk dari sektor berbeda dan di bawah perjanjian yang berbeda51.

Meskipun terdapat pembagian seperti yang dijelaskan di atas, namun penulis berpendapat bahwa hal tersebut tidak menghilangkan tujuan utama adanya mekanisme retaliasi bahkan dengan adanya retaliasi yang dilakukan dengan lintas sektor dan bidang perdagangan, justru semakin menunjukkan komitmen setiap negara untuk melindungi perdagangan negaranya. Pembagian tersebut bagi negara-negara maju juga dapat dijadikan alat untuk semakin memperkuat perdagangan negaranya dengan menekan perdagangan negara-negara lain yang secara ekonomi tidak sekuat negara-negara maju. Dalam praktik, pembagian ini menyebabkan instrumen retaliasi sangat jarang dilakukan oleh negara anggota. Hal ini dikarenakan selain adanya kecenderungan untuk memberikan tekanan besar apabila retaliasi dilakukan oleh negara maju terhadap negara berkembang serta diragukan efektivitasnya apabila dilaksanakan oleh negara berkembang atau terbelakang terhadap negara maju, alasan lain yang mungkin dapat diterima adalah tingginya nuansa politis dalam penerapan retaliasi suatu negara anggota kepada negara anggota lainnya. Oleh karena itu, pelaksanaan retaliasi harus kembali

dicermati

tujuan

utamanya

agar

dalam

pelaksanaannya

tetap

memperhatikan keseimbangan kepentingan perdagangan suatu negara dengan kepentingan perdagangan secara internasional.

2.2. Ketentuan Retaliasi dalam GATT Sistem penyelesaian sengketa yang sekarang diatur dalam WTO melalui DSU melalui Uruguay Round merupakan hasil penyempurnaan dari sistem 50

Pasal 22 ayat (3) huruf b DSU mengatur bahwa “…it may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations in other sectors under the same agreement” 51

Pasal 22 ayat (3) huruf c DSU mengatur bahwa “if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to other sectors under the same agreement, and that the circumstances are serious enough, it may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations under another covered agreement”

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

29

penyelesaian sengketa yang diatur dalam GATT termasuk di dalamnya ketentuan mengenai retaliasi. Meskipun DSU sifatnya menyempurnakan, namun dalam ketentuan-ketentuan mengenai penyelesaian sengketa tetap mengacu pada ketentuan dalam GATT. Untuk itu, sebelum memaparkan lebih jauh mengenai ketentuan retaliasi dalam DSU, akan dijelaskan lebih dahulu mengenai ketentuan retaliasi dalam GATT. 2.2.1. Ketentuan Penyelesaian Sengketa dalam GATT Pada dasarnya sistem penyelesaian sengketa yang diatur dalam GATT lebih menekankan pada usaha perdamaian52 dan tidak ada pemberian sanksi serta menyerahkan mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa kepada para pihak yang terlibat dalam sengketa tersebut 53 . Namun sistem penyelesaian sengketa yang demikian tidak cukup untuk secara penuh menggambarkan peranan

penting

dalam

menyelesaikan

sengketa

sehingga

dalam

perkembangannya, banyak terjadi pelanggaran yang dilakukan oleh negara – negara anggota GATT. Dalam kondisi tersebut, negara anggota tetap berusaha untuk menertibkan kembali perdagangan internasional dengan dibentuknya

Understanding

on

Notification,

Consultation,

Dispute

Settlement, and Surveillance 1979 (Understanding 1979) dan Decision on Dispute Settlement pada tahun 1984

54

. Usaha untuk memperbaiki

mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa GATT masih terus dilakukan bahkan ketika Uruguay Round tahun 1986 berlangsung melalui pembentukan Decision on Improvements to The GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures pada tahun 1989 (Decision on Improvement 1989). Decision on

52

Sifat penyelesaian sengketa dalam GATT yang bersifat perdamaian dapat disimpulkan dari 2 (dua) ketentuan utama penyelesaian sengketa GATT yaitu dalam Pasal XXII dan Pasal XXIII GATT. 53

Sistem penyelesaian sengketa dalam GATT lebih bersifat diplomasi ini dimaksudkan karena ketentuan penyelesaian sengketa dalam GATT bertujuan untuk melindungi dan mengembalikan keseimbangan kepentingan di antara negara-negara anggotanya sebagai hasil dari pertukaran konsesi di bidang perdagangan. 54

Hata, Op.cit., hlm. 197.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

30

Improvement 1989 inilah yang terus digunakan sampai dibentuknya mekanisme baru sebagai hasil dari Uruguay Round 55. Sebagai penyempurnaan pertama, Understanding 1979 beserta lampirannya yang berjudul Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT in The Field of Dispute Settlement, masih berpedoman pada Pasal XXII dan Pasal XXIII GATT 56 dengan tetap menggunakan Customary Practice yang telah berjalan selama menyelesaikan sengketa GATT dengan beberapa pengembangan 57 . Adapun praktik penyelesaian sengketa yang telah menjadi Customary Practice bagi negara-negara anggota GATT meliputi58: 1.

Konsultasi Prosedur konsultasi dalam penyelesaian sengketa GATT diatur dalam Pasal XXII yang berbunyi: “Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as may be made by another contracting party…” Mengenai

prosedur

konsultasi

diatur

lebih

lanjut

dalam

Understanding 1979 dengan ketentuan sebagai berikut:

55

Ibid., hlm. 198.

56

Keputusan untuk tetap berpedoman pada Pasal XXII dan XXIII GATT tetap dilakukan hingga penyempurnaan sistem penyelesaian sengketa dalam Decision Of 12 April 1989 On Improvements To The GATT Dispute Settlement Rules And Procedures dalam General Provisions Paragraph 2 yang menyatakan “Contracting parties agree that all solutions to matters formally raised under the GATT dispute settlement system under Articles XXII, XXIII and arbitration awards shall be consistent with the General Agreement…” 57

“The Contracting Parties agree that the customary practice of the GATT in the field of dispute settlement, described in the Annex, should be continued in the future, with the improvements set out below…” (GATT, Understanding 1979, Par. 7). 58

Ibid., hlm. 156-158.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

31

a. Para pihak harus menetapkan dan memutuskan apakah akan menerapkan prosedur konsultasi secara konsisten sehingga meningkatkan keefektivitasan dari prosedur konsultasi tersebut59. b. Para pihak wajib untuk menanggapi permintaan untuk konsultasi secara cepat60. c. Para pihak wajib melaksanakan konsultasi sebaik mungkin dengan tujuan untuk mencapai keputusan yang saling memuaskan. Setiap permintaan untuk konsultasi juga harus menyertakan alasanalasannya61. Pihak yang akan melakukan konsultasi berdasarkan Pasal XXII GATT 62 , harus memberitahu Executive Secretary agar dapat segera diinformasikan lebih lanjut kepada seluruh negara anggota 63 perihal akan dilakukannya konsultasi dan dalam waktu 45 (empat puluh lima) hari sejak pemberitahuan kepada Executive Secretary, maka para pihak harus melakukan konsultasi64. Proses konsultasi ini dilakukan dalam waktu tidak lebih dari 30 (tiga puluh) hari. Selama proses konsultasi, Executive Secretary juga wajib memberikan bantuan apabila pihak membutuhkannya 65 . Setelah konsultasi berakhir, para 59

GATT Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance 1979 (GATT Understanding 1979) Par. 4. 60

Ibid.

61

Ibid.

62

Mengenai ketentuan lebih lanjut terkait dengan Pasal XXII GATT diatur dalam Procedures under Article XXII on Questions Affecting the Interests of a Number of Contracting Parties tahun 1958, Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance tahun 1979 (GATT Understanding 1979), Decision on Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures tahun 1989 (GATT Decision on Improvement 1989), dan Consultations on residual import restrictions (http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/bookspe/ gatt_ai_e/art22_e.pdf, diunduh tanggal 16 September 2014). 63

GATT, Procedures under Article XXII on Questions Affecting the Interests of a Number of Contracting Parties 1958, Par.1. 64

Ibid., Par.2.

65

Ibid., Par 6.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

32

pihak wajib memberitahu Executive Secretary perihal hasil keputusan konsultasi66. Apabila dalam waktu sampai 60 (enam puluh) hari sejak permintaan, konsultasi mengalami kegagalan, maka pihak penggugat dapat meminta pembentukan Panel atau Kelompok Kerja (Working Party)67.

2.

Jasa-Jasa Baik (Good Offices), Konsiliasi, dan Mediasi Mengenai prosedur jasa-jasa baik, konsiliasi, dan mediasi tidak diatur dalam GATT 1947 namun melihat kebutuhan negara anggota terhadap prosedur ini, maka mengenai konsiliasi dan jasa-jasa baik secara tegas diatur dalam GATT Understanding 1979 dan GATT Decisions on Improvement 1989. Prosedur ini dilakukan apabila sengketa tidak dapat diselesaikan melalui konsultasi68. Jasa-jasa baik, konsiliasi dan mediasi adalah prosedur yang dilakukan secara sukarela jika para pihak yang bersengketa menyetujuinya. Berdasarkan GATT Decisions on Improvement 1989, prosedur jasa-jasa baik, konsiliasi, dan mediasi dapat dilakukan kapanpun, oleh pihak manapun, serta dapat dimulai dan dihentikan kapanpun. Setelah prosedur dihentikan, pihak penggugat dapat melanjutkan dengan mengajukan pembentukan Panel 69 . Namun apabila para pihak setuju, prosedur ini dapat tetap berlanjut meskipun proses panel atau kelompok kerja sedang berlangsung70.

66

Ibid., Par 5.

67

GATT Decision on Improvement 1989, Par. C dan D.

68

GATT 1979, Par. 8.

69

GATT 1989, Par. D (1).

70

GATT 1989, Par. D (2).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

33

3.

Panel atau Kelompok Kerja Pembentukan Panel yang diatur dalam GATT Understanding 1979 Paragraph 10 dilakukan apabila konsultasi telah dinilai gagal dan para pihak yang bersengketa sepakat untuk pembentukannya. Komposisi Panel disusun berdasarkan sengketa yang terjadi yaitu terdiri dari 3 (tiga) atau 5 (lima) dari pihak pemerintah yang diusulkan oleh General Director serta harus dibentuk paling lambat 30 (tiga puluh) hari sejak adanya keputusan dari para pihak untuk membentuk Panel 71 . Dalam melaksanakan tugasnya, Panel dapat dibantu oleh pihak, baik dari pemerintah maupun non pemerintah, yang ditunjuk oleh para pihak serta memiliki pengetahuan di bidang ekonomi dan perdagangan 72 . Sebelum memasuki prosedur Panel, pihak yang memiliki kepentingan substansial, setelah memberitahu Council, diberi kesempatan untuk didengar keterangannya oleh Panel dan Panel juga berhak untuk memperoleh informasi dan saran teknis dari pihak lain apabila dibutuhkan73. Prosedur Panel dibentuk oleh Panel yang bersangkutan. Pada umumnya, Panel mengadakan pertemuan formal dengan para pihak yang bersengketa agar para pihak dapat memberikan pandangannya terhadap sengketa atau bertanya mengenai hal-hal yang terkait dengan sengketa tersebut. Dari hasil pertemuan tersebut, Panel akan membuat laporan yang diberikan kepada para pihak serta seluruh negara anggota. Laporan tersebut harus diadopsi oleh Council yang pada akhirnya akan diteliti untuk membuat putusan atau rekomendasi.

71

Panel berfungsi untuk membantu penyelesaian sengketa para pihak dengan membuat penilaian obyektif terhadap sengketa yang bersangkutan, termasuk penilaian obyektif terhadap fakta-fakta dari sengketa tersebut dan apabila diminta oleh para pihak, Panel dapat memberikan rekomendasi atau putusan. Dalam memberikan rekomendasi atau putusan, Panel harus berkonsultasi secara teratur dengan pihak yang bersengketa dan memberi mereka kesempatan yang memadai untuk mencari solusi yang memuaskan bagi para pihak. Panel dalam melaksanakan fungsinya juga harus bersifat mandiri/ melayani dalam kapasitas bukan sebagai wakil dari pemerintah atau organisasi asalnya (GATT, Understanding 1979, Paragraph 14 dan 16). 72

GATT 1979, Par.14.

73

GATT 1979, Par 15.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

34

Putusan atau rekomendasi harus dilaksanakan oleh para pihak yang bersengketa dan apabila putusan atau rekomendasi tersebut tidak dilaksanakan oleh Defendant Party, maka jika menurut penilaian CONTRACTING PARTIES tindakan tersebut menyebabkan kerugian yang cukup serius bagi negara penggugat yang menang (Complainant Party), CONTRACTING PARTIES dapat memberikan otorisasi kepada Complainant Party untuk melakukan retaliasi

74

. Negara yang

dikenakan retaliasi diberikan kebebasan untuk mengundurkan diri dari perjanjian dengan memberitahukan secara tertulis kepada General Director dan mulai berlaku 60 (enam puluh) hari setelah pemberitahuan diterima75.

2.2.2. Ketentuan Retaliasi dalam GATT Dari praktik penyelesaian sengketa yang biasa dilakukan dalam GATT terlihat bahwa proses retaliasi sudah diakui dan diakomodasi sejak ketentuan perdagangan internasional diatur dalam GATT. GATT tidak menyebutkan secara langsung mengenai retaliasi namun ketentuan retaliasi dapat disimpulkan dari rumusan Pasal XXIII ayat (2) GATT yang berbunyi: “…If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the circumstances…” Ketentuan lebih lanjut mengenai retaliasi dalam GATT diatur kembali dalam Decision Of 5 April 1966 On Procedures Under Article XXIII Paragraph 9 yang berbunyi: “If… contracting party to which a recommendation has been directed has not complied in full with the relevant recommendation of the 74

Kartadjoemena, Op.cit., hlm.155.

75

GATT, Pasal XIII ayat (2).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

35

Contracting Parties or the Council, and that any benefit accruing directly or indirectly … to be nullified or impaired, and that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, the Contracting Parties may authorize the affected contracting party or parties to suspend, in regard to the contracting party causing the damage, application of any concession or any other obligation under the General Agreement whose suspension is considered warranted, taking account of the circumstances.” Pasal XXIII ayat (2) GATT serta Decision Of 5 April 1966 On Procedures Under Article XXIII Paragraph 9 memberikan kemungkinan dilakukannya retaliasi apabila: a. Tindakan retaliasi dapat dilakukan setelah adanya otorisasi dari CONTRACTING PARTIES. b. Tidak dilaksanakannya putusan atau rekomendasi Council oleh negara Tergugat yang dinyatakan bersalah (Defendant Party). c. Tindakan tersebut mengakibatkan kerugian yang cukup serius bagi negara Penggugat (Complainant Party). Ketentuan adanya kerugian yang ‘cukup serius’ (serious enough) adalah hal yang membedakan retaliasi yang diatur dalam GATT dengan retaliasi yang diatur dalam DSU. Hal ini didasarkan pada perbedaan konsep mengenai sengketa dalam GATT dan DSU

76

. Terhadap syarat ini,

Kelompok Kerja (Working Party) berpendapat bahwa kerugian 'cukup serius' membatasi kemungkinan otorisasi dari CONTRACTING PARTIES untuk mengambil tindakan retaliasi

sebagai pemaksaan pelaksanaan

putusan sengketa perdagangan internasional di mana pemecahan masalah 76

Sengketa menurut DSU adalah ketika suatu negara anggota menetapkan suatu kebijakan perdagangan tertentu yang bertentangan dengan komitmennya di WTO atau mengambil kebijakan yang kemudian merugikan kepentingan negara anggota lain (Robert Read, “Dispute Settlement, Compensation, and Retaliation under WTO,” http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/staff/ecarar/ dispute%20settlement.doc, diunduh tanggal 12 September 2014 dan Yetty Komalasari Dewi, “Penyelesaian Sengketa (Dispute Settlement) di World Trade Organization” dalam Modul Hukum Perdagangan Internasional, (Jakarta: Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia, 2011), hlm. 109). Sedangkan konsep sengketa menurut GATT terjadi dalam hal ketentuan dalam GATT tidak dilaksanakan atau dihambat pelaksanaannya atau hasil yang dicapai dari tujuan perjanjian terhalangi karena (1) kegagalan dari anggota lainnya dalam melaksanakan kewajiban menurut perjanjian ini, atau (2) pelaksanaan dari anggota lainnya dalam mengambil berbagai tindakan yang bertentangan dengan ketentuan perjanjian ini atau kehadiran situasi lainnya (GATT, Loc.cit., Pasal XXII ayat (1)).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

36

tersebut masih dapat diupayakan untuk melalui penarikan tindakan yang menyebabkan kerugian, penggantian konsesi lain, atau beberapa tindakan lainnya dan tindakan retaliasi dapat dibenarkan apabila otorisasi atas retaliasi tersebut adalah satu-satunya sarana yang paling baik untuk mencegah konsekuensi ekonomi yang serius bagi negara yang telah dirugikan atau satu-satunya cara untuk memulihkan kembali kondisi negara yang dirugikan tersebut77. Mengenai ukuran dari kerugian ‘cukup serius’ dalam syarat ini, terdapat perbedaan pendapat. Amerika Serikat berpendapat keadaan kerugian yang ‘cukup serius’ diartikan sebagai adanya gangguan pada keadaan perekonomian suatu negara sehingga meskipun terbukti tidak melaksanakan putusan atau rekomendasi Council, namun jika tindakan tersebut tidak menyebabkan kerugian secara ekonomi, maka tindakan retaliasi tidak dapat diberlakukan 78 . Berbeda dengan pendapat Amerika Serikat, EC berpendapat bahwa kerugian ‘cukup serius’ bukan hanya masalah kerugian secara ekonomi namun bagaimana dampak dari ketidakpatuhan suatu negara terhadap putusan atau rekomendasi Council terhadap ketertiban perdagangan internasional di masa yang akan datang79.

77

“GATT Analytical Index”, http://www.wto.org/english/rese/bookspe/ gattaie/art23e.pdf, diunduh tanggal 19 September 2014. 78

Hal ini merupakan argumen Amerika Serikat dalam kasus United States Manufacturing Clause tahun 1984 di mana dalam kasus ini, Amerika Serikat digugat oleh European Communities atas klausul dalam Undang-Undang Hak Cipta Amerika Serikat yang tidak sesuai dengan Pasal IX ayat (1) GATT. Dalam Laporan Panel atas kasus ini, Amerika Serikat berpendapat bahwa “even if the Panel were to find nullification or impairment of a benefit accruing to the European Communities… the circumstances would not be serious enough to justify authorization of a suspension of obligations or concessions … since the European Communities had suffered no economic harm” 79

Pendapat European Communities mengenai ukuran kerugian cukup serius disampaikan dalam diskusi Council pada bulan April 1986, di mana saat itu Amerika Serikat tidak melaksanakan putusan setelah 2 (dua) tahun dikeluarkannya putusan tersebut. Terhadap pendapat Amerika Serikat, European Communities membantah bahwa “This matter should be treated as a question of principle, irrespective of the volume of trade involved, because a contracting party would not only be failing to remove a measure found to be inconsistent with GATT but would be extending and enlarging the scope of the measure”

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

37

Bagan 2.1 Proses Retaliasi dalam GATT80:

Putusan/ Rekomendasi

Pihak yang kalah (Tergugat/ Defendant Party) tidak melaksanakan Putusan/ Rekomendasi Council

Rekomendasi dapat berisi pengenaan tindakan balasan apabila sengketa yang terjadi dirasakan cukup serius

Pihak yang dirugikan (Penggugat/ Complainant Party) dapat meminta otorisasi CONTRACTING PARTIES untuk melakukan retaliasi

CONTRACTING PARTIES memberikan otorisasi

Pihak Penggugat menangguhkan konsesi atau kewajiban lainnya yang termasuk dalam General Agreement

Bagi pihak yang terkena sanksi dapat mengundurkan diri dari Perjanjian GATT

80

Kristioadi, op.cit., hlm 75

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

38

2.3. Ketentuan Retaliasi dalam DSU 2.3.1. Retaliasi DSU sebagai Penyempurnaan Ketentuan Retaliasi GATT GATT merupakan upaya nyata pertama untuk menciptakan sebuah sistem regulasi yang terpadu dalam bidang perdagangan internasional. Meskipun pada sejarah awal pembentukannya, GATT dirancang untuk secara sementara mengatur perdagangan internasional, namun pada perkembangannya, GATT dapat menjalankan tugasnya dengan sangat baik dan bahkan menjadi entitas utama yang mengatur perdagangan internasional sejak tahun 1948 sampai 1994. GATT pada awal mulanya hanya berupa kesepakatan dan bukan organisasi fungsional sehingga penafsiran dan penerapan ketentuan GATT tidak selalu disepakati secara seragam oleh negara-negara anggota. Hal ini pada akhirnya berdampak pada timbulnya perselisihan antar negara anggota. Atas dasar hal tersebut, GATT pada akhirnya menyediakan prosedur untuk penyelesaian sengketa, termasuk di dalamnya bentuk asli dari retaliasi. Namun dalam perkembangan, justru semakin banyak pelanggaran yang dilakukan oleh negara-negara anggota dan penyelesaian sengketa GATT pun semakin lama semakin tidak efektif 81 . Mengingat pentingnya peran perdagangan internasional bagi perekonomian masing-masing negara anggota, maka negara-negara anggota terus melakukan perbaikan khususnya mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa yang pada akhirnya melalui Uruguay Round, terbentuklah WTO Agreement yang merupakan penyempurnaan dari sistem penyelesaian sengketa yang sebelumnya diatur dalam GATT. Terkait dengan retaliasi, penyempurnaan ketentuan GATT melalui WTO berdampak juga pada ketentuan realiasi. Terdapat 2 (dua) alasan

81

Meredith A. Crowley, “An introduction to the WTO and GATT”, http://www.chicagofed. org/digital_assets/publications/economic_perspectives/2003/4qeppart4.pdf, diunduh tanggal 20 September 2014.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

39

utama yang menyebabkan negara-negara anggota beranggapan bahwa ketentuan retaliasi perlu dilakukan penyempurnaan, yaitu:82 a. Tindakan retaliasi dalam GATT tidak dapat melindungi negara penggugat dalam hal negara penggugat adalah negara berkembang dan terbelakang serta; dan b. Tindakan retaliasi tidak dapat dilaksanakan secara langsung (selfexecuting) dalam arti sebuah ‘legal victory’ tidak secara otomatis diperoleh berdasarkan putusan Council. Ada hal-hal lain yang diperlukan untuk mendukung ‘legal victory’ tersebut seperti misalnya kekuatan ekonomi dan politik. Terkait dengan hal tersebut, sangat jelas bahwa retaliasi dapat berjalan apabila dilaksanakan oleh negara maju. Untuk

itu,

melalui

penyempurnaan

ketentuan

perdagangan

internasional dalam WTO, diharapkan ketentuan mengenai retaliasi pun juga

mengalami

penyempurnaan

sehingga

dapat

mengakomodasi

kepentingan seluruh negara anggota, baik negara maju, negara berkembang, bahkan negara terbelakang.

2.3.2. Retaliasi dalam DSU 2.3.2.1. Ketentuan Penyelesaian Sengketa dalam DSU Mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa dalam WTO dibagi menjadi 2 (dua) tahap yaitu83:

82

R.E.Hudec, et al., A Statistical Profile of GATT Dispute Settlement Cases: 1948-89, (London: Routledge, 1993), hlm.183. 83

Integrated Database of Trade Disputes for Latin America and the Caribbean, “Dispute Settlement in The World Trade Organization,” http://idatd.eclac.cl/controversias/soluciones/iTe mplate-OMC-explicacion.pdf, diunduh tanggal 19 September 2014.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

40

A.

Tahap Pra-Litigasi:

1. Konsultasi Sama halnya dengan sistem penyelesaian sengketa dalam GATT, tahap pertama yang harus dilakukan dalam sistem penyelesaian sengketa WTO adalah konsultasi antara para pihak yang bersengketa. Dalam tahap ini, para pihak diberikan kesempatan untuk mengungkapkan pendapat dan pandangan tentang masalah terkait serta diharapkan dapat menemukan solusi yang memuaskan bagi para pihak tanpa menggunakan jalur litigasi. Jika permintaan konsultasi dilakukan berdasarkan Covered Agreement 84 , maka pihak yang diminta berkonsultasi dalam jangka waktu 10 (sepuluh) hari dan dalam jangka waktu 30 (tiga puluh) hari setelah diterimanya permintaan tersebut, para pihak harus melakukan konsultasi 85 . Apabila dalam waktu 30 (tiga puluh) hari belum mengadakan

konsultasi,

maka

pihak

yang

mengajukan

permohonan konsultasi dapat meminta untuk membentuk Panel86.

84

Yang dimaksud dengan covered agreements adalah agreement yang termasuk dalam Appendix 1 Agreements Covered By The Understanding, yaitu: a. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization b. Multilateral Trade Agreements  Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods  Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services  Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights  Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes c. Plurilateral Trade Agreements  Annex 4: Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft  Agreement on Government Procurement  International Dairy Agreement  International Bovine Meat Agreement 85

DSU, Pasal 4 ayat (3).

86

Ibid.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

41

2. Jasa-Jasa Baik (Good Offices), Konsiliasi, dan Mediasi87 Para pihak secara sukarela dapat menyetujui untuk mengikuti cara lain untuk menyelesaikan sengketa yang berupa jasa-jasa baik (good offices), konsiliasi, dan mediasi pelaksanaan

dan

penghentian

88

. Permintaan untuk

pelaksanaan

jasa-jasa

baik,

konsiliasi, dan mediasi dapat dilakukan setiap saat 89 dan apabila dihentikan,

maka

pembentukan Panel

pihak 90

penggugat

dapat

meminta

untuk

. Selain itu, pembentukan Panel dapat

dilakukan apabila dalam waktu 60 (enam puluh) hari, para pihak menganggap bahwa jasa-jasa baik, konsiliasi, dan mediasi gagal menyelesaikan sengketa91.

B.

Tahap Litigasi

1. Panel Jika sengketa tidak dapat diselesaikan melalui tahap non litigasi, maka DSU mensyaratkan pembentukan Panel DSB92 paling lambat saat pertemuan DSB kecuali jika DSB berdasarkan konsensus tidak menyetujui pembentukan Panel DSB tersebut93. Dalam hal pihak 87

Seiring dengan perkembangan penyelesaian sengketa perdagangan internasional, jasa-jasa baik, konsiliasi dan mediasi, konsultasi dianggap sebagai instrumen non-yudisial atau diplomatik utama dalam sistem penyelesaian sengketa WTO (“Dispute Settlement in The World Trade Organization,” http://idatd.eclac.cl/controversias/soluciones/iTemplate-OMC-explicacion.pdf, diunduh tanggal 19 September 2014). 88

DSU Pasal 5 ayat (1).

89

DSU, Pasal 5 ayat (3).

90

Ibid.

91

DSU, Pasal 5 ayat (4).

92

Panel DSB terdiri dari 3 (tiga) orang yang dapat berasal dari unsur pemerintah maupun non pemerintah serta harus memiliki kemampuan di bidang perdagangan internasional dan politik internasional. Pemilihan anggota Panel dapat dilakukan dengan membuat daftar calon Panelis yang memenuhi kriteria namun apabila tidak terdapat kesepakatan mengenai calon Panelis tersebut, maka General Director WTO (setelah berkonsultasi dengan Ketua DSB dan Ketua Komite terkait atau Ketua Council) dapat menunjuk para Panelis untuk menyelesaikan sengketa tersebut. 93

DSU, Pasal 6 ayat (1).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

42

penggugat

mengajukan

permohonan

pembentukan

Panel,

penggugat harus menyampaikan justifikasi secara rinci. Pelaksanaan Panel dalam ketentuan WTO tetap mengacu pada Pasal XXII dan XXIII GATT 94 di samping tata laksana lainnya yaitu95: a.

Panel DSB harus menyelesaikan tugas dan membuat laporan Panel DSB dalam waktu 6 (enam) bulan dan untuk keadaan mendesak, dalam waktu 3 (tiga) bulan96.

b.

Laporan Panel DSB akan dipertimbangkan oleh DSB untuk disahkan dalam waktu 20 (dua puluh) hari setelah laporan tersebut disampaikan kepada negara-negara anggota97.

c.

Dalam waktu 60 (enam puluh) hari setelah dikeluarkannya laporan Panel DSB, laporan tersebut harus disahkan kecuali DSB

memutuskan

secara

konsensus,

untuk

tidak

mengesahkan laporan tersebut atau salah satu pihak menyatakan untuk mengadakan banding (appeal)98. 2. Banding (Appeal) Prosedur banding dilaksanakan oleh Appelate Body (AB). Berbeda dengan Panel, AB adalah standing body of jurists yang dibentuk untuk memastikan konsistensi penerapan hukum dari laporan atau putusan Panel DSB99. Laporan hasil banding yang dibuat oleh AB harus didasarkan pada keterangan dan pendapat dari para pihak dan 94

Prosedur pelaksanaan Panel diatur dalam Appendix 3 DSU Agreement mengenai Working Procedur. 95

Kartadjoemena, Op.cit., hlm.325.

96

DSU, Pasal 12 ayat (9).

97

DSU, Pasal 16 ayat (1).

98

DSU., Pasal 16 ayat (4).

99

Kewenangan AB yang demikian dikarenakan permohonan banding sendiri hanya terbatas pada masalah hukum yang terdapat pada laporan Panel dan interpretasi hukum yang dibuat oleh Panel (Pasal 17 ayat (6) DSU).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

43

jika ada, dari pihak ketiga mengenai kekeliruan penerapan hukum dari laporan Panel DSB 100 . Laporan AB dapat menguatkan atau membatalkan

laporan

Panel

DSB

baik

sebagian

maupun

seluruhnya serta laporan AB bersifat final 101 . Banding harus dilaksanakan dalam jangka waktu yang tidak lebih dari 60 (enam puluh) hari 102 sejak tanggal diberitahukan permohonan banding secara resmi oleh pihak. Laporan hasil banding harus disahkan oleh DSB dan secara tidak bersyarat (unconditionally) juga harus disetujui oleh para pihak kecuali DSB memutuskan sebaliknya103. Apabila laporan hasil banding disahkan, maka dalam jangka waktu 30 (tiga puluh) hari, para phak harus memberitahu kepada sidang DSB mengenai komitmen untuk melaksanakan hasil laporan tersebut dan apabila pihak kesulitan untuk melaksanakannya, maka pihak tersebut diberikan perpanjangan waktu yang pantas untuk mulai melaksanakannya104.

2.3.2.2. Ketentuan Prosedur Retaliasi dalam DSU Dilihat dari fungsi retaliasi dalam sistem penyelesaian sengketa perdagangan internasional, maka pembahasan mengenai retaliasi tidak terlepas dari bagaimana penerapan sebuah putusan atau rekomendasi dari DSB. Pada tahap implementasi, apabila diperlukan dapat melibatkan arbiter yang berfungsi untuk menentukan jangka waktu yang wajar di mana pihak yang kalah harus melaksanakan putusan

100

Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism and Developing Countries, (Georgetown: Department for Infrastructure and Economic Cooperation, 2004), hlm. 2. 101

Ibid. dan DSU Pasal 17 ayat (13).

102

DSU, Pasal 17 ayat (5).

103

DSU, Pasal 17 ayat (14).

104

DSU, Pasal 21 ayat (3).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

44

atau rekomendasi DSB 105 . Dalam waktu 6 (enam) bulan setelah periode waktu yang wajar ditetapkan, proses pemantauan dimulai. Pada tahap ini, pihak yang kalah harus menyerahkan laporan status berkala kepada DSB 106 . Pemantauan berakhir ketika DSB setuju bahwa keputusan telah dilaksanakan namun dalam praktiknya, pemantauan berakhir ketika para pihak yang bersengketa setuju bahwa putusan atau rekomendasi tersebut telah dipenuhi 107. Apabila dalam jangka waktu yang wajar, Defendant Party tidak melaksanakan putusan atau rekomendasi DSB, maka Complainant Party dapat meminta kompensasi dan apabila tidak ada kesepakatan mengenai kompensasi, maka pelaksanaan

Complainant Party dapat meminta otorisasi

penangguhan

konsesi

atau

kewajiban

lainnya.

Penangguhan konsesi atau kewajiban lainnya ini yang disebut dengan retaliasi. Mekanisme retaliasi dalam WTO diatur dalam Pasal 22 DSU di bawah judul Compensation and Suspension of Concession dan secara spesifik mengenai pengertian retaliasi dapat ditemukan dalam Pasal 22 ayat (1) DSU yang berbunyi: “Compensation and the suspension of concessions or other obligations are temporary measures available in the event that the recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a reasonable period of time…” Pasal 22 ayat (1) DSU menetapkan bahwa kompensasi dan penangguhan konsesi atau kewajiban lainnya (retaliasi) 108 dianggap

105

DSU, Pasal 21.

106

DSU, Pasal 21 ayat (6).

107

Amin Alavi, Legalization of Development in The WTO; Between Law and Politics, (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2009), hlm. 123. 108 Penangguhan konsesi atau kewajiban lainnya biasanya terjadi dalam praktik perdagangan internasional adalah dalam bentuk pengenaan tarif atau hambatan perdagangan lainnya, atas dasar non-most favoured nations terhadap anggota yang tidak patuh terhadap putusan atau rekomendasi DSB oleh negara penggugat. Penangguhan konsesi atau kewajiban lainnya untuk anggota yang

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

45

tindakan sementara dan tidak untuk pelaksanaan penuh. Sistem penyelesaian

sengketa

WTO

menyediakan

untuk

negosiasi

kompensasi dan arbitrase dari tingkat penangguhan konsesi atau kewajiban lainnya. Sebelum dilakukannya tindakan retaliasi, terlebih dulu para pihak harus menegosiasikan mengenai kemungkinan pengenaan kompensasi109 selambat-lambatnya sebelum berakhirnya jangka waktu yang wajar110 pelaksanaan putusan atau rekomendasi DSB. Dari sudut pandang ekonomi, pelaksanaan kompensasi lebih tepat digunakan daripada penangguhan konsesi. Namun, kompensasi juga memiliki kelemahan bagi Complainant Party terutama dari sudut pandang industri Complainant Party

111

yang terkait dengan sengketa,

kelemahan tersebut adalah kompensasi berupa pengurangan hambatan tidak secara efektif menghilangkan ketidakpatuhan Defendant Party. Jika tidak ada kesepakatan mengenai kompensasi dalam waktu 20 (dua puluh) hari setelah tanggal berakhirnya jangka waktu yang wajar, pihak penggugat dapat meminta otorisasi dari DSB untuk melakukan retaliasi yang termasuk dalam Covered Agreements112.

bersangkutan merupakan tindakan yang diskriminasi terhadap anggota yang tidak patuh saja, dan tidak terhadap anggota lain yang berhak atas manfaat lanjutan dari perjanjian WTO. 109

DSU, Pasal 22 ayat (2).

110

Mengenai “reasonable period of time” dalam Pasal 22 ayat (1) DSU, terdapat 3 (tiga) hal yang dapat dijadikan acuan untuk menetapkan jangka waktu yang wajar, yaitu: a.periode yang diusulkan oleh anggota yang bersangkutan, asalkan disetujui oleh DSB; b.Dalam hal tidak adanya persetujuan DSB, maka jangka waktu yang wajar ditetapkan berdasarkan waktu disepakati bersama oleh para pihak yang bersengketa dalam waktu 45 hari dari penerapan laporan; c.Dalam hal tidak ada perjanjian tersebut, periode ditentukan melalui arbitrase dalam waktu 90 hari sejak mengadopsi laporan (David Palmeter dan Petros C.Mavroidids, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization, Practice and Procedure, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), hlm. 236). 111

Rumusan Pasal 22 ayat (2) DSU menggunakan istilah “any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures” namun dalam tulisan ini yang dimaksud adalah pihak tergugat yang dinyatakan kalah oleh putusn DSB. 112

DSU, Pasal 22 ayat (2).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

46

Pasal 22 ayat (2) DSU tidak secara jelas mengatur mengenai syarat yang harus dipenuhi agar dapat meminta otorisasi dalam hal akan melakukan retaliasi. Mengenai syarat minimal pengajuan otorisasi retaliasi dapat dilihat dalam putusan arbiter dalam kasus Hormones antara Amerika Serikat dan EC113 yaitu: 1. Permintaan otorisasi retaliasi harus menetapkan tingkat tertentu dari pelaksanaan retaliasi114. 2. Permintaan otorisasi retaliasi harus menentukan di sektor mana retaliasi akan dilaksanakan115. Apabila Complainant Party telah mengajukan permohonan otorisasi untuk melaksanakan retaliasi, maka dalam jangka waktu 30 (tiga puluh) hari setelah habisnya jangka waktu yang wajar untuk penerapan putusan atau rekomendasi DSB dan tidak adanya kesepakatan mengenai kompensasi, DSB harus memberikan otorisasi pelaksanaan retaliasi apabila retaliasi dilaksanakan masih dalam lingkup Covered Agreements dan tidak ada penolakan secara konsensus

116

. Dalam pelaksanaan retaliasi, tidak jarang timbul

sengketa mengenai seberapa jauh retaliasi boleh dilaksanakan (level of suspension), prinsip, serta prosedur retaliasi. Dalam hal terjadinya sengketa, maka dapat diselesaikan melakui arbitrase 117 . Keputusan hasil arbitrase ini bersifat final dan oleh karena itu, keputusan tersebut

113

Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, Original complaint by the United States, recourse to arbitration by the EU under article 22.6 DSU (WT/DS26/ARB). 114

Contoh tingkat spesifik dari pelasanaan retaliasi adalah retaliasi yang dilakukan setara dengan setara dengan hilangnya keuntungan yang disebabkan karena inkonsistensi terhadap ketentuan WTO (Pasal 22 ayat (4) DSU). 115

Sektor spesifik yang dimaksud dapat dilihat dalam Pasal 22 ayat (3) DSU, yaitu pelaksanaan retaliasi dilakuka terhadap sektor yang sama maupun cross retaliation (baik cross sector realiation maupun cross agreement retaliation). 116

DSU, Pasal 22 ayat (6).

117

DSU, Pasal 22 ayat (6)..

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

47

harus segera diberitahukan kepada DSB untuk diadopsi 118 . Setelah keputusan tersebut diadopsi dan tidak ada konsensus yang menolak pemberian otorisasi tersebut, DSB harus memberikan otorisasi kepada Complainant Party untuk melaksanakan retaliasi sesuai dengan keputusan arbitarse. Mengingat tindakan retaliasi adalah tindak yang bersifat sementara (temporarily action) serta digunakan dalam hal terjadi ketidakpatuhan terhadap putusan atau rekomendasi DSB, maka retaliasi dapat dihentikan dalam keadaan tertentu. Keadaan yang paling memungkinkan untuk menghentikan retaliasi adalah saat adanya kepatuhan dari Defendant Party Sesuai dengan fungsi DSB, dalam hal sudah terjadi kepatuhan oleh pihak yang kalah, maka DSB tetap harus melakukan pengawasan terhadap penerapan dari putusan atau rekomendasi DSB tersebut.

2.3.3. Tujuan Retaliasi DSU Pasal 22 ayat (2) DSU mengatur bahwa retaliasi: “If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement into compliance therewith or otherwise comply with the recommendations and rulings within the reasonable period of ... any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures may request authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements.” Sedangkan dalam Pasal 22 ayat (4), (7), dan (8) DSU mengatur bahwa retaliasi: “The level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment ... shall determine whether the level of such suspension is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment ... and shall be temporary and shall only be applied until 118

DSU, Pasal 22 ayat (7).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

48

such time as the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed, or the Member that must implement recommendations or rulings provides a solution to the nullification or impairment of benefits, or a mutually satisfactory solution is reached ...” Dari 2 (dua) ketentuan di atas, dapat dilihat bahwa tujuan retaliasi dapat dilihat dari 2 (dua) sudut pandang, yaitu dari sudut pandang negara pelaksana retaliasi (Retaliating Country) dan negara yang dikenakan retaliasi (Non Compliance Country). Dua tujuan tersebut yaitu: a.

Sudut Pandang Non Compliance Country dengan Meningkatkan Kepatuhan (inducing complance) Dua tujuan besar yang telah ditetapkan dapat dicapai dengan retaliasi perdagangan, dalam hal ini didefinisikan sebagai kompensasi dibandingkan dengan sanksi. Sanksi ini dapat bertujuan untuk mendorong kepatuhan atau penyeragaman aturan atau setidaknya melalui penyelesaian bilateral yang disepakati. Retaliasi dalam bentuk pengenaan sanksi selain bertujuan untuk mendorong kepatuhan, dapat juga digunakan untuk

pencegahan dalam hal kemungkinan

pelanggaran di masa yang akan datang. Pasal 22 ayat (2) dan (8) dari DSU menyatakan sifat sementara dari retaliasi. Sifat sementara dari retaliasi menunjukan bahwa pada dasarnya retaliasi digunakan untuk memaksa agar negara anggota melaksanakan putusan Panel DSB dan menyesuaikan kebijakan perdagangan internasional sesuai dengan ketenuan WTO. Kasus Banana III yang melibatkan Amerika Serikat dan EC - Pisang menyatakan bahwa sifat sementara menunjukkan bahwa tujuan retaliasi adalah untuk mendorong kepatuhan 119 . Amerika Serikat 119

“Accordingly, the authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations is a temporary measure pending full implementation by the Member concerned. We agree with the United States that this temporary nature indicates that it is the purpose of countermeasures to induce compliance. But this purpose does not mean that the DSB should grant authorization to suspend concessions beyond what is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment. In our view, there is nothing in Article 22.1 of the DSU, let alone in paragraphs 4 and 7 of Article 22, that could be read as a justification for counter-measures of a punitive nature.” (Decision by The

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

49

Singkatnya, sifat sementara retaliasi menunjukkan bahwa DSU memiliki preferensi yang kuat untuk peningkatan kepatuhan dan retaliasi adalah ukuran alternatif dapat diterapkan sampai kepatuhan terjadi. b.

Sudut Pandang Retaliating Country dengan Mengembalikan Kerugian yang Hilang Akibat Tindakan Non Compliance Country (rebalancing) Penerapan retaliasi berupa pemberian sanksi sejalan dengan tujuan mendorong kepatuhan, namun dalam praktik tidak semua negara dapat menjalankan retaliasi berupa pemberian hukuman. Selain itu, arbiter dalam Kasus Byrd Amendment yang melibatkan Amerika Serikat sebagai tergugat, berpendapat bahwa peningkatan kepatuhan dianggap inkonsistensi persyaratan kesetaraan tingkat retaliasi dengan kerugian yang diderita oleh retaliating country. Arbiter dalam putusannya menyatakan bahwa120: “By relying on ”inducing compliance‟ as the benchmark for selection of the most appropriate approach we also run the risk of losing sight of the requirement of Article 22.4 that the level of suspension be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment.” Ketentuan dalam Pasal 22 ayat (4) dan (7) menunjukkan bahwa

retaliasi memiliki lebih menunjukan sifatnya yang memberikan kompensasi, dan bukan memberikan hukuman. Dengan adanya sifat kompensatoris tersebut, DSU mengakui tujuan lain dari retaliasi adalah untuk mengembalikan keseimbangan konsesi yang timbul dari ketidakpatuhan, atau singkatnya adalah tujuan penyeimbangan.

Arbitrators: European Communities - Regime For The Importation, Sale And Distribution of Bananas Recourse to Arbitration by The European Communities Under Article 22.6 of The DSU (WT/DS27/ARB), paragraph 6.3). 120

Decision By The Arbitrator: United States – Continued Dumping And Subsidy Offset Act Of 2000 (Original Complaint By Brazil) Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU (WT/DS217/ARB/BRA), paragraph 3.74.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

50

Dua tujuan retaliasi tersebut dapat disimpulkan dalam tabel sebagai berikut121:

Compensation (Focus on Victim)

Sanction (Focus on Violator)

Rebalance damages

Inducing compliance

Selain 2 (dua) tujuan utama retalisi yang dijelaskan di atas, tujuan retaliasi juga dapat berupa pencapaian pemecahan masalah yang saling menguntungkan.

Tercapainya

pemecahan

masalah

yang

saling

menguntungkan memiliki lingkup yang lebih luas daripada kepatuhan. Mendorong kepatuhan yang diatur dalam Pasal 19 ayat (1) DSU memiliki mencapai ukuran yang konsisten dan selaras, sedangkan solusi yang disetujui bersama bisa datang dalam bentuk ganti rugi/ kompensasi. Namun kompensasi ini berbeda dengan kompensasi yang diatur dalam Pasal 22 ayat (1) dan (2) DSU. Pemecahan masalah yang saling menguntungkan adalah solusi akhir, sedangkan kompensasi yang diatur dalam Pasal 22 ayat (1) dan (2) DSU bersifat sementara. Dengan kata lain, kompensasi berdasarkan Pasal 22 ayat (1) dan (2) DSU tidak menggantikan implementasi penuh untuk mencapai ukuran yang konsisten dan selaras. Nota antara Amerika Serikat dan EC pada kasus Hormones Beef, yang terdiri dari 3 (tiga) tahap, menawarkan solusi definitif yang bisa disepakati pada tahap ketiga 122 . Nota ini memberikan solusi permanen di antara Amerika Serikat dan E123. Pemecahan masalah yang saling menguntungkan 121

Bown dan Pauwelyn, Op.cit., hlm 38.

122

“Memorandum of Understanding Between The United States of America and The European Commission Regarding The Importation of Beef from Animals not Ttreated with Certain Growth-Hormones and Increased Duties Applied by The United States to Certain Products of The European Communites,” https://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file254_ 15654.pdf, diunduh tanggal 12 November 2014. 123

Kesepakatan Amerika Serikat dan EC dalam penyelesaian sengketa ini adalah penetapan kuota impor daging sapi berkualitas tinggi sebesar 45.000 ton dan Amerika Serikat akan mencabut tindakan retaliasi (Pasal 2 ayat (4) Memorandum of Understanding Between The United States of America and The European Commission).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

51

adalah hasil dari pendekatan diplomatik dan negosiasi serta menawarkan beberapa fleksibilitas dalam menyelesaikan sengketa. Keberadaan solusi yang disetujui bersama diperlukan untuk menjaga keseimbangan antara WTO sebagai sistem berbasis diplomatik atau negosiasi dan WTO sebagai sistem berbasis aturan. Tujuan retaliasi tersebut dapat diketahui dengan berbagai cara, antara lain124: a. Tujuan

retaliasi

dapat

diketahui

melalui

cara

“Reverse

Enginering” 125 dan berdasarkan tingkat analisis retaliasi yang diperbolehkan berdasarkan tujuan tersirat retaliasi dan sistem penyelesaian sengketa pada umumnya. b. Tujuan retaliasi dapat diketahui dengan mengamati latar belakang sejarah dan perubahan prosedur retaliasi sejak diatur dalam GATT hingga diatur dalam DSU.

c. Tujuan retaliasi dapat diketahui dari pertimbangan arbiter ketika arbiter setuju untuk memberikan otorisasi kepada negara anggota yang dirugikan untuk melaksanakan retaliasi.

d. Tujuan retaliasi dapat diketahui dari apa yang retaliating country inginkan dari pelaksanaan retaliasi atau dari bagaimana mereka merancang bentuk retaliasi sehingga dapat disimpulkan apa yang ingin dicapai oleh retaliating country melalui retaliasi tersebut.

124

Bown dan Pauwelyn, Op.cit., hlm 42.

125

Reverse engineering sebenarnya istlah yang digunakan dalam bidang teknik. Istilah ini merupakan sebuah pendekatan cara berpkit di mana seorang untuk menemukan atau mengembangkan pemahaman tentang hubungan fungsional komponen atau untuk mendapatkan informasi tentang jenis bahan yang digunakan untuk membuat komponen dalam hal ketiadaan pengetahuan awal mengenai hubungan tersebut. Tujuannya adalah untuk mengembangkan gambaran tingkat tinggi dari suatu sistem tanpa pengetahuan awal. (David Page, Andreas Koschan, dan Mongi Abid, “Methodologies and Techniques for Reverse Engineering–The Potential for Automation with 3-D Laser Scanners,” http://iris.engr.utk.edu/publications/papers/2007/ch2REAIP.pdf, diunduh tanggal 20 November 2014).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

52

Penentuan tujuan yang menjadi dasar dilakukannya retaliasi, menjadi penting mengingat sifat retaliasi yang diskriminatif. Pentingnya menentukan tujuan retaliasi adalah: a. Ketika arbiter diminta untuk memutuskan untuk menyetujui tingkat retaliasi yang sesuai dengan standar yang diatur dalam Pasal 22 ayat (4) DSU, arbiter akan menetapkan nilai yang tinggi terhadap tingkat retaliasi jika arbiter berpendapat bahwa tujuan retaliasi adalah sebagai ‘hukuman’ atau ‘meningkatkan kepatuhan’ daripada jika arbiter melihat bahwa tujuan retaliasi adalah sebagai ‘ganti rugi’126. b. Tujuan retaliasi juga berpengaruh terhadap apa yang diambil sebagai tolak ukur untuk menghitung jumlah kerugian yang disebabkan oleh pelanggaran (original violation) serta tingkat retaliasi yang seharusnya dilakukan atas adanya kerugian akibat pelanggaran

tersebut.

Jika

tujuan

retaliasi

adalah

untuk

mengompensasi negara korban pelanggaran (dalam hal ini Complainant Party), maka tolak ukur yang paling tepat untuk menilai kerugian adalah kerugian ekonomi (economic harm) atau kehilangan keuntungan yang diderita oleh negara korban pelanggaran. Namun jika tujuan dari suspensi adalah untuk mengembalikan keseimbangan yang lebih luas terhadap konsesi perdagangan antara kedua negara, maka tolak ukur yang lebih tepat adalah dampak terhadap perdagangan atau nilai perdagangan bilateral yang hilang yang disebabkan oleh pelanggaran.127. c. Dalam hal tujuan retaliasi adalah sebagai hukuman dan untuk meningkatkan kepatuhan, maka negara yang dirugikan lebih tepat jika melakukan retaliasi terhadap sektor dan produk yang paling 126

Bown dan Pauwelyn, Op.cit., hlm. 38.

127

Ibid., hlm. 39.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

53

memberikan dampak bagi negara anggota yang tidak konsisten dengan ketentuan WTO, misalnya terhadap politically-sensitive products atau cross retaliation terhadap intellectual property rights. Sebaliknya jika tujuan retaliasi adalah sebagai ganti rugi, maka negara yang dirugikan lebih tepat jika melakukan retaliasi terhadap sektor atau produk yang bersaing dengan industri domestik negara yang melakukan pelanggaran

128

, misalnya

retaliasi dalam kasus US-EC Hormones Beef dimana produk agrikultur dari EC dilarang masuk ke dalam Amerika Serikat.

d. Tujuan retaliasi juga dapat digunakan untuk penentuan waktu dimulainya retaliasi (guide questions of timing). Jika tujuan retaliasi adalah untuk meningkatkan kepatuhan, maka waktu yang tepat untuk memulai retaliasi adalah ketika ditetapkannya kebijakan yang bertentangan dengan ketentuan WTO atau setidaknya

ketika

ditemukannya

ketidaksesuaian

dalam

pengadopsian putusan WTO 129 . Pentingnya menetapkan tujuan retaliasi

WTO

juga

terkait

dengan

pertimbangan

dalam

pelaksanaan cross retaliastion130.

Pada

akhirnya,

penilaian

mengenai

efektivitas

dari

sistem

penyelesaian sengketa WTO secara umum tergantung secara khusus kepada tujuan dari retaliasi WTO dan tujuan sistem penyelesaian WTO secara umum131. Tanpa adanya pengaturan mengenai tujuan atau benchmark, maka akan terus timbul perdebatan mengenai efektifitas dari sistem ini.

128

Ibid.

129

Ibid., hlm. 40.

130

Ibid., hlm. 40-41.

131

Ibid.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

54

2.3.4. Ketentuan Tingkat Pelaksanaan Retaliasi (Level of Suspension) Sebagai salah satu tindakan formal, beban pembuktian dalam Pasal 22 ayat (6) untuk proses arbitrase sama halnya dari beban pembuktian dalam proses Panel dalam WTO. Baik negara anggota yang dianggap bertindak sesuai dengan kewajibannya dalam WTO maupun yang dianggap sebaliknya, memiliki beban pembuktian yang sama. Terkait dengan permintaan otorisasi pelaksanaan retaliasi, arbiter biasanya akan meminta Retaliating Country untuk memberikan perhitungan metodologis mengenai apa saja yang akan dikenakan tindakan retaliasi. Hal ini menjadi penting untuk diperhatikan mengingat bahaya yang akan ditimbulkan apabila retaliasi dilaksanakan hanya sebagai ‘pemuas’ bagi Retaliating Country dan digunakan sebagai alat penekan bagi Non Compliance Country. Beberapa ukuran mengenai tingkat pelaksanaan retaliasi dapat dilihat dalam kasus Banana dan kasus Hormones. Dalam kasus Banana132 antara EC dengan Amerika Serikat, Amerika Serikat mengikutsertakan ke dalam permohonan otorisasi retaliasi, daftar produk yang menurut Amerika Serikat sepadan dengan nilai kerugian yang diderita Amerika Serikat akibat tidak dilaksanakannya putusan atau rekomendasi DSB oleh EC133. Hal yang sama juga dilakukan dalam kasus Hormones, di mana Amerika Serikat dan Kanada menyertakan daftar produk yang mencakup jumlah perdagangan yang jauh lebih tinggi (products that covered a significantly higher amount of trade) daripada retaliasi yang seharusnya dilakukan dengan alasan bahwa tidak ada penetapan sebelumnya terhadap daftar produk tersebut yang dapat dikenakan retaliasi134. EC keberatan, meminta bahwa Amerika Serikat dan Kanada akan diminta untuk menyerahkan daftar seimbang antara kerugian yang ditimbulkan dengan retaliasi yang dilaksanakan namun keberatan

132

Banana Case merupakan kasus pertama yang memohon otorisasi pelaksanaan retaliasi berdasarkan Pasal 22 ayat (2) DSU. 133

Hal ini tidak secara langsung berasal dari keputusan dalam kasus Banana namun menjadi bahan pertimbangan bagi arbiter dalam kasus Hormones. 134

Palmeter dan Mavroidis, Op.cit., hlm.267.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

55

tersebut ditolak karena pada dasarnya DSU sendiri tidak mengatur syarat seperti itu135. Namun untuk melindungi kepentingan negara yang dikenakan tindakan retaliasi, retaliasi dibatasi terhadap produk yang terkait dengan pelaksanaan tindakan retaliasi saja. Dalam hal retaliasi dilaksanakan terhadap konsesi tarif, arbiter dalam kasus Hormones berpendapat bahwa hanya produk yang terkait dalam permohonan retaliasi saja yang dapat dikenakan tindakan retaliasi. Dari 2 (dua) contoh kasus di atas, dapat disimpulkan bahwa pada dasarnya DSU tidak mengatur mengenai pengukuran seberapa jauh retaliasi dapat dilaksanakan. Hal ini dikembalikan kepada kebutuhan dari negara pemohon otorisasi dengan menyertakan daftar136 hal-hal apa saja yang akan dikenakan retaliasi. Namun mengingat fungsi retaliasi yang hanya dapat digunakan sampai Non Compliance Country melaksanakan putusal Panel DSB, maka penentuan daftar tersebut harus diperhitungkan dengan perhitungan yang wajar serta didasarkan pada jumlah kerugian yang diderita saja.

2.3.5. Berakhirnya Retaliasi Mengenai berakhirnya retaliasi diatur dalam Pasal 22 ayat (8) DSU yang berbunyi: “The suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be temporary and shall only be applied until such time as the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed, or the Member that must implement recommendations or rulings provides a solution to the nullification or impairment of benefits, or a mutually satisfactory solution is reached.”

135

Ibid.

136

Meskipun sejauh ini pelaksanaan retaliasi berpedoman pada daftar produk yang dilampirkan oleh pemohon retaliasi, namun karena DSU sendiri tidak mengaturnya, maka daftar produk tersebut tidak memiliki dasar hukum yang kuat. Namun untuk alasan yang praktis: perincian produk target potensial berfungsi untuk memberitahukan elemen sektor swasta di wilayah dari anggota yang bersangkutan yang diperlukan untuk “membayar” keuntungan yang hilang akibat adanya tindakan yang tidak patuh. (Ibid., hlm 268).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

56

Dari ketentuan di atas, dapat dilihat bahwa retaliasi dapat berakhir karena 3 (tiga) hal, yaitu137: 1. Pihak yang dituntut bertindak sesuai dengan putusan atau rekomendasi DSB. 2. Pihak yang dituntut untuk melaksanakan putusan atau rekomendasi DSB telah memberikan solusi terhadap hilangnya kerugian yang timbul akibat perbuatannya. 3. Adanya penyelesaian masalah yang disepakati bersama dan saling menguntungkan.

Terhadap penentuan berakhirnya tindakan retaliasi, AB menyatakan bahwa 3 (tiga) kondisi dalam Pasal 22 ayat (8) bersifat alternatif 138 agar penerapan dari retaliasi ini sendiri tidak disalahgunakan oleh pihak penggugat untuk mengambil tindakan-tindakan lain yang tidak sah untuk menekan pihak yang kalah agar melaksanakan putusan atau rekomendasi DSB. Berdasarkan pendapat AB tersebut, dapat diartikan bahwa setelah pelanggaran telah berhenti, maka retaliasi harus berhenti pada saat yang sama 139 . Jadi ketika pelanggaran berakhir, hak (right) untuk melakukan retaliasi dan pemberian hak (entitlement) untuk melakukan retaliasi juga harus berakhir. Hal ini merupakan indikasi bahwa hak untuk membalas dan

137

Farzan Sabet, Kai Kan, dan Thibault Fresquet (Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies), “Retaliation under the WTO system: When does Nullification or Impairment Begin?”,http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/ctei/shared/CTEI /Law%20Clinic/Memoranda%202011/Memo-Retaliation_under_the_WTO.pdf, diunduh tanggal 21 September 2014. 138

Hal ini merupakan pendapat AB dalam Report of The Appelate Body dalam kasus Hormone Dispute antara Amerika Serikat dengan European Community dalam tingkat Banding ( Continued Suspension Of Obligations). Dalam laporannya, AB berpendapat bahwa “the three conditions in Article 22.8 are alternatives to each other…they are alternatives leading to the same result, that is, the termination of the suspension of concessions and final resolution of a dispute.” 139

Pasal 22 ayat (8) DSU memberikan penekanan pada keserentakan antara pelanggaran dan retaliasi serta telah dengan jelas memberikan acuan waktu kapan retaliasi harus berhenti yaitu ketika ada kepatuhan penuh.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

57

hak untuk membalas bersifat contemporaneous140. Hal ini bertujuan untuk mencegah kemungkinan tidak terkendalinya tindakan retaliasi yang dilakukan oleh negara anggota.

140

Sifat contemporaneous dari retaliasi adalah bahwa hak untuk melakukan retaliasi ada serentak/ bersamaan dengan adanya pelanggaran sehingga apabila sebelum ada pelanggaran atau setelah pelanggaran tersebut diselesaikan, maka hak untuk melakukan retaliasi tidak ada. .

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

58

Bagan 2.2. Proses Penyelesaian Sengketa dalam WTO141: Para pihak melakukan konsultasi (Pasal 4 DSU)

Pembentukan Panel oleh DSB (Pasal 6 DSU)

Panel Examination yang dilakukan dengan para pihak (Pasal 12 DSU) atau apabila ada, dilakukan dengan pihak ketiga (Pasal 10 DSU)

Laporan Panel kepada para pihak (Pasal 12 ayat (8) DSU) dan kepada DSB (Pasal 12 ayat (9) DSU)

DSB mengadopsi Laporan Panel untuk dibuatkan putusan atau rekomendasi (termasuk ketika ada perubahan laporan Panel saat di tigkat banding melalui Appeallate Report)

Penerapan putusan atau rekomendasi DSB oleh pihak yang kalah serta memberitahu jangka waktu penerapan dalam perhitungan yang wajar (Pasal 21 ayat (3) DSU)

Pihak yang kalah melaksanakan putusan atau rekomendasi DSB

Jika tidak ada kesepakatan mengenai kompensasi, maka pihak penggugat dapat meminta otorisasi kepada DSB untuk melaksanakan retaliasi

Dalam hal pihak yang kalah tidak melaksanakan putusan atau rekomendasi DSB

Para pihak dapat merundingkan mengenai kompensasi (Pasal 22 ayat (2) DSU)

141

Alavi, Op.cit, hlm.124

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

59

Bagan 2.3.Proses Retaliasi dalam Sistem Penyelesaian Sengketa WTO142: Rekomendasi atau Putusan DSB

Pihak yang kalah (Tergugat) tidak melaksanakan Putusan atau Rekomendasi DSB

Pihak yang dirugikan (Penggugat/ Complainant Country) dapat meminta otorisasi DSB untuk

DSB memberikan otorisasi untuk penangguhan dalam waktu 30 (tiga puluh) hari setelah habisnya jangka waktu implementasi sepanjang termasuk dalam Covered Agreement dan tidak ditolak dengan konsensus Keputusan hasil arbitrase harus segera diberitahukan kepada DSB (Pasal 22 : 7)

DSB akan memberikan otorisasi untuk penangguhan atas permintaan pihak penggugat sesuai dengan keputusan arbitrase dan tidak ada konsensus yang menolak

Tergugat meminta kepada penggugat untuk bernegosiasi guna mencapai kesepakatan mengenai kompensasi

Tidak tercapainya kesepakatan mengenai kompensasi dalam 20 (dua puluh) hari setelah tanggal habisnya waktu implementasi

Timbul sengketa mengenai tingkat dan prinsip serta prosedur retaliasi

Diselesaikan melalui Arbitrase (Pasal 22 : 6) dan keputusan arbiter bersifat final (Pasal 22 : 7)

DSB melanjutkan pengawasannya terhadap implementasi rekomendasi atau putusan yang diadopsi

142

Kristioadi, Op.cit., hlm 89.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

60

2.4.

Tinjauan Singkat Mengenai Penerapan Retaliasi yang Berhasil Dilaksanakan oleh Meksiko Melawan Amerika Serikat dalam Kasus Byrd Amendment The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (Byrd amendment)

adalah hukum Amerika Serikat

yang mengatur tentang distribusi bea masuk

impor yang dikumpulkan dari pengenaan aturan antidumping (AD) atau countervailing duty (CVD) atas permohonan dari industri domestik Amerika Serikat dan/ atau pihak lain yang berkepentingan 143 dalam penyelidikan atas adanya dugaan pelaksanaan dumping dari eksportir negara lain. Di bawah Byrd Amendment, produsen Amerika Serikat yang mendukung permohonan distribusi bantuan impor, menerima bea masuk anti dumping dan countervailing duty yang dikumpulkan oleh United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Sebelum diberlakukan Byrd Amendment, biaya-biaya tersebut ini dibayarkan langsung kepada Departemen Keuangan Amerika Serikat

144

. Namun sejak berlakunya

Byrd Amandment pada tanggal 1 Oktober 2007145, CBP telah mendistribusikan sekitar $1 miliar bea masuk anti dumping dan countervailing duty kepada para pemohon yang merupakan perusahaan Amerika Serikat. Namun, sebuah studi mengungkapkan bahwa lebih dari setengah dari uang ini pergi ke hanya 5 (lima) perusahaan Amerika Serikat 146.

143

Grimmett dan Jones, Loc.cit.

144

Gardner Carton dan Douglas, “Congress Repeals the Byrd Amendment”, http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/Templates/media/files/publications/2006/congress-repeals-thebyrd amendment.pdf, diunduh tanggal 27 September 2014. 145

Dalam sejarahnya, Presiden Clinton menandatangani Byrd Amendment menjadi undang-undang pada bulan Oktober 2000 dilatarbelakangi oleh perlunya pengaturan mengenai penerimaan negara yang diperoleh dari kasus anti dumping dan countervailing duty yang harus dibayarkan kepada produsen dalam negeri AS yang memohon pengenaan bea masuk anti dumping dan countervailing duty tersebut. 146

Alokasi pendistribusian uang yang dikumpulkan dari bea masuk anti dumping dan countervailing duty sebanyak US $ 231.000.000 pada tahun 2001 dan sekitar US $ 330 juta pada tahun 2002 Para penerima utama berasal dari sektor baja dan logam lainnya, barang rumah tangga dan makanan (khususnya pasta). (European Commission,“US Byrd Amendment – WTO says eight WTO Members may retaliate against the US – Joint Press statement by Brazil, Canada, Chile, the EU, India, Japan, Korea, and Mexico”, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-04-1055_en.htm, diunduh tanggal 27 September 2014).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

61

Terhadap ketentuan tersebut, pada tahun 2001, 11 (sebelas) negara anggota WTO (Australia, Brazil, Kanada, Chile, EC, India, Indonesia, Jepang, Korea, Meksiko dan Thailand) melaporkan hal tersebut kepada WTO karena dinilai tidak sesuai dengan ketentuan dalam WTO. Panel yang diselenggarakan pada bulan September 2002 dan proses Banding yang dilakukan pada bulan Januari 2003 menegaskan bahwa Byrd Amendment adalah respon terhadap dumping yang tidak sesuai dengan Agreement On Implementation Of article VI Of The General Agreement On Tariffs And Trade atau Anti Dumping Agreement (ADA)147 secara efektif memberi hukuman ganda kepada produsen negara lain yang mengekspor barangnya ke dalam Amerika Serikat, yaitu pertama dengan memberlakukan bea anti dumping pada impor Amerika Serikat dan kedua dengan kewajiban membayar sejumlah biaya kepada pesaing mereka di AS. Dengan demikian, Byrd Amandement memberikan keuntungan besar bagi industri domestik Amerika Serikat melebihi tujuan pengaturan anti dumping yang sebenarnya148. Terkait dengan pelaksanaan retaliasi, Meksiko sebagai salah satu negara penggugat dalam kasus Byrd Amendment, adalah negara berkembang yang berhasil melaksanakan retaliasi terhadap Amerika Serikat sebagai negara maju. Hal tersebut dapat dilihat dari langkah yang ditempuh Meksiko dalam menyampaikan argumennya dalam keputusan arbiter. Mengenai permohonan otorisasi retaliasi, Meksiko mengungkapkan 3 (tiga) hal yaitu149:

147

Agreement On Implementation Of article VI Of The General Agreement On Tariffs And Trade (Anti Dumping Agreement/ ADA) merupakan ketentuan WTO yang khusus mengatur mengenai anti dumping. 148

Drinker Biddle dan Gardner Carton, “Retaliation Against Byrd Amendment Continues”, http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/Templates/media/files/publications/2007/retaliation-against-byrdamendment-continues.pdf, diunduh tanggal 27 September 2014. 149

The Decision by the Arbitrator on United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (Original Complaint by Mexico) – Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU (WT/DS234/ARB/MEX) 31 Agustus 2004, hlm. 41-45.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

62

1.

Retaliasi sebagai sebagai kewajiban terhadap jumlah perdagangan tidak dapat ditentukan (undetermined quantity of trade) dan bukan sebagai retaliasi terhadap nilai perdagangan yang dapat ditentukan (determined value of trade)150 Amerika Serikat sangat menentang sikap Meksiko dan para penggugat lainnya untuk meminta otorisasi pelaksanaan retaliasi karena Meksiko dan para penggugat tidak menetapkan batas terhadap jumlah perdagangan yang tercakup dalam permohonan otorisasi mereka. Hal ini berdampak besar pada ekspor yang dilakukan Amerika Serikat. Lebih jauh, Amerika Serikat berargumen bahwa dampak tersebut akan jauh lebih besar jika dibandingkan dengan dampak yang ditimbulkan Byrd Amendment terhadap ekspor dari negara anggota lain. Terhadap argumen ini, Meksiko membantah dengan menyatakan bahwa Amerika Serikat sedang mencoba memperkenalkan konsep “uji efek perdagangan (trade effect test)” yang sebenarnya tidak disyaratkan dalam Pasal 22 DSU sehingga Meksiko berpendapat bahwa hal tersebut tidak perlu dilakukan. Selain itu dalam praktik, uji efek perdagangan tersebut sulit dilakukan karena tidak mungkin dapat memprediksi efek perdagangan dari kenaikan tarif.

2.

Retaliasi sebagai upaya untuk mengganti jumlah pencairan dana yang dilakukan berdasarkan Byrd Amendment151 Amerika Serikat berargumen bahwa permohonan otorisasi dari Meksiko dan para penggugat lainnya tidak berdasarkan pada Pasal 22 DSU. Amerika Serikat juga berargumen bahwa Meksiko dan para penggugat tidak mungkin bisa dirugikan apabila tidak ada permintaan atau kewajiban untuk melaksanakan ketentuan Byrd Amendment. Selain itu, Meksiko dan para penggugat juga dapat meminta 1/7 (satu

150

151

Ibid., hlm. 41. Ibid, hlm. 43.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

63

per tujuh) bagian dari pencairan dana yang dibayarkan oleh Meksiko dan para penggugat kepada Amerika Serikat. Terhadap argumen ini, Meksiko membantah dengan menyatakan bahwa pencairan dana tersebut tidak sesuai dengan ketentuan WTO karena jumlah kerugian dihitung berdasarkan konsep objektif dari kerugian yang disebabkan oleh ketentuan Byrd Amandment. Dengan demikian, karena semua pembayaran seimbang dengan jumlah kerugian, maka retaliasi harus diotorisasi dalam jumlah yang sama.

3.

Penetapan Variabel Tingkat Retaliasi152 Amerika Serikat berargumen bahwa arbiter harus menetapkan tingkat retaliasi tunggal (single level of suspension) untuk setiap negara penggugat dan terhadap tingkat ini tidak boleh diubah di masa depan serta harus ditentukan saat pelaksanaan arbitrase. Amerika Serikat juga berargumen bahwa jika tingkat tersebut dapat diubah berdasarkan ketentuan DSU, pengubahan tersebut tidak tepat dalam kasus ini. Terhadap argument tersebut Meksiko membantah dengan menyatakan bahwa tujuan Pasal 22 ayat (4) DSU adalah untuk menjamin kesetaraan tingkat retaliasi dengan tingkat kerugian. Meksiko berpendapat akan sangat spekulatif apabila memperkirakan tingkat yang pasti terhadap kerugian dan retaliasi tersebut mengingat pelaksanaan Byrd Amendment di tahun pertama juga sangat bervariasi. Jika dalam kasus terdapat peraturan yang dianggap tidak sesuai dengan WTO dan tingkat retaliasi ditentukan pada satu titik waktu maka negara yang melanggar dapat melakukan tindakan yang lebih merugikan lagi. Argumen Amerika Serikat justru menggagalkan tujuan dari retaliasi tersebut.

152

Ibid, hlm. 45.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

64

DSB WTO memutuskan untuk memberikan otorisasi kepada Meksiko untuk melakukan retaliasi terhadap Amerika Serikat. Setelah ada pemberitahuan bahwa Meksiko akan melakukan retaliasi, Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition (CITAC) kembali meminta Amerika Serikat untuk mencabut ketentuan Byrd Amendment namun hal tersebut tetap tidak dilakukan. Oleh karena itu, Meksiko menetapkan akan mengenakan tarif retaliasi sebesar $20.9 juta terhadap 3 (tiga) produk Amerika Serikat dengan rinician sebagai berikut153: a. Penambahan bea masuk sebesar 30% terhadap produk susu dan olahannya (dairy products) termasuk di dalamnya susu formula bayi; b. Penambahan bea masuk sebesar 20% terhadap produk anggur (wine products); dan c. Penambahan bea masuk sebesar 9% terhadap produk permen dan permen karet (candy and chewing gum)

Terhadap tindakan ini, Dairy Export Council Amerika Serikat menyatakan bahwa penerapan bea masuk tambahan oleh Meksiko, khususnya untuk produk susu dan olahannya, akan merugikan eksportir Amerika Serikat sebesar $ 160.4 juta. Dalam kasus ini, Meksiko adalah negara keempat dari 11 (sebelas) negara penggugat yang mengajukan retaliasi terhadap Amerika Serikat terkait Byrd Amendment. Total dari tarif retaliasi dari negara-negara tersebut adalah sekitar $ 114 juta. Berdasarkan argumen-argumen yang disampaikan oleh para pihak, arbiter berkesimpulan bahwa tingkat kerugian yang diderita oleh Meksiko pada tahun tertentu dapat dianggap sama dengan total pencairan dana dilakukan berdasarkan Byrd Amendment untuk tahun sebelumnya yang berkaitan dengan bea masuk antidumping atau countervailing duty dibayar oleh Meksiko. Dengan demikian, arbiter memutuskan bahwa Meksiko dapat melaksanakan retaliasi terhadap produk yang berasal dari Amerika Serikat meliputi nilai total perdagangan yang

153

“Mexico to Impose $21 Million in Retaliatory Tariffs Against US Exports; CITAC Says Byrd Amendment Must Be Repealed”, http://www.citac.info/press/release/2005 /08_18.php, diakses tanggal 14 Oktober 2014.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

65

tidak melebihi jumlah pencairan dana yang dilaksanakan berdasarkan Byrd Amendment154. Kasus di atas menunjukan bahwa pertimbangan yang didasasrkan pada tujuan yang hendak dicapai melalui penggunaan retaliasi, sangat berpengaruh terhadap keberhasilan penggunaan retaliasi tersebut, terlepas dari pelaksana retaliasi tesebut adalah negara berkembang maupun negara maju. Kasus ini juga dapat dijadikan contoh bagi negara anggota lain, khususnya negara berkembang dan terbelakang, agar dapat memanfaatkan secara maksimal fasilitas yang disediakan DSU dalam rangka penyelesaian sengketa perdagangan internasional sehingga dapat kepentingan nasional dapat dipertahankan dan fungsi DSU sebagai sarana meningkatkan kepatuhan dapat dijalankan dengan maksimal.

154

Ibid., hlm. 47.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

BAB III KASUS POSISI TUDUHAN DUMPING TERHADAP PRODUK KERTAS INDONESIA OLEH KOREA SELATAN (KASUS DS312)

3.1. Latar Belakang Kasus DS312 Pada tanggal 30 September 2002, Korea Trade Commission (KTC) 155 menerima permohonan dari 5 (lima) produsen kertas Korea Selatan untuk memulai penyelidikan terhadap produsen kertas, terutama produsen kertas yang berasal dari Cina dan Indonesia karena adanya dugaan praktik dumping 156 pada impor kertas jenis business information paper dan wood-free printing paper yang dilakukan oleh produsen dari kedua negara tersebut. Dalam tahap penyelidikan terhadap eksportir kertas dari Indonesia tersebut, KTC menetapkan lebih rinci produk yang disengketakan terbatas pada plain paper copier (PPC) dan uncoated wood-free printing paper (WF) 157 . Menanggapi laporan tersebut, KTC lalu mengirimkan kuesioner kepada 4 (empat) perusahaan kertas Indonesia, yaitu PT

155

Korea Trade Commission (KTC) adalah otoritas pemerintah Korea Selatan bertanggung jawab untuk melakukan investigasi anti-dumping. 156

Secara umum, dumping adalah tindakan di mana eksportir menjual produk ke negara lain dengan harga yang lebih rendah daripada harga produk tersebut apabila dijual di dalam negeri negara eksportir tersebut. Pada dasarnya, tindakan dumping bukan merupakan tindakan yang dilarang dalam ketentuan WTO maupun GATT atau dengan kata lain, tidak setiap tindakan dumping dapat dikenakan tindakan anti dumping. Dumping yang dapat dikenakan tindakan anti dumping hanya dumping yang menyebabkan kerugian bagi industri domestik dari negara yang menjadi tujuan ekspor dari negara yang melakukan dumping (Pasal VI ayat (1) GATT dan Pasal 2 ayat (1) ADA). Persyaratan tambahan ini dapat membatasi negara untuk mengenakan bea terhadap eksportir. Namun, kegagalan Pasal VI atau ADA adalah dalam memberikan definisi kerugian material dan sejauh mana syarat kerugian tersebut dapat digunakan. AB WTO menyatakan bahwa penentuan kerugian material hanya dapat didasarkan pada "sebuah pemeriksaan obyektif” dari bukti positif dan bukti diverifikasi. Namun hal ini masih memberikan banyak kelonggaran kepada otoritas untuk menentukan bagaimana menafsirkan bukti dan bahkan mempertimbangkan pelaksanaan anti dumping tanpa meminta informasi dari negara pengekspor (Reid M. Bolton, “Anti Dumping and Distrust: Reducing Anti Dumping Duties under the WTO through Heightened Scrutiny”, Berkeley Journal of International Law, http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article =1398&co, diunduh tanggal 29 September 2014). 157

Report of the Panel on Korea-Anti Dumping Duties on Imports of Certain Paper from Indonesia (WT/DS312), hlm.5

66

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

67

Indah Kiat Pulp and Paper, Tbk. (Indah Kiat), PT Pindo Deli Pulp and Paper Mills (Pindo Deli), PT Pabrik Kertas Tjiwi Kimia, Tbk. (Tjiwi Kimia), dan PT Riau Andalan Kertas (Fine April). Keempat perusahaan tersebut tidak memberikan tanggapan atas kuesioner yang dikirimkan KTC sampai akhirnya pihak KTC memperpanjang batas waktu untuk menanggapi kuesioner tersebut selama 3 (tiga) minggu. Sebagai respon terhadap permohonan yang diajukan oleh produsen kertas Korea Selatan, KTC menjadwalkan akan memulai investigasi pada 14 November 2002 dan mengeluarkan pernyataan publik pada 26 November 2002. Pihak Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli158 akhirnya menanggapi kuesioner tersebut dengan memberikan informasi secara rinci mengenai kegiatan penjualan dalam negeri yang dilakukan melalui sebuah perusahaan perdagangan, PT Cakrawala Mega Indah (CMI), maupun kegiatan perdagangannya, baik kegiatan ekspor dari produk kertas WF dan PPC. Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli juga melaporkan informasi yang lengkap mengenai penjualan baik kepada CMI dan penjualan kembali oleh CMI. Tjiwi Kimia tidak menanggapi kuesioner tersebut dengan argumen bahwa volume ekspor ke pasar Korea Selatan terlalu rendah untuk menjustifikasi penyelidikan terhadap Tjiwi Kimia. Sebelum KTC memverifikasi laporan yang disampaikan olen Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli, KTC meminta Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli untuk mempersiapkan laporan keuangan CMI pada tahun 2001 dan tahun 2002. Namun pada saat verifikasi, Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli menjelaskan kepada KTC bahwa Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli tidak dapat menyerahkan laporan keuangan CMI karena mereka tidak mengontrol kegiatan usaha CMI sehingga Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli tidak dapat memaksa CMI untuk menyerahkan dokumen tersebut. Sayangnya terhadap hasil laporan tersebut, KTC tidak memberikan pemberitahuan apapun tentang verifikasi di tempat (on-site verification). Namun, pada tanggal 4 April 2003, KTC mengadakan disclosure meeting yang menyatakan bahwa KTC memutuskan untuk menolak sepenuhnya laporan

158

April Fine juga memberikan tanggapan terhadap kuesioner tersebut namun Indonesia tidak mengajukan keberatan apapun terhadap perhitungan KTC terhadap margin dumping terhadap April Fine dalam kasus ini.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

68

penjualan dalam negeri159 dengan alasan bahwa Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli belum menyerahkan laporan keuangan CMI. Namun, KTC setuju untuk menerima laporan keuangan CMI jika laporan tersebut disampaikan tidak lebih dari tanggal 10 April 2003. Pada tanggal 9 April 2003, Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli menyampaikan laporan keuangan CMI kepada KTC. Dalam Penentuan Awal (Preliminary Determination), KTC menolak informasi penjualan dalam negeri dengan alasan Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli telah gagal untuk menyediakan dokumen yang terkait seperti misalnya laporan keuangan CMI dan pada tanggal 23 Maret 2003 KTC dalam Penentuan Awal menetapkan bahwa Indah Kiat, selaku eksportir terbesar Indonesia, memiliki Margin Dumping 160 –0,52% dan Margin Dumping untuk Pindo Deli sebesar 11,56%. Untuk Tjiwi Kimia, KTC menggunakan jumlah fakta yang ada dan menentukan Margin Dumping Tjiwi Kimia sebesar 51,61%. KTC juga membuat penentuan awal mengenai Kerugian Material namun KTC belum memberlakukan tindakan dalam ketentuan anti dumping. Pada tanggal 1 September 2003, KTC mengeluarkan rancangan Penentuan Akhir (Final Determination). Dalam rancangan ini, KTC menetapkan untuk menghitung Margin Dumping tunggal untuk Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli, dan Tjiwi Kimia yang merupakan bagian dari Sinar Mas Grup dengan menyatakan bahwa ketiga eksportir tersebut sebagai entitas ekonomi tunggal (single economic entity)161. Dalam Penentuan Akhir, KTC menghitung Margin Dumping sebesar

159

Pihak Indonesia berpendapat bahwa laporan penjualan Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli dapat dijadikan dasar untuk menetukan Nilai Normal (normal value). 160

Dalam penentuan Margin Dumping untuk Indah Kiat, KTC menggunakan periode penyelidikan dari tanggal 1 Oktober 2001 sampai tanggal 30 September 2002 (WT/DS312/R, hlm.6). 161

Single economy entity adalah konsep yang muncul dari hukum persaingan usaha di mana single economy entity adalah 2 (dua) entitas yang terpisah namun akhirnya bergabung untuk melakukan kegiatan usaha demi kepentingan bersama. Pengertian dasar mengenai single economy entity dapat ditemukan dalam Copperweld case the US Supreme Court yang berbunyi “Concerted activity inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk. It deprives the marketplace of the independent centers of decision making that competition assumes and demands. In any conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued their own interests separately are combining to act as one for their common benefit. This not only reduces the diverse directions in which economic power is aimed, but suddenly increases the economic power moving in one particular direction.” (Neil Mackenzie, Ingrid Rogers, dan Stephen Langbridge,( “The Single Economic Entity Doctrine

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

69

8,22 persen untuk entitas ekonomi tunggal tersebut serta masih tetap menolak informasi penjualan domestik dengan alasan yang sama seperti sebelumnya. KTC juga menyimpulkan bahwa impor dumping yang dilakukan eksportir tersebut telah merugikan industri domestik. KTC mengeluarkan keputusan akhir pada 24 September 2003. Keputusan akhir tersebut memuat penentuan mengenai Kerugian Material serta keputusan untuk memberlakukan bea masuk anti-dumping sebesar 8,22% untuk perusahaan Sinar Mas Group (SMG), 2,80 % untuk April Fine (AF) dan 2,80% untuk eksportir Indonesia lainnya.

3.2. Proses Konsultasi Pada tanggal 4 Juni 2004, Indonesia meminta kepada DSB untuk melakukan konsultasi dengan Korea Selatan sebagai tahap awal penyelesaian sengketa dan pada tanggal 7 Juli 2004, DSB memutuskan untuk melaksnakan proses konsultasi bilateral antara Indonesia dan Korea Selatan. Perwakilan dari pihak Indonesia yang hadir dalam proses konsultasi adalah Direktur Direktorat Pengamanan Perdagangan (DPP) Kementerian Perdagangan Republik Indonesia. Hal-hal yang dibahas dalam proses konsultasi adalah sebagai berikut: 3.2.1. Argumen Indonesia Argumen Indonesia didasarkan pada pandangan bahwa KTC tidak memberikan kesempatan yang adil kepada eksportir Indonesia untuk membela kepentingan mereka. Indonesia juga berargumen bahwa terdapat berbagai aspek dalam anti dumping yang diberlakukan oleh KTC kepada Indonesia yang tidak sesuai dengan Pasal VI GATT dan Agreement On Implementation Of Article VI Of The General Agreement On Tariffs And Trade 1994 (ADA)162 In South Africa And Its Implications For Competition Policy”, http://www.compcom.co.za/ assets/Uploads/events/Eighth-Annual-Conference/Parallel-1B/The-Single-Economic-EntityDoctrine-in-SA.PDF, diunduh tanggal 25 September 2014). 162

ADA merupakan mandatory rules dari Pasal VI GATT 1994 yang secara umum mengatur mengenai penerapan anti dumping bagi negara-negara anggota WTO (Andrea Knorr, “Antidumping Rules Vs. Competition Rules”, Journal Institute for World Economics and International Management University of Bremen, http://www.iwim.uni-bremen.de/publikationen /pdf/W031.pdf, diunduh tanggl 28 September 2014).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

70

Berdasarkan Pasal 6 ayat (8) ADA, otoritas penyelidikan memiliki hak untuk melihat langsung fakta-fakta yang ada hanya jika (1) pihak yang berkepentingan secara signifikan menghambat proses penyelidikan; atau (2) pihak yang berkepentingan tidak memberikan informasi yang dibutuhkan atau tidak memberikan akses kepada informasi yang dibutuhkan dalam jangka waktu yang ditentukan. Pada kenyataannya, Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli telah bekerja sama dengan KTC dalam memberikan tanggapan terhadap kuesioner dari KTC dengan lengkap dan sesuai dengan jangka waktu yang ditentukan. Selain itu, Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli juga bersedia memberikan informasi lebih lanjut apabila terdapat informasi-informasi lain yang dibutuhkan KTC. Dengan demikian, dalam kasus ini eksportir Indonesia tidak secara signfikan menghambat proses penyelidikan yang dilakukan oleh KTC. Pasal 6 ADA juga mewajibkan otoritas penyelidikan untuk memberikan penjelasan lebih lanjut dalam jangka waktu yang telah ditentukan, tentang hal-hal yang dipermasalahkan. Namun pada faktanya, KTC menolak memberikan kesempatan kepada Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli untuk memberikan penjelasan terkait tindakan pengenaan BMAD. KTC juga gagal memenuhi ketentuan Paragraph 7 Annex II ADA dengan tidak menerapkan kehati-hatian khusus dalam penggunaan informasi sekunder dalam menentukan Nilai Normal untuk Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli. Dalam menentukan Nilai Normal untuk Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli, KTC hanya menggunakan data yang diberikan oleh produsen kertas domestik Korea Selatan tanpa memeriksa data dari sumber-sumber lain yang terkait dengan sengketa tersebut.

3.2.2. Argumen Korea Selatan Menanggapi argumen Indonesia tersebut, pihak Korea Selatan dengan tegas membantah semua argumen tersebut. KTC menyatakan bahwa sebelum melakukan verifikasi terhadap tanggapan kuesioner dari Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli, KTC telah berkonsultasi dengan perwakilan yang ditunjuk Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

71

oleh responden dari SMG serta memberikan verifikasi rencana kerja secara rinci untuk Indonesia. Setelah melakukan verifikasi, KTC juga mengadakan pertemuan dengan pihak Indonesia untuk memberikan laporan tertulis terkait perhitungan awal pengenaan BMAD yang diusulkan KTC serta penjelasan lisan mengenai masalah yang dihadapi dalam proses verifikasi. Setelah penentuan awal, KTC meminta kepada produsen domestik Korea Selatan mengenai Kerugian Material yang diderita sesuai dengan Nilai Normal. Sebelum mengeluarkan penentuan akhir, KTC juga telah meminta pendapat lagi terkait Kerugian Material serta mengadakan pertemuan terpisah yang membahas tentang perhitungan Margin Dumping. Dalam pertemuan yang membahas tentang Kerugian Material, KTC telah menyediakan salinan tertulis laporan sementara kepada semua pihak, termasuk kepada perwakilan dari SMG. Namun pada kenyataannya perwakilan dari SMG tidak menghadiri pertemuan tersebut namun KTC tetap memberikan salinan laporan sementara melalui faks kepada SMG. Dalam pertemuan yang membahas tentang Margin Dumping, KTC juga telah memberikan kesempatan kepada Indonesia untuk menanggapi hasil pertemuan tersebut. Korea Selatan berpendapat bahwa sebenarnya pihak Indonesia yang tidak mau bekerja sama karena pada kenyataannya, justru pihak Indonesia tidak memberikan tanggapan terhadap laporan-laporan yang dikirimkan KTC, baik laporan terkait perhitungan Kerugian Material maupun laporan terkait perhitungan Margin Dumping. Dapat dilihat bahwa sebenarnya pengenaan BMAD yang dilakukan KTC telah sesuai dengan prosedur yang diatur dalam ADA, yaitu dengan telah memberikan informasi dan memberikan kesempatan kepada masingmasing pihak untuk menanggapi informasi yang diberikan KTC. Dapat disimpulkan juga bahwa argumen Indonesia yang menyatakan bahwa eksportir Indonesia tidak diperlakukan secara adil adalah tidak benar dan tidak memiliki dasar hukum karena eksportir Indonesia yang justru tidak menggunakan kesempatan yang diberikan, dan oleh karena itu, semua Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

72

argumen Indonesia harus ditolak. Konsultasi bilateral tersebut ternyata tidak dapat menyelesaikan masalah antara Indonesia dan Korea Selatan. Oleh karena itu, sebagai tahap selanjutnya dalam mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa WTO, Indonesia meminta kepad DSB untuk membentuk Panel.

3.3. Proses Sidang Panel Pertama Sesuai dengan Pasal 6 DSU, apabila proses konsultasi dinyatakan gagal, maka pihak yang bersengketa dapat memohon kepada DSB untuk membentuk Panel guna menyelesaikan sengketa perdagangan yang bersangkutan. Terkait dengan kasus ini, setelah konsultasi antara pihak Indonesia dan Korea Selatan dinyatakan gagal menyelesaikan sengketa tersebut, pada tanggal 16 Agustus 2004, Indonesia mengajukan permohonan kepada DSB untuk segera membentuk Panel. Panel tersebut terbentuk pada tanggal 27 September 2004, dan untuk komposisi Panel ditetapkan pada tanggal 18 Oktober 2004 163 . Sidang Panel pertama diadakan pada tanggal 1 Februari 2005 dan tanggal 2 Februari 2005. Untuk sidang Panel pertama pada tanggal 1 Februari 2005, dihadiri oleh para Panelis serta para pihak yang bersengketa sementara pada tanggal 2 Februari 2005 dihadiri oleh para pihak yang bersengketa serta pihak ketiga dalam sidang Panel lanjutan164. Adapun dalam sidang ini, Panelis memberi kesempatan kepada para pihak untuk menyampaikan argumen masing-masing. Argumen dari para pihak tersebut akan dijelaskan lebih lanjut dalam sub bab berikutnya. 3.3.1. Argumen Indonesia165 Dalam sidang Panel pertama, Indonesia meminta Panel untuk memeriksa bahwa dalam pengenaan BMAD oleh Korea Selatan, terdapat tindakan yang tidak sesuai dengan ketentuan ADA, yaitu166: 163

Komposisi Panel yang dibentuk untuk menyelesaikan sengketa Indonesia dan Korea Selatan adalah Mr. Ole Lundby sebagai ketua Panel dan Ms. Deborah Milstein serta Ms. Leane Naidin sebagai anggota Panel (WT/DS312, hlm.1). 164

WT/DS312, hlm.1

165

WT/DS312, hlm. 16.

166

WT/DS312, hlm. 2-4.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

73

a. Pasal 6 ayat (8) ADA dengan menolak informasi penjualan domestik yang diberikan oleh Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli; b. Pasal 6 ayat (8) ADA dan Paragraph 3 Annex II dari ADA dengan menolak informasi penjualan domestik yang diberikan oleh Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli dan laporan keuangan dari CMI; c. Pasal 6 ayat (8) dan Paragraph 6 Annex II dari ADA dengan tidak menginformasikan kepada eksportir Indonesia mengenai alasan penolakan KTC terhadap informasi penjualan domestik yang diberikan oleh Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli serta tidak memberikan kesempatan kepada Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli, dan Tjiwi Kimia untuk memberikan penjelasan lebih lanjut dalam jangka waktu yang ditentukan; d. Pasal 6 ayat (8) dan Paragraph 7 Annex II dari ADA dengan tidak menggunakan kehati-hatian khusus dalam penggunaan sumber kedua untuk menetapkan Normal Value (Nilai Normal) dari Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli serta Margin Dumping dari Tjiwi Kimia; e. Pasal 6 ayat (10) dan 9 ayat (3) ADA dalam menentukan Margin Dumping bagi masing-masing eksportir dari Indonesia, dalam hal ini Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli, dan Tjiwi Kimia; f. Pasal 2 ayat (2). 2 ayat (2.1), 2 ayat (2.2) dan 2 ayat (4) ADA dalam menentukan Nilai Normal untuk Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli sehingga ada ketidakadilan dalam perbandingan Export Price (Harga Ekspor) dengan Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli; g. Pasal 5 ayat (8) ADA dengan tidak menghentikan proses penyelidikan terhadap Indah Kiat ketika Indah Kiat terbukti tidak melakukan dumping; h. Pasal 6 ayat (4), ayat (9) dan Pasal 12 ayat (2) ADA dengan tidak mengungkapkan kepada eksportir mengenai cara penentuan Nilai

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

74

Normal terhadap eksportir tersebut dan penentuan Material Injury (Kerugian Material)167; i. Pasal 3 ayat (1) dan 3 ayat (4) ADA dengan tidak mempertimbangkan dengan layak mengenai faktor-faktor yang relevan dalam menyebabkan Kerugian Material; j. Pasal 2 ayat (6), 3 ayat (1), ayat (2), ayat (4), ayat (5), dan ayat (7), Pasal 6 ayat (2), ayat (4), dan Pasal 12 ayat (2) ADA dalam mendefinisikan PPC dan WF sebagai Like Product (Produk Sejenis) serta tidak memberikan informasi kepada eksportir mengenai penentuan Produk Sejenis tersebut; k. Pasal 3 ayat (1) dan 3 ayat (5) ADA dengan gagalnya membuktikan Causal Link (Hubungan Sebab Akibat) antara Kerugian Material yang diderita oleh industri domestik Korea Selatan dengan tindakan ekspor yang dilakukan oleh eksportir Indonesia; dan l. Pasal 1 ADA dengan tidak memastikan bahwa tindakan anti dumping hanya diterapkan terhadap situasi yang diatur dalam Pasal VI GATT 168 dan berdasarkan pernyelidikan yang dimulai dan dilakukan sesuai dengan ketentuan ADA.

167

Berdasarkan ADA, kerugian harus diartikan sebagai kerugian (kecuali diatur ketentuan lain yang lebih rinci) material kepada industri domestik negara pengimpor, ancaman kerugian kepada industri domestik negara pengimpor, atau menghambat pertumbuhan industri domestik negara pengimpor. 168 Pasal VI GATT di bawah judul Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duties pada intinya mengatur bahwa dalam pihak merasa bahwa ada tindakan dumping dari negara lain yang menyebabkan kerugian, maka negara yang dirugikan tersbeut boleh melakukan tindakan ‘penghukuman’ (“contracting parties recognize that dumping, by which products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another country … is to be condemned if it causes or threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory of a contracting party or materially retards the establishment of a domestik industry”).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

75

Dapat disimpulkan bahwa pada intinya pihak Indonesia mempermasalahkan 2 (dua) hal utama sebagai berikut169:

A.

Argumen

Terkait

Penentuan

Dumping

(determination

of

dumping)170 Terkait dengan argumen ini, Indonesia berpendapat bahwa KTC bertindak tidak sesuai dengan ketentuan dalam ADA khususnya dalam hal penggunaan fakta yang diberikan oleh eksportir Indonesia sehingga hal ini berpengaruh kepada perhitungan Nilai Normal171 dan Harga Ekspor172 bagi Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli serta serta Margin Dumping173 bagi Tjiwi Kimia yang dilakukan oleh KTC. Selain kesalahan dalam penggunaan fakta untuk menentukan Nilai Normal dan Margin Dumping, Indonesia juga berpendapat bahwa KTC juga melakukan kesalahan dalam hal menghitung

169

WT/D312, hlm. 6-11.

170

Penentuan ada atau tidaknya suatu tindakan dumping dapat dilihat dengan menghitung Nilai Normal, Harga Ekspor, Constructed Export Price, perbandingan Nilai Normal dengan Harga Ekspor, dan perhitungan mengenai Margin Dumping (ADA, Pasal 2 ayat (2), Pasal 2 ayat (3), Pasal 2 ayat (4.2)). 171

Nilai Normal adalah harga Produk Sejenis dalam kegiatan perdagangan secara umum yang sebanding (comparable price) dengan harga di pasar domestik negara eksportir. Jika Nilai Normal tidak dapat ditentukan melalui perbandingan dengan penjualan domestik, ADA juga mengatur 2 (dua) pilihan metode untuk menetapkan Nilai Normal, yaitu (1) perbandingan harga produk ekspor sejenis yang mewakili harga pasar domestik dengan harga di negara ketiga yang sepadan dengan harga dalam perdagangan secara umum dan (2) nilai normal yang diambil dari biaya produksi di negara asal (country of origin) dengan tambahan wajar untuk administrasi, penjualan dan biaya umum dan untuk keuntungan (ADA, Pasal 2 ayat (2)). 172 Harga Ekspor adalah harga Produk Sejenis yang dibayar atau dapat dibayarkan oleh pembeli independen pertama (first independent buyer) dalam perdagangan yang wajar. (Directorate General of Anti Dumping and Allied Duties Ministry of Commerce India, “Anti Dumping –A Guide,” hlm.3, http://commerce.nic.in/traderemedies/Anti_Dum.pdf, diunduh tanggal 29 September 2014). 173

Margin Dumping mengacu pada perbedaan antara Nilai Normal dan Harga Ekspor produk yang sedang dalam penyelidikan. Margin Dumping biasanya ditetapkan atas dasar (1) Perbandingan rata-rata Nilai Normal dengan rata-rata dengan rata-rata Harga Ekspor; atau (2) Perbandingan Nilai Normal dan Harga Ekspor normal untuk setiap transaksi. Selain 2 (dua) dasar penentuan di atas, penentuan Margin Dumping dapat dilakukan dengan perbandingan rata-rata Nilai Normal dengan harga setiap transaksi ekspor. Penentuan ini dilakukan dalam hal otoritas yang berwenang menangani masalah anti dumping, menemukan pola Harga Ekspor yang berbeda secara signifikan antara pembeli yang berbeda, wilayah yang berbeda, dan jangka waktu yang berbeda. (ADA, Pasal 2 ayat (4.2)).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

76

perbandingan antara Nilai Normal dan Harga Ekspor174 dan tindakan KTC dalam menerapkan single dumping margin (margin dumping tunggal) terhadap Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli, dan Tjiwi Kimia. Penerapan

margin

dumping tunggal pada Penentuan Akhir penyelidikan KTC untuk ketiga eksportir tersebut dilakukan dengan menganggap ketiga eksportir tersebut sebagai single economic entity 175 . Indonesia menilai keputusan KTC ini selain melanggar Pasal 6 ayat (10) ADA, juga merupakan keputusan yang terlambat (belated decision) dan tidak konsisten karena pada Penentuan Awal, KTC telah menetapkan margin dumping untuk masing-masing eksportir. Indonesia juga keberatan dengan perlakuan KTC yang menerapkan margin

dumping tunggal dengan alasan menghindari

kemungkinan “circumvention” diantara ketiga eksportir tersebut, mengingat ketiga eksportir tersebut memiliki ketentuan, struktur biaya, dan strategi penjual yang berbeda dan juga ketentuan “circumvention” belum diatur dalam ADA.

174

Harga Ekspor dan Nilai Normal Produk Sejenis harus dibandingkan pada tingkat perdagangan yang sama, untuk penjualan yang dilakukan dalam jangka waktu yang tidak terlalu lama. Pemberian kelonggaran dalam jangka waktu dilakukan dalam hal adanya perbedaan faktor yang mempengaruhi perbandingan harga penjualan domestik dan penjualan ekspor. Faktor-faktor tersebut antara lain ciri-ciri fisik, tingkat perdagangan, kuantitas, perpajakan, kondisi dan syarat penjualan. Perlu diperhatikan bahwa faktor-faktor tersebut hanya faktor indikatif. Faktor-faktor yang dapat dibuktikan pengaruhnya terhadap perbandingan harga harus ditentukan oleh otoritas. 175

Perlu diperhatikan bahwa dalam menentukan adanya dumping yang dilakukan oleh suatu negara ke negara lain adalah melalui analisa terhadap Nilai Normal, Harga Ekspor, serta perbandingan antara Nilai Normal dan Harga Ekspor yang akan menghasilkan Margin Dumping. Terkait dengan Margin Dumping, EC dalam kasus Anti Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-type Bed Linen from India, menyatakan ada 2 (dua) jenis Margin Dumping yaitu Positive Margin Dumping dan Negative Margin Dumping. Positive Margin Dumping merupakan hasil perbandingan dimana Nilai Normal lebih tinggi daripada Harga Ekspor sedangkan Negative Margin Dumping adalah perbandingan dimana Nilai Normal lebih rendah daripada Harga Ekspor. Apabila pada perhitungan perbandingan Nilai Normal dan Harga Ekspor menghasilkan Positive Margin Dumping, maka dapat disimpulkan bahwa terdapat tindakan dumping terhadap kegiatan ekspor tersebut. (K.D.Raju, “The WTO Appellate Body Jurisprudence on Anti Dumping: A Critical Review” (Thesis Master of Philosophy in International Trade Law, Jawaharlal Nehru University), hlm 12-13).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

77

B.

Argumen Terkait Penentuan Kerugian Material dan Hubungan Sebab Akibat Hal-hal yang mendasari gugatan di atas adalah tindakan KTC dalam

menetapkan PPC dan WF sebagai Produk Sejenis

176

dan penentuan

Kerugian Material tidak sesuai dengan ketentuan ADA. Selain itu, menurut Indonesia, KTC tidak dapat membuktikan Hubungan Sebab Akibat antara Kerugian Material yang diderita dengan tindakan dumping yang dilakukan eksportir Indonesia serta dalam menentukan adanya Kerugian Material, KTC juga telah melakukan pelanggaran khususnya terhadap Pasal 6 ayat (1), ayat (4), dan ayat (9) ADA. Dalam closing statement yang disampaikan Indonesia dalam sidang Panel pertama, pengenaan tindakan anti dumping seharusnya tidak digunakan secara oportunistik untuk memfasilitasi penerapan langkahlangkah yang bersifat proteksionis dan oleh karena itu, berdasarkan argumen-argumen

yang

disampaikan

sebelumnya,

Indonesia

memperlihatkan kepada Panel bahwa tindakan anti dumping Korea Selatan tidak sesuai dengan ketentuan ADA serta KTC selaku badan yang diberikan otoritas oleh pemerintah Korea Selatan, dalam penyelidikannya telah bertindak sewenang-wenang tanpa melihat bahwa dalam ADA sendiri telah diatur bagaimana penyelidikan tersebut seharusnya dilakukan. Melalui penjelasan-penjelasan tersebut, Indonesia percaya bahwa setelah melakukan evaluasi terhadap fakta dan terhadap ketentuan dalam ADA, Panel akan menyimpulkan bahwa Indonesia benar dalam menunjukkan bahwa KTC

176

Pengertian Produk Sejenis menurut Pasal 2 ayat (6) ADA “like product shall be interpreted to mean a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration.” Pada pelaksanaannya, banyak variasi yang mungkin mengenai penentuan Produk Sejenis namun prinsip dasarnya adalah bahwa perbandingan harus setepat mungkin. Akibatnya, variasi yang cukup berpengaruh pada harga atau biaya dari suatu produk biasanya akan diperlakukan sebagai model atau jenis yang berbeda. Untuk tujuan perhitungan, pemerintah biasanya akan membandingkan model yang sama atau sangat mirip atau jenis. (United Nation, “Training Module On The WTO Agreement On Anti-Dumping” (modul disampaikan dalam United Nations Conference On Trade And Development), New York: United Nations Publication, 2006, hlm. 5).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

78

melakukan pelanggaran terhadap ketentuan anti dumping secara umum dalam Pasal VI GATT dan secara khusus dalam ADA177. 3.3.2. Argumen Korea Selatan178 Sebagai pihak yang dinilai telah melakukan tindakan anti dumping yang tidak adil dan sewenang-wenang, Korea Selatan menyadari pentingnya perbedaan pendapat ini diselesaikan melalui penyelesaian sengketa WTO. Namun Korea Selatan tidak dapat menerima argumen yang diajukan oleh Indonesia. Korea Selatan berpendapat bahwa Indonesia tidak dapat melihat Kerugian Material yang ditimbulkan oleh eksportir Indonesia terhadap industri domestik Korea Selatan. Korea Selatan berpendapat bahwa argumen Indonesia mengenai penentuan Kerugian Material yang tidak tepat digunakan oleh Indonesia untuk menyerang Korea Selatan. Apabila Panel dapat menilai secara objektif, maka Panel akan melihat bahwa tindakan anti dumping yang dilakukan Korea Selatan telah sesuai dengan ketentuan dalam ADA. Terhadap argumen-argumen Indonesia tersebut, Korea Selatan memberikan bantahan sebagai berikut: A.

Penggunaan fakta oleh KTC sebagai dasar dalam pengenaan tindakan anti dumping terhadap Indonesia sudah adil dan tidak sewenang-wenang179 Dalam argumennya, Indonesia berpendapat bahwa KTC tidak

memberikan kesempatan bagi Indonesia untuk membela kepentingannya. Namun menurut Korea Selatan, argumen tersebut tidak tepat karena dalam pelaksanaannya, prosedur penyelidikan yang dilakukan KTC, selaku badan yang memiliki otoritas dari pemerintah Korea Selatan untuk melakukan penyelidikan anti dumping, sudah memberikan kesempatan bagi semua 177

WT/DS312, hlm. 21.

178

WT/DS312, hlm. 27-29.

179

WT/DS312, hlm. 12-13.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

79

pihak untuk memberikan informasi serta argumen. Contohnya pada saat penentuan awal (preliminary determination) KTC telah mengeluarkan penjelasan tertulis tentang keputusannya tentang dumping dan Kerugian Material yang juga menyertakan 2 (dua) laporan tambahan dari KTC Office of Investigation. Korea Selatan berargumen justru pihak Indonesia yang sengaja tidak mau bekerja sama agar penyelidikan tidak dapat berjalan lancar seperti contohnya sikap Tjiwi Kimia yang tidak mau menanggapi kuesioner dari KTC. Secara umum Korea Selatan menyimpulkan bahwa eksportir tersebut telah diberi kesempatan lebih dari cukup untuk mempertahankan kepentingan mereka sehingga KTC tidak dapat dinyatakan bersalah karena justru sikap SMG yang menghambat investigasi dengan menahan informasi yang diperlukan.

B.

Penentuan dumping yang dilakukan KTC sudah sesuai dengan ketentuan ADA180

1.

Penentuan Nilai Normal dan Harga Ekspor Indonesia berargumen bahwa KTC harus menetapkan Harga Ekspor dan Nilai Normal Tjiwi Kimia yang mencerminkan informasi yang disampaikan oleh eksportir lain sebagai tanggapan atas kuesioner KTC, meski Tjiwi Kimia tidak bekerja sama dengan KTC dalam melakukan penyelidikan. Bertentangan dengan argumen Indonesia, Paragraph 7 Lampiran II ADA 181 secara khusus memberi kuasa kepada otoritas untuk memenuhi hasil yang kurang menguntungkan (less favourable result) ketika pihak yang berkepentingan tidak

180

Ibid., hlm. 13-15.

181

Paragraph 7 Annex II ADA mengatur bahwa dalam hal “…In such cases, the authorities should, where practicable, check the information from other independent sources at their disposal, such … and from the information obtained from other interested parties during the investigation. It is clear, however, that if an interested party does not cooperate and thus relevant information is being withheld from the authorities, this situation could lead to a result which is less favourable to the party than if the party did cooperate.”

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

80

bekerja sama dan menahan informasi yang relevan. Indonesia tidak menyatakan bahwa informasi yang digunakan KTC untuk menentukan Harga Ekspor dan Nilai Normal untuk Tjiwi Kimia, tidak memadai dan akurat sehingga apabila benar ada kesalahan dalam penentuan Nilai Normal dan Harga Ekspor, bukan merupakan tanggung jawab KTC karena KTC telah menggunakan semua data yang diberikan eksportir Indonesia. Ketentuan tersebut juga tidak membebankan kewajiban kepada KTC untuk memperingatkan perusahaan SMG lainnya konsekuensi dari sikap tidak mau bekerja sama yang mereka lakukan. Oleh karena itu, argumen Indonesia dipandang tidak memiliki dasar. Mengenai penolakan informasi yang diberikan oleh CMI, Indonesia berargumen bahwa tindakan tersebut tidak tepat karena informasi yang diberikan CMI berpengaruh terhadap penentuan Nilai Normal dan Harga Ekspor. Korea Selatan berpendapat bahwa Indonesia tidak mempertimbangkan akibat dari penolakan tersebut terhadap hasil verifikasi yang dibuat oleh KTC. Meskipun pada akhirnya CMI mau menyerahkan laporan keuangannya kepada KTC, namun keterlambatan tersebut tidak bisa memperbaiki kesalahan yang disebabkan oleh penolakan sebelumnya. Apabila tetap digunakan justru akan menghambat proses penyelidikan karena KTC harus melakukan verifikasi ulang. Mengenai penggunaan Constructed Value

182

sebagai dasar

penentuan Nilai Normal, Indonesia berargumen bahwa tindakan tersebut tidak tepat mengingat Pasal 2 ayat (2) ADA telah mengatur tata cara dalam menentukan Nilai Normal. Namun penggunaan

182

Constructed value digunakan dalam hal (1) tidak ada Harga Ekspor atau (2) Harga Ekspor tidak dapat ditetapkan karena adanya penggabungan atau pengaturan kompensasi antara eksportir dan importir atau pihak ketiga untuk menentukan Nilai Normal. Harga Ekspor tersebut dapat ditentukan atas dasar harga di mana Produk Sejenis yang diimpor, dijual kembali kepada pembeli independen yang dapat digunakan Jika Produk Sejenis tidak dijual kembali kepada pemebli independen atau tidak dijual dalam kondisi seperti halnya produk tersebut diimpor, maka pemerintah dapat menetapkan Harga Ekspor secara wajar (ADA, Pasal 2 ayat (3)).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

81

Constructed Value sebagai penetuan Nilai Normal merupakan konsekuensi langsung dari penolakan SMG untuk memberikan data yang lengkap dan untuk memungkinkan verifikasi. Selain itu penggunaan Constructed Value telah sesuai dengan ADA, karena penggunaan

Constructed

Value

memungkinkan

KTC

untuk

mengurangi ketergantungan pada data-data sekunder. 2.

Penentuan Margin Dumping Mengenai penentuan dumping yang dilakukan KTC, KTC menanggapi perihal keberatan Indonesia terhadap sikap KTC yang memberlakukan Margin Dumping tunggal (single dumping margin) terhadap SMG. Indonesia berpendapat bahwa KTC seharusnya menetapkan Margin Dumping yang terpisah untuk SMG berdasarkan Pasal 6 ayat (10) ADA. Terhadap pendapat ini, Korea Selatan berpendapat bahwa Pasal 6 ayat (10) ADA183 tidak berbicara dalam konteks “perusahaan”. Dalam pasal 6 ayat (10) ADA disebutkan bahwa “sebagai sebuah peraturan”, pemerintah dapat “menentukan Margin Dumping untuk setiap eksportir atau produsen dari product under consideration (Produk yang Disengketakan)”. Korea Selatan berpendapat bahwa tidak ada dalam ketentuan tersebut yang menghalangi otoritas penyelidikan (dalam hal ini adalah KTC) dalam hal penerapan definisi fungsional "eksportir". Dengan demikian memperlakukan perusahaan terpisah yang bertindak sebagai satu kesatuan juga termasuk "eksportir atau produsen" yang diatur dalam Pasal 6 ayat (10) ADA.

3.

Penentuan Kerugian Material yang Dilakukan KTC Telah Sesuai dengan Ketentuan dalam ADA184

183

Pasal 6 ayat (1) ADA “as a rule, the authorities shall determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer…of the product under investigation.” 184

WT/DS312, hlm 16-17.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

82

Korea Selatan meragukan argumen Indonesia mengenai isu yang berkaitan dengan penentuan Kerugian Material. Korea Selatan memandang bahwa keberatan utama Indonesia adalah bahwa Indonesia ingin agar KTC menetapkan standar yang berbeda untuk setiap faktor yang dipertimbangkan. Argumen tersebut tidak memberikan dasar untuk menyatakan bahwa penentuan Kerugian Material oleh KTC ini tidak sesuai dengan ketentuan ADA. Berkenaan dengan penentuan Kerugian Material, Indonesia berargumen bahwa terdapat 3 (tiga) hal yang membuat penentuan Kerugian Material oleh KTC menjadi tidak konsisten, yaitu: a.

Definisi Produk Sejenis185 KTC mendefinisikan semua kertas jenis WF sebagai Produk yang Disengketakan. Sesuai dengan Pasal 2 ayat (6) ADA, KTC mengidentifikasi Produk Sejenis sebagai produk hasil industri domestik Korea Selatan yang paling serupa dengan Produk yang Disengketakan. Indonesia berpendapat bahwa KTC seharusnya melihat apakah Produk yang Disengketakan terdiri dari lebih dari 1 (satu) macam Produk Sejenis. Namun menurut Korea Selatan, argumen itu, tidak sesuai dengan definiri Produk Sejenis dalam Pasal 2 ayat (6) ADA, yang mengatur bahwa definisi Produk Sejenis flows directly dari definisi Produk yang Disengketakan. tentang

definisi

Indonesia

juga

tidak

KTC

terhadap

mempermasalahkan

definisi

Produk

yang

Disengketakan sehingga, Indonesia tidak memiliki dasar untuk keberatan terhadap hal ini. Selanjutnya, meskipun pada akhirnya Indonesia mempermasalahkan definisi tersebut, Korea Selatan tetap

pada

pernyataannya.

Indonesia

sendiri

tidak

menyampaikan bukti untuk mendukung argumennya kepada KTC untuk mendukung klaim Indonesia. Para produsen Indonesia hanya menyimpulkan secara luas bahwa terdapat 185

WT/DS312, hlm. 38.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

83

perbedaan berupa karakteristik

fisik,

penggunaan akhir,

kemampuan substitusi, harga, pangsa pasar, dan proses produksi, tanpa memberikan penjelasan lebih lanjut mengenai seberapa jauh perbedaan tersebut untuk mendukung argumen mereka. Oleh karena itu, tidak ada dasar untuk menyatakan bahwa Produk yang Disengketakan bukan merupakan Produk Sejenis. b.

Analisis terhadap Volume Impor dan Price Effects186 Menurut Korea Selatan, data statistik yang menunjukan penurunan volume impor sampai pertengahan tahun 2003 karena apabila dilihat volume impor secara keseluruhan pada tahun 2003 justru lebih tinggi daripada tahun-tahun sebelumnya (pada tahun 2002, volume impor sebesar 176.522 ton sementara tahun 2003 sebesar 177.548 ton). Selain dari volume, impor pada tahun 2003 memiliki pangsa pasar yang lebih tinggi daripada tahun-tahun sebelumnya. Hal ini tentu sejalan dengan ketentuan Pasal 3 ayat (2) ADA yang secara eksplisit memungkinkan otoritas penyelidik untuk menentukan Kerugian Material berdasarkan

peningkatan

volume

impor

relatif

terhadap

konsumsi, bahkan jika impor telah mengalami penurunan secara absolut. Terhadap analisis price effects, Indonesia berpendapat bahwa terjadinya penurunan harga merupakan hal yang ganjil dalam kasus ini karena data menunjukan bahwa dalam beberapan tahun, harga rata-rata penjualan impor dumping justru lebih tinggi daripada harga penjualan dalam negeri. Namun Korea Selatan berpendapat meskipun tidak terjadi penurunan harga, tidak berarti bahwa Indonesia tidak melakukan penekanan harga sampai pada tingkat tertentu atau mencegah terjadinya peningkatan harga. KTC menemukan bahwa telah terjadi 186

WT/DS312, hlm.39.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

84

penekanan harga pada impor dumping yang terjadi pada tahun 2000 sampai tahun 2003 yang tentu saja berkaitan dengan penurunan harga impor dumping. Tujuan penekanan harga ini jelas agar industri domestik Korea Selatan tidak mampu mencapai harga yang memungkinkan untuk meningkatkan pendapatan operasional. c.

Pertimbangan terhadap Faktor-Faktor yang Relevan terhadap penentuan Kerugian Material187 Indonesia

berargumen

mempertimbangkan

bahwa

faktor-faktor

lain

KTC yang

seharusnya berpengaruh

terhadap Kerugian Material tersebut, namun Indonesia belum mengidentifikasikan faktor apa yang termasuk “faktor lain” dan apa yang termasuk “faktor utama”. Pada pelaksanaannya KTC telah memeriksa semua faktor utama yang berpengaruh terhadap Kerugian Material. Argumen Indonesia yang menyatakan bahwa pemeriksaan KTC terhadap faktor utama akan memberikan hasil yang berbeda juga tidak dapat dibenarkan karena pada kenyataannya memang terjadi Kerugian Material pada industri domestik Korea Selatan. d.

Hubungan Sebab Akibat antar Impor dan Kerugian Material188 Indonesia berargumen bahwa faktor-faktor yang telah diperiksa KTC bukan penyebab Kerugian Material terhadap industri domestik Korea Selatan. Terhadap argumen tersebut, Korea Selatan berpendapat bahwa Indonesia berusaha mencari kesalahan dari pemeriksaan yang dilakukan oleh KTC namun sayangnya tidak meyakinkan. Sebaliknya, fakta menunjukan bahwa impor dumping dari Indonesia mengalami peningkatan pangsa pasar setiap tahun sementara terhadap harga produk

187

WT/DS312, hlm 40.

188

Ibid.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

85

impor dumping, terjadi penurunan setiap tahunnya. Akibatnya industri domestik Korea Selatan tidak mampu meningkatkan harga pada tingkat yang menguntungkan. Oleh karena itu, faktor-faktor

yang diperiksa

KTC merupakan penyebab

terjadinya Kerugian Material.

Berdasarkan argumen-argumen di atas, Korea Selatan berkesimpulan bahwa gugatan Indonesia didasarkan pada keyakinannya bahwa eksportir SMG adalah ‘korban’ tindakan pemerintah Korea Selatan yang sewenangwenang. Namun fakta menunjukan bahwa justru tindakan SMG yang membuat SMG berada dalam posisi seperti ini. Secara keseluruhan, perlakuan KTC terhadap SMG cukup ringan dan sepenuhnya konsisten dengan batas yang ditentukan oleh ADA. Oleh karena itu, Panel harus menolak semua gugatan Indonesia.

3.4. Proses Sidang Panel Kedua Dalam proses sidang Panel pertama, dapat dilihat bahwa belum ada kesepakatan antara Indonesia dan Korea Selatan. Oleh karena itu, pada tanggal 30 Maret 2005, diadakan kembali Sidang Panel yang kedua. Adapun yang dibahas dalam Sidang Panel kedua adalah sebagai berikut: 3.4.1. Argumen Indonesia Dalam Sidang Panel kedua, pada intinya Indonesia mempertahankan 2 (dua) hal, yaitu: A.

Penentuan Dumping oleh KTC189 Mengenai penentuan dumping oleh Korea Selatan, Indonesia tetap

berpendapat bahwa Korea Selatan telah melakukan kesalahan dalam memperhitungkan adanya tindakan dumping. Hal ini didasarkan pada penggunaan data yang bertentangan dengan Pasal 2 ayat (2) dan Pasal 6 ayat (8) ADA sehingga menghasilkan kesimpulan yang tidak tepat pula. 189

WT/DS312, hlm.41-43.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

86

1. Penentuan Dumping yang Tidak Sesuai dengan Pasal 2 ayat (2) ADA Pasal 2 ayat (2) ADA pada intinya adalah mengatur mengenai penentuan harga penjualan di pasar domestik negara pengekspor untuk kemudian

dijadikan

perbandingan

dalam

menghitung Margin

Dumping serta pasal tersebut memberikan alternatif penentuan harga jual lain apabila terdapat kondisi-kondisi yang tidak memungkinkan untuk menetapkan harga jual Produk Sejenis di pasar domestik negara pengekspor. Alternatif tersebut adalah dengan menggunakan harga yang sebanding dengan harga ketika Produk Sejenis tersebut diekspor ke negara ketiga yang sesuai serta harga ini merupakan perwakilan, atau dengan menggunakan biaya produksi di negara asal ditambah jumlah yang wajar untuk administrasi, penjualan dan biaya umum dan untuk keuntungan (constructed value)190. Terkait dengan penggunaan Constructed Value sebagai Nilai Normal, Korea Selatan tidak menjelaskan tentang perhitungan dalam penggunaan Constructed Value ini khususnya terkait biaya. Korea Selatan bahkan menyatakan bahwa tidak ada hubungan antara kegiatan perusahaan dan biaya. Hal ini tentu tidak benar karena dengan biaya ini yang akan menentukan Nilai Normal dari Produk Sejenis tersebut. Apabila biaya ini diabaikan, maka sudah sepantasnya Indonesia meragukan perhitungan data yang dilakukan oleh KTC. Dengan demikian, tindakan KTC dengan mengabaikan jenis kegiatan untuk menentukan biaya, tidak sesuai dengan Pasal 2 ayat (2) ADA.

190

Mengenai ketentuan tentang cinstructed value dapat ditemukan dalam Pasal 2 ayat (2.2)

ADA.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

87

2. Penentuan Dumping yang Tidak Sesuai dengan Pasal 6 ayat (8) ADA Indonesia menilai bahwa KTC memiliki kebijakan pemberian toleransi terhadap ketidakmampuan eksportir untuk memberikan informasi yang diperlukan untuk penyelidikan hal ini bertentangan dengan Pasal 6 ayat (8)191 ADA dan Annex II ADA yang mengatur langkah yang harus diambil oleh otoritas penyelidik dalam penggunaan informasi dari eksportir 192 . Pada praktiknya Korea Selatan tidak melaksanakan ketentuan ini dengan konsisten khususnya dalam hal ketiadaan data dari Tjiwi Kimia yang pada akhirnya berpengaruh terhadap perhitungan Margin Dumping bagi single economic entity SMG. Lebih lanjut, Korea Selatan bahkan berargumen bahwa kata “explanation” dalam Paragraph 6 Annex II ADA 193 tidak mencakup “kesempatan kedua untuk memberikan informasi baru”. Meskipun demikian, dalam Annex II ADA telah dijelaskan bahwa “explanation” mencakup pemberian keterangan lebih lanjut (providing further details). Dengan demikian, Paragraph 6 Annex II ADA secara konsisten ditafsirkan untuk merujuk kesempatan untuk memberikan informasi tambahan pembuktian, dan tidak

hanya

informasi

untuk

menjelaskan

kekurangan

data

sebelumnya. Interpretasi Korea Selatan terhadap Paragraph 6 Annex II

191

Pasal 6 ayat (8) ADA: “In cases in which any interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the investigation, preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative, may be made on the basis of the facts available. The provisions of Annex II shall be observed in the application of this paragraph.” 192

Berdasarkan Annex II ADA, dalam hal adanya kesulitan dari eksportir untuk menyediakan informasi yang dibutuhkan, maka terdapat 3 (tiga) pilihan yang dapat digunakan yaitu dengan memberikan informasi melalui media computer language atau computer tape, memberikan informasi secara tertulis, atau dengan cara lain yang disetujui oleh otoritas penyelidikan. 193

Paragraph 6 Annex II ADA “If evidence or information is not accepted, the supplying party … have an opportunity to provide further explanations within a reasonable period, … If the explanations are considered by the authorities as not being satisfactory, the reasons for the rejection of such evidence or information should be given in any published determinations.”

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

88

ADA jelas sekali bertentangan dengan tujuan sebenarnya dari ketentuan tersebut.

B.

Penentuan Kerugian Material dan Hubungan Sebab Akibat194 Mengenai penentuan Kerugian Material, Indonesia berpendapat

bahwa hal itu disebabkan adanya ketidaksesuaian dengan ADA dalam mendefinisikan Produk Sejenis dan kesalahan dalam menganalisis Kerugian Material serta dalam menganalisis adanya Hubungan Sebab Akibat. 1.

Definisi Produk Sejenis Indonesia

telah

menjelaskan

bahwa

dalam

menentukan

Kerugian Material dan Hubungan Sebab Akibat oleh KTC tidak sesuai dengan Pasal 2 ayat (6) dan Pasal 3 ADA. Dengan demikian, ada kewajiban dari KTC selaku otoritas penyelidik untuk memastikan bahwa penentuan Kerugian Material didasarkan pada Produk Sejenis. Korea Selatan telah mengakui secara tersirat bahwa harus ada konsistensi

internal

Disengketakan. Pada

dalam

mendefinisikan

Produk

yang

kenyataannya, ADA tidak secara jelas

mendefinisikan Produk yang Disengketakan, apakah harus Produk Sejenis atau tidak. Namun hal tersebut tidak membebaskan KTC dalam menentukan definisi Produk Sejenis dalam Pasal 2 ayat (6) dan Pasal 3 ADA dalam menetapkan Kerugian Material. Dalam praktiknya, KTC tidak membuat temuan apakah PPC dan WF adalah Produk Sejenis yang digunakan untuk menetapkan Kerugian Material. Dengan demikian, Panel harus menyimpulkan bahwa dengan tidak adanya penelitian mengenai kesamaan PPC dan WF sebagai Produk Sejenis, maka dapat disimpulkan perhitungan mengenai Kerugian Material harus diragukan kebenarannya karena masih tidak jelas apakah dasar perhitungan tersebut adalah Produk Sejenis atau bukan.

194

WT/DS312, hlm. 43-45.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

89

2.

Analisis terhadap Kerugian Material Faktor pertama yang menyebabkan terjadinya kekeliruan dalam

menganalisis Kerugian Material adalah pendapat KTC mengenai volume perdagangan dan price effects. Indonesia memandang bahwa KTC telah keliru delam menetapkan Kerugian Material yang dihitung dari jumlah impor yang sedang dalam penyelidikan. Pendapat KTC tersebut didasarkan pada fakta di tahun 2003, konsumsi barang impor dari Indonesia mengalami peningkatan dan hal tersebut dianggap tetap menimbulkan Kerugian Material. Indonesia juga memandang bahwa KTC telah membuat perhitungan yang salah mengenai pangsa pasar. Faktor kedua adalah metode analisis yang dilakukan KTC dalam menetapkan Kerugian Material yang tidak sesuai dengan Pasal 3 ayat (4) ADA195. KTC tidak dapat menyatakan bahwa tidak ada Kerugian Material

hanya

karena

adanya

kecenderungan

peningkatan

sehubungan dengan faktor-faktor yang sedang dalam penyelidikan, misalnya volume impor. Hal tersebut adalah tanggung jawab KTC untuk mengevaluasi kecenderungan dalam faktor penyebab Kerugian Material dan menempatkan mereka dalam konteks siklus bisnis untuk menentukan kesimpulan bahwa terdapat Kerugian Material yang diderita industri dalam negeri atau tidak. 3.

Analisis terhadap Hubungan Sebab Akibat Mengenai

analisis

Hubungan

Sebab

Akibat,

Indonesia

memandang KTC telah menetapkan Hubungan Sebab Akibat pada analisis keliru KTC, khususnya dalam hal analisis tentang konsumsi dan pangsa pasar. Mengenai biaya bahan baku produksi, Korea Selatan

berpendapat

bahwa

perubahan

biaya

tidak

dapat

195

Pasal 3 ayat (4) ADA “The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestik industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, including actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestik prices; the magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments…”

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

90

mempengaruhi pendapatan industri domestik Korea Selatan dan bahkan meningkatkan keuntungan. KTC harus menganalisis sejauh mana perubahan biaya ini mempengaruhi pendapatan dan keuntungan operasional sebagai bagian dari analisis Hubungan Sebab Akibat. KTC juga harus menyadari bahwa ada kecenderungan peningkatan impor dari negara lain terutama menjelang akhir periode. Terkait dengan penurunan ekspor industri dalam negeri, Korea Selatan juga tidak menanggapi argumen Indonesia bahwa penurunan tersebut sebenarnya lebih besar dari penurunan pengiriman domestik untuk periode 1999-2002 sehingga tidak tepat apabila mengatakan penurunan ekspor disebabkan oleh peningkatan impor dari Indonesia.

3.4.2. Argumen Korea Selatan Selama proses Panel berlangsung, Korea Selatan berpendapat bahwa argumen Indonesia tidak melakukan interpretasi ADA secara hati-hati. Sepanjang proses Panel ini, Indonesia telah memberikan daftar tentang kewajiban apa saja dalam ADA yang yang telah dilanggar oleh Korea Selatan. Namun Indonesia telah gagal untuk melakukan analisis terhadap ketentuan-ketentuan yang diperlukan untuk menjelaskan kewajiban tersebut dan analisis apakah tindakan Korea Selatan tidak sesuai dengan ketentuan tersebut atau tidak. Bantahan Korea Selatan terhadap argumen-argumen Indonesia yaitu: A.

Masalah Perhitungan Dumping196 Korea

Selatan

memandang

bahwa

pihak

Indonesia

selalu

mendasarkan argumennya mengenai kesalahan dalam perhitungan dumping karena adanya ketidaklengkapan serta kesalahan dalam menggunakan datadata yang dimiliki oleh KTC. Indonesia berpendapat bahwa KTC gagal untuk menguatkan fakta yang digunakan untuk menentukan Harga Ekspor dan Nilai Normal untuk Tjiwi Kimia. Tapi data yang digunakan KTC terkait 196

WT/D312, hlm.46-49.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

91

dengan Tjiwi Kimia, telah sesuai dengan Paragraph 7 Annex II ADA 197 . Data tersebut berasal data Harga Ekspor dari statistik pabean resmi Korea, dan dengan mendasarkan Nilai Normal pada informasi dari lembaga independen pemerintah Korea Selatan, dan kemudian membandingkan informasi ini dengan data yang diajukan oleh eksportir yang menanggapi kuesioner KTC. Masih mengenai data Tjiwi Kimia, KTC meminta data mengenai Tjiwi Kimia melalui SMG. KTC mengirim kuesioner untuk masing-masing perusahaan SMG meminta informasi yang lengkap pada semua penjualan dan biaya perusahaan-perusahaan yang terkait. Apabila Tjiwi Kimia mengalami kesulitan dalam memberikan data, SMG dapat meminta KTC untuk mengubah persyaratan kuesioner, namun pada faktanya hal itu tidak dilakukan SMG. Selain itu, tanpa pernah berkonsultasi dengan KTC, SMG secara sepihak memutuskan bahwa itu tidak akan memberikan data. Dapat dilihat bahwa kesulitan yang dihadapi KTC dalam membuat penentuan dumping disebabkan oleh pihak Indonesia sendiri. Terkait dengan ketentuan Pasal 2 ayat (2) ADA, Indonesia berpendapat bahwa jumlah biaya yang dimasukan dalam perhitungan Constructed Value tidak tepat sehingga menghasilkan nilai yang terlalu tinggi dari nilai yang sebenarnya. Namun, pendapat ini didasarkan pada asumsi yang tidak meyakinkan. Indonesia bahkan belum menunjukkan bahwa jumlah yang digunakan KTC adalah tidak masuk akal. Faktanya, jumlah yang digunakan oleh KTC berasal dari pengalaman nyata dari perusahaan lain di Indonesia yang menjual Produk Sejenis di pasar domestik pada tingkat yang sama dengan CMI. Selanjutnya, terkait dengan ketentuan Pasal 6 ayat (8) ADA, Indonesia berpendapat bahwa KTC tidak semestinya ‘menghukum’ SMG untuk kesulitan Sinar Mas Grup alami dalam memperoleh laporan keuangan dan

197

Paragraph 7 Annex II ADA “If the authorities have to base their findings, including those with respect to normal value, on information from a secondary source, including the … they should do so with special circumspection. In such cases, the authorities should, where practicable, check the information from other independent sources at their disposal, such as published price lists, official import statistics and customs returns, and from the information obtained from other interested parties during the investigation. ..”

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

92

catatan akuntansi dari CMI. Namun, Indonesia tidak memberikan bukti mengenai kesulitan tersebut. Meskipun KTC telah meminta laporan keuangan CMI dalam kuesioner awal, SMG tidak memberikan indikasi bahwa akan ada kesulitan dalam memperoleh informasi tersebut dan tidak pernah memberitahu KTC upaya SMG untuk memperoleh informasi yang diminta. Kemudian, ketika SMG menyadari konsekuensi dari sikap tidak kooperatif tersebut terhadap hasil verifikasi, SMG akhirnya memberikan laporan keuangan CMI dalam waktu kurang dari seminggu. Selanjutnya, terdapat bukti bahwa CMI adalah bagian dari divisi sama dengan perusahaan SMG lainnya sehingga sangat tidak mungkin apabila SMG mengalami kesulitan dalam memperoleh data tersebut. Dapat disimpulkan kegagalan SMG untuk memberikan data yang diminta KTC adalah penolakan yang disengaja dan tidak ada kesulitan dalam memperoleh data tersebut.

B.

Masalah Penentuan Kerugian Material 198 Mengenai penentuan kerugian, bantahan Korea Selatan terhadap

argumen Indonesia adalah sebagai berikut: 1.

Definisi Produk Sejenis Indonesia berpendapat bahwa Korea Selatan wajib untuk

mendefinisikan Produk yang Disengketakan dengan cara yang wajar. Namun, mengenai definisi tersebut belum dipermasalahkan lebih lanjut oleh Indonesia dalam sidang Panel ini dan justru sebaliknya, Indonesia

telah

menerima

definisi

KTC

dari

Produk

yang

Disengketakan." Indonesia juga berargumen bahwa Korea Selatan perlu melakukan temuan bahwa Produk yang Disengketakan bukanlah Produk Sejenis. Terhadap argumen tersebut, Pasal 2 ayat (6) ADA tidak memberikan kewajiban tersebut bahkan pasal tersebut menyebutkan bahwa Produk Sejenis merupakan turunan langsung dari Produk yang Disengketakan. Apabila melihat dari fakta yang terjadi, 198

WT/DS312, hlm. 49-50.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

93

argumen faktual Indonesia juga tidak meyakinkan. Hal ini dikarenakan SMG tidak pernah mengajukan bukti bahwa KTC menetapkan adanya perbedaan antara kertas PPC dan WF lainnya. Dapat dilihat bahwa terdapat tumpang tindih substansial dari informasi yang diberikan Indonesia terkait masalah Produk Sejenis. 2.

Penentuan Kerugian Material Mengenai

penentuan

Kerugian

Material,

Korea

Selatan

membantah 3 (tiga) hal yaitu volume impor, price effects dari impor dumping, serta perhitungan Kerugian Material. Terkait bantahan terhadap volume impor, Korea Selatan berpendapat bahwa Indonesia terlalu berfokus pada statistik yang menunjukkan penurunan volume impor dumping sebesar 15,3% pada pertengahan tahun 2003. Namun apabila dilihat lebih jauh, penurunan tersebut tidak benar-benar mencerminkan penurunan impor. Tingkat impor pada tahun 2003 masih lebih tinggi jika dibandingkan dengan tingkat impor pada tahun-tahun sebelumnya.

Indonesia juga mengklaim bahwa KTC

salah perhitungan angka pangsa pasar namun angka tersebut menurut perhitungan Korea Selatan adalah angka yang salah199. Selanjutnya, mengenai price effects dari impor dumping, Indonesia berpendapat bahwa Indonesia berpendapat temuan KTC ini tidak cukup, karena Indonesia menilai price effects hasil temuan KTC tidak terlalu signifikan terhadap industri domestik Korea Selatan. Dalam hal ini, KTC menemukan bahwa harga industri domestik Korea Selatan telah mengalami penurunan dari tahun 2000 sampai semester pertama tahun 2003 yang disebabkan oleh impor dumping. Penurunan ini menyebabkan industri domestik Korea Selatan kesulitan untuk meningkatkan keuntungan karena apabila industri domestik Korea Selatan menaikan harga Produk Sejenis, industri domestik Korea

199

Mengenai angka persentase yang pasti dari kenaikan jumlah impor Produk Sejenis dari Indonesia tidak disebutkan dalam Laporan Panel karena pihak Korea Selatan meminta kepada Panel untuk merahasiakannya (treated as confidential).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

94

Selatan tidak akan mampu bersaing dengan Produk Sejenis yang diimpor dari Indonesia. Penurunan harga tersebut jelas merupakan penurunan yang signifikan seperti yang disyaratkan dalam ADA. Bantahan yang terakhir adalah perihal perhitungan Kerugian Material oleh Korea Selatan. Indonesia juga mengklaim bahwa KTC gagal mempertimbangkan faktor-faktor lain yang memungkinkan menyebabkan Kerugian Material seperti yang diatur dalam Pasal 3 ayat (4) ADA. Namun, Indonesia juga belum mengidentifikasi faktor tunggal yang relevan yang KTC abaikan. Sebaliknya, Indonesia mengakui bahwa KTC benar-benar melakukan memeriksa semua faktor yang diidentifikasi dalam Pasal 3 ayat (4) ADA. Sebagaimana disyaratkan oleh ADA, KTC juga mempertimbangkan apakah Kerugian Material industri domestik disebabkan oleh faktor lain. KTC telah mengumpulkan informasi secara rinci mengenai penyebab alternatif yang mungkin menyebabkan Kerugian Material namun KTC berkesimpulan

bahwa

tidak

ada

faktor-faktor

lain

yang

memungkinkan untuk menyebabkan Kerugian Material pada industri domestik Korea Selatan.

3.5. Pendapat Pihak Ketiga Dalam mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa di WTO, keberadaan pihak ketiga dalam setiap kasus yang sedang ditangani adalah suatu keharusan guna membantu Panel dalam memberikan keputusan 200 . Pihak-pihak ketiga dalam sengketa Indonesia dan Korea Selatan adalah Kanada, Cina, EC, Jepang, dan Amerika Serikat. Argumen masing-masing pihak ketiga terkait kasus ini adalah sebagai berikut: A.

Kanada201 Kanada memfokuskan kepada penerapan hukum yang tepat terhadap

definisi dari Produk Sejenis dan Produk yang Disengketakan. Berdasarkan 200

DSU, Pasal 10.

201

WT/DS312, hlm. 51.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

95

Pasal 2 ayat (6) ADA, KTC selaku otoritas penyelidikan, harus menentukan Produk yang Disengketakan. Panel, berdasarkan Pasal 17 ayat (6) ADA juga memiliki tugas untuk menentukan apakah ketentuan yang dibuat oleh KTC mengenai interpretasi Produk Sejenis dan Produk yang Disengketakan telah sesuai dengan Pasal 2 ayat (6) ADA. Pasal 2 ayat (6) ADA sendiri menentukan bahwa Produk Sejenis adalah produk yang memiliki kesamaan karakteristik dengan Produk yang Disengketakan. Dalam kaitannya dengan penyelesaian sengketa, terminologi Produk Sejenis dalam ADA pada intinya memiliki 2 (dua) fungsi yaitu dalam hal menentukan adanya dumping dan dalam menentukan Kerugian Material. Dalam konteks penentuan dumping, istilah Produk Sejenis mengacu kepada produk yang dijuak di pasar domestik dari negara pengekspor. Harga penjualan Produk Sejenis di pasar domestik negara pengekspor tersebut yang akan menjadi dasar perhitungan Nilai Normal. Sedangkan dalam konteks penentuan Kerugian Material, istilah Produk Sejenis mengacu kepada produk yang dihasilkan oleh industri domestik dari negara yang diduga mengalami Kerugian Material, dalam hal ini adalah negara tujuan ekspor.

B.

Cina202 Cina memahami bahwa Pasal 6 ayat (8) ADA adalah “pemicu” dalam

penggunaan istilah ‘fakta-fakta yang ada’ sebagai informasi yang dibutuhkan dalam proses penyelidikan. Cina dengan ini membatasi pendapatnya hanya terhadap keadaan yang melibatkan informasi utama dalam penyelesaian sengketa. Cina juga berpendapat bahwa sebenarnya dalam ADA tidak mendefinisikan secara jelas mengenai informasi yang dibutuhkan. Oleh karena itu, otoritas penyelidik harus secara bijak dan tetap berpedoman pada batasan dan syarat prosedural yang diatur dalam ADA dalam memberikan definisi terkait informasi yang dibutuhkan.

202

WT/DS312, hlm. 52.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

96

Batasan-batasan yang dimaksud adalah (1) otoritas penyelidikan tidak boleh meminta informasi yang tidak relevan; (2) otoritas penyelidikan tidak boleh meminta informasi yang menciptakan beban tambahan bagi negara tergugat; dan (3) ketika meminta informasi, otoritas penyelidikan wajib bertindak dengan cara yang wajar, objektif, dan tidak memihak. Sedangkan mengenai syarat prosedural yang diatur dalam ADA adalah (1) otoritas penyelidikan harus menentukan informasi yang diperlukan untuk keperluan penyelidikan dan memberikan instruksi kepada pihak yang berkepentingan mengenai apa dan sampai sejauh mana informasi yang harus diberikan untuk keperluan penyelidikan; dan (2) otoritas penyelidikan tidak boleh mengabaikan informasi yang diberikan pihak yang terkait, bahkan jika informasi tersebut tidak sesuai dengan permintaan otoritas penyelidikan. Namun pihak terkait dalam memberikan informasi harus menunjukan itikad baik dan memberikan kemampuan terbaiknya dalam menyelesaikan sengketa. Selanjutnya, Cina juga berpendapat bahwa apabila ada beberapa permintaan informasi yang belum disampaikan, otoritas penyelidikan tidak boleh menolak keseluruhan informasi terlepas dari keakuratan informasi tersebut.

C.

European Community (EC)203 EC berpendapat bahwa KTC tidak memiliki wewenang untuk

memperlakukan

perusahaan

yang

berbeda

tetapi

masih

memiliki

keterkaitan, sebagai satu eksportir atau produsen. EC percaya bahwa pemahaman yang berbeda mengenai fakta yang ada harus ditangani bersama. Terkait dengan pengertian fakta yang ada, EC mempertanyakan kesesuaian interpretasi KTC mengenai fakta yang ada, baik terhadap Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli, dan Tjiwi Kimia. EC menekankan bahwa keseimbangan yang adil harus dicapai dengan cara memperhatikan kepentingan KTC

203

WT/DS312, hlm. 56-60.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

97

selaku otoritas penyelidikan dan kepentingan eksportir Indonesia selaku pihak tergugat. Mengenai Pasal 6 ayat (10) ADA, istilah ‘masing-masing eksportir atau produsen’ harus diterjemahkan secara tepat karena istilah tersebut mengandung makna otonom. EC mencatat bahwa istilah eksportir berbeda dengan korporasi. Dalam hal ini, EC sependapat dengan KTC bahwa hukum korporasi Indonesia tidak dapat digunakan dalam kasus ini. Terkait dengan pengertian Produk yang Disengketakan, EC juga berpendapat bahwa tindakan KTC yang mengkategorikan PPC dan WF sebagai satu Produk yang Disengketakan telah sesuai dengan Pasal 2 ayat (1) dan ayat (6) serta Pasal 3 ADA. EC juga berpendapat bahwa apabila PPC dan WF tidak dikategorikan ke dalam satu kelompok Produk yang Disengketakan, maka KTC harus memisahkan pertimbangan efek dari impor PPC terhadap produsen domestik PPC di Korea Selatan dengan efek dari impor WF terhadap produsen domestik WF di Korea Selatan.

D.

Jepang204 Sesuai dengan ADA, pembahasan tentang Produk yang Disengketakan

merupakan unsur dasar dalam proses penyelidikan khususnya dalam menentukan adanya dumping dan dalam menentukan Kerugian Material yang diderita. Berdasarkan Pasal 2 ayat (1) ADA, dumping adalah: “For the purpose of this Agreement, a product is to be considered as being dumped, i.e. introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value, if the export price of the product exported from one country to another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country.” Sedangkan penentuan Kerugian Material menurut Pasal 3 ayat (1) ADA adalah:

204

WT/DS312, hlm 62-64.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

98

“A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestik market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestik producers of such products.” Berbeda dengan pendapat Cina, Jepang berpendapat bahwa penentuan dumping serta Kerugian Material yang didasarkan pada gabungan produk yang terpisah, tidak sesuai dengan Pasal 2 ayat (1) dan Pasal 3 ayat (1) ADA. Hal ini dikarenakan ketika lingkup penyelidikan mencakup 2 (dua) produk berbeda, otoritas penyelidikan harus membuat penentuan dumping dan Kerugian Material yang berbeda bagi setiap produk tersebut. Dalam hal ini, Jepang melihat bahwa penggabungan PPC dan WF yang dilakukan KTC tidak tepat. Oleh karena itu, Jepang memberi saran kepada Panel untuk menganalisis secara lengkap mengenai definisi Produk yang Disengketakan dan kemudian meninjau apakah KTC telah mendefinisikan Produk yang Disengketakan dan Produk Sejenis secara tepat. Apabila Panel menemukan bahwa PPC dan WF adalah produk yang berbeda, maka penentuan dumping dan Kerugian Material yang dilakukan KTC harus dinyatakan tidak sesuai dengan ketentuan ADA.

E.

Amerika Serikat205 Dalam sidang Panel kedua, Amerika Serikat menyatakan 3 (tiga) isu

utama, yaitu (1) apakah temuan KTC terhadap 2 (dua) atau lebih entitas hukum merupakan eksportir atau produsen yang dimaksud dalam ADA; (2) apakah Pasal 2 ayat (2) ADA membatasi kewajiban KTC dalam hal memilih fakta yang ada untuk digunakan dalam menghitung Nilai Normal ketika pihak Indonesia tidak memberikan data yang dibutuhkan KTC; dan (3) bagaimana mendefinisikan Produk yang Disengketakan dan Produk Sejenis untuk dapat menentukan Kerugian Material. Dalam argumennya, Indonesia keberatan atas tindakan KTC yang memperlakukan eksportir Indonesia sebagai satu entitas ekonomi. Amerika 205

WT/DS312, hlm. 66-71.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

99

Serikat tidak sependapat dengan argumen tersebut. Pasal 6 ayat (10) ADA tidak

memberikan

batasan

kepada

otoritas

penyelidikan

untuk

mendefinisikan eksportir atau produsen dalam penyelidikan dumping sehingga argumen Indonesia tersebut tidak memiliki dasar hukum. Lebih lanjut Amerika Serikat berpendapat bahwa eksportir atau produsen yang dimaksud dalam ADA, mencerminkan fungsi komersial, yang artinya berfokus kepada entitas yang melakukan kegiatan produksi atau kegiatan ekspor dan bukan dalam konteks korporasi atau badan hukum seperti yang dinyatakan Indonesia dalam argumennya. Dengan demikian jika terdapat kegiatan yang dilakukan oleh lebih dari 1 (satu) entitas ekonomi namun sangat berkaitan secara fungsi komersial, maka dapat diperlakukan sebagai eksportir atau produsen tunggal. Terkait dengan definisi Produk yang Disengketakan dan Produk Sejenis, Amerika Serikat sependapat dengan Kanada. Menurut Amerika Serikat ADA tidak memberikan batasan kepada otoritas penyelidikan dalam hal mempertimbangkan karakteristik suatu produk (baik spesifikasi teknis maupun dari segi kualitas produk) dan karakteristik pasar. Amerika Serikat juga sependapat dengan penjelasan Korea Selatan bahwa untuk tujuan penentuan

Kerugian

Material,

definisi

Produk

Sejenis

harus

mempertimbangkan adanya kesamaan dengan Produk yang Disengketakan serta dalam menganalisis Produk Sejenis, dibutuhkan perbandingan secara keseluruhan antara Produk yang Disengketakan dengan Produk Sejenis tersebut.

3.6. Kesimpulan dan Rekomendasi Panel Setelah mendengar argumen-argumen yang diajukan oleh pihak Indonesia dan Korea Selatan serta pihak ketiga (Kanada, Cina, Jepang, EC, dan Amerika Serikat), pada tanggal 28 Oktober 2005, Panel DSB secara resmi mengeluarkan Laporan Panel yang memutus sengketa dagang antara Indonesia dan Korea Selatan di mana Panel DSB tidak mengabulkan semua gugatan Indonesia namun Panel DSB memutuskan untuk memenangkan pihak Indonesia serta meminta Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

100

Korea Selatan untuk menyesuaikan kebijakan mengenai BMAD sesuai denganADA 206 . Apabila Korea Selatan melaksanakan perhitungan ulang sesuai dengan Laporan Panel DSB, maka margin dumping untuk Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli adalah de minimis (kurang dari 2%) atau Korea Selatan harus menghentikan pengenaan BMAD. Adapun hasil Laporan Panel DSB akan dijabarkan sebagai berikut: A.

Terhadap penentuan dumping oleh KTC207:  Panel menyimpulkan bahwa KTC bertindak sesuai dengan Pasal 6 ayat (8) ADA dalam hal penggunaan fakta terkait dengan Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli.  Panel menyimpulkan bahwa KTC bertindak sesuai dengan Pasal 6 ayat (8) ADA dan paragraph 3 Annex II dengan penggunaan data penjualan domestik yang disampaikan oleh Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli.  Panel menyimpulkan bahwa KTC bertindak sesuai dengan Pasal 6 ayat (8) ADA dan paragraph 6 Annex II terkait dengan pelaksanakan pengungkapan kepada Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli perihal keputusannya untuk menolak data penjualan domestik dari Indah Kiat dan Pido Deli serta memberi mereka kesempatan untuk memberikan penjelasan lebih lanjut.  Panel menyimpulkan bahwa KTC bertindak sesuai dengan Pasal 2 ayat (2) ADA dalam hal penentuan Nilai Normal untuk Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli.  Panel menyimpulkan bahwa KTC bertindak tidak sesuai dengan Pasal 6 ayat (8) ADA dan paragraph 7 Annex II yaitu dengan tidak menerapkan prinsip

kehati-hatian khusus dalam penggunaan

206

Rr. Franzezka Lasma A. “Analisis Yuridis Penyelesaian Sengketa Dagang Melalui WTO terhadap Pemerintahan Indonesia dan Pemerintahan Korea Selatan”, (Skripsi S1 Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia,2010), hlm. 114. 207

WT/DS312, hlm. 148-149.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

101

informasi dari sumber-sumber sekunder daripada data penjualan domestik yang disediakan oleh Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli.  Panel menyimpulkan bahwa KTC bertindak tidak sesuai dengan Pasal 6 ayat (8) AD dan paragraph 7 Annex II terkait dengan penentuan Margin Dumping untuk Tjiwi Kimia.  Panel menyimpulkan bahwa KTC bertindak sesuai dengan Pasal 2 ayat (4) ADA terkait dengan dugaan keterlibatan CMI dalam penjualan domestik Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli.  Panel menyimpulkan bahwa KTC bertindak sesuai dengan Pasal 6 ayat (10) dan Pasal 9 ayat (3) ADA dengan memperlakukan 3 (tiga) perusahaan SMG sebagai eksportir tunggal dan menetapkan Margin Dumping tunggal terhadap SMG.  Panel menyimpulkan bahwa KTC bertindak tidak sesuai dengan Pasal 6 ayat (7) ADA terkait dengan pengungkapan hasil verifikasi.  Panel menyimpulkan bahwa KTC bertindak tidak sesuai dengan Pasal 6 ayat (4) ADA terkait dengan mengungkapkan rincian perhitungan Nilai Normal untuk Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli.  Indonesia gagal memberikan bukti prima facie 208 sehubungan dengan klaim berdasarkan Pasal 12.2 Perjanjian berkaitan dengan dugaan kegagalan KTC untuk mengungkapkan rincian perhitungan Nilai Normal untuk Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli.

208

Prima facie dalam bahasa Latin memiliki makna ‘fakta dianggap benar kecuali dibantah’. Dalam praktek hukum, istilah ini umumnya digunakan dalam peradilan dimana bukti yang sudah diajukan dalam persidangan sudah cukup untuk membuktikan kasus kecuali ada bukti substantive yang bertentangan. Untuk penggunaan dalam gugatan perdata, penggugat harus menyajikan sebuah bukti prima facie untuk menghindari pemberhentian kasus atau mencegah putusan yang merugikan. Penggugat harus memiliki bukti yang cukup pada semua unsur gugatan untuk mendukung gugatan dan mengalihkan beban pembuktian kepada tergugat. Jika penggugat gagal untuk memberikan bukti prima facie, tergugat dapat memenangkan perkara tanpa perlu menyediakan bukti untuk membantah bukti dari penggugat Hal ini karena beban pembuktian tetap berada di tangan penggugat. (http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/prima+facie, diunduh tanggal 26 September 2014 dan Herfino Husnaidi, Meirisa Hilda Sukasa, Ronald Eberhard, Sistem Penyelesaian WTO, (Jakarta: Direktorat Perdagangan Peindustrian, Investasi dan Hak Kekayaan Intelektual (HKI) Kementrian Luar Negeri), 2011).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

102

 Panel menyimpulkan bahwa KTC bertindak sesuai dengan Pasal 2 ayat (6), 3 ayat (1), 3 ayat (2), 3 ayat (4), 3 ayat (5), dan 3 ayat (7) ADA dalam hal penentuan definisi Produk Sejenis.

B.

Terhadap penentuan Kerugian Material oleh KTC209  Panel menyimpulkan bahwa KTC bertindak sesuai dengan Pasal 3 ayat (1), 3 ayat (2) dan 3 ayat (4) ADA terkait dengan analisis harga.  Panel menyimpulkan bahwa KTC bertindak tidak sesuai dengan Pasal 3 ayat (4) ADA sehubungan dengan penilaian atas dampak impor dumping di industri dalam negeri.  Panel menyimpulkan bahwa KTC bertindak sesuai dengan Pasal 3 ayat (4) dan (5) terakait dengan perlakuan terhadap impor dumping yang dilakukan oleh produsen Korea Selatan.  Panel menyimpulkan bahwa KTC bertindak tidak sesuai dengan Pasal 6 ayat (2) dan (4) serta Pasal 12 ayat (2) ADA terkait dengan pengungkapan hasil pengujian teknis yang dilakukan oleh Korean Agency untuk teknologi, standar serta pelaksanaan survey.

C.

Panel DSB menolak untuk menangani beberapa gugatan dari Indonesia dengan alasan ekonomi yudisial (judicial economy), yaitu:210  Dugaan pelanggaran KTC mengenai kebijakan yang sesuai dengan Pasal 6 ayat (9) ADA terkait dengan ketentuan dumping.  Dugaan pelanggaran KTC terhadap Pasal 3 ayat (1) dan 3 ayat (5) ADA terkait dengan analisis Hubungan Sebab Skibat.

209

WT/DS312, hlm. 149-150.

210

WT/DS312, hlm. 150.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

103

 Dugaan pelanggaran KTC terhada Pasal 3 ayat (1), 3 ayat (2), dan 3 ayat (5) ADA terkait dengan penentuan produk impor dari Indah Kiat sebagai produk dumping.

D.

Panel DSB menolak menangani beberapa gugatan karena gugatan tersebut telah ditarik oleh Indonesia, yaitu:  Dugaan pelanggaran KTC terhadap Pasal 6 ayat (1), 6 ayat (4), dan 6 ayat (9) ADA dengan tidak memberikan kesempatan kepada eksportir Indonesia untuk melihat dan memberi tanggapan terkait dengan penyelidikan pertama pada tahun 2003.  Dugaan pelanggaran KTC terhadap Pasal 6 ayat (4) dan 6 ayat (9) ADA dengan tidak memberikan informasi kepada eksportir Indonesia mengenai keputusan Korea Selatan untuk mengubah ancaman Kerugian Material menjadi Kerugian Material.

Berdasarkan kesimpulan di atas, Panel memutuskan untuk memenangkan pihak Indonesia dan menyatakan bahwa Korea Selatan telah bertindak tidak konsisten dengan ketentuan ADA di mana akibat tindakan tersebut telah merugikan Indonesia. Oleh karena itu Panel merekomendasikan bahwa DSB meminta Korea Selatan untuk menyelaraskan tindakan yang terdapat dalam poin 8.1 (a) (v), 8.1 (a) (vi), 8.1 (a) (ix), 8.1 (a) (x), 8.1 (b) (ii), dan 8.1 (b) (v)211. Adapun tindakan-tindakan tersebut dapat dijabarkan sebagai berikut: 1.

Pelaksanaan prinsip kehati-hatian khusus dalam penggunaan informasi dari sumber-sumber sekunder sesuai dengan Pasal 6 ayat (8) ADA dan paragraph 7 Annex II

2.

Penentuan Margin Dumping untuk Tjiwi Kimia harus sesuai dengan Pasal 6 ayat (8) ADA dan paragraph 6 Annex II

3.

Keterbukaan terhadap hasil verifikasi harus sesuai dengan Pasal 6 ayat (7) ADA

211

WT/DS312, hlm. 151.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

104

4.

Keterbukaan terhadap rincian perhitungan Nilai Normal untuk Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli harus sesuai dengan Pasal 6 ayat (4) ADA

5.

Perlakuan terhadap impor dumping oleh produsen Korea Selatan harus sesuai dengan Pasal 3 ayat (4) ADA

6.

Perlakuan terhadap informasi yang bersifat rahasia harus sesuai dengan Pasal 6 ayat (5) ADA.

Karena Korea Selatan sebagai pihak yang kalah tidak mengajukan banding ke AB, maka pada tanggal 28 November 2005, Laporan Panel disahkan oleh Ketua DSB WTO serta pada tanggal 20 Desember 2005, Korea Selatan sebagai pihak yang kalah, wajib melapor kepada Ketua DSB WTO bahwa akan melaksanakan hasil Panel WTO DSB. Terkait dengan pelaksanaan hasil Panel DSB WTO, Korea Selatan meminta waktu selambat-lambatnya tanggal 28 Juli 2005212.

3.7. Implementasi Hasil Panel DSB WTO oleh Korea Selatan 3.7.1. Sidang Panel Pelaksanaan Pasal 21 ayat (5) DSU Setelah Panel DSB memutuskan bahwa pengenaan BMAD oleh Korea Selatan tidak sesuai dengan ADA, Panel DSB meminta Korea Selatan untuk menyesuaikan ketentuan anti dumping dengan ADA. Panel menentukan bahwa Korea Selatan harus menyesuaikan ketentuan anti dumping tersebut sampai tanggan 28 Juli 2006 213 . SMG dan Atase Perindustrian dan Perdagangan

(Atperindag)

Seoul

menerima

dokumen

KTC’s

Implementation Report (Public Notice No. 2006-105 of the Korean Ministry of Finance and Economy) pada tanggal 27 Juli 2006 sebagai bentuk implementasi Korea Selatan terhadap putusan Panel DSB. Terhadap laporan 212

Direktorat Jenderal Kerjasama Perdagangan Internasional Kementrian Perdagangan Indonesia, Kasus Pertama Tuduhan Dumping Copy Paper Indonesia oleh Korea Selatan, (Jakarta: Subdit Pelayanan Pengaduan Direktorat Pengamanan Perdagangan, 2010), hlm. 5. 213

Korea – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Certain Paper From Indonesia, Understanding Between Korea And Indonesia Regarding Procedures Under Articles 21 And

22 Of The DSU (WT/DS312/7) tanggal 22 Agustus 2006.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

105

tersebut,

Indonesia

merasa

tidak

puas

dan

memutuskan

untuk

mempertahankan haknya berdasarnya Pasal 21 dan Pasal 22 DSU. Dirjen Kerjasama Perdagangan Internasional (KPI) menyampaikan surat kepada Duta Besar Indonesia untuk WTO agar menyampaikan permintaan kepada Ketua DSB WTO untuk menghidupkan kembali Panel awal dan mengadakan pertemuan dengan Korea Selatan untuk menandatangani Understanding Between the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Indonesia (Sequencing Agreement) agar Indonesia tidak kehilangan hak untuk melakukan kompensasi dan retaliasi apabila Korea Selatan tidak melaksanakan putusan Panel DSB

214

. Agreement tersebut telah

ditandatangani oleh kedua pihak pada tanggal 17 Agustus 2006 dan telah dimasukkan sebagai agenda sidang DSB pada tanggal 1 September 2006. Dalam sidang tersebut, Indonesia mengungkapkan kekecewaannya terhadap pelaksanaan putusan Panel DSB oleh Korea Selatan sehingga Indonesia akan mengambil tindakan sesuai dengan Pasal 21 ayat (5) DSU. Terhadap permintaan tersebut, Ketua DSB WTO menyetujuinya dan pada tanggal 5 Februari 2007, DSB membentuk Panel dengan komposisi yang sama dengan Panel awal. Sidang Ppanel tersebut dilaksanakan pada tanggak 24-25 April 2007215. Berbeda dengan sidang sebelumnya, sidang ini hanya dilaksanakan sekali di Jenewa. Inti permasalahan yang diajukan oleh Indonesia adalah perihal keengganan KTC untuk menggunakan interest rate AF selaku trading company bagi Riau Andalan Kertas, sebagai data sekunder untuk CMI selaku trading company bagi Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli, dalam menghitung Constructed Value. Indonesia berpendapat bahwa dasar penggunaan interest rate AF sama dengan CMI sehingga tidak tepat apabila

214

Direktorat Jenderal Kerjasama Perdagangan Internasional Kementrian Perdagangan Indonesia, loc.cit. hlm. 6 215

Ibid.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

106

menggunakan interest rate dari Riau Andalan Kertas 216 . Apabila KTC menggunakan interest rate AF dalam menghitung Constructed Value, maka margin dumping yang dihasilkan akan de minimis sehingga pengenaan BMAD harus dihentikan217. Korea Selatan membantah bahwa dikarenakan Pindo Deli dan Indah Kiat tidak menyampaikan laporan keuangan

CMI, maka KTC

tidak

mengetahui aktivitas CMI yang sebenarnya, yaitu apakah CMI hanya sebagai trading company atau juga sebagai produsen. Oleh karena itu, adalah hal yang sah apabila KTC menggunakan Best Information Available (BIA) dengan interest rate dari AF saat memperlakukan CMI sebagai trading company dan interest rate dari Riau Andalan Kertas saat memperlakukan CMI sebagai produsen. KTC juga menambahkan bahwa KTC memperoleh bukti yang didapat dari laporan Dataindo Inti Swakarsa (DIS) bahwa CMI juga beraktivitas sebagai produsen 218 . Dalam sidang Panel ini, Panel memutuskan untuk kembali memenangkan pihak Indonesia namun Korea Selatan tetap tidak melaksanakan hasil Panel DSB tersebut dan tetap mengenakan BMAD sebesar 7,72% bagi AF dan SMG219.

3.7.2. Tindak Lanjut Hasil Panel Pelaksanaan Pasal 21 ayat (5) DSU Melihat kondisi Korea Selatan yang tetap tidak mau melaksanakan hasil Panel DSB, maka diadakan sidang kedua dan pada tanggal 22 Juni 2007, Ketua Panel DSB WTO kembali memenangkan pihak Indonesia terkait dengan penerapan anti dumping oleh Korea Selatan. Laporan Panel dari sidang tersebut diterbitkan tanggal 28 September 2007 yang pada 216

Indonesia berpendapat bahwa penggunaan interest rate Riau Andalan Kertas sebagai dasar perhitungan constructed value bertentangan dengan Pasal 2 ayat (2) ADA tentang perhitungan dumping dan Pasal 6 ayat (8) ADA serta Annex II ADA tentang penggunaan Best Information Available. 217

Direktorat Jenderal Kerjasama Perdagangan Internasional Kementrian Perdagangan Indonesia, loc.cit., hlm. 6. 218

Ibid.

219

Ibid.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

107

intinya menyatakan bahwa KTC telah menyalahi ketentuan ADA dalam menghitung margin dumping untuk Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli220. Setelah keluarnya hasil Laporan Panel DSB WTO, Indonesia dan Korea Selatan melaksanakan pertemuan bilateral untuk membahas hasil Laporan Panel DSB WTO dan Indonesia dalam pendapat hukumnya menyatakan bahwa Indonesia perlu untuk meminta otorisasi dari DSB terkait dengan penggunaan hak untuk retaliasi sesuai dengan Pasal 22 ayat (2) DSU221. Pada akhirnya, Menteri Perdagangan RI dalam surat Nomor 200/M DAG/2/2008 perihal tindak lanjut hasil panel sengketa dumping IndonesiaKorea Selatan, menyampaikan pertimbangannya agar Indonesia tidak mengajukan permohonan untuk mendapatkan otorisasi dalam penggunaan hak retaliasi tersebut 222 . Namun, menanggapi sikap Indonesia tersebut, Korea Selatan dalam Report on Implementation of WTO Compliance Panel Decision justru semakin gencar dalam melakukan pengenaan BMAD terhadap produk kertas Indonesia. Terhadap laporan Korea Selatan tersebut, Indonesia melalui Direktorat Pengamanan Perdagangan (DPP), melakukan konsultasi dengan Advirsory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) perihal apakah Indonesia masih memiliki hak untuk melakukan retaliasi dan sejauh mana efektifitasnya. Hasil konsultasi dalam surat kepada Dirjen KPI dengan Nomor 366/DPP-1/XI/2008 adalah sebagai berikut223: a. ACWL menyarankan agar pemerintah Indonesia dan SMG tidak perlu menanggapi hasil Report on Implementation of WTO Compliance Panel Decision karena laporan tersebut tidak mengurangi hak Indonesia sebagai pihak yang dimenangkan. Ada 2 (dua) alternatif yang dapat dilakukan Indonesia, yaitu Indonesia masih memiliki hak untuk meminta Panel melakukan sidang pelaksanaan Pasal 21 ayat (5) DSU atau Indonesia masih berhak 220

Ibid.

221

Ibid., hlm. 7.

222

Ibid.

223

Ibid., hlm. 7-8.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

108

untuk membawa kasus ini ke badan Arbitrase WTO untuk pelaksanaan retaliasi. b. Apabila Indonesia memilih untuk melaksanakan sidang Panel, maka pelaksanaan sidang akan sama seperti sidang Panel pada tahun 2007 sedangkan apabila Indonesia memiliki untuk retaliasi, maka badan Arbitrase yang ditunjuk DSB harus mengkaji ulang Report on Implementation of WTO Compliance Panel Decision.

c. Jika Indonesia memilih untuk retaliasi, maka pelaksanaannya harus segera setelah hasil sidang pada tanggal 22 Oktober 2007 lalu dan DSB harus menunjuk arbiter untuk menetapkan besarnya retaliasi. Proses ini memakan waktu sekitar 60 (enam puluh) hari.

d. ACWL menduga bahwa KTC berani menyimpulkan dalam Report on Implementation of WTO Compliance Panel Decision, karena yakin bahwa Indonesia tidak akan menggunakan hak untuk melakukan retaliasi.

3.7.3. Perpanjangan Pengenaan BMAD oleh Korea Selatan Melihat sikap Korea Selatan yang memperpanjang pengenaan BMAD terhadap produk kertas Indonesia, Dirjen KPI melalui surat Nomor 21/KPI.6/1/2010 tertanggal 8 Januari 2010 yang ditujukan kepada Deputy Minister for Tax and Customs, Ministry of Strategy and Finance Korea Selatan, untuk menolak permintaan perpanjangan pengenaan BMAD dengan alasan SMG dan Ministry of Strategy and Finance telah melakukan kesepakatan mengenai penyesuaian harga (price undertaking 224 ). DPPDitjen KPI melalui surat Nomor 40/KPI.6.3/I/2010 tertanggal 28 Januari

224

Direktorat Jenderal Kerjasama Perdagangan Internasional Kementrian Perdagangan Indonesia, Profil Kasus Tuduhan Dumping Review Korea Selatan terhadap Produk PPC (Plain Paper Cpoier/ Business Information Paper), WF (Uncoated Wood-free Printing Paper), dan Uncoated Wood-free Paper In A Form of Roll, Sheet, or Other Asal n, (Jakarta: Subdit Pelayanan Pengaduan Direktorat Pengamanan Perdagangan, 2010), hlm. 2.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

109

2010 juga meminta bantuan ACWL untuk dapat memberikan pendapat hukum terkait Sunset Review ini. Pendapat tersebut adalah sebagai berikut225: a. Penyesuaian harga yang dilakukan oleh SMG tidak berpengaruh terhadap hak-hak Indonesia di WTO seperti misalnya hak untuk melakukan

retaliasi

maupun

mempertanyakan

pelaksanaan

keputusan pengenaan BMAD yang kedua.

b. Opsi lainnya adalah Indonesia memberi tanda kepada Korea Selatan bahwa Indonesia tidak akan ragu untuk melakukan permintaan dispute settlement baru apabila Sunset Review tidak dilakukan sesuai dengan ketentuan ADA. Selain itu, Indonesia juga berinisiatif untuk mengadakan pertemuan bilateral dengan Korea Selatan yang disampaikan kepada Korea Selatan melalui surat Nomor 148/KPI.6/SD/2/2010 pada tanggal 22 Februari 2010. Dalam surat tersebut, Indonesia, pada intinya, menegaskan sikap Indonesia yang menginginkan agar Korea Selatan menutup kasus Sunset Review dan apabila tidak dilakukan, Indonesia akan membawa kembali kasus ini ke DSB. Sebelum melaksanakan pertemuan bilateral dengan Korea Selatan, Indonesia sudah menyiapkan 2 (dua) alternatif tindakan yang akan diambil Indonesia, yaitu226: a. Alternatif 1: Indonesia mengikuti dengan cermat penyelidikan kasus Sunset Review yang dilakukan Korea Selatan dan mengajukan permintaan konsultasi dengan Korea Selatan di tingkat Direktur Jenderal dan hearing dengan otoritas dumping Korea Selatan. Jika tidak tercapai kesepakatan dalam konsultasi tersebut dalam jangka waktu tertentu, Indonesia akan mengusulkan untuk

225

Ibid., hlm. 3.

226

Ibid., hlm.3-4.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

110

menyerahkan kasus ini ke Arbitrase WTO dan kedua pihak harus menghormati hasil Arbitrase tersebut.

b. Alternatif 2: seperti yang diusulkan oleh SMG, Indonesia akan membawa langsung kasus ini ke DSB WTO. Terhadap alternatif ini, Indonesia tidak terlalu yakin akan melakukannya, mengingat hasil Panel DSB lalu yang tidak konklusif dan terdapat kemungkinan Korea Selatan tetap tidak melaksanakan hasil Panel. Di samping itu, apabila Indonesia akan benar-benar melaksanakan retaliasi, maka dikhawatirkan Korea Selatanakan membalas dengan tindakan ekonomi lainnya terhadap Indonesia. Terhadap kedua alternatif tersebut, pada tanggal 18 Maret 2010, Menteri Perdagangan Indonesia memutuskan untuk melaksanakan alternatif pertama terlebih dahulu. Keputusan ini disampaikan oleh Dubes RI untuk WTO kepada Korea Selatan melalui pertemuan informal pada tanggal 23 Maret 2010. Hasil dari pertemuan tersebut adalah sebagai berikut227: a. Korea Selatan menyatakan bahwa proses penyelidikan Sunset Review yang diajukan atas petisi industri domestik Korea Selatan, telah sesuai dengan peraturan nasional Korea Selatan dan ADA serta tidak bersifat diskriminatif karena tindakan ini juga diberlakukan terhadap Cina.

b. Terkait dengan tindak lanjut pelaksanaan Pasal 21 ayat (5) DSU dalam sengketa ini, di mana

pada dasarnya Indonesia dapat

melakukan retaliasi terhadap tindakan Korea Selatan tersebut, Korea Selatan berpendapat bahwa tindakan retaliasi tersebut tidak tepat karena Panel menyatakan Korea Selatan haya melanggar ADA dari aspek prosedural dan bukan hal yang bersifat substantif.

227

Ibid., hlm.4.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

111

c. Korea Selatan menyatakan bahwa eksportir Indonesia yang justru tidak bersikap kooperatif selama proses penyelidikan dan terkait dengan penyesuaian harga, Korea Selatan juga telah memenuhi permintaan Indonesia. Namun selama periode pelaksanaan penyesuaian harga, justru impor asal Indonesia semakin meningkat sebesar 8%.

d. Korea Selatan berharap agar penyelesaian kasus dilakukan dengan lebih persuasif dan menegaskan bahwa penyelidikan tersebut telah sesuai

dengan

ADA.

Korea

Selatan

juga

berjanji

akan

mempertimbangkan concern Indonesia tersebut dalam surat Nomor 148/KPI.6/SD/2/2010 pada tanggal 22 Februari 2010.

3.8. Alur Waktu Penyelesaian Sengketa Kasus DS312 a. 4

Juni

2004:

Indonesia

mengajukan

permohonan

untuk

melaksanakan konsultasi dengan pihak Korea Selatan228. b. 7 Juni 2004: Indonesia dan Korea Selatan melakukan proses konsultasi dan membahas tentang data-data yang diperlukan untuk mengidentifikasikan adanya praktik dumping yang dilakukan oleh produsen kertas Indonesia229. c. 16 Agustus 2004: konsultasi Indonesia dan Korea Selatan gagal menyelesaikan sengketa tersebut sehingga Indonesia mengajukan permohonan pembentukan Panel kepada DSB230. d. 27 September 2004: DSB membentuk Panel231.

228

WT/DS312, hlm.1.

229

Ibid.

230

Ibid.

231

Ibid.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

112

e. 18 Oktober 2004: DSB menentukan komposisi Panel yang terdiri dari Mr. Ole Lundby sebagai ketua Panel dan Ms. Deborah Milstein serta Ms. Leane Naidin sebagai anggota Panel232. f. Kanada, Cina, EC, Jepang, dan Amerika Serikat menggunakan haknya sebagai pihak ketiga dalam kasus ini233. g. 1 Februari 2005: Panel pertama di mana dalam pertemuan ini, Panel dan para pihak membahas tentang besaran Margin Dumping dan

penentuan

Kerugian

Material

dari

Produk

yang

Disengketakan234. h. 2 Februari 2005: Panel pertama di mana pada pertemuan ini, Panel membahas kasus ini bersama pihak ketiga235. i. 30 Maret 2005: Panel kedua di mana pada pertemuan ini, Indoesia dan Korea Selatan membahas tentang definisi Produk Sejenis sebagai Produk yang Disengketakan serta mendengarkan pendapat dari pihak ketiga236. j. 28 Oktober 2005: Putusan Panel DSB WTO memenangkan Indonesia namun pihak Korea Selatan tidak menerima putusan tersebut237. k. 22 Desember 2006: Indonesia meminta DSB untuk meninjau kembali kasus ini238.

232

Ibid.

233

Ibid.

234

Ibid.

235

Ibid.

236

Ibid.

237

Ellyzabeth Media Joanne Caroline Maitimo, “Penyelesaian Sengketa Dagang dalam Kerangka WTO untuk Kasus Tuduhan Dumping Korea Selatan Terhadap Produk Ekspor Kertas Indonesia (2002-2007)” (Skripsi S1 Universitas Pembangunan “Veteran” Jakarta, Jakarta, 2011) hlm. 112. 238

Ibid.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

113

l. Tahun 2007: Panel memenangkan Indonesia

DSB dalam Laporan Panel kembali 239

.

m. Desember 2010: Korea Selatan baru benar-benar mencabut pengenaan BMAD terhadap produk kertas dari Indonesia240.

239

Ibid.

240

Ibid.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

114

Bagan 3.1. Proses Penyelesaian Sengketa Kasus Dumping Kertas Indonesia dan Korea Selatan di WTO241 4 Juni 2004 : Indonesia meminta konsultasi

7 Juli 2004 : Indonesia dan Korea Selatan melakukan konsultasi

16 Agustus 2004 : Indonesia meminta pembentukan Panel

1 – 2 Februari 2005 : Sidang Panel I

30 Maret 2005 : Sidang Panel II

28 Desember 2005 : Laporan Panel memenangkan Indonesia

22 Desember 2006 : Indonesia meminta peninjauan kembali karena Korea Selatan tidak melaksanakan putusan Panel DSB

2007 : Laporan Panel kembali memenangkan Indonesia

Desember 2010 : Korea Selatan baru benar-benar mematuhi putusan Panel DSB

241

Ibid., hlm 113.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

BAB IV ANALISIS DASAR PERTIMBANGAN INDONESIA TERHADAP TIDAK DILAKSANAKANNYA RETALIASI DALAM KASUS DS312

4.1. Dasar Pertimbangan Negara-Negara Anggota WTO Melakukan Retaliasi

dalam

Proses

Penyelesaian

Sengketa

Perdagangan

Internasional Sistem penyelesaian sengketa WTO dan ketentuan retaliasi yang termasuk di dalamnya, dapat dikatakan sebagai sistem yang “kontroversial” karena banyak terdapat pandangan yang berbeda tentang bagaimana sebuah sistem dalam ketentuan perdagangan internasional harus dijalankan. Melihat dari sifat perjanjian WTO itu sendiri, terdapat beberapa pandangan mengenai konsekuensi dalam hal melanggar perjanjian WTO yang dikaitkan dengan pelanggaran terhadap pada umumya. Dari sudut pandang perjanjian WTO sebagai “kontrak” menyatakan bahwa pelanggaran harus dilihat sama dengan pelanggaran kontrak, yaitu pelanggaran terhadap hal-hal yang diperjanjikan dalam kontrak antara negara yang bersangkutan saja. Pelanggaran tersebut dapat diselesaikan oleh pihak yang bersangkutan dan dapat juga meminta adanya kompensasi

242

. Sedangkan dari sudut pandang WTO sebagai “perjanjian

internasional” menyatakan sebaliknya, yaitu pelanggaran harus dilihat terutama sebagai penyimpangan dari komitmen wajib terhadap masyarakat internasional243. Sedangkan

terkait

dengan

retaliasi,

beberapa

pandangan

yang

mempertanyakan tujuan utama dari retaliasi, yaitu apakah retaliasi dirancang untuk mendorong kepatuhan, menutup kerugian yang diakibatkan pelanggaran salah satu negara anggota WTO atau hanya untuk mempertahankan resiprositas dalam penyelesaian sengketa perdagangan internasional. Perbedaan dalam

242

Robert Z. Lawrence, Albert L. Williams, dan Research Associate, “Crimes and Punishments? An Analysis of Retaliation Under The WTO”, hlm 7-8. 243

Ibid.

115

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

116

membuat pertimbangan menyebabkan perbedaan penilaian keberhasilan sistem penyelesaian sengketa dan memiliki implikasi yang berbeda untuk pembaruan dari sistem tersebut.

Untuk itu, dalam bab ini akan dijelaskan

mengenai pertimbangan negara anggota WTO secara umum dan Indonesia secara khusus dalam menyelesaikan sengketa perdagangan internasional melalui prosedur retaliasi sehingga dapat menilai efektifitas dari retaliasi sebagai bagian dari proses penyelesaian sengketa.

4.1.1. US-EC Bananas Case (Kasus DS27) Pada tahun 1993 EC mengadopsi ketentuan impor dalam Common Market Organization for Bananas yang terdiri dari (1) kuota tarif 2 juta ton (pada tahun 1994, meningkat menjadi 2.1 juta ton dan 2,2 juta ton pada tahun 1995. Pada tahun 1995 juga, EC memberlakukan kuota tarif tambahan 353.000 ton) untuk negara-negara Amerika Latin dan pisang non tradisional dari negara Africa, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP); (2) jumlah impor yang dialokasikan kepada pemasok pisang ACP tradisional sebesar 857.700 ton; dan (3) pengenaan bea kuota sebesar 75 €/ton untuk negara-negara Amerika Latin dan membebaskan bea kuota bagi negara-negara ACP. Rezim impor ini dianggap telah bertentangan dengan ketentuan WTO dengan memberlakukan tindakan diskriminasi berupa pemberian hak impor preferensial untuk pisang dari negara-negara ACP merupakan diskriminasi terhadap perusahaan pisang impor lainnya, distribusi kuota tarif untuk negara-negara pemasok dari Amerika Selatan berdasarkan referensi yang tidak representatif, serta distribusi lisensi impor yang diskriminatif berdasarkan ketentuan Lome Convention

244

. Panel memutuskan EC

melanggar Pasal I, II, III, X, dan Pasal XI GATT 1994 serta ketentuan dalam The Agreement on Agriculture, Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), dan General Agreement on Trade and 244

Vahe Heboyan, Glenn C. W. Ames, dan James E. Epperson, “U.S.-EU Banana War: Implications Of Retaliatory Tariffs On Pecorino Cheese,” (makalah disampaikan pada Paper presented at Southern Agricultural Economics Association Annual Conference, Fort Worth, TX January 30, 2001), hlm. 6.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

117

Services (GATS) 245 . Terhadap putusan Panel ini, EC diharuskan untuk mengubah ketentuan impor pisang sesuai dengan ketentuan WTO dalam waktu 15 (lima belas) bulan dan 1 (satu) minggu sejak mengadopsi putusan Panel, yang mana EC harus menyesuaikan ketentuan impor pisang sebelum tanggal 1 Januari 1999246. Pada tanggal 26 Juni 1998, European Agricultural Council membuat beberapa perubahan pengaturan impor pisang dan menyatakan akan konsisten dengan ketentuan WTO. Namun sepanjang tahun 1999, Uni Eropa mengabaikan semua saran yang diberikan oleh Amerika Serikat, beberapa negara Amerika Latin, serta putusan Panel WTO, dan tetap menyatakan bahwa kebijakan pisang EC telah sesuai dengan WTO dan GATT. Sebagai akibat dari kegagalan EC untuk mematuhi putusan Panel WTO, DSB memberikan otorisasi kepada Amerika Serikat untuk memlakukan retaliasi berupa pengenaan bea ad valorem sebesar 100% sebesar $191.400.000 per tahun terhadap 9 (sembilan) produk yang dipilih diimpor dari EC247.

4.1.2. Mexico-US Offset Act/ Byrd Amendment Case (Kasus DS234) The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (CDSOA), atau yang biasa disebut dengan Byrd Amendment adalah salah satu regulasi Amerika Serikat yang mengatur redisribusi semua dana dari bea yang diperoleh dari bea Anti Dumping dan Countervailing (AD/CVD) untuk produsen domestik yang terkena dampak 248 yang akan digunakan oleh mereka untuk berbagai tujuan yang ditetapkan249. 245

“European Communities — Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,” http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds27_e.htm, diakses tanggal 11 November 2014. 246

Ibid.

247

Heboyan, Op.cit., hlm.7-8.

248

Produser domestik yang terkena dampak didefinisikan sebagai manufacturer, produser, petani, peternak, atau perwakilan pekerja (termasuk asosiasi perwakilan pekerja tersebut) yang (1) adalah pemohon atau pihak yang berkepentingan dalam mendukung petisi bekenaan dengan keberlakuan AD atau CVD dan (2) manufacturer, produser, petani, peternak, atau perwakilan pekerja (termasuk asosiasi perwakilan pekerja tersebut) masih beroperasi. Produsen yang telah berhenti produksi atau yang telah diakuisisi oleh perusahaan yang menentang petisi tidak

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

118

Australia, Brazil, Chile, EC, India, Indonesia, Jepang, Korea, Thailand, Kanada, dan Meksiko sebagai negara penggugat, berargumen bahwa ketentuan pemberian dana dalam Byrd Amendment dapat menjadi insentif yang kuat untuk produsen domestik untuk mengajukan petisi atau dukungan untuk langkah-langkah anti-dumping atau anti-subsidi, sehingga mendistorsi penerapan syarat-syarat yang diatur dalam Anti Dumping Agreement dan Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (ADA dan SCM Agreement). Panel dan Appellate Body (AB) WTO menyatakan bahwa Byrd Amendment mengatur tindakan khusus terhadap dumping dan subsidi yang tidak diizinkan dengan memberikan insentif keuangan bagi produsen domestik untuk mengajukan atau mendukung petisi bea antidumping and countervailing, sehingga tidak sesuai dengan persyaratan dukungan industri dalam ADA dan SCM Agreement. AB menyarankan agar Amerika Serikat tidak perlu mencabut Byrd Amendment namun cukup menyesuaikan ketentuan Byrd Amendment dengan ketentuan WTO paling lambat tanggal 27 Desember 2003250. Amerika Serikat tidak menyesuaikan Byrd Amendment dengan ketentuan WTO sampai batas waktu Desember 2003, sehingga 8 (delapan) negara penggugat (Brazil, Chile, EC, India, Jepang, Korea, Kanada, dan Meksiko) meminta otorisasi kepada DSB WTO untuk melakukan retaliasi. Meksiko, sebagai salah satu negara berkembang yang berada dalam posisi sebagai negara penggugat, merupakan negara yang aktif dalam penyelesaian sengketa ini. Meksiko mendapat otorisasi dari DSB WTO untuk melakukan retaliasi pada November 2004 dan mulai melaksanakan retaliasi pada tanggal 18 Agustus 2005. Retaliasi yang dilakukan oleh Meksiko termasuk sebagai produser domestik yang terkena dampak. (“Byrd Amendment”, http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/byrd_amendment.htm, diakses tanggal 11 November 2014). 249

Jagdish Bbhagwati dan Petros C.Mavroidis, “The Byrd Amendment Is WTO-Illegal: But We must Kill the Byrd with the Right Stone,” http://www.columbia.edu/~jb38/ papers/pdf/BYRD_Amendement.pdf, diunduh tanggal 11 November 2014. 250

Jeanne J. Grimmett dan Vivian C. Jones, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress; The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (“Byrd Amendment”), hlm. 9-12, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/57503.pdf, diunduh tanggal 11 November 2014.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

119

merupakan retaliasi paling tinggi di antara 7 (tujuh) negara penggugat lainnya, yaitu berupa pengenaan tarif sebesar $20.900.000 dan secara spesifik memberikan tarif 30% pada produk susu, 20% pada produk anggur, dan 9% untuk produk permen dan permen karet 251 . Pemerintah resmi Meksiko menyatakan retaliasi akan berlaku selama 12 bulan dan baru akan ditarik apabila Amerika Serikat telah memenuhi putusan WTO.

4.1.3. US-EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products/ Hormones Case (Kasus DS26) Kasus

Hormones yang melibatkan Amerika Serikat sebagai

Complainant Party dan EC sebagai Defendant Party ini berkaitan dengan Sanitary and Phitosanitary Agreement (SPS Agreement). Dalam kasus ini, Amerika Serikat menggugat EC atas tindakan proteksi terhadap produk daging sapi dengan cara meningkatkan standar Sanitary dan Phitosanitary sehingga daging sapi dari Amerika Serikat tidak dapat masuk ke dalam pasar EC. EC mengemukakan bahwa produk daging sapi asal Amerika Serikat

telah

disuntik

dengan

hormon

pertumbuhan

yang

akan

membahayakan kesehatan manusia. Laporan Panel dan Laporan AB di tingkat Banding menyatakan bahwa EC telah menetapkan kebijakan yang tidak sesuai dengan SPS Agreement. DSB dalam laporannya mengadopsi putusan di tingkat Banding dan putusan Panel. Terhadap pelaksanaan putusan tersebut, badan arbitrase memutuskan bahwa EC harus menjalankan putusann tersebut dalam waktu 15 (lima belas) bulan atau sampai bulan Mei 1999. Namun 1 (satu) bulan sebelum jangka waktu berakhir, EC menyatakan bahwa EC tidak dapat menjalankan putusan Panel dengan alasan bahwa EC tidak mau mengambil resiko kesehatan warganya akibat mengonsumsi daging sapi Amerika Serikat yang telah disuntik hormon. Dengan adanya pernyataan tersebut, maka Amerika Serikat memutuskan untuk melakukan retaliasi terhadap EC252. 251

Ibid.

252

Pelawi, loc.cit. hlm. 4-5.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

120

Retaliasi yang dilakukan oleh Amerika Serikat terhadap EC dalam kasus ini berupa pengenaan bea impor pada daftar produk sebesar US$116.800.000 dan memberlakukan bea ad valorem sebesar 100% terhadap produk daging sapi, babi, keju Roquefort, truffle, bawang, wortel, tomat yang diawetkan, sup, benang, roti panggang, cokelat Perancis, dan selai serta produk pertanian sampingan dari Perancis, Jerman, Italia, dan Denmark, serta Austria, Belgia, Finlandia, Yunani, Irlandia, Luksemburg, Belanda, Portugal, Spanyol, dan Swedia 253. Inggris dalam kasus ini tidak termasuk dalam daftar pengenaan retaliasi karena Inggris menunjukkan dukungan untuk mencabut ketentuan Sanitary dan Phitosanitary yang tidak sesuai dengan SPS Agreement tersebut. Pengenaan retaliasi dengan pengenaan tarif yang tinggi dalam kasus ini, justru tidak efektif dan tidak memberikan manfaat langsung terhadap industri daging sapi Amerika Serikat.

4.1.4. Dasar Pertimbangan Dilakukannya Retaliasi dalam Kasus DS26, Kasus DS27, dan Kasus DS217 a.

US-EC Bananas Case III (Kasus DS27) Organisasi yang mengatur mengenai perdagangan pisang di EC

didirikan dengan adanya Council Regulation 404/93 (Rregulation 404/93).

Ketentuan

yang

menggantikan

rezim

pengaturan

perdagangan pisang sebelumnya ini menjadi pokok permasalahan dalam Banana Case karena tidak sesuai dengan prinsip Most Favoured Nations dengan adanya ketentuan yang terkait dengan tarif dan kuota untuk pisang. Dalam ketentuan ini, EC membagi pisang yang diimpor ke dalam 3 (tiga) kategori, yaitu Traditional ACP bananas, Non-traditional ACP bananas, dan Third-country bananas. Ketentuan mengenai tarif dalam Regulation 404/93 adalah:

253

Renée Johnson dan Charles E. Hanrahan, “CRS Report for Congress; The U.S.-EU Beef Hormone Dispute,” http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40449.pdf, diunduh tanggal 12 November 2014.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

121

1.

Pembebasan tarif untuk pisang ketagori Traditional ACP bananas.

2.

Pembebasan tarif untuk pisang sebanyak 90.000 ton dengan tarif pengiriman sebesar €693 per ton untuk pisang kategori Non-traditional ACP bananas.

3.

Tarif sebesar €75 per ton untuk impor pisang dengan jumlah sampai dengan 2.100.000 ton dan bertambah menjadi 2.453.000 ton di tahun 1995-1996 dengan tarif pengiriman sebesar €793 per ton untuk pisang kategori Third-country bananas.

Sedangkan untuk ketentuan mengenai kuota impor adalah impor pisang kategori Third-country bananas dan Non-traditional ACP bananas meningkat dari 2 juta ton menjadi 2,2 juta ton. Pada tahun 1995 dan 1996, sebanyak 353.000 ton ditambahkan ke kuota tarif sebagai akibat dari bertambahnya konsumsi dan pasokan kebutuhan EC akan pisang sehingga pada praktiknya, kuota pisang kategori Nontraditional ACP bananas dan Third-country bananas meningkat menjadi 2.553.000 ton. Dari kuota tarif tersebut, sebanyak 90.000 ton pisang kategori Non-traditional ACP bananas diberi pembebasan biaya masuk. Ketentuan tersebut merugikan Amerika Serikat, mengingat Amerika Serikat adalah importir pisang terbesar di dunia, yaitu sekitar 3,7 ton254. Hal ini dikarenakan apabila EC menurunkan harga pisang di pasar bebas, dapat mempengaruhi kemampuan perusahaan Amerika Serikat untuk terus memproduksi dan mendistribusikan pisang. Kebijakan ini juga secara spesifik merugikan perekonomian Amerika Serikat, mengingat kebijakan ini sangat berpengaruh terhadap

254

Tiga importir terbesar di dunia adalah Amerika Serikat (3,7 juta ton), EC (3,5 juta ton), dan Jepang (0,9 juta ton), (Economic and Social Development Department FAO, “Overview of World Banana Production and Trade,” http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/y5102e/y5102e04.htm, diunduh tanggal 13 November 2014).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

122

Chiquita Brands International Inc. (Chiquita) dan Dole Foods yang merupakan distributor pisang terbesar di Amerika Serikat. Chiquita dan Dole Foods berperan besar dalam perkembangan pasar pisang di EC. Oleh karena itu, kegiatan Chiquita dan

Dole Foods sangat

dipengaruhi oleh kebijakan EC dalam mendistribusikan peluang pangsa pasar. Kebijakan tersebut berdampak pada terhambatnya impor Amerika Serikat, pengiriman dan fleksibilitas distribusi Chiquita dan Dole Foods sehingga Chiquita dan Dole Foods harus memperbesar modal agar dapat kembali menjalankan kegiatan usaha. Dalam kasus ini, Panel menilai bahwa kebijakan impor pisang pada rezim ini telah melanggar ketentuan GATT. Terhadap putusan Panel DSB tersebut, EC tidak menerapkannya dalam

kebijakan

impor

pisang

sehingga

Amerika

Serikat

melaksanakan retaliasi terhadap EC berupa pengenaan bea ad valorem sebesar 100% atau sebesar 191.400.000 per tahun terhadap 9 (sembilan) produk yang dipilih oleh Amerika Serikat. Besaran retaliasi tersebut dihitung dari jumlah kerugian yang diderita Amerika Serikat akibat adanya kebijakan tersebut. Arbiter dalam putusannya sependapat dengan tindakan retaliasi tersebut mengingat salah satu tujuan retaliasi adalah untuk mendorong kepatuhan negara anggota255. Hal tersebut juga sejalan dengan pertimbangan Amerika Serikat bahwa yang pada dasarnya mengingnkan adanya kepatuhan EC terhadap ketentuan WTO

256

. Dari penjelasan tersebut dapat

disimpulkan bahwa pertimbangan Amerika Serikat dalam melakukan 255

“...any assessment of the level of nullification or impairment presupposes an evaluation of consistency or inconsistency with WTO rules of the implementation measures taken by the European Communities, i.e. the revised banana regime, in relation to the panel and Appellate Body findings concerning the previous regime... Accordingly, the authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations is a temporary measure ... nature indicates that it is the purpose of countermeasures to induce compliance,” (Decision by the Arbitrators : European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale And Distribution Of Bananas- Recourse To Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU (WT/DS27/ARB), paragraph 4.3 dan 6.3). 256

“The United States substantiates its reasoning ... had a "legal interest" to launch a complaint against the EC's previous regime based on the EC's obligations under the GATT.”( WT/DS27/ARB, paragraph 6.8).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

123

retaliasi terhadap EC adalah berdasarkan pertimbangan hukum, di mana legal interest Amerika Serikat dalam kasus ini adalah kepatuhan EC terhadap ketentuan WTO. b.

Mexico-US Offset Act/ Byrd Amendment Case (Kasus DS217) Keberadaan Byrd Amendment sangat penting bagi kegiatan

perdagangan Meksiko. Meksiko berpendapat bahwa dalam ADA dan SCM Agreement telah ditetapkan persyaratan minimum mengenai inisiasi penyelidikan terkait antidumping atau countervailing, yaitu penyelidikan tidak dapat dimulai kecuali pihak berwenang telah melakukan penentuan bahwa permohonan penyelidikan disampaikan oleh atau atas nama industri domestik 257 yang dilakukan secara obyektif dan dengan itikad baik. Meksiko berpandangan bahwa Byrd Amendment menciptakan insentif keuangan bagi produsen domestik untuk mengajukan permohonan untuk dilakukannya dan insentif ini menyimpangkan dari fungsi pemeriksaan yang dilakukan oleh pihak berwenang untuk melakukan penyelidikan untuk menentukan apakah permohonan telah disampaikan oleh atau atas nama industri domestik. Hal ini tentu akan merugikan Meksiko, mengingat Amerika Serikat adalah negara tujuan utama untuk ekspor produk dari Meksiko258. Oleh karena itu, atas tidak dilaksanakannya putusan Panel DSB untuk menyesuaikan ketentuan Byrd Amendment dengan ketentuan WTO, maka Meksiko melakukan retaliasi terhadap Amerika Serikat. Mengingat Meksiko merupakan negara tujuan ekspor Amerika Serikat

257

Pasal 5 ayat (4) ADA dan Pasal 11 ayat (4) SCM Agreement.

258

Amerika Serikat merupakan negara tujuan utama dari ekpor Meksiko, yaitu sekitar 70% dari total ekspor Meksiko ditujukan untuk Amerika Serikat. Selain Amerika Serikat, Meksiko juga mengekspor ke sejumlah negara namun persentasenya tidak sebesar Amerika Serikat, yaitu negara Kanada sebesar 5.4%, Spanyol sebesar 2.1%, Cina sebesar 2.0%, dan Kolombia sebesar 1.8%, (“Observatory of Econpmic Complexity; Learn About Trade in Mexico,” http://atlas.media.mit .edu/profile/country/mex/, diakses tanggal 13 November 2014).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

124

kedua terbesar setelah Kanada259, maka Meksiko melakukan retaliasi terhadap Amerika Serikat berupa berupa penambahan bea masuk sebesar 30% terhadap produk susu dan olahannya (dairy products)260 termasuk di dalamnya susu formula bayi, 20% terhadap produk anggur (wine products)261, dan 9% terhadap produk permen262. Amerika Serikat sempat tidak setuju atas bentuk retaliasi tersebut karena Amerika Serikat berpendapat bahwa jumlah retaliasi yang dikenakan oleh Meksiko lebih besar daripada kerugian yang diderita sehingga tidak sesuai dengan tujuan retaliasi untuk mendorong kepatuhan. Selain itu, melihat posisi Meksiko sebagai 3 (tiga) besar negara tujuan ekspor Amerika Serikat, maka Amerika Serikat akan mengalami kerugian dengan dilaksanakannya retaliasi tersebut. Namun arbiter dalam putusannya

263

tetap mengizinkan

259

Meksiko merupakan negara tujuan kedua terbesar dari ekpor Amerika Serikat, yaitu sekitar 11% dari total ekspor ditujukan Amerika Serikat untuk Meksiko. Selain Meksiko, Amerika Serikat juga mengekspor ke sejumlah negara, yaitu negara Kanada sebesar 13%, Cina sebesar 9.3%, Jepang sebesar 5.5%, dan Jerman sebesar 4.9%. (“Observatory of Econpmic Complexity; Learn About Trade in United States,” http://atlas.media.mit.edu/profile/country/usa/, diakses tanggal 13 November 2014). 260

Pertimbangan Meksiko melaksanakan retaliasi berupa penambahan bea masuk pada impor dairy product adalah karena Meksiko adalah mitra dagang susu terbesar dari Amerika Serikat sepanjang tahun 1990-an. Sekitar $ 125.000.000 dolar susu dan produk susu yang dijual ke Meksiko dari Amerika Serikat. (David P. Ernstes and Joe L. Outlaw, “Dairy Sector Trade Between the United States and Mexico: An Overview,” http://agrinet.tamu.edu/trade/papers /sympos.pdf, diunduh tanggal 14 November 2014). 261

Meskipun ekspor wine product bukan merupakan ekspor utama untuk produk yang termasuk kategori agricultural exports, namun melihat pasar wine product sangat besar di Meksiko, maka pelaksanaan retaliasi di bidang wine product akan berjalan efektif (“Tariffs on Commodities of Export Interest to the United States,” http://www.ers.usda.gov/ media/919851/aer796k_002.pdf, dan Murray Silverman, Richard Castaldi, Greg Sorlien , dan Sally Baack, “Competition in the Global Wine Industry: A U.S. Perspective,” http://online.sfsu.edu/castaldi/bie/globcase.htm, diakses tanggal 14 November 2014). 262

Pertimbangan Meksiko melaksanakan retaliasi berupa penambahan bea masuk pada impor permen adalah karena Meksiko merupakan pasar ekspor permen Amerika Serikat ketiga terbesar ($281 juta) setelah ekspor sebesar $1.8 miliyar untuk ekspor ke seluruh dunia dan sebesar $709 juta untuk ekspor ke Kanada (“Profile of the US Candy Industry,” http:// www.candyusa.com/content.cfm?ItemNumber=1607, diakses tanggal 14 November 2014). 263

“... we have expressed some reservations about the notion of "inducing compliance", we note that variable levels could achieve this objective without affecting the requirement of "equivalence" between the level of nullification or impairment and the level of suspension under Article 22.4 of the DSU... if the CDSOA remains in force, the amount of disbursements is likely to

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

125

Meksiko untuk melaksanakan retaliasi sesuai dengan perhitungan kerugian Meksiko dengan pertimbangan bahwa penetapan tingkat retaliasi yang setara dengan kerugian yang ditujukan untuk meningkatkan kepatuhan tidak menjadi signifikan dalam kasus ini. Untuk itu diperlukan tingkat yang lebih tinggi untuk menutupi dan mencegah terjadinya kerugian yang diderita oleh Meksiko selama periode penyesuaian ketentuan Byrd Amendment terhadap ketentuan WTO. Berdasarkan penjelasan tersebut, dapat disimpulkan bahwa pertimbangan Meksiko untuk melakukan retaliasi terhadap Amerika Serikat adalah pertimbangan dari segi ekonomi. Hal ini sejalan dengan salah satu tujuan retaliasi adalah untuk menyeimbangkan kembali kondisi ekonomi Meksiko akibat kerugian yang diakibatkan oleh diberlakukannya Byrd Amendment oleh Amerika Serikat.

c.

US-EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products/ Hormones Case (Kasus DS26) Kasus Daging Sapi Hormon yang melibatkan Amerika Serikat

dan EC ini pada intinya mempermasalahkan ketentuan EC di bidang impor daging yang diatur dalam Council Directive 81/602/EEC (Directive 81/602/EEC), Council Directive 88/146/EEC (Directive 88/146/EEC),

dan

Council

Directive

88/299/EEC

(Directive

88/299/EEC). Amerika Serikat berpendapat bahwa pengaturan sanitary protection dalam ketentuan tersebut tidak didasarkan pada risk assesment sehingga menyebabkan diskriminsai terhadap produk increase in the coming years. We are conscious of the fact that higher countermeasures may not actually induce compliance in all instances. However, if we were to decide on a level of suspension fixed once for all on the basis of the first years of application of the CDSOA, it is possible that the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations would become, as time goes by, significantly less than the actual level of nullification or impairment resulting from the continued application of the CDSOA. In other words, the cost of the violation for the United States could decrease... We believe that such a risk exists in the present case and justifies that we determine a variable level of nullification or impairment and, consequently, a variable level of suspension of concessions or other obligations.” (Decision By The Arbitrator: United States – Continued Dumping And Subsidy Offset Act Of 2000 (Original Complaint By Mexico)-Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU (WT/DS234/ARB/MEX), paragraph 4.25).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

126

daging sapi yang berasal dari Amerika Serikat dan tidak sejalan dengan ketentuan SPS

Agreement

264

sehingga Panel dalam

putusannya, berpendapat bahwa EC bertindak tidak sesuai dengan SPS Agreement dan oleh karena itu,

EC harus menyesuaikan

ketentuan impor daging sapi tersebut dengan ketentuan SPS Agreement. Terhadap putusan Panel DSB tersebut, EC tidak dapat menerapkannya dalam ketentuan sanitary protection untuk impor daging sapi dan produk daging sapi. Terhadap tindakan EC tersebut, Amerika Serikat memutuskan untuk meretaliasi EC dengan pengenaan bea tambahan untuk tarif dari dafta produk yang dipilih oleh Amerika Serikat dari impor EC sebesar US$ 202 juta per tahun. Namun arbiter dalam putusannya tidak mengabulkan tingkatan retaliasi tersebut karena arbiter berpendapat bahwa tingkat retaliasi tersebut terlalu tinggi sehingga tidak setara dengan kerugian yang benar-benar diderita oleh Amerika Serikat265. Arbiter memutuskan nilai kerugian yang diderita Amerika Serikat sebagai dasar pengenaan retaliasi yaitu sebesar US$ 116,8 juta per tahun266.

264

Ketentuan yang dilanggar oleh Directive 81/602/EEC, Directive 88/146/EEC, dan Directive 88/299/EEC adalah Pasal 3 ayat (1), Pasal 3 ayat (3), Pasal 5 ayat (1) , dan Pasal 5 ayat (5) SPS Agreement. 265 “In this case the US has to identify the products ...equalling a total trade value that does not exceed the amount of trade impairment we find. In our view, this obligation to sufficiently specify the level of suspension flows directly from the requirement of ensuring equivalence in Article 22.4, the substantive provision we have to enforce here. It is part of the first element under the minimum requirements we outlined above, ...,” (Decision By The Arbitrators: European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat And Meat Products (Hormones) Original Complaint By The United States- Recourse To Arbitration By The European Communities Under Article 22.6 Of The DSU (WT/DS26/ARB), paragraph 21). 266

WT/DS26/ARB, paragraph 81.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

127

4.2. Pertimbangan Indonesia Terkait Retaliasi dalam Kasus DS312 4.2.1. Legalitas Pengajuan

Permohonan

Otorisasi

Retaliasi

oleh

Indonesia Berdasarkan Pasal 22 DSU, ada beberapa syarat yang harus dipenuhi oleh negara anggota yang terlibat dalam sengketa perdagangan internasional, yaitu: a. Adanya putusan Panel DSB yang tidak dilaksanakan dalam reasonable period of time (Pasal 22 ayat (2) DSU)267. b. Defendant Party dan Complainant Party tidak mencapai kesepakatan

mengenai

jumlah

kompensasi

yang

harus

dibayarkan oleh Defendant Party (Pasal 22 ayat (2) DSU)268. c. Objek yang akan diretaliasi masih termasuk dalam covered agreements (Pasal 22 ayat (5) DSU)269.

Dalam praktiknya, Korea Selatan memang telah mengeluarkan Implementation Report (Public Notice No. 2006-105 of the Korean Ministry of Finance and Economy) namun terhadap laporan tersebut, Indonesia berpendapat bahwa implementasi Korea Selatan tersebut masih belum sesuai dengan ketentuan ADA. Atas keberatan Indonesia tersebut, Korea Selatan dan Indonesia kembali menjalani proses Panel dan putusan Panel DSB kembali memenangkan Indonesia dan sama seperti putusan Panel DSB sebelumnya, Korea Selatan tetap tidak menyesuaikan ketentuan anti dumpingnya dengan ketentuan ADA. terhadap tindakan Korea Selatan ini, Indonesia dan Korea Selatan melakukan pertemuan bilateral untuk mencari 267

“If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement into compliance therewith or otherwise comply with the recommendations and rulings within the reasonable period of time ... such Member, if so requested, ... may request authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements.” 268

“...If no satisfactory compensation has been agreed within 20 days after the date of expiry of the reasonable period of time, any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures may request authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements...” 269

“The DSB shall not authorize suspension of concessions or other obligations if a covered agreement prohibits such suspension”

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

128

penyelesaian dari sengketa tersebut namun tidak terjadi kesepakatan mengenai penyelesaian sengketa tersebut. Apabila dikaitkan dengan ketentuan retaliasi dalam Pasal 22 DSU, Indonesia secara hukum memiliki hak untuk mengajukan permohonan otorisasi untuk melaksanakan retaliasi kepada DSB. Namun dalam pelaksanaannya, Indonesia tidak meminta otorisasi kepada DSB terkait pelaksanaan tindakan retaliasi. Mengenai analisis pertimbangan Indonesia untuk tidak melakukan retaliasi, akan dijelaskan dalam sub bab selanjutnya

4.2.2. Analisis Pertimbangan Indonesia Terkait Retaliasi dalam Kasus DS312 Kasus tuduhan dumping produk kertas Indonesia oleh Korea Selatan merupakan salah satu contoh kasus sengketa perdagangan internasional yang melibatkan negara berkembang, yaitu Indonesia, sebagai penggugat dan negara maju, yaitu Korea Selatan, sebagai tergugat. Indonesia sebagai pihak yang dirugikan sekaligus sebagai pihak yang dimenangkan oleh Panel DSB, berdasarkan Pasal 22 ayat (1) DSU, Indonesia memiliki hak untuk melakukan retaliasi terhadap Korea Selatan. Namun dalam praktiknya, Indonesia tidak melakukan retaliasi. Secara yuridis, retaliasi merupakan hak yang dimiliki oleh negara yang dimenangkan dalam sengketa perdagangan internasional oleh Panel DSB. Namun dalam pelaksanaannya, terdapat aspek non yuridis yang harus dipertimbangkan agar pelaksanaan retaliasi menjadi efektif atau setidaktidaknya tidak merugikan retaliating country itu sendiri. Dalam kasus ini, aspek non yuridis yang harus dipertimbangkan Indonesia sebelum melakukan retaliasi adalah kekuatan Indonesia dalam perdagangan internasional secara umum dan dengan Korea Selatan secara khusus serta hubungan politik di antara Indonesia dan Korea Selatan.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

129

4.2.3. Pertimbangan dari Aspek Kekuatan Perdagangan A.

Gambaran Perdagangan antara Indonesia dan Korea Selatan Presiden Indonesia dan Presiden Korea Selatan telah menandatangani

The Joint Declaration di Jakarta pada tanggal 4-5 Desember 2006. Joint Declaration tersebut meliputi 3 (tiga) pilar kerjasama, yaitu kerjasama politik dan keamanan, kerjasama ekonomi, perdagangan dan investasi, serta kerjasama sosial budaya. Joint Declaration tersebut mendorong kedua negara untuk lebih mempererat persahabatan dan menciptakan kerjasama yang lebih kongkrit. Sejak terbentuknya Joint declaration, investasi dan perdagangan antara kedua negara terus mengalami peningkatan dari tahun ke tahun. Kerjasama ekonomi, perdagangan dan investasi tersebut diwujudkan melalui pembentukan Indonesia-Korea Joint Task Force on Economic Cooperation (JTF-EC) yang telah menyelenggarakan pertemuan tahunan sejak tahun 2007. Kerja sama ini dapat dilihat melalui bentuk timbal balik yang saling menguntungkan, yaitu Korea Selatan sebagai negara yang memiliki tingkat kemampuan yang tinggi di bidang teknologi, dapat membantu kebutuhan Indonesia akan teknologi dengan cara alih teknologi dan di sisi lain, Korea Selatan membutuhkan pasar untuk memasarkan hasil industrinya. Data dari Kementrian Perdagangan juga menyebutkan bahwa Korea Selatan adalah 10 (sepuluh) besar negara yang paling tinggi aktivitas ekspor-impor dengan Indonesia dan dari aktivitas tersebut, neraca perdagangan menunjukkan angka surplus bagi Indonesia. Selain kegiatan ekspor-impor, kekuatan perdagangan Indonesia juga dipengaruhi oleh investasi Korea Selatan di Indonesia. a.

Kegiatan Ekspor Indonesia ke Korea Selatan Kegiatan ekspor Indonesia dibagi ke dalam 2 (dua) sektor, yaitu

migas dan non migas, di mana sektor non migas memiliki kontribusi lebih besar dalam kegiatan ekspor, yaitu sebesar 79,62% dari total ekspor Indonesia ke seluruh dunia. Ekspor non migas ini dibagi lagi Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

130

ke dalam beberapa sektor dari sektor yang paling banyak diekspor oleh Indonesia adalah industri (60,04%), pertambangan (17,03%), dan pertanian (2,54%). Produk kertas sebagai bagian dari sektor industri cukup berperan dalam memberikan pemasukan negara. Hal ini dibuktikan melalui posisi ekspor kertas yang termasuk dalam kelompok 10 (sepuluh) 270 besar hasil industri yang paling banyak diekspor Indonesia ke seluruh dunia. Dalam kegiatan ekspor yang dilakukan oleh Indonesia, Korea Selatan merupakan mitra yang cukup diperhitungkan. Hal ini terlihat dari posisi Korea Selatan yang termasuk dalam kelompok 10 (sepuluh) 271 besar negara tujuan ekspor Indonesia, sementara bagi Korea Selatan sendiri, Indonesia juga termasuk 10 (sepuluh) besar negara yang pengekspor ke Korea Selatan meskipun hanya berada dalam urutan ke-9 (sembilan) 272 . Terkait dengan komoditi yang diekspor oleh Indonesia, khususnya produk kertas, ke seluruh dunia, Korea Selatan masih menjadi 10 (sepuluh) 273 besar negara tujuan ekspor Indonesia meskipun secara persentase sangat kecil jika dibanding dengan negara tujuan ekspor kertas lainnya. Sedangkan secara khusus untuk total komoditi yang diekspor Indonesia ke Korea

270

Produk kertas berada di posisi ke-8 besar produk yang banyak diekspor dari sektor industri setelah pengolahan kelapa/ kelapa sawit, karet, tekstil, besi, baja, dan otomotif, elektronika, pengolahantembaga dan timah, serta kimia dasar. (“Perkembangan Ekspor Indonesia Berdasarkan Sektor,” http://www.kemenperin.go.id/statistik/peran.php?ekspor=1, diakses tanggal 15 November 2014). 271

Korea Selatan merupakan negara ketujuh terbesar negara tujuan ekspor Indonesia setelah Cina, Jepang, Amerika Serikat, India, Singapura, dan Malaysia. (“Perkembangan ekspor non migas (negara tujuan) periode 2008-2013,” http://diskumdagdki.jakarta.go.id/ekspor-impor-indonesia/176perkembangan-ekspor-nonmigas-negara-tujuan-periode--2008-2013, diakses tanggal 15 November 2014). 272

Lihat Gambar 4.1.

273

Ekspor produk kertas ke Korea selatan sebesar 4.32 % (industri non migas). Hal ini menempatkan Korea Selatan ke dalam urutan ke-7 dari total negaratujuan ekspor kertas setelah Jepang (12.79%), AS (11.61%), Singapura (9.37%), RRC (7.22%), India (6.54%), Malaysia (5.55%). (“Statistik perdagangan luar negeri Indonesia, direktorat pengembangan pasar dan informasi ekspor, Dirjen Pengembangan Ekspor Nasional (DJPEN) Kementrian Perdagangan Republik Indonesia 2013,” http://www.embassyofindonesia.eu/sites/default/files/NP%202013 %20Indonesia.pdf, diunduh tanggal 15 November 2014).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

131

Selatan, kertas bukan merupakan komoditi utama Indonesia ke Korea Selatan274.

274

Data dari Kementrian Perdagangan menyebutkan bahwa produk kertas merupakan komoditis ke-47 dari total komoditi yang diekspor Indonesia ke Korea Selatan.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

132

Gambar 4.1. Komposisi Negara Utama Pengimpor Korea Selatan Tahun 2008

(sumber: Laporan Atase Deperindag 2009, KBRI Seoul, Korea Selatan)

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

133

Tabel 4.1. Data Ekspor Non Migas Utama Indonesia ke Korea Selatan Periode 2003-2008

Nilai (US$ ribu) No Komoditi

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Total Ekspor Non Migas Udang Kopi Palm oil Coklat Karet TPTI Alas Kaki Elektronik Komponen otomotif Furniture Total Pangsa

Kenaikan Trend 2007-06 2004-08

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

5,212,310 4,683 4,971 4,437 679 80,978 177,331 25,602 140,327

6,368,132 5,541 5,293 1,034 157 111,632 191,157 24,53 131,597

8,184,433 3,495 9,88 1,101 27 121,846 200,67 24,684 163,682

8,848,554 4,984 3,188 4,193 72 186,841 237,269 38,907 201,45

9,113,843 4,677 1,58 2,892 42 211,629 260,728 43,898 184,328

11,320,291 5,083 1,656 13,799 66 307,883 307,278 49,209 195,12

24.21 7.72 4.81 377.14 57.14 45.48 17.85 12.10 5.66

13.41 1.02 33.46 84.93 12.11 29.45 12.88 21.75 8.23

883 18,049 457,886 8.78

521 14,91 486,372 7.64

348 19,432 564,371 6.90

769 24,369 702,042 7.93

1,527 28,202 739.501 8.11

1,342 27,475 908,866 8.03

12.12 2.58 22.90 1.05

40.17 17.29 16.42 2.66

(sumber: Laporan Atase Deperindag 2009, KBRI Seoul, Korea Selatan)

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

134

b.

Kegiatan Impor Indonesia dari Korea Selatan Dari keseluruhan kegiatan impor yang dilakukan oleh Indonesia sejak

tahun 2006 hingga tahun 2011, kegiatan impor pada tahun 2008 merupakan masa dimana impor mulai mengalami peningkatan tajam sekaligus masa dimana volume impor terbesar dari seluruh kegiatan impor Indonesia. Hal ini terjadi karena perekonomian Indonesia paling besar bergantung kepada konsumsi domestik dan bukan pada ekspor. Ketika negara ekportir lain di dunia sedang mengalami resesi keuangan sehingga harus mengurangi volume impor, Indonesia justru mengalami sebaliknya. Impor Indonesia mengalami peningkatan di awal tahun 2008 hingga akhirnya mengalami penurunan di pertengahan 2008 yang disebabkan oleh fluktuasi harga dan fluktuasi permintaan terhadap produk impor utama yang secara signifikan berpengaruh terhadap neraca perdagangan Indonesia seperti minyak bumi dan bahan baku industri. Pada masa ini, 5 (lima) besar negara yang mengekspor barangnya ke Indonesia adalah Singapura, Cina, Thailand, Malaysia, dan Korea Selatan 275 .

Bagi Korea Selatan sendiri,

Indonesia merupakan salah satu negara yang diperhitungkan sebagai tujuan ekspor meskipun secara persentase hanya 1,88% dari total seluruh ekspor yang dilaksanakan oleh Korea Selatan. Terkait dengan jenis produk, produk yang banyak diimpor oleh Indonesia dari Korea Selatan adalah produk hasil industri. Lima produk terbesar dari total produk yang diimpor dari Korea Selatan adalah tekstil besi baja, mesin, dan otomotif, alat elektronik, produk kimia dasar, serta produk hasil pengolahan timah dan tembaga276.

275

Pusat Data dan Informasi Kementrian Perindustrian, “Laporan Impor Berdasarkan Katagori Ekonomi (Barang Konsumsi, Bahan Baku, dan Barang Modal,” http://www.kemenperin.go.id/Download/3217/Impor-Menurut-Kategori-Ekonomi-BarangKonsumsi-Bahan-Baku-Dan-Barang-Modal)-Periode-Januari-Oktober-2010-Data-Impor-BarangOoleh-Indonesia-Berdasarkan-Negara-2008.pdf , diunduh tanggal 15 November 2014. 276

Persentase produk yang diimpor dari Korea Selatan: tekstil (77,07%), alat elektronik (47,69%), besi baja, mesin, dan otomotif (32,26%), produk kimia dasar (18,95%), serta produk hasil pengolahan timah dan tembaga (8,81%) (“Perkembangan Ekspor Indonesia Berdasarkan Sektor,” http://www.kemenperin.go.id/statistik/query_negara.php?negara=Korea+Selatan&jenis=i, diakses tanggal 15 Nnovember 2014).

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

135

Gambar 4.2 Komposisi Negara Utama Tujuan Ekspor Korea Selatan Tahun 2008

(sumber: Laporan Atase Deperindag 2009, KBRI Seoul, Korea Selatan)

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

136

B.

Pertimbangan Indonesia untuk Tidak Melakukan Retaliasi dari Aspek Kekuatan Perdagangan Dari diagram yang menunjukan kegiatan ekspor-impor antara

Indonesia dan Korea Selatan di atas, dapat dilihat bahwa hubungan eksporimpor antara Indonesia dan Korea Selatan adalah hubungan yang positif bagi Indonesia karena jumlah ekspor Indonesia ke Korea Selatan lebih besar daripada jumlah impor Indonesia dari Korea Selatan. Namun kondisi seperti ini harus disikapi dengan lebih hati-hati agar retaliasi tidak merugikan bagi Indonesia sendiri selaku Retaliating Country, baik secara langsung maupun tidak langsung, terhadap komoditi lain, mengingat sifat retaliasi yang diskriminatif dan menimbulkan dampak injury bagi Non Compliance Country. Misalnya, Indonesia melakukan retaliasi dengan menarik semua produk kertas yang dijual ke pasar Korea Selatan. Terhadap tindakan ini, Korea Selatan justru membalas tindakan Indonesia dengan memberikan hambatan non tarif dengan membatasi kuota produk karet yang diekspor Indonesia ke Korea Selatan. Mengingat produk karet merupakan salah satu komoditi yang paling banyak diekspor ke Korea Selatan, maka pembatasan kuota tersebut akan merugikan Indonesia. Selain pertimbangan terhadap kerugian bagi komoditi ekspor-impor antara Indonesia dan Korea Selatan selain kertas, pelaksanaan retaliasi juga harus mempertimbangkan efektivitas dari pelaksanaan retaliasi itu sendiri yang dapat dilihat baik dari sudut pandang Indonesia dan dari sudut pandang Korea Selatan. Dari sudut pandang Korea Selatan, dalam tabel 4.1 mengenai data komoditi ekspor Indonesia ke Korea Selatan, dapat dilihat bahwa kertas bukan merupakan komoditi ekspor utama Indonesia ke Korea Selatan. Selain itu, berdasarkan data pasar ekspor produk kertas Indonesia ke seluruh dunia, Korea Selatan juga bukan merupakan pasar utama dari ekspor produk kertas Indonesia. Jika dikaitkan dengan tujuan retaliasi untuk memberikan keseimbangan ekonomi dengan pemberian ganti rugi, maka retaliasi diberlakukan terhadap produk kertas, maka tidak tertutup kemungkinan Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

137

pemenuhan ganti rugi akibat dikenakannya BMAD terhadap produk kertas Indonesia akan membutuhkan waktu yang lama atau bahkan sama sekali tidak akan menutup kerugian yang dialami Indonesia. Contohnya, ketika Indonesia menarik produk kertas dari Korea Selatan, maka konsumsi Korea Selatan terhadap produk kertas Indonesia akan berkurang. Terhadap kondisi ini, tidak tertutup kemungkinan Korea Selatan akan mensubstitusi konsumsi produk kertas dengan cara mengimpor produk kertas dari negara lain, mengingat Indonesia sendiri bukanlah negara utama penghasil kertas di dunia. Sedangkan dari sudut pandang Indonesia, dalam Pasal 22 ayat (3) huruf d (ii) DSU mensyaratkan bahwa: “in applying the above principles ... the broader economic elements related to the nullification or impairment ...” Rumusan pasal tersebut mensyaratkan adanya pertimbangan terhadap dampak kerugian ekonomi secara luas akibat tindakan dari non compliance country. Apabila dikaitkan dengan kasus ini, maka unsur ‘broader economic elements related to the nullification’ tidak terpenuhi karena BMAD yag diberlakukan oleh KTC Korea Selatan hanya berlaku untuk 4 (empat) eksportir produk kertas Indonesia. Hal ini berarti bahwa eksportir produk kertas Indonesia selain 4 (empat) eksportir tersebut masih dapat mengekspor produk kertasnya tanpa dikenakan BMAD. Pengenaan BMAD memang memberikan kerugian bagi Indonesia, hanya saja kerugiannya tidak bersifat meluas sehingga tidak mempengaruhi ekspor kertas secara khusus maupun perdagangan dan perekonomian nasional secara umum.

4.2.4. Aspek Politik A.

Gambaran Hubungan Politik antara Indonesia dan Korea Selatan Sistem penyelesaian sengketa perdagangan internasional, khususnya

retaliasi, sangat dipengaruhi oleh aspek politik terhadap penentuan efektif atau tidaknya pelaksanaan retaliasi. Dalam kasus ini, faktor hubungan Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

138

diplomatik mempengaruhi Indonesia dalam pengambilan keputusan pelaksanaan retaliasi terhadap Korea Selatan. Hubungan diplomatik antara Indonesia dan Korea

Selatan telah

dimulai sejak tahun 1973 sementara hubungan konsuler telah dibuka sejak tahun 1966. Kedua negara tersebut berupaya meningkatkan hubungan dan kerja sama, baik bilateral, regional, maupun multilateral. Hubungan dan kerja sama bilateral diarahkan kepada kerja sama strategis. Hal ini dibuktikan pada tahun 2006, Indonesia dan Korea Selatan menandatangani Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership to Promote Friendship and Cooperation between Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of Korea (Joint Declaration). Di samping Joint Declaration, kedua negara tersebut. Di samping Joint Declaration, Kedua negara juga memiliki sejumlah forum dan atau modalitas dalam rangka kerja sama bilateral seperti: 

Pertemuan Working Level Task Force (WLTF);



Joint Task Force on Economic Cooperation pada tahun 2007;



Working Level Task Force Meeting (WLTFM ) pada tahun 2008;



Joint

Economic

Committee

(WLTFM)

Tingkat

Menteri

Ekonomi. Hubungan dan kerja sama politik yang difokuskan pada pertumbuhan ekonomi melalui investasi antara Indonesia dan Korea Selatan berjalan sangat baik dan dapat dikatakan hampir tidak ada permasalahan yang cukup serius. Peningkatan hubungan dan kerja sama bilateral antara Indonesia dan Korea Selatan didukung antara lain oleh sifat komplementaritas sumber daya dan keunggulan yang dimiliki masing-masing serta proses kemajuan ekonomi dan politik kedua negara yang sangat baik yang membuka peluang kerja sama di berbagai sektor semakin terbuka lebar. Bagi Indonesia, Korea Selatan menawarkan peluang yang baik sebagai sumber modal/ investasi, teknologi dan produk-produk teknologi. Korea Selatan menjadi alternatif sumber

teknologi

khususnya di

bidang heavy industry,

IT

dan

telekomunikasi. Di lain pihak, Indonesia dengan pertumbuhan ekonomi Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

139

yang cukup sehat dalam dekade terakhir menawarkan peluang pasar yang sangat besar, sumber alam/ mineral, dan tenaga kerja. Data menunjukkan bahwa nilai realisasi investasi Korea Selatan di Indonesia terus meningkat sejak tahun 2008 hingga tahun 2013 dan di akhir tahun 2013, nilai investasi dari Korea Selatan telah meningkat hingga mencapai US$ 2,2 miliar 277 . Nilai tersebut telah menempatkan Korea Selatan sebagai investor terbesar ke-4 setelah Jepang, Singapura dan Amerika Serikat. Investasi Korsea Selatan di Indonesia terutama pada sektor industri elektronik, telekomunikasi, konstruksi, otomotif, pertambangan, migas, air bersih, perbankan dan perhotelan. Beberapa investor besar dari Korea Selatan seperti

POSCO, Hankook Tire, Lotte Group dan Cheil Jedang

Group telah berinvestasi di Indonesia278. Hal tersebut membuktikan adanya kepercayaan yang tinggi dari para investor Korea Selatan kepada Indonesia. Investasi oleh perusahaan besar tersebut telah membawa perusahaanperusahaan Korea Selatan lainnya untuk ikut berinvestasi di Indonesia.

B.

Analisis Pertimbangan Indonesia untuk Tidak Melakukan Retaliasi dari Aspek Politik Dari data di atas, dapat dilihat bahwa hubungan politik antara

Indonesia dan Korea Selatan berjalan sangat baik, bahkan hubungan baik tersebut masih tetap dijaga meskipun Indonesia dan Korea Selatan sedang menghadapi sengketa perdagangan internasional. Sifat diskriminatif serta luasnya dampak dari retaliasi merupakan hal yang dapat mengganggu hubungan politik antara Indonesia dan Korea Selatan yang pada akhirnya justru akan merugikan Indonesia. Politik Indonesia dan Korea Selatan yang berfokus pada investasi, menjadikan investasi sebagai sektor strategis. Kondisi ini di satu sisi menguntungkan Indonesia namun di sisi lain harus diperhatikan secara hati-hati agar tidak digunakan Korea Selatan untuk 277

“Bilateral RI-Korsel,” http://kbriseoul.kr/kbriseoul/index.php/id/indokor, diakses tanggal 15 November 2014. 278

Ibid.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

140

merugikan Indonesia. Terkait dengan pelaksanaan retaliasi, apabila Indonesia melakukan retaliasi terhadap Korea Selatan, maka akan mempengaruhi investasi Korea Selatan di Indonesia khususnya di bidang elektronik. Retaliasi yang dilaksanakan Indonesia akan menimbulkan injury bagi Korea Selatan sehingga tidak tertutup kemungkinan, untuk menutupi injury tersebut, Korea Selatan akan melakukan pembalasan dengan menarik investasinya dari Indonesia.

Dari penjelasan mengenai analisis pertimbangan Indonesia untuk tidak melakukan retaliasi jika dikaitkan dengan tujuan retaliasi, dapat disimpulkan bahwa Indonesia sangat berfokus pada penggunaan retaliasi untuk tujuan rebalancing terhadap kerugian ekonomi yang diderita Indonesia dengan dikenakannya BMAD terhadap 4 (empat) eksportir produk kertas Indonesia ke Korea Selatan. Implikasi dari berfokusnya Indonesia pada tujuan rebalancing adalah pertimbangan

yang diambil

Indonesia

dalam

menentukan

sikap untuk

melaksanakan atau tidak melaksanakan retaliasi, sangat dipengaruhi oleh pertimbangan ekonomi jangka pendek, seperti bagaimana retaliasi dapat mencapai penggantian atas kerugian yang diderita Indonesia selama diberlakukannya BMAD, bagaimana retaliasi tidak mengganggu kegiatan ekspor-impor komoditikomoditi lain antara Indonesia dan Korea Selatan, serta bagaimana retaliasi tidak mengganggu hubungan Indonesia dan Korea Selatan yang akan berpengaruh pada langkah-langkah politik yang diambil oleh kedua negara, dalam ini politik antara Indonesia dan Korea Selatan difokuskan pada peningkatan ekonomi melalui investasi. Hal-hal tersebut memang perlu untuk dipertimbangkan mengingat posisi Indonesia sebagai negara berkembang serta kondisi perekonomian Indonesia tidak sebaik Korea Selatan. Namun terlepas dari pertimbangan tersebut, apabila dilihat dari segi hukum, posisi Indonesia sebenarnya lebih kuat jika dibanding dengan Korea Selatan, mengingat Indonesia memiliki dasar hukum yang kuat dan sah berdasarkan Pasal 22 DSU untuk melakaksanakan retaliasi, sehingga dalam Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

141

mempertimbangkan untuk melaksanakan atau tidak melaksanakan retaliasi, Indonesia juga perlu memperhatikan dari aspek hukum.

4.3. Upaya Pemerintah dalam Mengembalikan Kerugian Eksportir Kertas Indonesia Pasca Pencabutan BMAD Seperti yang telah dijelaskan pada bab sebelumnya, Korea Selatan harus mencabut BMAD atas 4 (empat) eksportir kertas Indonesia pada tahun 2006 namun dalam pelaksanaannya, Korea Selatan baru mencabut BMAD tersebut pada tahun 2010. Tindakan tersebut mengakibatkan 4 (empat) eksportir kertas Indonesia tersebut harus mengalami kerugian lebih besar karena adanya penundaan pelaksanaan putusan Panel DSB. Sayangnya, terhadap kondisi ini, pemerintah Indonesia tidak melakukan tindakan tertentu untuk mengembalikan kerugian tersebut pasce pencabutan BMAD oleh Korea Selatan. Sama halnya dengan Korea Selatan, Indonesia juga memiliki komite yang secara khusus menangani kasus dumping yang terjadi di Indoneia, yaitu Komite Anti Dumping Indonesia (KADI). Namun KADI yang dibentuk berdasarkan Keputusan Menteri Perindustrian Dan Perdagangan Republik Indonesia Nomor 427/MPP/Kep/10/2000

tentang

Komite

Anti

Dumping

Indonesia

(Kepmenperindag No 427/MPP/Kep/10/2000) mengatur bahwa KADI bertugas untuk menangani hal-hal yang berkaitan dengan upaya menanggulangi importasi barang dumping atau barang mengandung subsidi secara curang yang menimbulkan kerugian bagi industri dalam negeri yang memproduksi like product, yang pelaksanaannya berpedoman kepada Perjanjian Organisasi Perdagangan Dunia (WTO Agreement). Lebih lanjut Pasal 2 Kepmenperindag No 427/MPP/Kep/10/2000, mengatur bahwa tugas pokok KADI adalah (a) melakukan penyelidikan terhadap dugaan adanya barang dumping atau barang mengandung subsidi yang menimbulkan kerugian bagi industri dalam negeri barang sejenis; (b) mengumpulkan, meneliti dan mengolah bukti dan informasi mengenai dugaan adanya barang dumping atau barang mengandung subsidi; (c) mengusulkan pengenaan bea masuk anti dumping atau bea masuk imbalan kepada Menteri Perindustrian dan Perdagangan; (d) Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

142

melaksanakan tugas lain yang ditetapkan oleh menteri perindustrian dan perdagangan; dan (e) menyusun laporan pelaksanaan tugas untuk disampaikan kepada

Menteri

Perindustrian

dan

Perdagangan.

Sedangkan

Pasal

3

Kepmenperindag No 427/MPP/Kep/10/2000 mengatur bahwa dalam menjalankan tugas pokok tersebut, KADI memiliki fungsi (a) merumuskan kebijaksanaan penanggulangan importasi barang dumping atau barang mengandung subsidi; (b) meneliti dan melakukan konsultasi penyelesaian berbagai permasalahan yang berkaitan dengan importasi barang dumping atau barang mengandung subsidi; dan (c) mengawasi pelaksanaan kegiatan yang berkaitan dengan penanggulangan importasi barang dumping atau barang mengandung subsidi. Dari ketentuan tersebut, dapat dilihat bahwa tugas KADI adalah hanya menangani kasus dalam hal terjadi dumping atau dugaan dumping terhadap barang yang diimpor ke Indonesia. Sementara dalam hal terjadi kasus dumping atau dugaan dumping terhadap barang yang diekspor oleh Indonesia ke negara lain bukan menjadi tugas dan wewenang KADI kasus tersebut. Oleh karena itu, dengan tidak adanya regulasi maupun badan yang menangani masalah tuduhan dumping terhadap Indonesia, maka para eksportir sendiri yang akhirnya berusaha meningkatkan kembali kegiatan perdagangannya untuk menutupi kerugian yang diderita akibat pengenaan BMAD. Selanjutnya, terkait dengan Kasus DS312, Sinar Mas Group sebagai salah satu perusahaan yang terkena BMAD mengatakan bahwa pihaknya sendiri akan meningkatkan kembali ekspor kertas ke Korea Selatan hingga US$100 juta setelah sebelumnya terjadi penurunan ekspor hingga US$ 40 juta, menyusul semakin terbukanya peluang ekspor ke negara itu setelah pencabutan pengenaan Bea Masuk Anti Dumping (BMAD). Para eksportir yang sempat dikenakan BMAD tersebut yakin meskipun kehilangan pangsa pasar yang cukup besar ke Korea Selatan, namun produk kertas Indonesia tetap masih bisa bersaing baik dengan produk domestik maupun dengan produk impor.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

BAB V PENUTUP

5.1. Kesimpulan Berdasarkan analisis yang telah dilakukan dalam bab sebelumnya, maka dapat ditarik beberapa simpulan atas masalah yang dibahas dalam penelitian ini sebagai berikut: 1.

Ketentuan pelaksanaan retaliasi yang diatur dalam GATT maupun DSU, pada dasarnya sama, namun yang membedakan retaliasi dalam GATT dan DSU adalah syarat kondisi yang harus dipenuhi agar Complainant Party dapat meminta otorisasi untuk melaksanakan retaliasi. Ketentuan retaliasi dalam GATT mensyaratkan bahwa Complainant Party dapat meminta otorisasi pelaksanaan retaliasi dalam hal Defendant Party yang tidak melaksanakan putusan Council serta tindakan tersebut menimbulkan kerugian bagi Complainant Party, sementara dalam DSU tidak mensyaratkan secara jelas mengenai

adanya

kerugian,

meskipun

dalam

praktiknya

ketidakpatuhan terhadap ketentuan WTO oleh suatu negara anggota akan menimbulkan kerugian bagi negara anggota lain. Syarat untuk melakukan retaliasi adalah adanya putusan/ rekomendasi Panel yang tidak dilaksanakan oleh Defendant Party dalam jangka waktu yang wajar serta adanya pemberian otorisasi oleh DSB bagi Complainant Party untuk melaksanakan retaliasi. Sebelum melakukan retaliasi, kedua pihak dapat menggunakan mekanisme kompensasi namun apabila tidak tercapai kompensasi yang diinginkan kedua pihak, maka dalam waktu 20 (dua puluh) hari sejak tidak adanya kesepakatan, maka Complainant Party dapat meminta otorisasi kepada DSB untuk melaksanakan retaliasi. Complainant Party harus menentukan bentuk serta tingkat retaliasi dan apabila bentuk dan tingkat retaiasi sudah 143

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

144

2.

disetujui oleh arbiter melalui proses arbitrase, maka Complainant Party

dapat

melaksanakan

retaliasi

dengan

tetap

diawasi

penggunaannya oleh DSB.

3.

Kasus tuduhan dumping terhadap produk kertas Indonesia oleh Korea Selatan (Kasus DS312) adalah kasus yang melibatkan Indonesia sebagai negara yang digugat oleh Korea Selatan akibat adanya tuduhan mengenai praktik dumping yang dilakukan oleh 4 (empat) eksportir Indonesia yang merugikan produsen kertas domestik Korea Selatan. Namun Panel dalam laporannya (WT/DS312/R) justru memenangkan Indonesia. Panel dalam laporannya, memutuskan bahwa KTC dalam menentukan dumping telah bertindak inkonsisten dengan ketentuan ADA dengan tidak menerapkan prinsip kehati-hatian khusus dalam

penggunaan informasi dari sumber-sumber sekunder daripada data penjualan domestik yang disediakan oleh Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli,bertindak inkonsisten terkait dengan penentuan Margin Dumping untuk

Tjiwi

Kimia,

pengungkapan

hasil

verifikasi,

serta

pengungkapan rincian perhitungan Nilai Normal untuk Indah Kiat dan Pindo Deli. Selain itu, dalam laporannya, Panel juga memutuskan bahwa KTC dalam menentukan kerugian materiel, telah inkonsisten dengan ketentuan ADA terkait dengan penilaian atas dampak impor dumping di industri dalam negeri dan dengan pengungkapan hasil pengujian teknis yang dilakukan oleh Korean Agency untuk teknologi, standar serta pelaksanaan survey 4.

Korea Selatan sebagai pihak yang kalah dalam kasus ini, tidak melaksanakan putusan Panel sampai batas waktu yang wajar sehingga atas tindakan ini, Indonesia telah berusaha menempuh jalan pemberian kompensasi namun usaha ini gagal. Sesuai dengan Pasal 22 ayat (2) DSU, Indonesia memiliki hak untuk melaksanakan retaliasi namun pada kenyataannya, Indonesia tidak menggunakan hak tersebut. Pertimbangan yang mungkin diambil Indonesia dengan tidak Universitas Indonesia

Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

145

menggunakan hak retaliasi sangat terkait dengan kondisi dan hubungan antara Indonesia dan Korea Selatan. Kondisi yang paling berpengaruh adalah hubungan dalam bidang perdagangan dan hubungan politik. Terkait dengan aspek perdagangan, pertimbangan Indonesia antara lain adalah Indonesia tidak ingin retaliasi justru merugikan perdagangan komoditi selain kertas dan apabila Indonesia melakukan retaliasi, belum tentu akan menutup kerugian Indonesia akibat pengenaan BMAD oleh Korea Selatan. Selain itu, dilihat dari dampak terhadap perekonomian Indonesia, kerugian akibat pengenaan BMAD tidak memenuhi broader economic elements sehingga apabila dilaksanakan akan menjadi tidak efektif dan memakan biaya yang lebih besar daripada keuntungan yang didapat bila berhasil melaksanakan retaliasi. Sedangkan dari aspek politik, pertimbangan Indonesia adalah Indonesia tidak ingin sifat diskriminatif retaliasi akan berdampak hubungan politik Indonesia dan Korea Selatan di bidang investasi. Apabila Korea Selatan menarik investasinya dari Indonesia, khususnya investasi industri elektronik, sebagai balasan atas tindakan retaliasi,

maka akan sangat

berdampak pada

perekonomian nasional.

5.2. Saran Berdasarkan simpulan yang telah diuraikan, maka dapat diutarakan beberapa saran yang diharapkan kiranya dapat berguna untuk mengembangkan kekuatan perdagangan internasional yang dilakukan oleh Indonesia. Saran tersebut adalah sebagai berikut: 1.

Pemerintah Indonesia dalam memandang, baik sistem penyelesaian sengketa maupun retaliasi, sebaiknya tidak bersikap skeptis dengan menganggap bahwa sistem tersebut tidak akan efektif apabila dilaksanakan oleh negara berkembang seperti Indonesia. Pengalaman menunjukan bahwa ada negara berkembang yang melaksanakan retaliasi terhadap negara maju dan berhasil. Hal ini sangat terkait Universitas Indonesia

Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

146

dengan pandangan pemerintah Indonesia terhadap tujuan retaliasi itu sendiri. Seperti yang dijelaskan di atas, tujuan retaliasi tidak hanya untuk mengembalikan keuntungan ekonomi yang hilang, namun juga mendorong kepatuhan. Dalam kasus ini, pemerintah Indonesia sangat berfokus pada apakah retaliasi tersebut berdampak positif atau negatif terhadap perekonomian serta politik Indonesia dengan Korea Selatan. Namun ada aspek yang dilupakan oleh pemerintah Indonesia, yaitu aspek hukum. penulis berpendapat bahwa dalam kasus ini lebih tepat apabila pemerintah berfokus pada tujuan untuk meningkatkan kepatuhan karena pengembalian kerugian ekonomi yang hilang, selain tidak efektif, sifatnya hanya sementara. Namun pemerintah Indonesia juga harus memikirkan dampak jangka panjang. Indonesia dapat menggunakan retaliasi sebagai peringatan bagi Korea Selatan dan juga mitra negara anggota lainnya bahwa apabila ingin melakukan perdagangan dengan Indonesia, maka Korea Selatan dan negara anggota lainnya harus mematuhi ketentuan yang ada dalam WTO. Hal ini justru baik bagi citra Indonesia di mata internasional. Indonesia selain akan dipandang sebagai negara yang taat hukum, posisi Indonesia dalam perdagang internasional juga semakin kuat dan diperhitungkan meskipun secara ekonomi, Indonesia tidak sekuat negara maju.

2.

Penulis

setuju

apabila

pelaksanaan

retaliasi

membutuhkan

pertimbangan yang matang dan menyeluruh sehingga diusahakan pelaksanaan retaliasi tidak akan berbalik merugikan Indonesia. Namun kembali lagi, pemerintah Indonesia melupakan aspek hukum. Pasal 22 ayat (2) DSU mengatur bahwa sebelum melakukan retaliasi, Complainant Country harus meminta otorisasi kepada DSB WTO. Apabila pemerintah mencermati rumusan pasal ini, maka sebenarnya dapat meminta otorisasi kepada DSB WTO untuk melaksanakan retaliasi tanpa harus melakukan retaliasi tersebut karena pada dasarnya Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

147

retaliasi adalah hak sehingga keputusan untuk menggunakan atau tidak menggunakan hak adalah otoritas pemegang hak. Dengan meminta otoritas retaliasi kepada DSB WTO, paling tidak Indonesia dapat menguatkan bargaining position serta “menggertak” Korea Selatan agar segera melaksanakan putusan Panel. Dengan ini diharapkan Korea Selatan akan segera melaksanakan putusan Panel tanpa Indonesia harus menggunakan hak retaliasi yang telah diberikan DSB WTO.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

148

DAFTAR REFERENSI

BUKU

Alavi, Amin. Legalization of Development in The WTO; Between Law and Politics. The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2009.

Bown, Chad P. dan Joost Pauwelyn. The Law, Economics, and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement. New York: Cambridge Press University, 2010.

Busch, Marc L. Dan Eric Reinhardt. The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism and Developing Countries. Georgetown: Department for Infrastructure and Economic Cooperation, 2004.

Direktorat

Jenderal

Kerjasama

Perdagangan

Internasional

Kementrian

Perdagangan Indonesia. Kasus Pertama Tuduhan Dumping Copy Paper Indonesia oleh Korea Selatan. Jakarta: Subdit Pelayanan Pengaduan Direktorat Pengamanan Perdagangan, 2010.

Direktorat

Jenderal

Kerjasama

Perdagangan

Internasional

Kementrian

Perdagangan Indonesia. Profil Kasus Tuduhan Dumping Review Korea Selatan terhadap Produk PPC (Plain Paper Cpoier/ Business Information Paper), WF (Uncoated Wood-free Printing Paper), dan Uncoated Woodfree Paper In A Form of Roll, Sheet, or Other Asal. Jakarta: Subdit Pelayanan Pengaduan Direktorat Pengamanan Perdagangan, 2010.

Hata. Perdagangan Internasional dalam Sistem GATT dan WTO, Aspek-Aspek Hukum dan Non Hukum. Bandung: PT Refika Aditama, 2006.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

149

Hoda, Anwarul. Dispute Settlement in the WTO, Developing Countries, and India. New Delhi: Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, 2012.

Hudec, R.E.et al. A Statistical Profile of GATT Dispute Settlement Cases: 194889. London: Routledge, 1993.

Husnaidi, Herfino, Meirisa Hilda Sukasa, dan Ronald Eberhard. Sistem Penyelesaian WTO. Jakarta: Direktorat Perdagangan Peindustrian, Investasi dan Hak Kekayaan Intelektual (HKI) Kementrian Luar Negeri, 2011.

Kartadjoemena, H.S. GATT, WTO, dan Hasil Uruguay Round. Jakarta: UI-Press, 1998.

_________________ GATT dan WTO: Sistem Forum dan Lembaga Internasional di Bidang Perdagangan. Jakarta: UI Press, 1996.

Mamudji, Sri et al. Metode Penelitian dan Penulisan Hukum. Jakarta: Penerbit Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia, 2005.

Palmeter, David dan Petros C.Mavroidids. Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization, Practice and Procedure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Tim Kerja Badan Pembinaan Hukum Nasional (BPHN). Pengkajian Hukum tentang Masalah Penyelesaian Sengketa Dagang dalam WTO. Jakarta: Badan

Pembinaan

Hukum

Nasional,

Departemen

Kehakiman

RI,

1997/1998.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

150

INTERNET “Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes (A Unique Contribution)” http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm.

Diakses

tanggal 26 Agustus 2014. “Dispute Settlement System Training Module: Chapter 1 Introduction to the WTO Dispute Settlement System” http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu_e/disp_settlementcbte/c1s1p1e.ht m. Diakses tanggal 26 Agustus 2014. “Dispute Settlement System Training Module: Chapter 6 The Process - Stages In A Typical WTO Disputes Settlement Case” http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispsettlementcbte/c1s1p1_e.h tm. Diakses tanggal 26 Agustus 2014. “Globalisation and Development Inequalities: Challenges and Prospects for ‘A just Development.” http://www.gjournals.org/GJSC/GJSC%20PDF/2013/May/022613499%20T agarirofa%20and%20Tobias.pdf, diunduh tanggal 12 September 2014. “The Economics of The Trade Disputes, The GATT’s Article XXIII, and The WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding.” http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbown/papers/dispute.pdf. Diunduh tanggal 12 September 2014. “Dispute Settlement, Compensation, and Retaliation under WTO,” http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/staff/ecarar/dispute%20settlement.doc. Diunduh tanggal 12 September 2014.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

151

“Law and Its Limitation in the GATT Multilateral Trade System by Oliver Long” http://digital

commons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol11/iss1/9/.

Diakses

tanggal 12 September 2014. “Hudec’s Method’s and Ours” http://www.minnjil.org/?p=1061. Diakses tanggal 12 September 2014. “Dispute Settlement, Compensation, and Retaliation under WTO” http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/staff/ecarar/ dispute%20settlement.doc. Diunduh tanggal 12 September 2014. “CRS Report for Congress: The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (“Byrd Amendment”)” http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/57503.pdf. Diunduh tanggal 13 September 2014. “GATT Analytical Index” http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/ gatt_ai_e/art23_e.pdf. Diunduh tanggal 19 September 2014. “Dispute Settlement in The World Trade Organization” http://idatd.eclac.cl/controversias/soluciones/iTemplate-OMC explicacion.pdf. Diunduh tanggal 19 September 2014. “Dispute Settlement in The World Trade Organization” http://idatd.eclac.cl/controversias/soluciones/iTemplate-OMCexplicacion.pdf, Diunduh tanggal 19 September 2014. “Retaliasi dalam Kerangka Penyelesaian Sengketa WTO” http://ditjenkpi.kemendag.go.id/website_kpi/images/Bulletin/Bulletin%2046 .pdf, Diunduh tanggal 20 September 2014. Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

152

“An introduction to the WTO and GATT” http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/economic_perspectiv es/2003/4qeppart4.pdf. Diunduh tanggal 20 September 2014. “Retaliation under the WTO system: When does Nullification or Impairment Begin?” http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/ctei/shared/CTEI/L aw%20Clinic/Memoranda%202011/MemoRetaliation_under_the_WTO.pdf Diunduh tanggal 21 September 2014. “The Single Economic Entity Doctrine In South Africa And Its Implications For Competition Policy” http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/events/Eighth-Annual Conference/Parallel-1B/The-Single-Economic-Entity-Doctrine-in-SA.PDF. Diunduh tanggal 25 September 2014. “Congress Repeals the Byrd Amendment” http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/Templates/media/files/publications/2006/con gress-repeals-thebyrd amendment.pdf. Diunduh tanggal 27 September 2014. “US Byrd Amendment – WTO says eight WTO Members may retaliate against the US – Joint Press statement by Brazil, Canada, Chile, the EU, India, Japan, Korea, and Mexico” http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-04-1055_en.htm. Diunduh tanggal 27 September 2014.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

153

“Anti Dumping and Distrust: Reducing Anti Dumping Duties under the WTO through Heightened Scrutiny” http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1398&co. Diunduh tanggal 29 September 2014. “Anti Dumping –A Guide” http://commerce.nic.in/traderemedies/Anti_Dum.pdf. Diunduh tanggal 29 September 2014. “Mexico to Impose $21 Million in Retaliatory Tariffs Against US Exports; CITAC Says Byrd Amendment Must Be Repealed” http://www.citac.info/press/release/2005 /08_18.php. Diakses tanggal 14 Oktober 2014. “European Communities — Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas” http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds27_e.htm.

Diakses

tanggal 11 November 2014. “Byrd Amendment” http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/byrd_amendment.htm. Diakses tanggal 11 November 2014. “The Byrd Amendment Is WTO-Illegal: But We must Kill the Byrd with the Right Stone” http://www.columbia.edu/~jb38/papers/pdf/BYRD_Amendement.pdf, Diunduh tanggal 11 November 2014. “The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (“Byrd Amendment”)” http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/57503.pdf. Diunduh tanggal 11 November 2014. Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

154

“CRS

Report

for

Congress;

The

U.S.-EU

Beef

Hormone

Dispute,”

http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40449.pdf. Diunduh tanggal 12 Nnovember 2014. “Memorandum of Understanding Between The United States of America and The European Commission Regarding The Importation of Beef from Animals not Ttreated with Certain Growth-Hormones and Increased Duties Applied by The United States to Certain Products of The European Communites” https://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file25415654.pdf. Diunduh tanggal 12 November 2014. “Overview of World Banana Production and Trade” http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/y5102e/y5102e04.htm. Diunduh tanggal 13 November 2014. “Observatory of Econpmic Complexity; Learn About Trade in Mexico” http://atlas.media.mit

.edu/profile/country/mex/.

Diakses

tanggal

13

November 2014. “Observatory of Econpmic Complexity; Learn About Trade in United States,” http://atlas.media.mit.edu/profile/country/usa/,

diakses

tanggal

13

November 2014. “Dairy Sector Trade Between the United States and Mexico: An Overview” http://agrinet.tamu.edu/trade/papers /sympos.pdf. Diunduh tanggal 14 November 2014. “Tariffs on Commodities of Export Interest to the United States” http://www.ers.usda.gov/ media/919851/aer796k_002.pdf. Diakses tanggal 14 November 2014.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

155

“Competition in the Global Wine Industry: A U.S. Perspective” http://online.sfsu.edu/castaldi/bie/globcase.htm.

Diakses

tanggal

14

November 2014. “Profile of the US Candy Industry” http://www.candyusa.com/content.cfm?ItemNumber=1607. Diakses tanggal 14 November 2014.

“Perkembangan Ekspor Indonesia Berdasarkan Sektor” http://www.kemenperin.go.id/statistik/peran.php?ekspor=1. Diakses tanggal 15 November 2014. “Perkembangan ekspor non migas (negara tujuan) periode 2008-2013” http://diskumdagdki.jakarta.go.id/ekspor-impor indonesia/176perkembangan-ekspor-nonmigas-negara-tujuan-periode-2008-2013. Diakses tanggal 15 November 2014. “Statistik perdagangan luar negeri Indonesia, direktorat pengembangan pasar dan informasi ekspor, Dirjen Pengembangan Ekspor Nasional (DJPEN) Kementrian Perdagangan Republik Indonesia 2013” http://www.embassyofindonesia.eu/sites/default/files/NP%202013%20Indo nesia.pdf. Diunduh tanggal 15 November 2014. “Laporan Impor Berdasarkan Katagori Ekonomi (Barang Konsumsi, Bahan Baku, dan Barang Modal” http://www.kemenperin.go.id/Download/3217/Impor-Menurut-KategoriEkonomi-Barang-Konsumsi-Bahan-Baku-Dan-Barang-Modal)-PeriodeJanuari-Oktober-2010-Data-Impor-Barang-Ooleh-Indonesia-BerdasarkanNegara-2008.pdf. Diunduh tanggal 15 November 2014.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

156

“Bilateral RI-Korsel” http://kbriseoul.kr/kbriseoul/index.php/id/indokor.

Diakses

tanggal

15

November 2014. “Methodologies and Techniques for Reverse Engineering–The Potential for Automation with 3-D Laser Scanners” http://iris.engr.utk.edu/publications/papers/2007/ch2-REAIP.pdf.

Diunduh

tanggal 20 November 2014.

PERATURAN PERUNDANGAN-UNDANGAN

General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947.

GATT. Procedures under Article XXII on Questions Affecting the Interests of a Number of Contracting Parties tahun 1958.

WTO. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing The Settlement of Disputes.

WTO. Agreement On Implementation Of Article VI Of The General Agreement On Tariffs And Trade, Anti Dumping Code.

GATT. Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance 1979.

GATT. Decision on Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures 1989.

WTO. Agreement On Implementation Of article VI Of The General Agreement On Tariffs And Trade (Anti Dumping Agreement). Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

157

PUTUSAN

Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, Original complaint by the United States, recourse to arbitration by the EU under article 22.6 DSU (WT/DS26/ARB).

Decision by The Arbitrators: European Communities - Regime For The Importation, Sale And Distribution of Bananas - Recourse to Arbitration by The European Communities Under Article 22.6 of The DSU (WT/DS27/ARB). Decision By The Arbitrator: United States – Continued Dumping And Subsidy Offset Act Of 2000 (Original Complaint By Brazil) Recourse to Arbitration by

the

United

States

under

Article

22.6

of

the

DSU

(WT/DS217/ARB/BRA). Decision by the Arbitrator on United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (Original Complaint by Mexico) – Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU (WT/DS234/ARB/MEX).

Report of the Panel on Korea-Anti Dumping Duties on Imports of Certain Paper from Indonesia (WT/DS312).

SKRIPSI DAN THESIS Hidayati, Maslihat Nur.. “Analisis tentang Sistem Penyelesaian Sengketa Dagan Internasional dalam WTO dan Manfaatnya bagi Indonesia” Tesis Pasca Sarjana Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta, 2009.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

158

Lasma A Rr. Franzezka. “Analisis Yuridis Penyelesaian Sengketa Dagang Melalui WTO terhadap Pemerintahan Indonesia dan Pemerintahan Korea Selatan.” Skripsi S1 Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia, 2010. Maitimo Ellyzabeth Media Joanne Caroline. “Penyelesaian Sengketa Dagang dalam Kerangka WTO untuk Kasus Tuduhan Dumping Korea Selatan Terhadap

Produk

Ekspor

Kertas

Indonesia

(2002-2007).”

Skripsi

Universitas Pembangunan “Veteran” Jakarta, Jakarta, 2011. Raju, K.D. “The WTO Appellate Body Jurisprudence on Anti Dumping: A Critical Review.” Thesis Master of Philosophy in International Trade Law, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Savitri, Nur Suci. “Pengaruh Sengketa Dagang Indonesia dan Korea Selatan Terhadap Ekspor Kertas Indonesia 2002-2004.” Skripsi Institut Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik Jakarta, Jakarta, 2012. Siyu, YE. “The Legal Analysis of The Cross-Retaliation Under the WTO Framework.” Thesis LLM Gent University, 2012.

WAWANCARA

Christhophorus Barutu. (30 September 2014). Kasubdit Fasilitasi dan Aturan Perdagangan, Direktorat Jenderal Kerjasama Perdagangan Internasional, Departeman Perdagangan Republik Indonesia.

Jeremy Albert Gabriel Kumajas. (1 Agustus 2014). Direktorat Pengamanan Perdagangan, Departeman Perdagangan Republik Indonesia.

SUMBER LAIN

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

159

Busch, Marc L. dan Eric Reinhardt. “The Evolution of GATT/ WTO Dispute Settlement” Jurnal Hukum Unversity of Georgetown. Dewi, Yetty Komalasari. “Penyelesaian Sengketa (Dispute Settlement) di World Trade Organization” dalam Modul Hukum Perdagangan Internasional. Jakarta: Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia, 2011. Heboyan, Vahe, Glenn C. W. Ames, dan James E. Epperson. “U.S.-EU Banana War: Implications Of Retaliatory Tariffs On Pecorino Cheese.” Makalah disampaikan pada Paper presented at Southern Agricultural Economics Association Annual Conference, Fort Worth, TX 30 Januari 2001. Lawrence, Robert Z., Albert L. Williams, dan Research Associate. “Crimes and Punishments? An Analysis of Retaliation Under The WTO” Nzelibe, Jide. “The Case Against Reforming The WTO Enforcement Mechanism” 2007. Rajagukguk, Erman. Globalisasi Ekonomi dan Perdagangan Internasional” dalam Modul Hukum Perdagangan Internasional. Jakarta: Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia, 2011. United Nation. “Training Module On The WTO Agreement On Anti-Dumping.” Modul disampaikan dalam United Nations Conference On Trade And Development), New York: United Nations Publication, 2006. Yusuf, Adijaya. “Prinsip-Prinsip GATT dan WTO Dispute Settlement Body.” Makalah disampaikan dalam Rangkaian Lokakarya Terbatas MasalahMasalah Kepailitan dan Wawasan Hukum Bisnis Lainnya, Jakarta 15-16 September 2004.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

160

“Prinsip-Prinsip GATT dan WTO Dispute Settlement Body.” Makalah disampaikan dalam Rangkaian Lokakarya Terbatas Masalah-Masalah Kepailitan dan Wawasan Hukum Bisnis Lainnya, Jakarta 15-16 September 2004. “Antidumping Rules Vs. Competition Rules,” Jurnal Institute for World Economics and International Management University of Bremen.

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

161

LAMPIRAN

Universitas Indonesia Analisis yuridis penggunaan hak retaliasi..., Sarah Patricia Gultom, FH UI, 2015

WORLD TRADE

WT/DS312/R 28 October 2005

ORGANIZATION

(05-4890)

Original: English

KOREA – ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES ON IMPORTS OF CERTAIN PAPER FROM INDONESIA (WT/DS312)

Report of the Panel

WT/DS312/R Page i

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I.

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1

II.

FACTUAL ASPECTS .............................................................................................................. 1

III.

PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS......................... 2

A.

INDONESIA ................................................................................................................................... 2

B.

KOREA ......................................................................................................................................... 4

IV.

ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES ........................................................................................ 4

A.

FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF INDONESIA ................................................................................ 4

1.

Introduction............................................................................................................................... 4

2.

Factual Background ................................................................................................................. 4

3.

Legal Argument ........................................................................................................................ 6

(a)

Claims arising from the determination of dumping .................................................................... 6

(i)

Korea's use of "facts available" to calculate normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli was inconsistent with Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Agreement ............................ 6

(ii)

Korea's use of "facts available" to determine Tjiwi Kimia's dumping margin was inconsistent with Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Agreement...................................................... 7

(iii)

Korea's use of constructed value to determine normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli was inconsistent with Articles 2.2 and 6.8 of the Agreement ................................... 8

(iv)

Korea's calculation of constructed value for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli was inconsistent with Articles 2.2, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2 and 2.4 of the Agreement ...................................... 8

(v)

Korea's failure to make a fair comparison between normal value and export price by adjusting for selling expenses was inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the Agreement .................... 8

(vi)

Korea's treatment of Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli, and Tjiwi Kimia as a single economic entity was inconsistent with Articles 6.10 and 9.3 of the Agreement.......................................... 9

(vii)

Korea's failure to terminate the investigation of Indah Kiat was inconsistent with Article 5.8 of the Agreement ....................................................................................................... 9

(viii)

Korea's determinations contain several violations of the disclosure obligations contained in Articles 6.4, 6.7, 6.9 and 12.2 of the Agreement .................................................... 9

(b)

Claims relating to the determination of injury and causal link ................................................... 9

(i)

The KTC's treatment of PPC and WF Paper as "like products" was inconsistent with Articles 2.6, 3.1, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Agreement .................................................................... 9

(ii)

Korea's failure to conduct its injury and causal link determinations in an objective manner and to base these determinations on positive evidence was inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Agreement .................................................................. 10

(iii)

Korea's injury determinations contain several violations of the disclosure obligations contained in Articles 6.1, 6.4 and 6.9 of the Agreement ........................................................... 10

(iv)

Korea improperly granted confidential treatment to information contained in the Domestic Industry's application in violation of Article 6.5 of the Agreement .......................... 11

4.

Request for Findings, Rulings and Recommendations........................................................ 11

WT/DS312/R Page ii

5.

Suggestions on Implementation ............................................................................................. 11

B.

FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF KOREA.................................................................................... 12

1.

The KTC’s procedures were fair........................................................................................... 12

2.

The KTC’s dumping determination was consistent with the requirements of the Agreement................................................................................................................................ 13

(a)

Single dumping margin for the Sinar Mas Group Mills ........................................................... 13

(b)

Facts available for Tjiwi Kimia ................................................................................................ 14

(c)

Facts available for sales through CMI ...................................................................................... 14

(d)

Continuation of investigation after determination of de minimis preliminary dumping margins for Indah Kiat .............................................................................................................. 15

3.

The KTC’s injury determination was also consistent with the requirements of the Agreement ......................................................................................................................... 16

(a)

Definition of like product.......................................................................................................... 16

(b)

Analysis of import volumes and price effects........................................................................... 16

(c)

Analysis of imports by Korean producers................................................................................. 17

(d)

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 17

C.

FIRST ORAL STATEMENTS OF INDONESIA.................................................................................. 17

1.

Opening Statement of Indonesia at the First Meeting of the Panel.................................... 17

(a)

The use of facts available for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli ......................................................... 17

(b)

Tjiwi Kimia............................................................................................................................... 18

(c)

Calculation of individual margins for each exporter ................................................................ 19

(d)

Fair comparison ........................................................................................................................ 19

(e)

Like product.............................................................................................................................. 20

(f)

The price and volume effects of imports .................................................................................. 20

(g)

The consideration of injury factors, causation analysis and own imports by the domestic industry ...................................................................................................................... 20

(h)

Procedural issues....................................................................................................................... 21

2.

Closing Statement of Indonesia at the First Meeting of the Panel ..................................... 21

D.

FIRST ORAL STATEMENTS OF KOREA ........................................................................................ 21

1.

Opening Statement of Korea at the First Meeting of the Panel.......................................... 22

(a)

Single dumping margin for the Sinar Mas Group Mills ........................................................... 22

(b)

Facts available for Tjiwi Kimia ................................................................................................ 22

(c)

Facts available for sales through CMI ...................................................................................... 22

(d)

Continuation of investigation after preliminary determination................................................. 23

(e)

Like product.............................................................................................................................. 23

(f)

Consideration of injury factors ................................................................................................. 23

(g)

Analysis of imports by Korean producers................................................................................. 24

2.

Closing Statement of Korea at the First Meeting of the Panel ........................................... 24

WT/DS312/R Page iii

E.

SECOND WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF INDONESIA .......................................................................... 25

1.

Introduction............................................................................................................................. 25

2.

Legal Argument ...................................................................................................................... 25

(a)

Claims arising from the determination of dumping .................................................................. 25

(i)

Korea's use of "facts available" to calculate normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli was inconsistent with Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Agreement .......................... 25

(b)

Korea's calculation of constructed value for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli was inconsistent with Articles 2.2, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2, 2.4, and 6.8 of the Agreement ........................... 27

(c)

Korea's use of "facts available" to determine Tjiwi Kimia's dumping margin was inconsistent with Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Agreement .................................................. 27

(i)

The KTC acted inconsistently with paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Agreement in failing to exercise "special circumspection" in its use of secondary information to determine dumping margins for Tjiwi Kimia............................................................................ 27

(ii)

The KTC's use of "facts available" for Tjiwi Kimia without providing other exporters with an opportunity to submit further explanations was inconsistent with Article 6.8 and paragraph 6 of Annex II of the Agreement ........................................................................ 28

(d)

Korea's failure to make a fair comparison between normal value and export price by adjusting for selling expenses was inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the Agreement................. 29

(e)

Korea's treatment of Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli, and Tjiwi Kimia as a single economic entity was inconsistent with Articles 6.10 and 9.3 of the Agreement....................................... 29

(f)

Korea's determinations contain several violations of the disclosure obligations contained in Articles 6.4, 6.7, 6.9 and 12.2 of the Agreement.................................................. 30

3.

Claims relating to the determination of injury and causal link.......................................... 30

(a)

The KTC's treatment of PPC and WF Paper as "like products" was inconsistent with Articles 2.6, 3.1, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Agreement ................................................................. 30

(b)

Korea's failure to conduct its injury and causal link determinations in an objective manner and to base these determinations on positive evidence was inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Agreement ................................................................. 31

(c)

Korea's injury determinations contain several violations of the disclosure obligations contained in Articles 6.1, 6.4 and 6.9 of the Agreement........................................................... 32

F.

SECOND WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF KOREA ................................................................................ 33

1.

The composition of Indonesia’s delegation........................................................................... 33

2.

Dumping calculation issues .................................................................................................... 33

(a)

Treatment of Sinar Mas Group Mills as a Single Entity........................................................... 33

(b)

Facts Available for Tjiwi Kimia ............................................................................................... 34

(c)

Facts Available for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli ......................................................................... 34

(i)

Rejection of Submitted CMI Sales Data.................................................................................... 34

(ii)

Inclusion of Amount Representing CMI’s SG&A Expenses in the Calculation of Constructed Value..................................................................................................................... 36

(iii)

Adjustment for Differences in Level of Trade ........................................................................... 37

(d)

Continuation of Investigation after Preliminary Determination ............................................... 38

WT/DS312/R Page iv

(e)

Disclosure of Verification “Results” ........................................................................................ 38

3.

Injury issues............................................................................................................................. 38

(a)

Like product.............................................................................................................................. 38

(b)

Dumped import volumes........................................................................................................... 39

(c)

Adverse price effects of dumped imports ................................................................................. 39

(d)

Factors relevant to material injury determination ..................................................................... 40

(e)

Causal link between imports and injury.................................................................................... 40

(f)

Imports by Korean producers that were not part of the domestic industry ............................... 40

4.

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 41

G.

SECOND ORAL STATEMENTS OF INDONESIA .............................................................................. 41

1.

Opening Statement of Indonesia at the Second Meeting of the Panel................................ 41

(a)

Issues relating to the determination of dumping ....................................................................... 41

(i)

Use of FactsAvailable For Indah Kiat And Pindo Deli ............................................................ 41

(ii)

Rejection of the Domestic Sales Data ....................................................................................... 41

(iii)

Rejection of the CMI Financial Statements .............................................................................. 42

(iv)

Calculation of SG&A and Interest Expenses of CMI................................................................ 42

(v)

Use of Facts Available for Tjiwi Kimia .................................................................................... 43

(vi)

Fair Comparison....................................................................................................................... 43

(vii)

Collapsing the Three Exporters to a Single Entity ................................................................... 43

(b)

Issues relating to the determination of injury and causation..................................................... 43

(i)

Like Product.............................................................................................................................. 43

(ii)

The Injury Analysis ................................................................................................................... 44

(c)

Procedural issues....................................................................................................................... 45

2.

Closing Statement of Indonesia at the Second Meeting of the Panel ................................. 45

H.

SECOND ORAL STATEMENT OF KOREA ...................................................................................... 46

1.

Opening Statement of Korea at the Second Meeting of the Panel...................................... 46

(a)

The proper conceptual framework ............................................................................................ 46

(b)

Dumping calculation issues ...................................................................................................... 47

(i)

The KTC’s decision to “collapse” the Sinar Mas Group mills ................................................ 47

(ii)

“Facts available” for Tjiwi Kimia............................................................................................ 47

(iii)

The KTC’s rejection of the submitted CMI sales data .............................................................. 48

(iv)

Inclusion of facts available SG&A for CMI in constructed value ........................................... 49

2.

Injury determination issues ................................................................................................... 49

(a)

Like product.............................................................................................................................. 49

(b)

Trends in the volume of dumped imports ................................................................................. 49

(c)

Price effects of the dumped imports ......................................................................................... 50

WT/DS312/R Page v

(d)

Consideration of injury factors ................................................................................................. 50

(e)

Consideration of imports by Korean producers ........................................................................ 50

V.

ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES ........................................................................ 50

A.

THIRD PARTY WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF CANADA ..................................................................... 51

B.

THIRD PARTY ORAL STATEMENT OF CANADA ........................................................................... 52

C.

THIRD PARTY WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF CHINA ......................................................................... 52

1.

Introduction............................................................................................................................. 52

2.

Arguments ............................................................................................................................... 52

(a)

Issue 1: necessary information in the context of the application of “facts available” ............. 52

(b)

Issue 2: whether the obligation of the investigating authorities under paragraph 7 of Annex II can be released by compliance of the investigating authorities with Article 5.3 before the initiation of the investigation ............................................................................. 53

(c)

Issue 3: The “collapsing” of affiliated respondents ................................................................. 53

D.

THIRD PARTY ORAL STATEMENT OF CHINA ............................................................................... 54

(a)

Issue 1: Necessary information in the context of the application of “facts available”............. 54

(b)

Issue 2: Whether the obligation of the investigating authorities under paragraph 7 of Annex II can be released by compliance of the investigating authorities with Article 5.3 before the initiation of the investigation ............................................................................. 55

(c)

Issue 3: The “collapsing” of affiliated respondents ................................................................. 56

E.

THIRD PARTY WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ................................... 56

1.

The interpretation of “each known exporter” under Article 6.10 of the Agreement................................................................................................................................ 56

2.

The use of “facts available” under Article 6.8 of the Agreement in conjunction with Annex II of the Agreement ............................................................................................ 57

3.

The termination of an investigation under Article 5.8 of the Agreement ......................... 58

F.

THIRD PARTY ORAL STATEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES ......................................... 60

1.

Introduction............................................................................................................................. 60

2.

The definition of the “product under consideration” .......................................................... 61

3.

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 62

G.

THIRD PARTY WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF JAPAN ......................................................................... 62

1.

Introduction............................................................................................................................. 62

2.

Arguments ............................................................................................................................... 62

3.

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 64

H.

THIRD PARTY ORAL STATEMENT OF JAPAN ............................................................................... 64

1.

Introduction............................................................................................................................. 64

2.

Article 6.10 of the Agreement prohibits investigating authorities from arbitrary “collapsing” ............................................................................................................................. 64

3.

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 66

I.

THIRD PARTY WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES ................................................... 66

WT/DS312/R Page vi

1.

Article 6.10 does not require investigating authorities to determine separate dumping margins for separate legal entities if they constitute a single “exporter” or “producer” .......................................................................................................................... 66

2.

Article 2.2 does not limit an investigating authority’s discretion to use constructed value as “facts available” to determine normal value in the absence of timely-submitted, verifiable home market sales data...................................................... 66

3.

Article 2.4 of the Agreement requires adjustment to price only where differences in selling expenses affect price comparability ...................................................................... 67

4.

Examining information in the application for initiation under Article 5.3 of the Agreement does not necessarily satisfy the obligation to corroborate information from secondary sources under paragraph 7 of Annex II .................................................... 67

5.

Article 5.8 of the Agreement does not require immediate termination of an investigation upon calculation of a preliminary de minimis dumping margin for a responding party ..................................................................................................................... 67

6.

An investigating authority does not act inconsistently with Article 2.6 or fail to take into account differences in the markets for different products simply by defining the “like product” to include items that are not identical to each of the items comprising the product under consideration ............................................................. 67

7.

Article 3.2 of the Agreement requires that investigating authorities “consider” whether there was significant price undercutting by subject imports ............................... 68

8.

Article 3.5 does not prescribe a particular methodology to be used in determining whether dumped imports are the cause of injury to domestic producers or specify the level of detail at which the analysis must be conducted............. 68

9.

The fact that some domestic producers import the subject merchandise does not preclude an affirmative injury finding ................................................................................. 69

10.

Article 6.9 requires that interested parties be given advance notice of the facts under consideration, not the legal reasoning of the authorities.......................................... 69

J.

THIRD PARTY ORAL STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES ......................................................... 69

1.

A single dumping margin may be calculated for two or more legal entities under Article 6.10 if they constitute a single “exporter or producer”........................................... 69

2.

Article 2.2 does not limit an investigating authority’s discretion to select among the “facts available” to calculate normal value when a respondent does not provide verifiable home market sales data ........................................................................... 70

3.

The definition of the domestic "like product" and the "product under consideration" in injury determinations............................................................................... 71

VI.

INTERIM REVIEW............................................................................................................... 71

A.

REQUEST OF INDONESIA ............................................................................................................ 71

B.

REQUEST OF KOREA ................................................................................................................... 75

VII.

FINDINGS ............................................................................................................................... 75

A.

GENERAL ISSUES ....................................................................................................................... 75

1.

Standard of Review................................................................................................................. 75

2.

Burden of Proof....................................................................................................................... 76

3.

Treaty Interpretation.............................................................................................................. 77

WT/DS312/R Page vii

B.

PROCEDURAL ISSUE ................................................................................................................... 77

1.

Composition of Delegation ..................................................................................................... 77

2.

Access to Submissions............................................................................................................. 78

C.

KTC'S DECISION TO DISREGARD DOMESTIC SALE INFORMATION AND TO CALCULATE NORMAL VALUES FOR INDAH KIAT AND PINDO DELI ON THE BASIS OF FACTS AVAILABLE ................................................................................................................................ 79

1.

Arguments of Parties .............................................................................................................. 79

(a)

Indonesia................................................................................................................................... 79

(b)

Korea......................................................................................................................................... 80

2.

Arguments of Third Parties ................................................................................................... 80

(a)

European Communities............................................................................................................. 80

(b)

China......................................................................................................................................... 80

3.

Evaluation by the Panel.......................................................................................................... 80

(a)

Relevant Facts........................................................................................................................... 80

(b)

Legal Analysis .......................................................................................................................... 84

(i)

Did Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli Fail to Provide Necessary Information to the KTC Within a Reasonable Period? ................................................................................................... 84

(ii)

In its Use of Facts Available, Could the KTC disregard Domestic Sales Data Submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli? ................................................................................ 89

(iii)

Did the KTC Fail to Inform Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli of its Decision to Reject their Domestic Sales Data and to Provide them with an Opportunity to Express their Views?....................................................................................................................................... 92

D.

KTC'S USE OF CONSTRUCTED VALUE TO DETERMINE NORMAL VALUES FOR INDAH KIAT AND PINDO DELI ................................................................................................................ 94

1.

Arguments of Parties .............................................................................................................. 94

(a)

Indonesia................................................................................................................................... 94

(b)

Korea......................................................................................................................................... 94

2.

Arguments of Third Parties ................................................................................................... 94

(a)

United States ............................................................................................................................. 94

3.

Evaluation by the Panel.......................................................................................................... 95

E.

KTC'S CALCULATION OF THE CONSTRUCTED NORMAL VALUES FOR INDAH KIAT AND PINDO DELI ................................................................................................................................ 96

1.

Arguments of Parties .............................................................................................................. 96

(a)

Indonesia................................................................................................................................... 96

(b)

Korea......................................................................................................................................... 96

2.

Evaluation by the Panel.......................................................................................................... 96

F.

KTC'S USE OF FACTS AVAILABLE TO DETERMINE TJIWI KIMIA'S DUMPING MARGIN ................ 100

1.

Arguments of Parties ............................................................................................................ 100

(a)

Indonesia................................................................................................................................. 100

WT/DS312/R Page viii

(b)

Korea....................................................................................................................................... 100

2.

Arguments of Third Parties ................................................................................................. 101

(a)

China....................................................................................................................................... 101

(b)

United States ........................................................................................................................... 101

3.

Evaluation by the Panel........................................................................................................ 101

(a)

Alleged Violation of Article 6.8 of the Agreement and Paragraph 7 of Annex II .................. 101

(b)

Alleged Violation of Article 6.8 of the Agreement and Paragraph 6 of Annex II .................. 103

G.

KTC'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO MAKE A FAIR COMPARISON BETWEEN NORMAL VALUE AND EXPORT PRICE .................................................................................................................. 104

1.

Arguments of Parties ............................................................................................................ 104

(a)

Indonesia................................................................................................................................. 104

(b)

Korea....................................................................................................................................... 104

2.

Arguments of Third Parties ................................................................................................. 104

(a)

United States ........................................................................................................................... 104

3.

Evaluation by the Panel........................................................................................................ 105

H.

KTC'S TREATMENT OF INDAH KIAT, PINDO DELI AND TJIWI KIMIA AS A SINGLE EXPORTER................................................................................................................................ 108

1.

Arguments of Parties ............................................................................................................ 108

(a)

Indonesia................................................................................................................................. 108

(b)

Korea....................................................................................................................................... 108

2.

Arguments of Third Parties ................................................................................................. 109

(a)

China....................................................................................................................................... 109

(b)

European Communities........................................................................................................... 109

(c)

United States ........................................................................................................................... 109

3.

Evaluation by the Panel........................................................................................................ 109

I.

KTC'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO TERMINATE THE INVESTIGATION WITH RESPECT TO INDAH KIAT ............................................................................................................................. 114

1.

Arguments of Parties ............................................................................................................ 114

(a)

Indonesia................................................................................................................................. 114

(b)

Korea....................................................................................................................................... 114

2.

Arguments of Third Parties ................................................................................................. 114

(a)

European Communities........................................................................................................... 114

(b)

United States ........................................................................................................................... 114

3.

Evaluation by the Panel........................................................................................................ 115

J.

KTC'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO ABIDE BY THE DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS CONTAINED IN ARTICLES 6.4, 6.7, 6.9 AND 12.2 OF THE AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO ITS DUMPING DETERMINATIONS.................................................................................................................... 115

1.

Arguments of Parties ............................................................................................................ 115

WT/DS312/R Page ix

(a)

Indonesia................................................................................................................................. 115

(b)

Korea....................................................................................................................................... 115

2.

Evaluation by the Panel........................................................................................................ 116

(a)

Alleged Violation of Article 6.7 of the Agreement ................................................................ 116

(b)

Alleged Violations of Articles 6.4, 6.9 and 12.2 of the Agreement........................................ 118

(i)

Article 6.4................................................................................................................................ 118

(ii)

Article 6.9................................................................................................................................ 120

(iii)

Article 12.2.............................................................................................................................. 121

K.

KTC'S TREATMENT OF "PLAIN PAPER COPIER" AND "UNCOATED WOOD-FREE PRINTING PAPER" AS LIKE PRODUCTS...................................................................................................... 122

1.

Arguments of Parties ............................................................................................................ 122

(a)

Indonesia................................................................................................................................. 122

(b)

Korea....................................................................................................................................... 123

2.

Arguments of Third Parties ................................................................................................. 123

(a)

Canada .................................................................................................................................... 123

(b)

Japan ....................................................................................................................................... 123

(c)

United States ........................................................................................................................... 123

3.

Evaluation by the Panel........................................................................................................ 123

L.

KTC'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO BASE ITS INJURY AND CAUSAL LINK DETERMINATIONS ON AN OBJECTIVE EXAMINATION OF POSITIVE EVIDENCE ............................................................ 126

1.

Arguments of Parties ............................................................................................................ 126

(a)

Indonesia................................................................................................................................. 126

(b)

Korea....................................................................................................................................... 126

2.

Arguments of Third Parties ................................................................................................. 127

(a)

United States ........................................................................................................................... 127

3.

Evaluation by the Panel........................................................................................................ 127

(a)

KTC's Price and Volume Analyses......................................................................................... 127

(i)

KTC's Price Analysis .............................................................................................................. 127

(ii)

KTC's Volume Analysis........................................................................................................... 131

(b)

KTC's Evaluation of the Impact of Dumped Imports on the Korean Industry ....................... 134

(c)

KTC's Causation Analysis ...................................................................................................... 137

(d)

KTC's Treatment of the Korean Industry's Imports of the Subject Product as Dumped Imports .................................................................................................................................... 137

(e)

KTC's Treatment of Imports from Indah Kiat as Dumped Imports ........................................ 140

M.

KTC'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO ABIDE BY THE DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS CONTAINED IN ARTICLES 6.1, 6.2, 6.4 AND 6.9 OF THE AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO ITS INJURY DETERMINATION ..................................................................................................................... 140

1.

Arguments of Parties ............................................................................................................ 140

WT/DS312/R Page x

(a)

Indonesia................................................................................................................................. 140

(b)

Korea....................................................................................................................................... 141

2.

Arguments of Third Parties ................................................................................................. 141

(a)

United States ........................................................................................................................... 141

3.

Evaluation by the Panel........................................................................................................ 141

(a)

Disclosure of the Data Relating to the First Half of 2003 ...................................................... 141

(b)

Disclosure of the Results of the Technical Test and the Customer Survey Regarding the Like Product Issue............................................................................................................. 141

(i)

Article 6.4................................................................................................................................ 142

(ii)

Article 6.2................................................................................................................................ 143

(iii)

Article 6.9................................................................................................................................ 143

(iv)

Article 12.2.............................................................................................................................. 144

(c)

Change With Respect to the Basis of the KTC's Injury Determination.................................. 145

(d)

Failure to Disclose Findings Regarding the Price Effect of Dumped Imports........................ 145

N.

TREATMENT OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY'S APPLICATION AS CONFIDENTIAL ............................................................................................. 147

1.

Arguments of Parties ............................................................................................................ 147

(a)

Indonesia................................................................................................................................. 147

(b)

Korea....................................................................................................................................... 147

2.

Evaluation by the Panel........................................................................................................ 147

VIII.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.............................................................. 148

IX.

ARTICLE 19.1 OF THE DSU ............................................................................................. 151

WT/DS312/R Page xi

LIST OF ANNEXES ANNEX A

REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PANEL

Annex A-1

Contents Request for the Establishment of a Panel – Document WT/DS312/2

Page A-2

WT/DS312/R Page 1

I.

INTRODUCTION

1.1 On 4 June 2004, the Republic of Indonesia ("Indonesia") requested consultations pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes ("the DSU"), Article XXII:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("the GATT"), and Article 17 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ("Anti-Dumping Agreement") regarding, inter alia, the imposition by the Republic of Korea ("Korea") of definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of business information paper and uncoated wood-free printing paper from Indonesia and certain aspects of the investigation leading thereto.1 Korea and Indonesia consulted on 7 July 2004, but failed to settle the dispute. 1.2 On 16 August 2004, Indonesia requested the Dispute Settlement Body ("the DSB") to establish a panel pursuant to Articles 4.7 and 6 of the DSU, Article XXIII:2 of the GATT, and Articles 17.4 and 17.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement ("the Agreement"). 1.3 At its meeting on 27 September 2004, the DSB established a Panel in accordance with Article 6 of the DSU to examine the matter referred to the DSB by Indonesia in document WT/DS312/2. At that meeting, the parties to the dispute also agreed that the panel should have standard terms of reference. The terms of reference are, therefore, the following: "To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by Indonesia in document WT/DS312/2, the matter referred to the DSB by Indonesia in that document, and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in those agreements." 1.4 On 18 October 2004, Indonesia requested the Director-General to determine the composition of the Panel, pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article 8 of the DSU. On 25 October 2004, the DirectorGeneral accordingly composed the Panel as follows: Chairman:

Mr. Ole Lundby

Members:

Ms. Deborah Milstein Ms. Leane Naidin

1.5 Canada, China, the European Communities, Japan and the United States reserved their thirdparty rights. 1.6 The Panel met with the parties on 1-2 February and on 30 March 2005. It met with the third parties on 2 February 2005. II.

FACTUAL ASPECTS

2.1 On 30 September 2002, the Korea Trade Commission ("the KTC") received an application from the Korean producers for the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation on the imports of "business information paper and wood-free printing paper" originating in China and Indonesia. The KTC sent questionnaires to four Indonesian companies: PT Indah Kiat Pulp and Paper Tbk ("Indah Kiat"), PT Pindo Deli Pulp and Paper Mills ("Pindo Deli"), PT Pabrik Kertas Tjiwi Kimia Tbk ("Tjiwi Kimia"), and PT Riau Andalan Kertas ("April Fine"). The KTC initiated the investigation on 14 November 2002 and issued the public notice of initiation on 26 November 2002. The original deadline for responses to the questionnaires sent to Indonesian companies was extended by three weeks. Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli responded to the questionnaires in a timely manner, while Tjiwi Kimia did not respond. 1

WT/DS312/1

WT/DS312/R Page 2

2.2 The KTC carried out, between 24-27 March 2003, a verification visit to verify information submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. The KTC issued its preliminary determinations on 23 April 2003 in which it found a dumping margin of 11.56 per cent for Pindo Deli, 51.61 per cent for Tjiwi Kimia and a negative dumping margin of 0.52 per cent for Indah Kiat. The KTC also made a preliminary determination of threat of material injury. The KTC did not impose any provisional antidumping duties. 2.3 The KTC issued its final determination on 24 September 2003. In the context of its final determination, the KTC treated the three Indonesian companies which were part of the Sinar Mas Group, i.e. Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli and Tjiwi Kimia, as a single exporter and calculated one single dumping margin for the three of them, which was 8.22 per cent. In its final determination, the KTC made a determination of material injury. Consequently, Korea imposed an anti-dumping duty of 8.22 per cent for the Sinar Mas Group companies, 2.80 per cent for April Fine and 2.80 per cent for other Indonesian exporters. III.

PARTIES' REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A.

INDONESIA

3.1 Indonesia requests the Panel to find that in imposing the anti-dumping duty at issue, Korea acted inconsistently with its obligations under: (a)

Article 6.8 of the Agreement by rejecting domestic sales information submitted by the Indonesian exporters Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli, and the CMI financial statements, and instead resorting to facts available to determine normal value for these exporters;

(b)

Article 6.8 and paragraph 3 of Annex II of the Agreement by failing to follow the requirements of paragraph 3 in rejecting the domestic sales information submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli, and the CMI financial statements and resorting to facts available to determine normal value for these exporters;

(c)

Article 6.8 and paragraph 6 of Annex II of the Agreement by failing to inform the exporters forthwith of the reasons why the domestic sales information of Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli, and the CMI financial statements, were being rejected and by failing to provide the exporters with an opportunity to provide further explanations within a reasonable period of time;

(d)

Article 6.8 and paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Agreement by failing to use special circumspection in using information from secondary sources in the determination of normal value for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli.

(e)

Article 6.8 and paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Agreement by failing to use special circumspection in using information from secondary sources to determine the dumping margins for Tjiwi Kimia.

(f)

Article 6.8 and paragraph 6 of Annex II of the Agreement by failing to provide Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli with an opportunity to provide further explanations regarding Tjiwi Kimia within the meaning of paragraph 6.

WT/DS312/R Page 3

(g)

Article 2.2 of the Agreement by failing to comply with the requirements of Article 2.2 in determining the normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli.

(h)

Articles 2.2, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2. and 2.4 of the Agreement by improperly calculating constructed values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli, resulting in an unfair comparison with export price for these exporters.

(i)

Article 2.4 of the Agreement by failing to make due allowance for differences affecting price comparability between export prices and normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli.

(j)

Articles 6.10 and 9.3 of the Agreement by failing to determine an individual margin of dumping for Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli, and Tjiwi Kimia, resulting in the imposition of dumping duties in excess of the margin of dumping established under Article 2.

(k)

Article 5.8 of the Agreement by failing to terminate the investigation of Indah Kiat when it failed to find dumping by that exporter.

(l)

Article 6.7 of the Agreement by failing to provide Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli with the results of the on-site verification of those exporters.

(m)

Articles 6.4, 6.9 and 12.2 of the Agreement by failing to disclose to the exporters how it determined normal value, including the amounts used to arrive at the constructed value.

(n)

Articles 2.6, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the Agreement by defining PPC and WF paper as a single like product and reaching its injury determinations based on that definition.

(o)

Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4 of the Agreement by failing to base its analysis of the price and volume effects of the imports under investigation on positive evidence or involve an objective determination and by improperly finding significant price undercutting within the meaning of Article 3.2.

(p)

Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Agreement by failing to properly consider all relevant injury factors.

(q)

Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Agreement by failing to properly establish a causal link between any injury suffered by the Korean industry and by failing to properly examine other known factors to ensure that injury caused by those factors was not attributed to the imports under investigation.

(r)

Articles 3.1, 3.4 and 3.5 of the Agreement by failing to consider the effect of the Korean industry's own imports in the injury and causation analyses.

(s)

Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5 of the Agreement by treating imports from Indah Kiat as dumped imports for the purpose of the injury analysis.

WT/DS312/R Page 4

(t)

Articles 6.1 and 6.9 of the Agreement by failing to establish a proper period of investigation of injury.

(u)

Articles 6.2, 6.4 and 12.2 of the Agreement by failing to provide the exporters with information regarding its like product determination.

(v)

Articles 6.4 and 6.9 of the Agreement by failing to disclose the basis of its material injury determination.

(w)

Article 6.5 of the Agreement by granting confidential treatment to information contained in the domestic industry's application without a showing of good cause or requiring non-confidential summaries. (i)

Article 1 of the Agreement by not ensuring that an anti-dumping measure is applied only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of the GATT and pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement.

3.2 Indonesia requests the Panel to recommend, in accordance with Article 19.1 of the DSU, that the DSB request Korea to bring its measure at issue into conformity with the GATT and with the Anti-dumping Agreement by repealing Regulation No. 330 of the Ministry of Finance and Economy dated 7 November 2003 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain paper products from Indonesia. B.

KOREA

3.3

Korea requests the Panel to reject Indonesia's claims in their entirety.

IV.

ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

4.1 The arguments of the parties are set out in their written submissions and oral statements to the Panel. The parties' arguments as presented in their submissions are summarised in this section. A.

FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF INDONESIA

4.2

The following summarizes Indonesia's arguments in its first submission.

1.

Introduction

4.3 At issue in this dispute, Indonesia challenges various aspects of the anti-dumping measures imposed by Korea on imports of certain paper from Indonesia as inconsistent with Article VI of the GATT, Article 1 of the Agreement, and the other provisions of the Agreement discussed herein. 2.

Factual Background

4.4 The KTC, the governmental authority responsible for the conduct of anti-dumping investigations in Korea, initiated this investigation on 14 November 2002, in response to an application submitted by five Korean paper producers2 (the "applicants" or the "domestic industry").3 2

The applicants were Shinho Paper, Hankook Paper, Hansol Paper, Dong- A Paper and Samil Paper. The domestic producers expressing support for the application were Moorim, Shin-Moorim, Kyesung, Namhan, Poongman, Hongwon, Samduk, Daehan and Pan-Asia. See Application for Investigation Necessary for Imposing Anti-dumping duties, 30 September 2002 (English translation supplied by Indonesia) (the "Application for Investigation") [Exhibit IDN-1(b)], pp. 16-18. 3 Application for Investigation [Exhibit IDN-1(b)].

WT/DS312/R Page 5

The KTC investigated four Indonesian exporters, Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli, Tjiwi Kimia, and April Fine. The KTC defined the "product subject to investigation" as including two categories of information paper and uncoated woodfree paper:4 "PPC" (plain paper copier or business information paper used on copies in businesses and home offices) and "WF" (uncoated wood-free printing paper used for printing from printing presses, as well as for production of stationery items). 4.5 Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli each submitted detailed information on all relevant domestic and export sales of both WF and PPC paper. 5 All domestic sales were made through a trading company called PT Cakrawala Mega Indah ("CMI"). Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli reported complete information regarding sales both to CMI and resales by CMI (referred to hereinafter as the "domestic sales information"). Tjiwi Kimia did not submit a questionnaire response, explaining instead that the volume of its exports to the Korean market was too low to justify an active participation in the investigation.6 4.6 The KTC fully verified the domestic sales information submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. In its verification plan sent before the verifications, the KTC requested for the first time that Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli "prepare" financial statements of CMI for the years 2001 and 2002 for presentation at the verification7 to enable the KTC "to understand Indah Kiat [Pindo Deli] in order to carry out verification successfully."8 At the verification, Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli explained to the KTC that they would not be able to submit the financial statements of CMI because they did not control CMI and therefore could not compel the production of its documents, even though they had acted to the best of their ability. 4.7 The KTC did not provide any report on its on-site verifications. However, on 4 April 2003, the KTC held a "disclosure" meeting, at which it announced that it intended to reject entirely the domestic sales information and instead to resort to "facts available" to determine normal value.9 The KTC's stated ground for this was that Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli had not submitted the CMI financial statements. However, the KTC agreed to accept the CMI financial statements if they were submitted by 10 April 2003.10 By letters dated 9 April 2003, Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli submitted CMI's financial statements to the KTC.11 Thus, these statements were submitted before the deadline of 10 April 2003 fixed by the KTC at the meeting of 4 April 2003, two full weeks before the KTC's preliminary determination and more than five months before the KTC's final determination. 4.8 In its Preliminary Determination,12 the KTC rejected the domestic sales information and used facts available for both exporters on the ground that they had failed to provide relevant documents such as the CMI financial statements.13 Nevertheless, the KTC found that Indah Kiat, the largest 4

See, e.g., KTC, Investigation Report on Preliminary Calculation of Dumping Rate for Indonesian and Chinese-made Business Information Paper and Uncoated Wood-Free Paper, 23 April 2003 (English translation supplied by Indonesia) ("Preliminary Dumping Report") [Exhibit IDN 12(b)], pp. 11, 17. 5 April Fine also submitted a timely questionnaire response. Indonesia has not raised any claims regarding the KTC's calculation of dumping margins for this exporter in this dispute. 6 Letter from Arvind Gupta, General Manager, Sinar Mas Group (on behalf Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli) to Hyun Soo Kim, Deputy Director, Korean Trade Commission of 22 January 2003 [Exhibit IDN-19]. 7 Ibid., p. 4 (item VII.1.B(d). 8 Ibid., p. 4 (item VII.1.A). 9 Affidavit by Won-Hyun Choi and Michael Shin, 24 November 2004 [Exhibit IDN-26]. 10 Affidavit by Won-Hyun Choi and Michael Shin, 24 November 2004 [Exhibit IDN-26]. 11 Letter from Arvind Gupta, General Manager, Sinar Mas Group (on behalf of Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli) to Seung Jin Bae, Director, Dumping Investigation Division, Korean Trade Commission of 9 April 2003 [Exhibit IDN-10]. 12 KTC, A Resolution for Preliminary Judgement on Dumping of Indonesian and Chinese-made Business Information Paper and Wood-Free Printing Paper and Injury to Domestic Industry, 23 April 2003 (English translation supplied by Indonesia) ("Preliminary Determination") [Exhibit IDN-11(b)]. 13 Preliminary Dumping Report [Exhibit 12 (b)], p. 8 (for Pindo Deli), p. 15(for Indah Kiat).

WT/DS312/R Page 6 Indonesian exporter, had a dumping margin of minus 0.52 per cent.14 The KTC found a dumping margin of 11.56 per cent for Pindo Deli. For Tjiwi Kimia, the KTC used total facts available and determined a dumping margin of 51.61 per cent. 4.9 On 1 September 2003, the KTC disclosed a draft version of its final determination15, in which the KTC indicated that it had decided to calculate a single dumping margin for Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli, and Tjiwi Kimia, even though it had stated at the preliminary phase that it was not permitted to do so under Korean law. The KTC stated that it considered these exporters to be a "single economic entity." In its Final Determination16, the KTC calculated a dumping margin of 8.22 per cent per cent for the "single economic entity" comprised of Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli and Tjiwi Kimia. The KTC continued to reject the domestic sales information on the same grounds as before. The KTC also concluded that the dumped imports had caused material injury to the applicants. 3.

Legal Argument

(a)

Claims arising from the determination of dumping

(i)

Korea's use of "facts available" to calculate normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli was inconsistent with Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Agreement

4.10 Under Article 6.8, the investigating authority may resort to facts available only if it has established either that (a) the interested party significantly impeded the investigation; or (b) the interested party did not provide necessary information (or refused access to necessary information) within a reasonable period of time. The KTC did not determine that either circumstance applied in this case and, indeed, could not reasonably have done so based on the evidence before it. 4.11 Both Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli cooperated in submitting complete questionnaire responses and verifying those responses. No discrepancies were found in any of these data during verification. Both parties submitted the CMI financial statements in accordance with the KTC's own revised deadline and indicated their willingness to provide any further information.17 The CMI financial statements could be used, at the most, to permit the KTC to perform an additional layer of verification of already-verified data, which the KTC was not in any case required to verify exhaustively.18 Thus, these exporters did not significantly impede the investigation. 4.12 Moreover, these exporters did not fail to provide "necessary information (or refused access to necessary information) within a reasonable period of time" within the meaning of Article 6.8. The domestic sales information was submitted in a timely fashion, as were the CMI financial statements, which were submitted one day in advance of the KTC's extended deadline, two weeks before the KTC's preliminary determination and more than five months before its final determination. 4.13 Even assuming that the CMI financial statements were untimely submitted, the KTC would not be entitled to rely on that fact alone to justify discarding both the domestic sales information and 14

In its determination of dumping margins, the KTC used a period of investigation for dumping of 1 October 2001 to 30 September 2002. 15 KTC, Tentative Investigation Report on Dumping Rate circulated at 3 September meeting, 3 September 2003. 16 KTC, Final Resolution on Dumping Imports of Indonesian and Chinese-made Business Information Paper and Uncoated Wood-Free Printing Paper and Injury to Domestic Industry, 24 September 2003 (English translation supplied by Indonesia) ("Final Determination") [Exhibit IDN-14(b)]. 17 See Final Dumping Report [Exhibit IDN-15(b)], pp. 2-3, which contains charts indicating that all information sought from Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli was submitted and supported by documentary evidence. See also Affidavit by Roger Simpson, 24 November 2004 [Exhibit IDN-24]. 18 Panel Report, US – DRAMs, para. 6.78 ("Article 6.6 does not explicitly require verification of all information to be relied on").

WT/DS312/R Page 7 the statements themselves. 19 The KTC should have found that, in light of all the facts and circumstances, the financial statements were nevertheless submitted within a reasonable period of time20, as they were submitted merely 2 weeks after the initially stipulated deadline. Moreover, Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli encountered difficulties in obtaining and submitting the CMI financial statements, which the KTC was required to take into account.21 Also, the KTC was provided with full access to CMI's sales records during the verification.22 The KTC had already verified the domestic sales information, so the CMI financial statements were not necessary within the meaning of Article 6.8.23 4.14 The KTC also failed to comply with the requirements of Article 6.8 and Annex II regarding the use of facts available. The domestic sales information, and the CMI financial statements, fulfilled all four criteria of Paragraph 3 of Annex II. The domestic sales information was actually verified extensively by the KTC. The CMI financial statements could have been verified by the KTC as they were received in sufficient time for the KTC to do so. The domestic sales information was timely submitted and could have been used without "undue difficulty." 24 Moreover, there is no reason why the circumstances surrounding the submission of the CMI financial statements would make the use of a distinct category of information, i.e., the domestic sales information, unduly difficult. 25 Finally, all of the information at issue was submitted within the requested deadlines and in the requested media. 4.15 Paragraph 6 requires an investigating authority to give the supplying party an opportunity to provide further explanations within a reasonable period. The KTC denied Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli any opportunity to explain and rectify any "failures" on which the KTC based its resort to facts available. The KTC also failed to comply with the requirements of paragraph 7 of Annex II, by failing to exercise "special circumspection" in its use of secondary information to determine the normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. (ii)

Korea's use of "facts available" to determine Tjiwi Kimia's dumping margin was inconsistent with Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Agreement

4.16 In determining the normal value for Tjiwi Kimia, the KTC relied exclusively on data supplied by the applicants and thereby failed to act with the "special circumspection" required under paragraph 7. The KTC failed to check the information on which it relied against other sources or the information obtained from other interested parties during the course of the investigation. The massive difference between the dumping margins yielded by the use of the applicants' information and the margins calculated by the KTC for the other exporters, indicates that not only did the KTC fail to check the information provided by the applicants against other sources, but that the applicants' data was wholly unreliable. 4.17 By weight-averaging the dumping margins for all three exporters, the KTC used Tjiwi Kimia’s high facts available dumping margin to increase the dumping margin for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. In this case, the KTC failed in its duty, pursuant to Annex II, paragraph 6, to notify these exporters and to allow them an opportunity to provide further information regarding Tjiwi Kimia's sales and their relevance to the investigation.26

19

Appellate Body Report, US - Hot Rolled Steel, para. 89. Ibid., para. 87. 21 Ibid., para. 104. 22 Affidavit by Roger Simpson, 24 November 2004 [Exhibit IDN-24]. 23 See Affidavit by Roger Simpson, 24 November 2004 (Exhibit IDN-24). See also See Final Dumping Report [Exhibit IDN-15(b)], pp. 2-3, which contains charts indicating that all information sought from Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli was submitted and supported by documentary evidence. 24 Ibid., para. 7.72. 25 Ibid., para. 7.67. 26 See Argentina – Ceramic Tiles, para. 6.67. 20

WT/DS312/R Page 8

(iii)

Korea's use of constructed value to determine normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli was inconsistent with Articles 2.2 and 6.8 of the Agreement

4.18 The "constructed value" is one of three possible means of calculating "normal value" set out in Article 2.2 of the Agreement. Under Article 2.2 of the Agreement, the KTC could have departed from the use of home market sales as the basis for normal value only if it had made one of the three findings specified in that Article. The KTC made none of these findings. It did not conduct the viability test of Indonesian market demand because it could not review the completeness of the domestic sales data.27 It did not perform the "sales below cost" test in order to determine whether there were sufficient domestic market sales in the ordinary course of trade.28 Finally, the KTC did not find a "particular market situation" in Indonesia within the meaning of Article 2.2. (iv)

Korea's calculation of constructed value for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli was inconsistent with Articles 2.2, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2 and 2.4 of the Agreement

4.19 The KTC's use of the constructed value as the basis for normal value for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli was inconsistent with Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the Agreement. The KTC's calculation contains several substantive errors. 29 First, the KTC based its calculation in part on the use of facts available, even though the KTC found no errors or deficiencies whatsoever in the exporters’ reporting. Second, the KTC added financing expenses attributed to CMI to the calculation, even though CMI is merely a reseller that did not incur any manufacturing-related financing costs. By adding the financing expenses of Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli, the KTC overstated these expenses. Third, the KTC erred by relying on the [[Company A]]30’s SG&A expenses as a proxy for CMI’s expenses, because [[Company A]]31’s expenses related to manufacturing as well as selling activities. The KTC's errors resulted in an overstatement of the constructed value and rendered its determinations inconsistent with Articles 2.2, 2.2.1.1, and 2.2.2, governing the calculation of the constructed value. These errors also lead to an unfair comparison between normal value and export price, contrary to the requirements of Article 2.4. (v)

Korea's failure to make a fair comparison between normal value and export price by adjusting for selling expenses was inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the Agreement

4.20 There was a clear difference between Indah Kiat's and Pindo Deli's domestic market sales and their export sales that affected the price comparability of these sales. The exporters’ domestic sales were made via a reseller, CMI, to the first unrelated purchaser. CMI undertakes selling activities of its own in making the resales. In contrast, the exporters do not provide any distribution services on their export sales of the kind performed by CMI in the Indonesian market. The KTC should have adjusted for selling activities undertaken by CMI to reflect the difference in price comparability caused by the different circumstances of the domestic market sales. By failing to do so, the KTC acted contrary to Article 2.4 of the Agreement.32 Finally, the KTC added CMI's SG&A expenses to the constructed value calculated for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli, for the purposes of its sales below cost test. However, the KTC did not subsequently remove these expenses for the purpose of the dumping margin calculation, resulting in an unfair comparison and a further violation of Article 2.4.

27

Final Dumping Report [Exhibit IDN-15(b)], p. 9. Ibid. 29 Final Dumping Report [Exhibit IDN-15(b)], p. 11. 30 Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. 31 Ibid. 32 Final Dumping Report [Exhibit IDN-15(b)], p. 13 states that only transportation and packing costs were deducted from normal value. 28

WT/DS312/R Page 9

(vi)

Korea's treatment of Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli, and Tjiwi Kimia as a single economic entity was inconsistent with Articles 6.10 and 9.3 of the Agreement

4.21 The KTC should have calculated separate dumping margins for Pindo Deli, Indah Kiat and Tjiwi Kimia, which are separate and distinct legal entities. Absent specific legal authorisation under the Agreement, an investigating authority cannot treat distinct exporters that are separate natural or legal persons as a single "exporter" for the purpose of calculating dumping margins. 4.22 Article 6.10 permits investigating authorities to depart from the requirement to calculate a separate margin for each exporter only in the case of “sampling” where there are too many exporters.33 While other provisions of the Agreement, such as Articles 4.1(i) and 2.3, expressly authorizes investigating authorities to take into account affiliations between distinct legal entities, Article 6.10 does not do so, and contains no standards for doing so. By treating Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli, and Tjiwi Kimia as a single exporter, the KTC has impermissibly read into the text of Article 6.10 a concept that cannot be found in the text. 34 By imposing an anti-dumping duty on Indah Kiat in excess of the de minimis margin of dumping actually established for this exporter, the KTC also acted inconsistently with Article 9.3 of the Agreement. (vii)

Korea's failure to terminate the investigation of Indah Kiat was inconsistent with Article 5.8 of the Agreement

4.23 Indah Kiat's individual dumping margin of minus 0.52 per cent in the Preliminary Determination was less than 2 per cent.35 Accordingly, by failing to terminate the investigation in respect of Indah Kiat the KTC breached its obligations under Article 5.8 of the Agreement. (viii)

Korea's determinations contain several violations of the disclosure obligations contained in Articles 6.4, 6.7, 6.9 and 12.2 of the Agreement

4.24 The KTC failed to make an adequate and detailed disclosure of the results of the verification visits, in violation of Article 6.7 of the Agreement. The KTC's failure to specifically disclose how and why it arrived at normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli, including how it had complied with Article 2.2 in reaching its final determination, is inconsistent with its obligations under Articles 6.4 and 6.9 of the Agreement. This failure also renders the KTC’s determination inconsistent with Article 12.2.2, governing the public notice of the conclusion of the investigation, all relevant information and a full explanation of the reasons for the methodology used. (b)

Claims relating to the determination of injury and causal link

(i)

The KTC's treatment of PPC and WF Paper as "like products" was inconsistent with Articles 2.6, 3.1, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Agreement

4.25 During the investigation, the exporters argued that PPC and WF are not "like products" within the meaning of the Agreement. They argued that the KTC should have separately considered (1) the effect of Indonesian PPC imports on Korean PPC producers and (2) the effect of Indonesian WF imports on Korean WF producers for the purposes of its injury analysis.36

33

Appellate Body Report, US – Sunset Reviews on Corrosion-Resistant Steel, para. 154. See also Appellate Body Report, EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), para. 116. 34 See Appellate Body Report, India – Patents, para. 45, where the Appellate Body stated that "principles of interpretation neither require nor condone the imputation into a treaty of words that are not there or the importation into a treaty of concepts that were not intended." 35 KTC, English Summary of Preliminary Determination, 9 May 2003 [Exhibit IDN-23], p. 5. 36 Ibid.

WT/DS312/R Page 10

4.26 The KTC did not address the question of whether PPC and WF are "like products" but instead whether Korean PPC is identical to Indonesian PPC and whether Korean WF is identical to Indonesian WF. Thus, the KTC fundamentally misconstrued the issue before it. Rather than conducting the proper enquiry into whether PPC and WF were "like products" the KTC instead merely enquired into the question, not in dispute, of whether Korean and Indonesian PPC, and Korean and Indonesian WF, were each "like products." This inquiry was simply irrelevant to the essential issue of whether PPC and WF are "like products." The KTC also failed to examine evidence showing that these products were different like products. Thus, the KTC’s decision to treat these products as a single like product was inconsistent with Article 2.6. (ii)

Korea's failure to conduct its injury and causal link determinations in an objective manner and to base these determinations on positive evidence was inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Agreement

4.27 In examining whether there was significant price undercutting within the meaning of Article 3.2, the KTC did not properly evaluate evidence in the years 2000, 2001 and 2003, the prices of the investigated imports were higher than the prices charged by the Korean producers in their domestic market, resulting in violations of Articles 3.1 and 3.2. 4.28 Regarding the injury factors listed in Article 3.4, the KTC failed to properly evaluate these factors in the manner described by the Panel in EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India).37 While the KTC's injury determination recites the trends in many relevant factors, it does not contain any objective examination of these trends or explain how these trends support a finding of "material" injury.38 In fact, the trends in many of the injury factors offered no support for the KTC’s conclusion. The KTC’s failure to properly evaluate these factors rendered its findings inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.7 of the Agreement. 4.29 In its causation analysis, the KTC failed to address the decline in demand in the Korean market that affected the imports under investigation even more than it affected the Korean industry's own shipments. In addition, the evidence before the KTC indicated that the prices of the imports under investigation were greater than those charged by the domestic industry for much of the period of investigation. The KTC also failed to conduct any further analysis of whether imports from other sources may also have caused injury to the Korean industry. The KTC also failed to consider properly that the domestic industry's exports had declined sharply over the period of investigation. The KTC’s failure to properly evaluate these factors rendered its findings inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Agreement. 4.30 The KTC failed to properly consider the impact on its analysis of the condition of the domestic industry of the fact that the Korean industry itself accounted for a very large portion of the total imports from Indonesia and China by the Korean producers themselves, which cannot be said to have caused injury to the Korean industry themselves. Finally, Indah Kiat's exports (with their de minimis margins) to Korea should have been classified as non-dumped imports and treated as such throughout the KTC's injury analysis. These failures rendered the KTC’s determination inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Agreement. (iii)

Korea's injury determinations contain several violations of the disclosure obligations contained in Articles 6.1, 6.4 and 6.9 of the Agreement

4.31 The KTC's decision to extend the period of investigation for injury to include the first 6 months of 200339, without permitting the Indonesian exporters access to or any opportunity to 37

Panel Report, EC – Bed Linen (Article 21.5 – India), para. 6.162. Ibid., p. 14. 39 Final Staff Report [Exhibit IDN-16(b)]. 38

WT/DS312/R Page 11

comment on the additional data, deprived the Indonesian exporters of their rights under Article 6.1 to an ample opportunity to present evidence relevant to the determination. This was also inconsistent with the requirement of Article 6.1.2 that all information submitted by the domestic producers should be promptly made available to the Indonesian industry and that of Article 6.4 that the KTC provide timely opportunities to see all relevant information used by the KTC and to prepare presentations based on this information. Finally, the KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.9, which requires the KTC to inform the Indonesian exporters of the essential facts under consideration that form the basis of the KTC's decision, in sufficient time for the Indonesian exporters to defend their interests. 4.32 The KTC also failed to comply with its obligations under Articles 6.2, 6.4 and 12.2 of the Agreement by failing to provide the Indonesian exporters with information relating to its determination on the issue of like products. By failing to disclose details of its price effects analysis and the basis of its injury determination prior to the final determination, the KTC acted inconsistently with its obligation under Article 6.4 and 6.9 of the Agreement. (iv)

Korea improperly granted confidential treatment to information contained in the Domestic Industry's application in violation of Article 6.5 of the Agreement

4.33 The KTC granted confidential treatment to information contained in the domestic industry's application domestic industry without (i) requiring the applicants or the domestic industry to provide showing of good cause for such a treatment; (ii) requiring the applicants or the domestic industry to furnish non-confidential summaries "in sufficient detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the information submitted in confidence"; or (iii) any indication that the information could not be summarized and the reasons why summarization was not possible. This was inconsistent with Articles 6.5, Article 6.5.1 and Article 6.5.2 of the Agreement. 4.

Request for Findings, Rulings and Recommendations

4.34 In the light of the considerations set out above, Indonesia requests imposing its anti-dumping measure against certain paper products from inconsistently with its obligations under Article 6.8 and paragraphs 3, 6, Articles 2.2, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2, 2.4, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.7, 5.8, 6.4, 6.5, the Agreement.

the Panel to find that in Indonesia, Korea acted and 7 of Annex II, and 6.9, 6.10 and 12.2 of

4.35 Korea has also failed to respect its obligations under Article VI of the GATT and Article 1 of the Agreement to ensure that an anti-dumping measure is applied only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of the GATT and pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement. Indonesia requests the Panel to recommend, in accordance with Article 19.1 of the DSU, that the DSB request Korea to bring the measure at issue into conformity with the GATT and with the Agreement. 5.

Suggestions on Implementation

4.36 By the time the Panel issues its report on this matter, Indonesian exporters will have been subject to the measure at issue for nearly two years.40 This measure has imposed, and continues to impose, a significant financial burden on Indonesia’s exports. In these circumstances, Indonesia requests that the Panel exercise its discretion under Article 19.1 of the DSU to suggest ways in which Korea could implement the Panel's rulings and recommendations. Given that Korea's violations of its obligations under the Agreement in this case pervaded its investigation and were fundamental to the outcome of the investigation, Korea could not revise its determinations in accordance with the rulings and recommendations requested by Indonesia without reaching negative determinations of both 40

The KTC's Final Determination was issued in September 2003; the Panel's report is expected to be issued in July 2005.

WT/DS312/R Page 12 dumping and injury.41 Accordingly, Indonesia requests that the Panel suggest that Korea repeal Regulation No. 330 of the Ministry of Finance and Economy dated 7 November 2003 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain paper products from Indonesia. B.

FIRST WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF KOREA

4.37

The following summarizes Korea's arguments in its first submission.

1.

The KTC’s procedures were fair

4.38 Indonesia’s claims in this proceeding are based on the contention that the KTC did not allow the Indonesian respondents — and, in particular, the respondents that were subsidiaries of the Indonesian Sinar Mas Group — a fair opportunity to defend their interests. 4.39 The evidence in this case demonstrates, however, that the KTC’s investigatory procedures provided ample opportunity for all parties to submit information and arguments. For example: •

As part of its initiation process, the KTC prepared a detailed report reviewing the accuracy and adequacy of the application and made that report publicly available on its web-site.

•

After initiating the investigation, the KTC issued detailed questionnaires to the Indonesian respondents with explicit descriptions of the required information.

•

Prior to verification, the KTC consulted with the designated representative of the Sinar Mas Group respondents concerning the location of the materials needed for verification, and then sent a detailed verification work-plan to the Indonesian respondents.

•

Shortly after verification, the KTC held a disclosure meeting, at which it provided to all parties (including the Sinar Mas Group’s representatives) a written disclosure of the proposed preliminary dumping calculations, and an oral description of the problems encountered at the verification.

•

In connection with its preliminary determination, the KTC issued a written explanation of its decision on the dumping and injury issues, as well as two additional reports by its KTC’s Office of Investigations (one describing all of the information gathered in the dumping and injury investigations, and the other specifically focused on the information and issues relating to the dumping margin calculations and responding to the arguments presented by the interested parties). The non-confidential versions of these documents were posted on the KTC’s web-site and mailed to the designated representative of the Sinar Mas Group respondents. In addition, the confidential version of the report on the preliminary dumping margin calculations was faxed to the designated representative of the Sinar Mas Group respondents.

•

After its preliminary determination, the KTC requested that the domestic producers of uncoated “wood-free” paper provide updated injury-related information, in accordance with its normal practice. The updated information was summarized by the KTC in an “interim report.”

•

Before it issued its final determination, the KTC held a hearing on injury issues and a separate disclosure meeting on dumping margin calculation issues. At the injury hearing, the KTC provided copies of its “interim report” to all parties — including the designated Sinar Mas 41

Panel Report, Argentina – Ceramic Tiles, paras. 8.6-7.

WT/DS312/R Page 13

Group representatives. At the dumping disclosure meeting, the KTC provided a copy of a written disclosure of the proposed final dumping calculations. Because the representatives of the Sinar Mas Group respondents did not attend the disclosure meeting, the KTC faxed the written disclosure of the proposed final dumping calculations to the designated Sinar Mas Group representative. •

After the injury hearing and dumping disclosure meetings, the Sinar Mas Group respondents were given an opportunity to comment on the materials provided. And, in fact, the Sinar Mas Group respondents did submit comments after those materials were provided to them.

•

In connection with its preliminary determination, the KTC issued a written explanation of its decision on the dumping and injury issues, as well as two additional reports by its KTC’s Office of Investigations (similar to those issued in connection with the preliminary determination).

These procedures gave the parties full notice of the required information, and also provided all parties with a reasonable opportunity to comment on the information that had been gathered. While Indonesia has attempted to concoct complaints about the KTC’s procedure and disclosure, those claims simply do not withstand scrutiny. 4.40 Nevertheless, despite the KTC’s efforts to ensure a fair proceeding, the Sinar Mas Group deliberately refused to provide necessary information. Two of the Group’s mills — Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli — did respond to the KTC’s questionnaires and did participate in the verification. However, a third Group mill — Tjiwi Kimia — simply refused to respond to the KTC’s questionnaires at all. Another Group subsidiary — CMI, which handled all domestic sales by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli — refused to provide the KTC access to its financial statements or accounting records during the verification, even though the designated representative of the Sinar Mas Group mills had been informed in advance that those materials would be required and had assured the KTC that the necessary materials would be available. More generally, the KTC found at verification that the representatives of the Sinar Mas Group companies had engaged in delaying tactics and had been “insincere and uncooperative all throughout the on-the-spot investigation.” 4.41 In light of these facts, Indonesia’s suggestion that the Sinar Mas Group mills were treated unfairly is unsustainable. Those companies were given more than adequate opportunities to defend their interests. It is not the KTC’s fault that the Sinar Mas Group decided, instead, to impede the investigation and withhold necessary information. 2.

The KTC’s dumping determination was consistent with the requirements of the Agreement

(a)

Single dumping margin for the Sinar Mas Group Mills

4.42 Indonesia’s primary complaint about the dumping calculations concerns the KTC’s decision to calculate a single dumping margin for the Sinar Mas Group mills. According to Indonesia, the fact that the Sinar Mas Group mills are legally distinct under Indonesian corporate law required the KTC to assign separate dumping margins to each, under the provisions of Article 6.10 of the Agreement. 4.43 But, Article 6.10 does not speak in terms of “corporations.” Instead, it states that, “as a rule,” the authorities shall “determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer ... of the product under investigation.” Nothing in the Agreement precludes investigating authorities from applying a functional definition of “exporter” — and thus treating separate corporations that act as a single entity as one “exporter or producer” for purposes of Article 6.10.

WT/DS312/R Page 14

4.44 The evidence in this case demonstrated that the Sinar Mas Group mills had intertwined management structures, that they operated under the oversight of a single “corporate marketing” unit, and that all of the reported sales in the domestic market made through a single affiliated sales organization (CMI). In these circumstances, it was plainly reasonable for the KTC to treat the Sinar Mas Group mills as a single “exporter” for purposes of Article 6.10. Indonesia certainly has not identified any provision of the Agreement that precludes the KTC from interpreting the term “exporter” in that manner. (b)

Facts available for Tjiwi Kimia

4.45 Indonesia also asserts that the KTC improperly determined the export price and normal value for sales by Tjiwi Kimia based on relatively unfavourable information contained in the Korean producers’ initial application. According to Indonesia, the KTC should have assigned an export price and normal value to Tjiwi Kimia that reflected the information submitted by the other mills that did respond to the KTC’s questionnaires, despite Tjiwi Kimia’s complete failure to cooperate with the investigation. In addition, Indonesia argues that the KTC had an obligation to warn the other Sinar Mas Group mills that Tjiwi Kimia’s failure to respond might adversely affect the overall dumping margin assigned to the Group. 4.46 Contrary to Indonesia’s claims, however, paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Agreement specifically authorizes investigating authorities to reach a “less favourable” result when “an interested party does not cooperate and thus relevant information is being withheld.” Indonesia has not claimed that the information in the application (which the KTC relied upon to determine the export price and normal value for Tjiwi Kimia) was not “adequate and accurate.” And, it also has not identified any obligation in the Agreement that would have required the KTC to warn the other Sinar Mas Group companies of the consequences of their selective cooperation. Consequently, there is no basis for Indonesia’s claims. (c)

Facts available for sales through CMI

4.47 Indonesia also claims that the KTC erred in rejecting the submitted data on CMI’s domestic resales of Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli products, due to CMI’s refusal to allow access to its financial statements and accounting records. According to Indonesia, any deficiencies were cured after verification, when the Sinar Mas Group submitted two worksheets purporting to reflect CMI’s income statements for 2002 and 2003. 4.48 But this late submission could not cure the problems caused by CMI’s previous refusal to cooperate. The CMI financial statements and accounting records were needed by the KTC to verify the accuracy of the submitted domestic sales data. CMI’s refusal to allow access to those documents at verification — even though they had been requested both in the original questionnaire and again in the verification plan — prevented verification of the submitted domestic sales data. 4.49 Contrary to Indonesia’s claims, the KTC never asked the Sinar Mas Group to submit the CMI statements after verification, and never set a post-verification deadline for the submission of those statements42. CMI’s failure to allow access to those documents when they were needed at verification made any subsequent submission untimely. Moreover, the submission the Sinar Mas Group actually made after verification did not cure the problem, because there was no way for the KTC to verify the accuracy of the submitted worksheets, or to use the worksheets to verify the submitted CMI sales data, without scheduling another verification and having further access to CMI’s accounting records.

42

See Affidavit of Sang-Deok Han, Deputy Director, Dumping Investigation Division, 18 December 2004, Exhibit KOR-39.

WT/DS312/R Page 15

4.50 As a separate matter, Indonesia also argues that, even if the CMI sales data was properly rejected, the KTC was not permitted to base normal value on “constructed value” without following the hierarchy established by Article 2.2 of the Agreement (under which constructed value normally would not be used unless there was a finding that the “particular market situation” or “low volume” of sales precluded the calculation of normal value based on domestic market sales). Indonesia also objects to the method used by the KTC to calculate constructed value — in particular, the inclusion of an amount corresponding to CMI’s selling, general and administrative (“SG&A”) expenses — and the KTC’s refusal to allow a “level-of-trade” adjustment reducing normal value. 4.51 It is true that, in this case, the KTC was not able to determine whether there was a “particular market situation” or “low volume” of sales. But the KTC’s inability to make that determination was the direct consequence of the Sinar Mas Group’s refusal to provide complete data and to permit verification. The Sinar Mas Group should not, therefore, be heard to complain about the KTC’s failure to conduct an analysis that had been rendered impossible by the Sinar Mas Group’s lack of cooperation. And, in any event, the use of constructed value was consistent with the overall context of the Agreement, because it allowed the KTC to reduce its reliance on “secondary sources,” which are disfavoured as a source of facts available under paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Agreement. 4.52 Finally, the inclusion of an amount corresponding to CMI’s SG&A expenses was appropriate to ensure that the normal value was calculated at the same level of trade as the sales that were used to determine the export price. The information submitted by the Sinar Mas Group respondents indicated that the sales from CMI to its customers were at the same level of trade as the sales from the mills to their customers in Korea. Because the export price was based on sales from the mills to Korean customers, the KTC properly included in normal value the expenses incurred in selling to CMI’s customers in the domestic market (at the same level of trade as the export sales). For the same reason, there was no basis for making an adjustment to reduce normal value to account for differences in level of trade. (d)

Continuation of investigation after determination of de minimis preliminary dumping margins for Indah Kiat

4.53 Indonesia argues that, under Article 5.8 of the Agreement, the investigation should have been terminated with respect to Indah Kiat at the time of the KTC’s preliminary determination, because the KTC preliminarily calculated a de minimis dumping margin for Indah Kiat. It should be noted, however, that Article 5.8 applies only when the authorities are “satisfied” that there is no dumping, and only when termination is appropriate for the entire “investigation” or “case.” 4.54 In this case, the de minimis dumping margin for Indah Kiat was calculated based on a company-specific analysis, and did not reflect a finding of no dumping for the “case” or “investigation” as a whole. Moreover, the KTC’s preliminary determination specifically reserved judgment on the issue whether the Sinar Mas Group companies should be considered separate “exporters” or a single “exporter” in its analysis. Thus, it is clear that, when the KTC made its preliminarily determination, it was not “satisfied” that there was no dumping. 4.55 Moreover, the entity covered by the KTC’s final determination (the single, “collapsed” Sinar Mas Group exporter) was not the same as the entity for which the KTC had preliminary found de minimis margins (the Indah Kiat corporation). Consequently, the de minimis preliminary dumping margin for Indah Kiat did not require termination of the investigation for the Sinar Mas Group “exporter.”

WT/DS312/R Page 16

3.

The KTC’s injury determination was also consistent with the requirements of the Agreement

4.56 Indonesia’s arguments concerning the issues relating to the injury determination are also unconvincing. Indonesia essentially concedes that the KTC analyzed all of the factors relevant to the injury determination. It appears that Indonesia’s main complaint is that it would have preferred that the KTC assign different weights to the various factors it considered. Such arguments do not, however, provide a basis for finding the KTC’s injury decision inconsistent with the requirements of the Agreement. (a)

Definition of like product

4.57 Indonesia also asserts that the KTC’s injury analysis was distorted by an incorrect definition of the domestic “like product” and, hence, of the domestic industry. According to Indonesia, the “like product” defined by the KTC subsumed two distinct items — plain paper copier paper sold in smaller sheets and “other” wood-free paper sold in rolls or larger sheets — which are too dissimilar to be considered a single “like product. 4.58 On closer examination, however, the factual distinction proposed by Indonesia does not hold up. In fact, the evidence on the record demonstrates that plain paper copier paper was sometimes initially sold in rolls or larger sheets, and then cut by the customer into the smaller sheets described by Indonesia. 4.59 More importantly, the legal standard proposed by Indonesia has no basis in the Agreement. The Agreement’s definition of “like product” (which is found in Article 2.6) specifies that the “like product” should be defined by similarity to the imported “product under investigation” — and not by differences among the products produced by the domestic industry. This interpretation was recently upheld by the Panel in the US – Softwood Lumber case, which held that the Agreement does not create an obligation to limit the like product to a single group of products sharing characteristics.” 4.60 The KTC’s approach to the like product definition in this case focused on the similarities between the imported product under investigation and the products produced by the domestic industry. It was, therefore, entirely consistent with the definition of “like product” found in Article 2.6, and with the Panel’s decision in the Softwood Lumber case. (b)

Analysis of import volumes and price effects

4.61 Indonesia also claims that an affirmative injury determination should have been precluded by the fact that the average import prices were higher in some periods than the average prices for domestic products, and by the fact that the absolute volume of subject imports fell during the first half of 2003. Indonesia’s arguments would, however, create obligations that are not found in the Agreement. 4.62 Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Agreement indicate that the investigating authorities must objectively examine evidence of the volume of dumped imports and the effect of dumped imports on prices, but they also caution that no single factor will necessarily give decisive guidance. Article 3.2 explicitly permits the investigating authority to base an injury determination on increases in import volumes relative to consumption — even if imports have fallen in absolute terms. Article 3.2 also specifically recognizes that an investigating authority may find that dumped imports affected the domestic industry’s prices, in the absence of “price undercutting,” based on evidence that “the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices … or prevent price increases….” 4.63 The evidence before the KTC showed that there had been a sharp deterioration in the prices for both the domestic products and the dumped imports starting in 2000. It also found that the dumped

WT/DS312/R Page 17

imports had steadily increased their share of the Korean market over the entire period examined. Under Article 3.2, these findings provided a sufficient basis for finding that the imports had increased in relative terms and that there had been an adverse effect on prices. (c)

Analysis of imports by Korean producers

4.64 Indonesia also asserts that the KTC erred by failing to consider the impact of the Korean industry’s own imports as an alternative cause of injury. But, Indonesia’s claims are based on a faulty analysis. While there may have been imports by individual Korean producers, there were no significant imports by the “domestic industry.” 4.65 In this case, the KTC exercised the authority granted to it by Article 4.1 of the Agreement and excluded from the “domestic industry” those Korean producers that had imported significant volumes of the subject merchandise from the countries under investigation. Because the KTC had excluded the domestic producers with significant imports from the definition of the “domestic industry,” it necessarily follows that the remaining producers that were considered part of the “domestic industry” did not have a significant volume of imports of the subject merchandise from the countries under investigation. Thus, Indonesia’s argument is based on a false premise. The KTC’s injury determination was based on data showing that the Korean producers that were not importing subject merchandise had been harmed by the imports under investigation. (d)

Conclusion

4.66 Indonesia apparently brought this claim based on its belief that the Sinar Mas Group’s exporters were the victims of arbitrary governmental action. A fair review of the facts demonstrates, however, that the Sinar Mas Group companies were the victims only of their own recalcitrance. On the whole, the KTC’s treatment of the Sinar Mas Group was actually quite mild, and entirely consistent with the limits prescribed by the Agreement. Indonesia’s claims should, therefore, be dismissed. C.

FIRST ORAL STATEMENTS OF INDONESIA

4.67

The following summarizes Indonesia's arguments in its first oral statements.

1.

Opening Statement of Indonesia at the First Meeting of the Panel

(a)

The use of facts available for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli

4.68 The factual record reveals that contrary to Korea’s arguments, the exporters’ domestic sales data were extensively verified. Prior to the verification, the Indonesian exporters had cooperated fully in the investigation and had provided all relevant information, including all necessary domestic sales transactions. The KTC verified sample transactions, including both sales to CMI and re-sales by CMI, requested both before and during the verification (see Exhibit IDN-20). The KTC also verified the quantity and value of the reported domestic sales, by tracing those values back to the exporters’ financial statements, including a review of a breakdown of the exporters’ sales, monthly sales totals, and sales ledgers for selected months. No discrepancies were found. 4.69 Korea’s contention that it was not able to verify the data regarding the re-sales by CMI is incorrect. The sample sales transactions reviewed by the KTC contained data relating to the re-sales by CMI, including documents from independent sources such as CMI’s banks. The KTC was also able to, and in fact did, check the completeness of the exporters’ data by means of the sample selected sales traces.

WT/DS312/R Page 18

4.70 By checking the reported sales by the exporters against the exporters’ own financial statements, the KTC effectively verified that all relevant CMI re-sales were also reported. The questionnaire responses of Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli indicated that neither Indah Kiat nor Pindo Deli makes a sale in the domestic market unless CMI has first obtained a customer and issued an invoice to the customer and that CMI’s invoice to the ultimate customer was a prerequisite for the exporters’ invoice to CMI. This entails that every invoice from the exporter to CMI matched an invoice from CMI to the unaffiliated customer. Accordingly, by verifying the total of the exporters’ own invoices to CMI, the KTC of necessity also verified the total of CMI’s invoices to the first unaffiliated customers. The KTC also verified the prices charged by CMI on its re-sales. The KTC also verified, based on a sample of its own choosing, that the [[**]]43 charged by CMI pursuant to an agreement between the exporters and CMI applied in every instance. Again, this was supported by CMI’s bank statements. 4.71 The only document that was not provided at verification was the CMI financial statements. The relevant question for the Panel is whether this circumstance rendered the "domestic sales information" unverifiable". Indonesia has submitted evidence to the effect that the KTC indicated during a meeting held on 4 April 2003 that it would be willing to accept the CMI statement if it were submitted by 10 April 2003. The Panel should therefore consider the financial statement to have been timely submitted. 4.72 Even if the KTC had not indicated to the exporters that the financial statements would be accepted if submitted by 10 April, the KTC should nevertheless have used the statements. The KTC’s failures to take a reasonable approach to deadlines, to examine the difficulties faced by the exporters in this case, and to evaluate whether the financial statements could be relied upon in its determinations all constitute violations of the duty to cooperate identified by the Appellate Body and found in Article 6.8, paragraphs 3 and 6 of Annex II, and Article 6.13. 4.73 The mere fact that the CMI financial statements were not required to be audited does not mean they were not “verifiable” within the meaning of paragraph 3 of Annex II. The KTC should have reviewed the statements and requested any additional information, such as supporting documentation for the financial statements themselves or the link between the financial statements and the questionnaire responses that it needed. 4.74 The CMI financial statements were not necessary to verify the data. Reconciliation using financial statements is not the only way to verify sales data, and loses its importance in the case of a re-seller like CMI. In situations involving a re-seller of goods obtained from several different suppliers, any reconciliation to the re-seller’s financial statements is entirely dependent on the accuracy of the identification of the subset of the re-seller’s sales that were purchased from the exporter under investigation. Therefore, any additional verification step involving the CMI financial statement would be dependent on the verification already done on identifying all of the sales from the exporters to CMI. Thus, the CMI financial statements would, at most, have permitted an additional, largely superfluous level of verification.

4.75 Korea has also argued that it was not provided with CMI’s accounting records. Indonesia has provided evidence that the KTC’s team was provided with on-line access to CMI’s sales records, as well as an affidavit by the CMI officer that prepared the database of CMI sales and subsequently participated in the verification. (b)

Tjiwi Kimia

4.76 By stating that the KTC relied entirely on information contained in the application to determine the facts available margin for Tjiwi Kimia, Korea effectively concedes that the KTC took 43

Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential.

WT/DS312/R Page 19

no further steps to check this information against secondary sources and therefore acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 and paragraph 7 of Annex II. It is not enough that the information on which the KTC relied had been deemed sufficient to justify the initiation of the investigation. The standard of evidence required to satisfy the requirements of Articles 5.2 and 5.3 is lower than the standard required to make a preliminary or final determination. 4.77 Korea appears to agree that in an investigation involving a single exporter, the investigating authority is required to notify the exporter of any deficiencies in its questionnaire response before resorting to facts available under Article 6.8 and paragraph 6 of Annex II. Had the KTC treated the three exporters as a single entity early in the investigation, it would have been required to give them an opportunity to address the missing Tjiwi Kimia data. Korea cannot diminish the exporters’ rights in this regard simply by waiting until immediately before the final determination to decide to treat the three exporters as a single entity. (c)

Calculation of individual margins for each exporter

4.78 Korea argues that the investigating authority has discretion to interpret the phrase “each known exporter” to refer to “several known exporters” that the investigating authority is permitted to combine into a single entity. As a practical matter, this interpretation would deprive the first sentence of Article 6.10, including the verb “shall determine,” of any effet utile. Korea does not explain what this sentence would mean if the investigating authority were given unlimited discretion to “collapse” separate exporters, or what standards investigating authorities must use to “collapse” exporters. 4.79 The mere existence of a legal relationship between individual exporters cannot be an objective basis for this decision, as it says nothing about how an individual exporter determines its export prices. The KTC did not make any factual findings that the Indonesian exporters coordinated their prices during the period of investigation. In fact, all of the evidence on the record shows that the three exporters conducted their export sales activities separately. Thus, even if it were legally permissible for the KTC to “collapse” different exporters, the KTC has not provided an explanation that would permit the Panel to conclude that its determination was unbiased and objective. (d)

Fair comparison

4.80 Korea has clarified that it used the entire production and sales related SG&A expenses of another Indonesian exporter [[Company A]]44 as the basis of the selling expenses attributable to CMI, which resulted in impermissible double-counting of certain SG&A and interest expenses. The CMI financial statements, which included its SG&A and interest expenses, were provided in a timely and usable manner. The KTC could also have avoided double-counting when it used the [[Company A]]45 data, by separating [[Company A]]46’s sales-related expenses from its overall corporate SG&A figures and using only the sales-related expenses (not production-related expenses) to approximate the expenses incurred by CMI. 4.81 The KTC's double-counting of interest expenses was unjustified. CMI is a trading company that had no assets to finance by borrowing. The KTC verified that the exporters delivered the goods directly to CMI’s customer, so CMI could not have incurred any expenses to finance inventories, and that CMI’s sales terms were “cash before delivery,” so that it did not incur interest expenses to finance its accounts receivable. Thus, the KTC verified that CMI did not incur financing expenses. The use of the full amount of the exporters’ own financing expenses was totally unjustified and grossly overstated these actual expenses.

44

Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. Ibid. 46 Ibid. 45

WT/DS312/R Page 20

4.82 Regarding the KTC’s failure to deduct selling expenses incurred by CMI from normal value, the evidence shows that the sales to unaffiliated customers in the domestic market involve selling activities by CMI and that that there are no comparable activities on export market sales. Therefore, the Indonesian exporters incurred a category of expense on domestic sales – CMI’s selling expenses – that was not incurred on export sales. Whether this means that these sales were at a different level of trade, or simply involved different circumstances, these expenses clearly affected the price comparability between the normal value and the export price. Using either terminology, an adjustment was necessary under the third sentence of Article 2.4 of the Agreement. (e)

Like product

4.83 Article 2.6 emphasizes that the domestic product must be “like” the imported product “in all respects.” This requires not just external consistency between the imported product and the domestic product but also internal consistency. To conclude otherwise, that the Agreement permits only that the investigating authority define the domestic like product as having the same external boundaries as the imported product, would be to read the requirement of likeness “in all respects” out of the Agreement and result in an injury analysis that does not objectively reflect an analysis of the competitive impact of the imports under investigation with the domestic products with which they actually compete. 4.84 Korea effectively concedes that the KTC failed to consider whether PPC and WF paper were “like” products. Thus, the Panel should find that the KTC’s like product analysis was inconsistent with Article 2.6, and that its injury analysis, based on this flawed definition of the like product, was inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the Agreement. (f)

The price and volume effects of imports

4.85 Korea’s admission that the evidence showed a “mixed picture” on price effects undermines its Article 3.2 analysis. As the evidence provided by Korea in paragraph 171 of its submission shows, apart from the first year of the period of investigation, the price of the imports was at or above the price of the domestic product for the remainder of the period. Korea’s admission that the price data shows a “mixed picture” undermines the KTC’s analysis of “significant” price undercutting or depression. The KTC cannot objectively reach an injury finding based in part on the price effects of imports where there is a “mixed picture” regarding those effects. 4.86 Korea also argues that the volume of imports under investigation relative to consumption increased substantially. However, the data supplied by Korea shows that dumped imports in fact declined by 15.3 per cent in the first half of 2003, while the decline in domestic shipments was only 11.9 per cent. In addition, the KTC significantly overstated the import market shares by understating total domestic consumption. (g)

The consideration of injury factors, causation analysis and own imports by the domestic industry

4.87 The KTC’s injury analysis amounts to nothing more than a recitation of the data points relating to the factors under consideration. The KTC cannot simply recite the data points and reach a conclusion, but it must exercise judgment to objectively place trends in their context. The injury factors showed conflicting trends that were inconsistent with a finding of injury. For example, the decline in employment coincided with increases in the domestic industry’s profits increased. Wages and productivity increased as employment decreased. There was no correlation between the trends in the industry’s operating profits and the imports under investigation. 4.88 Likewise, the KTC’s causation analysis largely consists of nothing more than a recital of the relevant data points and a sentence reaching a conclusion. The KTC made no effort to evaluate or

WT/DS312/R Page 21

place in context the evolution of the industry’s operating profits, especially the fact that operating profits were positive during most of the period of investigation, even at periods when imports increased. The KTC made no analysis whatsoever of the effect of the decline in domestic consumption on the performance of the domestic industry. The KTC's examination of two other possible causes of injury (loss of export markets and imports from third countries) was also inadequate and cursory, and failed to ensure that injury from those factors was not attributed to the imports. 4.89 Korea has not explained with any clarity how the KTC actually considered the issue of imports by the domestic industry in its injury determination. Indonesia’s claims on this issue are also based on the failure of the KTC to consider the importance of these imports to the assessment of the performance of the domestic industry. However, the KTC did not address this issue in its injury analysis, even though Indonesian exporters raised it. (h)

Procedural issues

4.90 Korea argues that it is not required to provide a written report on the verification and that it is sufficient if it made proper disclosure of the essential facts under consideration pursuant to Article 6.9. Korea misreads the relevant provisions of the Agreement. Article 6.7 contains requirements which are separate and distinct from the requirement under Article 6.9. Korea also argues that oral disclosure of the results of the verification is sufficient. Indonesia is not aware of any instance in which oral disclosure satisfies the procedural obligations of the Agreement. Lastly, Korea argues that it was not required to disclose “actual calculation figures” to the Indonesian exporters. However, these figures are the “essential facts” on which the determination of dumping margins is based within the meaning of Article 6.9. Exporters cannot possibly evaluate whether the investigating authority has in fact made a fair comparison within the meaning of Article 2.4 unless they know what comparison was actually made. 2.

Closing Statement of Indonesia at the First Meeting of the Panel

4.91 Anti-dumping investigations should not be conducted in an opportunistic manner to facilitate the imposition of protectionist measures. In its written submission and its statement to the Panel, Indonesia has explained in detail how the KTC’s actions were outcome-driven in several respects. 4.92 Defending those actions before the Panel, Korea takes the position that the KTC has absolute discretion in the conduct of its investigations and how it responds to issues that arise in the course of the investigation. Korea also considers that Indonesia and its exporters must abide by the KTC’s determinations no matter what. In fact, the Agreement contains detailed rules governing how these investigations are to be conducted. These rules strike a balance between the investigating authority’s needs, the requirement of fairness and objectivity, and the practical difficulties that inevitably may arise in investigations of this complexity. 4.93 In its first written submission, Indonesia went through the rules of anti-dumping step-by-step, measuring the KTC’s conduct against those detailed rules. Korea prefers not to discuss the KTC’s actions in the context of those rules, hoping instead that its complaints regarding the Indonesian exporters will distract the Panel from analyzing the KTC’s actions under those rules. Indonesia trusts that having conducted its own detailed evaluation of the facts of this investigation and the standards contained in the Agreement, the Panel will conclude the flaws Indonesia has identified in the KTC’s investigation constitute violations of the provisions of the GATT Article VI and the Agreement that were identified in Indonesia’s first written submission. D.

FIRST ORAL STATEMENTS OF KOREA

4.94

The following summarizes Korea's arguments in its first oral statements.

WT/DS312/R Page 22

1.

Opening Statement of Korea at the First Meeting of the Panel

4.95 As a frequent target of unfair and arbitrary antidumping actions, Korea recognizes the fundamental importance of the WTO dispute settlement process. Nevertheless, Korea cannot see the merits in Indonesia’s complaints. Among other things, Indonesia’s arguments fail to recognize the role played by the main Indonesian exporter in creating a situation in which an unfavourable result was inevitable. In addition, Indonesia’s claims concerning the injury finding improperly seek to ambush Korea with arguments that were never presented to the KTC. An objective review demonstrates that the KTC’s determinations were consistent with the Agreement’s requirements. (a)

Single dumping margin for the Sinar Mas Group Mills

4.96 According to Indonesia, Article 6.10 of the Agreement required the KTC to assign separate dumping margins to each corporation that had exports to Korea. But, Article 6.10 requires, “as a rule,” a separate dumping margin for each “exporter or producer.” Nothing in the Agreement precludes investigating authorities from applying a functional definition of “exporter” — and thus treating separate corporations that act as a single entity as one “exporter or producer” for purposes of Article 6.10. 4.97 At the same time, Korea does not agree with the third parties who suggest that any affiliated corporations may be treated as a single exporter. In Korea’s view, a mere potential for affiliates to act in a coordinated fashion is not sufficient. Instead, there must be evidence that the affiliated corporations did in fact act as a single entity. In this case, the KTC’s decision to treat them as a single “exporters” was appropriate precisely because the evidence in this case demonstrated that the Sinar Mas Group mills did act as a single entity. (b)

Facts available for Tjiwi Kimia

4.98 Indonesia also objects to the KTC’s use of information contained in the Korean producers’ application to determine the export price and normal value for Tjiwi Kimia. But the use of these “less favourable” facts available was consistent with paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Agreement — which specifically authorizes investigating authorities to reach a “less favourable” result when “an interested party does not cooperate and thus relevant information is being withheld.” Also, contrary to Indonesia’s claims, the Agreement does not require investigating authorities to warn respondents about the consequences of non-cooperation. The Agreement itself makes clear what those consequences may be. 4.99 Finally, the arguments about the extent to which the KTC corroborated the “facts available” used to determine Tjiwi Kimia’s export price and normal value do not apply. The information relied upon came entirely from independent and reliable sources — i.e., from official Korean government customs statistics and from information obtained by the Korea Trade - Investment Promotion Agency. Furthermore, as part of its analysis, the KTC’s staff actually did compare the normal value data in the application to the data submitted by the responding companies, and found it to be comparable. (c)

Facts available for sales through CMI

4.100 Indonesia claims that the KTC should not have rejected the submitted CMI data, because the problems caused by CMI’s refusal to allow access to its records at verification were cured when the Sinar Mas Group subsequently submitted two worksheets purporting to reflect CMI’s income statements. But this late submission could not cure the problems caused by CMI’s previous refusal to cooperate, because there was no way for the KTC to go back in time to verify the accuracy of the submitted worksheets, or to use the worksheets to verify the submitted CMI sales data.

WT/DS312/R Page 23

4.101 Indonesia also objects to the method used by the KTC’s inclusion in constructed value of an amount corresponding to CMI’s selling, general and administrative (“SG&A”) expenses, and to the KTC’s refusal to allow a “level-of-trade” adjustment. But, the information submitted by the Sinar Mas Group indicated that the sales from CMI to its customers were at the same level of trade as the sales from the mills to their customers in Korea. The inclusion of an amount corresponding to CMI’s SG&A expenses was appropriate, therefore, to ensure that the normal value was calculated at the same level of trade as the sales that were used to determine the export price. (d)

Continuation of investigation after preliminary determination

4.102 Indonesia argues that, under Article 5.8 of the Agreement, the investigation should have been terminated with respect to Indah Kiat once the KTC preliminarily calculated a de minimis dumping margin for Indah Kiat. But Article 5.8 applies only when the authorities are “satisfied” that there is no dumping, and only when termination is appropriate for the entire “investigation” or “case.” In this case, the preliminary dumping margin for Indah Kiat was calculated based on a company-specific analysis, and did not reflect a finding of no dumping for the “case” or “investigation” as a whole. Moreover, the KTC’s preliminary determination specifically reserved judgment on the issue whether the Sinar Mas Group companies should be considered separate “exporters” or a single “exporter” in its analysis. The entity covered by the KTC’s final determination (the single, “collapsed” Sinar Mas Group exporter) was not the same as the entity for which the KTC had preliminary found de minimis margins (the Indah Kiat corporation). Consequently, the de minimis preliminary dumping margin for Indah Kiat did not require termination of the investigation for the Sinar Mas Group “exporter.” (e)

Like product

4.103 According to Indonesia, the KTC should have found that there were two “like products.” On closer examination, however, the factual distinction proposed by Indonesia does not hold up. Moreover, the legal standard proposed by Indonesia has no basis in the Agreement. The Agreement’s definition of “like product” specifies that the “like product” should be defined by similarity to the imported “product under investigation” — and not by differences among the products produced by the domestic industry. 4.104 Canada has argued that the term “product under investigation” must impose some limits on the scope of the items included in the investigation. Korea does not disagree with Canada’s logic. But Canada’s argument is not relevant to this proceeding, because Indonesia has not objected to the KTC’s definition of the “product under investigation.” Having accepted the KTC’s definition of the “product under investigation,” Indonesia has no grounds to object to the definition of the “like product,” because the “like product” must, under Article 2.6, be defined based on the similarity to the “product under investigation.” (f)

Consideration of injury factors

4.105 Indonesia’s arguments present a detailed discussion of the updated injury data collected by the KTC, and attempt to show that this data could have supported a finding that the Korean industry had not been injured. It is worth noting, however, that Indonesia’s arguments concerning the updated data were never actually made to the KTC during the investigation. Because the Indonesian respondents failed to submit these arguments to the KTC, the KTC never had an opportunity to respond to them. 4.106 In any event, Indonesia’s arguments are unpersuasive. The Agreement clearly does require investigating authorities to “consider” various factors in making injury determinations. However, the Agreement does not require any particular analysis of those factors, or mandate any particular result. It is clear in this case that the KTC did consider all of the factors identified in the Agreement. The KTC’s determination explained how the analysis of each of these factors led it to an affirmative injury

WT/DS312/R Page 24

determination. The KTC’s analysis and explanation were logical and reasonable. Nothing more was required under the Agreement. 4.107 In this regard, Indonesia has attempted to create obligations that are not found in the Agreement. Article 3.2 explicitly permits the investigating authority to base an injury determination on increases in import volumes relative to consumption — even if imports have fallen in absolute terms. Article 3.2 also specifically recognizes that an investigating authority may find that dumped imports affected the domestic industry’s prices, in the absence of “price undercutting,” based on evidence that “the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices … or prevent price increases….” Nothing in these provisions would prohibit an affirmative injury determination when the import prices are higher than the domestic prices, or when imports have gained market share, but fallen in absolute terms. (g)

Analysis of imports by Korean producers

4.108 Finally, Indonesia asserts that the KTC erred by failing to consider the impact of the Korean industry’s own imports as an alternative cause of injury. These claims are, however, based on a faulty analysis. 4.109 In this case, the KTC exercised the authority granted to it by Article 4.1 of the Agreement and excluded from the “domestic industry” those Korean producers that had imported significant volumes of the subject merchandise from the countries under investigation. Because the KTC had excluded the domestic producers with significant imports from the definition of the “domestic industry,” it necessarily follows that the remaining producers that were considered part of the “domestic industry” did not have a significant volume of imports of the subject merchandise from the countries under investigation. Thus, Indonesia’s argument is based on a false premise. 2.

Closing Statement of Korea at the First Meeting of the Panel

4.110 In Korea’s view, this dispute is, among other things, about non-cooperation by the three Sinar Mas Group mills. One of them decided not to participate in the investigation at all. The other two refused to allow the Korean investigating authorities access to documentation necessary for verification, leaving the Korean authorities no other choice but to resort to facts available. 4.111 The full cooperation of respondents is a fundamental aspect of anti-dumping investigations. Investigating authorities do not have legal tools to compel respondents to submit the information needed to perform the analysis required by the Agreement. They must depend instead on the willingness of respondents to cooperate - a willingness that may only be encouraged, but not compelled, by threats of unfavourable facts available. 4.112 Despite the Sinar Mas Group’s lack of cooperation, the KTC conducted the investigation and made the necessary determinations within the bounds of the disciplines envisaged in the Agreement. The non-cooperating respondents should be left to bear the consequences of their action, instead of their government being forced to try to relieve them of these consequences through the WTO dispute settlement process. 4.113 Having said that, the Korean delegation wishes to take this opportunity to put on record its concern about the composition of the Indonesian delegation which includes employees of Sinar Mas Group. In Korea’s view, Indonesia’s decision to compose its delegation in this manner, and to share Korea's confidential submission with company employees, constitutes a clear violation of Article 18.2 of the DSU which sets out requirements for protection of confidential information. The confidential information contained in Indonesia’s oral statement has now been given to the main Indonesian producer and exporter of the product under consideration. Given Indonesia’s admission that the employees of the Sinar Mas Group participated in the preparation of that statement, Korea can only

WT/DS312/R Page 25

assume that all the confidential information that Korea submitted to the Panel in its first written submission and related exhibits has been passed on to an Indonesian paper producer that competes directly with its Korean counterparts. 4.114 In view of the seriousness of the violation of Article 18.2 of the DSU in terms of potential commercial damage to the Korean paper industry, the Korean delegation raised an objection to the presence of the Indonesian industry representative in the room in the morning of 1 February 2005. In order to minimize the disclosure of the confidential information, Korea requested that they remain outside the room during the Panel hearing. 4.115 It is unfortunate that the Panel ruled in favour of Indonesia on the basis of Paragraph 15 of its Working Procedures. Korea has reservations about the ruling which entails invalidation of the treaty provisions by a procedural guidance in the Working Procedure. A member’s right to determine the composition of its own delegation should not be construed to permit circumvention of the requirement to protect confidential information. 4.116 Korea recognizes that, under the Working Procedures, it is Indonesia’s responsibility to ensure that the confidentiality obligations of Article 18.2 are met. However, when the facts demonstrate that Indonesia has not fulfilled that responsibility, the Panel must act. Indonesia’s failure to honour its Article 18.2 commitments does not absolve the Panel of its independent responsibilities. At a minimum, the Panel should instruct Indonesia to remove all industry representatives from its delegation, to cease any distribution of the confidential submissions in this proceeding to industry representatives, and to ensure that any copies of confidential submissions that were previously distributed to industry representatives are returned to Indonesian government and destroyed. 4.117 In this regard, Korea found the Panel’s suggestion after the ruling to set up a special procedure governing protection of confidential information not to be a viable option, given the advanced stage of the Panel process. Such procedure would only have been meaningful if it had been established, at the latest, prior to the first submission. 4.118 It should also be noted that the Korean delegation did not object to the above-mentioned ruling of the Panel in the interest of expediting the proceedings of this Panel, despite the fact that Korea is the defending party in this dispute. As Korea made it clear immediately after the said Panel’s ruling, it reserves its right to raise this issue in the future as appropriate. E.

SECOND WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF INDONESIA

4.119

The following summarizes Indonesia's arguments in its second submission.

1.

Introduction

4.120 In resolving this dispute, the Panel must be able to discern from specific statements on the record that matters the KTC was required to address were properly considered and decided. In addition, the Panel may not rely on ex post explanations regarding the KTC’s reasoning or findings. 2.

Legal Argument

(a)

Claims arising from the determination of dumping

(i)

Korea's use of "facts available" to calculate normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli was inconsistent with Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Agreement

4.121 When the KTC arrived in Indonesia to conduct the verifications, Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli had cooperated fully and comprehensively in the KTC’s investigation. These exporters had submitted

WT/DS312/R Page 26

all requested data, and had written to the KTC asking whether they would be receiving a supplemental questionnaire. The KTC’s verification plan was the first time the KTC specifically requested the Indonesian exporters to “prepare” – not to “submit” – CMI’s financial statement. At this point, there is no reason why the KTC could have concluded that these exporters were uncooperative under Article 6.8 and no evidence that the KTC did so. 4.122 The exporters’ inability to provide the CMI statements at the start of verification was the first stumbling block in a hitherto normal investigation. Articles 6.8 and Annex II contain detailed procedures that must be applied objectively by the investigating authority in (i) dealing with any such stumbling blocks; and (ii) assessing the nature or size of any stumbling block encountered in the investigation. 4.123 The KTC took no steps to deal with the exporters’ predicament other than to treat it as a “wilful refusal” and a “refusal to cooperate” that permitted the use of facts available without any further consideration. This is inconsistent with the KTC’s obligations under Article 6.8 and Annex II. The KTC failed to consider the practical ability of the interested parties to comply fully with its requests. The KTC took no steps to assist the exporters in overcoming difficulties. The KTC neither assisted nor made allowances for the inability of the exporters to provide the financial statements at the start of verification. The KTC ignored its obligation under paragraph 5 of Annex II not to discard information simply because it is not “ideal in all respects.” The KTC improperly failed to consider providing additional time to obtain the CMI financial statements, or to accept these statements when they were finally submitted. To the extent that the KTC rejected the CMI financial statements submitted on 9 April 2003 “for the sole reason that it was submitted beyond the deadlines,” the KTC also acted inconsistently with Article 6.8. Korea has also not shown how the KTC determined that the CMI financial statements were not submitted within a reasonable period of time. In contrast, the KTC was able to collect data relating to the domestic industry three months after the CMI financial statements and use it in its determinations. The KTC failed to discharge its obligation to consider whether it could use these statements “without undue difficulty” under paragraph 3 of Annex II. The KTC failed to discharge this obligation. 4.124 Information can be “verifiable” under paragraph 3 of Annex II if the accuracy of information can be determined by “an objective process of examination,” without limitation to any one way of doing this. Thus, the USDOC manual states that the “ways and means of [verifying completeness] varies from response to response and from respondent to respondent;” that “no two verifications are alike;” and that the verifiers must “above all, be flexible.” 4.125 The obligation to report CMI re-sales is defined by the quantity and value of sales from the exporters to CMI: the “total pool of reportable transactions” is found by reference to the database of sales by the exporters to CMI, not CMI’s financial statements. The question of whether the exporters properly reported all appropriate re-sales by CMI can only be answered by examining the CMI resales of each of the sales to CMI. The CMI financial statements have very limited relevance to this process. The KTC actually verified extensively both the exporters’ sales to CMI and CMI’s re-sales to the first unaffiliated customer without finding any errors or discrepancies, including a review of CMI’s own documents, including invoices; and independently-sourced documents, such as CMI’s bank statements. Also, the exporters made available to the KTC the CMI staff member that worked on preparing the sales database, who made her computer records available to the KTC’s verifiers. Korea’s ex post allegations that some of the documents the KTC saw at verification might have been falsified are not supported by the record and are contradicted by the KTC’s own findings at verification. Finally, “Perfection is not the standard” for verifications. 4.126 Under paragraph 6, if the investigating authority decides to reject information, it is required to inform the exporters forthwith and to provide it with an opportunity to correct whatever deficiency exists, even if the alleged failure to provide supporting information came in response to a supplemental request in the KTC’s verification plan. Korea’s argument that the KTC did not invite

WT/DS312/R Page 27

the Indonesian exporters to provide the CMI financial statements at the 4 April 2003 disclosure meeting is an admission that the KTC did not fulfil its obligations under paragraph 6. The CMI financial statements were not necessary for other purposes. In addition, any omissions relating to minor adjustment items such as credit notes could not justify the rejection of the entire domestic sales data. (b)

Korea's calculation of constructed value for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli was inconsistent with Articles 2.2, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2, 2.4, and 6.8 of the Agreement

4.127 The KTC should have relied on CMI’s submitted financial statements to determine amounts for SG&A and interest expenses for CMI. In addition, the manner in which the KTC calculated CMI’s SG&A and interest expenses was inconsistent with both the requirement of Article 6.8 and paragraph 7 of Annex II that the KTC must exercise special circumspection in the use of facts available and with the requirements of Articles 2, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2, and 2.4 that the investigating authority may only include reasonable amounts relating to the production and sales of the relevant product in its calculation of SG&A and interest expenses to ensure a fair comparison with export price. 4.128 The KTC used SG&A and interest expenses of about [[**]] per cent and [[**]47 per cent respectively as the proxies for CMI. Evidence on the record shows that CMI’s SG&A expenses were [[**]]48 per cent of cost of goods sold, while total interest expenses were zero. These expenses should have been used by the KTC. In addition, the KTC made no effort to use special circumspection under paragraph 7 or to ensure that the amounts it used were reasonable under Article 2. The KTC had before it verified information that showed that Indah Kiat’s and Pindo Deli’s SG&A expenses were much lower than the figures used by the KTC. The KTC should have reviewed the breakdowns for these figures to determine whether it was appropriate to include those expenses in its determination of CMI’s SG&A and interest expenses. This review would have revealed that the exporters’ interest expenses were related almost exclusively to production-related activities, such as loans for construction equipment. 4.129 Article 2.2 provides that the investigating authority may add only a “reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs.” Article 2.2.2 emphasises that these amounts should be based on actual data where possible. Article 2.2.2(iii) reiterates that any other method used to determine amounts for administrative, selling and general costs must be “reasonable". Articles 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.2 recognise a distinction between concepts of “production and sale” in how it describes the expenses that may reasonably be included in the constructed value. In these circumstances, the KTC’s failure to consider verified evidence to determine whether the amounts it intended to use as CMI’s SG&A and interest expenses were reasonable was inconsistent with these provisions and constituted a failure to exercise special circumspection within the meaning of paragraph 7 of Annex II. (c)

Korea's use of "facts available" to determine Tjiwi Kimia's dumping margin was inconsistent with Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Agreement

(i)

The KTC acted inconsistently with paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Agreement in failing to exercise "special circumspection" in its use of secondary information to determine dumping margins for Tjiwi Kimia

4.130 The data contained in the application and used by the KTC to determine Tjiwi Kimia’s margin were inconsistent with data obtained from independent sources. The application overstated the dumping margins for April Fine by 1600 per cent and overstated Pindo Deli's normal value, before 47 48

Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. Ibid.

WT/DS312/R Page 28

adjustment, by approximately $135-195/ton (approximately 16-23 per cent). It is clear, therefore, that had the KTC exercised special circumspection in using facts available to determine the margins for Tjiwi Kimia, it would have reached a different result. 4.131 There is no evidence in the record to indicate how the KTC established that KOTRA and KOTIS acted "independently" from the domestic industry in obtaining this information or that the KTC considered the nature of these agencies as a relevant factor in its evaluation of the application data. The duty imposed on the investigating authority is to check the reliability of the secondary information itself. In doing so, the KTC is not entitled to overlook glaring inconsistencies between the actual information supplied by these agencies and the other information on the record, including its own (albeit flawed) findings regarding normal value and export prices, simply because the ultimate suppliers of this information are supposedly "independent and reliable". There is no evidence that the application data on normal value "fell within the range of domestic sales data reported by the responding companies". Also, the KTC has not explained how it conducted this alleged comparison, given that the data in the application on normal value was not segregated between PPC and WF, while the KTC calculated separate dumping margins for PPC and WF paper. 4.132 Korea defends its decision to collapse the three Sinar Mas companies on the basis that the Sinar Group companies "really did act as a single entity". If the three Sinar Mas companies "acted as a single entity" then it is eminently reasonable to assume that the sales prices of that entity would be similar. Also, the KTC cannot assume that the prices charged by Tjiwi Kimia would diverge massively from the prices charged by other Indonesian producers operating in the same markets. 4.133 The investigating authority's duty to act with special circumspection under paragraph 7 of Annex II applies in all cases where “the authorities have to base their findings” on information from secondary sources, regardless of whether the interested party concerned cooperates or not. The final sentence of paragraph 7 does not negate this duty. It merely provides that the margin in a situation where an exporter does not cooperate may be greater than if the exporter had cooperated. But this does not give the investigating authority license to ignore the requirement of special circumspection. Moreover, to the extent that the KTC sought to “punish” Tjiwi Kimia, Korea has not explained what standards it used to determine that it was appropriate to “punish” the exporter or how those standards were consistent with paragraph 7. 4.134 For these reasons, the KTC's calculation of Tjiwi Kimia's dumping margin on the basis of the information supplied by the applicants was inconsistent with the procedures required under Article 6.8 and paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Agreement. (ii)

The KTC's use of "facts available" for Tjiwi Kimia without providing other exporters with an opportunity to submit further explanations was inconsistent with Article 6.8 and paragraph 6 of Annex II of the Agreement

4.135 Korea acknowledges that paragraph 6 of Annex II to the Agreement imposes a duty on investigating authorities to "provide respondents an opportunity to cure defects in submitted information". When the three exporters were first collapsed into a single entity late in the investigation, they found themselves in the same position as a single exporter that had submitted a questionnaire response in which certain domestic and export sales were not reported. However, the “single economic entity” in this case was not provided any such opportunity to cure defects. The KTC’s belated decision to make its final determination for a different entity than its preliminary determination cannot relieve the KTC of its obligations under paragraph 6 or reduce the procedural protections of the Indonesian exporters under that provision. Korea wants to have it both ways – it wants the freedom to treat these companies as one entity, but without any of the obligations that might entail under the Agreement.

WT/DS312/R Page 29

4.136 Indonesia’s position is simply that the KTC cannot reduce the procedural rights of exporters by waiting until the end of the investigation to resolve issues that affect those rights. Indonesia’s claims under paragraph 6 do not relate to particular outcomes, they relate to the procedures laid down in paragraph 6 to protect exporters that must be followed before information can be rejected. Indonesia’s claims also concern the failure to provide an opportunity to rectify defects in submitted information. (d)

Korea's failure to make a fair comparison between normal value and export price by adjusting for selling expenses was inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the Agreement

4.137 As the exporters noted in their 9 April letter to the KTC on this topic during the investigation, the sales in both markets are made to the same kinds of customers. What matters in this case is that the CMI re-sales involve additional expenses that are not incurred with respect to the export sales. In making a fair comparison, the crucial question is not where the analysis begins (the gross sales price in each market), but where it ends (the net, or ex factory, price at which the fair comparison will be made). At the end-point, the comparison must be at the same level of trade –the investigating authority must adjust for all differences between the gross prices in each market that affect the comparability of those prices. Otherwise, it will make an asymmetrical, unfair comparison of prices, as happened in this case. 4.138 The verified evidence establishes that CMI incurred expenses that were not incurred on the export sales. Accordingly, these expenses affect the price comparability of the CMI re-sale price and Indah Kiat’s re-sale price. The KTC’s failure to adjust for these expenses resulted in an unfair comparison, contrary to Article 2.4 of the Agreement. (e)

Korea's treatment of Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli, and Tjiwi Kimia as a single economic entity was inconsistent with Articles 6.10 and 9.3 of the Agreement

4.139 Korea has made clear that a decision to collapse cannot be based on a “potential for coordinated action” between affiliated exporters following the imposition of definitive dumping measures. This implies that any decision to collapse must be based on findings regarding actual coordinated action on pricing during the period of investigation above and beyond the existence of affiliations between exporters. 4.140 The KTC failed to disclose the legal standard it used to make its decision to collapse in this case. There is therefore no way for the Panel to determine what standard, if any, was applied by the KTC. The KTC’s stated grounds for its determination deal primarily with the presence of common shareholding and the presence of overlapping directors and commissioners in the three companies. The presence of common shareholding and a certain amount of overlap in the composition of the board of directors and commissioners is merely evidence of the "existence of affiliation", a fact that was never denied by the Sinar Mas Group companies. It does not establish the presence of collaboration and coordination of pricing policies in the domestic and export markets. In addition, the fact that all three affiliated companies produce the subject merchandise and that one of them sold marginal quantities of the subject merchandise to the others is basically irrelevant to the question of whether these firms act jointly in the domestic and export markets. Korea has not pointed to any evidence in the record that shows where the KTC examined the issue of coordination of prices, or asked the exporters for specific information on that topic. 4.141 Korea’s reference to the existence of a "single corporate marketing department" as evidence of "extensive coordination and oversight" is an inadmissible ex post justification and is incorrect as a matter of fact. Korea’s assertion that the companies' sales in Indonesia were closely coordinated through CMI is incorrect. The fact that the re-sales occurred through an affiliated reseller does not indicate that this reseller was in a position to control pricing decisions for the entire Group. CMI was

WT/DS312/R Page 30

not in a position to set centralised prices, because, in fact, the minimum prices to the customers were determined separately by each mill. 4.142 The KTC did not explain how it investigated or determined that the overlapping commissioners or non-executive directors actually were involved in managing and coordinating prices among the exporters. Korea’s arguments regarding Mr. Gupta’s role are also ex post and not supported by the facts. 4.143 Korea’s allegation that the Sinar Mas Group did not fully respond to questions regarding affiliation is also contrary to the record. Had the KTC analysed the actual pricing practices of the exporters, based on submitted and verified data before it, it would have found that the exporters charged different prices for sales of the same product to the same customers in the same market. 4.144 A finding of coordination of domestic market pricing alone would not suffice to “collapse” affiliated entities. This would not establish that the exporters could coordinate the export sales to avoid dumping duties, but would imply only that there is a potential to coordinate prices for export sales. (f)

Korea's determinations contain several violations of the disclosure obligations contained in Articles 6.4, 6.7, 6.9 and 12.2 of the Agreement

4.145 The KTC’s purported disclosure of the results of verification mentions only one issue and ignores all other aspects of the verification visit. Moreover, an oral briefing cannot satisfy the requirements of Article 6.7 or 6.9. Finally, the requirements of Article 6.7 cannot be fulfilled by disclosure of the essential facts under Article 6.9. 4.146 The actual calculation figures used in determining normal value and export prices are the "essential facts" on which a dumping margin calculation is based and must be disclosed under Article 6.9. 3.

Claims relating to the determination of injury and causal link

(a)

The KTC's treatment of PPC and WF Paper as "like products" was inconsistent with Articles 2.6, 3.1, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Agreement

4.147 Korea now perceives a duty to limit the "product under consideration" to "a single group of products sharing characteristics". Logic dictates also that there is a corresponding duty to limit the "like product" to a single group of products sharing characteristics and to conduct the injury analysis on that basis. 4.148 The investigating authority is under a duty not to conduct a single injury determination for unlike products arising from Articles 2.6 and 3; both of which have been identified by Indonesia in its panel request and submissions. 4.149 Korea admits the KTC did not assess whether PPC and WF are like products for which it is appropriate to conduct a single injury analysis. Korea does not refer to findings on the record regarding the likeness or unlikeness of PPC and WF. 4.150 Korea asserts only that PPC and WF “may be identical” and “can have the exact same” characteristics. The KTC’s failure to conduct any objective analysis if whether these products were alike renders its injury and causal link determinations inconsistent with Articles 3.1., 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 read with Article 2.6 of the Agreement.

WT/DS312/R Page 31

4.151 If the KTC had examined this issue, it would have had to conclude that PPC and WF are not like products. There are significant differences in how PPC and WF are manufactured. The fact that the Korean Paper Manufacturers Association could distinguish between these two products for the purpose of preparing statistics also shows that this distinction is not "unworkable". The KTC's determination that PPC and WF are "like products" is inconsistent with Article 2.6 of the Agreement and its injury determination therefore inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Agreement. (b)

Korea's failure to conduct its injury and causal link determinations in an objective manner and to base these determinations on positive evidence was inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Agreement

4.152 The KTC failed to make an objective analysis based on positive evidence of the price and volume effects of the imports under investigation. The KTC appears to have omitted a significant portion of the domestic market from its analysis, artificially inflating the market share of the imports under investigation and deflating the market share of the domestic industry. The KTC also miscalculated the trends in market shares for the first half of 2003, in which the imports under investigation declined. The corrected figures provided by Indonesia indicate that the imports under investigation were losing market share, and that the major increase in that period came from imports from other sources. Because of these methodological errors, the KTC’s consideration of the volume effects of the imports under investigation was not based on an objective examination or positive evidence. Regarding the price effects, the KTC’s analysis does not properly address the trends in import and domestic prices. 4.153 The KTC’s failure to refer the concepts of significant price undercutting, significant price depression, or preventing price increases to a significant degree from the final determination of the KTC itself suggests that the KTC did not properly consider these matters. Korea’s admission that the evidence regarding price undercutting showed a “mixed picture” also indicates that the KTC did not appear to attach any meaning to the use of the word “significant” four times in Article 3.2. 4.154 The KTC improperly failed to conduct a proper examination of the injury factors listed in Article 3.4. This obligation lies on the investigating authority in every instance and is not limited by the arguments raised by the exporters. WTO panels have repeatedly made it clear that this obligation is not satisfied by collecting data, reciting it in a determination, and reached a conclusion, but that it requires the analysis of data through placing it in the context of the particular evolution of the data pertaining to each factor individually, as well as in relation to the other factors examined. 4.155 The KTC’s injury findings consist of roughly one and a half pages of recitals of data for various factors. The only analysis of these data is to indicate whether the figures went up or down from one period to the next. While the KTC’s final staff report contains the data recited by the KTC in its injury determination, it does not contain any additional analysis. The KTC’s recital of data is followed by a one-sentence conclusion. None of this determination satisfies the standards required under Article 3.4. While Indonesia has explained how the KTC’s evaluation of several specific Article 3.4 factors was flawed, Indonesia’s claims under Article 3.1 and 3.4 relate not just to those factors, but to the KTC’s Article 3.4 analysis in toto. 4.156 Korea’s arguments with respect to specific factors are flawed. The Bank of Korea data shows positive trends for the companies within the Korean paper industry, and there is no evidence that the KTC took these trends into account. Korea misstates Indonesia’s argument that the KTC failed to properly analyse data relating to wages, productivity and employment. In fact, there is no analysis or attempt to provide context for these data in the KTC’s injury finding, which merely recites the statistics on employment (but not wages or productivity). The KTC’s failure to use the evidence regarding wages and productivity to place the decline in employment in its proper context further illustrates how the KTC failed to properly evaluate these data. Korea’s explanation regarding the

WT/DS312/R Page 32

impact of non-dumped imports ignores the fact that the data shows that the other imports increased their market share most dramatically at the time at which the imports under investigation were falling (first half 2003) and that this increase in other imports’ market share appears to have come at the expense of the domestic industry and to have coincided with that industry’s fall in operating profits. Korea suggests that the large investment in facilities by the domestic industry was for non-subject production. This ex post explanation suggests there were errors either in the domestic industry’s data or the KTC’s analysis. 4.157 Korea has not explained the KTC’s causation and non-attribution analysis. However, the KTC is under an obligation to conduct this analysis in every case. The KTC’s failure to properly conduct this analysis in this case rendered its determination inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the Agreement. 4.158 It is not clear whether the KTC excluded all of the domestic producers that imported the products under investigation. The KTC’s treatment of domestic producers excluded from the definition of the domestic industry also resulted in the overstatement of the market share of the imports under investigation. 4.159 The KTC should have evaluated whether imports by the Korean industry were related to a shift by the Korean industry from producing the products under investigation to producing other higher value added products. The KTC accepted that the Korean industry’s own imports accounted for approximately half of the total Indonesian exports. The KTC should have accounted for the domestic industry’s own imports by excluding that quantity of imports from its injury analysis in order to ensure a consistent and symmetrical analysis. (c)

Korea's injury determinations contain several violations of the disclosure obligations contained in Articles 6.1, 6.4 and 6.9 of the Agreement

4.160 The KTC improperly failed to disclose the results of the consumer surveys undertaken by the KTC and the product tests performed by the Korean Agency for Technology and Standards. Korea has not explained why these test results were inherently confidential and why the results could not have been disclosed in a manner that would maintain due regard of any interests of other parties in preserving confidentiality. 4.161 Korea states that the KTC provided injury data for the first half of 2003 at the public hearing held on 27 August 2003. To the best of Indonesia's knowledge, no such information was provided to the representatives of the Sinar Mas Group present at that meeting. 4.162 Korea assumes that there is no requirement to require that good cause be shown for the treatment of confidential information that is "by nature confidential". Article 6.5 of the Agreement mandates a showing of good cause in all situations. The KTC's failure to insist on this requirement constitutes a violation of Article 6.5 of the Agreement. 4.163 Indonesia identified specific deficiencies in the non-confidential version of the application in paragraph 205 of its first submission. Korea has not responded to a single one of those allegations. The KTC made defective disclosure of "normal values, export prices and dumping margins for Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli, and Tjiwi Kimia", "the basis for the Domestic Industry's request for cumulation of imports from Indonesia and China" and " the price effects of imported products". 4.164 Indonesia requests the Panel to find that in imposing its anti-dumping measure against certain paper products from Indonesia, Korea acted inconsistently with its obligations under provisions of the Agreement listed in paragraph 207 of Indonesia’s first written submission.

WT/DS312/R Page 33

4.165 Indonesia also requests that for the reasons explained in paragraphs 210-211 of its first written submission, the Panel exercise its discretion under Article 19.1 of the DSU to suggest ways in which Korea could implement the Panel's rulings and recommendations by suggesting that Korea repeal Regulation No. 330 of the Ministry of Finance and Economy dated 7 November 2003 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of certain paper products from Indonesia. F.

SECOND WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF KOREA

4.166

The following summarises Korea's arguments in its second submission.

1.

The composition of Indonesia’s delegation

4.167 Article 18.2 of the DSU and paragraph 3 of the Panel’s Working Procedures require a WTO Member participating in a dispute settlement proceeding to “treat as confidential information submitted by another Member ... which that Member has designated as confidential.” These provisions plainly prohibit WTO Members from disclosing to company officials any submissions that have been “designated as confidential” by the WTO Member that submitted them. 4.168 Korea’s first written submission in this proceeding was designated by Korea as confidential. Nevertheless, Indonesia included employees of the Sinar Mas Group in its delegation for the first meeting of the Panel, and gave those employees access to documents prepared based on confidential information in Korea’s confidential submissions. 4.169 Under Article 6.5 of the Agreement, Korea is required to maintain the confidentiality of information that was submitted to the KTC in confidence by the parties to the antidumping investigation. However, the participation of company officials in Indonesia’s delegation necessarily meant that any attempt by Korea to address confidential information in its submissions to the Panel would result in the improper disclosure of that information. Korea has, therefore, continued to object to the participation of company employees in Indonesia’s delegation. 4.170 A few days before the deadline for the most recent submissions to the Panel, Indonesia informed the Panel that its delegation for the second meeting of the Panel would include only government officials and legal advisors. Although Indonesia’s letter did not fully satisfy Korea’s concerns, especially with respect to previous submissions that Korea had designated as confidential, Korea decided to provide the full confidential version of its submissions to Indonesia, subject to the understanding that these submissions would not be disclosed by Indonesia to anyone other than the relevant Indonesian government officials and to legal advisors of Indonesia who agreed to maintain the confidentiality of information provided to them. 4.171 Nevertheless, Korea wishes to re-emphasize the importance of strict adherence to the confidentiality obligations of Article 18.2 of the DSU, which are critical to the functioning of the WTO dispute settlement system. Great care should, therefore, be taken to prevent actions, such as the inclusion of company officials in proceedings in which information designated as confidential will be discussed, that would tend to compromise the confidentiality obligations. 2.

Dumping calculation issues

(a)

Treatment of Sinar Mas Group Mills as a Single Entity

4.172 In its first written submission, Indonesia asserted that Korea was required to define the terms “exporter” and “producer” for purposes of Article 6.10 of the Agreement based on the provisions of Indonesia’s municipal corporate law, which would treat each corporation as a legally-distinct entity. However, in its statements during the first Panel meeting, Indonesia appears to have retreated from that position. It appears that Indonesia now concedes that an investigating authority may treat

WT/DS312/R Page 34

separate corporations as a single entity in appropriate circumstances, and that the separate corporate form is simply a “relevant” factor. 4.173 However, disagreement still remains concerning the standard for determining the relevant facts. Indonesia would require explicit evidence of coordination on specific export transactions. Korea, instead, would allow the investigating authorities to make reasonable inferences from the totality of the circumstances, even when overt evidence of a collaboration has not been found. In Korea’s view, the totality of the evidence in this case plainly justified the conclusion that the Sinar Mas Group mills were not acting independently. Even if this did not identify specific instances of coordination of activities in export markets, it did provide a reasonable basis for the KTC to infer such coordination. (b)

Facts Available for Tjiwi Kimia

4.174 Indonesia contends that, before the KTC could resort to “less favourable” facts available for Tjiwi Kimia’s export price and normal value, the KTC was required to “cooperate” with the Sinar Mas Group by providing an additional opportunity to submit the Tjiwi Kimia data. Indonesia fails to recognize, however, that the Sinar Mas Group’s refusal to provide information precluded cooperation from the KTC. 4.175 When the KTC first issued its questionnaires, the Sinar Mas Group did not attempt to discuss with the KTC whether the information requested from Tjiwi Kimia was actually “necessary.” The Sinar Mas Group did not consult with the KTC about possible steps to reduce the burdens of compiling the Tjiwi Kimia information. Instead, the Sinar Mas Group unilaterally made the decision to withhold the Tjiwi Kimia information without consulting the KTC at all — before it had given the KTC any description of the Sinar Mas Group or of the relationship among its mills. 4.176 The provisions of Article 6.8 are absolutely clear. When an interested party “refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the investigation,” the investigating authorities may apply facts available. It is clear that the Sinar Mas Group refused to provide necessary information, and it is clear that this refusal “impeded” the KTC’s ability to complete its analysis. In such circumstances, the KTC’s decision to use “facts available” was authorized under the Agreement and, in fact, entirely appropriate. 4.177 As a separate matter, Indonesia claims that the KTC was required to “corroborate” the information it used as facts available for Tjiwi Kimia. But these arguments are also misplaced. The information in the application, which the KTC used as “facts available” for Tjiwi Kimia, came entirely from independent and reliable sources. Once the KTC confirmed that this data accurately reflected the information from those independent and reliable sources, any corroboration requirements under paragraph 7 of Annex II were necessarily satisfied. 4.178 Moreover, although no further corroboration of this data was necessary under the applicable provisions of the Agreement, the KTC actually did take further steps to corroborate the information on export prices and normal values that had been submitted in the application. The KTC’s reliance on this information was, therefore, entirely consistent with the requirements of Paragraph 7 of Annex II. (c)

Facts Available for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli

(i)

Rejection of Submitted CMI Sales Data

4.179 As explained previously, the Sinar Mas Group refused to allow the KTC access to the financial statements and accounting records of CMI. The KTC concluded that, without access to the CMI financial statements and accounting records, it could not verify the completeness of the reported

WT/DS312/R Page 35

domestic sales. The KTC therefore decided to base the normal value for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli on a constructed normal value, as “facts available.” 4.180 Indonesia asserts that the completeness of the reported sales could have been verified through the other documentation that the Sinar Mas Group agreed to make available at verification. That argument is, however, based on a fundamental misconception of the nature of the verification process. 4.181 In verifying the “completeness” of submitted sales files, the investigating authorities are trying to “prove a negative” — that there were no reportable transactions that were incorrectly omitted from the sales listing. Because certainty can never be achieved, the goal of the verification is to reduce the risk of inaccuracy to a reasonable level. Verification therefore involves a variety of “completeness” tests intended to achieve a sufficient “level of comfort” with the submitted data. 4.182 As noted in Korea’s first submission, the reconciliation of the reported sales to the selling company’s accounting records and financial statements “lays the foundation” for any other completeness tests, and also serves to establish the validity of the documents presented at verification. The Sinar Mas Group’s refusal to allow that reconciliation, therefore, seriously impeded the verification process. It also undermined whatever confidence the KTC may have had in the submitted data. As an accountant with extensive experience in auditing and verification processes has explained: [T]he mere fact that the Reseller refused to allow access to its financial statements would have raised serious questions about the accuracy of its information.... The fact that the Reseller objected to disclosure of its financial statement after it had agreed to disclose its detailed customer and pricing information would strongly suggest that the Reseller was hiding something, and that there was some inconsistency between the information in the financial statements and the information already provided in the sales listing. In these circumstances, the other tests the Sinar Mas Group allowed the KTC to perform could not replace the reconciliation to the financial statements, because they did not allow the KTC to achieve the necessary level of confidence in the completeness of the submitted CMI data. 4.183 There also is no merit to Indonesia’s claims that the completeness of the reported CMI sales data had been verified once the completeness of the mills’ sales to CMI had been established. Contrary to Indonesia’s assertions, the Sinar Mas Group actually admitted that there was not a one-toone correspondence between the sales from the mills to CMI and the sales from CMI to its customers over the course of the entire investigation period, due to differences in “timing.” Instead, there was a discrepancy of roughly [[**]]49 tons. Consequently, the verification of the total quantity of the mills’ sales to CMI did not establish the total quantity of CMI’s sales to its customers. 4.184 Furthermore even if the total quantity of CMI’s sales had been established, questions about the reported prices would have remained. Without access to CMI’s accounting records, there was no way for the KTC to confirm that the invoices presented to it at verification to support the reported sales prices actually matched the invoices that were recorded in CMI’s accounting records. In addition, without a reconciliation to CMI’s financial statement, there was no basis to conclude that there were no unreported discounts, rebates, billing adjustments or additional charges by CMI. 4.185 Indonesia has claimed that, when faced with the Sinar Mas Group’s refusal to submit the requested information, the KTC was required to try to “cooperate” with the Sinar Mas Group to help it overcome these “difficulties.” Indonesia thus attempts to invoke the provisions of Article 6.13 of the Agreement, and, more specifically, the Appellate Body’s decision in Hot-Rolled Steel Products 49

Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential.

WT/DS312/R Page 36

from Japan (in which the Appellate Body overturned a finding that a respondent that was unable to obtain information from an affiliate had been “uncooperative”). 4.186 There is, however, simply no parallel between the Hot-Rolled Steel case and the present case. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the Sinar Mas Group was unable to obtain information from CMI. Any doubt about the Sinar Mas Group’s ability to obtain the necessary information was removed when the Sinar Mas Group submitted purported CMI income statements only a few days after the verification, after it realized what the consequences of its non-cooperation would be. The Sinar Mas Group’s argument that it could not persuade CMI to allow access to its financial statements and accounting records is nothing more than a cynical attempt to exploit the Appellate Body’s ruling in Hot-Rolled Steel. 4.187 Finally, Indonesia claims that the problems caused by the Sinar Mas Group’s refusal to allow the KTC access to the CMI financial statements and accounting records at verification were cured when the Sinar Mas Group subsequently submitted two worksheets purporting to represent CMI’s income statements. A review of the Sinar Mas Group’s submission makes clear, however, that this submission was intended to address a different issue, and not to establish the completeness of the reported sales. At no point during the proceedings before the KTC did the Sinar Mas Group argue that the completeness of the submitted CMI sales data had been verified during the verification or by the subsequent submission of the purported income statements. Instead, that argument was first raised by Indonesia, in its first submission to this Panel. 4.188 In any event, Indonesia’s post-hoc efforts to resurrect the submitted sales data are unpersuasive. Because the purported income statements were only submitted after verification, they could not have been used to verify the reported sales data at verification. The Sinar Mas Group never submitted the worksheets and supporting accounting records that would be needed to reconcile the reported sales data to the purported income statements. Furthermore, the KTC had no basis for assessing whether the purported income statements, which were not audited, were nonetheless accurate and reliable. By the time the Sinar Mas Group finally submitted those statements, it was too late to verify them, because the verification was already finished. (ii)

Inclusion of Amount Representing CMI’s SG&A Expenses in the Calculation of Constructed Value

4.189 In its first submission, Indonesia objected to the inclusion of an amount representing CMI’s SG&A and financial expenses in the calculation of the constructed normal value. During the first meeting of the Panel, however, Indonesia clarified that it did not object to the inclusion of some amount for CMI’s SG&A and financial expenses. Instead, it now objects only to the particular amounts used by the KTC. 4.190 According to Indonesia’s oral statement, the SG&A and interest expense figures used by the KTC (which were derived from verified information from the unrelated Indonesian respondent [[Company A]]50) were incorrect because the purported CMI “income statements” submitted by the Sinar Mas Group after verification presented a better source for the relevant expenses. In addition, Indonesia also argued that the [[Company A]]51 expenses used by the KTC as “facts available” double-counted “manufacturing related expenses.” These claims are, however, without merit. 4.191 First, as discussed above, the purported CMI “income statements” were unreliable and unverifiable. Because they were unaudited, the KTC could not rely on an auditor’s opinion as the basis for an assumption that they were accurate. And, because the KTC only received those

50 51

Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. Ibid.

WT/DS312/R Page 37

statements after the verification, it had no way to conduct its own verification to determine whether the figures presented in those statements were correct. 4.192 Second, the [[Company A]]52 SG&A expenses that the KTC used in place of the CMI expenses did not, in fact, reflect the overall [[Company A]]53 SG&A expenses. Instead, the KTC used the much lower SG&A expense rate derived from a worksheet [[Company A]]54 had submitted identifying the selling and sales-related administrative expenses for sales of the subject merchandise. 4.193 Finally, Indonesia’s suggestion that the SG&A and interest expense figures used by the KTC double-counted manufacturing-related expenses reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of SG&A and interest expenses. SG&A expenses relate either to selling activities (if they are selling expenses) or to overall company activities (if they are G&A expenses). There is no direct correlation of these expenses with a company’s manufacturing activities (or lack thereof). 4.194 In Korea’s view, it would have been reasonable for the KTC to use the overall [[Company A]]55 SG&A expenses as the basis for its calculation of the “facts available” SG&A expenses for a company operating at the level of CMI. Nevertheless, the KTC did not do so. Instead, it based its calculations on the selling and sales-related administration expenses incurred by [[Company A]]56, without including the overall G&A expenses of the affiliated company that manufactured the subject merchandise. This calculation almost certainly understated the applicable G&A expenses. Consequently, there is no basis for Indonesia’s complaints. (iii)

Adjustment for Differences in Level of Trade

4.195 Indonesia argues that an adjustment should have been made for the differences between the level of trade for the mill’s exports to Korea and the level of trade for the CMI resales. Indonesia also claims that, if a level-of-trade adjustment was not required, an adjustment would still have been required because the involvement of CMI in the domestic-market sales constituted a difference affecting “price comparability.” These arguments are, however, fundamentally flawed. 4.196 Indonesia’s request for a level-of-trade adjustment is flatly inconsistent with the Sinar Mas Group’s repeated statements during the investigation that the relevant sales in both markets were at the same level of trade. Consequently, the KTC’s decision not to make a level-of-trade adjustment must be upheld — in accordance with Article 17.5 of the Agreement, which directs the Panel to base its review upon “the facts made available in conformity with appropriate domestic procedures to the authorities of the importing Member.” 4.197 Furthermore, Indonesia’s claim that CMI’s involvement resulted in additional expenses is wholly unsubstantiated. As Korea has explained previously, the involvement of CMI in the domesticmarket sales might just have meant that the mills had to bear expenses on their export sales that they did not bear on their domestic sales (because CMI was already bearing them on the domestic sales). To the extent that CMI’s involvement just reflected a shifting of expenses from the mills to CMI on domestic sales, CMI’s involvement would not have resulted in any additional expenses — and thus would not have had any impact on price comparability.

52

Ibid. Ibid. 54 Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 53

WT/DS312/R Page 38

(d)

Continuation of Investigation after Preliminary Determination

4.198 In its first written submission, Indonesia claimed that Korea was required, under Article 5.8 of the Agreement, to terminate the antidumping investigation immediately with respect to Indah Kiat once the KTC made its preliminary determination that Indah Kiat had de minimis dumping margins. But this argument ignores the fact that the KTC never indicated that it was “satisfied” that the Sinar Mas Group mills were not dumping. 4.199 The KTC’s preliminary determination specifically noted that it was reviewing certain aspects of its preliminary calculations — in particular, its decision to calculate separate dumping margins for Indah Kiat , Pindo Deli and Tjiwi Kimia. Consequently, it is clear that the KTC was not “satisfied” that there was no dumping at the time it made its preliminary decision. Thus, Article 5.8, which requires termination only when the investigating authorities are “satisfied” that there is not sufficient evidence of dumping, is inapplicable. 4.200 Furthermore, contrary to Indonesia’s claims, the KTC did not impose antidumping duties on Indah Kiat after making a preliminary determination that Indah Kiat had de minimis dumping margins. Instead, the KTC’s final determination imposed antidumping duties on the single entity comprised of Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli and Tjiwi Kimia. The KTC had never determined that this single entity had de minimis dumping margins. In short, there never was a preliminary determination of de minimis dumping margins for the entity that was the subject of the KTC’s final determination. (e)

Disclosure of Verification “Results”

4.201 Indonesia has asserted that the KTC’s failure to disclose its internal verification report was inconsistent with the requirements of Article 6.7. In this regard, Indonesia claims that the disclosure of “results” required by Article 6.7 calls for more extensive detail than the disclosure of “essential facts” under Article 6.9. 4.202 That interpretation cannot, however, be reconciled with the ordinary meaning of the language of the Agreement. Article 6.7 clearly envisions that disclosure of the verification results as part of the “essential facts” under Article 6.9 is sufficient. It states explicitly that the investigating authorities “shall make the results of any such [on-the-spot] investigations available, or shall provide disclosure thereof pursuant to paragraph 9.” 4.203 As a separate matter, Article 6.7 does not, by its terms, require disclosure of a detailed report, or a step-by-step recitation of the process followed, or a full accounting of all documents examined. Instead, it only requires the disclosure of the “results” of verification. The use of the term “results” indicates that the investigating authorities must disclose their conclusions they drew from the verification — not the steps that led to those conclusions. 4.204 In this case, the KTC’s disclosure was sufficient to inform the Sinar Mas Group of the “results’ of verification and of all other “essential facts.” Indonesia’s claim must therefore be dismissed. 3.

Injury issues

(a)

Like product

4.205 As explained in Korea’s first submission, the KTC defined the “product” under investigation in this case to include all wood-free paper meeting the definition set forth in the application. Then, in accordance with Article 2.6 of the Agreement, the KTC identified the most similar products produced by the Korean industry as the “like product.”

WT/DS312/R Page 39

4.206 Indonesia has argued that the KTC should have considered “whether the product under consideration contained more than one ‘like product.’” That argument, however, is inconsistent with the definition of “like product” in Article 2.6, which indicates that the “like product” flows directly from the definition of the “product under consideration.” Since Indonesia has not challenged the KTC’s definition of the “product” under consideration, it has no basis for objecting to the definition of the “like product” flowing from the definition of the “product” under consideration. 4.207 Furthermore, even if the definition of the “product” under consideration had been raised, the KTC’s determination would have to be upheld. No evidence was presented to the KTC to support Indonesia’s claim that the uncoated wood-free paper category included two “products” within the meaning of the Agreement. The Indonesian producers submitted only broad conclusory statements that there were differences in physical characteristics, end uses, substitutability, prices, market sectors, HTS classifications, and production processes. They did not identify what the differences were, and they did not provide any evidence to support their claims. 4.208 By contrast, the applicants did address the substantial overlaps between “plain paper copier” paper and other categories of “uncoated wood-free paper” in their application. Since the information submitted by the applicants was uncontested, there would have been no basis for an unbiased and objective investigating authority to find that the two categories proposed by the Sinar Mas Group constituted separate products. (b)

Dumped import volumes

4.209 Indonesia’s arguments have focused on statistics that apparently show a 15.3 per cent decrease in the volume of dumped imports in the first half of 2003. But, a closer review reveals that this apparent “decrease” did not actually reflect a fall in imports. The imports during the first half of 2003 totalled 88,774 tons — which corresponded to an annual rate of 177,548 tons. This annual rate was actually higher than the annual rate of imports in any previous year, including the previous record year of 2002 (when dumped imports totalled 176,522 tons). Thus, in absolute terms, the dumped imports were increasing. 4.210 Furthermore, the evidence showed that, in relative terms, the dumped imports in the first half of 2003 had an even higher market share than in any previous year. The KTC decided to base its analysis of import trends during the first half of 2003 on this evidence of increases relative to consumption. 4.211 In this regard, the KTC’s decision to focus on relative market shares was entirely consistent with Article 3.2 of the Agreement, which specifically provides that “[w]ith regard to the volume of the dumped imports, the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the importing Member.” Since the evidence demonstrated that the dumped imports had increased “relative to production or consumption,” the KTC properly relied on that evidence to support its finding of a significant increase in dumped imports. (c)

Adverse price effects of dumped imports

4.212 Indonesia contends that a finding of price undercutting was logically impossible in this case, in view of data showing that, in some years, the average prices for sales of the dumped imports were higher than the average prices for the domestic industry’s sales. But, even if there had been no “price undercutting,” that would not mean that the dumped imports had not “otherwise depress[ed] prices to a significant degree or prevent[ed] price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree.”

WT/DS312/R Page 40

4.213 In this case, the KTC found that the evidence demonstrated that the dumped imports had both depressed prices and prevented price increases: The KTC’s determination of price depression was based on the evidence that the overall decrease in the domestic industry’s prices from 2000 to 2003 was correlated to the consistent fall in the prices for dumped imports over that period. Its determination of price suppression was based on evidence that, as a result of the competition with dumped imports, the domestic industry had been unable to achieve prices that would have enabled them to earn a reasonable level of operating income. 4.214 In short, the evidence was overwhelming that, as the dumped imports increased their market share at ever lower prices, the Korean industry had suffered falling prices that resulted in meagre “operating” profits at best, and consistent losses after taking other ordinary expenses into account. The KTC’s finding of price depression and suppression was entirely consistent with this evidence. (d)

Factors relevant to material injury determination

4.215 Indonesia also claims that the KTC failed “to properly consider all injury factors” described in Article 3.4 of the Agreement. However, Indonesia has not identified a single relevant factor that the KTC ignored. To the contrary, Indonesia has specifically conceded that the KTC actually did examine all of the factors identified in Article 3.4. 4.216 Indonesia also argues that the KTC’s evaluation of those factors should have led to a different conclusion. But there was no evidence of any positive trends for the Korean industry. It faced declining market share, production and prices. And, despite shedding employees at an alarming rate, it remained unprofitable throughout the period. The KTC’s determination that the Korean industry was experiencing material injury was, therefore, entirely consistent with the available evidence. (e)

Causal link between imports and injury

4.217 Indonesia asserts that the KTC should have attributed the injury the Korean industry experienced to other causes. But, the KTC did examine all other factors which it thought might be suspected of causing the injury to the Korean industry. It found that none of these had been a cause of the injury the KTC observed. 4.218 In its submissions, Indonesia has attempted to poke holes in the KTC’s analysis of specific factors. But, the examples identified by Indonesia are unpersuasive. To the contrary, the evidence showed that the dumped imports increased their market share in every single year, at constantly decreasing prices. As a result, the domestic industry was unable to raise its prices to profitable levels, despite massive cuts in employment. No other factor was to blame for the injury caused by the dumped imports. (f)

Imports by Korean producers that were not part of the domestic industry

4.219 Indonesia asserts that the KTC was required to consider the portion of the dumped imports accounted for by the Korean producers that were excluded from the domestic industry as an “alternative cause” of injury. But, Indonesia has not pointed to any provision of the Agreement that would define imports of the dumped products from the countries under investigation as an “alternative” cause of injury. 4.220 The only provision addressing imports by domestic producers is Article 4.1, which permits the investigating authorities to exclude importing producers from the definition of the “domestic industry.” There is nothing in Article 4.1 or in any other provision of the Agreement that permits an investigating authority to classify imports at dumped prices of the product under consideration from the countries under investigation as anything other than “dumped imports.”

WT/DS312/R Page 41

4.

Conclusion

4.221 It is apparently easy for an exporter like the Sinar Mas Group to criticize an investigating authority after the fact for failing to decide the case in the way the exporter would have liked, based on arguments that were never even presented to the investigators. But the evidence shows that KTC and its staff conducted this investigation in accordance with the highest standards of professionalism. It adhered to procedures designed to allowed all parties to participate and defend their interests fully. Its decisions reflected an objective and unbiased assessment of the facts, under entirely reasonable interpretations of the relevant legal principles. G.

SECOND ORAL STATEMENTS OF INDONESIA

4.222

The following summarises Indonesia's arguments in its second oral statements.

1.

Opening Statement of Indonesia at the Second Meeting of the Panel

(a)

Issues relating to the determination of dumping

(i)

Use of FactsAvailable For Indah Kiat And Pindo Deli

4.223 Korea continues to take the position that the investigating authority is entitled to have what is, in effect, a zero tolerance policy for any inability by an exporter to provide requested information. This is contrary to the entire scheme of Article 6.8 and Annex II governing the steps that must be taken by an investigating authority before rejecting submitted information. The investigating authority cannot rigidly adhere to deadlines without considering whether it would be possible to accept information submitted after the deadline. Here, the KTC made no such effort. The investigating authority must take into account difficulties faced by an exporter in deciding how to proceed under Article 6.8. This requires some cooperative interaction with the exporters. Here, the KTC did not do so. (ii)

Rejection of the Domestic Sales Data

4.224 Korea submitted an affidavit of Mr. Ki-Seok You, a Korean accountant that has represented Korean companies, including the paper industry involved in this case, in anti-dumping investigations. In response to Mr. You’s affidavit, Indonesia submits as Exhibit IDN-57 an affidavit by Mr. Albert Hayes, a former US Department of Commerce investigator with extensive experience in conducting USDOC anti-dumping verifications around the world, who has previously testified in WTO dispute settlement proceedings. Mr. Hayes’ opinion is that the CMI re-sales data would be verifiable even without the CMI financial statement. 4.225 Mr. You actually supports Indonesia’s position. Mr. You acknowledges that it is possible that an investigating authority could have "considered the Reseller’s sales data to be verified in the circumstances I have described." It follows from this that the domestic sales information was, at a minimum, verifiable by the KTC within the meaning of paragraph 3. 4.226 Korea argues that it would have had to have access to CMI’s inventory records in order to see that there was a one-to-one correspondence for all sales. But it is undisputed that CMI never took possession of the goods and therefore had no inventory and no reason to have inventory records. Korea also suggests that the fact that the databases of re-sales by CMI contained slightly more sales than the databases of sales by the exporters to CMI undermines Indonesia’s position. Contrary to Korea's argument, this re-affirms Indonesia’s arguments. In its verification plan, the KTC asked the Indonesian exporters to explain why there were slight differences between the quantities in the two sets of databases. This indicates that the KTC expected these two databases to match and that it

WT/DS312/R Page 42

considered that the "total pool of reportable sales" was defined by the sales by the exporters to CMI. The KTC apparently accepted the explanations provided by the exporters. 4.227 Korea does not directly contradict Indonesia’s evidence that it was provided access to CMI’s accounting records during the verification, stating only that the relevant KTC officials "are unable to reconcile [Ms. Lim’s] statement to their experience or to the documents provided to them." Korea argues that the list of exhibits presented to the KTC officials during the verification and provided to the Panel as Exhibit IDN-20 contains no reference to CMI ledgers. However, Ms. Lim’s evidence was that she provided the KTC officials with access to computerised, not hard copy, sales records. Second, Korea argues that Ms. Lim’s affidavit "does not indicate that the KTC was allowed access to CMI’s accounting records." That this is incorrect is confirmed by Ms. Lim's further affidavit (Exhibit IDN-60). 4.228 Korea's position that the CMI financial statements were necessary to test "completeness" of the submitted domestic sales is inconsistent with its actions. In its verification plan, under the heading of "completeness", the KTC requested the submission of a reconciliation between the Indah Kiat/Pindo Deli financial statements and the submitted mills sales data as well as several reconciling items. In contrast, there was no express request to submit a reconciliation between the CMI financial statements and the submitted resales data. From the conduct of the KTC prior to and subsequent to the verification it is clear that the KTC did not request the submission of any sort of prior reconciliation to the CMI financial statements in its verification plan. (iii)

Rejection of the CMI Financial Statements

4.229 Korea has not explained why it considered the submission of the CMI financial statements on 9 April 2003 not to have been made within a reasonable period of time. Korea has argued that it could not use these financial statements because they were not verifiable, in that they were submitted after verification and were not supported by accompanying worksheets. However, it appears that the KTC was verifying information submitted by the domestic industry as late as August 2003 – four months after the CMI data was deemed unverifiable. An unbiased and objective investigating authority cannot consistently reject information provided by the exporters as untimely and unverifiable while continuing to collect and verify information from the domestic industry for a further three to four months. Likewise, Korea’s objections to the format of the CMI financial statements are undermined by the fact that the income statements of [[**]] and [[**]]57 are in essentially the same spreadsheet format as those of CMI. (iv)

Calculation of SG&A and Interest Expenses of CMI

4.230 Regarding interest expenses, Indonesia’s position is that the KTC should have used the actual submitted CMI data. Korea claims that the KTC used for these expenses "an additional amount for the interest expenses of a company operating at the same level of CMI." This, presumably, also refers to [[**]]58. However, Exhibit KOR-54 reveals that [[**]]59, like CMI, had no interest expenses, but instead had small amounts of interest income. Instead, the KTC used the interest expenses of [[**]]60 – a manufacturing company not operating at the same level as CMI – as the basis for the interest expenses of CMI. This is not what Korea claims the KTC did. It is also not what the KTC should have done. As Indonesia has explained, a production company such as [[**]]61 necessarily incurs significant interest expenses solely related to the manufacturing function. There is no reasonable basis to attribute interest expenses of this nature to a company operating at CMI’s level that, in 57

Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 58

WT/DS312/R Page 43

Korea’s words, incurs only selling and sales-related administrative expenses. Korea attempts to rebut Indonesia’s argument that CMI could not have incurred financing expenses to finance its accounts receivable by saying that CMI’s payment practices were not verified. This is incorrect. The KTC verified CMI’s payment terms for 24 different sales without finding any discrepancies. (v)

Use of Facts Available for Tjiwi Kimia

4.231 The KTC’s decision to use data from the application to calculate the normal values and export prices for Tjiwi Kimia cannot be reconciled with the requirements of paragraph 7 of Annex II. The steps allegedly taken by the KTC were plainly inadequate to discharge the duty imposed on the KTC. Korea’s justifications provide no valid grounds for a reasonable investigating authority to (1) rely on secondary data which has been directly contradicted by its own findings, and, (2) assume that a single exporter with an insignificant quantity of export sales has dumping margins far in excess of all other investigated producers. 4.232 The KTC also failed to comply with its duty to provide the single economic entity of Sinar Mas companies with any opportunity to submit data regarding the portion of its sales accounted for by Tjiwi Kimia. Korea now argues that the term "explanation" does not encompass "a second chance to submit new information." However, the ordinary meaning of the term "explanation" encompasses the action of providing further details. Accordingly, paragraph 6 has consistently been interpreted to refer to an opportunity to provide additional evidentiary information, and not simply argument, to explain deficiencies in previously-submitted data. Korea's interpretation would risk rendering paragraph 6 of Annex II largely inutile. (vi)

Fair Comparison

4.233 Korea argues that CMI’s involvement just reflected a shifting of expenses from the mills to CMI that would not have resulted in any additional expenses. And yet, as noted, the KTC considered that CMI incurred roughly double the amount of SG&A and interest expenses as the producers and exporters Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. Korea’s argument that these massive additional expenses do not affect price comparability between the domestic and export markets is at odds with the KTC’s actions and logic. (vii)

Collapsing the Three Exporters to a Single Entity

4.234 Korea appears to acknowledge that price decision-making in both markets is the appropriate standard. While it is not clear whether it was actually used by the KTC, this standard at least has the advantage of focusing on the essential issue – pricing in each market – and requiring a showing that the exporters actually or in fact acted as a single entity with respect to those pricing activities. 4.235 From the nature of the grounds used by the KTC, it must be concluded that the KTC did not consider price coordination to be a necessary condition for collapsing legally distinct entities and also failed to make any determination that there was price coordination between the different Sinar Mas companies. For this reason, the KTC cannot be considered to have articulated or followed a standard for collapsing that is consistent with Articles 6.10 and 9.3 of the Agreement. Moreover, no unbiased and objective authority could have concluded from the evidence on record that Pindo Deli, Indah Kiat and Tjiwi Kimia coordinated the prices of their domestic and export sales. (b)

Issues relating to the determination of injury and causation

(i)

Like Product

4.236 Indonesia has explained that an injury and causal link determination based on unlike products would be inconsistent with Articles 2.6 and 3 of the Agreement. Accordingly, there is an obligation

WT/DS312/R Page 44

on the investigating authority to ensure that its injury determinations are based on "like" products. Nothing in Korea’s second submission rebuts this obligation. In addition, Korea has impliedly acknowledged that there must be internal consistency within the product under consideration. It would follow then that there must be internal consistency in the like product. The fact that the Agreement does not expressly define the "product under consideration" does not absolve the investigating authority of its duty to define the "like product" under Article 2.6 as one that is alike the product under investigation in all respects and to conduct injury determinations under Article 3 for "like products," in the plural, so defined. 4.237 It is apparent that the KTC did not make any findings on the issue of whether PPC and WF were sufficiently similar to warrant the conduct of an aggregate injury determination. While Korea refers to evidence submitted by an interested party regarding this issue, the presence of evidence on the record is, of course, not the same thing as a finding by the investigating authority regarding that evidence. Accordingly, the Panel must conclude that the KTC did not compare PPC and WF and made no findings regarding the similarities or difference between PPC and WF. (ii)

The Injury Analysis

Volume and Price Effects 4.238 Korea consistently relies on its claim that the imports under investigation were continuing to increase their market share even in the first half of 2003 to support virtually every aspect of its injury finding. However, the KTC miscalculated the market share statistics in that it did not properly reflect the fact that the volume of imports under investigation was decreasing at a faster rate than domestic consumption. Moreover, Korea substantially understated total domestic consumption and, therefore, overstated market shares, by failing to include in its analysis domestic shipments by domestic producers excluded from the definition of the domestic industry. 4.239 Korea also now seems to take the position that the KTC did not make any findings regarding significant price undercutting, instead, the KTC made only findings of price suppression and price depression. Korea has not explained the standard used by the KTC in its findings of price suppression and price depression and its findings suffer from a number of deficiencies. Korea’s submissions refer to the decline in the domestic industry’s market share as the chief indicator that the domestic industry was suffering injury. However, given that price is the factor of competition, it is not possible to attribute the decline in domestic industry market share to imports which do not significantly undercut domestic prices. 4.240 Korea repeatedly refers to the domestic industry’s consistent ordinary losses as supporting the findings of price suppression, price depression, and injury. These trends have nothing to do with the price effects of imports since their losses depend on significant changes in non-operating income and expense. Article 3.4 Analysis 4.241 The KTC’s superficial series of recitals and conclusions is not sufficient to meet the standards of Article 3.4. As a legal matter, the KTC may not find injury simply because it considers that there are no improving trends with respect to the factors examined. Every industry, including paper, is subject to the vagaries of a business cycle. It is the responsibility of the investigating authority to evaluate the trends in injury factors and place them in the context of the business cycle to determine whether flat trends justify the inference that the domestic industry is suffering material injury. As a factual matter, Indonesia notes that several of the injury factors were showing positive or steady trends. Wages and productivity generally increased, and production capacity and output were

WT/DS312/R Page 45

generally steady. There was also an increase in facility investment, for facilities that could produce [[**]]62. Article 3.5 Causation/Non-Attribution Analysis 4.242 In its attempts to explain the KTC’s causation analysis, Korea again relies on the KTC’s flawed analysis of consumption and market shares. Korea ignores the possible effect of a decline in domestic consumption on prices. Regarding raw material costs, Korea's position that cost fluctuations could not affect the Korean industry’s revenues and hence profits. This is directly contradicted by evidence on the record. The KTC should have analysed the extent to which these cost fluctuations affected revenue and operating profits as part of its non-attribution analysis. In fact, the substantial facility investment in 2001 was in facilities that could be used for [[**]]63. This suggests the Korean industry was in a healthy condition. The KTC should have considered that imports from other countries increased significantly over the period of investigation, especially towards the end of the period. Korea has not responded to Indonesia's argument that the domestic industry’s decline in export volumes was greater than the decline in its domestic shipments for the period 1999-2002. Domestic Industry’s Own Imports 4.243 Korea admits that if members of the domestic industry were themselves importing the product under investigation, the analysis "might be more complex." The table provided in Korea’s response to the Panel’s question 57 indicates that the domestic industry had substantial imports during several portions of the period under investigation. The KTC should have conducted the "more complex" analysis of the impact of these imports on the domestic industry. (c)

Procedural issues

4.244 Indonesia has examined Korea's contention that during the 27 August 2003 hearing, the Indonesian exporters were provided with a document which indicated that the period of investigation for injury had been extended till June 2003. In light of apparent corroboration of Korea's position, Indonesia wishes to withdraw its claim regarding this particular issue. 2.

Closing Statement of Indonesia at the Second Meeting of the Panel

4.245 Anti-dumping proceedings are necessary complex and burdensome for all parties – the exporters that participate, the investigating authorities that conduct the investigations, and, not the least, for WTO panels that must review the investigating authorities’ determinations. Thus, while this case is also very detailed, it is by no means unique. The Agreement contains detailed rules for the conduct of these investigations. These rules have been interpreted and applied by many previous panels and the Appellate Body. Indonesia is surprised, therefore, by Korea’s claim, not supported by any reference to precedent, that the Agreement governs only the “mental” analysis the investigating authority must perform, and that the investigating authority’s determinations are no more than written summaries of that analysis. Indonesia trusts that the Panel will follow established standards and base its decision on the KTC’s actual determinations. 4.246 In this regard, Indonesia notes that Korea continues to provide new ex post justifications. For example, Korea now argues that the KTC in fact required all three Sinar Mas affiliated exporters to provide a single questionnaire response, even though the KTC never articulated this position in its investigation and in fact took the position in its preliminary determination that it was precluded by law from doing so. Had the KTC taken the position early in the investigation that it wanted a single response from all three exporters, the entire course of the investigation would undoubtedly have 62 63

Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential.

WT/DS312/R Page 46

unfolded differently. But that is not what happened, and the Panel can review only what actually happened. Similarly, Korea now suggests that it excluded importing producers from its analysis of Korean market consumption as some sort of inference adverse to the importers – another previouslyunheard theory. 4.247 In its submissions, Korea has provided much new disclosure and discussion of the substantive issues that were before the KTC and are now before the Panel. In many respects, the discussion before the Panel involved precisely the kind of analysis that should have been conducted by the KTC. For example, Korea has attempted to explain the standards applicable to a decision to collapse different exporters into one. Any explanation of these standards was missing from the KTC’s determination. Similarly, Korea has attempted to discuss the question of whether PPC and WF are like products, which the KTC did not do (and which Korea continues to maintain it was not required to do). And to give just one example relating to the injury determination, Korea has provided some discussion of import trends on a semester-to-semester basis, although Korea has still not disclosed the half-yearly trends other than for the imports under investigation. Indonesia disagrees with Korea’s arguments on these issues. However, had the KTC conducted this kind of evaluation of the evidence – which it was required to do under the Agreement – it is possible that the parties would not be here. 4.248 Korea has suggested that Indonesia’s arguments have no practical significance. That is not how Indonesia sees it. An important exporting industry in a developing country has been subject to anti-dumping duties in a situation where the investigating authority first determined that the largest exporter was not dumping and then changed the rationales for its determinations until it was able to conclude that that exporter was in fact dumping. And the investigating authority then made an injury determination that consisted of a single sentence of analysis. The Panel may or may not agree with all of Indonesia’s arguments as to whether the KTC’s conduct was consistent with the Agreement, but it should be in no doubt as to the practical importance of the issues before it. H.

SECOND ORAL STATEMENT OF KOREA

4.249

The following summarises Korea's arguments in its second oral statement.

1.

Opening Statement of Korea at the Second Meeting of the Panel

(a)

The proper conceptual framework

4.250 There are several conceptual flaws in Indonesia’s arguments. For example, a number of Indonesia’s arguments start with the assumption that the Sinar Mas Group was being truthful — and then assert that the KTC erred by not accepting the conclusions that flowed from that premise. But the Agreement does not require investigating authorities to start with an assumption of truthfulness by respondents. The KTC was permitted to approach the Sinar Mas Group’s submissions with scepticism, and to require that the Sinar Mas Group demonstrate the accuracy of the submitted information. When the Sinar Mas Group refused to provide necessary documentation that was readily available to it, the KTC was justified in concluding that the accuracy of the submitted information was not established, and that the information could not be used. 4.251 Indonesia’s arguments also fail to recognize that interpretation of the WTO Agreements must be carefully based on the text of those Agreements. Throughout this proceeding Indonesia has cited a laundry list of provisions in the Agreement whose obligations it claims Korea has violated. But, it has failed to undertake the hard analysis of the text of those provisions that is needed to clarify what those obligations are, and whether Korea’s actions were inconsistent with them. 4.252 Finally, Indonesia’s arguments concerning the sufficiency of Korea’s final determination assume that the Agreement requires perfect explanations of the analysis performed by the investigating authorities — including full responses to arguments that were never presented to the

WT/DS312/R Page 47

investigators. But the provisions of Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2, which set forth the requirements for the investigating authorities’ explanations, only require explanations “in sufficient detail” of all “material issues” and of the “main reasons leading to the determination.” Of course, the explanations provided must be sufficient to permit a Panel to determine whether an investigating authority properly “assessed” or “considered” or “examined” or “evaluated” the relevant factors. But they do not require perfection — especially on issues that were not raised during the proceedings before the investigators. (b)

Dumping calculation issues

(i)

The KTC’s decision to “collapse” the Sinar Mas Group mills

4.253 Indonesia has conceded that an investigating authority may treat separate corporations as a single entity in appropriate circumstances, and that the separate corporate form is simply a “relevant” factor. However, Indonesia has argued that Korea’s description of the facts supporting the conclusion that the Sinar Mas Group acted as a single entity is not correct. The effort is, to say the least, unconvincing. It would require the Panel to disregard the evidence — including the business card of an official in a corporate marketing department that Indonesia claims does not exist, the Sinar Mas Group’s own statements about CMI’s role in negotiating sales in Indonesia, and the fact that the three Sinar Mas Group mills shared the same president, a majority of directors, and several vice-presidents as well. (ii)

“Facts available” for Tjiwi Kimia

4.254 Indonesia has claimed that the KTC failed to properly corroborate the facts available used to determine the export price and normal value for Tjiwi Kimia. But the “facts available” for Tjiwi Kimia were corroborated within the meaning of paragraph 7 of Annex II — by deriving the export price data from official Korean customs statistics, and by basing normal value on information from an independent Korean government agency, and then comparing this information with the data submitted by the responding companies. 4.255 In the end, Indonesia’s argument reduces to the proposition that the dumping margin assigned to Tjiwi Kimia could not be significantly higher than those assigned to more cooperative respondents, because that would imply that the “facts available” had not been corroborated against the information submitted by the more cooperative respondents. But this argument would effectively read the third sentence of paragraph 7 of Annex II out of the Agreement, because it would prevent investigating authorities from assigning results to non-cooperative respondents that are “less favourable” than those assigned to cooperative respondents. 4.256 Indonesia also claims that the KTC could not properly resort to “less favourable” facts available for Tjiwi Kimia unless it had given the other Sinar Mas Group mills an additional opportunity to submit the Tjiwi Kimia data. There is nothing in the Agreement that supports this claim. Furthermore, Indonesia’s argument is based on a factual error. Contrary to Indonesia’s assumptions, the KTC had not initially requested the Tjiwi Kimia information solely from Tjiwi Kimia. Instead, its questionnaire to each of the Sinar Mas Group mills requested complete information on all sales by all related parties. Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli were specifically told that, “[f]or all related parties,” they should “include the sales and cost of these related companies with your sales and cost in the same computer data file(s) and submit a single narrative response.” 4.257 In this case, the Sinar Mas Group did not ask the KTC to modify its questionnaire requirements, and it did not give the KTC the information that would be needed to make an informed decision. Instead, without ever consulting the KTC, the Sinar Mas Group unilaterally decided that it was not going to provide any information on Tjiwi Kimia’s sales and production. There is no way to read this as anything other than a refusal by the Sinar Mas Group to provide information that was

WT/DS312/R Page 48

specifically requested in the KTC’s questionnaire — and that was requested not only from the Group as a whole and from Tjiwi Kimia, but also from each of the Group’s other mills. (iii)

The KTC’s rejection of the submitted CMI sales data

4.258 Indonesia contends that the KTC improperly penalized the Sinar Mas Group for the “difficulties” the Group experienced in obtaining financial statements and accounting records from CMI. However, there is no evidence of any real “difficulties.” Although the CMI income statement had been specifically requested in the KTC’s initial questionnaire, the Sinar Mas Group did not provide any indication that it was experiencing “difficulties” in obtaining that information until the start of verification, and it never apprised the KTC of the efforts it was making to obtain the requested information. Then, when the Sinar Mas Group realized the consequences of its non-cooperation after the verification was over, it managed to provide purported CMI income statements to the KTC in the space of less than a week. Furthermore, in light of the evidence that CMI was part of the same Division as the other Sinar Mas Group mills and shared the same offices, it was reasonable for the KTC to conclude that the failure of the Sinar Mas Group to supply the requested documentation was a wilful refusal, and not a mere “difficulty.” 4.259 Indonesia also claims that the KTC could have completed its verification successfully without access to CMI’s financial statements and accounting records. Significantly, this argument was never raised to the KTC during its investigation. More importantly, it is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of a completeness test (based in large part on a mischaracterization of the practice of the US Department of Commerce). 4.260 In verifying the “completeness” of submitted sales files, the investigating authorities are, in fact, trying to “prove a negative” — to satisfy themselves that there were no reportable transactions that were incorrectly omitted from the sales listing. In this case, the Sinar Mas Group refused to allow the KTC to conduct the most fundamental completeness test — the reconciliation of the reported CMI sales to CMI’s normal accounting records and financial statements. The Sinar Mas Group therefore prevented the KTC from “laying the foundation” for any other completeness tests, and from “baselining” the documents presented at verification. And, more fundamentally, the Sinar Mas Group’s refusal to allow the KTC access to the CMI financial statements and accounting records necessarily raised questions about the Sinar Mas Group’s credibility. In the end, the verification of completeness comes down to a matter of trust. The Sinar Mas Group’s refusal to allow access to the CMI financial statements and accounting records made failure virtually inevitable. 4.261 Indonesia also claims that the completeness of the CMI sales to its customers was established by the verification of the completeness of the sales from the mills to CMI. This argument is based on the premise that there was a one-to-one correspondence between the mills’ sales to CMI and CMI’s sales to its customers. In fact, there was a discrepancy of some [[**]] tons — roughly [[**]]64 reams of paper — between the sales form the mills to CMI and the sales from CMI to its customers. Furthermore, even if the total quantity of CMI’s sales had been established, questions about the reported prices would have remained. Without access to CMI’s accounting records, there was no way for the KTC to confirm that the invoices presented to it at verification to support the reported sales prices actually matched the invoices that were recorded in CMI’s accounting records, or that there were no unreported discounts, rebates, billing adjustments or additional charges by CMI. 4.262 Finally, Indonesia claims that the KTC could have verified the completeness of the CMI sales after the verification was over, based on the Sinar Mas Group’s post-verification submission of purported CMI income statements. But, the KTC had no basis for assessing whether the purported income statements were themselves accurate and reliable. A verification would have been needed to establish that the purported statements were genuine and fairly presented CMI’s results — and to 64

Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential.

WT/DS312/R Page 49

reconcile the reported sales to those statements. By the time the Sinar Mas Group finally submitted those statements, it was too late to verify them, because the verification was already finished. (iv)

Inclusion of facts available SG&A for CMI in constructed value

4.263 Indonesia also claims that the amounts included in the constructed value to reflect CMI’s selling, general and administrative (“SG&A”) and interest expenses were too high. However, its arguments are based entirely on unsupported assumptions about the expenses CMI might have incurred. Indonesia has not demonstrated that the amounts the KTC used were unreasonable. In fact, the amounts used by the KTC were derived from the actual experience of another Indonesian company that sold the subject merchandise in the domestic market at the same level as CMI. 4.264 Indonesia also objects to the KTC’s failure to make an adjustment to account for the involvement of CMI in domestic sales. Although Indonesia concedes that the domestic sales by CMI were at the same level of trade as the export sales by the mills, it claims that CMI’s involvement nevertheless required an adjustment for “other differences ... affect[ing] price comparability.” Again, this argument is based entirely on unsupported assumptions. Indonesia has not demonstrated that the activities performed by CMI on domestic sales were not performed by the mills themselves on export sales. Thus, no adjustment was warranted. 2.

Injury determination issues

(a)

Like product

4.265 Indonesia argues that Korea was under an obligation to define the “product under consideration” in a reasonable manner. However, the definition of the “production under consideration” has not been challenged by Indonesia in this proceeding. Instead, Indonesia has accepted the KTC’s definition of the “product under consideration.” Indonesia’s argument has been that, given this definition, the KTC was required to find that there were two distinct “like products” for this one “product under consideration.” 4.266 There is nothing in Article 2.6 that requires that result. Instead, Article 2.6 states that the “like product” is to flow directly from the definition of the product under consideration. Having accepted the KTC’s definition of the “product under consideration,” Indonesia has no grounds to object to the “like product” definition that flowed directly from it. 4.267 Indonesia’s factual claims are also unpersuasive. The Sinar Mas Group never presented any evidence to the KTC establishing that there were differences between plain-paper-copier paper and other wood-free paper. And, in fact, the information submitted to the Panel by Indonesia shows that there were substantial overlaps in those products. (b)

Trends in the volume of dumped imports

4.268 Indonesia’s arguments have focused on statistics that apparently show a 15.3 per cent decrease in the volume of dumped imports in the first half of 2003. But, a closer review reveals that this apparent “decrease” did not actually reflect a fall in imports. The annual rate of imports on 2003 was actually higher than the annual rate of imports in any previous year. 4.269 Indonesia also claims that the KTC miscalculated the market share figures, by excluding the domestic production by Korean producers who were not included in the domestic industry. Indonesia argues that, if one adjusts for these excluded producers, one can calculate that the dumped imports actually lost market share in the first half of 2003. But, the figures Indonesia has used in its recalculation of domestic consumption for the first half of 2003 are wrong. When the correct figures are used, Indonesia’s recalculation actually shows that the market share held by the dumped imports

WT/DS312/R Page 50 increased by almost [[**]] full percentage points from [[**]] per cent in 2002 to [[**]]65 per cent in the first half of 2003. (c)

Price effects of the dumped imports

4.270 Indonesia argues that the KTC’s findings are insufficient, because the KTC did not use the word “significant” in describing these price effects. But, the failure of the KTC to utter that “magic word” cannot be dispositive. Instead, the real question before the Panel is whether the KTC’s analysis was substantively correct. 4.271 In this case, the KTC found that the Korean industry’s prices had fallen by [[**]]66 per cent from 2000 to the first half of 2003, due to the impact of the dumped imports. It also found that the Korean industry’s prices were [[**]]67 per cent below what would have been needed to return a reasonable level of profit. Such price depression and suppression is plainly “significant,” under any definition of that term. (d)

Consideration of injury factors

4.272 Indonesia also claims that the KTC failed “to properly consider all injury factors” described in Article 3.4 of the Agreement. However, Indonesia has not identified a single relevant factor that the KTC ignored. To the contrary, Indonesia concedes that the KTC actually did examine all of the factors identified in Article 3.4. A review of the data analyzed by the KTC indicates that the trends for every single injury factor were adverse for the domestic industry. 4.273 As required by the Agreement, the KTC also considered whether the injury the domestic industry had experienced might have been caused by other factors. The KTC’s staff collected detailed information on possible alternative causes of injury. The KTC’s conclusion that these factors did not explain the injury to the domestic industry was entirely consistent with that evidence. (e)

Consideration of imports by Korean producers

4.274 Indonesia continues to assert that the KTC should have excluded imports by the “Korean industry” from its analysis. However, the “Korean industry,” as defined by the KTC, did not include the producers that imported the subject merchandise. 4.275 The Agreement required the KTC to consider the impact of “dumped imports” on the “domestic industry.” Indonesia has not identified any provision of the Agreement that would allow, let alone require, the KTC to treat the imports by Korean producers who were excluded from the “domestic industry” as anything other than “dumped imports.” The only provision concerning imports by a domestic producer is Article 4.1 — and there is no claim that the KTC failed to comply with the provisions of Article 4.1. Consequently, Indonesia’s claims must be dismissed. V.

ARGUMENTS OF THE THIRD PARTIES

5.1 The arguments of the third parties, Canada, China, the European Communities, Japan and the United States are set out in their written submissions and oral statements to the Panel and are summarised in this section.

65

Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. 67 Ibid. 66

WT/DS312/R Page 51

A.

THIRD PARTY WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF CANADA

5.2

The following summarizes Canada's arguments in its third party written submission.

5.3 This dispute concerns Indonesia’s challenge to various aspects of an anti-dumping measure imposed by Korea on imports of plain paper copier and woodfree printing paper under the Agreement and Article VI of the GATT. 5.4 Canada has a substantial interest in this matter, particularly with respect to Indonesia’s claim that Korea improperly defined “like product” under Article 2.6 of the Agreement. Canada is concerned with the proper legal interpretation of the definitions for “like product” and “product under consideration” found in this provision. 5.5 An investigating authority must determine the “product under consideration” in a specific investigation. However, in order to comply with WTO obligations, an investigating authority must act in accordance with Article 2.6 of the Agreement in making a determination. 5.6 In accordance with Article 17.6(ii) of the Agreement, a panel has a duty to determine whether an investigating authority’s determination of what constitutes the “like product” and “product under consideration” in a specific investigation rests on a permissible interpretation of Article 2.6 of the Agreement. 5.7 The term “like product” appears in the Agreement in two main contexts: (1) the determination of dumping; and (2) the determination of injury. In the context of the determination of dumping, the term “like product” refers to the product sold in the home market of the exporting country that forms the basis for the calculation of the normal value. In the context of the determination of injury, the term “like product” refers to the product produced by the domestic industry that allegedly suffers injury. 5.8 Article 2.6 defines the term “like product” in relation to the “product under consideration”. The “product under consideration” refers to the allegedly dumped product that is the subject of the investigation. The term “like product” must be interpreted in accordance with this definition wherever it appears in the Agreement. All of the words in Article 2.6, including the words “product under consideration”, must be given meaning. 5.9 A “like product” is a product that has a common set of “characteristics” with the “product under consideration”. Accordingly, a reasonable interpretation of the words in Article 2.6 would suggest that an investigating authority must identify the “characteristics” of the “product under consideration”. 5.10 An investigating authority must also divide the “product under consideration” into cohesive groupings of products that share common characteristics (i.e., the investigating authority must determine whether there is one or more “product under consideration”) and make separate determinations of dumping and injury with respect to each “product under consideration”. Each such determination will necessarily require the identification of a corresponding “like product” to the “product under consideration”. 5.11 To find that the “product under consideration” can include a group of products that do not share common characteristics would lead to absurd results. An investigating authority could capture non-injurious dumping by creating an overly broad definition of “product under consideration”.

WT/DS312/R Page 52

B.

THIRD PARTY ORAL STATEMENT OF CANADA

5.12 Canada has indicated in a letter to the Panel dated 25 January 2005, that it will not make an oral statement at the third party session. C.

THIRD PARTY WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF CHINA

5.13

The following summarizes China's arguments in its third party written submission.

1.

Introduction

5.14

The People’s Republic of China (“China”) wishes to comment on the following issues:

•

Issue 1: Necessary Information in the Context of the Application of “Facts Available”

•

Issue 2: Whether the Obligation of the Investigating Authorities under Paragraph 7 of Annex II Can Be Released by Compliance of the Investigating Authorities with Article 5.3 before the Initiation of the Investigation

•

Issue 3: The “Collapsing” of Affiliated Respondents

2.

Arguments

(a)

Issue 1: necessary information in the context of the application of “facts available”

5.15 In the alleged antidumping investigation, the KTC determined that since Pindo Deli and Indah Kiat, the two respondents to the alleged investigation, failed to “submit data such as financial statements and account documents” of CMI, deemed by the KTC as an affiliate to Pindo Deli and Inda Kiat, the individual normal value of each of them was calculated based on facts available. 5.16 China understands that Article 6.8 of the Agreement, in essence is a sort of “trigger term” for the adoption of “facts available”, exhaustively provides for the circumstances under which the investigating authorities can resort to facts available. China will hereby limit its comment only to the circumstance involving “necessary information” provided in Article 6.8 of the Agreement which is the main focus of the alleged dispute described above. 5.17 China notes that there are no provisions in the Agreement expressly defining the “necessary information” referred to in Article 6.8 of the Agreement and therefore believes that the investigating authorities shall have the discretion to determine what information is necessary for a specific investigation. However, such discretion is subject to certain limitations and procedural requirements provided for in the Agreement. These limitations are that (1) the investigating authority shall not request irrelevant information; (2) the investigating authority shall not request the information that creates the extra burden for the interested parties; and (3) when demanding necessary information, the investigation authorities are also required to act in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner. The procedural requirements are (1) the investigating authorities shall determine what exact information is necessary for the specific investigation and give any interested party qualified instructions which are sufficient for the interested party to understand what and to what extent it shall provide as the necessary information demanded by the investigating authorities; and (2) the investigating authorities shall not disregard the information provided by the interested party even if it is not ideal in all respects as long as the interested party has acted to the best of its ability. 5.18 China agrees that in the event that some of the required information necessary for the investigation has not been submitted or, although provided, has been otherwise rejected, the investigating authorities shall not therefore reject the entire information provided regardless of the

WT/DS312/R Page 53

accuracy of that information. The investigating authorities shall determine on the basis of the specific facts and circumstances of the investigation at hand as to whether the fact that some information not properly submitted or is rejected otherwise has consequences for the remainder of the information submitted and therefore facts available can be resorted to. (b)

Issue 2: whether the obligation of the investigating authorities under paragraph 7 of Annex II can be released by compliance of the investigating authorities with Article 5.3 before the initiation of the investigation

5.19 Indonesia claimed that, in the alleged antidumping investigation, the KTC failed to check the information from the applicants on which it relied against the information obtained from other sources during the course of the investigation as required under Paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Agreement. Korea contended that as part of the initiation process, the KTC had examined the information contained in the application and found that it was accurate and adequate as required by Article 5.3 of the Agreement and therefore Indonesia should not challenge the investigating authorities’ reliance on that information as “facts available”. 5.20 China notes that the dispute in this regard mainly lies in the point that whether the investigating authorities’ implementation of the obligations under Article 5.3 of the Agreement at the initiation stage will necessarily release their obligations under Paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Agreement when using the information in the application to determine the dumping margin in the later part of the investigation. 5.21 From the plain language of Article 5.3 of the Agreement, it is clear that the obligations required thereunder for the investigating authorities to examine the application information are right at the initiation stage before the investigation really starts. The purpose of such examination is none other than determining whether evidence in the application is sufficient to justify the initiation of an investigation. However, the obligations required under Paragraph 7 of Annex II for the investigating authorities to use special circumspection are in the later part of an initiated investigation, the purpose of which is to reach findings and justify the determination of dumping margin. 5.22 By comparing the different scenarios implied respectively in Article 5.3 and Paragraph 7 of Annex II, it is noteworthy that, due to the lapse of time, it is undoubted that there will definitely come out more “new” information, i.e. information provided by respondents, which is available for the investigating authorities to use for the investigation after the initiation. It is possible that the information contained in the application which was previously determined to be “accurate and adequate” to justify the initiation of the investigation might be found inaccurate or inadequate in the later part of investigation based on those “new” information duly come out under the Agreement. If the investigating authorities are permitted to refuse the implementation of their obligations under Paragraph 7 of Annex II with the sole excuse that they have implemented the obligations under Article 5.3 of the Agreement, the opportunity for the interested parties to defend their interests as secured by Article 6.2 of the Agreement will definitely be deprived of. Therefore, China concludes that the investigating authorities’ implementation of the obligations under Article 5.3 of the Agreement at the initiation stage will not necessarily release their obligations under Paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Agreement when using the information in the application to determine the dumping margin in the later part of the investigation. (c)

Issue 3: The “collapsing” of affiliated respondents

5.23 In the alleged antidumping investigation, the KTC treated, or “collapsed” in another word, the Sinar Mas Group companies (Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli and Tjiwi Kimia) as a single entity for purposes of calculating the final dumping margin, which was claimed by Indonesia to be inconsistent with Article 6.10 of the Agreement.

WT/DS312/R Page 54

5.24 Korea contended that Article 6.10 of the Agreement does not necessarily require the calculation of a separate dumping margin for each corporation that exported the subject merchandise for the simple reason that Article 6.10 of the Agreement does not speak in terms of corporations. Since terms “exporters” or “producers” are not explicitly defined by the Agreement, the investigating authorities are consequently permitted to interpret the term “exporter” under Article 6.10 of the Agreement in a functional manner in order to permit separate corporate entities that function as a single economic unit to be considered as a single “exporter”. 5.25 However, as China perceives, the assertion that there is no language of definition in the Agreement does not self justify Korea’s implication that the Agreement strictly treat “exporter” or “producer” and “corporation” as two separate terms. Korea’s interpretation of “producer” and “corporation” in a so-called functional manner is neither authorized nor justified. 5.26 In China’s view, there is no reason to believe that the Agreement absolutely excludes and prohibits the “collapsing” of affiliated respondents in any situations. Considering it is a spirit of the Agreement to conduct a “fair comparison” between the export price and the normal value when determining dumping margins, if the existence of affiliation to any extent damages the “fair comparison”, the investigating authorities shall be permitted to collapse such affiliation. In addition, a reference of this Article 9.5 of the Agreement can also imply, to some extent, in the whole context of the Agreement that the Agreement actually does not exclude the consideration of collapsing affiliated parties when determining dumping margins. Therefore, the investigating authorities shall have discretion as to collapse affiliated responding corporations and determine a single dumping margin for them. D.

THIRD PARTY ORAL STATEMENT OF CHINA

5.27

The following summarizes China's arguments in its third party oral statement.

5.28 China believes that this dispute raises a number of important questions in respect of the interpretation of the Agreement. China wishes to comment on the following issues which China believes to be important. (a)

Issue 1: Necessary information in the context of the application of “facts available”

5.29 In the alleged antidumping investigation, the KTC determined that since the two respondents to the alleged investigation, namely “Pindo Deli” and “Indah Kiat”, failed to “submit data such as financial statements and account documents” of CMI, which was deemed by the KTC as an affiliate of the two respondents, the individual normal value of each of them was calculated therefore based on facts available. 5.30 China understands that Article 6.8 of the Agreement in essence is a sort of “trigger term” for the adoption of “facts available”, exhaustively provides the circumstances under which the investigating authorities can resort to facts available. China will hereby limit its comment only to the circumstance involving “necessary information” provided in Article 6.8 of the Agreement which is the main focus of the alleged dispute described above. 5.31 China notes that there are no provisions in the Agreement expressly defining the “necessary information” referred to in Article 6.8 of the Agreement and therefore believes that the investigating authorities shall have the discretion to determine what information is necessary for a specific investigation. However, such discretion is subject to certain limitations and procedural requirements provided in the Agreement. These limitations are that (1) the investigating authority shall not request irrelevant information; (2) the investigating authority shall not request the information that creates the extra burden for the interested parties; and (3) when demanding necessary information, the investigation authorities are also required to act in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner. The

WT/DS312/R Page 55

procedural requirements are (1) the investigating authorities shall determine what exact information is necessary for the specific investigation and give any interested party qualified instructions which are sufficient for the interested party to understand what and to what extent it shall provide as the necessary information demanded by the investigating authorities; and (2) the investigating authorities shall not disregard the information provided by the interested party even if it is not ideal in all respects as long as the interested party has acted to the best of its ability. 5.32 China agrees that in the event that some of the required information necessary for the investigation has not been submitted or, although provided, has been otherwise rejected, the investigating authorities shall not therefore reject the entire information provided regardless of the accuracy of that information. The investigating authorities shall determine on the basis of the specific facts and circumstances of the investigation at hand as to whether the fact that some information not properly submitted or is rejected otherwise has consequences for the remainder of the information submitted and therefore facts available can be resorted to. (b)

Issue 2: Whether the obligation of the investigating authorities under paragraph 7 of Annex II can be released by compliance of the investigating authorities with Article 5.3 before the initiation of the investigation

5.33 Indonesia claimed that, in the alleged antidumping investigation, the KTC failed to check the information from the applicants on which it relied against the information obtained from other sources during the course of the investigation as required under Paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Agreement. Korea contended that as part of the initiation process, the KTC had examined the information contained in the application and found that it was accurate and adequate as required by Article 5.3 of the Agreement and therefore Indonesia should not challenge the investigating authorities’ reliance on that information as “facts available”. 5.34 China notes that the dispute in this regard mainly lies in the point that whether the investigating authorities’ implementation of the obligations under Article 5.3 of the Agreement at the initiation stage will necessarily release their obligations under Paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Agreement when using the information in the application to determine the dumping margin in the later part of the investigation. 5.35 From the plain language of Article 5.3 of the Agreement, it is clear that the obligations required there-under for the investigating authorities to examine the application information are right at the initiation stage before the investigation really starts. The purpose of such examination is none other than determining whether evidence in the application is sufficient to justify the initiation of an investigation. However, the obligations required under Paragraph 7 of Annex II for the investigating authorities to use special circumspection are in the later part of an initiated investigation, the purpose of which is to reach findings and justify determination. 5.36 By comparing the different scenarios implied respectively in Article 5.3 and Paragraph 7 of Annex II, it is noteworthy that, due to the lapse of time, it is undoubted that there will definitely come out more “new” information, i.e. information provided by respondents, which is available for the investigating authorities to use for the investigation after the initiation. If the investigating authorities are permitted to refuse to implement their obligations under Paragraph 7 of Annex II with the sole excuse that they have implemented the obligations under Article 5.3 of the Agreement, the opportunity for the interested parties to defend their interests as secured by Article 6.2 of the Agreement will definitely be deprived of. Therefore, China concludes that the investigating authorities’ implementation of the obligations under Article 5.3 of the Agreement at the initiation stage will not necessarily release their obligations under Paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Agreement when using the information in the application to determine the dumping margin in the later part of the investigation.

WT/DS312/R Page 56

(c)

Issue 3: The “collapsing” of affiliated respondents

5.37 In the alleged antidumping investigation, the KTC treated, or “collapsed” in another word, the three respondents as a single entity for purposes of calculating the final dumping margin, which was claimed by Indonesia to be inconsistent with Article 6.10 of the Agreement. 5.38 In China’s view, there is no reason to believe that the Agreement absolutely excludes and prohibits the “collapsing” of affiliated respondents in any situations. Considering it is a spirit of the Agreement to conduct a “fair comparison” between the export price and the normal value when determining dumping margins, if the existence of affiliation to any extent damages the “fair comparison”, the investigating authorities shall be permitted to collapse such affiliation. In addition, a reference of this Article 9.5 of the Agreement can also imply, to some extent, in the whole context of the Agreement that the Agreement actually does not exclude the consideration of collapsing affiliated parties when determining dumping margins. Therefore, the investigating authorities shall have discretion as to collapse affiliated responding corporations and determine a single dumping margin for them. E.

THIRD PARTY WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

5.39 The following summarizes the European Communities arguments in its third party written submission. 1.

The interpretation of “each known exporter” under Article 6.10 of the Agreement

5.40 As regards the text of Article 6.10 of the Agreement, the term “each known exporter or producer” is not directly defined. It accordingly bears an autonomous meaning, and there is a certain margin for the investigating authorities to interpret this term. The EC notes that the term “exporter” is different from the term “corporation”. It agrees with Korea that the corporate law of Indonesia cannot determine the matter. Rather, the text of the Agreement allows an investigating authority to consider separate corporate entities that are related as constituting one single “exporter”. The EC also observers that Article 6.10 of the Agreement uses the alternative “exporter or producer”, and thus leaves a certain flexibility to the investigating authority to take due account of the economic circumstances of a given case, when deciding on whom to impose the anti-dumping duty. 5.41 Seen in its context, Article 6.10 of the Agreement first sentence establishes, “as a rule”, the duty to determine individual margins of dumping for each known exporter. The second sentence provides for the exception, namely that under certain conditions sampling is allowed. The Indonesian conclusion in the present case that the second sentence provides for the “only one circumstance where a departure from determining individual margins is allowed” is, however, flawed. It is based on the assumption that “each known producer” refers to each single legal entity and deduces from this that not granting an individual rate to each single legal entity is in breach of Article 6.10 of the Agreement, first sentence, unless the conditions under the second sentence of that provision are met. 5.42 However, the present debate is not about the relationship between the first and second sentences of Article 6.10 of the Agreement, but about the interpretation of the notion “exporter” within the meaning of the first sentence. In short, the argument derived by Indonesia out of the second sentence of Article 6.10 of the Agreement is based on what it is supposed to demonstrate, and is thus without merit. Treating related companies as one “exporter” does not deprive the provisions concerning “sampling” under the second sentence of their effect. 5.43 The same is true for the comparison between Article 6.10 of the Agreement and Article 4.1 (i), footnote 11 and Article 2.3 of the Agreement. Indonesia seems to advance an a contrario argument based on the fact that there is no corresponding provision on economic affiliations for exporters under Article 6.10 of the Agreement. In the view of the EC, it would, however, be equally

WT/DS312/R Page 57

possible to come to the opposite conclusion: because Article 4.1 (i), footnote 11 and Article 2.3 of the Agreement take account of economic affiliations other provisions of the Agreement may be interpreted in line with their economic rationale as well. 5.44 Rather than the provisions just cited, Article 9.5 of the Agreement may be more relevant context. Under this provision, an investigating authority shall promptly carry out a review for the purpose of determining individual margins of dumping for any exporters or producers in the exporting country in question who have not exported the product to the importing Member during the period of investigation, “provided that these exporters or producers can show that they are not related to any of the exporters or producers in the exporting country who are subject to the anti-dumping duties on the product”. If the relationship between exporters and producers is decisive for the revision of individual margins of dumping, the same relationship may also be considered in the initial determination. 5.45 In accordance with Art. 31 (1) third head of the Vienna Convention, Article 6.10 of the Agreement shall also be interpreted in the light of its object and purpose. In the EC’s view, the investigating authorities should determine an individual dumping margin for an exporter or producer that reflects its real economic structure, duly delineated in legal terms. If companies are related, this relationship would give them a possibility to channel exports through an affiliate with the lowest dumping margin, thus rendering the anti-dumping measures ineffective. In short: the object and purpose of the provision is to allow fair treatment of the exporter or producer by the investigating authority, and to ensure the effectiveness of the anti-dumping measures by preventing possibilities of manipulation by the exporter or producer. 5.46 It follows that a determination of individual dumping margins for each legal entity regardless of whether they are economically related to each other would be contrary to the object and purpose of Article 6.10 of the Agreement. Rather, the investigating authorities should be allowed to determine one dumping margin for related companies as a whole. 5.47 Such interpretation reflects the subsequent practice of the Community institutions. The European Commission and the Council of the European Union have consistently held with respect to related companies that calculating individual dumping margins would create the likelihood of manipulation of anti-dumping measures (thus rendering them ineffective) by enabling the related producers to channel their exports to the Community through the affiliate with the lowest dumping margin. In EC practice, related companies would normally be treated together where they belong to the same group, or share directors and facilities, or have other significant financial or economic links. In conclusion, the EC submits that a group that is composed of several legal entities which are related may be treated as one “exporter or producer” in the sense of Article 6.10 of the Agreement. 2.

The use of “facts available” under Article 6.8 of the Agreement in conjunction with Annex II of the Agreement

5.48 The EC submits that the division of the “facts available” issue into two claims is questionable. As has been explained in Section II of this written submission, an investigating authority is entitled under the Agreement to treat separate legal corporations as one “exporter or producer”, provided that they are related. It follows that they, as a whole, bear the rights and obligations vis-à-vis the investigating authority during the anti-dumping procedure. Therefore, either cooperation or noncooperation by any part of it may be attributed to the group as a whole. Accordingly, an investigating authority may use “facts available” with regard to an exporter if one of its legal corporations has not cooperated and thereby prevented an investigating authority from obtaining or verifying the necessary information relating to the determination of dumping. 5.49 For these reasons the EC believes that the first and second claim should be dealt with together. The question before the Panel is therefore whether the KTC did properly apply “facts available” for the exporter, i.e. the Group composed of Indah Kiat/Pindo Deli/Tjiwi Kiwi.

WT/DS312/R Page 58

5.50 The EC emphasizes that a fair balance must be struck between the interests of an investigating authority to conduct its investigation expeditiously, and the interests of an exporter to be heard. 5.51 First, it goes without saying that submission of evidence within a deadline set by the investigating authority should be considered as timely. As the setting of deadlines creates important legitimate expectations on the side of exporters, the investigating authority bears a certain responsibility to ensure that, when deadlines are set, with legal consequences if they are missed, they are clearly denoted as such. The EC submits that the legal consequences for any ambiguity whether a deadline has been set or revised should be borne by the investigating authority. 5.52 Second, the categorical approach under Korean law not to accept any new evidence after closure of the verification period does not seem to be in line with the above stated duty of an investigating authority to take into account all relevant factors when determining that a document was produced in good time or not. Hence, a practice that shuts off any evidence produced by an exporter after the verification, may well be in breach of Article 6.8 of the Agreement in conjunction with paragraph 3 of Annex II of the Agreement. The KTC must show in the case at hand, why reliance on a document submitted after the closure of the verification would compromise its ability to conduct the investigation expeditiously. 5.53 Third, the Indonesian argument that the two legal entities had difficulties to obtain relevant information from CMI, is without merit since such difficulties arose in the sphere of responsibility of the Sinar Mas Group and would therefore have to be attributed to the exporter, in line with the EC's general observation that the use of facts available should target the related companies as a whole. 5.54 Fourth, both sides point out that the exporter’s right to be heard concerns “all information which is verifiable” (paragraph 3 of Annex II of the Agreement, first sentence). Indonesia finds that the document of 9 April 2003 was a “verifiable” CMI financial statement, whereas Korea denies this since the papers were not “self-verifying”. 5.55 Again, without attempting to reach a conclusion on the factual aspects of the issue, the EC submits that the question should not be dealt with in isolation. Rather, verifiability is one of the factors that allow an investigating authority to reject submitted evidence as untimely. Accordingly, a statement may be “verifiable” in abstract terms: but if it is submitted only after a verification mission has already taken place, its actual verification would necessitate a second mission. That costs time and money and is not required by the Agreement. In such a case, the investigating authorities may consider this as an important factor in their overall consideration of whether to reject such a document as untimely or not. 3.

The termination of an investigation under Article 5.8 of the Agreement

5.56 The European Communities agrees with Korea that Article 5.8 refers to termination of an investigation on a country-wide basis. Article 2 of the Agreement defines dumping. Article 2.1 of the Agreement refers to the word “country” 3 times – and specifically to the product exported “from one country to another”. The word “country” is used a further 5 times in Article 2.2 and footnote 2 of the Agreement. These provisions reflect the language of Article VI of the GATT, which also repeatedly refers to imports from one country to another. They indicate that the concept of dumping involves a strong connotation of a country-wide assessment, which may be reflected in the scope of the investigation. Thus, absent particular provisions requiring a company specific approach, a countrywide approach will generally be permissible. 5.57 Article 5.2(ii) of the Agreement requires the provision of the “names of the country or countries of origin or export in question”. This is the primary obligation, in the sense that it is mentioned first in this provision, and is not qualified in any way – a complainant cannot state that it does not know the country or countries of origin. There is a secondary obligation – to describe known

WT/DS312/R Page 59

exporters or producers and importers. This obligation is, however, subject to the important qualification of the word “known” – if the names of the exporters or producers are not known, they do not need to be indicated in the complaint. It would be permissible to initiate an original investigation even in circumstances where only the country of origin would be known – even if there were no known exporters or producers. Thus, the country-wide nature of the investigation is also reflected in the complaint, right from the start. 5.58 Such an approach is confirmed by Article 12.1.1 of the Agreement, which requires that the public notice of the initiation of an original investigation states the name of the exporting country or countries. There is no obligation to state the names of known exporters or producers. 5.59 The country-wide approach to the initiation of an original investigation is common sense. The primary objective of an anti-dumping proceeding is to address the economic problem (injury) caused by dumped imports from a particular source. The precise identification of exporters and producers in the exporting country is, in terms of the scope of the investigation, incidental and may be difficult or impossible to achieve. If the investigation were initiated in the first place only in relation to known exporters and producers, then each time a further exporter or producer became known, it would presumably be necessary to extend the investigation. An investigating authority has no real means of ascertaining with complete certainty the full list of exporters or producers in the exporting country, and the Agreement imposes no obligation on an investigating authority to actively seek out that information. 5.60 The first sentence of Article 5.8 of the Agreement refers to the rejection of an application under paragraph 1, an application which, the European Communities has just observed, could lawfully be country-wide only – and indeed is likely to be so. The European Communities thus concludes that the first sentence of Article 5.8 of the Agreement imposes an obligation in relation to the investigation – that is, the country-wide investigation. Members may go further, by considering such matters on a company specific basis, but they are not obliged to do so by the terms of Article 5.8 of the Agreement. 5.61 The European Communities understands the final words “the case” in the first sentence of Article 5.8 of the Agreement to refer to the case as reflected in the application – which may lawfully be country-wide. Furthermore, the European Communities understands the words “the cases” in the second sentence of Article 5.8 of the Agreement to have the same meaning (except that the plural is used) as the words “the case” in the first sentence of Article 5.8 of the Agreement. The European Communities agrees that the text might have read: “in a case”. However, the European Communities does not attach any significance to the use of the plural in the second sentence of Article 5.8. It is common when drafting an abstract and normative piece of legislation to have in mind its future application in concrete terms to many individual cases (plural), and that may often be reflected in the drafting. The first sentence of Article 5.8 of the Agreement might just as well have been drafted in the plural. That the singular was used, presumably for reasons of grammar or style, is without significance. 5.62 The European Communities would find it unpersuasive to suggest that by using the plural “the cases” the drafters intended to refer to several company specific cases or investigations, as opposed to “the case” referred to in the first sentence of Article 5.8 of the Agreement – that being a country-wide case. It seems to the European Communities that had the drafters wished to write such a distinction into this provision, they would have done so more clearly – choosing, for example, a different abstract noun, rather than relying on an over-subtle distinction between the singular and the plural. 5.63 The European Communities finds further support for this view in the fact that the French language version of the first sentence of Article 5.8 of the Agreement does not use the word “cas”. That strongly militates in favour of rejecting the notion that the drafters intended to build on a

WT/DS312/R Page 60

distinction between the singular and the plural – had they so intended they would surely have ensured that the text had the same meaning in all the language versions. 5.64 Finally, the European Communities would observe that the second sentence of Article 5.8 of the Agreement refers both to de minimis dumping margins and to a negligible volume of imports. Both of these are linked to the words “in cases where”. The import threshold factor is clearly countrywide, as reflected, for example, in the fourth sentence of Article 5.8 of the Agreement. It follows that the words “in cases where” cannot, in themselves, lead to the conclusion that the investigating authority must conduct a company specific assessment. 5.65 Accordingly, the KTC’s decision to continue the investigation after the preliminary de minimis determination vis-à-vis Indah Kiat was consistent with Article 5.8. of the Agreement. Only if the KTC had found in its final determination that the country-wide dumping margin was below the de minimis threshold – which it did not – would it have been obliged to immediately terminate its investigation as regards Indonesia. F.

THIRD PARTY ORAL STATEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

5.66 The following summarizes the European Communities arguments in its third party oral statement. 1.

Introduction

5.67 In its written submission, the European Communities invited the Panel to conclude on four points of law: − − −

−

Article 6.10 of the Agreement allows an investigating authority to determine an individual margin for an exporter or producer that may be composed of separate corporations that are related; Article 6.8 of the Agreement in conjunction with Annex II allows applying “facts available” to such related companies; Article 6.8 of the Agreement in conjunction with paragraph 3 of Annex II is only violated if the investigating authority rejected submitted evidence without having struck a fair balance between its own interests to conduct an investigation expeditiously and the interests of the exporter to be heard, taking into account, inter alia, whether the need for a second verification of a document submitted after the closure of a first verification would lead to undue prolongation of the investigation or indeed whether any such second verification would be feasible at all; Article 5.8 of the Agreement does not require the termination of a proceeding in respect of companies found to have a de minimis dumping margin.

5.68 In this third party session, the European Communities has not developed these arguments further. The European Communities trusts that the Panel has taken due note of the European Communities' views. Instead, the European Communities concentrates on another issue that is of equally systematic importance for the interpretation of the Agreement and that has been addressed by other third parties in their written submissions: the definition of the product under consideration.

WT/DS312/R Page 61

2.

The definition of the “product under consideration”

5.69 At the outset, the EC notes the Panel’s observation in US – Softwood Lumber that the Agreement does not give guidance on the way in which the “product under consideration” shall be determined68. 5.70 Indeed, Article 2.6 of the Agreement only defines the term “like product”. That term refers to two different products: in the context of the determination of dumping the “like product” is the product sold in the home market of the exporting country; in the context of the determination of injury, the same term refers to the relevant product of the allegedly injured domestic industry. 5.71 In contrast, the Agreement does not contain a similar definition for the “product under consideration”. Rather, it presupposes that the investigating authority selects the product forming the subject of its investigation. Nevertheless, the discretion of the authority to select products for investigation purposes is not unfettered under the Agreement. 5.72 Article 2.6 of the Agreement contains a reference to “the product under consideration” (emphasis added). Comparably, Article 2.1 of the Agreement speaks of “a product” (emphasis added) that is to be considered as dumped under certain conditions. The two provisions just quoted do not employ the plural “products”. The European Communities believes that this wording may offer some guidance to the investigation authorities not to “bundle” clearly distinct and separate products into “one product under consideration”. 5.73 The European Communities’ view can perhaps be best illustrated by examples. Paper can be produced in many different sizes, types and qualities and these may be continuously variable. Whilst there must be some limits on how widely the scope of the subject product can be defined, paper can probably be considered a single product. Accordingly, one anti-dumping investigation may be conducted to establish whether exports of all types of paper from a given country are dumped when compared with the prices at which an identical (or, in the absence of an identical range, a “like”) range of product types is sold on the market of the exporting country and whether this causes material injury to the producers of the same (or “like”) range of product types in the importing county. Similarly, whilst there must be some limits on how narrowly the subject product can be defined, it is probably also possible to conduct an anti-dumping investigation into exports of a more narrowly defined product, provided it can be distinguished from other product types in the continuum. This needs to be examined on a case-by-case basis. 5.74 What is not admissible in the view of the European Communities is to select two products out of a product type range and to “bundle” them together to the exclusion of the other products in the same range. To take an easy example, it is inadmissible to bundle together apples and oranges as a single “product under consideration”. These would constitute two products and “bundling” one with the other could allow an anti- dumping duty to be imposed on a non-dumped product (e.g. apples) when another product is dumped (e.g. oranges). 5.75 Indonesia considers that plain paper copier (“PPC”) and uncoated wood-free printing paper (“WF”) should have been considered as separate products under consideration since they differ in physical characteristics, end-uses, market sectors, HTS classification and manufacturing processes69. Korea asserts that the two categories of paper differ only in form (sheet or roll), or for sheets, in size. Furthermore, it was impossible to tell at the time a roll is produced whether it will be destined for the PPC market or the WF market70.

68

See Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber, para. 7.153. First submission by the Republic of Indonesia, para. 150. 70 First submission by the Republic of Korea, paras. 162-163. 69

WT/DS312/R Page 62

5.76 The European Communities does not wish to comment on the factual dispute between the parties but is only concerned that the Agreement is correctly interpreted. In the European Communities' view , the Panel should verify whether the two categories of paper (plain paper copier and uncoated wood-free printing paper) differ only in form (sheet or roll) or size, as argued by Korea, and constitute basically the whole continuum, or whether they are two separate products plucked out of a continuum and/or improperly bundled together, as argued by Indonesia. That is a factual question on which the European Communities does not take a position. Either appears possible. 5.77 Accordingly, it will be for the Panel to decide whether the treatment of PPC and WF by the KTC as “one product under consideration” was compatible with Articles 2.1 and 2.6 of the Agreement (and consequently Article 3.1 of the Agreement). If it establishes that PPC and WF are separate products, the KTC should also have separately considered: (1) the effect of Indonesian PPC imports on Korean PPC producers and (2) the effect of Indonesian WF imports on Korean WF producers to determine dumping and injury. 3.

Conclusion

5.78 In sum, the European Community invites the Panel to first define the meaning of the “product under consideration” and then review whether Korea properly applied it in the present case. G.

THIRD PARTY WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF JAPAN

5.79

The following summarizes Japan's arguments in its third party written submission.

1.

Introduction

5.80 Japan welcomes this opportunity to present its views in the proceeding brought by Indonesia over the consistency with Article VI of the GATT, the Agreement, and the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization ("WTO Agreement") of the anti-dumping measures imposed by Korea on imports of certain paper from Indonesia. 5.81 Japan has a systemic interest in the interpretation and application of the Agreement, the GATT and the WTO Agreement with regard to anti-dumping investigations. As a third party, Japan would like to address the issue of the interpretation and application of the terms “product under consideration” and “like product” under Article 2.6 of the Agreement in conjunction with Articles 2.1 and 3.1 thereof. 2.

Arguments

5.82 Under the Agreement, an antidumping duty investigation can begin only after the “product under consideration” has been defined. The Panel in US—Softwood Lumber noted that: As the definition of “like product” implies a comparison with another product, it seems clear to us that the starting point can only be the “other product”, being the allegedly dumped product. Therefore, once the product under consideration is defined, the “like product” to the product under consideration has to be determined on the basis of Article 2.6.71 5.83 As noted by the Panel in US—Softwood Lumber, the definition of the “product under consideration” is the fundamental element in an antidumping duty investigation and is the starting 71

Panel Report, United States—Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada (“US—Softwood Lumber”), WT/DS264/R, adopted on 31 August 2004, para. 7.153 (emphasis in original).

WT/DS312/R Page 63

point for both the determination of dumping and injury under Articles 2 and 3 respectively. Article 2.1 defines dumping under the Agreement that: For the purpose of this Agreement, a product is to be considered as being dumped, i.e. introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value, if the export price of the product exported from one country to another is lower than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country. (Emphasis added.) 5.84 The Appellate Body in US – Softwood Lumber stated: “It is clear from the texts of these provisions (Article VI:1 of the GATT and Article 2.1 of the Agreement) that dumping is defined in relation to a product as a whole as defined by the investigating authority.”72 5.85 The assessment of injury also begins with consideration of the “product under consideration.” Article 3.1 sets forth: A determination of injury for the purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products. (emphasis added). 5.86 Whether an import is “dumped” is determined in accordance with Article 2.1, which, as discussed above, requires the authorities to determine dumping with respect to the product under consideration. In this way, the definition of the “product under consideration” is the starting point of the injury determination. 5.87 In light of the fundamental importance of the term “product under consideration”, as demonstrated above, particular care should be paid to ensure that the particular “product under consideration” in an antidumping duty investigation is properly defined. 5.88 As noted in Korea’s First Written Submission, the Panel in US—Softwood Lumber offered some clarification on the meaning of “product under consideration”: “in our analysis of the AD Agreement, we could not find any guidance on the way in which the ‘product under consideration’ should be determined.”73 Japan believes that the Panel’s analysis of “product under consideration” is incomplete. It is true that the Agreement on its face offers no additional clarification or definition of the “product under consideration.” However, since the Agreement does not provide specific additional clarification, it is a basic tenet of treaty interpretation to interpret terms in accordance with their ordinary meaning, as required in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.74 5.89 The ordinary meaning of the word “product” is “an article or substance manufactured or refined for sale; a substance produced during a natural, chemical, or manufacturing process; or a result of an action or process.”75 The ordinary meaning of the word “product” therefore is a single article or substance, as opposed to a collection of distinct articles or substance. The interpretation of the meaning of “product under consideration” for the purposes of the Agreement must follow this ordinary meaning of the word “product.” It should also be noted that the Agreement, as specifically 72

Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS264/AB/R, adopted on 31 August 2004, para. 93 (emphasis added). 73 Panel Report, US—Softwood Lumber, para. 7.153. 74 Paragraph 1 of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty and in the light of its object and purpose.” 75 Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Tenth Edition, Revised, p. 1140.

WT/DS312/R Page 64

set forth in Article 2.1, contemplates defining “a product” under consideration, not “products” under consideration. 5.90 The term “product under consideration” thus prevents an anti-dumping investigation from capturing two separate products. While Japan has no objection to conduct two separate anti-dumping investigations on separate products simultaneously, Japan believes that determination of dumping and injury combining separate products into one “product under consideration” is not permitted. When the scope of the investigation includes two of more clearly distinct products, the investigating authorities should make separate determinations of dumping and injury for each such product. If the authorities determine either dumping or injury combining two separate products, the authorities act inconsistently with Article 2 or 3 of the Agreement, and also would act inconsistently with Article 2.6 when defining the scope of the “like product.” 5.91 In this case, Indonesia argues that “PPC” (plain paper copier) and “WF” (woodfree printing paper) are two distinguishable products.76 Japan does not take any specific position on the factual aspect of this issue. If, however, PPC and WF are distinct products, Korea should have separately considered (1) the effect of Indonesian PPC imports on Korean PPC producers and (2) the effect of Indonesian WF imports on Korean WF producers to determine dumping and injury. Therefore, Japan requests that the Panel first complete the analysis of the meaning of the “product under consideration,” then review whether Korea properly defined the “product under consideration” and the “like product” in the instant dispute, and review whether Korea properly made determinations of dumping and injury for PPC and WF separately if the Panel finds that these are distinct products. 3.

Conclusion

5.92 For the foregoing reasons, Japan respectfully requests that the Panel clarify the meaning of “product under consideration” under the Agreement, and examine if Korea established the scope of the product under consideration and the like product properly based on evidence in this dispute. H.

THIRD PARTY ORAL STATEMENT OF JAPAN

5.93

The following summarizes Japan's arguments in its third party oral statement.

1.

Introduction

5.94 Japan would like to focus on certain arguments for some provisions of the Agreement presented by parties that Japan did not address in detail in its written submission. 2.

Article 6.10 of the Agreement prohibits investigating authorities from arbitrary “collapsing”

5.95 Indonesia argues that the KTC's decision not to calculate separate dumping margins for Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli, and Tjiwi Kimia and instead to “collapse” these three companies into a single entity with a dumping margin is inconsistent with Korea’s obligations under Article 6.10 of the Agreement.77 Korea states that when legally-separate corporations in fact operate as a single economic entity with respect to sales of a subject merchandise, nothing in the Agreement precludes the investigating authorities from applying a functional definition and treating them as a single “exporter.” 5.96 On this issue, Japan would not disagree to all of Korea’s argument. It is worth arguing to permit investigating authorities to treat certain companies as a single “exporter or producer” under 76 77

First Written Submission of Indonesia, paras. 142-153. First Written Submission of Indonesia, paras. 120-129.

WT/DS312/R Page 65

Article 6.10 of the Agreement in very rare cases. Japan, however, notes that Article 6.10 does not permit unlimited “collapsing.” Investigating Authorities are prohibited from treating several legal entities as one “exporter or producer” arbitrarily. 5.97

The first sentence of Article 6.10 of the Agreement provides as follows: The authorities shall, as a rule, determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer concerned of the product under investigation.(emphasis added)

5.98 Article 6.10 thus requires investigating authorities to determine an individual margin of dumping for “each” exporter or producer concerned as a rule. The purpose of this general obligation on investigating authorities is not to allow these authorities to calculate margins of dumping arbitrarily. Without this provision, investigating authorities could deliberately find a positive margin of dumping for a company, applying a single margin for two or more separated entities, even though the company was not found to be dumping standing alone. 5.99 The only permissible exception to this general obligation is for a special situation, i.e. “sampling” in the second sentence of Article 6.10 of the Agreement, where the number of exporters, producers, importers or types of products involved is so large as to calculate an individual margin impracticable. Article 6.10 makes the general obligation of its first sentence all the more rigid by permitting only one exception. 5.100 If, however, it is permissible for investigating authorities to treat two or more separated entities as a single “exporter or producer” under the first sentence of the Article 6.10 freely, that would open up in Article 6.10 a vast loophole on this fundamental obligation of calculating an individual margin of dumping. It would make results of this rigid obligation effectively worthless. If so, Members could easily jump over this obligation, just by explaining these entities are “one exporter” in an economical viewpoint. Accordingly, there is a certain margin or limit to treat separated entities as a single “exporter or producer.” At least, investigating authorities are not entitled to treat this kind of “collapsing” arbitrarily. 5.101 On this point, some of the Third Parties in this case are apparently willing to give investigating authorities a relatively free hand for “collapsing” separated entities as a single “exporter or producer.” For example, China insists that investigating authorities shall have discretion as to collapse affiliated responding corporations and determine a single dumping margin.78 The EC also submits that a group that is composed of several legal entities which are related may be treated as one “exporter or producer” in the sense of Article 6.10 of the Agreement.79 In the view of Japan, these discretions given to authorities are inappropriate. 5.102 The term “affiliated” or “related” is not used in Article 6.10 of the Agreement. The term “related” is used in Article 4.1(i) of the Agreement, which permits an investigating authority to exclude a producer from the definition of the domestic industry because of the relationship between a producer and an exporter or importer. The situation in Article 4.1(i) is obviously different from that in Article 6.10. Moreover, Article 4.1(i) has a Footnote 11 which specifies the type of relationship in detail, while 6.10 never had such a footnote. Had the negotiators of the Agreement intended to permit to treat “related” or “affiliated” entities as an “exporter or producer,” they would do so explicitly. But they did not. The negotiators never had any intent to “treat Opel and Saab as a single entity simply

78 79

Third Party Submission of China, paras. 24. Third Party Submission of the EC, para. 18.

WT/DS312/R Page 66

because they are both owned by General Motors,” as Indonesia states in its First Written Submission.80 5.103 On this present case, Japan does not take any specific position on the factual aspect of this issue. Japan, however, notes that there is a certain limit or margin to “collapsing” separated entities into a single “exporter or producer” and investigating authorities are not entitled to treat such “collapsing” arbitrary, even if “collapsing” is permitted in some cases. 3.

Conclusion

5.104 For the foregoing reasons, Japan respectfully requests the Panel to clarify the meaning of the first sentence of Article 6.10 of the Agreement and examine whether Korea acted inconsistently with Article 6.10 of the Agreement or not. I.

THIRD PARTY WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES

5.105

The following summarizes the United States' arguments in its third party written submission.

1.

Article 6.10 does not require investigating authorities to determine separate dumping margins for separate legal entities if they constitute a single “exporter” or “producer”

5.106 Indonesia argues incorrectly that Article 6.10 of the Agreement does not permit an investigating authority to “treat distinct exporters that are separate natural or legal persons as a single ‘exporter’ for the purpose of calculating dumping margins.”81 Where the facts demonstrate that multiple legal entities constitute a single “exporter” or “producer,” the investigating authority may, consistent with Article 6.10 of the Agreement, determine a single dumping margin for those entities. 5.107 The Agreement does not define either the term “exporter” or “producer.” Moreover, the terms “exporter” and “producer” reflect commercial functions (i.e. exporting and producing) rather than corporate structure. Thus, the facts of a particular case may support a finding that the operations of two or more affiliated parties are so closely intertwined that the parties effectively constitute a single “exporter” or “producer” within the meaning of Article 6.10. 2.

Article 2.2 does not limit an investigating authority’s discretion to use constructed value as “facts available” to determine normal value in the absence of timely-submitted, verifiable home market sales data

5.108 Contrary to Indonesia’s arguments, Article 2.2 does not limit an investigating authority’s discretion to use constructed value as “facts available” to determine normal value for purposes of conducting the dumping calculation under Article 2.1 in the absence of timely-submitted, verifiable home market sales data. 5.109 Article 6.8 expressly permits an investigating authority to rely on “facts available” in making a determination if a party to the proceeding does not provide necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the investigation. Nothing in Articles 6.8 or 2.2 either limits an investigating authority’s discretion in choosing from among the facts available in making its determination or imposes conditions on the use of certain categories of information, such as the cost information at issue in this dispute. Moreover, paragraph 3 of Annex II makes clear that an investigating authority may disregard certain information if it is not verifiable or not submitted in a timely fashion.

80

81

First Written Submission of Indonesia, para. 122. First Written Submission of Indonesia, para. 121.

WT/DS312/R Page 67

5.110 There is thus no legal basis for concluding that an investigating authority’s discretion in the selection of facts available under Article 6.8 is subject to the obligations set out in Article 2.2 regarding the determination of normal value. 3.

Article 2.4 of the Agreement requires adjustment to price only where differences in selling expenses affect price comparability

5.111 Indonesia claims that Korea breached its obligation under Article 2.4 of the Agreement by failing to make “due allowance” for certain differences in selling expenses between the Korean and Indonesian markets. Indonesia misstates the obligations under Article 2.4. Contrary to Indonesia’s arguments, Article 2.4 obligates an investigating authority to make “due allowance” only for differences that are “demonstrated to affect price comparability.” If, as Indonesia appears to suggest, any difference in expenses warranted an adjustment under Article 2.4, regardless of whether it had an effect on price comparability, the references to “price comparability” in Article 2.4 would be rendered meaningless. 4.

Examining information in the application for initiation under Article 5.3 of the Agreement does not necessarily satisfy the obligation to corroborate information from secondary sources under paragraph 7 of Annex II

5.112 Indonesia claims in its first submission that Korea breached its obligations under paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Agreement because the Korean investigating authorities failed to corroborate certain secondary information used as facts available.82 Korea responds by arguing that, as part of the initiation process, the authorities examined the information in the application and found it to be accurate and adequate as required by Article 5.3 of the Agreement.83 The United States notes, in this regard, that the obligations under Article 5.3 and paragraph 7 of Annex II are distinct. The obligation to corroborate information from secondary sources under Paragraph 7 of Annex II is not necessarily satisfied by an investigating authority’s examination of the information in an application for initiation during the initiation process. Whether the steps taken to satisfy the obligation under Article 5.3 have also satisfied the obligation under paragraph 7 of Annex II will depend on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. 5.

Article 5.8 of the Agreement does not require immediate termination of an investigation upon calculation of a preliminary de minimis dumping margin for a responding party

5.113 Indonesia claims that Korea breached its obligations under Article 5.8 of the Agreement because the KTC did not immediately terminate the investigation as to an Indonesian responding party upon calculating a preliminary de minimis dumping margin for that company.84 Indonesia’s argument is based on a flawed interpretation of Article 5.8. Under Article 5.8, the obligation to terminate an investigation upon a finding of no or de minimis dumping applies solely with respect to final determinations of dumping. 6.

An investigating authority does not act inconsistently with Article 2.6 or fail to take into account differences in the markets for different products simply by defining the “like product” to include items that are not identical to each of the items comprising the product under consideration

5.114 The United States respectfully requests the Panel, in assessing the “like product” claims of Indonesia, to take into account the following general points concerning the definition of the like product in antidumping cases and the relationship between that definition and the injury analysis. 82

First Written Submission of Indonesia, paras. 83-88. First Written Submission of Korea, para. 99. 84 First Written Submission of Indonesia, para. 130. 83

WT/DS312/R Page 68

5.115 First, the like product analysis under Article 2.6 requires a comparison of the overall scope of the product under consideration with the overall scope of the like product. There is no requirement that each individual item within the like product be “like” each individual item within the imported product subject to consideration. Further, as there are no substantive obligations other than those set out in Article 2.6 relating to the definition of the appropriate like product in each particular investigation, it is left to the discretion of the investigating authorities to determine which domestic product is “alike in all respects, or . . . has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration.” 5.116 Second, by determining that there is only one “like product” for purposes of an injury determination, an investigating authority does not necessarily fail to “distinguish between the markets” for different types of the product subsumed within the single like product, as Indonesia suggests.85 The Agreement allows for authorities to take into account differences in the markets for different types of products within the same like product. 7.

Article 3.2 of the Agreement requires that investigating authorities “consider” whether there was significant price undercutting by subject imports

5.117 Indonesia challenges the KTC’s findings regarding the price impact of subject imports, claiming that there was no positive evidence that would permit an investigating authority to find that there was price undercutting by subject imports within the meaning of Article 3.2 of the Agreement.86 The United States agrees that each injury determination – including the one at issue in this dispute – must be supported by positive evidence, as required under Article 3.1. However, the United States notes that Article 3.2 does not require the authorities to find significant volume increases, price undercutting, and price effects as a precondition to making an affirmative injury determination. Article 3.2 of the Agreement simply requires that the authorities consider whether there have been significant volume increases and significant price undercutting, and whether subject imports have had significant price depressing or suppressing effects. 8.

Article 3.5 does not prescribe a particular methodology to be used in determining whether dumped imports are the cause of injury to domestic producers or specify the level of detail at which the analysis must be conducted

5.118 Indonesia challenges Korea’s analysis of whether dumped imports were the “cause” of injury to the domestic producers of the like product, claiming that Korea did not undertake a sufficiently detailed analysis under Article 3.5.87 Further, Indonesia claims that Korea failed to conduct a proper analysis of the effects of non-subject imports under Article 3.5.88 5.119 The United States notes that while Article 3.5 of the Agreement sets out several factors that “may” be considered by investigating authorities in ascertaining whether there is a “causal relationship” between dumped imports and injury to the domestic industry, it does not specify the type of information that the authorities must collect and examine or the detail in which they must explain their analysis of the information. 5.120 Article 3.5 also provides that the investigating authorities must examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which are injuring the domestic industry to ensure that injury caused by these other factors is not attributed to the dumped imports. However, it does not prescribe the particular methods and approaches to be used by investigating authorities to separate and distinguish the injurious effects of unfair imports from the injurious effects of the other known causal factors. 85 86 87 88

See First Written Submission of Indonesia, para. 151. First Written Submission of Indonesia, paras. 159-161, 164. First Written Submission of Indonesia, paras. 180-187. First Written Submission of Indonesia, para. 180.

WT/DS312/R Page 69

9.

The fact that some domestic producers import the subject merchandise does not preclude an affirmative injury finding

5.121 Indonesia claims that Korea breached various provisions of the Agreement because, in making its injury determination, the KTC failed to take into account the fact that some members of the domestic industry were importing subject merchandise from the countries under investigation.89 The United States notes, in this regard, that the fact that domestic producers may be importing some dumped merchandise does not preclude an affirmative injury finding. Article 4.1(i) provides investigating authorities with the discretion to exclude from the domestic industry those domestic producers that are importing the dumped product. However, neither Article 4.1(i), nor any other provision of the Agreement, requires that such domestic producers be excluded from the domestic industry in order to make an affirmative finding of injury. 10.

Article 6.9 requires that interested parties be given advance notice of the facts under consideration, not the legal reasoning of the authorities

5.122 Indonesia claims that Korea breached Article 6.9 because the KTC failed to inform the interested parties in advance that it would determine that subject imports were causing present material injury, rather than threatening to cause material injury.90 Contrary to Indonesia’s arguments, however, Article 6.9 does not obligate the investigating authorities to give interested parties advanced notice of the legal reasoning of their determination. Rather, Article 6.9 requires investigating authorities to inform the interested parties of the “essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures.” (Emphasis added). J.

THIRD PARTY ORAL STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

5.123

The following summarizes the United States' arguments in its third party oral statement.

5.124 As the Panel will recall, the United States has already filed a third party submission in this dispute. In its statement, the United States would like to elaborate on three issues: (i) whether an investigating authority may find that two or more legal entities constitute a single “exporter or producer” under Article 6.10 of the Agreement and calculate a single dumping duty for them; (ii) whether Article 2.2 limits an investigating authority’s discretion in selecting among the “facts available” to use in calculating normal value when a respondent does not provide verifiable home market sales data; and (iii) how the “like product” and “product under consideration” may be defined for purposes of making an injury determination. 1.

A single dumping margin may be calculated for two or more legal entities under Article 6.10 if they constitute a single “exporter or producer”

5.125 Indonesia has argued in its first written submission that investigating authorities may not find that separate legal entities constitute a single “exporter” within the meaning of Article 6.10 of the Agreement and determine a single dumping margin for the entities. According to Indonesia, investigating authorities must consider each separate legal entity to be a separate “exporter or producer” for purposes of calculating dumping margins. The United States disagrees. 5.126 Article 6.10 states that “authorities shall, as a rule, determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer concerned in the investigation.” The terms “exporter” and “producer” are not defined in the Agreement. Therefore, nothing in the text of the Agreement supports Indonesia’s argument that the term “exporter” can encompass only a single legal entity.

89 90

First Written Submission of Indonesia, paras. 188-195. First Written Submission of Indonesia, para. 202.

WT/DS312/R Page 70

5.127 Moreover, the terms “exporter” and “producer” reflect commercial functions (i.e. exporting and producing) rather than corporate or legal structure. Thus, the facts of a particular case may demonstrate that the operations of one or more separate legal entities are so closely intertwined that – as a matter of commercial fact – they constitute a single “exporter” or “producer.” 5.128 Consider, for example, that XYZ corporation produces widgets in four separate factories. It determines – for tax and other commercial reasons – that it will separately incorporate each of its factories, which will become wholly-owned subsidiaries of XYZ corporation. Prior to the corporate change, a single dumping margin could be calculated for the corporation and its factories. However, after the corporate change, under Indonesia’s interpretation, an investigating authority would be precluded from finding that the separately incorporated factories and the parent company constitute a single “producer or exporter” and calculating a single dumping margin for them. In the view of the United States, such a result is not mandated under Article 6.10. 2.

Article 2.2 does not limit an investigating authority’s discretion to select among the “facts available” to calculate normal value when a respondent does not provide verifiable home market sales data

5.129 In the investigation that is the subject of this dispute, Korean investigating authorities calculated the normal value of sales for two Indonesian respondents on the basis of “facts available.” They did so because, according to the Korean authorities, the home market sales data submitted by the respondents could not be verified. The Korean authorities selected as the “facts available” certain cost information, which they used to “construct” the normal value of sales. Indonesia is challenging Korea’s actions. Indonesia argues that, under Article 2.2 of the Agreement, cost information can be used to determine normal value only in certain limited circumstances – that is (according to Indonesia), in circumstances where there are either no home market sales of a “like product” or the home market sales do not provide a proper basis for comparison. Indonesia asserts that, because Korean authorities did not make a finding that such circumstances existed, they were precluded from determining normal value on the basis of the cost information. 5.130 In the view of the United States, Indonesia’s argument is off the mark. Article 2.2 establishes a requirement that home market sales be used to calculate normal value where such sales are available and provide a proper basis for comparison. Article 2.2 says nothing about what an investigating authority should do when a respondent fails to cooperate in an investigation and does not provide verifiable home market sales data. That issue is governed by Article 6.8 of the Agreement. 5.131 Article 6.8 permits an investigating authority to rely on “facts available” in making a determination if a party to the proceeding does not provide necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the investigation. Further, Paragraph 3 of Annex II recognizes that an investigating authority may decide not to take into account information that is not verifiable. Applied together, these provisions allow an investigating authority to disregard home market sales data if they are found to be unverifiable and to determine normal value on the basis of “facts available.” 5.132 Article 6.8 does not require that the limitations under Article 2.2 be observed when making a normal value determination on the basis of “facts available.” Moreover, Article 6.8 does not impose conditions on the use of certain categories of information, such as the cost information at issue in this dispute. Thus, there is no legal basis for Indonesia’s argument that cost information cannot be used as “facts available” to determine normal value unless an investigating authority makes the findings outlined in Article 2.2. 5.133 Moreover, Indonesia’s argument may lead to illogical results. Imagine, for example, that a respondent submits home market sales and cost data for purposes of calculating normal value. The sales data is ultimately found to be inaccurate but the cost data is verified and found to be accurate. Under Indonesia’s proposed approach, the investigating authority could use the cost data instead of

WT/DS312/R Page 71

the flawed sales data to calculate normal value only if it found that there were no home market sales of a like product in the ordinary course of trade. If the home market sales data on the record of the proceeding is flawed, however, how can the investigating authority make such a finding without relying on the same flawed sales data? In the view of the United States, Article 2.2 cannot be interpreted in a way that would require such a result. 3.

The definition of the domestic "like product" and the "product under consideration" in injury determinations

5.134 In its third party submission, the United States provided its views on certain issues raised in Indonesia’s submission relating to the definition of the domestic “like product” in injury determinations. The United States would like to submit two other observations today. First, the United States agrees with Canada that, in defining the domestic product that is “like” the “product under consideration” for purposes of an injury determination, nothing in the Agreement precludes an investigating authority from considering both physical characteristics – including technical specifications and quality factors – and market characteristics.91 In the view of the United States, the market characteristics relevant in defining the domestic “like product” in injury determinations might include end uses, interchangeability, channels of distribution, and perceptions of the market participants. Similarities in production facilities, processes, and employees may also be relevant to this analysis. 5.135 Second, the United States agrees with Korea’s explanation in its submission that, for purposes of the injury determination, the “like product” is defined by considering the similarity to the imported “product under consideration.”92 The United States notes, in this regard, that a “like product” may be similar to a “product under consideration” even if the two include items that have some different characteristics. As the United States explained in its third party submission, the domestic “like product” analysis requires a comparison of the overall scope of the product under consideration with the overall scope of the like product. VI.

INTERIM REVIEW

6.1 On 24 June 2005, we submitted the interim report to the parties. Both parties submitted written requests for the review of precise aspects of the interim report. Parties also submitted written comments on the other party's comments. Neither party requested an interim review meeting. 6.2 We have outlined our treatment of the parties' requests below. Where necessary, we have also made certain technical revisions to our report. A.

REQUEST OF INDONESIA

6.3 First, Indonesia argues that the Panel should change its findings regarding the KTC's calculation of the constructed normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. More specifically, Indonesia submits that the KTC acted inconsistently with Articles 2.2, 2.2.2, 6.8 and paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Agreement by using interest expenses relating to a production company, [[Company B]], for CMI which was merely a trading company. 6.4 Korea responds that financial expenses incurred by a company is independent of its size and activities. Korea also submits that it was proper for the KTC to use [[Company B]]'s financial expenses for CMI because these expenses included both production and sales-related components.

91 92

See Third Party Submission of Canada, para. 16. See Written Submission of the Republic of Korea, para. 164.

WT/DS312/R Page 72

6.5 We note that in our discussion of this claim in our interim report (infra, paras. 7.99-7.105), we addressed what we perceived to be the main arguments developed by Indonesia in this regard. At interim review, however, Indonesia drew our attention to certain additional arguments (infra, para. 7.108) regarding the calculation of interest expenses for CMI, which we had not addressed in our interim report. Although these arguments could, in our view, have been raised in a more coherent manner, we nevertheless felt obliged to address them and have accordingly revised our finding with respect to this claim, as contained in paragraphs 7.106-7.112 below. 6.6 Second, Indonesia contends that the Panel should clarify whether or not its findings in paragraphs 7.35 and 7.45 refer to its factual finding in paragraph 7.31 that the Sinar Mas Group failed to allow the KTC investigators access to CMI's accounting records other than its financial statements during verification. Korea submits that the Panel made the necessary findings in this regard. We note that our findings in paragraphs 7.35 and 7.45 cited by Indonesia are clearly based on our factual finding in paragraph 7.31 that the Sinar Mas Group failed to allow the KTC investigators access to CMI's accounting records other than its financial statements during verification. We therefore need not make additional findings in this regard. 6.7 Third, Indonesia argues that the Panel failed to make a factual finding to acknowledge the fact that Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli provided certain CMI records, including documents relating to certain sample transactions. Citing paragraph 7.31 below, Korea contends that the Panel made the necessary finding in this regard. We modified paragraph 7.36 of our report to emphasize the fact that information relating to sample transactions between CMI and independent buyers were submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. 6.8 Fourth, Indonesia contends that the Panel did not address some of Indonesia's arguments regarding the meaning of the term "verifiable" under paragraph 3 of Annex II. Korea disagrees and submits that the Panel properly discussed Indonesia's arguments in this regard. We note that in paragraphs 7.59-7.67 below, we discussed Indonesia's arguments under paragraph 3 of Annex II regarding the verifiability of the domestic sales data provided by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. We therefore decline to make additional findings in this regard. 6.9 Fifth, Indonesia argues that the Panel should clarify its statement in paragraph 7.67 below that a comparison of the list of sales from Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli to CMI on the one hand, and the list of sales between CMI and independent buyers on the other could not have assured the KTC investigators about the completeness of the domestic sales data because this comparison would not shed enough light on the values of the domestic sales transactions. Indonesia re-cites specific arguments it had raised in this regard during these proceedings. Korea disagrees and submits that the Panel has properly addressed Indonesia's arguments on this matter. We note that in paragraphs 7.597.67 below we discuss in detail the issue of whether the domestic sales data submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli were verifiable within the meaning of paragraph 3 of Annex II. In our view, this discussion addresses the relevant arguments parties raised on this issue. We therefore decline to make additional findings in this regard. 6.10 Sixth, Indonesia seeks clarification from the Panel as to whether the Panel's statement in paragraph 7.70 below that "[a]ccuracy ... goes beyond verifying the completeness of domestic sales data and concerns a broader range of information, including CMI's costs associated with the sales of the subject product and its prices" implies that the absence of CMI's cost information was relevant to the question of the accuracy of domestic sales. Korea has made no specific argument in this regard. The statement cited by Indonesia is part of our analysis regarding the issue of whether the record supports the proposition that the sole purpose of requesting CMI's financial statements and accounting records was the completeness test. As such, the mentioned statement is not intended to imply anything as to whether CMI's cost information was relevant to the question of accuracy of domestic sales. We therefore decline to make additional findings in this regard.

WT/DS312/R Page 73

6.11 Seventh, Indonesia argues that the Panel failed to address Indonesia's argument that the KTC failed to explain the reasons for its decision to reject the domestic sales data submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli and to use facts available instead. Indonesia requests us to append a footnote to paragraph 7.73 below to indicate that Indonesia raised such an argument. Korea responds that Indonesia should not be allowed to raise a new argument at the interim review stage. Korea also submits that the KTC did in fact explain the reasons for its decision to reject the domestic sales data presented by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. In our view, the assertion that the KTC failed to explain the reasons for its decision to reject the domestic sales data submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli is inherent in the way we characterized Indonesia's arguments in this regard in paragraph 7.73 of our report. We note that, in paragraph 7.83 below, we expressed our view as to whether the KTC explained the basis of its decision to reject the mentioned domestic sales data. We therefore decline to make additional findings in this regard. 6.12 Eighth, Indonesia requests the Panel to revise its findings in paragraphs 7.79-7.80 below to reflect the fact that the Provisional Report demonstrates that the KTC applied the ordinary course of trade test under Article 2.2 of the Agreement. Korea submits that the fact that the KTC applied the mentioned test in its Provisional Report is legally insignificant as it did not mean that the KTC would not later on decline to use the domestic sales data submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli in its normal value determinations. Although we do not find it relevant to our legal analysis, we nevertheless appended footnote 152 to paragraph 7.80 to accommodate Indonesia's request, i.e. to acknowledge the fact that in the Provisional Report the KTC did in fact apply the mentioned test. 6.13 Ninth, Indonesia asked for clarification regarding the Panel's interpretation of the term "etc." used in the KTC's Preliminary Dumping Report, quoted in paragraph 7.81 below. Korea submits that no clarification is needed in this regard. We made a slight modification to paragraph 7.81 to accommodate Indonesia's concern. 6.14

Tenth, Indonesia requested a typographical change to paragraph 7.83 below, which we made.

6.15 Eleventh, Indonesia objects to our statement in footnote 185 and argues that the Panel has not addressed its argument that the single entity consisting of the three Sinar Mas Group companies should have been given the rights under paragraph 6 of Annex II. Korea submits that our findings in this regard are sufficiently clear, hence no modification is needed. In order to address Indonesia's concern regarding the specific issue of whether or not the single entity should have been given the rights under paragraph 6 of Annex II, we modified the text of footnote 185. 6.16 Twelfth, Indonesia raised a question regarding the basis of one of our statements in paragraph 7.165 below. Korea submits that no modification is needed to the statement cited by Indonesia. We modified the wording of the mentioned statement in order to address Indonesia's concern. 6.17 Thirteenth, Indonesia submits that in connection with its finding in paragraph 7.210 below, the Panel should explain how the KTC's obligation not to disclose confidential information would allow its refusal to disclose (1) why the reported domestic sales data were rejected, (2) the reasoning relating to the methods provided for under Article 2.2 of the Agreement, and (3) the details relating to the calculation of the normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. Korea has raised no specific arguments in this regard. We note that Indonesia repeats the arguments that it has raised on this issue in the course of these proceedings. We therefore decline to make any additional findings in this regard. 6.18 Fourteenth, Indonesia requests the Panel to modify the quotation from Indonesia's response to question 51 from the Panel following the first meeting, found in footnote 243 below. Indonesia also submits that the Panel has failed to address some of its substantive arguments about the like product claim, presented in the remainder of Indonesia's response to question 51. Korea disagrees with Indonesia in this regard. We modified the format of the mentioned quotation to accommodate

WT/DS312/R Page 74

Indonesia's request. Regarding the substantive arguments Indonesia raises, we are of the view that we have addressed Indonesia's arguments relevant to the resolution of the mentioned claim. We therefore decline to make any additional findings in this regard. 6.19 Fifteenth, Indonesia contends that the Panel has failed to explain how it found that the KTC properly analyzed whether or not dumped imports had "significant" price undercutting, "significant" price depression or "significant" price suppression on the prices of the Korean industry. Our findings on this issue are found in paragraphs 7.252-7.253 below. As we stated in paragraph 7.253, we do not interpret Article 3.2 of the Agreement to require that the word "significant" appear in the IA's determination. We therefore decline to make any additional findings in this regard. 6.20 Sixteenth, Indonesia requests the Panel to revise its finding that Indonesia's claim regarding the KTC's volume analysis is not within its terms of reference. In this context, Indonesia argues that the Panel collapsed the issue of the increase in the volume of dumped imports from 2002 to the first half of 2003 with the issue of the calculation of domestic consumption. Indonesia submits that it is not clear whether the Panel's conclusion in paragraph 7.264 applies to both of these issues. We note that in the mentioned paragraph, we found Indonesia's claim regarding the KTC's volume analysis to be outside our terms of reference. That obviously applies to all arguments raised by Indonesia to support that claim, including its argument relating to the increase in the volume of dumped imports from 2002 to the first half of 2003 and the calculation of the domestic consumption. We therefore decline to make any additional findings in this regard. 6.21 Indonesia also argues that it is not clear whether Korea raised such a jurisdictional issue before the Panel. Korea submits that even if this was not requested by Korea, the Panel correctly considered this jurisdictional issue sua sponte. We discussed Korea's request in this regard in paragraphs 7.255 and 7.256 below. We also note our statement in paragraph 7.257 that even if this issue was not raised by Korea, we would have to address it on our own motion. We therefore decline to make any additional findings in this regard. 6.22 Indonesia argues that its claim regarding the KTC's volume analysis should be found to be within the Panel's terms of reference through its claim under Article 3.2 concerning the impact of dumped imports on the prices of the domestic industry and the one under Article 3.4 regarding the consequent impact of those imports on the state of the domestic industry. Korea disagrees with Indonesia in this regard. We note that we have analyzed Indonesia's request for the establishment of a panel with sufficient care in deciding whether or not its claim on the volume of dumped imports was properly raised in it. We do not consider Indonesia's comments to be convincing to require us to change our analysis in this regard. We therefore decline Indonesia's request. 6.23 Indonesia submits that the issue of whether the KTC excluded from the domestic industry all domestic producers that imported the subject product from the subject countries, raised in paragraph 116 of its second written submission, is not related to the KTC's volume analysis. Indonesia submits that this claim has to do with the KTC's obligation to carry out a WTO-consistent price analysis under Article 3.2 and the analysis under Article 3.4 of the Agreement. As stated above, we are not convinced by Indonesia's proposition that its claim regarding the calculation of domestic consumption has been properly raised in its request for the establishment through its other claims under Article 3.2 or 3.4. We therefore decline to change our finding in this regard. 6.24 Seventeenth, Indonesia argues that the Panel exercised false judicial economy with respect to its claim regarding the KTC's causation analysis. Korea disagrees with Indonesia in this regard. As we explained in paragraph 7.277 below, we applied judicial economy with respect to this claim because the KTC's causation analysis was based on an injury analysis that we found to be WTOinconsistent. We therefore decline to change our finding in this regard.

WT/DS312/R Page 75

6.25 Finally, Indonesia requests the Panel to make factual findings on two issues: (1) that CMI's financial statements submitted by the Sinar Mas Group on 9 April 2003 were part of the record of the investigation at issue, and (2) that the verification report submitted by Korea as Exhibit KOR-7 was not part of the record. Korea submits that the Panel should not make any further findings with regard to these two issues. We note that we made the necessary factual findings on these two issues in paragraphs 7.38 and 7.181 of our report. We therefore decline to make any additional findings in these regards. B.

REQUEST OF KOREA

6.26 Korea requests the Panel to modify its finding in paragraph 7.201 to take into consideration Korea's statement in its response to question 32 from the Panel following the second meeting that the KTC could not disclose confidential information submitted by [[Company A]] to the Sinar Mas Group because of its confidentiality obligations under Article 6.5 of the Agreement. Indonesia submits that the Panel should not modify its finding because Indonesia's claim under Article 6.4 is not limited to confidential information. We note that the main premise of our finding regarding Indonesia's disclosure claim under Article 6.4 of the Agreement is the KTC's failure to disclose confidential information to interested parties who submitted that information. It follows that the fact that the KTC was precluded from disclosing to the Sinar Mas Group confidential information submitted by another interested party would not affect our finding. We therefore decline to modify our finding in this regard. 6.27 Second, Korea requests the Panel to treat certain information in this report as confidential. Indonesia argues that some of the information that Korea wants to be treated as confidential is available in the public version of the KTC's reports and therefore should not be treated as confidential. More specifically, Indonesia argues that redacting the company names could create confusion about the number of companies that were subject to the investigation at issue. We note that Indonesia has not submitted evidence as to whether the information Korea wants to be treated confidential had been made public in the same context that it is used in our report. In the absence of such specific evidence and for the sake of respecting confidentiality of sensitive information, we consider it proper to redact from our findings the information that Korea identified as confidential. However, taking into consideration the concern raised by Indonesia, we have used abbreviations that would preclude confusion as to the identities of companies, while keeping their names confidential. VII.

FINDINGS

A.

GENERAL ISSUES

1.

Standard of Review

7.1 In light of the claims and arguments made by the parties in the course of these Panel proceedings, we recall, at the outset of our examination, the standard of review we must apply to the matter before us. 7.2 Article 11 of the DSU93 sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels for all covered agreements except the Anti-dumping Agreement. Article 11 imposes upon panels a comprehensive

93

Article 11 of the DSU, entitled "Function of Panels", states: "The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements…"

WT/DS312/R Page 76

obligation to make an "objective assessment of the matter", an obligation which embraces all aspects of a panel's examination of the "matter", both factual and legal. 7.3 Article 17.6 of the Anti-dumping Agreement sets forth the special standard of review applicable to anti-dumping disputes. It provides: “(i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine whether the authorities’ establishment of the facts was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned;” “(ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Where the panel finds that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities’ measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.” 7.4 Thus, together, Article 11 of the DSU and Article 17.6 of the Anti-dumping Agreement set out the standard of review we must apply with respect to both the factual and legal aspects of our examination of the claims and arguments raised by the parties.94 7.5 In light of this standard of review, in examining the claims under the Anti-dumping Agreement in the matter referred to us, we must evaluate whether the Korean measure at issue is consistent with relevant provisions of the Anti-dumping Agreement. We must find it consistent if we find that the KTC has properly established the facts and evaluated them in an unbiased and objective manner, and that its determinations rest upon a "permissible" interpretation of the relevant provisions. Our task is not to perform a de novo review of the information and evidence on the record of the antidumping investigation at issue, nor to substitute our judgment for that of the KTC, even though we might have arrived at a different determination were we examining the record ourselves. 2.

Burden of Proof

7.6 We recall that the general principles applicable to burden of proof in WTO dispute settlement require that a party claiming a violation of a provision of the WTO Agreement by another Member must assert and prove its claim.95 In these Panel proceedings, Indonesia, which has challenged the consistency of Korea's measure, thus bears the burden of demonstrating that the measure is not consistent with the relevant provisions of the Agreement. Indonesia also bears the burden of establishing that its claims are properly before us. We also note that it is generally for each party asserting a fact to provide proof thereof.96 In this respect, therefore, it is also for Korea to provide evidence for the facts which it asserts. We also recall that a prima facie case is one which, in the absence of effective refutation by the other party, requires a panel, as a matter of law, to rule in favour of the party presenting the prima facie case.

94

Appellate Body Report, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan ("US – Hot-Rolled Steel "), WT/DS184/AB/R, adopted 23 August 2001, paras. 54-62. 95 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India ("US – Wool Shirts and Blouses"), WT/DS33/AB/R and Corr. 1, adopted 23 May 1997, DSR 1997:I, 323 at 337. 96 Ibid.

WT/DS312/R Page 77

3.

Treaty Interpretation

7.7 We note that many of the claims raised by Indonesia in these proceedings require us to interpret various provisions of the Anti-dumping Agreement. 7.8 We note that Article 3.2 of the DSU indicates that Members recognise that the WTO dispute settlement system serves to clarify the provisions of the covered agreements "in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law". In this regard, the Appellate Body, in United States – Gasoline, refers to "a fundamental rule of treaty interpretation [which] has received its most authoritative and succinct expression in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties"97 ("Vienna Convention"), and cites Article 31.1 thereof, which reads as follows: ARTICLE 31 General rule of interpretation 1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.98 7.9 According to the Appellate Body, "[this] general rule of interpretation has attained the status of a rule of customary or general international law. As such, it forms part of the 'customary rules of interpretation of public international law'"99. We shall, therefore, follow the provisions of Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention when interpreting the provisions of the Anti-dumping Agreement referred to by the parties in these proceedings and base our interpretation on the text of the provision under consideration in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the Anti-dumping Agreement. B.

PROCEDURAL ISSUE

1.

Composition of Delegation

7.10 At our first substantive meeting with the parties, Korea, citing Article 18.2 of the DSU, stated that there were representatives of the Indonesian paper industry in the Indonesian delegation and requested that they leave the hearing room because access to confidential information submitted by Korea would give them an unfair competitive advantage over their Korean counterparts. Indonesia submitted that it had full discretion with respect to the composition of its delegation in these proceedings and that it had been respecting its obligation under Article 18.2 of the DSU to protect the confidentiality of the submissions made by Korea. 7.11 In that meeting, we ruled that, as provided in paragraph 15 of our Working Procedures, Indonesia was entitled to determine the composition of its delegation in these proceedings. We also stated that, in accordance with Article 18.2 of the DSU and paragraph 15 of our Working 100 Procedures , Indonesia assumed responsibility for its delegation, including respect for the 101 confidentiality of the submissions made by Korea in these proceedings.

97

Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline ("US – Gasoline"), WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I, 3 at 16. 98 (1969) 8 International Legal Materials 679. 99 Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, supra, note 97 at 17 (footnote omitted). 100 Paragraph 15 of our Working Procedures provides: "The parties to the dispute have the right to determine the composition of their own delegations. The parties shall have the responsibility for all members of their delegations and shall ensure that all members of the delegation act in accordance with the rules of the DSU

WT/DS312/R Page 78

7.12 We are cognisant of the need to protect sensitive information in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings, and in particular of the importance of protecting confidential information submitted to the IA in an anti-dumping investigation pursuant to Article 6.5 of the Agreement. We note that at the time we made our ruling on this issue102, Korea had not identified any specific information for which it sought confidential treatment.103 Rather, Korea sought to exclude certain representatives of Indonesia from the entirety of the meeting of the parties with the Panel. We further emphasize that we indicated at the meeting our willingness to entertain a request for procedures for the protection of 104 specific Business Confidential Information, an offer echoed by Indonesia, but Korea made no such request. We also note that Indonesia subsequently indicated that it would not in any event include business representatives in its delegation in the second substantive meeting of the Panel with the parties. 2.

Access to Submissions

7.13 In its second written submission, Korea stated that it would continue to serve its confidential submissions on Indonesia "subject to the understanding that these submissions [would] not be disclosed by Indonesia to anyone other than the relevant Indonesian government officials and to legal advisors of Indonesia who [had] agreed to maintain the confidentiality of information provided to them".105 Indonesia responded that Korea could not unilaterally subject to conditions Indonesia's use of Korea's submissions in the preparation of its case. Korea then requested the Panel to direct Indonesia to return to Korea all confidential submissions made by the latter. Korea also indicated that it would serve non-confidential versions of its confidential submissions on Indonesia. We understood this proposition to mean that Korea would submit full confidential versions of its submissions to the Panel, but that only non-confidential versions would be served on Indonesia. 7.14 Regarding the issue of confidentiality of submissions made by parties to WTO dispute settlement proceedings, we note the following provision in Article 18.2 of the DSU: "Written submissions to the panel or the Appellate Body shall be treated as confidential, but shall be made available to the parties to the dispute. Nothing in this Understanding shall preclude a party to a dispute from disclosing statements of its own positions to the public. Members shall treat as confidential information submitted by another Member to the panel or the Appellate Body which that Member has designated as confidential. A party to a dispute shall also, upon request of a and the Working Procedures of this Panel, particularly in regard to confidentiality of the proceedings." 101 We find support for this proposition in the following ruling of the panel in Indonesia – Autos: "We would like to emphasize that all members of parties' delegations -- whether or not they are government employees -- are present as representatives of their governments, and as such are subject to the provisions of the DSU and of the standard working procedures, including Articles 18.1 and 18.2 of the DSU and paragraphs 2 and 3 of those procedures. In particular, parties are required to treat as confidential all submissions to the Panel and all information so designated by other Members; and, in addition, the Panel meets in closed session. Accordingly, we expect that all delegations will fully respect those obligations and will treat these proceedings with the utmost circumspection and discretion." (footnote omitted) Panel Report, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry ("Indonesia – Autos "), WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R and Corr.1, 2, 3, 4, adopted 23 July 1998, DSR 1998:VI, 2201, para. 14.1. 102 We made an oral ruling on this issue during our first meeting with the parties, which we then sent to the parties in writing in a fax dated 14 March 2005. 103 Korea had designated its entire first submission as confidential. 104 In its letter dated 10 March 2005, Indonesia offered supplemental working procedures concerning Business Confidential Information. 105 Again, Korea had designated its entire second submission as confidential.

WT/DS312/R Page 79

Member, provide a non-confidential summary of the information contained in its written submissions that could be disclosed to the public." 7.15 Article 18.2 lays down a general requirement that submissions made by parties to a dispute be treated as confidential by the other parties receiving such submissions. We also note that paragraph 15 of our Working Procedures contains the same requirement. We do not, however, understand Article 18.2 to prevent a party from seeking advice of individuals, as necessary, for its effective participation in the dispute, provided that any persons consulted are held accountable with respect to 106 the provisions of the DSU, including those on confidentiality. We see this as a natural corollary to the proposition that Members are free to determine the composition of their delegations to meetings. It would not be logical if Members were allowed to decide which individuals would represent them in their delegations, but not allowed to decide whose services would be utilized in preparation of their cases. 7.16 Taking into consideration Indonesia's repeated statements that it would respect the confidentiality of Korea's submissions in accordance with Article 18.2 of the DSU and paragraph 15 of our Working Procedures, we see no reason to find that Indonesia has not fulfilled this obligation so far in these proceedings. 7.17 In respect of Korea's proposal to withdraw its existing submissions and submit nonconfidential versions of those submissions to Indonesia, considering the fact that Article 18.1 of the DSU precludes ex parte communications between the Panel and a party, we stated that while we would entertain any request by Korea to withdraw its submissions or to redact from them certain information, in such a case the submissions withdrawn or information redacted would no longer be before the Panel. We further stated that we were fully conscious of the obligations placed on Members by Article 6.5 of the Anti-dumping Agreement, and remain prepared to work with the parties to design ways to protect any information treated as confidential by the investigating authorities in the underlying investigation. Korea, however, failed to request such procedures. 7.18 We note in this regard that Korea subsequently requested that we exclude certain specific information from the public version of our report107, and we have complied with this request. C.

KTC'S DECISION TO DISREGARD DOMESTIC SALE INFORMATION AND TO CALCULATE NORMAL VALUES FOR INDAH KIAT AND PINDO DELI ON THE BASIS OF FACTS AVAILABLE

1.

Arguments of Parties

(a)

Indonesia

7.19 Indonesia argues that the KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the Agreement and various provisions of Annex II to the Agreement in its decision to disregard domestic sales data and to use facts available to calculate normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. Indonesia bases this claim on three grounds. Firstly, Indonesia submits that the KTC failed to make the necessary finding under Article 6.8 that these exporters either significantly impeded the investigation or failed to provide necessary information within a reasonable period. Secondly, Indonesia submits that the KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 and paragraph 3 of Annex II by refusing to consider domestic sales data submitted by these two exporters, because those data (1) were verifiable, (2) were submitted in a timely manner and in the medium requested by the investigating authority ("IA"), and (3) could 106

See, Panel Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, Second Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU ("Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II ) "), WT/DS46/RW/2, adopted 23 August 2001, DSR 2001:XI, 5481, paras. 3.6-3.7. 107 Korea submitted its request in its letter dated 10 May 2005, containing its comments on the descriptive part of our report.

WT/DS312/R Page 80

be used without undue difficulty. Thirdly, according to Indonesia, the KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 and paragraph 6 of Annex II by not informing Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli of its decision to reject their domestic sales data and not providing them with an opportunity to submit further explanations and rectify their failure. 7.20 According to Indonesia, had the KTC taken into consideration the domestic sales data submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli, it would have found no dumping with respect to the single entity consisting of Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli and Tjiwi Kimia. (b)

Korea

7.21 Korea submits that the KTC requested CMI's financial statements on different occasions during the investigation at issue. More specifically, it requested that CMI's financial statements and accounting records be made available during verification, but the Sinar Mas Group companies refused to make them available. This, in Korea's view, demonstrates that the Sinar Mas Group companies did not cooperate in the investigation at issue and the KTC properly resorted to facts available. Korea asserts that the domestic sales data submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli were not verifiable and hence could not be used by the KTC in the absence of CMI's financial statements and accounting records. Korea also submits that the KTC properly explained the reasons for resorting to facts available with respect to calculating normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli and gave these companies opportunities to comment on that issue. 2.

Arguments of Third Parties

(a)

European Communities

7.22 According to the European Communities, since the IA is entitled, under Article 6.10, to treat related companies as a single entity in the context of its dumping determinations, if an exporter that is part of a single entity subject to an anti-dumping investigation fails to cooperate with the IA, the latter can legitimately resort to facts available with respect to the single entity pursuant to Article 6.8 and the relevant provisions of Annex II of the Agreement. The European Communities generally argues that a balance should be struck between the need to complete the investigation in a timely manner and the interested parties' right to express their views to the IA. In the investigation at issue, the KTC must show why acceptance of CMI's financial statements after verification would undermine the timely completion of the investigation. The IA should not be allowed to reject the information solely because it was submitted past the deadline set out under the national law of the importing Member. (b)

China

7.23 China argues that although the IA has a certain degree of discretion with respect to defining what is meant by "necessary information" for purposes of Article 6.8, such discretion has to be used in accordance with the procedural requirements implied in the Agreement. According to China, an IA should not be entitled to reject all the information provided by an interested party on the grounds that some information has not been submitted. The IA can only do so when the circumstances of a given investigation so justify. 3.

Evaluation by the Panel

(a)

Relevant Facts

7.24 The investigation at issue was initiated on 26 November 2002. On the same date, questionnaires were sent to the Indonesian companies involved in the investigation. In addition to information relating to individual exporters, i.e. Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli and Tjiwi Kimia in the case of the Sinar Mas Group, the questionnaires requested that information concerning the sales and costs of

WT/DS312/R Page 81

related companies engaged in the production or sale of the subject product, and the financial statements of these related companies, be submitted. The questionnaires read in relevant part: "For all related parties ... involved with the production or sale of the merchandise under investigation during the period of investigation ... in the domestic market or Korean market or both, include the sales and cost of these related companies with your sales and cost in the same computer file(s) and submit a single narrative response. ... For sales to related resellers, you must report the sales from the related resellers to the unrelated customers."108 (emphasis added) "(4) financial statements or other relevant documents (i.e., profit and loss reports) of all related companies involved in the production or sale of the merchandise under investigation in your domestic and Korean market, and of the parent(s) of these related companies, (5) any financial statement or other financial report filed with the local or national government of the country in which your company is located."109 (emphasis added) 7.25 Tjiwi Kimia chose not to respond to the questionnaire. Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli submitted their responses to the questionnaires on 24 January 2003. In their responses to the questionnaires, Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli submitted information regarding their sales to CMI. This information was verified by the investigators. They explained to the KTC that [[**]]110 per cent of Indah Kiat’s and [[**]]111 per cent of Pindo Deli’s domestic sales of the subject product were made through CMI. They also submitted a detailed listing of CMI's sales of the subject product to independent buyers.112 CMI's financial statements were not submitted along with questionnaire responses.113 7.26 The KTC sent its verification plan to the Sinar Mas Group on 10 March 2003. The verification plan grouped the information requested for verification purposes under five headings: "Understanding of Indah Kiat/Pindo Deli", "Verification of the completeness of the data submitted", "Verification of the accuracy and validity of the information on the export prices to Korea and relevant adjustment factors", "Verification of the accuracy and validity of the information on the domestic prices and the relevant adjustment factors" and "Verification of the cost of production". 7.27 Under the first heading, i.e. "Understanding of Indah Kiat/Pindo Deli", the verification plan clearly requested that CMI's financial statements be prepared for verification. The verification plan provides in the pertinent part: "d. Prepare the financial statement of 2001 and 2002 year of PT.CMI ("CMI") and PT.MKP ("MKP")."114 (emphasis in original) 7.28 The verification plan also asked for information in relation to Indah Kiat's and Pindo Deli's sales of the subject product through CMI. For instance, it requested a wide range of documents relating to certain sample transactions between CMI and independent buyers.115 The plan also asked 108

Exhibit KOR- 5 at 4. Exhibit KOR- 5 at 13. 110 Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. 111 Ibid. 112 See, First Written Submission of Korea, para. 104. 113 First Written Submission of Korea, para. 42. 114 Exhibit KOR- 25 at 221. 115 Exhibit KOR- 25 at 225-226. 109

WT/DS312/R Page 82

for information relating to certain differences between quantities of sales from Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli to CMI and the latter's corresponding sales to independent buyers.116 Finally, information relating to CMI's resale of the subject product to sister mills within the Sinar Mas Group and the [[**]]117charged by CMI over the prices of Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli was also requested.118 7.29 In response to the verification plan, the Sinar Mas Group pointed out that information relating to CMI's sales to independent buyers could be verified in the Group's office.119 7.30 The verification was carried out between 24-27 March 2003. During the verification, the KTC officials requested CMI's financial statements. In response, the Sinar Mas Group submitted a letter indicating that they were unable to make CMI's financial statements available. The letter reads in relevant parts: "The KTC verification plan faxed to us on 8 March 2003 requires preparation of the financial statements of CMI and MKP (section VII.I.B.d). We are unable to prepare these statements for the following reasons: CMI and MKP are not controlled by Indah Kiat or Pindo Deli. While CMI and MKP companies are related to Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli through shareholding they are separate legal entities with their own management which is independent of that of Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. ... CMI has no interest in exports to Korea or elsewhere and therefore has no interest in this proceeding. At Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli's requests, CMI has already prepared a substantial amount of material required by the KTC to which it has committed substantial resources. CMI considers that the information already prepared and that of Indah Kiat clearly demonstrates that its resell [sic] prices are its buying prices from the mills divided by 95%, i.e. it takes a 5% profit margin from its resell prices. CMI is not satisfied that its highly confidential financial statements have any relevance to this investigation of Indah Kiat's and Pindo Deli's exports. We have done our utmost to obtain the required statements from CMI but we cannot control them. In addition to the financial statements of CMI, the KTC has requested certain further information in relation to CMI's activities. In response to the repeated requests of Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli, CMI has provided the materials requested in relation to the sample sales per sections VII.4.B.a (Indah Kiat) and VII.4.B.a (Pindo Deli) of the verification plan, CMI has made it very clear that it will not provide further in relation to this matter. We request KTC's understanding that we have acted to the best of our ability in this matter."120 (emphasis added) 116

Exhibit KOR- 25 at 226. Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. 118 Exhibit KOR-25 at 226. 119 Exhibit KOR-25 at 1. 117

WT/DS312/R Page 83

7.31 We note that although it is undisputed that the Sinar Mas Group did not provide CMI's financial statements during verification, parties' views diverge as to whether or not the KTC investigators were provided access to other accounting records of CMI, again during verification. Korea asserts that, in addition to the financial statements, the KTC investigators also requested to access CMI's accounting records during verification and that the Sinar Mas Group did not provide such access.121 Indonesia contends that the Sinar Mas Group provided the KTC investigators with electronic access to CMI's accounting records.122 Indonesia submitted two affidavits in support of this assertion.123 7.32 Turning to the record, we note that it indicates that what was requested by the KTC and not provided by the Sinar Mas Group during verification went beyond CMI's financial statements and included some other accounting records. For instance, the Verification Report states in relevant parts: "- Since Indah Kiat did not submit data on sales made by CMI, an affiliated company, to unrelated parties, we could not verify completeness of Indah Kiat's sales data, as the following could not be performed. - Verification of the submitted data against CMI's financial statements, independent auditors' reports thereon, general ledgers and sales sub-ledgers, etc...."124 (emphasis added) 7.33

The Final Investigation Report reads in pertinent parts: "During the on the spot investigation, Pindo Deli and Indah Kiat failed to submit relevant data, such as the financial statements, accounting books and records, etc., which would support accuracy and completeness of the resales made through its affiliated company, CMI. Therefore, the Office of Investigation calculated individual normal values on the basis of the facts available..."125 (emphasis added)

7.34 We note that multiple reports by the KTC investigators indicate that the KTC sought access to CMI's accounting records other than its financial statements and that such request was declined. We note that the Verification Report was not submitted to the Sinar Mas Group126 during the investigation, but the Final Investigation Report was. There is no indication on the record that the accuracy of the above-quoted statements in the Final Investigation Report was contested by the Sinar Mas Group during the investigation. Most critically, we recall that the letter provided by the exporters to the KTC investigators during the verification itself indicated what information had been provided by CMI and stated that "CMI has made it very clear that it will not provide further [information] in relation to this matter." (supra, para. 7.30). We also note that the Provisional Report on Investigation of Preliminary Dumping Margins handed out to the Sinar Mas Group during the 4 April meeting stated that the KTC decided to use constructed normal value on the basis of facts available because the respondents had failed to submit "evidence on their affiliated company"127 or " evidence on resales cost of their affiliated company"128, without necessarily limiting it to CMI's financial statements.

120

Exhibit KOR- 29 at 2-3. See, Response of Korea to Question 6 from the Panel Following the First Meeting. 122 See, First Oral Statement of Indonesia, para. 65. 123 See, Exhibits IDN-24 and 35. 124 Exhibit KOR- 6 at 3. On page 7, the Verification Report repeats the same statement with respect to Pindo Deli. 125 Exhibit KOR-13A at 11. 126 First Written Submission of Korea, para. 151. 127 Exhibit KOR-7 at 4. 128 Exhibit KOR-7 at 11. 121

WT/DS312/R Page 84

7.35 We recall that according to our above-outlined standard of review (paras. 7.1-7.5), Indonesia has to prove this factual matter that it asserts. Given that the record shows that what was requested by the KTC and not submitted by the Sinar Mas Group went beyond CMI's financial statements and also included other accounting records of this company, we conclude that Indonesia has failed to prove this factual assertion on the basis of the facts on the record. We shall therefore base our analysis on our factual finding that the Sinar Mas Group failed to provide CMI's financial statements and accounting records requested by the KTC investigators during verification. 7.36 Apart from information relating to CMI's sales of the subject product, the verification was carried out and completed without any difficulty. Among other things, the KTC officials also verified a number of sample sales transactions by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli, as well as by CMI to independent buyers. 7.37 A post-verification public hearing was held in Seoul on 4 April 2003. In this meeting, the KTC officials orally informed the Sinar Mas Group representatives that since CMI's financial statements were not made available during verification, the KTC would resort to facts available with respect to determining normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. During this meeting, the KTC officials also handed out their Provisional Report on Investigation of Preliminary Dumping Margins. This report contained the KTC's first post-verification dumping margin calculations in the investigation at issue. 7.38 On 9 April, the Sinar Mas Group submitted to the KTC a two-page document, termed CMI's income statements for the years 2001 and 2002. However, the KTC did not change its approach and based normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli on facts available. Since it considered domestic sales data submitted by the Sinar Mas Group to be unreliable because CMI's financial statements and accounting records were not made available during verification, the KTC decided to construct the normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli.129 (b)

Legal Analysis

7.39 We note that the crux of Indonesia's claim is that in its normal value determinations the KTC should have taken into consideration the domestic sales data submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli in their responses to the questionnaires. Korea responds that it could not take the domestic sales data into account because CMI's financial statements and accounting records were necessary to verify the completeness of that data, and the Sinar Mas Group failed to make those documents available during verification. Thus, we shall first consider whether CMI's financial statements and accounting records represented necessary information which was not provided within a reasonable period so that the KTC was entitled under Article 6.8 to resort to facts available. If we find this to be the case, we shall then consider to what extent that allowed the KTC to disregard the domestic sales data submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. (i)

Did Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli Fail to Provide Necessary Information to the KTC Within a Reasonable Period?

7.40 Indonesia claims that the KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the Agreement by resorting to facts available without establishing that the conditions set out therein were met in this investigation. Korea argues that the KTC did not act inconsistently with Article 6.8 because the Sinar Mas Group failed to make CMI's financial statements and accounting records available during verification and thus failed to provide necessary information within a reasonable period. 7.41

We note that Article 6.8 of the Agreement provides:

129

First Written Submission of Korea, para. 132.

WT/DS312/R Page 85

"In cases in which any interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the investigation, preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative, may be made on the basis of the facts available. The provisions of Annex II shall be observed in the application of this paragraph." 7.42 Article 6.8 allows an IA to base its determinations on facts available, and to disregard information submitted by an interested party, only if: the interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide, necessary information within a reasonable period, or significantly impedes the investigation. We shall therefore consider whether or not CMI's financial statements and accounting records were necessary information within the meaning of Article 6.8 of the Agreement, and whether or not they were submitted within a reasonable period. Were CMI's Financial Statements and Accounting Records Necessary Information Within the Meaning of Article 6.8? 7.43 Article 6.8 of the Agreement stipulates that failure to provide necessary information within a reasonable period may allow the IA to resort to facts available. In our view, the decision as to whether or not a given piece of information constitutes "necessary information" within the meaning of Article 6.8 has to be made in light of the specific circumstances of each investigation, not in the abstract. A particular piece of information that may play a critical role in an investigation may not be equally relevant in another one. We shall therefore determine whether or not CMI's financial statements and accounting records constituted necessary information in the circumstances of the investigation at issue. 7.44 We note that in this investigation, the KTC based its normal value determinations on CMI's sales of the subject product to independent buyers, rather than Indah Kiat's and Pindo Deli's sales to CMI.130 Therefore, information pertaining to CMI's sales played a critical role with respect to the KTC's normal value determinations. This applies, in particular, to quantities and all aspects of prices of CMI's sales to independent buyers, as well as information relevant to whether those sales were in the ordinary course of trade. It follows that the KTC could legitimately consider as necessary information about CMI's selling activities, including its costs associated with the domestic sales of the subject product. Therefore, the accuracy of Indah Kiat's and Pindo Deli's domestic sales information being central to the KTC's normal value determinations leads, in our view, to the conclusion that CMI's financial statements and accounting records constituted "necessary information" for purposes of the investigation at issue. Were CMI's Financial Statements and Accounting Records Submitted Within a Reasonable Period Within the Meaning of Article 6.8?

130

We note that the Appellate Body in US - Hot-Rolled Steel, ruled that basing normal value determinations on downstream sales in the domestic market of the exporter subject to the investigation is allowed under the Agreement. The Appellate Body opined: "Thus, Article 2.1 does not expressly mandate that the sale be made by the exporter for whom a margin of dumping is being calculated. Nor does Article 2.1 expressly preclude that relevant sales transactions might be made downstream, between affiliates of the exporter and independent buyers. In our view, provided that all of the explicit conditions in Article 2.1 of the Anti-dumping Agreement are satisfied, the identity of the seller of the "like product" is not a ground for precluding the use of a downstream sales transaction when calculating normal value. In short, we see no reason to read into Article 2.1 an additional condition that is not expressed." Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, supra, note 94, para. 166. We note, however, that Indonesia has not challenged the KTC's reliance on downstream sales in determining normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli in this investigation.

WT/DS312/R Page 86

7.45 It is undisputed that, through the verification plan, the KTC informed the Sinar Mas Group that its investigators would need to see CMI's financial statements during verification. The Sinar Mas Group refused to make these statements available during verification. The record also indicates that the Sinar Mas Group failed to allow the KTC investigators access to other accounting records of CMI during verification. The KTC investigators completed their verification without seeing CMI's financial statements and accounting records. 7.46 Following the verification, the KTC held a disclosure meeting on 4 April 2003. The KTC's letter dated 19 March 2003, addressed to the Sinar Mas Group, which convened the mentioned meeting reads in relevant parts: "[T]he Korean Trade Commission will hold a disclosure meeting ... on April 4, 2003 for the preliminary determination of the magnitude of dumping margin about PT. Indah Kiat Pulp & Paper Tbk., PT. Pindo Deli Pulp & Paper Mills. In the meeting, we will explain the methodology and the data used for determining the dumping margin. After the meeting, you may submit written opinion concerning our method no later than April 10, 2003."131 (emphasis added) 7.47 After the disclosure meeting, the Sinar Mas Group submitted certain documents which, in their view, were CMI's financial statements. 132 This took place on 9 April 2003, i.e. within the 6-day deadline for the submission of a "written opinion concerning [the KTC's] method". Indonesia argues that the KTC should have taken these financial statements into account because during the meeting of 4 April, the KTC officials announced that they would accept CMI's financial statements if they were submitted by 10 April. Indonesia submitted an affidavit to this effect.133 Korea disagrees and submits that the KTC never stated that submission of CMI's financial statements after the verification would have been accepted.134 7.48 We note that the parties disagree as to whether or not the KTC indicated that it would accept CMI's financial statements if submitted by 10 April. The record, however, is quite clear that the KTC sought these statements in its original questionnaire, and again in its verification plan. Further, the letter sent by the KTC indicates that 10 April was the deadline for the submission of a "written opinion" regarding the KTC's methodology, and does not refer to the receipt of new information postverification. It is for a party asserting a fact to provide proof thereof.135 In light of the conflicting statements of the parties on this question, and the limited purpose for the deadline reflected in the only contemporaneous written evidence before us, we conclude that Indonesia has not established as a matter of fact that the KTC indicated that it would accept CMI's financial statements if submitted by

131

Exhibit KOR-28. We note that different terms, such as "income statement", "profit-and-loss statement" and, most commonly, "financial statements" have been used by the parties to describe the document submitted to the KTC by the representative of the Sinar Mas Group on 9 April 2003. In response to questioning from the Panel, Korea stated that the document submitted by the Sinar Mas Group purported to be CMI's "income statements" for the years 2001 and 2002. Korea also mentioned that an income statement is part of financial statements of a company, but that financial statements normally include other documents as well. Korea pointed out that the original questionnaire sent to the exporters did not require a complete set of financial statements, hence "[i]f CMI did not have a full set of financial statements, the submission of CMI’s “income statements” (i.e., profit and loss reports) would have satisfied the KTC’s request." See, Response of Korea to Question 9 from the Panel Following the First Meeting. We therefore consider that the document submitted by Sinar Mas Group on 9 April 2003 can be referred to as CMI's financial statements for purposes of our evaluation of Indonesia's claim. 133 Exhibit IDN- 26. 134 Response of Korea to Question 9 from the Panel Following the First Meeting. 135 See, supra, note 96. 132

WT/DS312/R Page 87

10 April. It follows that CMI's financial statements were submitted past the deadline established by the KTC in the investigation at issue. 7.49 Having found that the Sinar Mas Group failed to submit the requested information within the deadline fixed by the KTC, the next issue we consider is whether failure to submit this information justified the KTC's refusal to consider it. We note that the relevance of missing a deadline for the submission of information in an anti-dumping investigation was discussed by the Appellate Body in US - Hot-Rolled Steel. In that case, the Appellate Body acknowledged that importing Members may impose deadlines for the submission of information in order to allow the IA to complete the investigation in a timely manner. According to the Appellate Body, however, this does not mean that the IA can disregard information every time it is submitted past the deadline. The Appellate Body ruled that time-limits imposed by an importing Member are not absolute and that if information is submitted after the deadline, but within a reasonable period, the IA cannot disregard it and resort to facts available.136 Regarding what a reasonable period might mean in this regard, the Appellate Body opined: "In sum, a "reasonable period" must be interpreted consistently with the notions of flexibility and balance that are inherent in the concept of "reasonableness", and in a manner that allows for account to be taken of the particular circumstances of each case. In considering whether information is submitted within a reasonable period of time, investigating authorities should consider, in the context of a particular case, factors such as: (i) the nature and quantity of the information submitted; (ii) the difficulties encountered by an investigated exporter in obtaining the information; (iii) the verifiability of the information and the ease with which it can be used by the investigating authorities in making their determination; (iv) whether other interested parties are likely to be prejudiced if the information is used; (v) whether acceptance of the information would compromise the ability of the investigating authorities to conduct the investigation expeditiously; and (vi) the numbers of days by which the investigated exporter missed the applicable time-limit."137 (emphasis added) 7.50 We note that the Appellate Body identified certain factors to be taken into consideration in determining whether or not information has been submitted within a reasonable period. With regard to the nature and quantity of the information submitted, we note that CMI's financial statements submitted by the Sinar Mas Group consisted of two pages and contained certain accounting information about this company.138 As stated below (para. 7.55), we note that the Sinar Mas Group did not attempt to submit other accounting records that were also requested by the KTC investigators during verification. 7.51 Regarding the difficulties encountered by the two Sinar Mas Group companies in obtaining CMI's financial records, we note that the letter submitted to the KTC investigators during verification by the Sinar Mas Group alleges that the respondents were not in a position to convince CMI to submit further information to the KTC because they did not control them (supra, para. 7.30). We also note that Indonesia raised the same argument in these proceedings.139 However, as we observed below (para. 7.166), the record indicates that there was a significant degree of commonality of ownership and management between Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli on the one hand, and CMI on the other. Further, we note that although the Sinar Mas Group asserted during verification that they could not compel CMI to provide its financial statements, around two weeks following the verification, the Group was nevertheless able to convince CMI to submit these statements. Finally, we note that there is no supporting evidence on the record (such as copies of correspondence) to document the alleged 136

Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, supra, note 94,paras. 74 and 77. Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, supra, note 94,para. 85. 138 Attachment to the Sinar Mas Group letter dated 9 April 2003 (Exhibit KOR-30). 139 See, for instance, First Written Submission of Indonesia, para. 53. 137

WT/DS312/R Page 88

difficulties experienced by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. We therefore reject Indonesia's contention that the respondents encountered difficulties in obtaining the information requested by the KTC investigators.140 7.52 With respect to verifiability, we note that the facts at issue in these proceedings are quite different from the facts in US - Hot-Rolled Steel. In US - Hot-Rolled Steel, the IA requested the respondents to submit within a specific deadline certain information to be used in the IA's dumping margin calculations. Respondents provided the requested information after the deadline, but before verification. The IA considered the submissions to be late and did not verify the belatedly submitted information during verification.141 In the case before us, the KTC stated that it would need CMI's financial statements during verification, but the Sinar Mas Group failed to provide them. This, in our view, makes this deadline different from an ordinary deadline for the submission of information to the IA. Verification is a critical stage in an anti-dumping investigation where the IA's main objective is to satisfy itself about the completeness and accuracy of the information on which it will later base its determinations. Thus, it would, in our view, be unfair to take the view that in a case such as this one, the KTC had to carry out a second verification visit to verify the belatedly submitted information. 7.53 The record contains no indication, and none of the parties has argued before us, that some interested parties could have been prejudiced if CMI's financial statements were used by the KTC in its dumping determinations. 7.54 With respect to the KTC's ability to conduct the investigation expeditiously and the number of days by which the Indonesian companies missed the deadline, we note that CMI's financial statements were submitted two weeks before the KTC's preliminary determination and over five months before its final determination. We further note, however, that the information was originally requested in the initial questionnaires sent to the exporters and again in the verification plan sent before the verification. Thus, the delay in receipt of the information was substantial and had the KTC been required to conduct a second verification, the investigation could have been delayed substantially. 7.55 We therefore conclude that in the investigation at issue, the Sinar Mas Group's submission of CMI's financial statements on 10 April 2003 was not made within a reasonable period as set out in Article 6.8 of the Agreement and that the KTC was entitled to disregard CMI's financial statements and resort to facts available. Furthermore, we note that Sinar Mas Group's post-verification submission was limited to CMI's financial statements, which were submitted for the specific purpose of demonstrating CMI's SG&A and financial expenses. The Group never attempted to submit other accounting records which, as we have found above, were also sought by the KTC during verification and not submitted by the Group. Obviously, therefore, these accounting records were not submitted within a reasonable period either. 7.56 It follows that the KTC did not act inconsistently with Article 6.8 in resorting to facts available with respect to Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli.142

140

In this regard, we note the following statement by the Appellate Body in US - Hot-Rolled Steel: "We, therefore, see paragraphs 2 and 5 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as reflecting a careful balance between the interests of investigating authorities and exporters. In order to complete their investigations, investigating authorities are entitled to expect a very significant degree of effort – to the "best of their abilities" – from investigated exporters. At the same time, however, the investigating authorities are not entitled to insist upon absolute standards or impose unreasonable burdens upon those exporters." Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, supra, note 94, para. 102. 141 See, Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, supra, note 94, paras. 64-69. 142 Korea argued that Sinar Mas Group's failure to provide necessary information within a reasonable period also led to significantly impeding the investigation. See, Response of Korea to Question 5 from the Panel Following the First Meeting. We note that "significantly impeding an investigation" is another ground

WT/DS312/R Page 89

(ii)

In its Use of Facts Available, Could the KTC disregard Domestic Sales Data Submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli?

7.57 Above, we found that since the Sinar Mas Group failed to submit necessary information, i.e. CMI's financial statements and accounting records, within a reasonable time, the KTC was entitled to disregard the belatedly-submitted financial statements and resort to facts available. We recall that since the Sinar Mas Group failed to provide CMI's financial statements and accounting records during verification, the KTC decided to construct normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli on the basis of facts available. Parties disagree, however, as to whether or not resorting to facts available allowed the KTC to disregard the domestic sales data submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. 7.58 Indonesia argues that even if the KTC's decision to resort to facts available was consistent with Article 6.8, that did not necessarily allow the KTC to disregard the domestic sales data submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli and to construct normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli on the basis of facts available. Since these data fulfilled the conditions set out under paragraph 3 of Annex II, the KTC was required to take them into consideration in its normal value determinations. More specifically with respect to verifiability, Indonesia argues that the domestic sales data were verifiable because there were ways, other than using CMI's financial statements, available to the KTC investigators which would have allowed them to verify those data. Korea responds that in the absence of CMI's financial statements and accounting records, there was no way for the KTC to consider the domestic sales data submitted by the Sinar Mas Group to be reliable. More specifically, Korea submits that in the absence of these documents, the KTC could not verify the completeness of the submitted domestic sales data. That is, the KTC could not confirm that all reportable domestic sales transactions had been reported by the respondents. Therefore, the KTC was allowed to disregard these data and construct normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli on the basis of facts available. 7.59 We note that the crux of the claim at issue is whether or not the domestic sales data submitted in Indah Kiat's and Pindo Deli's responses to the questionnaires were verifiable within the meaning of paragraph 3 of Annex II and therefore had to be taken into consideration by the KTC in the calculation of the constructed normal values for these two companies. 7.60

We note that paragraph 3 of Annex II reads: "All information which is verifiable, which is appropriately submitted so that it can be used in the investigation without undue difficulties, which is supplied in a timely fashion, and, where applicable, which is supplied in a medium or computer language requested by the authorities, should be taken into account when determinations are made. If a party does not respond in the preferred medium or computer language but the authorities find that the circumstances set out in paragraph 2 have been satisfied, the failure to respond in the preferred medium or computer language should not be considered to significantly impede the investigation." (emphasis added)

7.61 We note that paragraph 3 stipulates that information submitted by an interested party has to be taken into consideration by the IA provided that it satisfies certain conditions. One of these conditions is that the information be verifiable. The issue therefore is whether or not the domestic sales data submitted to the KTC by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli were verifiable within the meaning of paragraph 3. If we find that these data were verifiable, we shall conclude that the KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 and paragraph 3 of Annex II by disregarding them in its normal value determinations for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli.

provided for in Article 6.8 for resorting to facts available. However, having found that the KTC was justified in resorting to facts available because of the Sinar Mas Group's failure to provide necessary information within a reasonable period, we need not, and do not, discuss the legal issue raised by Korea's argument.

WT/DS312/R Page 90

7.62 In this regard, we note that the domestic sales data submitted by an exporter subject to an anti-dumping investigation may play an important role with respect to the IA's determinations in many respects. This applies, more specifically, to the value and quantity of domestic sales. Many steps that Article 2 of the Agreement requires the IA to take in the context of its dumping determinations necessarily require information regarding the quantity and the value of domestic sales. For instance, to carry out the ordinary course of trade test under Article 2.2, the IA needs information on the quantity of domestic sales. Similarly, under Article 2.2.1, the IA needs information on the costs and domestic prices of the exporter. We also note that Article 6.6 of the Agreement generally requires the IA to take the necessary steps in an investigation to satisfy itself on the accuracy of the information on which it bases its determinations. It follows that the KTC in this investigation had the right to ask the Sinar Mas Group to submit necessary accounting information that would allow the investigators to verify the domestic sales data its companies had submitted. 7.63 We recall our factual finding above (paras. 7.32-7.34) that the KTC investigators requested CMI's financial statements and accounting records during verification and that they were not provided by the respondents. More importantly, we recall that the letter submitted by the Sinar Mas Group on the first day of the verification went beyond a refusal to submit CMI's financial statements in particular and stated that CMI intended not to submit any further information to the KTC investigators (supra, para. 7.30). 7.64 Given that during the verification the Sinar Mas Group clearly refused to submit corroborating information, i.e. CMI's financial statements and accounting records, which was highly relevant to the KTC's dumping determinations and also stated that CMI would not submit any further information, we do not see how the domestic sales data submitted by the Sinar Mas Group could have been considered reliable and taken into consideration by the KTC. 7.65 We note Indonesia's argument that the completeness of the domestic sales data reported by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli could have been verified through a comparison of the list of sales from Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli to CMI with the list of CMI's sales to independent buyers, because there was a "one-to-one correspondence" between these two sets of sales. We note that in Indah Kiat's response to the KTC's questionnaire, this issue was explained as follows: "[[**]]"143 7.66 On the basis of this one-to-one correspondence, Indonesia submits that the KTC could have checked the completeness of Indah Kiat's and Pindo Deli's domestic sales by comparing sales from these companies to CMI with CMI's sales to independent buyers. According to Indonesia, since all sales from Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli to CMI were verified by the KTC investigators, the only thing remained to be done was to compare that list against the list of CMI's sales to independent buyers, which was also submitted to the investigators.144 In response, Korea asserts that even if this comparison was made, it would only shed light on the completeness of Indah Kiat's and Pindo Deli's sales with respect to their quantity. The issue of whether or not sales by CMI to independent buyers contained any "discounts, rebates, billing adjustments or additional charges by CMI" would remain unanswered.145 7.67 We do not agree with Indonesia's contention that a comparison of these two lists of sales could have assured the KTC about the completeness of domestic sales reported by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. That is because, as Korea argues, this comparison would not verify the values of domestic sales as much as it would have verified their quantities. As we noted above, values of domestic sales are as important in dumping determinations as their quantities. Therefore, we do not 143

Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. Response of Indonesia to Question 22(a) from the Panel Following the First Meeting. 145 Second Written Submission of Korea, para. 44. 144

WT/DS312/R Page 91

agree with the proposition that the KTC could have assured itself about the completeness of Indah Kiat's and Pindo Deli's domestic sales by comparing the list of their sales to CMI with the list of CMI's sales to independent buyers. 7.68 Furthermore, we note that Indonesia's argumentation is premised on the assumption that the sole purpose for which the KTC requested CMI's financial statements and accounting records was to confirm the completeness of the domestic sales data submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. However, we note that the record contradicts this proposition. For instance, the Final Investigation Report reads in relevant parts: "During the on the spot investigation, Pindo Deli and Indah Kiat failed to submit relevant data, such as the financial statements, accounting books and records, etc., which would support accuracy and completeness of the resales made through its affiliated company, CMI. Therefore, the Office of Investigation calculated individual normal values on the basis of the facts available..."146 (emphasis added) 7.69

The Final Dumping Report reads in pertinent parts: "However, during the on the spot investigation, Pindo Deli and Indah Kiat failed to submit relevant evidence, such as the financial statements, accounting books and records, etc., to verify the accuracy and completeness of the data on resales made through its affiliated company, CMI. Therefore, the Office of Investigation calculated an individual normal value on the basis of the facts available..."147 (emphasis added)

7.70 We note that these reports indicate that, in addition to checking completeness, another stated purpose of requesting these records was to verify the accuracy of the domestic sales data. Accuracy, in our view, goes beyond verifying the completeness of domestic sales data and concerns a broader range of information, including CMI's costs associated with the sales of the subject product and its prices. Indeed, we find it only normal for the IA to seek accounting records of the exporting company under investigation during verification to verify accuracy of the information already submitted, including accounting records of related companies, if any, involved in the domestic sales of the subject product. If that basic request by the IA is rejected, we do not see how an IA could be required nevertheless to accept that the data in question were accurate. 7.71 Indonesia argues that completeness and accuracy of the domestic sales data submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli were verified through the verification of a number of sample transactions relating to sales to CMI and CMI's resales to independent buyers.148 It follows that the KTC did not need CMI's financial statements and accounting records. We disagree. Although verifying individual sales transactions could be one of the tools to satisfy the investigators about the completeness and accuracy of domestic sales transactions generally, we do not accept the contention that this could replace or minimize the relevance of doing a verification on the basis of the financial statements and accounting records of the exporter under investigation. 7.72 On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the KTC did not act inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the Agreement and paragraph 3 of Annex II in disregarding the domestic sales data provided by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli in determining normal values for these two companies.

146

Exhibit KOR-13A at 11. Exhibit KOR-14A at 12. 148 See, for instance, First Written Submission of Indonesia, para. 55; Response of Indonesia to Question 6 (b) from the Panel Following the First Meeting. 147

WT/DS312/R Page 92

(iii)

Did the KTC Fail to Inform Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli of its Decision to Reject their Domestic Sales Data and to Provide them with an Opportunity to Express their Views?

7.73 Indonesia submits that the KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the Agreement and paragraph 6 of Annex II by not informing Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli forthwith of its decision to reject their domestic sales data and giving them an opportunity to provide further explanations and rectify their failure. Korea argues that the KTC did inform the Sinar Mas Group companies of its decision to reject their domestic sales data and also gave them opportunities to make comments in this regard. 7.74

Paragraph 6 of Annex II reads: "If evidence or information is not accepted, the supplying party should be informed forthwith of the reasons therefore, and should have an opportunity to provide further explanations within a reasonable period, due account being taken of the time-limits of the investigation. If the explanations are considered by the authorities as not being satisfactory, the reasons for the rejection of such evidence or information should be given in any published determinations." (emphasis added)

7.75 We note that paragraph 6 provides that in cases where the IA declines to accept information submitted by an interested party, that party has to be informed without delay of the IA's decision and has to be given a chance to provide further explanations regarding that decision. If the IA finds such explanations as being unsatisfactory, then the information can be disregarded, in which case the IA has to explain, in its published determinations, why the information has been rejected. Paragraph 6 does not, however, set out a procedure through which the interested party has to be notified of this rejection. 7.76 We recall our finding above (para. 7.72) that the KTC properly declined to consider the domestic sales data submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli in its normal value determinations for these companies. It follows that the KTC had, under paragraph 6, to inform these companies of this refusal and give them an opportunity to comment. We now turn to the facts of the investigation at issue to examine whether this was done. 7.77 We note that Indonesia acknowledges that the KTC explained orally, during the meeting held on 4 April 2003, and through the submission of certain written documents, that the domestic sales data submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli were rejected and facts available were used instead.149 Indonesia also acknowledges that the KTC stated in the Final Investigation Dumping Report that it had rejected domestic sales information submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli because of these companies' failure to submit CMI's financial statements.150 However, Indonesia argues that none of these disclosures was specific enough to explain properly what information had been withheld by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli which led to the use of facts available. 7.78 We recall that the issue is whether or not the KTC informed the Sinar Mas Group of its decision to reject domestic sales data submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli and to base its normal value determinations for these two companies on facts available and whether or not it gave them an opportunity to provide further explanations within a reasonable period, as set out under paragraph 6 of Annex II. 7.79 We note that the Provisional Report on Investigation of Preliminary Dumping Margins which was submitted to the Sinar Mas Group during the 9 April meeting, reads in pertinent parts:

149 150

First Written Submission of Indonesia, para. 71. First Written Submission of Indonesia, para. 72.

WT/DS312/R Page 93

"Since Respondent failed to submit evidence on resales cost of its affiliated company, CMI, the Office of Investigation arrived at the average cost based on the resales cost of Pindo Deli which was calculated based on the facts available."151 7.80 We note that this statement clearly indicates that the KTC decided to base its determinations regarding CMI's costs on facts available because the respondents had failed to submit the relevant cost data.152 7.81 Next, we note that the KTC sent its Preliminary Dumping Report to the Sinar Mas Group on 9 May 2003153, which reads in relevant part: "Respondent submitted within the prescribed time limit the data on domestic sales, export sales and adjustment factors for fair comparison, together with substantiating evidence. However, during the on the spot investigation, Respondent failed to submit relevant evidence, such as the financial statements, etc. concerning sales made through its affiliated company, CMI. Therefore, the Office of Investigation calculated the normal value on the basis of the facts available and calculated the export price based on the data which were submitted by Respondent and verified during the on the spot investigation."154 7.82 We note that the Preliminary Dumping Report also clearly states that the KTC decided to resort to facts available with respect to determining normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli because of their failure to provide, among others, CMI's financial statements during verification. 7.83 There are other documents on the record that also explain clearly the basis of the KTC's decision to resort to facts available with respect to determining normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli.155 We also note that the Sinar Mas Group submitted CMI's financial statements on 9 April following the 4 April meeting, which indicates that the Group was in fact aware of the reasons for the KTC's rejection of the submitted domestic sales data. We therefore conclude that the KTC complied with its obligation under paragraph 6 of Annex II to inform the Sinar Mas Group of its decision to reject Indah Kiat's and Pindo Deli's domestic sales data and to use facts available instead. We do not agree with Indonesia's contention that these disclosures were not precise enough to explain the grounds for the KTC's decision to resort to facts available. They do, in our view, clearly indicate that the reason why the KTC resorted to facts available in this regard was because CMI's financial statements and accounting records were not provided during verification. 7.84 Regarding the issue of providing further explanations to the IA about its decision to reject submitted information, we note that Indonesia cited no evidence on the record to show that the Sinar Mas Group was not given the chance to provide further explanations within a reasonable period regarding the KTC's rejection of the domestic sales information submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. Korea argues that the Group had ample opportunity to comment, but that it did not do so. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we see no reason to find that the Sinar Mas Group was not given the opportunity to provide further explanations within a reasonable period regarding the KTC's decision to disregard the submitted domestic sales data.

151

Exhibit KOR-7 at 11. We note that the Provisional Report demonstrates that the KTC applied the ordinary course of trade test under Article 2.2 of the Agreement after using facts available in determining CMI's costs. Ibid. 153 See, the letter conveying the KTC's Preliminary Dumping Report (Exhibit KOR-31). 154 Exhibit KOR-8B at 14. The quoted portion of the report addresses the arguments of Pindo Deli. On page 25, the report contains the same statement with respect to Indah Kiat. 155 See, for instance, the Final Investigation Report (Exhibit KOR-13A at 11) and the Final Dumping Report (Exhibit KOR-14A at 12). 152

WT/DS312/R Page 94

7.85 Finally in this regard, we note Indonesia's argument that the KTC should have given the Sinar Mas Group the right to submit further information to cure the defects in the submitted domestic sales data. In Indonesia's view, paragraph 6 provides an interested party whose information is rejected by the IA with the right to submit further evidence.156 We do not agree. In our view, what paragraph 6 requires is that the IA has to give the interested party whose information is rejected the opportunity to explain to the IA why the information has to be taken into consideration. This, in turn, would give the IA a second chance to review its decision to reject that information. Paragraph 6 does not, however, give the interested party a second chance to submit information. If paragraph 6 is interpreted to mean that each time there is a defect in the submitted information the interested party concerned has the right to submit further information, the investigation might carry on indefinitely. 7.86 On the basis of the above considerations, we conclude that the KTC did not act inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the Agreement and paragraph 6 of Annex II with respect to informing the Sinar Mas Group of its decision to reject the domestic sales data submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli and giving them an opportunity to make further explanations within a reasonable period. D.

KTC'S USE OF CONSTRUCTED VALUE TO DETERMINE NORMAL VALUES FOR INDAH KIAT AND PINDO DELI

1.

Arguments of Parties

(a)

Indonesia

7.87 Indonesia asserts that the KTC violated Article 2.2 of the Agreement by failing to make the necessary determinations under that article before resorting to constructed normal value with respect to Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. According to Indonesia, the KTC did not make any determination as to whether or not there were no sales of the subject product in the ordinary course of trade in the Indonesian market, or whether the volume of such sales were low, or whether such sales did not permit a proper comparison because of a particular market situation. (b)

Korea

7.88 Korea contends that because domestic sales data submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli were found to be unreliable and not used by the KTC in its normal value determinations, the KTC could not possibly follow the hierarchy set forth in Article 2.2 before resorting to constructed normal value. The KTC's inability to follow this hierarchy was a direct result of the Sinar Mas Group's noncooperation, hence it should not complain about the legal consequence of that fact. 2.

Arguments of Third Parties

(a)

United States

7.89 The United States argues that Article 2.2 of the Agreement does not prevent an IA from using constructed value as the basis of normal value determinations once the IA, consistently with Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Agreement, resorts to facts available because of an interested party's failure to submit necessary information within a reasonable period of time. In the view of the United States, Article 2.2 imposes no obligations with respect to the use of facts available.

156

See, Response of Indonesia to Question 14(b) from the Panel Following the First Meeting; Response of Indonesia to Question 16 from the Panel Following the First Meeting.

WT/DS312/R Page 95

3.

Evaluation by the Panel

7.90 Indonesia submits that the KTC violated Article 2.2 of the Agreement by resorting to constructed normal value without making the necessary determinations under that provision which would justify such resorting. 7.91

Article 2.2 of the Agreement reads: "When there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade in the domestic market of the exporting country or when, because of the particular market situation or the low volume of the sales in the domestic market of the exporting country2, such sales do not permit a proper comparison, the margin of dumping shall be determined by comparison with a comparable price of the like product when exported to an appropriate third country, provided that this price is representative, or with the cost of production in the country of origin plus a reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits. _____________________________________________________ 2

Sales of the like product destined for consumption in the domestic market of the exporting country shall normally be considered a sufficient quantity for the determination of the normal value if such sales constitute 5 per cent or more of the sales of the product under consideration to the importing Member, provided that a lower ratio should be acceptable where the evidence demonstrates that domestic sales at such lower ratio are nonetheless of sufficient magnitude to provide for a proper comparison."

7.92 We note that Article 2.2 allows the IA to base its normal value determination on the constructed value only when there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade in the domestic market of the exporting country, or when, because of the particular market situation or the low volume of the sales in the domestic market of the exporting country, such sales do not permit a proper comparison. 7.93 Korea concedes that the KTC resorted to construction without making these determinations because the domestic sales data provided by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli were unreliable as they failed to submit CMI's financial statements and accounting records to the KTC investigators during the verification. 7.94 The issue is whether or not the KTC violated Article 2.2 of the Agreement by failing to make a determination as to whether or not one of the two bases that would allow resorting to constructed normal value was present in the investigation at issue. We recall our finding above (para. 7.72) that the KTC's decision to disregard the domestic sales data submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli was not WTO-inconsistent because those data were not verifiable. It follows that the KTC could not possibly carry out the determinations set out under Article 2.2 of the Agreement before resorting to constructed normal value for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. We therefore conclude that the KTC did not act inconsistently with Article 2.2 in basing its normal value determination on constructed value under Article 2.2 for these two companies and reject Indonesia's claim.157

157

We note that Indonesia also alleged a violation of Article 6.8 of the Agreement in connection with this claim. However, it also stated that the Article 6.8 aspect of its claim was "somewhat dependant" on the Article 2.2 aspect. See, Response of Indonesia to Question 19 from the Panel Following the First Meeting. We therefore need not, and do not, make a finding under Article 6.8.

WT/DS312/R Page 96

E.

KTC'S CALCULATION OF THE CONSTRUCTED NORMAL VALUES FOR INDAH KIAT AND PINDO DELI

1.

Arguments of Parties

(a)

Indonesia

7.95 According to Indonesia, even assuming arguendo that the KTC could legitimately use constructed normal value in this investigation with respect to Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli, the way it calculated their costs of production was inconsistent with Articles 2.2, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2 and 2.4 of the Agreement. Although Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli drew the KTC's attention to certain errors made in the calculation of the constructed normal values, the KTC did not respond. The first error stems from the KTC's use of facts available in the calculation of the constructed normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. According to Indonesia, the KTC had no reason to depart from the cost data submitted by these two exporters in the calculation of their constructed normal values. By disregarding these data and adding CMI's SG&A expenses to those of Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli in the calculation of their constructed normal values, the KTC violated Articles 2.2, 2.2.1.1, 2.2.2, 6.8 and Annex II of the Agreement. Secondly, Indonesia submits that the KTC erred in adding CMI's financial expenses to those of Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli in the calculation of their constructed normal values. Furthermore, Indonesia argues that the KTC erred in using [[Company A]]'s158 data in determining CMI's SG&A and financial expenses, rather than CMI's own data. 7.96 Finally, with regard to the calculation of the constructed normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli, Indonesia asserts that the KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the Agreement and paragraph 7 of Annex II by failing to exercise special circumspection in its use of information from secondary sources instead of domestic sales data provided by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. (b)

Korea

7.97 Korea contends that CMI played the role of a wholesaler in the Indonesian market whereas Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli played the same role in their sales to distributors and end users in Korea. In order to calculate a normal value at the same level of trade as the export price, the KTC legitimately added CMI's SG&A and financial expenses to the constructed normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. Because the Sinar Mas Group failed to provide CMI's financial statements during verification, the KTC used data relating to another Indonesian company, [[Company A]]159, operating at the same level of trade as CMI in the Indonesian market to calculate CMI's SG&A and financial expenses. 7.98 With regard to Indonesia's assertion that the KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the Agreement and paragraph 7 of Annex II by failing to exercise special circumspection in its use of information from secondary sources instead of domestic sales data provided by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli, Korea submits that all information used in the calculation of the constructed normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli came from sources that were verified during the investigation at issue. It follows that the KTC did not act inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the Agreement and paragraph 7 of Annex II in this regard. 2.

Evaluation by the Panel

7.99 We recall that the record indicates that in its calculation of the constructed normal values for these two companies, the KTC took the total of the cost of manufacturing, SG&A and interest expenses of the individual exporters (Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli), SG&A and interest expenses of 158 159

Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. Ibid.

WT/DS312/R Page 97

CMI and finally profits. All costs relating to Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli individually were taken from their responses to the KTC's questionnaires. CMI's SG&A expenses were taken from those of [[Company A]]160, another Indonesian company subject to the same investigation, and its interest expenses from those of [[Company B]]161, a subsidiary of [[Company A]]162.163 7.100 In the context of the claim at issue, Indonesia takes issue with the SG&A and financial expenses the KTC used for CMI in calculating the constructed normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli.164 Regarding financial expenses, Indonesia submits that the KTC erred by adding to the constructed normal values financial expenses for CMI. According to Indonesia, CMI did not have any such expense because it was not involved in the production of the subject product. Korea responds that there was no evidence on the record that showed that CMI's financial expenses were zero. In order to determine the exact amount of CMI's financial expenses, the KTC needed this company's financial statements and accounting records, which the Sinar Mas Group refused to submit during verification. 7.101 We note that Indonesia has not directed our attention to any evidence on the record that would show that CMI's financial expenses in the POI were in fact zero. Indonesia mentions two letters by the Sinar Mas Group to the KTC in which it was argued that CMI's financial expenses were zero.165 One of them is the 9 April letter that conveyed CMI's financial statements after the verification. The second is the letter dated 2 June 2003, in which the Sinar Mas Group again cites the financial statements submitted along with the 9 April letter and argues that CMI's financial expenses were zero. We note that both letters rely on CMI's financial statements submitted on 9 April as evidence of the fact that CMI's financial expenses were zero. Further, we recall our finding above (para. 7.55) that the KTC properly rejected the financial statements submitted on 9 April. It follows that the record does not support Indonesia's assertion that CMI's financial expenses in the POI were zero. 7.102 The question then becomes whether or not it was reasonable for the KTC to assume that CMI had financial expenses. We note that CMI is a trading company that does almost all domestic sales of the subject product by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. Since it is not involved in the production of the subject product, clearly CMI would not have any production-related financial expenses. However, we do not consider it biased or non-objective for the KTC to assume that CMI could have financial expenses stemming from its selling activities. The same applies to CMI's SG&A expenses. Given the lack of information about CMI's actual SG&A expenses, we do not find it biased or non-objective for the KTC to assume that CMI could have such expenses. 7.103 Having found that it was reasonable for the KTC to assume that CMI could have both SG&A and financial expenses, we shall now address Indonesia's argument that the KTC failed to apply special circumspection in the use of facts available with respect to the two cost items added to the constructed normal values of Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli for CMI. Indonesia's contention applies to both the financial and the SG&A expenses added for CMI. In this regard, Indonesia firstly submits that the KTC had in front of it verified information pertaining to Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli, from which it could have derived CMI's financial and SG&A expenses. According to Indonesia, the KTC 160

Ibid. Ibid. 162 Ibid. 163 See, Exhibit KOR-54; Response of Korea to Question 7 from the Panel Following the First Meeting. 164 To the extent that Indonesia's arguments in connection with the claim at issue relate to the KTC's decision to disregard the domestic sales data submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli and base normal values for these two companies on constructed value, we note that we have addressed these claims in preceding sections of our report. More specifically, we note that in para. 7.56 above, we found that the KTC did not err in resorting to facts available with respect to determining normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli in the investigation at issue. We also found (supra, para. 7.94) that the KTC did not act inconsistently with the Agreement in using constructed normal value for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. 165 See, First Written Submission of Indonesia, footnote 105. 161

WT/DS312/R Page 98

could, and should, have taken Indah Kiat's and Pindo Deli's figures as a starting point and have calculated CMI's costs by making the necessary adjustments to them bearing in mind that CMI only sold the subject product and did not produce it.166 By relying on the data relating to [[Company A]]167, rather than those of Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli, the KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the Agreement and paragraph 7 of Annex II. 7.104

Paragraph 7 of Annex II provides: "If the authorities have to base their findings, including those with respect to normal value, on information from a secondary source, including the information supplied in the application for the initiation of the investigation, they should do so with special circumspection. In such cases, the authorities should, where practicable, check the information from other independent sources at their disposal, such as published price lists, official import statistics and customs returns, and from the information obtained from other interested parties during the investigation. It is clear, however, that if an interested party does not cooperate and thus relevant information is being withheld from the authorities, this situation could lead to a result which is less favourable to the party than if the party did cooperate."

7.105 We recall that the Sinar Mas Group refused to provide CMI's financial statements and accounting records during verification. The KTC therefore resorted to facts available with respect to determining normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. In the context of calculating the normal values, the KTC had no information regarding CMI's financial and SG&A expenses. It therefore used information relating to another investigated company, i.e. [[Company A]]168, in determining CMI's expenses. [[Company A]]'s169 information was verified by the KTC.170 We agree with Indonesia that the KTC could have relied on Indah Kiat's and Pindo Deli's information in deriving the appropriate financial and SG&A expenses for CMI. However, we do not consider that this was the only way for the KTC to proceed in this regard. The KTC also had verified information relating to another investigated company and used it to determine CMI's costs. We do not find this course of action to be inconsistent with the KTC's obligation to apply special circumspection under paragraph 7 in the use of information from a secondary source. 7.106 Secondly, Indonesia argues that the KTC failed to apply special circumspection in its use of information from secondary sources by using SG&A expenses of [[Company A]] and interest expenses of [[Company B]] for CMI. 7.107 With respect to SG&A expenses, Indonesia contends the figures used by the KTC included both production and sales-related components and therefore could not be properly used for CMI, which was merely a selling company, without excluding production-related aspects.171 This, in Indonesia's view, resulted in an overstatement of these expenses and consequently overstatement of the constructed normal values. Korea responds that the KTC only used sales-related administrative expenses of [[Company A]] in deriving CMI's expenses.172 Indonesia has not rebutted Korea's assertion in this regard.173 We therefore conclude that the KTC has added only sales-related parts of 166

See, Response of Indonesia to Question 18 from the Panel Following the First Meeting; Second Written Submission of Indonesia, paras. 29-38. 167 Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. 168 Ibid. 169 Ibid. 170 Response of Korea to Question 10 from the Panel Following the First Meeting. See also, Exhibit KOR-56. 171 First Written Submission of Indonesia, para. 110. 172 Response of Korea to Question 7 From the Panel Following the First Meeting. 173 We note, for instance, para. 30 of Indonesia's Second Oral Statement where Indonesia notes Korea's explanation in this regard and does not disagree with it.

WT/DS312/R Page 99

[[Company A]]'s SG&A expenses as CMI's in the calculation of the constructed normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli and reject Indonesia's claim regarding the KTC's determination on CMI's SG&A expenses. 7.108 With respect to financial expenses, Indonesia also argues that the KTC overstated CMI's interest expenses by basing its determinations in this regard on the data pertaining to [[Company B]]. According to Indonesia, since [[Company B]] was a manufacturer of the subject product, the KTC acted inconsistently with its obligations under paragraph 7 of Annex II by taking its expenses as a proxy for CMI.174 Indonesia also submits that in the circumstances of the investigation at issue, the KTC should have taken interest expenses of [[Company A]] as a proxy, which was zero as indicated on the record. According to Indonesia, the KTC's decision to base CMI's SG&A on [[Company A]] and its interest expenses on [[Company B]] has no legal basis.175 Korea submits that [[Company B]]'s interest expenses included production as well as sales-related components. Korea also disagrees with Indonesia's proposition that financial expenses incurred by [[Company A]] would have been a better proxy for CMI's expenses because they were both trading companies which were not involved in the production of the subject product. In Koreas' view, "the interest expenses incurred by a company are independent of its size and activities."176 7.109 We recall that the KTC used SG&A expenses of [[Company A]] and financial expenses of [[Company B]] in determining corresponding costs of CMI which were then used in the calculation of the constructed normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. [[Company A]] was a trading company that sold, both domestically and in export markets, the products manufactured by [[Company B]] which was a manufacturer of the subject product in Indonesia.177 Indonesia argues that the KTC should have used the financial expenses of [[Company A]] rather than those of [[Company B]] for CMI because, unlike [[Company B]] which was a producer of the subject product, both [[Company A]] and CMI were trading companies. In Indonesia's view, it was erroneous to treat financial expenses of a producer as proxy for those of a trading company. 7.110 In our view, one might expect certain differences between the types of activities carried out by trading companies and those carried out by producing companies. Production activities might require more capital investments and might therefore be more likely to give rise to higher financial expenses. Selling activities, however, would not normally require as much capital investment as production activities and might therefore create lower financial expenses. Therefore, when applying facts available in an investigation, the IA would normally be expected to take into consideration the similarities and dissimilarities between the activities carried out by the company for which information is obtained from secondary sources and those of the company whose information is used as proxy. We do not suggest that the IA is generally precluded, for instance, from using the interest expenses of a producing company as proxy for those of a trading company. Notwithstanding our observation that the activities carried out by these two types of companies would normally be different from one another, we do not exclude the possibility that - in a given investigation - using the information relating to these companies for one another may be allowed provided that the reasons for that course of action are adequately explained in the IA's determinations. 7.111 In the investigation at issue, we note that the KTC needed information regarding CMI's SG&A and financial expenses in order to use them in the construction of the normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. For SG&A, the KTC based its determination on the data pertaining to a trading company, i.e. [[Company A]]. With regard to financial expenses, however, it relied on the data relating to [[Company B]], a producing company. We have seen no explanation on the record as to 174

See, for instance, Second Oral Statement of Indonesia, para. 31. Response of Indonesia to Question 12 from the Panel Following the Second Meeting. 176 Comments of Korea on Indonesia's Closing Statement and Responses to Questions from the Panel Following the Second Meeting, para. 57. 177 Response of Korea to Question 7 from the Panel Following the First Meeting, footnote 27. 175

WT/DS312/R Page 100

why the KTC decided to use the data relating to a company whose activities were less similar to CMI, i.e. [[Company B]], although it had in its possession data relating to a company, [[Company A]], which carried out activities similar to those of CMI. This, in our view, runs counter to the obligation to exercise special circumspection in the use of information from secondary sources when applying facts available, as set out under paragraph 7 of Annex II. We therefore conclude that the KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the Agreement and paragraph 7 of Annex II with respect to determining financial expenses of CMI in the context of calculating the constructed normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. 7.112 We note that Indonesia also alleges violations of several subparagraphs of Article 2 of the Agreement with regard to the KTC's use of [[Company B]]'s financial expenses for CMI. Having found that the KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the Agreement and paragraph 7 of Annex II in this regard, we do not make any finding under Article 2. F.

KTC'S USE OF FACTS AVAILABLE TO DETERMINE TJIWI KIMIA'S DUMPING MARGIN

1.

Arguments of Parties

(a)

Indonesia

7.113 Indonesia contends that the KTC violated Article 6.8 of the Agreement and paragraph 7 of Annex II by relying exclusively on the information provided by the applicants in the calculation of Tjiwi Kimia's dumping margin and by failing to compare that information against data submitted by other investigated exporters. According to Indonesia, there can logically be a difference between Tjiwi Kimia's dumping margin and those of the other exporters, but the 51.61 per cent dumping margin which is four times higher than the highest dumping margin calculated for the other Indonesian exporters demonstrates that the KTC did not act in an unbiased and objective manner in its calculation of Tjiwi Kimia's dumping margin. 7.114 According to Indonesia, since, contrary to what it did in the preliminary determinations, the KTC decided to treat the three Sinar Mas Group companies as a single exporter and calculated a single dumping margin for them in its final determinations, the calculation of Tjiwi Kimia's dumping margin on the basis of facts available materially affected the positions of Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. In the absence of the effect of Tjiwi Kimia's dumping margin, there would have been no finding of dumping for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. It follows that the KTC should have provided Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli with an opportunity to submit further explanations and to rectify defects in the submitted information regarding Tjiwi Kimia pursuant to Article 6.8 of the Agreement and paragraph 6 of Annex II. By failing to do so, the KTC violated these provisions. (b)

Korea

7.115 Korea submits that the Sinar Mas Group chose not to cooperate with the KTC in this investigation with respect to Tjiwi Kimia. It follows that the results of non-cooperation could become less favourable for Tjiwi Kimia pursuant to paragraph 7 of Annex II. With respect to Indonesia's argument about the KTC's alleged failure to use special circumspection in the use of facts available for Tjiwi Kimia, Korea submits that at the initiation stage of the investigation, the KTC checked, pursuant to Article 5.3 of the Agreement, the accuracy and adequacy of the information submitted by the applicants with respect to Tjiwi Kimia. The KTC found that the mentioned information came from independent and reliable sources. That, in Korea's view, also satisfied the requirements of paragraph 7 of Annex II. Furthermore, Korea asserts that in the course of the investigation at issue the KTC compared those data against other sources. Therefore, the KTC cannot be said to have acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 and paragraph 7 of Annex II in its use of facts available with respect to Tjiwi Kimia.

WT/DS312/R Page 101

7.116 As to Indonesia's argument relating to paragraph 6 of Annex II, Korea submits that that paragraph applies in cases where information submitted by a responding party is not accepted by the IA. Since Tjiwi Kimia did not submit any information to the KTC in this investigation, it cannot logically argue a violation of that paragraph. Nothing in that paragraph, or in Article 6.8 of the Agreement, requires the IA to provide non-cooperating parties with a second chance to submit information. 2.

Arguments of Third Parties

(a)

China

7.117 China submits that checking, in accordance with Article 5.3 of the Agreement, the accuracy and adequacy of the information submitted by the applicants at the initiation stage of an investigation does not release the IA from its obligation, under paragraph 7 of Annex II, to check against independent sources the information from secondary sources that is being used in the context of facts available. These are two distinct obligations that have to be respected at two different stages of an anti-dumping investigation. (b)

United States

7.118 The United States argues that the obligation under Article 5.3 of the Agreement to verify the accuracy and adequacy of the information submitted in the application is distinct from the obligation under paragraph 7 of Annex II to compare the information from the secondary sources used as part of facts available against independent sources. According to the United States, meeting the first obligation may not necessarily amount to meeting the second one. The Panel, therefore, has to find as a matter of fact whether or not the KTC met its obligation under paragraph 7 of Annex II in the investigation at issue. 3.

Evaluation by the Panel

7.119 We note that facts relating to this claim are relatively straightforward. Tjiwi Kimia intentionally chose not to submit information in response to the KTC's questionnaire. In its preliminary dumping determinations, the KTC treated the three Sinar Mas Group companies separately. In its final determinations, however, it treated them as a single exporter and assigned to them one single margin of dumping. In its final margin calculations, the KTC first calculated individual normal values and export prices for each company and then weighted them in order to come up with a final normal value and export price figure. These final figures were then used to calculate the final (single) margin of dumping.178 In this process, normal value and export price figures for Tjiwi Kimia were obtained from the information submitted by the applicants in the application. 7.120 Indonesia's claim is premised on two arguments. Firstly, Indonesia argues that the KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the Agreement and paragraph 7 of Annex II by relying exclusively on the data submitted by the applicants in the calculation of Tjiwi Kimia's dumping margin without corroborating them against independent sources. Secondly, Indonesia asserts that the KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the Agreement and paragraph 6 of Annex II by not providing Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli with an opportunity to submit further explanations and to rectify defects in the submitted information regarding Tjiwi Kimia. (a)

Alleged Violation of Article 6.8 of the Agreement and Paragraph 7 of Annex II

7.121

We note that paragraph 7 of Annex II provides: 178

First Written Submission of Korea, para. 75.

WT/DS312/R Page 102

"If the authorities have to base their findings, including those with respect to normal value, on information from a secondary source, including the information supplied in the application for the initiation of the investigation, they should do so with special circumspection. In such cases, the authorities should, where practicable, check the information from other independent sources at their disposal, such as published price lists, official import statistics and customs returns, and from the information obtained from other interested parties during the investigation. It is clear, however, that if an interested party does not cooperate and thus relevant information is being withheld from the authorities, this situation could lead to a result which is less favourable to the party than if the party did cooperate." 7.122 Paragraph 7 states that when an IA uses facts available in accordance with Article 6.8 of the Agreement, and in that context bases its determinations on information obtained from a secondary source, it has to do so with special care. It also provides that, to the extent possible, that information should be compared against information from other independent sources, including information obtained by the IA about other investigated companies in the same investigation. However, paragraph 7 also acknowledges that as long as special circumspection is exercised in the use of information from a secondary source, the results of the investigation may be less favourable for the non-cooperating interested party than had it chosen to cooperate. 7.123 Turning to the investigation at issue, we note that in the process of calculating the single margin of dumping for the three Sinar Mas Group companies, the KTC based Tjiwi Kimia's normal value and export price on the information submitted by the applicants in the application. Korea does not dispute this fact.179 However, parties' views diverge regarding whether or not that information was later on corroborated by the KTC against information from other independent sources. In this context, Korea generally argues that in certain cases, the fulfilment of the obligation under Article 5.3 may also suffice to meet the requirements of paragraph 7 of Annex II. Based on this view, Korea asserts that in the investigation at issue, there was no need to corroborate the normal value and export price data obtained from the application because these data came from independent and reliable sources such as the Korean government customs statistics ("KOTIS") and the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency ("KOTRA"). Furthermore, Korea asserts that because these data were obtained from such sources, they were deemed to have been corroborated.180 7.124 We consider the obligations set forth under Article 5.3 and paragraph 7 of Annex II to be different. Firstly, these two sets of obligations apply at different stages of an investigation: Article 5.3 concerns the quality of the evidence that would justify the initiation of an investigation whereas paragraph 7 of Annex II has to do with the evidence on which the IA's final determination may be based. Secondly, the standards of these two obligations are different. The standard under Article 5.3 is that evidence be "adequate and accurate" so as to justify initiation whereas paragraph 7 of Annex II requires that information from secondary sources be compared against that from other independent sources. We therefore do not agree with the view that the fulfilment of the obligation under Article 5.3 of the Agreement may in some cases also satisfy the requirements of paragraph 7 of Annex II. It may be the case that the obligation to corroborate under paragraph 7 may entail little substantive analysis in addition to the analysis carried out under Article 5.3 at the initiation stage. However, that does not make these two obligations the same from a procedural and substantive point of view. They are two distinct obligations that have to be observed by the IA at different stages of an investigation. We therefore disagree with Korea's contention that in certain cases, the fulfilment of the obligation under Article 5.3 may also suffice to meet the requirements of paragraph 7 of Annex II.

179

First Written Submission of Korea, para. 97. Second Written Submission of Korea, para. 32; Second Oral Statement of Korea, para. 64; Response of Korea to Question 26 from the Panel Following the First Meeting. 180

WT/DS312/R Page 103

7.125 We have no specific reason to question that the information about Tjiwi Kimia, submitted by the applicants in the application, may have been reliable as it came from independent institutions, i.e. KOTIS and KOTRA. The fact remains, however, that the KTC was under the obligation to take the procedural step, under paragraph 7 of Annex II, to confirm the reliability of that information for purposes of its determinations in the investigation. The issue, therefore, is whether or not the KTC took that step to satisfy the requirements of paragraph 7. 7.126 Korea argues that in the course of the investigation at issue, the KTC did in fact compare the information obtained from the application against information from other independent sources. In this context, Korea submits that the export price was compared against data from KOTIS. The record supports this proposition.181 Korea also argues that the normal value was compared against normal values established with respect to the other investigated companies in the same investigation. We note, however, that there is no indication of such corroboration on the record. Korea submitted an affidavit from a KTC investigator to prove this assertion.182 We are left in a position where there is evidence on the record that demonstrates that the KTC did corroborate export price information from the data of KOTIS, but no evidence as to whether or not the same was done with respect to the normal value. It is for a party asserting a fact to provide proof thereof.183 We therefore consider that Korea has not established as a matter of fact that the KTC compare the normal value figure for Tjiwi Kimia against other independent sources. It follows that Korea has not rebutted the prima facie case made by Indonesia in this regard. We therefore conclude that the KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the Agreement and paragraph 7 of Annex II by failing to fulfil its obligation to corroborate information obtained from secondary sources for purposes of calculating Tjiwi Kimia's dumping margin against other independent sources at its disposal. 7.127 Regarding Indonesia's argument that the magnitude of the margin of dumping calculated for Tjiwi Kimia also demonstrates that the KTC failed to exercise special circumspection, we are of the view that the magnitude of the margin of dumping may not have a bearing on the WTO-consistency of the KTC's calculation as long as the calculation conforms to the relevant provisions of the Agreement. We therefore disagree with Indonesia in this regard. (b)

Alleged Violation of Article 6.8 of the Agreement and Paragraph 6 of Annex II

7.128 Indonesia argues that since the KTC decided to treat the three Sinar Mas Group companies as a single exporter with respect to its dumping determinations, it should have treated these three companies as a single exporter for purposes of the procedural requirements of the Agreement as well. It follows that the single exporter should have been given "an opportunity to cure defects in submitted information."184 Korea disagrees. According to Korea, since Tjiwi Kimia did not submit any information to the KTC, there may be no violation of paragraph 6 vis-à-vis this company. Similarly, Korea submits that the fact that the KTC treated the three Sinar Mas Group companies as single exporter for purposes of its dumping margin determinations did not alter the implications of paragraph 6. 7.129

We note that paragraph 6 of Annex II reads: "If evidence or information is not accepted, the supplying party should be informed forthwith of the reasons therefore, and should have an opportunity to provide further explanations within a reasonable period, due account being taken of the time-limits of the investigation. If the explanations are considered by the authorities as not being

181

Exhibit KOR-8A at 39. Exhibit KOR-44. 183 See, supra, note 96. 184 Second Written Submission of Indonesia, para. 52. 182

WT/DS312/R Page 104

satisfactory, the reasons for the rejection of such evidence or information should be given in any published determinations." (emphasis added) 7.130 Paragraph 6 provides that in cases where the IA declines to accept information submitted by an interested party, that party has to be informed of the IA's decision and has to be given an opportunity to provide further explanations regarding that decision. If the IA finds such explanations as being unsatisfactory, then the information can be disregarded, in which case the IA has to explain, in its published determinations, why the information has been rejected. 7.131 In this case, it is undisputed that Tjiwi Kimia chose not to submit any information to the KTC. Thus, no submission of information was made on behalf of this company. Our understanding of the obligation set out in paragraph 6 is that submission of information is a prerequisite to invoke this paragraph. In other words, we consider that an interested party that chooses not to submit any information to the IA cannot logically claim a violation of paragraph 6. We are therefore of the view that the KTC did not act inconsistently with Article 6.8 and paragraph 6 of Annex II in not giving either Tjiwi Kimia or the Sinar Mas Group another opportunity to submit information which had already been withheld from the KTC.185 G.

KTC'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO MAKE A FAIR COMPARISON BETWEEN NORMAL VALUE AND EXPORT PRICE

1.

Arguments of Parties

(a)

Indonesia

7.132 Indonesia notes that Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli made their domestic sales through CMI whereas they exported directly to their customers in Korea. Indonesia asserts that CMI rendered certain additional sales-related services in the Indonesian market, which were not rendered in Indah Kiat's and Pindo Deli's exports to Korea. According to Indonesia, the [[**]]186 that CMI charged over the prices of Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli in the Indonesian market was evidence of the fact that it rendered additional marketing services. It follows that the KTC should have made an adjustment under Article 2.4 of the Agreement for this difference that affected price comparability in the investigation at issue. By failing to do so, the KTC acted inconsistently with Article 2.4. (b)

Korea

7.133 Korea acknowledges that the Sinar Mas Group companies argued during the investigation at issue that additional sales-related activities undertaken by CMI in the Indonesian market deserved an adjustment under Article 2.4 of the Agreement. According to Korea, however, the involvement of CMI in the domestic sales did not automatically necessitate an adjustment under that article. Korea asserts that the Sinar Mas Group never demonstrated that the involvement of CMI in the domestic sales gave rise to a difference that affected price comparability as set out under Article 2.4. 2.

Arguments of Third Parties

(a)

United States

7.134 The United States submits that, contrary to Indonesia's assertion, not all differences necessitate an adjustment under Article 2.4. For an adjustment to be made under Article 2.4 of the 185

Having concluded that paragraph 6 of Annex II could not possibly be invoked to submit information on behalf of Tjiwi Kimia because this company had not submitted any information to the KTC, we need not, and do not, discuss the specific issue of whether or not the fact that the KTC treated the three Sinar Mas Group companies as a single exporter changed this outcome. 186 Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential.

WT/DS312/R Page 105

Agreement for differences in levels of trade, it has to be shown that the alleged difference affects price comparability. 3.

Evaluation by the Panel

7.135 We note, at the outset, that parties agree that the levels of trade of the Sinar Mas Group companies' domestic and export sales were the same in that the sales in both markets were made to the same categories of customers.187 We are therefore not faced with a claim regarding an alleged difference in the levels of trade per se. Indonesia contends that CMI performed certain marketing activities with respect to Indah Kiat's and Pindo Deli's domestic sales, which were not carried out by these companies in their exports to Korea. These additional activities by CMI necessarily gave rise to additional costs, which constituted a factor that affected price comparability within the meaning of Article 2.4 of the Agreement. It follows that the KTC should have made an adjustment with respect to this difference. According to Indonesia, the fact that CMI charged a [[**]]188 in the domestic sales was evidence of this difference that affected price comparability. 7.136 Korea concedes that the Sinar Mas Group companies made a request for an adjustment under Article 2.4 with respect to the alleged additional costs stemming from CMI's involvement in the domestic sales. Korea asserts, however, that they never provided sufficient evidence to prove that such involvement necessarily gave rise to additional costs that had to be removed in comparing the normal values and export prices for these companies. According to Korea, the fact that these expenses were incurred by CMI, rather than the exporters themselves, did not automatically mean that they deserved an adjustment under Article 2.4. 7.137

We note that the relevant part of Article 2.4 of the Agreement provides: "A fair comparison shall be made between the export price and the normal value. This comparison shall be made at the same level of trade, normally at the ex-factory level, and in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time. Due allowance shall be made in each case, on its merits, for differences which affect price comparability, including differences in conditions and terms of sale, taxation, levels of trade, quantities, physical characteristics, and any other differences which are also demonstrated to affect price comparability." (footnote omitted, emphasis added)

7.138 We note that Article 2.4 of the Agreement, which generally requires the IA to carry out a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price, specifically mentions levels of trade as one possible item for which an adjustment may be needed. In addition to providing a non-exhaustive list of items for which adjustments may be needed, Article 2.4 also generally stipulates that necessary adjustments have to be made with respect to any other factor which affects price comparability. Consequently, to make a prima facie case, Indonesia has to demonstrate to the Panel that there was (1) a difference (2) that affected price comparability between the normal value and the export price for which the KTC failed to make an adjustment. 7.139 We note that Indonesia cited two items as the factors that affected price comparability in the investigation at issue: the [[**]]189 charged by CMI in its sales to independent buyers in Indonesia and the SG&A and interest expenses added by the KTC in the constructed normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli to account for CMI's expenses related to the sale of the subject product in Indonesia.

187

See, for instance, Response of Indonesia to Question 28(a) from the Panel Following the First

188

Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. Ibid.

Meeting. 189

WT/DS312/R Page 106

7.140 However, we do not understand Indonesia to assert that the KTC should have made an adjustment for both of these two factors. Indonesia generally argues that the fact that CMI charged a [[**]]190 in its sales to independent buyers is evidence of the fact that there was a difference between the normal value and the export price, which affected price comparability.191 As to the quantification of the adjustment, we note that the Sinar Mas Group put forward a two-fold argument during the investigation, as shown in the quotation in paragraph 7.142 below: the Group argued that if the KTC bases its normal value determinations on CMI's selling prices submitted by the respondents, account should be taken of CMI's [[**]]192. If, however, the KTC constructs the normal values, then the expenses added to the constructed normal values for CMI should be removed at the fair comparison stage. 7.141 We recall that the KTC did not use CMI's selling prices, but decided to construct the normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. In its construction of these two normal values, the KTC added [[**]]193 per cent for SG&A and [[**]]194per cent for interest expenses for CMI.195 Given that the record clearly demonstrates that the KTC used constructed normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli, we understand Indonesia to argue that the KTC should have made an adjustment to remove the SG&A and the interest expenses added to account for CMI's involvement in the domestic sales of the subject product. In other words, Indonesia's argument is that these two expenses added to the normal values to account for CMI's costs should have been removed when comparing the normal values with export prices in order to make a fair comparison as required under Article 2.4 of the Agreement. In any event, we do not consider this distinction regarding the quantification of the adjustment to have an important bearing on our legal reasoning with respect to this claim because, no matter on what basis the claimed adjustment should have been calculated by the KTC, the issue is whether or not there was in fact such a difference that affected price comparability and for which an adjustment should have been made. In other words, the issue is whether or not domestic sales of the subject product made through CMI in Indonesia contained certain additional expenses stemming from the services rendered by CMI with respect to domestic sales, which were not rendered in exports to Korea. 7.142 Turning to the record of the investigation at issue, as stated above, we note that in its construction of the normal values for the three Sinar Mas Group companies, the KTC added additional SG&A and interest expenses for CMI's re-sales of the subject product. It is also clear that the Sinar Mas Group requested that an adjustment be made to the normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli to account for these expenses which, in their view, affected price comparability and that the KTC declined that request. The Sinar Mas Group raised this issue at least three times during the investigation. The letter by the Sinar Mas Group dated 9 April 2003 reads in relevant parts: "[[**]]"196 7.143

The Sinar Mas Group's letter dated 4 July 2003 reads in pertinent parts: "[[**]]"197

7.144

The Sinar Mas Group's letter dated 12 September 2003 reads in relevant parts: "[[**]]"198 190

Ibid. Response of Indonesia to Question 16 from the Panel Following the Second Meeting. 192 Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. 193 Ibid. 194 Ibid. 195 These two figures were subsequently corrected to [[**]] and [[**]] per cent (Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential) for the respective companies. See, Exhibit KOR- 54. 196 Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. 197 Ibid. 191

WT/DS312/R Page 107

7.145 In response to these requests by the Sinar Mas Group, the KTC's Final Dumping Report reads in pertinent parts: "7) Adjustments for the Difference in the Level of Trade Opinion of the Respondents Respondents requested to take into consideration the difference in the level of trade in determining the normal value, as the products are sold to independent domestic merchants in the domestic market through CMI, the sales company, while the exports to Korea are directly made to Korean importers, thus making the level of trade different for the domestic sale in Indonesia and the exports to Korea. Review Opinion of the Office of Investigation First, in order for the difference in the level of trade to be recognized as an adjustment factor of the normal value, the domestic sale in Indonesia must have one more level of trade than exports. Second, such difference in the level of trade must affect the difference between the export price to Korea and the domestic sales price. - CMI, the sales company, is an affiliated company of Respondent, and thus, forms one economic entity with Respondent. Therefore, the domestic sale in Indonesia does not have one more level of trade than exports. - Further, for fair comparison, Respondents are required to establish the impact of such difference in the level of trade on the prices of exports and domestic sales. However, Respondents failed to submit such evidence to the Office of Investigation during the on the spot investigation, thereby failing to prove the impact of the difference in the level of trade on the price of exports to Korea and the domestic sales price. - Therefore, for the above reasons, Respondents' arguments are not acceptable."199 7.146 The crux of Indonesia's claim, and the main line of reasoning put forward by the Sinar Mas Group in the course of the investigation at issue, is that the involvement of CMI in the domestic sales chain necessarily meant that an adjustment should have been made to make a fair comparison. The fact that CMI charged a [[**]]200 over the prices of Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli is, in Indonesia's view, evidence of this fact. Evidence on which Indonesia relies in this regard has also to do with the involvement of CMI in domestic sales. For instance, Indonesia refers to the fact that CMI had to pay its employees who were carrying out sales-related work in addition to the work done by the employees of Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. Indonesia also mentions that there were two price negotiations in domestic sales: One between Indah Kiat or Pindo Deli and CMI and the other between CMI and independent buyers. Consequently, two sets of sales-related documents were issued with respect to domestic sales.201 That is why CMI charged a [[**]]202 and why the KTC added SG&A and interest expenses for CMI in the constructed normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli.

198

Ibid. Exhibit KOR-14A at 19. 200 Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. 201 Response of Indonesia to Question 16 from the Panel Following the Second Meeting. 202 Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. 199

WT/DS312/R Page 108

7.147 We note that in a given investigation there may be differences with respect to sales-related expenses in the export and domestic markets for a variety of reasons. It may also be the case that these differences may affect price comparability. If so, the IA has to make an adjustment to account for the effect of such differences in order to ensure a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price, consistently with Article 2.4 of the Agreement. This may be the case irrespective of whether or not there is a trading company, such as CMI in this investigation, involved in the distribution of the subject product either in the export or the domestic market. In other words, the fact that a trading company handles domestic or export sales of the subject product does not in and of itself mean that there is a difference that affects price comparability and that an adjustment has to be made under Article 2.4. The interested party claiming such an adjustment has to demonstrate that the involvement of the trading company gives rise to a difference that affects price comparability. We note that, just as the Sinar Mas Group did during the investigation at issue, in these proceedings Indonesia repeatedly referred to the costs incurred by CMI as the trading company handling domestic sales of Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. This, in our view, is not enough to demonstrate that CMI's involvement created a difference between the normal values and the export prices of Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli which affected price comparability. We are not convinced that there were sales-related services rendered by CMI with respect to domestic sales of Indah Kiat's and Pindo Deli's products in the Indonesian market which were not rendered in these two companies' export sales to Korea. Indonesia has failed to make a prima facie case in this regard. We therefore reject Indonesia's claim. H.

KTC'S TREATMENT OF INDAH KIAT, PINDO DELI AND TJIWI KIMIA AS A SINGLE EXPORTER

1.

Arguments of Parties

(a)

Indonesia

7.148 Indonesia notes that Article 6.10 of the Agreement requires that individual margins of dumping be calculated for each exporter involved in an anti-dumping investigation. Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli and Tjiwi Kimia are separate legal entities under Indonesian law. Following the mandate of Article 6.10, therefore, the KTC should have treated them separately in its dumping determinations. According to Indonesia, no provision in the Agreement permits an IA to treat separate legal entities as a single exporter and thereby to assign a single dumping margin to them. Had the KTC treated these three companies separately, there would have been no finding of dumping with respect to Indah Kiat, the largest Indonesian exporter subject to the investigation. It follows that the KTC violated Article 6.10 of the Agreement by treating these three companies as a single exporter for purposes of its dumping margin calculations. 7.149 Assuming that Article 6.10 allows an IA to treat separate legal entities as a single exporter for purposes of its dumping determinations, Indonesia submits that the KTC failed to make the necessary determinations in the investigation at issue which would have justified such treatment. In the absence of evidence indicating actual coordination with respect to both domestic sales and exports to Korea, the existence of overlapping management or shareholding between individual companies cannot be sufficient ground to treat them as a single exporter. 7.150 Indonesia argues that the KTC also violated Article 9.3 of the Agreement by treating the three Sinar Mas Group companies as a single exporter because the calculation of the single margin of dumping subjected Indah Kiat to the anti-dumping duty at issue although that company's preliminary margin was negative. (b)

Korea

7.151 Korea asserts that Article 6.10 does not require the calculation of a separate dumping margin for each individual corporate entity. It requires that an individual dumping margin be calculated for each known exporter or producer. There is no definition of the terms "exporter" or "producer" in the

WT/DS312/R Page 109

Agreement. In Korea's view, therefore, the IA can interpret this provision as allowing the treatment of separate corporate entities that function as a single economic unit as a single exporter. Korea characterizes this as a functional definition of the term "exporter" under Article 6.10. Korea argues that the KTC found important management links that justified treating these three Indonesian companies as a single exporter. 2.

Arguments of Third Parties

(a)

China

7.152 Although China disagrees with Korea's proposition that the terms "corporation" on the one hand and "exporter" or "producer" on the other have been used in such a way that they cannot substitute one another in the context of the Agreement, it nevertheless agrees that in certain circumstances treating different corporations as a single entity for purposes of dumping margin determinations in an anti-dumping investigation may be allowed. China also finds support for its proposition in Article 9.5 of the Agreement which allows the IA not to calculate an individual dumping margin for a new exporter if that exporter is affiliated with another exporter that is already subject to an anti-dumping measure. (b)

European Communities

7.153 The European Communities submits that the terms "exporter" and "producer" used in Article 6.10 have not been directly defined in the Agreement. The IA, therefore, has certain discretion in interpreting these terms by taking due account of the economic circumstances surrounding a given anti-dumping investigation. According to the European Communities, it is not inconsistent with the text, or the object and purpose, of Article 6.10 to treat separate corporations that are related, as a single entity for purposes of dumping determinations in an anti-dumping investigation. The European Communities finds support for this proposition in Article 9.5 of the Agreement. According to the European Communities, if Article 9.5 requires that account be taken of the relationship between foreign exporters in the context of a newcomer's review, the same should hold true under Article 6.10 with respect to the initial investigation. (c)

United States

7.154 The United States argues that Article 6.10 does not disallow the treatment of more than one corporation as a single economic entity for purposes of dumping margin calculations in an antidumping investigation. In the view of the United States, the words "exporter" and "producer" which are used in Article 6.10, and not defined in the Agreement, should be interpreted by reference to the commercial functions of the companies rather than their corporate structure. 3.

Evaluation by the Panel

7.155 Indonesia asserts that Article 6.10 of the Agreement precludes the treatment of separate legal entities in an anti-dumping investigation as a single exporter and the assignment of a single margin of dumping to them. Assuming arguendo that Article 6.10 allows a Member to treat separate legal entities as a single exporter for purposes of dumping margin calculations, Indonesia submits in the alternative that such treatment is possible only if there is evidence of actual coordination in the companies' domestic sales and their export sales to the importing Member, and that the KTC did not find any such evidence in the investigation at issue. Korea disagrees and contends that Article 6.10 requires that an individual dumping margin be calculated for each individual exporter, not for each independent corporate entity. It follows that several companies that act as a single economic entity may be treated as a single exporter. 7.156

We note that Article 6.10 provides:

WT/DS312/R Page 110

"The authorities shall, as a rule, determine an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer concerned of the product under investigation. In cases where the number of exporters, producers, importers or types of products involved is so large as to make such a determination impracticable, the authorities may limit their examination either to a reasonable number of interested parties or products by using samples which are statistically valid on the basis of information available to the authorities at the time of the selection, or to the largest percentage of the volume of the exports from the country in question which can reasonably be investigated." (emphasis added) 7.157 The claim at issue concerns the first sentence of Article 6.10. The issue here is whether, and if so under what circumstances, Article 6.10 permits an IA to treat separate legal entities, which export the subject product to the importing Member and which are in certain ways related to one another, as a single exporter and to determine an individual margin of dumping for that exporter. We note that Article 6.10 mentions "exporters" and "producers" of the subject product and requires that an individual margin be calculated for each of them. It does not, however, define these two words. After setting out this general rule, Article 6.10 then goes on to create an exception, i.e. sampling, which allows the IA, under certain circumstances, to limit its examination to a certain number of exporters or producers and to assign the resulting margin of dumping to unexamined exporters or producers. Nowhere in the text of Article 6.10, however, can we find any specific guidance as to whether each separate legal entity must be treated as a distinct exporter or producer. 7.158 Turning to the context of Article 6.10, we find important guidance in Article 9.5 of the Agreement. Article 9.5 reads in pertinent parts: "If a product is subject to anti-dumping duties in an importing Member, the authorities shall promptly carry out a review for the purpose of determining individual margins of dumping for any exporters or producers in the exporting country in question who have not exported the product to the importing Member during the period of investigation, provided that these exporters or producers can show that they are not related to any of the exporters or producers in the exporting country who are subject to the anti-dumping duties on the product . . . . ." (emphasis added) 7.159 Article 9.5 requires that the IA determine individual margins for exporters and producers who did not export during the POI. Article 9.5 further provides, however, that the IA is not required to calculate an individual dumping margin for a newcomer who is related to an exporter subject to an existing anti-dumping duty. Thus, in the context of new shipper reviews, the mere existence of a relationship to an exporter or producer already subject to anti-dumping duties is sufficient to disqualify an entity from entitlement to an individual margin of dumping. The logic of Article 9.5 would appear to be that to allow related companies to obtain individual rates could undermine the efficiency of the existing duties. We recognize that Article 9.5 applies only after a duty has been put in place, and that the situation in an investigation might well justify a different approach. Nevertheless, Article 9.5 as context strongly suggests that the term "exporter" in Article 6.10 should not be read in a way to require an individual margin of dumping for each independent legal entity under all circumstances. 7.160 Several other provisions of the Agreement, although less directly relevant, nevertheless confirm that the Agreement recognizes that relationships between legally distinct entities may impact behaviour and are thus relevant to the application of the rules of the Agreement. For example, Article 2.3 allows the IA to disregard the export price between affiliated parties in cases where there is reason to believe that, because of an affiliation between the exporter and the importer or a third party, the export price reported to the IA is not reliable. In these cases, the IA may base its export price determination on the price at which the subject product is first resold to an independent buyer in

WT/DS312/R Page 111

the importing Member. Similarly, Article 2.1 of the Agreement allows a Member to exclude sales "not in the ordinary course of trade" when determining normal value, and the Appellate Body has made clear that sales might not be in the ordinary course of trade by reason of affiliation.203 7.161 Thus, we consider that, when read in context, Article 6.10 does not necessarily preclude treating distinct legal entities as a single exporter or producer for purposes of dumping determinations in anti-dumping investigations. Having said that, however, we do not consider that Article 6.10 provide the IA with unlimited discretion to do so. While Article 6.10 does not by its terms require that each separate legal entity be treated as a single "exporter" or "producer", neither does it allow a Member to treat distinct legal entities as a single exporter or producer without justification. Whether or not the circumstances of a given investigation justify such treatment must be determined on the basis of the record of that investigation. In our view, in order to properly treat multiple companies as a single exporter or producer in the context of its dumping determinations in an investigation, the IA has to determine that these companies are in a relationship close enough to support that treatment. 7.162 We note Indonesia's contention that a necessary element in this regard is evidence indicating actual coordination in the domestic sales of the companies in question and their exports to the importing Member in question, a contention disputed by Korea. We recall, however, the standard of review that we are required to apply in respect of questions of law (supra, paras.7.1-7.5). Although evidence of actual coordination of domestic or export sales might well be a highly relevant element for consideration in determining whether separate entities may be treated as a single exporter or producer, we do not consider Indonesia's interpretation of Article 6.10 as requiring such evidence to be the only permissible interpretation of that Article. Rather, we consider that Article 6.10, read in its context, and in particular with Article 9.5, could permissibly be interpreted to allow such treatment in other circumstances where the structural and commercial relationship between the companies in question is sufficiently close to be considered as a single exporter or producer. 7.163 With these considerations in mind, we now turn to the facts before the KTC in this investigation. We note that, in its preliminary determination, the KTC rejected the domestic industry's request that the three Sinar Mas Group companies be treated as a single exporter and that a single margin of dumping be assigned to them.204 At the final stage of the investigation, however, the KTC did treat them as a single exporter or producer and assigned a single margin to them. The KTC explained the reasons for its decision in its Final Dumping Report, which states in pertinent parts: "Upon re-examination, based on the following grounds, the Office of Investigation calculated a single dumping margin for Pindo Deli, Indah Kiat and Tjiwi Kimia by considering them as one entity. - Ekapersada, the subsidiary of APP, owns [[**]]%, [[**]]% and [[**]]% of the shares of Pindo Deli, Indah Kiat and Tjiwi Kimia, respectively.205 - Among the commissioners of Pindo Deli [[**]], Indah Kiat [[**]] and Tjiwi Kimia [[**]], [[**]] commissioners of Indah Kiat and Tjiwi Kimia and [[**]] commissioners of Pindo Deli and Tjiwi Kimia are identical persons, and [[**]] person serves as a commissioner of all three companies.206 - Among the directors of Pindo Deli [[**]], Indah Kiat [[**]] and Tjiwi Kimia [[**]], [**]] directors of Indah Kiat and Tjiwi Kimia, [[**]] directors of Pindo Deli and

203

Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, supra, note 94, para. 143. Preliminary Dumping Report (Exhibit KOR-8B at 12). 205 Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. 206 Ibid. 204

WT/DS312/R Page 112

Tjiwi Kimia and [[**]] directors of Pindo Deli and Indah Kiat are identical persons, and [[**]] persons serve as directors of all three companies.207 - During the POI of the dumping margins, Pindo Deli sold uncoated woodfree paper to Indah Kiat ([[**]] tons) and Tjiwi Kimia ([[**]] tons) through its affiliated company, CMI.208 - Each of Pindo Deli, Indah Kiat and Tjiwi Kimia manufactures and sells the product under investigation."209 7.164 We note that the above-quoted part of the record, where the KTC discusses the basis of its decision to treat the three Sinar Mas Group companies as a single exporter or producer, demonstrates that one parent company, i.e. Ekapersada, owns the [[**]] of the shares of the three companies. This, in our view, shows that the parent company had a considerable controlling power over the operations of its three subsidiaries. Further, we note that there was a significant commonality with respect to the management of the three companies. The record shows that [[**]] commissioners of Indah Kiat and Tjiwi Kimia and [[**]] commissioners of Pindo Deli and Tjiwi Kimia were the same persons and that [[**]] person served as a commissioner of all three companies. Furthermore, [[**]] directors of Indah Kiat and Tjiwi Kimia, [[**]] directors of Pindo Deli and Tjiwi Kimia and [[**]] directors of Pindo Deli and Indah Kiat were the same persons, and [[**]] persons served as directors of all three companies.210 7.165 We consider the commonality of management among these three companies, coupled with the fact that they were all owned by the same parent company, to be indications of a close legal and commercial relationship between these three companies. Given these similarities, one might, in our view, expect that commercial decisions for the three companies could be made in substantial part by the same closely interlocked group of individuals, and the management of all three companies could ultimately be answerable to their majority shareholder Ekapersada. We note that the record also indicates that one of these companies, Pindo Deli, sold the subject product to the other two during the POI. This also indicates that these companies could harmonize their commercial activities to fulfil common corporate objectives. The ability and willingness of the three companies to shift products among themselves is, in our view, of some importance to the consideration of whether the three companies should be treated as a single exporter and subject to a single margin determination. 7.166 In addition to these factors specifically referred to by the KTC in the above-quoted part of the Final Dumping Report, the record also shows that CMI acted practically as the sole channel through which all three companies made their domestic sales in Indonesia. We note the following determinations that the KTC made regarding the relationship between the two Sinar Mas Group companies which cooperated with the KTC in the investigation at issue on the one hand and CMI on the other: "In accordance with Article 23, Paragraph 5 of the Decree, Respondent [Pindo Deli] and CMI can be considered as one economic entity, as one company controls the other company legally or practically for the following reasons: (i) [[**]] shareholders of PT Sinar Mas Tunggal, the parent company of CMI, are directors of APP, the holding company of Pindo Deli; (ii) Pindo Deli controls the sales price of CMI (B-6 1 b of the response: "they cannot sell lower price without Pindo Deli's authority"); (iii) they are described as affiliated companies on the annual report; and (iv) 207

Ibid. Ibid. 209 Exhibit KOR-14A at 14-15. We note that the KTC's Final Determination repeats the same determination. See, Exhibit KOR-15A at 4. 210 Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. 208

WT/DS312/R Page 113

Respondent makes domestic sales of most of the like product through CMI ([[**]]% for PPC and [[**]] for WF).211 Therefore, the argument of Respondent cannot be accepted."212 (emphasis added) "In accordance with Article 23, Paragraph 5 of the Decree, Respondent [Indah Kiat] and CMI can be considered as one economic entity, as one company controls the other company legally or practically for the following reasons: (i) [[**]]213 shareholders of PT Sinar Mas Tunggal, the parent company of CMI, are directors of APP, the holding company of Indah Kiat; (ii) Indah Kiat controls the sales price of CMI (B-6 1 b of the response: "they cannot sell lower price without Pindo Deli's authority"); (iii) they are described as affiliated companies on the annual report; and (iv) Respondent makes domestic sales of all of the like product through CMI. Therefore, the argument of Respondent cannot be accepted."214 (emphasis added) 7.167 Although the foregoing discussion by the KTC focused on the relationship between Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli, respectively, with CMI, rather than to the direct relationship between Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli directly, we find the determination by the KTC and the considerations underlying it to be relevant to our evaluation of the claim at issue. In terms of the determination itself, the conclusion that Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli were each "one economic entity" with the same third company is obviously relevant to the relationship between the former two companies. This determination is based on evidence showing that [[**]] per cent of Indah Kiat’s and [[**]] per cent of Pindo Deli’s domestic sales of the subject product were made through CMI.215 Furthermore, we note that CMI also made Tjiwi Kimia's sales in the Indonesian market.216 We also note that the record shows that CMI charged the same [[**]], on its sales of the products produced by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli.217 These facts are, in our view, indicative of a close commercial relationship among the three companies.218 7.168 In our view, bearing in mind our standard of review (supra, paras. 7.1-7.5), the fact that the three Sinar Mas Group companies made almost all their domestic sales through CMI, coupled with the commonality regarding shareholdings and management and the existence of cross-sales of the subject product among the three companies, is an adequate basis for the KTC's decision to treat the three Sinar Mas Group companies as a single exporter or producer. We therefore reject Indonesia's claim that Korea acted inconsistently with Article 6.10 of the Agreement. 7.169 We note Indonesia's argument that the KTC's decision to treat the three Sinar Mas Group companies as a single exporter also violated Article 9.3 of the Agreement because it subjected Indah Kiat to an anti-dumping duty of 8.22 per cent, although the KTC had calculated a negative preliminary dumping margin of 0.52 for this company. 7.170

Article 9.3 provides: "The amount of the anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the margin of dumping as established under Article 2."

7.171 We note that Article 9.3 clearly prohibits the imposition of a duty in excess of the margin of dumping calculated in an investigation. It does not, however, mention a distinction between an 211

Ibid. Preliminary Dumping Report (Exhibit KOR-8A at 13). 213 Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. 214 Preliminary Dumping Report (Exhibit KOR-8A at 24). 215 We recall that the third Sinar Mas Group company, Tjiwi Kimia, did not submit any information to the KTC regarding its sales of the subject product. 216 See, Indah Kiat's Response to the KTC's Questionnaire (Exhibit KOR-20 at 2). 217 Exhibit KOR-20 at 4; Exhibit KOR-21 at 5. 218 Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. 212

WT/DS312/R Page 114

individual margin for separate corporate entities and a single margin calculated for a group of them. We recall our finding above that the KTC did not act inconsistently with Article 6.10 of the Agreement by treating the three Sinar Mas Group companies as a single exporter or producer and assigning a single margin of dumping to them in the investigation at issue. It follows that as long as the single anti-dumping duty imposed in this investigation was not higher than the single margin calculated for the three Indonesian companies, there can be no violation of Article 9.3. We note that Indonesia does not argue a violation of Article 9.3 regarding the duty imposed for the single exporter in this investigation. We do not therefore agree with Indonesia's argument that Article 9.3 was violated because the single margin imposed on the single entity was higher than the individual margin calculated for Indah Kiat in the KTC's preliminary dumping determinations, and reject it. I.

KTC'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO TERMINATE THE INVESTIGATION WITH RESPECT TO INDAH KIAT

1.

Arguments of Parties

(a)

Indonesia

7.172 Indonesia argues that the KTC violated Article 5.8 of the Agreement by not terminating the investigation with respect to Indah Kiat for which a negative dumping margin had been calculated in the preliminary determinations. (b)

Korea

7.173 Korea argues that the KTC's preliminary determination stated that the KTC was reviewing certain aspects of its preliminary calculations, in particular its decision to calculate separate dumping margins for Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli and Tjiwi Kimia. Therefore, the KTC was not satisfied at the time of its preliminary determination that there was no dumping. In fact, the KTC treated the three Sinar Mas Group companies as a single exporter for purposes of its final determination and calculated a single margin for the three of them. There could therefore be no violation of Article 5.8 with respect to Indah Kiat in the investigation at issue because the KTC did not make individual dumping margin calculations in its final determinations. The KTC never determined that the dumping margin for this single entity was de minimis. 2.

Arguments of Third Parties

(a)

European Communities

7.174 The European Communities contends that Article 5.8 does not require that the investigation be terminated with respect to an exporter for whom a de minimis dumping margin has been calculated. According to the European Communities, Article 5.8 requires such termination when the margin for the country as a whole is de minimis. The KTC, therefore, did not err in this investigation by not terminating the investigation with respect to Indah Kiat on the grounds that the preliminary dumping margin calculated for this company was de minimis. (b)

United States

7.175 According to the United States, the obligation to terminate the investigation pursuant to Article 5.8 where the margin of dumping is de minimis only applies to final, as opposed to preliminary, determinations. Given that the Agreement contains no requirement to make a preliminary determination, Indonesia's misinterpretation of Article 5.8 becomes more apparent.

WT/DS312/R Page 115

3.

Evaluation by the Panel

7.176 We recall our finding above (paras. 7.168-7.171) that the KTC did not act inconsistently with Articles 6.10 and 9.3 of the Agreement with respect to treating the three Sinar Mas Group companies as a single exporter for purposes of its dumping determinations in the investigation at issue. That is, we found that the KTC properly treated them as one exporter and assigned one margin of dumping to them. 7.177 Further, we note the following statement from Indonesia with regard to the nature of this claim: "Indonesia agrees that Article 5.8 applies to final, as opposed to preliminary, determinations of dumping. Thus, its claim that the KTC should have terminated the investigation with respect to Indah Kiat is dependent on its claims that the KTC improperly “collapsed” Indah Kiat into a “single economic entity” and failed to calculate an individual margin of dumping for Indah Kiat under Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement. If the Panel finds that the KTC improperly “collapsed” these exporters and hence improperly failed to calculate an individual margin of dumping for Indah Kiat, Indonesia requests that the Panel rule on its claims under Article 5.8, as well as its related claims under Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5 of the Agreement described in paragraph 196 of its first written submission."219 7.178 We note that Indonesia submits that the Panel should address this claim if it finds that treating the three Sinar Mas Group companies as a single exporter was WTO-inconsistent. Given that we did not find that treating the three Sinar Mas Group companies as a single exporter was WTO-inconsistent and taking into consideration Indonesia's above-quoted statement, we need not, and do not, make any finding on this claim. J.

KTC'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO ABIDE BY THE DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS CONTAINED IN ARTICLES 6.4, 6.7, 6.9 AND 12.2 OF THE AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO ITS DUMPING DETERMINATIONS

1.

Arguments of Parties

(a)

Indonesia

7.179 Indonesia submits that the KTC's failure to disclose the results of the verification violated Article 6.7 of the Agreement. The KTC did not make such disclosure even though this was expressly requested by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. Indonesia acknowledges that the KTC officials made an oral disclosure regarding the results of the verification. However, Indonesia considers that an oral disclosure cannot satisfy the requirements of Article 6.7. Furthermore, Indonesia asserts that the contents of the mentioned oral disclosure, together with the subsequent written disclosures in the KTC's reports, fell short of disclosing all the verification results. 7.180 Indonesia also argues that the KTC's failure to adequately disclose its method of calculating the constructed normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli violated Articles 6.4, 6.9 and 12.2 of the Agreement. (b)

Korea

7.181 Korea contends that the KTC investigators prepared a verification report for the KTC's internal use. This report was not released to any of the interested parties in the investigation. During 219

Response of Indonesia to Question 48 from the Panel Following the First Meeting.

WT/DS312/R Page 116

the disclosure meeting held on 4 April 2003, the KTC officials orally informed interested parties of the verification results. Furthermore, various reports prepared by the KTC and disclosed to the parties in connection with the KTC's preliminary determinations also described the defects found during verification. According to Korea, these disclosures were sufficient to satisfy the obligation contained in Article 6.7, which does not necessarily require the disclosure of a written verification report. 7.182 With respect to the alleged violations of Articles 6.4, 6.9 and 12.2 of the Agreement, Korea argues that the reports released in connection with the KTC's preliminary and final determinations in the investigation at issue were sufficient to inform the Indonesian exporters of all relevant issues relating to the calculation of the normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. Korea contends, however, that confidential information was excluded from the scope of these disclosures in accordance with Article 6.5 of the Agreement. 2.

Evaluation by the Panel

(a)

Alleged Violation of Article 6.7 of the Agreement

7.183 We commence our evaluation of Indonesia's claim with the text of Article 6.7 of the Agreement. That article provides in relevant part: "Subject to the requirement to protect confidential information, the authorities shall make the results of any such investigations available, or shall provide disclosure thereof pursuant to paragraph 9, to the firms to which they pertain and may make such results available to the applicants." (emphasis added) 7.184 We note that Article 6.7 requires the IA to inform the investigated exporters of the verification results. The text provides that such disclosure can be made either by making the results available so that the exporters can see them if they so wish or through the final disclosure under Article 6.9 before a final decision is taken in the investigation. 7.185 Indonesia asserts that there was no adequate disclosure of the verification results to the investigated Indonesian exporters, i.e. Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. Indonesia submits that the person acting on behalf of Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli in the investigation at issue specifically requested to see the verification results, but that such request was not granted. Korea submits that the representatives of the Indonesian exporters were informed orally of the verification results and then through the disclosure of certain reports prepared by the KTC, which also included the verification results. In Korea's view, the Agreement does not necessarily require a written disclosure regarding the verification results. Korea submits that this oral briefing met the requirements of Article 6.7 in terms of informing the Indonesian companies about the verification results. 7.186 We note that the record indicates that the KTC organized a disclosure meeting on 4 April 2003, immediately following the verification. The representatives of the Sinar Mas Group participated in this meeting. Parties agree that during this meeting the KTC investigators informed the Sinar Mas Group of the fact that the KTC would base its normal value determinations for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli on facts available on the grounds that they failed to provide CMI's financial statements during verification. 7.187 With regard to the rest of the disclosures that may have been made during this meeting, however, parties disagree. Indonesia asserts that nothing else was communicated to the Sinar Mas Group in that meeting, whereas Korea argues that a number of other issues were also brought to the attention of the Sinar Mas Group. Korea submitted an affidavit220 to the Panel in which a KTC official testified that information relating to export price determinations as well as adjustments to the 220

Exhibit KOR-44.

WT/DS312/R Page 117

normal values and export prices for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli was also conveyed in this meeting. The affidavit also states that the fact that these data were successfully verified was also explained in the meeting. Indonesia disagrees with these assertions. We note that apart from submitting the mentioned affidavit, Korea has not referred to any evidence on the record in this regard. We recall that a party making a factual assertion has the burden to prove it. Korea has failed to prove its assertion that issues other than the KTC's decision to resort to facts available for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli were also brought to the attention of the Sinar Mas Group during the 4 April meeting. We therefore consider that the disclosure made during the mentioned meeting was limited to the fact that the KTC would base its normal value determinations for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli on facts available on the grounds that they failed to provide CMI's financial statements during verification. 7.188 Next, we shall address Korea's allegation that certain documents sent by the KTC also informed the Sinar Mas Group of the verification results. In this context, we shall first address the issue of whether or not Article 6.7 requires that the disclosure regarding the verification results be made in a written format. Since Indonesia submits that an oral disclosure would not satisfy Article 6.7221, we understand Indonesia to argue that a written disclosure is necessary. Korea disagrees with Indonesia in this regard. According to Korea, Article 6.7 does not require written disclosure.222 We agree with Korea that Article 6.7 does not require written disclosure. It requires that the verification results be disclosed to the investigated exporters without specifying the format in which such disclosure is to be made. We note that when they intended that written format be used with respect to certain communications in the course of an anti-dumping investigation, drafters stated it clearly in the Agreement. For instance, Article 5.1 of the Agreement provides that the application for the initiation of an investigation has to be made in writing. Similarly, Article 6.3 provides that oral information submitted to the IA by an interested party may only be taken into account if it is subsequently reproduced in writing. These examples support our interpretation that Article 6.7 does not require that disclosure be a written disclosure. As long as it can be proved that the substantive requirements of that provision have been fulfilled, the format of the disclosure would not matter. 7.189 We now turn to the contents of the documents mentioned by Korea to examine whether they informed the Sinar Mas Group of the verification results. We note that in this regard Korea refers to the Preliminary Dumping Report and the Preliminary Investigation Report prepared by the KTC.223 The Preliminary Dumping Report states in pertinent parts: "Although the Office of Investigation requested for the financial statements of CMI during the on the spot investigation, Respondent refused to provide the financial statements for reasons that CMI and Respondent were separate legal entities and that Respondent could not control CMI. Therefore, the Office of Investigation calculated the sales cost of CMI on the basis of the facts available, as it was not able to verify CMI's resale data against the financial statements, related accounting books and records and substantiating evidence thereon."224 7.190

The Preliminary Investigation Report reads in pertinent parts: "However, during the on the spot investigation, Respondent failed to submit relevant data, such as the financial statements, etc. concerning sales made through its affiliated company, CMI (PT, Cagrawala Mega Indah). Therefore, the Office of Investigation calculated the normal value on the basis of the facts available and calculated the

221

Response of Indonesia to Question 40 from the Panel Following the First Meeting. First Written Submission of Korea, para. 155. 223 First Written Submission of Korea, footnote 180. 224 Preliminary Dumping Report (Exhibit KOR-8B at 12). The quoted part of the report addresses the arguments of Pindo Deli. On page 23, the report contains exactly the same statement with respect to Indah Kiat. 222

WT/DS312/R Page 118

export price based on the [sic.] data which were submitted by Respondent and verified during the on the spot investigation."225 7.191 We note that these reports clearly disclose that the respondent Indonesian exporters failed to provide CMI's financial statements during verification and that the KTC therefore based their normal values on facts available. However, the reports contain no clarification with respect to the other aspects of the verification and hence do not add much to the content of the oral briefing that took place on 4 April 2003. 7.192 On the basis of the above explanations, it becomes factually clear that the contents of the disclosure regarding verification made through the oral briefing during the April 4 meeting and the KTC's reports issued following the verification were limited to the fact that the Sinar Mas Group failed to submit CMI's financial statements during verification and that the KTC decided to use facts available with respect to Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. The issue is whether or not this limited disclosure was enough to satisfy the requirements of Article 6.7. In our view, the purpose of the disclosure requirement under Article 6.7 is to make sure that exporters, and to a certain extent other interested parties, are informed of the verification results and can therefore structure their cases for the rest of the investigation in light of those results. It is therefore important that such disclosure contain adequate information regarding all aspects of the verification, including a description of the information which was not verified as well as of information which was verified successfully. This is because, in our view, information which was verified successfully, just as information which was not verified, could well be relevant to the presentation of the interested parties' cases. 7.193 On the basis of these considerations, we find that in this case the KTC's disclosure of the verification results vis-à-vis the Sinar Mas Group fell short of meeting this standard. It did not inform the two Sinar Mas Group companies of the verification results in a manner that would allow them to properly prepare their case for the rest of the investigation. We therefore conclude that the KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.7 of the Agreement in this regard. (b)

Alleged Violations of Articles 6.4, 6.9 and 12.2 of the Agreement

7.194 Indonesia argues that the KTC violated Articles 6.4, 6.9 and 12.2 of the Agreement by failing to disclose (1) why the reported CMI data were not accepted, (2) the reasoning regarding which one of the methods provided for under Article 2.2 of the Agreement was used in determining normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli, and (3) on what basis and how, in terms of its mechanics, it calculated the constructed normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. Korea disagrees and submits that the reports released by the KTC in the course of the investigation at issue were sufficient to inform the Indonesian exporters of all the issues identified by Indonesia. (i)

Article 6.4

7.195

Article 6.4 reads: "The authorities shall whenever practicable provide timely opportunities for all interested parties to see all information that is relevant to the presentation of their cases, that is not confidential as defined in paragraph 5, and that is used by the authorities in an anti-dumping investigation, and to prepare presentations on the basis of this information."

225

Preliminary Investigation Report (Exhibit KOR-9A at 11). The quoted part of the report addresses the arguments of Pindo Deli. On page 16, the report contains exactly the same statement with respect to Indah Kiat, except the inclusion of CMI's full name.

WT/DS312/R Page 119

7.196 We note that Article 6.4 addresses the right of interested parties in an anti-dumping investigation to see the information contained on the record that is relevant to prepare submissions to defend their positions in the investigation. It also makes clear that this right does not extend to confidential information on the record. Logically, therefore, in order to prevail in a claim under this article, the complaining party has to show that an interested party requested to see non-confidential information that was used by the IA in its determinations and that this request was declined. Following from our understanding of the nature of the obligation set out under Article 6.4, we note that most of the arguments raised by Indonesia to support its claim are not of the kind that can logically be put forward under Article 6.4, with one exception. We therefore do not make any findings with regard to the arguments that are not relevant to Indonesia's claim under Article 6.4. 7.197 Indonesia's only argument which, in our view, may be properly raised under Article 6.4 is that the Indonesian exporters made a specific request to access information relating to the KTC's calculation of the constructed normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli but that this request was declined by the KTC.226 We note that the letter sent by the Sinar Mas Group to the KTC in this regard reads in relevant parts: "[[**]]"227 7.198 We note that the letter was sent following the receipt of the non-confidential version of the Preliminary Dumping Report.228 In the letter, the Sinar Mas Group clearly requests to see confidential information regarding the calculation of the margins of dumping for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. We asked Korea what the KTC's reaction was in response to this letter. Korea stated that in response to that letter, the KTC sent the confidential version of the Preliminary Dumping Report to the Sinar Mas Group.229 Furthermore, Korea stated that the KTC also sent the confidential versions of the Preliminary Investigation Report230 and the Provisional Report on Final Dumping Margins231 to the Sinar Mas Group. Indonesia did not dispute these facts. 7.199 We note that for both Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli, the confidential version of the Preliminary Dumping Report states their normal values, export prices and the adjustments made to them.232 It does not, however, provide any details of the calculations made to reach these final figures. The Preliminary Investigation Report contains exactly the same information with respect to these two companies, without further detail.233 The same applies to the Provisional Report on Final Dumping Margins. This report only provides information regarding the final adjusted normal value and export price for the single entity consisting of the three Sinar Mas Group companies, without explaining, for instance, which cost figures were used in the calculation of the constructed normal value.234 In this regard, we note Korea's acknowledgement that this report "did not provide the actual figures for cost of manufacture, SG&A expenses or profit used in the KTC’s calculation of the constructed normal value."235 7.200 We asked Korea whether or not confidential information relating to the dumping margin calculations for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli was disclosed to these companies. Korea responded:

226

First Written Submission of Indonesia, para. 137. Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. 228 The non-confidential version of the Preliminary Dumping Report is found in Exhibit KOR-8B. 229 Response of Korea to Question 42 from the Panel Following the First Meeting. 230 First Written Submission of Korea, para. 157. 231 Response of Korea to Question 46 from the Panel Following the First Meeting. 232 See, Exhibit KOR-8A at 17, 18, 28 and 29. 233 See, Exhibit KOR-9A at 14, 15, 18 and 19. 234 See, Exhibit KOR-12 at 6. 235 Response of Korea to Question 43 from the Panel Following the First Meeting. 227

WT/DS312/R Page 120

"Articles 6.4, 6.9 and 12.2 do not require investigating authorities to disclose any confidential information to any interested parties. They also do not preclude an IA from disclosing an interested party’s own confidential information to that party, if the investigating authorities choose to do so. In this case, the KTC did disclose to the Sinar Mas Group the confidential version of its preliminary dumping margin analysis as well as the confidential version of its provisional final dumping margin analysis. These analyses plainly described the methodology used by the KTC to determine the export price and normal value. They also provided the actual figures for export price and normal value, and for the adjustments made to export price and normal value. In addition, although these analyses did not provide the actual figures for cost of manufacture, SG&A expenses or profit used in the KTC’s calculation of the constructed normal value, they did provide the SG&A, interest and profit rates that were used as “facts available.” The confidential versions of the KTC’s preliminary and provisional final dumping margin analyses that were sent to the Sinar Mas Group included all confidential information relating to the Sinar Mas Group that was included in those reports."236 (footnotes omitted, emphasis in original) 7.201 We recall that the reports sent to the Sinar Mas Group did not contain all the confidential information relating to their dumping margin calculations. We also note Korea's view that the KTC did not have to disclose the confidential part of these calculations even though that confidential information was provided by these companies themselves. We recall that Article 6.4 precludes the IA from disclosing confidential information to the interested parties. However, that provision cannot, in our view, possibly be interpreted to deny an interested party access to its own confidential information. That is, confidentiality cannot be used as the basis for denying access to information against the company which submitted the information. The notion of confidentiality, as elaborated upon in Article 6.5 of the Agreement, is about preserving confidentiality of information that concerns one interested party vis-à-vis the other interested parties. To the extent that the KTC used confidential information submitted by other interested parties in the calculation of the constructed normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli, the relevant provisions of Article 6.5 on confidentiality would preclude the KTC from disclosing that part of the information to the Sinar Mas Group. We note, however, that Korea has raised no such argument. Nor does the record contain any indication to that effect. We therefore conclude that the KTC acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 6.4 of the Agreement with respect to disclosing information regarding the calculation of the constructed normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli to those companies. (ii)

Article 6.9

7.202 We recall that in the context of its claim regarding the KTC's alleged failure to respect its disclosure obligations in connection with its dumping determinations, Indonesia puts forward a number of arguments and asserts that they lead to a violation of Articles 6.4, 6.9 and 12.2 of the Agreement. In order to distinguish its claim under Article 6.9 from the one under Article 6.4, we invited Indonesia to explain the exact nature of its claim under Article 6.9 and the ways in which it differed from its claim under Article 6.4. Indonesia responded: "Unlike Article 6.4, Article 6.9 contains no exception for confidential information. Moreover, Article 6.9 only requires a one-time disclosure prior to the final determination, while Article 6.4 applies throughout the investigation. Article 6.9 only requires the disclosure of essential facts but it does not provide a right to prepare presentations on the basis of the information before the investigating authority. In the 236

Response of Korea to Question 46 from the Panel Following the First Meeting.

WT/DS312/R Page 121

present case, Indonesia's claims under Article 6.9 do not differ significantly from its claims under Article 6.4 in respect of the KTC's failure to disclose aspects of its dumping determination. However, to the extent that Article 6.9 is understood as a requirement to make a one-time disclosure prior to the final determination, Indonesia's claims in respect of the inadequate disclosure by the KTC throughout the duration of the investigation are only maintainable under Article 6.4."237 (emphasis added) 7.203

Article 6.9 provides: "The authorities shall, before a final determination is made, inform all interested parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures. Such disclosure should take place in sufficient time for the parties to defend their interests."

7.204 We note that Article 6.9 requires the IA to disclose the essential facts establishing the basis of its final determination whether to apply definitive measures in an investigation. As Indonesia submits, we note that the obligation under Article 6.9 is one that requires the IA to make a one-time disclosure and that is before a final determination is made as to whether or not a definitive measure will be applied. Indonesia stated that its claim would not be maintainable under Article 6.9 if we consider that Article 6.9 only requires the IA to make a one-time disclosure in the course of an investigation. We also note that addressing Indonesia's claim under Article 6.9 based on the same arguments would not in any event provide further assistance in resolving the dispute before us. We therefore need not, and do not, make a ruling in this regard. (iii)

Article 12.2

7.205 Indonesia bases its allegation regarding the violation of Article 12.2 in this investigation on the same arguments that it raises with respect to Articles 6.4 and 6.9. That is, Indonesia argues that the KTC violated Article 12.2 of the Agreement by failing to disclose (1) why the reported CMI data were not accepted, (2) the reasoning regarding which one of the methods provided for under Article 2.2 of the Agreement was used in determining normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli, and (3) on what basis and how, in terms of its mechanics, it calculated the constructed normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. Korea disagrees and submits that the reports released by the KTC in the course of the investigation at issue were sufficient to inform the Indonesian exporters of all the issues identified by Indonesia. 7.206

Article 12.2 provides: "Public notice shall be given of any preliminary or final determination, whether affirmative or negative, of any decision to accept an undertaking pursuant to Article 8, of the termination of such an undertaking, and of the termination of a definitive anti-dumping duty. Each such notice shall set forth, or otherwise make available through a separate report, in sufficient detail the findings and conclusions reached on all issues of fact and law considered material by the investigating authorities. All such notices and reports shall be forwarded to the Member or Members the products of which are subject to such determination or undertaking and to other interested parties known to have an interest therein."

7.207 We note that Article 12.2 contains general provisions regarding public notices to be given by the IA at certain stages of an anti-dumping investigation. One of these is the imposition of a final anti-dumping duty. Article 12.2 also states that each public notice has to set forth, or make available 237

Response of Indonesia to Question 44 from the Panel Following the First Meeting.

WT/DS312/R Page 122

through a separate report, sufficiently detailed information about issues of fact and law on which the IA bases its determination. 7.208 In our view, this aspect of Indonesia's claim differs from the ones under Articles 6.4 and 6.9 in that the KTC could not include any confidential information regarding the calculation of the constructed normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli in the public notice of imposition because of Article 6.5 of the Agreement, which requires the protection of confidential information in an investigation. 7.209 We note that the public notice of imposition contains the following general statement regarding the KTC's dumping determinations: "Through preliminary investigation, the Korean Trade Commission confirmed that there existed sufficient evidence to presume dumping and material injury to the domestic injury [sic.] caused by such dumping. Through final investigation following the preliminary investigation, the Korean Trade Commission calculated dumping margins of the product under investigation upon confirmation of dumping of the product under investigation, and determined that there was material injury to the domestic industry caused by the dumping."238 We also note that the KTC's Final Determination and the Final Investigation Report were attached to the final notice. 7.210 Given that the KTC was precluded from including confidential information in the public notice by virtue of Article 6.5 and that the KTC's Final Determination and the Final Investigation Report were attached to the public notice, we are of the view that Indonesia failed to make a prima facie case with regard to the alleged violation of Article 12.2 of the Agreement. We therefore reject this aspect of Indonesia's claim. K.

KTC'S TREATMENT OF "PLAIN PAPER COPIER" AND "UNCOATED WOOD-FREE PRINTING PAPER" AS LIKE PRODUCTS

1.

Arguments of Parties

(a)

Indonesia

7.211 Indonesia notes that the KTC divided the subject product in the investigation at issue into two groups for purposes of its dumping determinations, i.e. "plain paper copier" ("PPC") and "wood-free printing paper" ("WF") and made separate dumping determinations with respect to each one of them. However, the KTC did not make the same distinction for purposes of its injury determinations and carried out an aggregate injury determination for these two types of paper on the basis of the assumption that they were like products. Indonesia argues that PPC and WF are not like products. PPC is boxed paper sold to offices and homes mainly for the use in photocopiers and printers. WF is printing paper sold in large rolls and sheets to offset printers and publishers for commercial use. WF is also used in making notebooks and other stationary products. Indonesia also cites other grounds on which these two types of paper differ. According to Indonesia, therefore, to conform to the provisions of Article 2.6 of the Agreement, the KTC should have analyzed the effect of Indonesian PPC on Korean PPC producers and the effect of Indonesian WF on Korean WF producers, separately. It follows that by carrying out an aggregate injury determination for PPC and WF without affirmatively determining that they were like products within the meaning of Article 2.6, the KTC acted inconsistently with Articles 2.6, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Agreement.

238

Exhibit KOR-16.

WT/DS312/R Page 123

(b)

Korea

7.212 Korea argues that under Article 2.6 of the Agreement, like product is defined by reference to the similarity between the imported product and the domestically produced product. Therefore, Indonesia's reference to the differences among the products produced by the domestic industry has no legal basis under the Agreement. Besides, Korea contends that PPC and WF only differ in form or in size. Apart from that, they are identical because they have the same colour, strength, weight and surface qualities. Differences in form and size cited by Indonesia do not provide a sufficient basis to treat these two paper types as different for purposes of injury determinations in an anti-dumping investigation. 2.

Arguments of Third Parties

(a)

Canada

7.213 Canada argues that an interpretation of Article 2.6 of the Agreement should give meaning to all words contained therein, including "product under consideration" and "characteristics". A reasonable interpretation of that article would require the IA to identify the characteristics on the basis of which the product under consideration is defined. It follows that, when necessary, the IA must divide the product under consideration into cohesive groupings and carry out a separate dumping and injury determination for each one of them. In Canada's view, leaving the definition of the product under consideration to the IA's complete discretion could lead to absurd results, which would, under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, give rise to an impermissible interpretation of Article 2.6. (b)

Japan

7.214 Japan submits that, as noted by the panel in US – Softwood Lumber V, the definition of the "product under consideration" is critical with respect to both dumping and injury determinations in antidumping investigations. Japan is of the view that in cases where two separate products are at issue, separate dumping and injury determinations have to be made with respect to each one of them. Carrying out a combined dumping and injury determination for such distinct products would, in Japan's view, run counter to the provisions of Articles 2 and 3 of the Agreement, respectively. (c)

United States

7.215 The United States submits that Article 2.6 of the Agreement does not require that each item within the product under consideration be like each item within the like product. According to the United States, since there are no substantive provisions about the like product issue in the Agreement except Article 2.6, the IA has a certain discretion with respect to the determination of like product in an investigation. This does not mean, however, that the IA cannot take account of different markets for different types of products within like product. 3.

Evaluation by the Panel

7.216 We note that it is undisputed that the investigation initiated by the KTC concerned dumped imports of PPC and WF originating, inter alia, in Indonesia. The KTC determined that Korean PPC and WF were identical to imported PPC and WF239 and carried out a single injury determination with respect to dumped imports of PPC and WF. Indonesia agrees with the KTC's determination that PPC and WF originating in Indonesia are identical to PPC and WF produced in Korea, respectively.240 It contends, however, that PPC in general is not like WF because they have differences with respect to physical characteristics, end-uses, substitutability, market sectors in which they compete, HS 239 240

See, the KTC's Final Investigation Report (Exhibit KOR-13 at 3-4). First Written Submission of Indonesia, para. 144.

WT/DS312/R Page 124

nomenclatures and manufacturing processes. According to Indonesia, Article 2.6 required that PPC and WF be treated separately in the KTC's injury determinations because they are not like products as defined therein. Korea disagrees and contends that Article 2.6, which is the only provision in the Agreement regarding the like product issue, defines "like product" by reference to "the product under consideration". However, Article 2.6 does not define "the product under consideration". Consequently, Indonesia's claim has no legal basis under the Agreement. Korea also objects to Indonesia's assertions regarding the differences between PPC and WF. According to Korea, differences cited by Indonesia do not justify treating these two types of paper as separate products in the context of injury determinations. 7.217 We recall once again that Indonesia argues that the KTC's like product definition was inconsistent with Article 2.6 of the Agreement because the KTC presumed that WF and PPC were like products, which, in Indonesia's view, they are not. The issue therefore is whether or not the like product definition found in Article 2.6 of the Agreement required the KTC to determine that PPC and WF were like products before proceeding to carry out a single injury determination with respect to these two types of imported paper. 7.218

Article 2.6 of the Agreement provides: "Throughout this Agreement the term "like product" ("produit similaire") shall be interpreted to mean a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration." (emphasis added)

7.219 We note that Article 2.6 takes "the product under consideration" as the starting point of the definition of "like product". It then stipulates that the like product is the product that is identical to the product under consideration, or one that has physical characteristics that closely resemble those of the product under consideration. The phrase "Throughout this Agreement" indicates that this definition applies to the definition of like product for both dumping and injury determinations in an anti-dumping investigation. Therefore, once the product under consideration is defined, the IA has to make sure that the product it is using in its injury determination is like the product under consideration. As long as that determination is made consistently with the parameters set out in Article 2.6, the IA' s like product definition will be WTO-consistent. 7.220 In the investigation at issue, the KTC determined the "the product under consideration" to be PPC and WF. The KTC also determined that the definition of the domestically produced PPC and WF was identical to the definition of the PPC and WF imported from Indonesia. It follows that the KTC's like product definition was consistent with the provisions of Article 2.6.241 7.221 Indonesia argues that the KTC had to determine that PPC and WF were like products. We note that these two, together, constituted "the product under consideration" in the investigation at issue. We see no basis in Article 2.6 for the proposition that the like product definition also applies to the definition of "the product under consideration". We are aware of no provision in Article 2.6, or 241

We find support for our approach in the following finding by the panel in Softwood Lumber V: "As the definition of "like product" implies a comparison with another product, it seems clear to us that the starting point can only be the "other product", being the allegedly dumped product. Therefore, once the product under consideration is defined, the "like product" to the product under consideration has to be determined on the basis of Article 2.6. However, in our analysis of the AD Agreement, we could not find any guidance on the way in which the "product under consideration" should be determined." Panel Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada ("US – Softwood Lumber V "), WT/DS264/R, adopted 31 August 2004, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS264/AB/R, para. 7.152.

WT/DS312/R Page 125

any other article in the Agreement, that contains a definition of "the product under consideration" itself.242 In any event, we note Indonesia's statement that it is not challenging the KTC's determination regarding "the product under consideration".243 7.222 Finally in this regard, we note Indonesia's assertion that the KTC made separate dumping determinations with respect to PPC and WF in the investigation at issue. We also note, however, that the KTC's final determination reveals that one single margin of dumping was calculated for "PPC and WF" by the KTC in this investigation. The Final Dumping Report reads in relevant part: I. Calculation of dumping rate The final dumping margin of the 3 APP Companies is 8.22%, which is the weighted average of the dumping margins for each model based on the export volume of each model exported to Korea.244 7.223 The chart in the Final Dumping Report that follows the above-quoted part indicates dumping calculations for PPC and WF as being [[**]] per cent and [[**]] per cent, respectively.245 Therefore, it seems that the KTC divided the subject product into two models for purposes of its dumping determinations, but ultimately computed one single margin that applied to the subject product as a whole.246 7.224 On the basis of the above considerations, we reject Indonesia's claim that the KTC's like product definition was inconsistent with Article 2.6 of the Agreement. It follows that the KTC's injury determination based on this like product definition was not inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Agreement.

242

In this regard, we note the finding by the panel in Softwood Lumber V, Ibid. Korea argued that to the extent that Indonesia challenges the KTC's determination regarding "the product under consideration", the Panel should decline to address that claim because it was not raised in Indonesia's request for the establishment of a panel. In response to questioning from the Panel, Korea stated that by raising this argument it did not request the Panel to make a preliminary ruling under Article 6.2 of the DSU on jurisdictional grounds because it was Korea's understanding that Indonesia did not challenge the KTC's determination regarding "the product under consideration". Korea mentioned, however, that if Indonesia challenges that determination then it would require the Panel to make such a procedural ruling. See, Response of Korea to Question 51 from the Panel Following the First Meeting. In response to questioning from the Panel, Indonesia stated that it did not challenge the KTC's determination regarding "the product under consideration". In this regard, Indonesia pointed out: "Indonesia would simply observe that it has not, in fact, challenged the KTC’s definition of the product under consideration, in the sense that either PPC or WF paper should have been entirely excluded from the scope of the KTC’s investigation. Instead, Indonesia challenged the KTC’s conduct of a single injury investigation on the basis of a flawed definition of the “like product” as inconsistent with Articles 2.6, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.7 of the AD Agreement." Response of Indonesia to Question 51 from the Panel Following the First Meeting. We therefore did not make any ruling with respect to the KTC's determination regarding "the product under consideration". 244 Exhibit KOR-14A at 24. 245 Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential 246 In this regard, we note the Appellate Body's finding that multiple averaging, i.e. dividing the product under investigation into product types or models for the purpose of calculating a weighted average normal value and a weighted average export price for each one of them, is consistent with the Agreement. See, Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada ("US – Softwood Lumber V "), WT/DS264/AB/R, adopted 31 August 2004, para. 81. 243

WT/DS312/R Page 126

L.

KTC'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO BASE ITS INJURY AND CAUSAL LINK DETERMINATIONS ON AN OBJECTIVE EXAMINATION OF POSITIVE EVIDENCE

1.

Arguments of Parties

(a)

Indonesia

7.225 Indonesia asserts five substantive violations by Korea of its obligations under the Agreement with respect to the KTC's injury and causal link determinations in the investigation at issue. Firstly, Indonesia argues that the KTC's price and volume analyses were inconsistent with the Agreement. With respect to price, Indonesia submits that for substantial periods during the injury POI, prices of Indonesian exporters were above those of Korean producers. Even if at certain points during this period prices of Indonesian exporters fell below those of Korean producers, the KTC could not legitimately conclude that Indonesian exporters' prices undercut or suppressed Korean producers' prices. Furthermore, Indonesia argues that the KTC did not make any determination as to whether or not the effect of Indonesian exporters' prices was "significant", and therefore, the KTC's price analysis was inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4 of the Agreement. With regard to the analysis of the volume of dumped imports, Indonesia submits that the KTC acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Agreement by disregarding the fact that the volume of dumped imports declined by 15.3 per cent in the first half of 2003. 7.226 Secondly, Indonesia argues that the KTC acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Agreement by failing to analyse the relevance of many of the injury factors set out in Article 3.4. Indonesia does not argue that the KTC failed to collect data about these injury factors. Rather, according to Indonesia, many injury factors signalled a healthy domestic industry, yet the KTC failed to explain how it nevertheless reached the conclusion that there was material injury. 7.227 Thirdly, Indonesia contends that the KTC acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Agreement in its causation analysis. In this context, Indonesia submits that the KTC failed to analyse developments in the first half of 2003, although this period was part of the POI for the injury determination. Indonesia also contends that in its non-attribution analysis, the KTC failed to properly analyse the impact on the Korean domestic industry of the increase in the volume of imports from other sources. According to Indonesia, the KTC also failed to analyze the effect of some other factors in its non-attribution analysis. 7.228 Fourthly, Indonesia submits that the KTC violated Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the Agreement by failing to exclude imports made by the Korean industry from the volume of dumped imports considered in its injury determination. 7.229 Finally, Indonesia asserts that the KTC violated Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5 of the Agreement by considering exports by Indah Kiat as dumped imports for purposes of its injury determination when this exporter's individual dumping margin was de minimis. (b)

Korea

7.230 Korea argues that the KTC's price analysis was consistent with the Agreement. The KTC determined that prices of dumped imports were below the Korean producers' prices in 1999 and 2002, equal to them in 2000 and above Korean producers' prices in 2001 and in the first half of 2003. With regard to the volume of dumped imports, Korea points out that this claim was not raised in Indonesia's request for the establishment of a panel. Regarding the substance of this claim, Korea submits that they increased in absolute terms over the period from 1999 to the first half of 2003. Even though there was a decline in the volume of dumped imports in absolute terms from 2002 to the first half of 2003, the overall trend was upward and there was also a clear increase in the volume of dumped imports relative to domestic consumption in Korea.

WT/DS312/R Page 127

7.231 With regard to the injury factors under Article 3.4 of the Agreement, Korea submits that the KTC properly evaluated all of them. Based on its overall evaluation of these injury factors, the KTC concluded that the Korean industry suffered material injury. According to Korea, there is no provision in the Agreement which requires that a particular weight be given to certain injury factors. 7.232 Korea argues that the KTC's causation analysis was also in line with the Agreement. In its causation analysis, the KTC analysed the effect of dumped imports on the domestic industry. This included an analysis of the volume and prices of dumped imports. The KTC also evaluated the potential impact of factors other than dumped imports on the Korean industry and found no evidence that suggested that any such factor contributed to the material injury suffered by the domestic industry. 7.233 Regarding imports of the subject product made by the Korean producers, Korea contends that the KTC excluded from the definition of the domestic industry those producers who imported significant quantities of the subject product from the countries under investigation. The rest of the domestic producers did not have significant imports. 7.234 With regard to exports made by Indah Kiat, Korea submits that since the dumping margin calculated for this company was properly attributed to the calculation of the single margin for the three Sinar Mas Group companies, there was no reason to exclude these exports from the volume of dumped imports for purposes of the KTC's injury determination. 2.

Arguments of Third Parties

(a)

United States

7.235 The United States submits that Article 3.2 of the Agreement requires the IA to "consider" whether there has been a significant price undercutting, suppression or depression. It does not, however, require the IA to find that there have been significant price effects as a precondition to making an affirmative injury determination. 7.236 Regarding causality, the United States argues that all that Article 3.5 requires is a finding by the IA that there is a causal relationship between dumped imports and injury. It does not specify in what detail and on the basis of what information the causation or non-attribution analysis has to be carried out. 7.237 Regarding imports of the subject product by the domestic producers, the United States contends that neither Article 4.1(i) of the Agreement, nor any other provision, requires that domestic producers importing the subject product be excluded from the domestic industry. The Agreement simply provides the IA with the option of excluding such domestic producers from the definition of the domestic industry. According to the United States, the fact that the domestic producers are also importers of the subject product may in some cases indicate that the impact of dumped imports is significant. 3.

Evaluation by the Panel

(a)

KTC's Price and Volume Analyses

(i)

KTC's Price Analysis

7.238 Indonesia asserts that the data collected by the KTC with respect to prices could not support its finding that dumped imports caused material injury to the Korean industry. More specifically, Indonesia raises two arguments. Firstly, Indonesia contends that since for substantial periods during the POI, prices of Indonesian exporters were higher than those of Korean producers, the KTC could

WT/DS312/R Page 128

not properly find that the Indonesian exporters' prices had an impact on the prices of Korean producers. Secondly, Indonesia submits that the KTC acted inconsistently with Article 3.2 of the Agreement because it failed to make a determination as to whether or not the price effects that it found were "significant". 7.239 With respect to price undercutting, Korea notes that the trend in prices in this particular investigation was somewhat mixed in the sense that prices of Indonesian exporters were at various times above, below, or equal to, the prices of Korean producers. Korea also notes that the KTC did not limit its price analysis to undercutting, but also analyzed price depression and suppression. With respect to Indonesia's argument relating to whether the price effects were "significant", Korea submits that the KTC's determination did not use the word "significant", but nevertheless demonstrated that there was significant price depression and suppression. 7.240 We shall commence our evaluation of Indonesia's claim with the relevant provisions of the Agreement regarding price analyses in injury determination. Articles 3.1 of the Agreement reads: "A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products." 7.241

Article 3.2 reads: "With regard to the volume of the dumped imports, the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the importing Member. With regard to the effect of the dumped imports on prices, the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant price undercutting by the dumped imports as compared with the price of a like product of the importing Member, or whether the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree or prevent price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree. No one or several of these factors can necessarily give decisive guidance."

7.242 Article 3.1 provides that an injury determination under the Agreement requires an examination of (a) the volume of dumped imports, (b) effect of dumped imports on the prices of the domestic industry and (c) the consequent impact of these imports on the domestic industry in the importing country. Article 3.2 sets out details pertaining to the examination of the volume of dumped imports and their impact on the domestic industry's prices. Regarding the price analysis, Article 3.2 stipulates that the IA has to consider whether dumped imports have had one of the three possible effects on the prices of the domestic industry: (a) significant price undercutting, (b) significant price depression or (c) significant price suppression. In our view, what Article 3.2 requires is that the IA consider whether or not any of these three price effects are present in a given investigation. It does not, however, require that a determination be made in this regard.247 Finally, we note that the last 247

We find support for our conclusion in the following finding of the panel in Thailand – H-Beams: "We examine the nature of the obligation in Article 3.2. We note that the text of Article 3.2 requires that the investigating authorities "consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports". The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines "consider" as, inter alia: "contemplate mentally, especially in order to reach a conclusion"; "give attention to"; and "reckon with; take into account". We therefore do not read the textual term "consider" in Article 3.2 to require an explicit "finding" or "determination" by the investigating authorities as to whether the increase in dumped imports is "significant"." (footnote omitted)

WT/DS312/R Page 129

sentence of Article 3.2 mentions that no one or several of these three injury factors can necessarily give decisive guidance. That is, even if the IA finds certain positive trends with respect to some of these factors, it can nevertheless reach the conclusion that there is injury, provided that that decision is premised on positive evidence and reflects an objective examination of the evidence as required by Article 3.1 of the Agreement. 7.243 One initial issue raised in these proceedings with respect to the KTC's price analysis is whether, in an investigation where the prices of dumped imports were above, or equal to, those of the domestic industry in certain segments of the injury POI, the IA is precluded from finding that dumped imports had a negative effect on the domestic industry's prices. In our view, as long as the IA's analysis conforms to the requirements of Article 3.1 of the Agreement, that is, an objective examination based on positive evidence, changes in the relative levels of prices of dumped imports and the domestic industry during the POI do not necessarily preclude the IA from concluding that dumped imports had negative effects on prices.248 We therefore do not agree with Indonesia's argument that because the prices of dumped imports remained above, or equal to, those of the domestic industry in certain segments of the POI, the KTC could not conclude that the Korean industry was suffering material injury. With that in mind, we now turn to the facts of the investigation at issue. 7.244 We note that the KTC's final injury determination in the investigation at issue is found in two documents: The Final Investigation Report and the Final Determination. The Final Investigation Report mainly contains the information gathered by the investigators whereas the Final Determination contains the KTC's conclusions based on its analysis of those data. We shall therefore base our evaluation of the claims at issue on these two documents. 7.245 We note that the Final Investigation Report contains a chart that shows the trends in the prices of dumped imports preceded by the recital of the data in that chart.249 In the section on causation, the Final Investigation Report also contains information regarding the KTC's analysis of the three types of price effects. This section also consists of charts that show figures with respect to each of the three price effects and a recital of the data in the charts.250 7.246 The Final Determination sets out the KTC's price analysis in two places. Firstly, the Final Determination contains the following statements under the heading "Trend of Import Volume and Price of the Cumulated Dumped Imports": "In addition to the above import trend of the cumulated dumped imports, the domestic resale price of the cumulated dumped imports was reviewed. Although the domestic resale price of the cumulated dumped imports was KRW [[**]] thousand per ton in 1999, and increased to KRW [[**]] thousand in 2000 by 20.9%, it continuously fell to

Panel Report, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or NonAlloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland ("Thailand – H-Beams "), WT/DS122/R, adopted 5 April 2001, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS122/AB/R, DSR 2001:VII, 2741, para. 7.161. 248 We find support for this view in the following finding of the panel in EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings: "Sales at undercutting prices could have an impact on the domestic industry (for example, in terms of lost sales) irrespective of whether other sales might be made at prices above those charged by the domestic industry. The fact that certain sales may have occurred at "nonunderselling prices" does not eradicate the effects in the importing market of sales that were made at underselling prices." Panel Report, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil ("EC – Tube or Pipe Fittings "), WT/DS219/R, adopted 18 August 2003, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS219/AB/R, para. 7.277. 249 Exhibit KOR-13A at 41. 250 Exhibit KOR-13A at 62-64.

WT/DS312/R Page 130

KRW [[**]] thousand in 2001, KRW [[**]] thousand in 2002, and KRW [[**]] thousand in the first half of 2003.251 Accordingly, the Commission determined that the volume of the cumulated dumped imports has increased in both absolute and relative terms, and that their sales price has been falling."252 (footnote omitted) 7.247 Secondly, the Final Determination contains a more detailed analysis of the price effects of dumped imports under the heading "Causal Relationship between Dumped Imports and the Material Injury to the Domestic Industry". 7.248 With regard to price undercutting, the chart on page 62 of the Final Investigation Report shows that prices of dumped imports were below those of the Korean industry in 1999 and 2002 and that they were above the Korean industry's prices in 2000, 2001 and the first half of 2003.253 The Final Determination contains the following discussion on price undercutting: "[T]he Commission first examined whether the dumped imports were sold at a low price. The resale price of the cumulated dumped imports per ton was lower than the sales price of the domestic products by KRW [[**]] thousand in 1999, was higher than the sales price of the domestic products by KRW [[**]] thousand and KRW [[**]] thousand in 2001, respectively, but was lower than the sales price of the domestic products by KRW [[**]] thousand in 2002, and was higher by KRW [[**]] thousand in the first half of 2003254."255 (footnote omitted) 7.249 With respect to price depression, the Final Investigation Report recites the same price data, puts them in the form of a graph and contains another chart where price fluctuations with respect to both dumped imports and domestic producers' sales can be seen.256 The Final Determination contains the following evaluation with respect to price depression: "Second, it was reviewed whether the price of the dumped imports caused a fall in the sales price of the domestic products. The resale price of the cumulated dumped imports per ton was KRW [[**]] thousand in 1999, and increased 20.9% to KRW [[**]] 949 thousand in 2000, but decreased 6.6% in 2001, 0.6% in 2002 and 0.4% in the first half of 2003, respectively. Accordingly, the sales price of the domestic products per ton was KRW [[**]] thousand in 1999, and increased 10.1% to KRW 948 thousand in 2000, but decreased 8.1% to KRW [[**]] thousand in 2001, increased 2.4% in 2002 and decreased 4.6% in the first half of 2003.257 Thus the Commission found that the sales price of the domestic products has been falling due to the continued fall in the price of dumped imports."258 (footnote omitted) 7.250 Concerning price suppression, the situation is similar to price depression. The Final Investigation Report contains the data relevant to the price suppression analysis. It contains a graph and a chart that show that the prices of the Korean producers remained below a target price throughout the POI.259 The Final Determination contains the following analysis:

251

Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. Exhibit KOR-15A at13. 253 Exhibit KOR-13A at 62. 254 Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. 255 Exhibit KOR-15A at16. 256 Exhibit KOR-13A at 62-63. 257 Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. 258 Exhibit KOR-15A at16. 259 Exhibit KOR-13A at 64. 252

WT/DS312/R Page 131

"Third, it was reviewed whether the dumped imports suppressed an increase in the sales price of the domestic products. The sales price of the domestic products per ton was lower than the target sales price by KRW [[**]] thousand in 1999, KRW [[**]] thousand in 2000, KRW [[**]] thousand in 2001, KRW [[**]] thousand in 2002, and KRW [[**]] thousand in the first half of 2003, respectively.260 Thus, the Commission found that the sales price of the domestic products was suppressed."261 (footnote omitted) 7.251 On the basis of our review of the Final Investigation Report and the Final Determination, we conclude that the KTC has clearly considered whether there was price undercutting, price suppression and price depression caused by dumped imports. 7.252 We now turn to Indonesia's argument that the KTC failed to determine or at least consider whether these price effects were "significant". In Indonesia's view, failure to address the issue of whether or not the price effects were "significant" constitutes a violation of Article 3.2.262 7.253 We note that the record contains no discussion as to whether or not the price effects found by the KTC were "significant". However, we do not read Article 3.2 as requiring that the word "significant" appear in the text of the IA's determination. Furthermore, as we stated above (para. 7.242), Article 3.2 does not generally require the IA to make a determination about the "significance" of price effects or indeed as to whether there were price effects as such. All it requires is that the IA consider whether there has been significant price undercutting, price depression or price suppression. In our view, therefore, the requirements of that article will be satisfied if the determination demonstrates that the IA properly considered whether or not prices of dumped imports had one of the three price effects set out under Article 3.2.263 We are of the view that the KTC's determination in this investigation properly addressed the issue of whether or not dumped imports caused significant price undercutting, price depression or price suppression to the domestic industry's prices. Consequently, we do not agree with Indonesia that the KTC acted inconsistently with Article 3.2 of the Agreement by failing to determine or consider whether or not dumped imports caused "significant" price undercutting, price depression or price suppression. 7.254 We therefore reject Indonesia's claim that the KTC's analysis concerning the price effects of dumped imports on the Korean industry was inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4 of the Agreement. (ii)

KTC's Volume Analysis

7.255 Indonesia submits that the KTC failed to analyse the volume of dumped imports in the first half of 2003, which was part of the KTC's POI for the injury determination. Since there was a 260

Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. Exhibit KOR-15A at16. 262 Second Written Submission of Indonesia, para. 99. 263 In this regard, we find support in the following finding of the panel in Thailand – H-Beams: "We therefore do not read the textual term "consider" in Article 3.2 to require an explicit "finding" or "determination" by the investigating authorities as to whether the increase in dumped imports is "significant". While it would certainly be preferable for a Member explicitly to characterize whether any increase in imports as "significant", and to give a reasoned explanation of that characterization, we believe that the word "significant" does not necessarily need to appear in the text of the relevant document in order for the requirements of this provision to be fulfilled. Nevertheless, we consider that it must be apparent in the relevant documents in the record that the investigating authorities have given attention to and taken into account whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, in absolute or relative terms." (footnote omitted) Panel Report, Thailand – H-Beams, supra, note 247, para. 7.161. 261

WT/DS312/R Page 132

decrease of 15.3 per cent in the volume of dumped imports from 2002 to the first half of 2003, Indonesia asserts that the KTC could not properly conclude that there had been an increase in the volume of dumped imports. Indonesia also asserts that the domestic consumption figures used by the KTC in its analysis of the increase in the volume of dumped imports relative to domestic consumption were flawed because the KTC ignored an important portion of domestic consumption in its calculations. Consequently, the KTC overstated the market share of dumped imports. Indonesia contends that had the KTC calculated domestic consumption correctly, it would have found a decrease in the market share of dumped imports in the first half of 2003, rather than the increase found by the KTC. Korea points out that this claim was not raised in Indonesia's request for the establishment of a panel. Regarding the substance of the claim, Korea generally argues that the KTC based its volume analysis on trends in the absolute volume of dumped imports, as well as trends in the volume relative to domestic consumption. With regard to the change in the volume of dumped imports from 2002 to the first half of 2003, in particular, Korea notes that the KTC analyzed the impact of this decline relative to domestic consumption. 7.256 Given Korea's assertion that this claim was not raised in Indonesia's request for the establishment of a panel, we shall first make a finding in that regard. We will only address the substance of Indonesia's claim if we find the claim to be properly before us. 7.257 We note that paragraph 13 of the Working Procedures states that any requests for preliminary rulings have in principle to be submitted before the first meeting with the parties. We also note that Korea raised this jurisdictional matter relatively late during these proceedings, i.e. in its comments on Indonesia's closing statements in our second meeting with the parties. It would, obviously, have been preferable had Korea raised it earlier in these proceedings. However, we consider this to be a fundamental issue as it concerns our jurisdiction. We cannot make a finding on a claim which has not been raised by Indonesia in its request for establishment in conformity with the provisions of the DSU outlined below, and which is therefore not properly before us.264 7.258 We recall that, under Article 7 of the DSU, it is Indonesia's panel request that determines our terms of reference in these proceedings. Article 6.2 of the DSU, which sets out the requirements applicable to the requests for the establishment of a panel, provides: "The request for the establishment of a panel shall be made in writing. It shall indicate whether consultations were held, identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly. In case the applicant requests the establishment of a panel with other than standard terms of reference, the written request shall include the proposed text of special terms of reference." 7.259 According to Article 6.2, therefore, a panel request must identify the specific measures at issue and must provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint. Together, these two elements comprise the "matter referred to the DSB", which forms the basis for a panel's terms of reference under Article 7.1 of the DSU. It is important that the panel request be sufficiently clear for two reasons: first, it defines the scope of the dispute and second, it serves the due process objective of notifying the parties and third parties of the nature of a complainant's case.265 We must therefore scrutinize carefully Indonesia's panel request "to ensure its compliance with both the letter and the 264

We find support for our proposition in the decisions of the Appellate Body in Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – US) and US – Carbon Steel. See, Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States ("Mexico – Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 – US)"), WT/DS132/AB/RW, adopted 21 November 2001, DSR 2001:XIII, 6675, para. 36; Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on Certain CorrosionResistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany ("US – Carbon Steel"), WT/DS213/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 December 2002, para. 123. 265 Ibid., para. 126.

WT/DS312/R Page 133 spirit of Article 6.2 of the DSU."266 In doing that, we shall consider Indonesia's panel request as a whole and take into account the circumstances of the present proceedings.267 7.260 With these considerations in mind, we now turn to the text of Indonesia's panel request to decide whether it conforms to the requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU. We note that Indonesia's request for the establishment of a panel mentions the word "volume" only in paragraph 3 which reads: "3. Korea initiated the investigation notwithstanding its failure to make an objective examination of the participation of the applicant Hansol Paper Co. ("Hansol") in the definition of "domestic industry", despite Hansol's significant volume of imports from Indonesia during the period of investigation for injury. This is inconsistent with Article 3.1 and Article 4.1(i) of the AD Agreement." (emphasis added) We note that paragraph 3 specifically concerns the alleged deficiencies in the KTC's decision to initiate the investigation at issue. In that context, this paragraph refers to the volume of imports made by Hansol, one of the domestic producers of the subject product, and asserts that Hansol should have been left out of the domestic industry for purposes of the investigation at issue. We therefore do not consider this section to refer to the alleged deficiencies in the KTC's analysis regarding trends in the volume of dumped imports in the course of the investigation at issue. 7.261 We note that Article 3.2 of the Agreement, on which Indonesia's claim regarding the KTC's volume analysis is mainly based, has been mentioned in three instances in the request for establishment. Paragraph 28 of the request for establishment reads: "28. Korea's incorrect classification of imports from PT Indah Kiat as dumped imports as a result of treating PT Indah Kiat, PT Pindo Deli and PT Tjiwi Kimia as a single economic unit, as well as Korea's incorrect classification of all imports from Indonesia and China, including imports that occurred outside the period of investigation for dumping, as dumped imports and the consequent incorrect determination of injury and causal link between the alleged dumped imports and injury is inconsistent with Article 3.1, Article 3.2, Article 3.4, Article 3.5 and Article 3.7 of the AD Agreement, and Article VI:1 and Article VI:6 of GATT." (emphasis added) We note that paragraph 28 concerns imports made from Indah Kiat, and imports made outside the injury POI. We cannot construe this specific reference to Article 3.2 as one that takes issue with the alleged deficiencies in the KTC's analysis regarding trends in the volume of dumped imports. 7.262 The second reference to Article 3.2, found in paragraph 30 of the request for establishment, reads: "30. Korea's failure to adequately evaluate the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products is inconsistent with Article 3.1, Article 3.2, Article 3.5 and Article 3.7 of the AD Agreement, and Article VI:1 and Article VI:6 of GATT." (emphasis added) We note that paragraph 30 only raises a claim regarding the alleged deficiencies in the KTC's price analysis. It does not seem in any way to relate to the KTC's volume analysis. 7.263

The third and the last reference to Article 3.2 reads: 266 267

Ibid. Ibid., para. 127.

WT/DS312/R Page 134

"32. Korea's failure to objectively examine the participation of the domestic industry in the importation of the allegedly dumped imports and Korea's erroneous attribution of the injury that occurred in the first half of 2003 to dumped imports that entered the Korean market 3-15 months earlier is inconsistent with the requirements set out in Article 3.1, Article 3.2, Article 3.4, Article 3.5, and Article 3.7 of the AD Agreement, and Article VI:1 and Article VI:6 of GATT." (emphasis added) We note that paragraph 32 concerns dumped imports made by the Korean industry, and the KTC's linking injury that occurred towards the end of the injury POI to dumped imports that entered the Korean market 3-15 months earlier. As such, it cannot be construed to raise a claim regarding the KTC's volume analysis in the investigation at issue. 7.264 On the basis of the foregoing, it is clear to us that the request for establishment does not contain any reference to the KTC's volume analysis in its final injury determination, and thus fails to set out any legal basis for a complaint concerning that aspect of the determination. We therefore conclude that Indonesia failed to raise a claim regarding the alleged WTO-inconsistencies in the KTC's volume analysis during the investigation at issue. As the purported claim is thus not properly before us, we decline to make any findings in this regard. (b)

KTC's Evaluation of the Impact of Dumped Imports on the Korean Industry

7.265 Indonesia acknowledges that the KTC gathered data concerning each injury factor set out in Article 3.4 of the Agreement. However, Indonesia contends that the KTC failed to evaluate these factors. More specifically, Indonesia asserts that the KTC did not explain how it came to the conclusion that the Korean industry suffered material injury notwithstanding the fact that a number of injury factors showed positive trends with respect to the state of the Korean industry. Indonesia cites profits, wages, employment, productivity, production capacity, output and investments as the factors regarding which the Korean industry showed positive signs. 7.266 Korea argues that the KTC considered all injury factors set out in Article 3.4 in its injury determination. Korea cites factors such as production, capacity utilization, sales, market share and inventories as supporting the KTC's overall conclusion that the Korean industry suffered material injury. According to Korea, the KTC was justified with respect to the relative weight assigned to certain injury factors given that the Agreement contains no rule as to the weight to be given to the Article 3.4 injury factors. 7.267

We note that Article 3.4 of the Agreement provides: "The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, including actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments. This list is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance."

7.268 We note that the WTO panels and the Appellate Body have consistently held that an analysis of the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry in the importing Member shall comprise an

WT/DS312/R Page 135 evaluation of all factors set out in Article 3.4.268 To fulfil that obligation, the IA has obviously to collect the data relating to each of the factors set out in Article 3.4. However, the obligation under Article 3.4 is not limited to the compilation of the relevant data. Having gathered the relevant data, the IA then has to evaluate them in context and in connection with one another. The WTO jurisprudence has also consistently approved this proposition.269 Recently, the panel in Egypt –Steel Rebar stated that "for an IA to "evaluate" evidence concerning a given factor in the sense of Article 3.4, it must not only gather data, but it must analyze and interpret those data."270 7.269 We note that Indonesia acknowledges that the KTC did collect the relevant data regarding the injury factors set out under Article 3.4. The issue, therefore, is whether or not the KTC analyzed these data in context and reached a reasoned conclusion with respect to the impact of dumped imports on the Korean industry. 7.270 We note that Korea cites the text of the Final Investigation Report and the Final Determination as evidence that the KTC carried out a WTO-consistent analysis of the impact of dumped imports on the Korean industry. The Final Determination271 and the Final Investigation Report272 both contain analyses of injury factors on which the KTC's determination was based. We also note, however, that these two reports do not seem to have a section where the KTC evaluates the relevance of these factors with respect to its overall conclusion on injury, except the following concluding paragraph in the Final Determination: "Accordingly, the Commission determined that there exists material injury to the domestic industry, such as reduced production quantity, reduced sales quantity, increased inventory, reduced sales amount, low operating income ratio, and reduced employment etc."273 7.271 We note that there were certain factors, such as capacity, profits, wages, cash flow, which fluctuated rather than showing negative trends throughout the POI. For instance, the domestic industry's production capacity increased from 751,668 tons in 1999 and 2000 to 754,168 tons in 2001 and then to 758,668 tons in 2002.274 Operating income rose from a loss of [[**]] million KRW in 2000 to a profit of [[**]] KRW in 2001 and further to a profit of [[**]] KRW in 2002.275 Average wages constantly grew throughout the POI, rising from [[**]] KRW in 1999 to [[**]] KRW in the first half of 2003. Cash flows increased from [[**]] million KRW in 2000 to [[**]] million KRW in 2001 and to [[**]] million KRW in 2002276.277

268

See, for instance, Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland ("Thailand – H-Beams"), WT/DS122/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001, DSR 2001:VII, 2701, para. 125. 269 See, for instance, Panel Report, Egypt – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from Turkey ("Egypt –Steel Rebar "), WT/DS211/R, adopted 1 October 2002, para.7.236. 270 Ibid., para. 7.44. Applying this standard to the facts of the case before it, the panel in Egypt –Steel Rebar found that the Egyptian IA had "failed to evaluate productivity, actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, employment, wages, and ability to raise capital or investments." Ibid., para. 7.51. 271 Exhibit KOR-15A at 13-15. 272 Exhibit KOR-13A at 45-51. 273 Exhibit KOR-15A at 15. In response to questioning from the Panel as to where in its final determinations the KTC discussed the relevance of the injury factors set out in Article 3.4, Korea referred to the same sections of the Final Investigation Report and the Final Determination cited above. See, Response of Korea to Question 59 from the Panel Following the First Meeting. 274 Final Investigation Report (Exhibit KOR-13A at 45). 275 Final Investigation Report (Exhibit KOR-13A at 47). 276 Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. 277 Final Investigation Report (Exhibit KOR-13A at 50).

WT/DS312/R Page 136

7.272 We do not suggest that these data precluded the KTC from making an affirmative finding of material injury in the investigation at issue. However, we are of the view that the KTC failed to properly evaluate the relevance of these injury factors in making its conclusion regarding the material injury suffered by the Korean industry. We consider that the IA's obligation to evaluate all relevant economic factors under Article 3.4 shall be read in conjunction with the overarching obligation to carry out an "objective examination" on the basis of "positive evidence" as set out under Article 3.1. Therefore, the obligation to analyse the mandatory list of fifteen factors under Article 3.4 is not a mere "checklist obligation" consisting of a mechanical exercise to make sure that each listed factor has somehow been addressed by the IA. We recognize that the relevance of each one of these injury factors may vary from one case to the other. The fact remains, however, that Article 3.4 requires the IA to carry out a reasoned analysis of the state of the industry. This analysis cannot be limited to a mere identification of the "relevance or irrelevance" of each factor, but rather must be based on a thorough evaluation of the state of the industry. The analysis must explain in a satisfactory way why the evaluation of the injury factors set out under Article 3.4 lead to the determination of material injury, including an explanation of why factors which would seem to lead in the other direction do not, overall, undermine the conclusion of material injury.278 7.273 In the investigation at issue, we note that the KTC did not provide any analysis which adequately explains why the data collected with respect to the Article 3.4 injury factors lead to a determination of material injury, except the statement found in the KTC's Final Determination that "there exists material injury to the domestic industry, such as reduced production quantity, reduced sales quantity, increased inventory, reduced sales amount, low operating income ratio, and reduced employment etc."279 As we pointed out above, the IA's determination may find certain injury factors to be more relevant than others in a given investigation. However, the bottom line is that it has to evaluate the data pertaining to each factor set out under Article 3.4. Consequently, since the KTC did not adequately evaluate the injury factors, especially those that showed a positive trend, and explain their relevance in the determination of material injury, we find that it acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 3.4 of the Agreement. 7.274 We note that Indonesia argued that the KTC's failure to evaluate all injury factors also violated Article 3.1 of the Agreement.280 It seems to us that Indonesia's claim under Article 3.1 in this regard is dependent on its main claim under Article 3.4. Having found a violation of Article 3.4 in this regard, we consider that a finding of inconsistency with respect to Article 3.1 would neither 278

We find support for our approach in the following finding of the panel in Thailand – H-Beams: "We are of the view that the "evaluation of all relevant factors" required under Article 3.4 must be read in conjunction with the overarching requirements imposed by Article 3.1 of "positive evidence" and "objective examination" in determining the existence of injury. Therefore, in determining that Article 3.4 contains a mandatory list of fifteen factors to be looked at, we do not mean to establish a mere "checklist approach" that would consist of a mechanical exercise of merely ensuring that each listed factor is in some way referred to by the investigating authority. It may well be in the circumstances of a particular case that certain factors enumerated in Article 3.4 are not relevant, that their relative importance or weight can vary significantly from case to case, or that some other non-listed factors could be deemed relevant. Rather, we are of the view that Article 3.4 requires the authorities properly to establish whether a factual basis exists to support a well-reasoned and meaningful analysis of the state of the industry and a finding of injury. This analysis does not derive from a mere characterization of the degree of "relevance or irrelevance" of each and every individual factor, but rather must be based on a thorough evaluation of the state of the industry and, in light of the last sentence of Article 3.4, must contain a persuasive explanation as to how the evaluation of relevant factors led to the determination of injury." (footnote omitted, emphasis added). Panel Report, Thailand – H-Beams, supra, note 247, para. 7.236. 279 Supra, note 273. 280 See, for instance, First Written Submission of Indonesia, para. 176.

WT/DS312/R Page 137

elucidate the scope of that provision nor assist in any meaningful way in the implementation of our finding. We therefore need not, and do not, make any finding on this aspect of Indonesia's claim. (c)

KTC's Causation Analysis

7.275 Indonesia puts forward a number of arguments in the context of its claim regarding the KTC's causation analysis in the investigation at issue. Firstly, Indonesia submits that the KTC failed to consider the decrease in the volume of dumped imports in the first half of 2003. Secondly, it did not consider the fact that prices of dumped imports remained above those of the Korean domestic industry for long periods during the POI. Thirdly, the KTC failed to consider whether or not imports from other sources caused the injury suffered by the Korean producers. Fourthly, the KTC did not take into account the decline in the Korean industry's exports of the subject product. With respect to its nonattribution analysis, Indonesia also argues that the KTC failed to consider the impact of the domestic industry's excessive investments, the decline in the domestic industry's internal consumption and the facts that the prices of dumped imports remained above those of the domestic industry and their volume declined in the POI. 7.276 Korea submits that the KTC's causation analysis complied with the requirements of Article 3.5. The KTC based its causation analysis mainly on the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry's market share. The KTC also evaluated the impact of the other factors cited by Indonesia. 7.277 We recall our finding above (para. 7.273) that the KTC acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 3.4 of the Agreement with respect to the evaluation of the impact of dumped imports on the Korean industry. Given this inconsistency we have found with respect to the KTC's injury determination in the investigation at issue, we do not consider that addressing Indonesia's claim regarding the KTC's causation analysis would provide any further assistance in resolving the dispute before us because that analysis was based on a WTO-inconsistent injury determination. We therefore do not address Indonesia's claim on causation. (d)

KTC's Treatment of the Korean Industry's Imports of the Subject Product as Dumped Imports

7.278 Indonesia asserts that the KTC should have considered the fact that the Korean producers were importing substantial quantities of the subject product from Indonesia as an injury factor under Article 3.4 of the Agreement. Second, Indonesia submits that the KTC should have considered this fact, under Article 3.5, as a potential other factor that might have contributed to the material injury suffered by the Korean industry. 7.279 Korea submits that there is no legal basis in the Agreement to support Indonesia's view that the fact that Korean producers imported the subject product from the subject countries has to be evaluated as an injury factor under Article 3.4 of the Agreement. More generally with regard to imports made by the Korean producers, Korea notes that Article 4.1 of the Agreement gives the IA the discretion to exclude domestic producers who are importers of the subject product in an anti-dumping investigation from the domestic industry. Korea submits that in accordance with the mentioned provision of the Agreement, the KTC excluded Korean producers, importing significant quantities of the subject product from the countries under investigation, from the domestic industry for purposes of the investigation at issue. It follows that the remaining domestic producers did not have significant imports of the subject product into Korea from the countries under investigation. Therefore, not analyzing the impact of these imports under Article 3.5 was not inconsistent with that provision. 7.280

We recall the provisions of Article 3.4: "The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices

WT/DS312/R Page 138

having a bearing on the state of the industry, including actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments. This list is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance." 7.281 Article 3.4 sets out a list of factors that have to be taken into account by the IA in evaluating the impact of dumped imports on the state of the domestic industry in importing Member. We note that the fact that the domestic industry also imports the subject product from the countries subject to the investigation is not mentioned as an injury factor under Article 3.4. We also note, however, that this list is not exhaustive. That is, Article 3.4 does not preclude the possibility that there may be other factors that should be analyzed by the IA, depending on the circumstances of a specific investigation. However, we are puzzled by Indonesia's argument that the KTC should have treated the fact that the Korean producers imported the subject product from the subject countries as an injury factor under Article 3.4. We do not see in what sense this fact could qualify as an injury factor under Article 3.4. In response to questioning from the Panel, Indonesia stated that the fact that Korean producers were importing the subject product demonstrated their strategy to move from the subject product to higher value-added products. This, in Indonesia's view, should have been considered as an indicator regarding the state of the Korean industry.281 We do not agree. We do not see the factor cited by Indonesia as one that describes the state of the Korean industry. Rather, it seems to reflect a business decision made by the Korean industry, which may or may not have been the result of dumping. Thus, in our view, rather than being an injury factor to be considered under Article 3.4, this issue would logically be addressed, if at all, in the context of the KTC's causation analysis under Article 3.5. We therefore reject Indonesia's argument under Article 3.4 and turn to its argument under Article 3.5. 7.282

Article 3.5 provides: "It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement. The demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry shall be based on an examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities. The authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports. Factors which may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the volume and prices of imports not sold at dumping prices, contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers, developments in technology and the export performance and productivity of the domestic industry."

7.283 We note that Article 3.5 requires that the IA in an anti-dumping investigation determine that dumped imports are the cause of the injury suffered by the domestic industry. It does not, however, set out a methodology through which that determination has to be made. The second sentence states that the causation analysis has to be carried out on the basis of all available evidence before the IA. It follows that if the IA demonstrates, on the basis of positive evidence, that dumped imports are causing the injury suffered by the domestic industry, the requirement of the first sentence of Article 3.5 would be satisfied. The third sentence of Article 3.5, the so-called non-attribution clause, stipulates that the IA has to analyze whether there are factors other than dumped imports that are also contributing to the injury and to refrain from attributing that injury to dumped imports. 281

Response of Indonesia to Question 57(b) from the Panel Following the First Meeting.

WT/DS312/R Page 139

7.284 Indonesia contends that the KTC acted inconsistently with Article 3.5 by not assessing the impact of imports made by Korean producers as part of its non-attribution analysis under that article. Korea submits that since the KTC excluded the producers that had significant imports of the subject product from the subject countries, the remaining producers did not have significant imports. Therefore, there could be no violation of Article 3.5 stemming from the KTC's failure to take these imports into account as part of its causation analysis under that article. 7.285 We note that the record indicates that the KTC did in fact exclude two of the Korean producers who imported significant amounts of the subject product from the subject countries, i.e. Kye Sung Paper Co., Ltd. and Hansol Patech Co., Ltd., from the scope of the domestic industry. The remaining 14 Korean producers imported the subject product from the subject countries in 1999 and 2000. Their imports ceased as of 2001. The share of these domestic producers in total dumped imports were [[**]] and [[**]] per cent in 1999 and 2000, respectively282.283 We note that the share of the Korean producers making up the domestic industry in the total dumped imports declined from 1999 to 2000 and then stopped completely from 2001 on. Thus, by the time of the KTC's determination, imports by the Korean producers making up the domestic industry had been reduced to zero and could not have been causing injury. Even assuming that in theory imports by the domestic industry might be considered as an "other factor" causing injury, on the basis of the facts of this case we cannot conclude that the KTC was required to treat imports by the domestic producers which had ceased as of 2001 as such an "other factor". We therefore do not agree with Indonesia's assertion that the KTC was required to treat these imports as a potential other factor that could have contributed to the injury suffered by the Korean industry under Article 3.5 of the Agreement. 7.286 We note that in the context of this claim, Indonesia also raises its argument about the KTC's alleged failure to properly calculate total domestic consumption.284 We recall that we have found Indonesia's claim regarding the KTC's analysis of the volume of dumped imports to be outside our terms of reference (supra, para. 7.264). Indonesia's argument regarding the calculation of total domestic consumption concerns the KTC's analysis of the volume of dumped imports relative to domestic consumption. It follows that this aspect of Indonesia's claim is outside our terms of reference. We therefore do not make any finding in that regard. 7.287 Finally in this regard, we note Indonesia's argument that the KTC should have excluded imports made by Korean producers from the scope of dumped imports for purposes of its injury determination in the investigation at issue.285 In this context, Indonesia refers to imports made by producers making up the domestic industry.286 However, we are unaware of any provision in the Agreement which could support the proposition that dumped imports made by the domestic industry have to be excluded from the scope of dumped imports for purposes of the IA's injury determination. Imports from sources subject to an anti-dumping investigation may properly be treated as dumped imports irrespective of the identity of the importers making these imports. We therefore do not agree with Indonesia's view in this regard either. 7.288 On the basis of the foregoing, we reject Indonesia's claim that the KTC acted inconsistently with Articles 3.4 and 3.5 of the Agreement with regard to the treatment of dumped imports made by the Korean producers from the subject countries.

282 283

Korea requests that the data in square brackets be treated as confidential. See, the chart provided in the Response of Korea to Question 57 from the Panel Following the First

Meeting. 284

See, Second Written Submission of Indonesia, para. 116. First Written Submission of Indonesia, para. 189. 286 Response of Indonesia to Question 58(a) from the Panel Following the First Meeting. 285

WT/DS312/R Page 140

(e)

KTC's Treatment of Imports from Indah Kiat as Dumped Imports

7.289 Indonesia submits that the KTC acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5 of the Agreement by treating imports from Indah Kiat as dumped imports in this investigation because the preliminary dumping margin calculated for this company was de minimis. Since Indah Kiat was the largest Indonesian exporter of the subject product into Korea, this inclusion significantly increased the amount of dumped imports in the context of the KTC's injury determination. Korea states that since the KTC treated the three Sinar Mas Group companies as one exporter in its dumping determinations, it properly included all exports made by these three companies as dumped imports for purposes of its injury determination, including Indah Kiat's. 7.290 We recall our finding above (paras. 7.168-7.171) that the KTC did not act inconsistently with Articles 6.10 and 9.3 of the Agreement with respect to treating the three Sinar Mas Group companies as a single exporter for purposes of its dumping determinations in the investigation at issue. That is, we found that the KTC properly treated them as one exporter and assigned one margin of dumping to them. 7.291 Further, we note the following statement from Indonesia with regard to the nature of this claim: "Indonesia agrees that Article 5.8 applies to final, as opposed to preliminary, determinations of dumping. Thus, its claim that the KTC should have terminated the investigation with respect to Indah Kiat is dependent on its claims that the KTC improperly “collapsed” Indah Kiat into a “single economic entity” and failed to calculate an individual margin of dumping for Indah Kiat under Article 6.10 of the AD Agreement. If the Panel finds that the KTC improperly “collapsed” these exporters and hence improperly failed to calculate an individual margin of dumping for Indah Kiat, Indonesia requests that the Panel rule on its claims under Article 5.8, as well as its related claims under Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5 of the Agreement described in paragraph 196 of its first written submission."287 7.292 We note that Indonesia submits that the Panel should address this claim if it finds that treating the three Sinar Mas Group companies as a single exporter was WTO-inconsistent. Given that we did not find that treating the three Sinar Mas Group companies as a single exporter was WTO-inconsistent and taking into consideration Indonesia's above-quoted statement, we need not, and do not, make any finding on this claim. M.

KTC'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO ABIDE BY THE DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS CONTAINED IN ARTICLES 6.1, 6.2, 6.4 AND 6.9 OF THE AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO ITS INJURY DETERMINATION

1.

Arguments of Parties

(a)

Indonesia

7.293 Indonesia argues that at the final determination stage of the investigation at issue, the KTC extended the POI for the injury determination to cover the first half of 2003, but it did not provide the Indonesian exporters with an opportunity to comment on the data relating to the additional period. This deprived these exporters of their right to comment on this decision, in violation of Articles 6.1, 6.1.2, 6.4 and 6.9 of the Agreement. Indonesia further contends that the KTC's failure to disclose to the Indonesian exporters the results of the technical test carried out by the Korean Agency for Technology and Standards and those of a customer survey, which were used in the context of the 287

Response of Indonesia to Question 48 from the Panel Following the First Meeting.

WT/DS312/R Page 141

KTC's like product determination, was in violation of Articles 6.2, 6.4, 6.9 and 12.2 of the Agreement. Indonesia also asserts that the KTC acted inconsistently with Articles 6.4 and 6.9 of the Agreement by failing to inform the Indonesian exporters of its decision to change the basis of its injury determination from threat to material injury. Finally, Indonesia argues that by not disclosing the results of its analysis regarding the price effects of dumped imports, the KTC acted inconsistently with Articles 6.4 and 6.9 of the Agreement. (b)

Korea

7.294 Korea asserts that the Indonesian exporters were given a full opportunity to comment on the injury data concerning the first half of 2003. This was done through the disclosure of the KTC's Interim Report to the interested parties during the meeting held on 27 August 2003. Regarding the results of the technical test and the customer survey, Korea contends that the KTC treated these two documents as confidential and therefore could not disclose them to the Indonesian exporters. 2.

Arguments of Third Parties

(a)

United States

7.295 Regarding the disclosure requirements of Article 6.9, the United States argues that nothing in that article requires the IA to disclose its legal reasoning. The disclosure requirements of Article 6.9 are limited to the essential facts under consideration which form the basis of the IA's determination. More specifically, the United States submits that Article 6.9 does not require the IA to disclose whether its injury determination will be based on material injury or threat thereof. 3.

Evaluation by the Panel

(a)

Disclosure of the Data Relating to the First Half of 2003

7.296 Indonesia submits that the KTC violated Articles 6.1, 6.4 and 6.9 of the Agreement by not giving the Indonesian exporters an opportunity to see, and comment on, the data relating to the first half of 2003. Korea submits that the Indonesian exporters had an opportunity to comment on the data relating to the first half of 2003 as they received, in the public hearing held on 27 August 2003, a copy of the non-confidential version of the KTC's Interim Report. Korea also submits that the representatives of the Sinar Mas Group made comments on that report. 7.297 We note that in its second oral statement, Indonesia pointed out that it withdrew this aspect of its claim because the document submitted by Korea in Exhibit KOR-50 corroborated Korea's position in this regard.288 We therefore do not make any finding with respect to this aspect of Indonesia's claim. (b)

Disclosure of the Results of the Technical Test and the Customer Survey Regarding the Like Product Issue

7.298 Indonesia notes that, in the context of its like product determination, the KTC cited the results of a technical test carried out by the Korean Agency for Technology and Standards and those of a customer survey. According to Indonesia, the KTC's failure to inform the Indonesian exporters of the substance of these two documents was in violation of Articles 6.2, 6.4, 6.9 and 12.2 of the Agreement. Korea contends that Indonesia's claim in this regard is without merit because these two documents contained confidential information, which could not be disclosed by the KTC.

288

Second Oral Statement of Indonesia, para. 93.

WT/DS312/R Page 142

(i)

Article 6.4

7.299

We note that Article 6.4 provides: "The authorities shall whenever practicable provide timely opportunities for all interested parties to see all information that is relevant to the presentation of their cases, that is not confidential as defined in paragraph 5, and that is used by the authorities in an anti-dumping investigation, and to prepare presentations on the basis of this information." (emphasis added)

7.300 Article 6.4 stipulates that interested parties have the right to see all non-confidential information that is relevant to the presentation of their cases in an investigation. When an interested party requests to see that information, Article 6.4 requires that they be allowed to see it, to the extent this is practicable for the IA. Consequently, in order to establish a prima facie case with respect to this particular claim, Indonesia has to demonstrate that the Sinar Mas Group requested to see nonconfidential information on the record of the investigation at issue and that the KTC declined such request. 7.301 In this regard, we note Indonesia's assertion that, in its letter dated 18 October 2003, the Sinar Mas Group requested the disclosure of the results of a technical test carried out by the Korean Agency for Technology and Standards and those of a customer survey and that the KTC never responded. That letter provides in pertinent parts: "We are in receipt of non-confidential versions of the Commission's Final Investigation Reports on Dumping Rate, Dumping and Injury and its Final Resolution on Dumping and Injury, all of 24 September 2003. We request your prompt supply of confidential information pertaining to findings in respect of Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli and Tjiwi Kimia appropriately not included in the non-confidential versions but important to our understanding of the findings. The information required is outlined hereunder: ... 2. Final Investigation Report on Dumping and Injury a) Details of comparison of physical properties between domestic products and dumped imports per the table in Section II.3.A as they relate to the exports of Pindo Deli, Indah Kiat and Tjiwi Kimia."289 (emphasis added) 7.302 We note that the letter acknowledges that the Sinar Mas Group received the non-confidential version of the KTC's Final Investigation Report. Indeed, it clearly requests to see confidential information regarding the KTC's like product determination found in Section II.3.A of the Final Investigation Report. In our view, this indicates that the Sinar Mas Group recognized that this information was appropriately not included in the non-confidential version of the Final Investigation Report. It is therefore clear that what the Sinar Mas Group requested to see was the texts of these two documents, which were treated by the KTC as confidential. The issue is whether or not the KTC's refusal to make these documents available to the Sinar Mas Group was inconsistent with Article 6.4 of the Agreement. 7.303 Indonesia has made no claims under Article 6.5 of the Agreement regarding the treatment of these documents as confidential. As noted above, Article 6.4 clearly states that the right to see the 289

Exhibit IDN-31.

WT/DS312/R Page 143

information on the record is limited to the non-confidential information. Since the Sinar Mas Group's request pertained to confidential information, we are of the view that there is no legal basis for Indonesia's claim under Article 6.4 in light of the acknowledged facts. We therefore reject this aspect of Indonesia's claim. (ii)

Article 6.2

7.304 Indonesia asserts that by not disclosing the results of the technical test carried out by the Korean Agency for Technology and Standards and those of the customer survey, the KTC also violated the requirements of Article 6.2 of the Agreement. According to Indonesia, in the absence of this information, the Indonesian exporters were unable to defend their interests. 7.305

Article 6.2 of the Agreement reads: "Throughout the anti-dumping investigation all interested parties shall have a full opportunity for the defence of their interests. To this end, the authorities shall, on request, provide opportunities for all interested parties to meet those parties with adverse interests, so that opposing views may be presented and rebuttal arguments offered. Provision of such opportunities must take account of the need to preserve confidentiality and of the convenience to the parties. There shall be no obligation on any party to attend a meeting, and failure to do so shall not be prejudicial to that party's case. Interested parties shall also have the right, on justification, to present other information orally." (emphasis added)

7.306 We note that Article 6.2 addresses interested parties' right to defend their interests in an investigation. To that end, Article 6.2 stipulates that interested parties shall be given the opportunity meet other interested parties with opposing views about the investigation to be able to exchange views. We do not consider Article 6.2 to address interested parties' right to see the information on the record. That right is addressed in Article 6.4, which has also been invoked by Indonesia in these proceedings. We therefore consider that there is no legal basis for Indonesia's claim under Article 6.2 in light of the acknowledged facts. We therefore reject this aspect of Indonesia's claim too. 7.307 Assuming arguendo that Article 6.2 could be interpreted as relating to interested parties' right to see the information on the record, Indonesia's claim would still fail because, by its own terms, Article 6.2 excludes confidential information from the scope of the right it creates. In this regard, we note again that Indonesia has not challenged the confidential treatment of these two documents by the KTC under Article 6.5 of the Agreement. Thus, there would be no legal basis for a claim under Article 6.2 on the basis of the facts of this case. (iii)

Article 6.9

7.308 Indonesia asserts that by not disclosing the results of the technical test carried out by the Korean Agency for Technology and Standards and those of the customer survey, the KTC also violated the requirements of Article 6.9 of the Agreement. In response to questioning from the Panel regarding the nature of this aspect of its claim, Indonesia stated that its claim under Article 6.9 would only apply if the KTC made a comparison between PPC and WF generally.290 7.309 The text of the KTC's Final Investigation Report demonstrates that the KTC did not make a comparison between PPC and WF generally. The KTC compared imported PPC and WF with Korean PPC and WF, respectively, and concluded that "[t]he domestic products [were] identical to the

290

Response of Indonesia to Question 29 from the Panel Following the Second Meeting.

WT/DS312/R Page 144

product under investigation in terms of the product name, definition, usage and manufacturing process."291 7.310 Thus, as the factual basis Indonesia considers necessary for its claim does not exist, we need not, and do not, make a finding regarding this aspect of Indonesia's claim. (iv)

Article 12.2

7.311 Indonesia asserts that by not disclosing the results of the technical test carried out by the Korean Agency for Technology and Standards and those of the customer survey, the KTC also violated Article 12.2 of the Agreement. 7.312

We note that Article 12.2 reads: "Public notice shall be given of any preliminary or final determination, whether affirmative or negative, of any decision to accept an undertaking pursuant to Article 8, of the termination of such an undertaking, and of the termination of a definitive anti-dumping duty. Each such notice shall set forth, or otherwise make available through a separate report, in sufficient detail the findings and conclusions reached on all issues of fact and law considered material by the investigating authorities. All such notices and reports shall be forwarded to the Member or Members the products of which are subject to such determination or undertaking and to other interested parties known to have an interest therein."

7.313 Article 12.2.2, which sets out additional detail concerning the public notice on the imposition of a final anti-dumping duty, reads in relevant part: "A public notice of conclusion or suspension of an investigation in the case of an affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty or the acceptance of a price undertaking shall contain, or otherwise make available through a separate report, all relevant information on the matters of fact and law and reasons which have led to the imposition of final measures or the acceptance of a price undertaking, due regard being paid to the requirement for the protection of confidential information." (emphasis added) 7.314 We note that Article 12.2.2 clearly states that the IA's disclosure obligation with respect to a public notice imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty is subject to the protection of confidential information. With that in mind, we now turn to the facts of the investigation at issue. 7.315 We note that the public notice of imposition of the anti-dumping duty in question does not specifically address the like product issue. We note, however, that the Final Determination and the Final Investigation Report were attached to the final public notice.292 That is, these two reports were part of the public notice itself. Section II.3.A of the KTC's Final Investigation Report contains a sufficiently detailed description of the KTC's like product determination. We recall that the two tests were confidential and that Indonesia has not raised any claim under Article 6.5 of the Agreement regarding their confidentiality. 7.316 Article 12.2 does not allow an IA to disclose confidential information in its public notice imposing a final measure. Therefore, Indonesia failed to establish a legal basis for its claim in light of the facts acknowledged. We therefore reject this aspect of Indonesia's claim.

291 292

Final Investigation Report (Exhibit KOR-13A at 4). See, Exhibit KOR-16.

WT/DS312/R Page 145

(c)

Change With Respect to the Basis of the KTC's Injury Determination

7.317 Indonesia alleges that the KTC acted inconsistently with Articles 6.4 and 6.9 of the Agreement by failing to inform the Indonesian exporters of its decision to change the basis of its injury determination from threat to material injury. 7.318 In its second written submission, however, Indonesia withdrew this claim.293 We therefore do not make any finding with regard to this claim. (d)

Failure to Disclose Findings Regarding the Price Effect of Dumped Imports

7.319 Indonesia argues that by not disclosing the results of its analysis regarding the price effects of dumped imports, the KTC acted inconsistently with Articles 6.4 and 6.9 of the Agreement. Indonesia asserts that although the Sinar Mas Group specifically requested to see this information, the KTC never replied.294 In this regard, Indonesia refers to the letter dated 18 October 2003, which reads in pertinent parts: "We are in receipt of non-confidential versions of the Commission's Final Investigation Reports on Dumping Rate, Dumping and Injury and its Final Resolution on Dumping and Injury, all of 24 September 2003. We request your prompt supply of confidential information pertaining to findings in respect of Indah Kiat, Pindo Deli and Tjiwi Kimia appropriately not included in the non-confidential versions but important to our understanding of the findings. The information required is outlined hereunder: ... 2. Final Investigation Report on Dumping and Injury c) An indexed summary of the comparison of the resale prices of dumped products and domestic products per section IV.2.c."295 (emphasis added) 7.320 Korea submits that the mentioned letter by the Sinar Mas Group came more than three weeks after the KTC had disclosed its final determination about the investigation at issue. Therefore, the KTC did not respond to this letter. 7.321 We note that the Article 6.4 aspect of Indonesia's claim in this regard is very similar to its claim under Articles 6.4 and 6.9 regarding the KTC's alleged failure to disclose the results of the technical test carried out by the Korean Agency for Technology and Standards and those of the customer survey in that they both concern a request to see confidential information on the record. In its above-quoted letter, the Sinar Mas Group requests to see confidential information relating to the KTC's analysis on the impact of the Indonesian exporters' prices on those of the Korean industry. That is, they acknowledge the confidential nature of that information. 7.322 We recall once again that Indonesia has made no claim under Article 6.5 of the Agreement concerning the confidential treatment of these documents. As we stated above (para. 7.300), Article 6.4 clearly states that the right to see the information on the record is limited to the non-confidential information. Since the Sinar Mas Group's request was directed at confidential information, we are of 293

Second Written Submission of Indonesia, para. 121; Response of Indonesia to Question 68 from the Panel Following the First Meeting. 294 First Written Submission of Indonesia, paras. 202-203. 295 Exhibit IDN-31.

WT/DS312/R Page 146

the view that Indonesia failed to establish a legal basis for its claim under Article 6.4 in light of the facts acknowledged. We therefore reject this aspect of Indonesia's claim too. 7.323 Turning to the Article 6.9 aspect of Indonesia's claim, we first note that parties agree that the Sinar Mas Group received, as did others, the non-confidential version of the KTC's Final Investigation Report on 1 October 2003.296 Indonesia argues that the disclosure provided in that report with regard to the price effect of dumped imports on the Korean industry was not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 6.9. 7.324

Article 6.9 provides: "The authorities shall, before a final determination is made, inform all interested parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures. Such disclosure should take place in sufficient time for the parties to defend their interests." (emphasis added)

7.325 We note that, regarding the price effect of dumped imports, the non-confidential version of the KTC's Final Investigation Report provides: "Impact of the Dumped Imports on the Price of Domestic Products and Likelihood of Increase in the Demand for Imports The resale price of the dumped imports was lower than the sales price of the domestic products by KRW ** thousand in 1999, was higher than the sales price of the domestic products by KRW * thousand and KRW ** thousand in 2000 and 2001, respectively, but was lower than the sales price of the domestic products by KRW ** thousand in 2002 and was higher by KRW ** thousand in the first half of 2003."297 7.326 We also note that the above-quoted section of the report is followed by a chart that demonstrates the changes in the prices of dumped imports and the domestic producers in the form of percentages over the POI. The core of Indonesia's claim is that the KTC's failure to include in this chart the absolute figures with respect to the Korean industry's prices was inconsistent with Article 6.9. Indonesia contends that since the prices of the Korean producers in this chart belonged to the industry as a whole rather than individual producers, the KTC should have included them in the chart.298 7.327 Since Indonesia has made no claim under Article 6.5 to challenge the KTC's decision to treat the information on the prices of the Korean industry as confidential, we cannot make a finding with regard to the confidentiality of those price data. 7.328 Regarding the conformity with Article 6.9 of the explanations provided in the mentioned report, we consider that the trends in prices may be seen as one essential fact that established the basis of the KTC's decision to apply the definitive anti-dumping duty at issue. We note that the report explains trends in the prices of dumped imports and those of the Korean industry in the POI. We do not agree with Indonesia's view that failure to include absolute figures for the Korean industry's prices rendered this disclosure inconsistent with the requirements of Article 6.9. We see no support in the text of Article 6.9, or elsewhere in the Agreement, for Indonesia's proposition. We therefore reject this aspect of Indonesia's claim too.

296

See, KTC's letter addressed to the Sinar Mas Group conveying the Final Investigation Report (Exhibit KOR-38). 297 Exhibit KOR-13B at 55. 298 Response of Indonesia to Question 31 from the Panel Following the Second Meeting.

WT/DS312/R Page 147

N.

TREATMENT OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE DOMESTIC INDUSTRY'S APPLICATION AS CONFIDENTIAL

1.

Arguments of Parties

(a)

Indonesia

7.329 Indonesia argues that the KTC provided confidential treatment to the information submitted in the Korean domestic industry's application for the initiation of the investigation without requiring a showing of good cause. This, in Indonesia's view, violated Articles 6.5, 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 of the Agreement. (b)

Korea

7.330 Korea argues that the information submitted by the Korean domestic industry in the application for the initiation of the investigation was by nature confidential and therefore could not be disclosed by the KTC pursuant to Article 6.5 of the Agreement. According to Korea, since the information submitted in the application was by nature confidential, no good cause needed to be shown for that information to be treated as confidential under Article 6.5. 2.

Evaluation by the Panel

7.331 As an initial factual matter, we note that Indonesia agrees that the applicants submitted a nonconfidential version of their application.299 Indonesia argues, however, that the non-confidential version was inconsistent with Article 6.5 of the Agreement in that the KTC failed to require good cause to treat certain information in the application as confidential. In this regard, Indonesia cites information relating to the allegations of dumping and injury by the domestic industry, which was either deleted or indexed in the non-confidential version of the application. 7.332 We also note that Indonesia is not taking issue with Korea's assertion that information in the application cited by Indonesia was by nature confidential. That is, Indonesia does not disagree that this information could appropriately be treated as confidential. Parties do disagree, however, as to whether or not the Agreement requires that good cause be shown for the confidential treatment of the information that is by nature confidential. Indonesia asserts that good cause has to be shown in these circumstances. Korea disagrees with Indonesia and contends that no good cause is required for information that is by nature confidential. 7.333

We note that Article 6.5 of the Agreement reads in pertinent parts: "Any information which is by nature confidential (for example, because its disclosure would be of significant competitive advantage to a competitor or because its disclosure would have a significantly adverse effect upon a person supplying the information or upon a person from whom that person acquired the information), or which is provided on a confidential basis by parties to an investigation shall, upon good cause shown, be treated as such by the authorities. Such information shall not be disclosed without specific permission of the party submitting it." (footnote omitted)

7.334 We note that Article 6.5 provides for the confidential treatment of two types of information: information which is confidential by nature and information which, although not confidential by nature, has been submitted by an interested party on a confidential basis. Article 6.5 stipulates that

299

Response of Indonesia to Question 69 from the Panel Following the First Meeting.

WT/DS312/R Page 148

both types of confidential information may not be disclosed by the IA without specific authorization by the party submitting it. 7.335 The only issue presented by this claim is whether or not the requirement of showing good cause in order for information to be treated as confidential under Article 6.5 applies to information that is by nature confidential as well as to information that is submitted on a confidential basis. We note that the phrase "upon good cause shown" is preceded by both types of confidentiality in the text of Article 6.5. We are therefore of the view that the text of Article 6.5 makes it clear that the good cause requirement applies to both categories of confidential information.300 That is, some showing of good cause is necessary for the confidential treatment of information that is by nature confidential. The degree of that requirement may, however, depend on the type of information concerned. In the investigation at issue, there is no indication that the KTC requested that any good cause be shown in order to treat as confidential information submitted in the application, which was by nature confidential. We therefore conclude that the KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.5 in the investigation at issue by not requiring that good cause be shown with respect to the information submitted in the application which was by nature confidential.301 7.336 Before concluding our findings concerning the specific claims raised by Indonesia, we note Indonesia's assertion that to the extent that the Korean measure was inconsistent with the provisions of the Agreement cited by Indonesia in connection with each of its specific claims, it was also inconsistent with the requirement of Article 1 of the Agreement to impose anti-dumping measures in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement. Indonesia has not raised an independent claim based on the obligations set out in Article 1. Rather, we understand Indonesia's claim to be dependent on our finding of an inconsistency with respect to the specific claims raised by Indonesia. In our view, to the extent that we have found an inconsistency with respect to the specific claims raised by Indonesia, making an additional ruling under Article 1 would neither elucidate the scope of that provision nor assist in any meaningful way in the implementation of our finding. With respect to Indonesia's claims where we have found no inconsistency, we would not need to make a finding under Article 1 because of the dependent nature of Indonesia's claim under that Article. 7.337

We therefore need not, and do not, make any finding under Article 1 of the Agreement.

VIII.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1

In light of the above findings, we conclude that: (a)

In respect of the KTC's dumping determination: (i)

300

The KTC did not act inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the Agreement in resorting to facts available with respect to Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli,

We find support for our proposition in the following finding of the panel in Guatemala – Cement II: "Instead, the requirement to show "good cause" appears to apply for both types of confidential information, such that even information "which is by nature confidential" cannot be afforded confidential treatment unless "good cause" has been shown." (footnote omitted) Panel Report, Guatemala – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico ("Guatemala – Cement II "), WT/DS156/R, adopted 17 November 2000, DSR 2000:XI, 5295, para. 8.219. 301 We note that Indonesia also argued that the KTC acted inconsistently with Articles 6.5, 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 of the Agreement by failing to require a non-confidential version of the application from the applicants. See, First Written Submission of Indonesia, para. 206. We note, however, that Korea submitted, in Exhibit KOR-1B, the non-confidential version of the application. In response to questioning from the Panel in this regard, Indonesia stated that "its claims concern the nature of this non-confidential version." See, Response of Indonesia to Question 69 from the Panel Following the First Meeting. We therefore do not make any finding on this aspect of Indonesia's claim.

WT/DS312/R Page 149

(b)

(ii)

The KTC did not act inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the Agreement and paragraph 3 of Annex II in disregarding domestic sales data submitted by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli,

(iii)

The KTC did not act inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the Agreement and paragraph 6 of Annex II with respect to informing Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli of its decision to reject their domestic sales data and giving them an opportunity to provide further explanations,

(iv)

The KTC did not act inconsistently with Article 2.2 of the Agreement by using constructed normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli,

(v)

The KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the Agreement and paragraph 7 of Annex II with regard to exercising special circumspection in its use of information from secondary sources instead of domestic sales data provided by Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli,

(vi)

The KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the Agreement and paragraph 7 of Annex II, but did not act inconsistently with Article 6.8 of the Agreement and paragraph 6 of Annex II with respect to determining Tjiwi Kimia's margin of dumping,

(vii)

The KTC did not act inconsistently with Article 2.4 of the Agreement with respect to the alleged difference stemming from CMI's involvement in domestic sales of Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli, which allegedly affected price comparability,

(viii)

The KTC did not act inconsistently with Articles 6.10 and 9.3 of the Agreement by treating the three Sinar Mas Group companies as a single exporter and assigning a single margin of dumping to them,

(ix)

The KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.7 of the Agreement with respect the disclosure of the verification results,

(x)

The KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.4 of the Agreement with regard to disclosing details of the calculations of the constructed normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli,

(xi)

Indonesia failed to make a prima facie case with respect to its claim under Article 12.2 of the Agreement with regard to the KTC's alleged failure to disclose details of the calculations of the constructed normal values for Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli,

(xii)

The KTC did not act inconsistently with Articles 2.6, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.7 of the Agreement of the Agreement with respect to its like product definition,

In respect of the KTC's injury determination: (i)

The KTC did not act inconsistently with Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.4 of the Agreement with respect to its price analysis,

(ii)

The KTC acted inconsistently with Article 3.4 of the Agreement with respect to its assessment of the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry,

WT/DS312/R Page 150

(c)

(d)

(e)

(iii)

The KTC did not act inconsistently with Articles 3.4 and 3.5 of the Agreement with regard to the treatment of the dumped imports made by the Korean producers from the subject countries,

(iv)

The KTC did not act inconsistently with Articles 6.2, 6.4 and 12.2 of the Agreement with respect to disclosing the results of the technical test carried out by the Korean Agency for Technology and Standards and those of a customer survey, and did not act inconsistently with Articles 6.4 and 6.9 of the Agreement with respect to disclosing its determination concerning the effect of the prices of dumped imports on the Korean industry,

(v)

The KTC acted inconsistently with Article 6.5 of the Agreement by not requiring that good cause for confidential treatment be shown with respect to the information submitted in the application which was by nature confidential,

We decline to address the following claims on the grounds of judicial economy: (i)

Alleged violation by the KTC of Article 5.8 of the Agreement by not terminating the investigation vis-à-vis Indah Kiat,

(ii)

Alleged violation by the KTC of its disclosure obligations under Article 6.9 of the Agreement with respect to its dumping determinations,

(iii)

Alleged violation by the KTC of Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the Agreement with respect to its causation analysis,

(iv)

Alleged violation by the KTC of Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5 of the Agreement by treating imports from Indah Kiat as dumped imports,

(v)

Alleged violation by the KTC of Article 6.9 of the Agreement with respect to disclosing the results of the technical test carried out by the Korean Agency for Technology and Standards and those of a customer survey,

(vi)

Alleged consequent violation by the KTC of Article 1 of the Agreement stemming from the violations of the provisions of the Agreement cited in connection with Indonesia's specific claims,

We do not address the following claims because they have been withdrawn by Indonesia: (i)

Alleged violation by the KTC of Articles 6.1, 6.4 and 6.9 of the Agreement by not giving the Indonesian exporters an opportunity to see, and comment on, the data relating to the first half of 2003,

(ii)

Alleged violation by the KTC of Articles 6.4 and 6.9 of the Agreement by failing to inform the Indonesian exporters of its decision to change the basis of its injury determination from threat to material injury,

We do not address Indonesia's claim under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the Agreement regarding the KTC's analysis of the volume of dumped imports as we have found that claim not to be within our terms of reference.

WT/DS312/R Page 151

8.2 Under Article 3.8 of the DSU, in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment of benefits under that agreement. Accordingly, we conclude that, to the extent Korea has acted inconsistently with the provisions of the Anti-dumping Agreement, it has nullified or impaired benefits accruing to Indonesia under that agreement. We therefore recommend that the Dispute Settlement Body request Korea to bring its measures mentioned in paragraph 8.1(a)(v), 8.1(a)(vi), 8.1(a)(ix), 8.1(a)(x), 8.1(b)(ii) and 8.1(b)(v) above into conformity with its obligations under the WTO Agreement. IX.

ARTICLE 19.1 OF THE DSU

9.1 Indonesia requests that we use our discretion under article 19.1 of the DSU to suggest that Korea implement our recommendation in this case by revoking the measure at issue. Korea did not specifically respond to this request. 9.2

We note that Article 19.1 of the DSU provides: "Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement. In addition to its recommendations, the panel or Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the Member concerned could implement the recommendations." (footnotes omitted)

9.3 We note that the general rule under Article 19.1 of the DSU with respect to the recommendations of WTO panels is to recommend that the Member concerned bring its measure into conformity with the relevant provisions of the covered agreements at issue. Exceptionally, Article 19.1 also authorizes the panels to suggest ways in which such recommendations could be implemented. 9.4 Taking into account the circumstances of the proceedings at issue, we see no reason to depart from the general rule and make a suggestion regarding implementation. We therefore decline Indonesia's request. _______________