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Third International Conference on Elections & Democracy in Malaysia 2017 @ 2017 Faculty of Social Sciences UNIMAS Faculty of Social Sciences UNIMAS Universiti Malaysia Sarawak 94300 Kota Samarahan Sarawak T. +6082 584145 F.+6082 584155 http://www.fss.unimas.my ISBN 978-967-2008-30-9 The validity and authenticity of content in every article is the sole responsibility of respective author/s. Any copyright violations are entirely the responsibility of the author/s. All rights reserved. No part of this publition may be reproduced or used in any form, or by any names – graphic, or information storage – and – retrieval system – without the prior permission of the publisher.

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Table of Content The 11th Sarawak‘s State Elections in Perspective I

3 -18

Media, Women and Elections I

19 - 73

Elections, Youth and Leadership

74 – 119

State, Religion and Democracy

120 - 167

Democracy Beyond Elections

168 – 205

Ethnic Dimension in Electoral Politics

206 - 237

The 11th Sarawak‘s State Elections in Perspective II

238 - 323

Contesting Democracy

324 - 384

Grassroots Politics, Political Networks and Patronage

385 - 414

Regional Dynamics in Electoral Politics

415 - 472

Malaysian Politics Post GE13

473 – 524

Civil Society and Democractic Movements

525 - 56

Media, Women and Elections II

567 - 640

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The 11th Sarawak‘s State Elections in Perspective I A Semiotic and Theoretical Analysis of Political Campaign Posters in the 11th Sarawak State Election Khadijah Mohamad Tuah, Malia Taibi, Awang Ideris Awang Daud, Siti Haslina Hussin & Siti Zanariah Ahmad Ishak Universiti Malaysia Sarawak

Abstract Political campaign posters were rigorously used by all contesting parties and candidates at the 11 th Sarawak State Election (SSE11). This election served as a testing ground for a new leadership of Adenan Satem as the state‘s Chief Minister. The aim of this paper is to analyse the election posters used throughout the campaigning period from 26th April 2016 until 6th May 2016. Integrating semiotic analysis and Devran‘s approach, a group of posters were analysed to identify the themes, messages and strategies used by different political parties and candidates. Findings showed that the state‘s autonomy is the common theme represented in most posters regardless of political parties. In terms of messages, several local and national issues were highlighted including Government Service Tax (GST) and local development. All parties applied both positive and negative strategies. One positive strategy is the promise of infrastructure development whereas negative strategy capitalises on direct attack towards opposing candidates. The usage of integrated approach is more comprehensive for analysing political campaign posters. Suggestions for future research are also discussed.

Introduction Political campaign posters, designed to influence voters and spark political debate, were rigorously used by all contesting parties and candidates during the 11th Sarawak State Election (SSE11). This election served as a testing ground for the new leadership of the late Adenan Satem as the state‘s Chief Minister during the election period. The election witnessed challenges posed by the opposition parties in vying for seats.The aim of this paper is to analyse the campaign posters used throughout the campaigning period from the 26th of April 2016 until the 6th of May 2016. The usage of political posters has been a common practice during election campaigning period in many countries around the world that practice democracy. Political poster is seen as a tool for political parties to disseminate information on their promises and manifesto to their supporters during the campaigning period. Despite the latest advancement in technology such as the Internet where political parties can continue to carry out their campaigning online, the use of political 3

posters is still preferred by many political candidates. Sharndama and Mohammed (2013) in their study on the use of political campaign posters and slogans in Nigeria revealed that political campaign posters are still relevant during election campaigning period for political candidates to garner votes. With effective design, attractive photographs, color selections and the right choice of keywords printed in posters, Sharndama and Mohammed believed that the message can be easily transmitted to the voters as posters are seen as a manifestation of political candidates‘ ideologies and mission to win the election. Past studies have shown that political campaign posters have the ability to persuade voters to choose their candidates during election. Poster is also believed to be able to give emotional reactions to political stimuli (Marcus, 2002) and has the persuasive power of visual in candidates‘ TV advertisements (Brader, 2005). Thus, it is quite common for candidates to use posters and television advertisements during election campaigning period to inform their electorates about their parties‘ manifesto and garner their supports and eventually to vote for them. Dumitrescu (2010) acknowledged that posters are important visual tools during election campaigns around the world where political parties and candidates are willing to spend a substantial amount of money allocated for the budget of their campaign to print and display the posters during campaigning period. In her study on the anatomy of candidate poster designs in the 2007 French legislative elections, Dumitrescu concluded that political campaign posters are indeed an effective communication tools to persuade voters. She pointed out that there was significant evidence to suggest that posters not only allow communication of both factual and complex nonverbal information, but they give candidates an opportunity to try to shape voters‘ images of them as displayed on the political posters and in turn increase their chances to win the election. Similarly, a study conducted by Besar et.al. (2015) on state election in Kajang, Selangor and voters‘ perception on government policy found out that political speech and political poster are still influential in persuading people to vote for their chosen candidate compared to alternative media. Their study showed that 50% of the respondents expressed their opinion that the use of political posters and banners influenced them in making their decision on whose candidates to vote during the election. This was based on the visible information about the party‘s manifesto on each banner and poster, which according to them show the spirit and commitment of the candidates.

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Another good example of the effective use of political posters during campaigning period is the PRU 2013 in Kelantan. A study by Zain et.al (2014) demonstrated that the use of photograph of political candidates in election posters may have significant impact to voters. The findings from this study have identified four factors why voters in Kelantan rejected the Barisan Nasional (BN) in PRU 13 namely the image of Tok Guru; urban voters and Chinese; the failure of BN‘s manifesto and the red wave; and the personality of the candidate. Of all the BN rejection factors in Kelantan, the use of Tok Guru‘s image on election posters proved to be the most significant that contribute to PAS success in retaining their power in Kelantan. From the study, it has showed that the image of Tok Guru greatly influenced the voting patterns among electorates. The portrayal of Tok Guru‘s image in the posters as a pious man, charismatic leader and a humble person has managed to win the heart of the voters. This was acknowledged by Mohd Huzaimy (2013, cited in Zain et.al (2014) who added that Tok Guru‘s personality has attracted interest and support from young voters who have shown keen interest in politics.

Method of study Semiotics is anything that can stand for something else and according to Roland Barthes (Griffin, Ledbetter & Sparks, 2015) is the study of meaning from signs which consists of signifier and signified. This paper adopted Barthes‘ (Griffin, Ledbetter & Sparks, 2015) analysis of visual signs using semiotics and will focus on the use of colours in the election posters, the choice of illustrations, the positioning of both illustrations and texts, and also the selection of texts for the posters. Devran (2004) proposed analysing visual materials (campaign posters) by categorizing them into campaign theme, campaign message and campaign strategies. Campaign themeincludes the general topics of campaign messages and these can be either partisanship, political ideology, the candidates taking part in election, the campaign itself, problems and expectations of electorate, or election type. Campaign message consists of several characteristics but mainly the significant aims are to encourage the supporters to cast their votes on election day, persuade the independent and undecided electorate and persuade those who may vote for other political parties to change their 5

minds and get their support for the new party because of justifiable reasons and advantages (Devran, 2004). Campaign strategies are either positive or negative. Positive campaign strategies explain their ideas and policies regarding specific issues, which are significant for the electorate taking part in their coalition profile. Negative campaign strategies, on the other hand, are divided into three, namely direct attack strategy (past promises, past failures, credibility of candidates), comparative attack strategy (exaggeration of policies and projects) and implied attack strategy (Devran, 2004). Integrating semiotic analysis and Devran‘s (2004) approach, 14 posters were content analysed. These posters are from Barisan Nasional (BN), Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), Democratic Action Party (DAP) and State Reform Party (STAR). BN, PKR and DAP are chosen as these are the prominent parties contesting in the SSE11 whereas STAR is chosen because it is a local party championing autonomy for the state of Sarawak. Furthermore, these posters portray issues considered as pertinent by the parties, which conform to the criteria of selection for this paper. These posters are taken from three different locations namely the urban areas of Kuching, Sibu and Miri as these locations have been identified as hot seats for this election.

Analysis of Posters Based on Devran‘s approach by discerning the themes, messages and strategies as well as semiotic analysis which includes the use of colour, illustration, positioning and text, below are the analysis of the 14 posters. Poster 1 (Barisan Nasional – BN) Theme – Problems and expectations of electorate. Message – Clear and understandable to persuade electorate. Strategy –Positive.

Colour – Both candidates are wearing blue, which is BN‘s official colour and the symbol of unity. 6

Illustration – The background photo of culverts emphasizes the message of the poster. Ongoing construction is to show BN‘s commitment to carry out their promise. The use of Adenan‘s photo together with Lee Kim Shin shows the CM‘s support for the candidate. The smiling faces of Adenan and Lee Kim Shin suggest that they are people-friendly. Both Sarawak United Peoples' Party (SUPP) and BN logos are clearly visible in the poster. Positioning – The focal point of this poster is the background photo which emphasizes the seriousness of BN‘s promise to bring development to Tudan. Both photos of Adenan and Lee Kim Shin in the poster are symmetrically positioned. Text – The mixed usage of English and Mandarin in the posters is for the benefits of Mandarin and non-Mandarin speakers. The use of yellow in the text represents the official colour of SUPP logo. Poster 2 (Democratic Action Party – DAP) Theme – Partisanship. Message – Capacity to destroy possible effects of the negative messages given by rival political parties. Strategy – Negative: direct attack.

Colour –Two prominent colours, red and blue are used. Blue is meant for BN while red serves as a warning. Illustration – A wooden see-saw with BN on one side and GST on another. BN is shown to be heavier, which is why GST is high. The see-saw itself represents the scale used by BN as their party logo. The more people vote for BN, the higher will be the GST. The hand casting the vote is also wearing blue shirt, signifying a BN supporter. Positioning – Both the text and illustration are positioned in the middle of the poster, the centre of attraction. DAP‘s logo, slogan and mascot are included at the bottom right of the poster. Text – The blue and red texts are written in Mandarin and Malay. For Mandarin version, blue text is for BN while red is for GST. However, for Malay version, ‗undi lagi‘ and ‗GST‘ are highlighted in red.

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Poster 3 (Parti Keadilan Rakyat – PKR) Theme – Problems and expectations of electorate. Message – Clear and understandable to persuade electorate. Strategy – Positive. (Translation: Fair competition will increase job opportunities) Colour – Yellowish orange is used as the background colour for text with the flag of Sarawak. Illustration – A group of youths wearing mostly white looking up and smiling with thumbs up gestures, showing optimism for the future. Positioning – The illustration is slightly larger than the area for text, giving it slight prominence. PKR and its logo is at the bottom. Text – Written in Mandarin which clearly shows that the target audience is Mandarin literate voters. Poster 4 (State Reform Party – STAR) Theme – Problems and expectations of electorate. Message – Distinctive from other political parties. Strategy – Positive.

Colour – The background is white so that the text and illustration can be seen clearly. Illustration – The candidate is on the left with 13 other candidates on the right. Even though the poster is highlighting the candidate as the one contesting in that constituent, the others are also included as a sign of support and unity. Positioning – The focal point of the poster is the candidate and the text. His name and logo is at bottom right of the poster. Text – The candidate invites the public to ask him about Negara Sarawak, the only text written in Malay. The rest are in Mandarin and English. Text with yellow background is in a dialogue box,

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about Negara Sarawak and an act whereas the text with white background is asking the public to vote for them. Poster 5 (Barisan Nasional – BN) Theme – Political ideology. Message – Political party‘s ideology, policy. Strategy – Positive.

Colour – The yellow background signifies that the candidate is from SUPP. Blue shirt shows that he is a BN candidate. Illustration – Adenan is positioned behind him, which indicates that the candidate is supported by Adenan. The smile shows him to be a friendly and approachable person. Only BN logo is used in this poster. Positioning – Both candidate and Adenan are on the same side, indicating a strong support from Adenan. There is no other illustration. Text – The main text is blue in colour (BN) and written in English. Only the bottom part of the poster consists of Mandarin. Poster 6 (Democratic Action Party – DAP) Theme – Problems and expectations of electorate. Message – Capacity to destroy possible effects of the negative messages given by rival political parties. Strategy – Negative: direct attack. Colour – The illustration on the left-hand side is grey, which gives more prominence to the text. Illustration – A figure carrying a very heavy load – ‗GST‘ and ‗rasuah‘ (corruption). The GST load is bigger than the one for corruption but corruption sits on top of GST. The figure represents the public who has to bear the burden of both GST and corruption. Public suffers and by voting for Adenan (BN), who supports GST (as in the caption), public will continue to suffer. 9

Positioning – The illustration is not as big and colourful as the caption which takes two third of the poster. The emphasis here is clearly on the text. DAP‘s logo, slogan and mascot are included at the bottom right of the poster. Text – The main caption is in Mandarin, with GST written in blue (BN). Poster 7 (Parti Keadilan Rakyat – PKR) Theme – Problems and expectations of electorate. Message – Clear and understandable to persuade electorate. Strategy – Positive.

Colour – The same yellowish orange with the flag of Sarawak (refer Poster 3) is used as the background colour for the text. Illustration – Highway which refers to upgrading the roads and highways in Sarawak especially the Pan Borneo project. Positioning – The main highlight is the highway which is positioned in the centre of the poster. PKR and its logo is at the bottom. Text – The caption is written in black (no significance to any party) with the flag of Sarawak as background. Poster 8 (State Reform Party – STAR) Theme – Problems and expectations of electorate. Message – Capacity to destroy possible effects of the negative messages given by rival political parties. Strategy – Negative: implied attack. Colour – The colour yellow at the bottom part of the poster isone of the colours of party logo.

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Illustration – The left-hand side of the poster shows a skinny cow, buckets of milk and a map of Malaysia. The cow is shown to eat the grass in Sarawak but its hind legs are in Semenanjung Malaysia and the buckets of milk are also on that side. It portrays the natural resources from Sarawak being taken and enjoyed by Semenanjung Malaysia, leaving Sarawak poor. The skinny cow represents the figure of speech ―milk the cow dry‖. The poster includes five STAR candidates standing together (right hand side) wearing black suits to impart their professionalism. Positioning – The skinny cow and the candidates are given almost equal space with the candidates on the right-hand side. Overall, the poster is too crowded. Text – The main headline is written in English, supported by further persuasion in Mandarin and English. Poster 9 (Barisan Nasional – BN) Theme – Political ideology. Message – Political party‘s ideology, policy. Strategy –Positive.

(Translation: For the sake of our next generation,

what

we

can

do

now

is

transformation) Colour – The white background symbolizes innocence and wholesomeness as children are used. Illustration – A group of multi-cultural children lying on the grass forming a circle and reading books. The circle signifies unity and cooperation and books indicate knowledge. Positioning – The children are the focus of this poster. Text – The texts are written in Mandarin except for the seat – Bukit Assek. Clearly the target audience is the Mandarin literate society.

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Poster 10 (Democratic Action Party – DAP) Theme – Political ideology. Message – Political party‘s ideology, policy. Strategy – Positive.

Colour – The poster is dominated by red, the colour of courage. Illustration –A quarter of the poster shows a pair of red gloves worn by someone in a suit. The DAP candidates will fight for autonomy as well as provide check and balance. The words written on the gloves are ‗autonomy‘ and ‗check and balance‘. The use of red, showing the gloves belong to DAP and at the same time, showing courage and fighting spirit. Positioning – The illustration and caption are given almost equal space, stressing on the importance of both elements in the poster. DAP‘s logo, slogan and mascot are included at the bottom right of the poster. Text – The main text is in Mandarin (red), followed by English (red), with ‗ubah‘ as the only Malay word. Poster 11 (Parti Keadilan Rakyat – PKR) Theme – Political ideology. Message – Political party‘s ideology, policy. Strategy – Negative: implied attack.

Colour – The yellowish orange as the background colour with the flag of Sarawak. PKR posters are almost consistent in their choice of background. Illustration – The candidate is wearing PKR corporate shirt and PKR headscarf and she is smiling, an indication of friendliness. 12

Positioning – The candidate and the caption are both given equal space. PKR and its logo is at the bottom. Text – The text is written in Malay, for everyone to understand. Poster 12 (Barisan Nasional – BN) Theme – Problems and expectations of electorate. Message – Capacity to destroy possible effects of the negative messages given by rival political parties. Strategy – Agree to disagree (agree to collecting the tax but not in the form of GST). (Translation: Revoke the authority to set or collect the tax, Abolish GST) Colour – The background is white and even the candidate is wearing white whereas Adenan wears blue (BN). This could be due to the fact that the candidate is someone new, and the colour white is used to represent freshness. Illustration – The only illustration is of Adenan and the candidate, again to show Adenan‘s support for Pau Kiu Sung. The way the candidate is smiling (no teeth shown compared to the previous two BN candidates) shows that he is friendly but as he is new, not as confident as the others. Positioning – Both Adenan and Pau Kiu Sung are on the left, with the caption taking a larger space. Text – The main text – ‗Revoke the authority to set or collect the tax, Abolish GST‘ – is written in red, something voters should focus on. It is interesting to note the use of GST as an issue from a BN candidate. One needs to understand that the N9 Padungan seat‘s incumbent is the DAP current candidate and that GST is an issue highlighted by DAP. As a new candidate, Pau Kiu Sung needs to highlight the same issue but with a twist (GST should be abolished as a result of revoking the authority but that does not mean tax should be abolished, just in different form, by a different authority). The next caption is Sarawak for Sarawakian in blue (BN) and the bottom part of the poster contains the candidate‘s name and BN logo.

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Poster 13 (Democratic Action Party – DAP) Theme – Partisanship. Message – Capacity to destroy possible effects of the negative messages given by rival political parties. Strategy – Negative: direct attack.

Colour – The background is white so that the text and illustration can be seen clearly. Illustration –There are two ballot boxes where the upper box belongs to Adenan (BN) and the one below belongs to Najib (BN). Voting for Adenan is the same as voting for Najib as they both belong to the same party that is BN. Positioning – The main highlight is the text which occupy most of the space in the poster. DAP‘s logo, slogan and mascot are included at the bottom right of the poster. Text – The text is the main highlight of the poster, with Adenan and Najib written in blue (BN), in Malay and Mandarin versions. Poster 14 (Parti Keadilan Rakyat – PKR) Theme – Candidates taking part in the election. Message – Political party‘s ideology, policy. Strategy – Positive.

Colour – Yellowish orange as the background colour (the use of background colour is consistent in all their posters). Illustration – The focal point is the candidate with her being featured in one third of the poster. Her smiling face indicates that she is people friendly and vibrant. Positioning – She is positioned on the right side of the poster. Text – The text is written in Malay; it promises a better future for Tupong, with ‗No 1‘ highlighted in red (they aim to be the best). 14

Themes used by the 14 posters selected for analysis: Barisan Nasional

Democratic Action

Parti Keadilan Rakyat

State Reform Party

(BN)

Party (DAP)

(PKR)

(STAR)

Political ideology

Problems and

Problems and

expectations of

expectations of

electorate

electorate.

Problems and

Problems and

Problems and

expectations of

expectations of

expectations of

electorate

electorate

electorate.

Political ideology

Political ideology

Political ideology

Problems and

Partisanship

Candidates taking part

Political ideology

Partisanship

expectations of

in the election

electorate

Messages of the 14 posters selected for analysis: Barisan Nasional

Democratic Action

Parti Keadilan Rakyat

State Reform Party

(BN)

Party (DAP)

(PKR)

(STAR)

Political party‘s

Capacity to destroy

Clear and

Distinctive from other

ideology, policy

possible effects of the

understandable to

political parties

negative messages

persuade electorate

given by rival political parties Political party‘s

Capacity to destroy

Clear and

Capacity to destroy

ideology, policy

possible effects of the

understandable to

possible effects of the

negative messages

persuade electorate

negative messages

given by rival

given by rival

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political parties

political parties

Political party‘s

Political party‘s

Political party‘s

ideology, policy

ideology, policy

ideology, policy

Capacity to destroy

Capacity to destroy

Political party‘s

possible effects of the

possible effects of the

ideology, policy

negative messages

negative messages

given by rival

given by rival

political parties

political parties

Strategies employed by the 14 posters selected for analysis: Barisan Nasional

Democratic Action

Parti Keadilan Rakyat

State Reform Party

(BN)

Party (DAP)

(PKR)

(STAR)

Positive

Negative: direct attack Positive

Positive

Positive

Negative: direct attack Positive

Applied negative

Positive

Positive

Agree to disagree

Negative: direct attack Positive

Applied negative

Discussion and Conclusion The overall major theme for SSE11 is autonomy for Sarawak. BN, DAP and STAR use ‗autonomy‘ as their overall key messages with BN promoting ‗Sarawak for Sarawakian‘ (BN candidate Padungan). STAR highlighted an ‗autonomous Sarawak‘ by voting for them while DAP promises 16

‗autonomy with accountability‘. DAP also continue with their previous theme ‗jom ubah‘ (let‘s change) which has been revised to ‗berani ubah‘ (4 real change). They portray a courageous image in their slogan of ‗berani ubah‘ reinforced by their mascot, Pahlawan Ubah. Meanwhile, SUPP (a BN component) have their own theme which is ‗Safeguard Sarawak,‘ also advocating on autonomy for Sarawak. Most common type of message projected in posters is the political party‘s ideology and policy, emphasizing the issues championed by the parties. Another type of message used is the capacity to destroy possible effects of the negative messages given by rival political parties and this is mostly used by DAP in promoting their stand against GST. As for the strategies used, BN and PKR adopted positive strategy while most of DAP posters carry negative strategy using direct attacks especially towards BN. However, from their posters, DAP do not seem to have a problem with Adenan himself but rather the issues he was associated with, namely GST and Malaysia‘s Prime Minister. An interesting finding is the strategy used by BN for the new candidate in Padungan which is ‗agree to disagree‘ in regards to economic and political issues that have been highlighted during the campaigning period. In the economic issue, the BN candidate for Padungan agreed that GST should be abolished and replaced by another taxation system which should be managed by the state government. On the other hand, in the political issue, the stand made by the Padungan candidate can be misconstrued as supporting the opposition party when he used the same slogan ‗Sarawak for Sarawakian.‘ This does not mean that Pandungan candidate wants Sarawak to cease from Malaysia, but merely requested for more autonomy from the federal government so that the State can make its own decision pertaining to education, religious and other state matters. References Besar, J. A., Jali, M. F. M., Lyndon, N., & Daud, S. (2015). Kempen Pilihan Raya Kecil (PRK) dan persepsi pengundi terhadap dasar kerajaan: Kajian kes Dewan Undangan Negeri (N25) Kajang, Selangor. Geografia: Malaysian Journal of Society and Space, 11(8), 78-89. Brader, T. (2005). Striking a responsive chord: How political ads motivate and persuade voters by appealing to emotions. American Journal of Political Science, 49, 388–405.

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Devran, Y. (2004). A theoretical approach to analysis of political posters and print ads. 2ndInternational Symposium of Interactive Media Design, 5-7 January 2004. Dumitrescu, D. (2010). Know me, love me, fear me: The anatomy of candidate poster designs in the 2007 French legislative elections. Political Communication, 27(1), 20-43. Griffin, E., Ledbetter, A. & Sparks, G. (2015). A First Look at Communication Theory (9th Ed). New York: McGraw-Hill Education. Marcus, G. (2002). The sentimental citizen: Emotion in democratic politics. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. Sharndama, E. C., & Mohammed, I. (2013). Stylistic analysis of selected political campaign posters and slogans in Yola Metropolis of Adamawa State of Nigeria. Asian Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences (AJHSS), 1(3). Zain, M. F. M., Mamat, S. A., Besar, J. A., & Jali, M. F. M. (2014). Pilihan Raya Umum 2013: Penolakan berterusan pengundi di Kelantan terhadap Barisan Nasional. Geografia: Malaysian Journal of Society and Space, 10(4), 15-27.

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Media, Women and Elections I The Status of Ghanaian Women in Democratic Governance: the need for transforming political spaces for development. Bassoumah Bougangue Universiti Malaysia Sarawak Abstract Despite the enviable democratic credentials and leadership role exhibited by Ghana within the African Region, democratisation and governance in Ghana is compromised with cultural demands and gender role expectations dominated by patriarchal societal norms. Premised on the fact that gender equality, full citizenship rights and equal opportunities between men and women are constitutional provisions, this paper uses existing empirical literature and relevant secondary data sources to discuss the status of Ghanaian women under a democratically constitutional governance. It presents how gender structures and systems condition women as minors and subject them to marginalisation and oppression within households, communities and in religious as well as state institutions due to discriminatory implementation of national policies. This paper provides insights into the identity of women as rightful citizens with equal rights to opportunities as men versus the role confusion in the level of participation in several aspects of life such as education, employment, healthcare, control of resources and political life. The paper argues that in spite of the constitutional provision of common humanity of both men and women and the important contributions of women towards nation-building in areas of production, family care activities, educational attainment and the fight for women's human rights, women are still treated as minors occupying subordinate positions at all levels of society. This paper calls for multi-sectoral adoption and implementation of culturally sensitive and structurally transformative agency strategies as well as gender responsive policies and programmes especially in state institutions through active engagement of men as role models, agents of change and indirect beneficiaries of women's empowerment. Keywords: democratisation, gender responsive policies, discriminatory, equal rights, governance, marginalisation, oppression, transformative strategies. Introduction Women's participation in governance has been highlighted in various international conventions and treaties including the 1995 Beijing Platform for Affirmative Action and the 2000 UN Millennium Summit. Engagement of women in politics is central to democratic and sustainable development (UN, 2000; Adaina, 2012; UNDP, 2016a, b). In the light of this, the SDG 5 focuses on gender imbalancesandfemale empowerment with the target of ensuring gender equalityin leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public lifeby 2030.There cannot be a 19

balanced developmental progress in any country without equal opportunities for both men and women (Cann, 2016). Therefore, gender balance in political participation and decision-making has becomean internationally agreed target (UN, 2000; ICRW, 2014; UNDP, 2016b). This accounts for the global efforts towards the removal of all forms of discrimination against women including harmful socio-cultural structures that hamper women's empowerment. Regardless of the global call for democratic governance, structural systems and forces of genderism remain stubborn and resistant to true democratic governance across regions and countries (Cann, 2016; UN Women, 2017a). This is more remarkable in women's participation in politics and decision-making at the familial, local and national levels (GSS, 2014), which invariably, impact their employment (FAO, 2012a, b) and health (ICRW, 2010; Bougangue, 2017). Currently, no region has up to 50% of women in parliament and the Nordic countries leads with 41.1%, followed by Americas 27.7%, Europe (excluding Nordic countries) 24.3%, sub-Saharan Africa 23.1%, Asia 19.2%, Arab States 18.4% and Pacific 13.5% (UN Women, 2017b). In many parts of the world, gender inequalities remain deeply entrenched and progress in achieving gender equality and women‘s empowerment has been halting and remains uneven (ICRW, 2008, 2010, 2014; Cann, 2016). Consequently, few women are represented in key political and economic decision-making positions (IDEA, 2012). Therepresentation of women in legislatures across the world, is only 22.8%, with only 10 women as heads of state. Globally, only 2 countries (Rwanda 63.8% & Bolivia 53.1%) have 50% or more women in parliament (Cann, 2016; UN Women, 2017b). In regions and countries with the critical minority of 30% women in legislation, the success had to go through difficult hurdles and uncompromising resistance to women's empowerment (UN Women, 2017a). Meanwhile, the contribution of women in local and national governance makes a significant difference in all dimensions of development (Cheston & Kuhn, 2002; UN Women, 2017a). For example, in India, local council water projects entrusted in the hands of women was 62% higher than those handled by men (Bratton& Ray,2002). Similarly, a study in Norway established a direct causal relationship between the presence of women in municipal councils and childcare coverage (Chattopadhyay&Duflo, 2004). Pathetically, at the risks of poor economic growth and development, the world is facing acute misuse of talent for neglect of gender equality (Cann, 2016). With a gradual progress in education and health from very low levels, progress towards parity in key economic areas has slowed dramatically with a gap of 59% to the disadvantage of females - the largest since 2008. Averagely, women earn just over half of what men 20

earn irrespective of the long hours in unpaid work. Currently, only 54% of women in the world compared with 81% of men are employed (Cann, 2016). In line with international treaties and conventions, Ghana has been committed to upholding women‘s human rights, ensuring women‘s participation in politics and public life, and developing affirmative action. The government is also bound by the 1992 Constitution of Ghana as well as national policies to promote gender equality. The establishment of a ministry for women and children in 2001 was a step towards women's empowerment for democratic growth and development with a core mandate to initiate and coordinate formulation of policies, monitor and evaluate those policies to promote gender mainstreaming, women's empowerment and developmental issues using a multi-sectoral approach (Addo, 2012). Another remarkable attempt is the mainstreaming of justice as a policy area for gender equity in the form of legal reforms including a constitutional provision for gender equity under the law, and the revision of the criminal code of 1960 to ensure criminalising harmful traditional or cultural practices such as ritual servitude such as the trokosi system and female genital mutilation that are perpetuated against young women and girls. Aside, the enactment of domestic violence law and the creation of Domestic Violence and Victims Support Unit (DVVSU) of the Ghana Police Service was towards healthy and secured relationship especially for women. Regardless of these efforts, just like in other countries, most Ghanaian women are engulfed in the web of gender and treated as secondary citizens (Tsikata, 2007; Adaina, 2012; IDEA, 2012; FAO, 2012a; UN Women, 2017a), which generates a state of crisis of their identify as rightful citizens with equal opportunities as men by the constitutional provision versus the role they play within the family, community and state institutions in relation to the expectations of true democratic governance. Methods This paper adopts the structuration theory (Giddens, 1984; Germov, 2014) and the stage theory of psychosocial development (Erikson & Erikson, 1998) to discuss how socio-cultural and political structures create barriers for women at the agency level under democratic governance. The discussions are based on information from published journals, thesis, conference papers the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) and international organisations such as the World Bank, FAO and UNDP amongst others and excerpts from the media. The paper identifies women in a stage of democratic crisis due to gender-biased structures versus the role confusion over the expectations of true 21

democratic governance regarding their status in society and participation in political and socioeconomic activities in relation to men. Gender and democratic governance in Ghana The Ghanaian woman is entrapped in the web of genderism under democratic governance within both private and state structures. The gender inequality in governance today traces back to the colonial era, when males were given the opportunity for formal education and skill training (Tsikata, 2007; Adaina, 2012). Before colonialism, Ghanaian women were active and fearless political giants (Adaina, 2012). This is evident in the system of chieftaincy amongst the Akan ethnic group and the immense contribution of women within the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) with the Ghanaian first president, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah in the independence struggle (Azikiwe, 2009; Adaina, 2012). The advent of colonialism widened the existing inequality gaps and created more with political, economic and gender policies (Ikpe, 2004; Lewu, 2005; Omotola, 2007; Oni, 2009, Adaina, 2012). Women's participation in governance has been observed to be central to democratic and sustainable development (UN, 2000; ICPD, 1994; Adaina, 2012; UNDP, 2016b). However, the commitment towards building a gender-balanced state governance has received a mixed of warm and cold responses in the formulation and implementation of gender responsive policies (Addo, 2012; Atta, 2015; UNDP, 2016b). Either the demands in theinternational conventions and treaties are yet to be fully domesticated and effectively implemented or it is a conscious and intentional neglect of gender responsiveness or there is no effective legal binding in the form of affirmative action to the application of such policies and laws (Addo, 2012; UNDP, 2016b). For example, the Affirmative Action Bill that is supposed to be passed into law by 2013 to enhance women's participation in governance and decision-making has not received attention. The provision of the 1992 Constitution and existing legal policies indicate that there is more to implementation than provision of legal structures. The existing laws are in consistence with international legal frameworks for ensuring gender equality and women's empowerment. One key setback is lack of will on the part of the government and political parties to institute measures to ensure that the existing structural inequalities between men and women are removed for promoting women's participation in policy decisions (Adaina, 2012; UN Women, 2017a).

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The achievement of SDG 5 will be a mirage in the face ofthe existing 'patriarchal-autocracy' and authoritarian governance associated with under-representation of women in positions of power and decision-making. Despite the proportion (51.8%) of women in Ghana, their participation in policy making and governance is very low (Adaina, 2012; IDEA, 2012; UN Women, 2017a). As of January, 2017, women constituted only 4 of the 30 cabinet ministers and 14 out of 49 deputy ministers; 3 of the 25 members of council of state (Daily Graphic, 23.12.2016). Out of 133 women who contested in 2016 for parliament seats from the 275 seats, only 37 (13.1%) women won with little improvement over previous 29 (10.5%) of women legislators. Regional distribution of female parliamentarians makes the impact of patriarchal genderism more visible. Women won 5 seats in each of Ashanti and Eastern Regions (matriarchal regions). The gap is widened in the three patriarchal northern regions where women won only one seat each in Upper East and Northern with no seat in the Upper West Region (Daily Graphic, 23.12.2016). Currently, out of 31 cabinet ministers only 7 women are represented and no woman has been appointed a regional minister out of the 10 ministers. Women form only 6.5% of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives (MMDCEs)at the local government level (UNDP, 2016a, b; Daily Graphic, 23.12.2016). This low representation within the national and local government structures limits women‘s potentially valuable contribution to development, poverty reduction, and the achievement of gender equality (UNDP, 2016b).The relative improvement of 8.3% to 13.3% in women's representation in parliament from 2009 to 2017, is built on fluctuations since the first parliament (see Table 1) signifying inconsistency in progress. Lack of skills, confidenceand public support for women's political participationlimits their capacity to challengegovernment and hold it accountable (Tsikata, 2007; IDEA, 2012). Though there is no discriminatory law against women in politics,there are overt and covert practices such as monetisation of elections that hinder women‘s abilities to contest men (UN Women, 2017a). Women given political appointments have been victims of defamatory allegations from the public in the media. They are either alleged to be flirts or described as weak decision-makers. Typical instances were the Ghanaian public responses to the appointments of the first female chief justice, Mrs Georgina T. Woode and the first electoral commissioner Mrs Charlotte Osei. As seen in the quotation below, whilst gender activists lauded the president for the move, other people including key political figures described the step as an exchange for sex.

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"The NPP MP, Ken Agyapong launched a scathing attack on Charlotte Osei, alleging that she was appointed after sexual favours." (Ghana Web, adomonilne.com, 03-03-2017). This was the response of the electoral commissioner: "A woman‘s beauty is liability, her ugliness is liability‘. If you are beautiful it is a liability, if you are ugly it is a liability,‖ – Charlotte Osei (Ghana | Myjoyonline.com 08-03-2017 Time: 05:03:23:pm)

Another crucial hurdle often underestimated and neglected is the traditional gender norms and beliefs around decision-making. In patriarchal society, men are given the mandate to make sole decisions as a protection for women and children (Bougangue, 2017). As mediators in traditional worship, men use spiritualism as a source of fear and power to control women (Nukunya, 2003; Tsikata, 2007; UNDP, 2016a; Bougangue, 2017). In Nabdam in Ghana, voters were warned against voting for a female candidate in district assembly elections to avoid punishment from the gods and ancestors of the land (UNDP, 2016a). Women who dominate against the societal gender norms of politics are often branded as flirts, uncontrollable or witches which normally generates mistrust in their marriages and degenerates into divorce. As a result, family members as well as peers influence women to avoid active participation in politics (UNDP, 2016a). Furthermore, the mediaplays a crucial role in shaping voters' opinion as it often stereotypes women as only capable oftraditional feminine roles. The consequence is exclusion of women from decision-making processes as leaders, legislators, ministers and chief executives withmost of their needs not incorporated into policy formulation and implementation (UNDP, 2016a, b; UN Women, 2017a, b). Gender and Education Education is a fundamental element of poverty reduction strategies (UN, 2000; GSS, 2014), a primary requirement for employment in both formal and informal sectors of the economy and a prerequisite for political participation. It is a valuable input into production and contributes to differences in productivity and earnings (World Bank, 2012). Female education increases women's labour force participation and improves production and standards of living (UNDP, 2016b). For example, educated female farmers usually exhibit higher productivity, which explains that, gender 24

differences in human capital translates into differences in agricultural productivity (FAO, 2012a; World Bank, 2012). Law making, interpretation as well as policy formulation and implementation require literacy skills, which implies that women need education to participate actively in politics as well as other aspects of governance. To better fit into the fourth industrial revolution, women need education and training especially in the areas of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM). In Ghana, indicators of education reflect gender gaps and disparities (Lambert, Perrino &Barreras, 2012; GSS et al., 2000, 2012, 2014, 2015) especially rural areas (FAO, 2012a). Ghana's literacy rate stands at 71.5%, with a notable gap between men (78.3%) and women (65.3%). The recent progress in primary education is associated with a wide gap in the gender parity index (GPI) in completion of schools at all levels (Camfed Ghana, 2012; GSS, 2000, 2012, 2014). The virtual gender parity in enrollment at primary and senior high school levels does not translate into national gender ratio for completion estimated to be 67.5% (two girls for every three boys) mainly due to teenage pregnancies and early marriages (Camfed Ghana, 2012). Female education is the most cost-effective measure to improve living standards in developing countries (ICRW, 2010, 2014; Lambert et al., 2012; Hagman, 2013). Female education indirectly regulates fertility by increasing age at marriage and childbearing, reducing their reproductive periods and increasing contraceptive use. Educated women are able to translate knowledge into practice by putting positive attitudes towards healthcare seeking (Preston, 1989, Magadi & Curtis 2003; Hagman, 2013; ICRW 2010, 2014; Bougangue & Kumi-Kyereme, 2015; Bougangue, 2017).Denying women access to education means nearly more than half of Ghana's labour and intellect will be untapped which translates into the country making only half of the GDP that could be realised with women's inclusion (Lambert et al., 2012). In Ghana, there still exist high gender differentials in educational attainment to the disadvantage of women. Out of Ghanaians aged 15 years and above, 34.7% females are illiterates compared with 21.7% men (GSS, 2014). Apart from lack of good will to implement gender responsive education policies, conditions such as poverty, sexual harassment and cultural mind-set are impediments to women's education (Lambert et al., 2012; UN Women, 2017a). Female students especially, adolescents experience unfair treatment and sexual harassment from both teachers and their peers in school (UNICEF, 2011 in Lambert et al., 2012). Aside, especially in the rural northern Islamic areas people focus on a subservientrole for women and discourage higher careerpursuits for them (Grzybowshi, 2010, FAO, 2012a,b; Atta, 2015). This perception leads women into risks such 25

as early/forced marriage, STIs & low contraceptive use, which further place them at the risks of maternal morbidity and mortality (Tsikata, 2007; GSS et al., 2008, 2009, 2015). Employment and Social Welfare Whilst the constitution and other legal frameworks grant women rightful citizenship with equal opportunities as men, they are held to structural injustices and gender norms with implications for their citizenship status (Tsikata, 2007). In 60 years of independence, women's rights and gender equity matters have not been consistently prioritised in government policies. The quest for gender equality and women's empowerment has not been adequately and responsively integrated into national policies (Tsikata, 2007; Addo, 2012; UN, 2016b; UN Women, 2017a). In spite of the cabinet status of the gender ministry, it is quite marginal in policy making process (Tsikata, 2007). There are gender differentials in positions in Ghanaian labour force segmented in terms of sector and status of employment (Offei-Aboagye, 1996; Bortei-Doku Aryeetey, 2000; Awumbila, 2001; Heintz, 2005; Tsikata, 2007; GSS, 2014; UNDP, 2016b). The most of Ghanaian women continue to be in less paid informal sector work primarily made up of small scale businesses (Tsikata, 2007; GSS, 2012, 2014), as well as domestic work and traditional farming (FAO, 2012a, b; GSS, 2014). As most women are mainly into small scale food crop cultivation, men are engaged in large scale food and crop production (FAO, 2012a, b; GSS, 2014). This is due to the fact that more men than women have adequate social capital and access to loans for agriculture (World Bank, 2012) even from state owned banking institutions (GSS, 2014). The under-representation of women in the formal sector of the economy is due to their generally low level of education and professional training (Tsikata, 2007; FAO, 2012a,b; World Bank, 2012; UN Women, 2017a), the burden of unpaid care activities and many years of discriminatory policies (UNDP, 2016b) inherited from the colonial administration (Acheampong & Agyei-Mensah, 2006; Tsikata, 2007; Adaina, 2012). In Ghana, apart from the service and sales work, elementary occupations and managerial positions, the gender gap is wide in other occupations and maintained between 2000 and 2010 as more men than women are employed in the public and private formal sectors (see Tables 3 & 4 in appendices). This discriminatory system against women creates gender inequalities in earnings and production output, which has a consequence of poor economic growth and development (FAO, 2012a, b; World Bank, 2012; Cann, 2016; UNDP, 2016b; UN Women, 2017a). 26

Under democratic rule, the colonial system of using security forces in tax collection in the informal sector is maintained and applied to traders, the most of whom are women, not even in rural areas, but in the big commercial cities including Accra, the capital city (UNICEF, 2002 in Tsikata, 2007; Opare, 2003). This harassment has been normalised and applied in the removal of unauthorised structures in markets usually put up by women who have not been adequately provided with shops and the women have on countless occasions resisted. It is common to hear the word aabaye (a signal that the city guards or the police are coming) at commercial centres and people begin to run. These security guards are used to cease materials on sale at the so-called unauthorised places in the name of decongesting the city. Further, this unfair treatment of women is extended to denial of adequate social amenities such as refuse bins, toilets and portable drinking water at vantage points in the informal working environment where most women work (Tsikata, 2007). Meanwhile, these poor marginalised minors are expected to observe all sanitation laws just like their counterparts majority of whom are men who have been provided with the basic sanitation facilities in their offices in the formal sector by the same government. Gender insensitiveness in Ghana has degenerated into kaya yei system (female head porterage), where young girls and women migrate from the poor rural north of the country to earn their living in commercial centres by carrying luggage for traders on daily basis. These are normally either school dropouts or never attended school girls who leave their children with girls aged 6-8 years who act as nannies and later absorbed into the porterage job (UNICEF, 2002 in Tsikata, 2007). This exposes the women to both security and health risks as they sleep on cardboards, sacks and old cloths under wooden structures hired to them by market women on night basis (Tsikata, 2007). Adherence to traditional gender division of labour within households and the general society relegates women to either less paid or unpaid economic activities that further subject women to less time and resources (FAO, 2012a, b; GSS, 2014).Females spend twice more time on unpaid domestic services within household (171 minutes) than males (85 minutes). Females also spend more time than males providing unpaid caregiving services to household members - 109 minutes against 62 minutes (GSS, 2014). Traditionally, the Ghanaian men play the role of family heads. However, today is witnessing a continuous rising of female household heads (GSS, 2014). Apart from death of husbands and migration, this might be due to dissolution of relationship and neglect of children by men which subjects the women to poverty and associated crises at personal, family and community levels. 27

Control of Resources A country's development depends on its human and material resources including time and technology (World Bank, 2012; UN Women, 2017a). Therefore, inequalities in access to and control of these resources have unpleasant implications for the earnings and output of production of the disadvantaged (Bortei-Doku Aryeetey, 2000; Awumbila, 2001) and the country at large (World Bank, 2012; Cann, 2016). Under democratic rule, history and culture still take precedence in land acquisition and ownership in Ghana (Tsikata, 2007; FAO, 2012a, b). Though the customary laws permit both men and women to obtain land for any activity, women are mostly affected by the mode of land acquisition in the olden days through land clearing which was men's space. The contribution of women in those days in the form of preparing food for the men to gain energy to work and assistance offered on the farm has not been given recognition in land ownership. It has been observed that this gender-biased system of land acquisition and ownership continues to benefit men to the disadvantage of women in the allocation of land as well as in inheritance practices (Nukunya, 1975; Kotey & Tsikata, 1998; Tsikata, 2007). Unfortunately, the problem is doubled by the unwillingness of financial institutions including state owned banks to give equal opportunities of loans to men and women for housing and land acquisition (UN Women, 2017a; GSS, 2014). According to Tsikata, a study conducted between 1989 and 2002 showed that 65% of land titles were in the names of men, 25% in the names of women and 10% jointly registered mostly by spouses. In the same study, between 1970 and 2002, entries in the Deeds Registry indicated that 75% of deeds were for men, 23 for women, whilst 2% were joint entries. The traditional expectations of property ownership and the perception towards land acquisition and ownership are concrete blocks to women in resource control and ownership (Lambert et al., 2012; FAO, 2012a, b; World Bank, 2012). It is culturally expected that male family members or husbands lead women to acquire land. Under the influence of these expectations, properties are normally registered in the name of a husband whether jointly acquired by spouses or solely acquired by a woman with an implication of contest in the event of husband's death or marriage dissolution (Minkah-Premo & Dowuona-Hammond, 2005). It is the male chiefs and heads of families who are commondecisions-makers in regards to land tenure even in matrilineal society. In view of this, Ghanaian men hold3.2 times more of the total farms than women, and 8.1 times more of the medium andlarge-sized farms (FAO, 2012a, b). 28

The distribution of domestic work between men and women in Ghana is not balanced. The average amount of time that women spend in domestic activities isgreater than that of men, even if women spend as much time as men in productive activities (UN Women, 2017a; GSS, 2014). For instance, 65% ofmen spend up to 10 hours per week on domestic activities compared with 89% of women who engage in the most time-engaging activities such as cooking and household care. Even young womencombine greater domestic and productive workloads compared to their male counterparts: 63% males against 88% females in rural Ghana (UN Women, 2017a). For this reason, women are less likely to be able to take fulladvantage of economic opportunities, to respond to changing market opportunities, and to participate inincome-generating activities. Time constraints also hamper women‘s ability to develop their capabilities througheducation and skills development, which could enhance economic returns and wellbeing (UN Women, 2017a). Conclusions and the way forward The inter-connectedness of education, employment and political participation means that, women's lower levels of education, low representation in decision-making within households, at local and national levels as well as their employment into lowly paid jobs amount to poor economic growth and development (World Bank, 2012; Cann, 2016; UNDP, 2016b). This is because gender inequality undermine local and national efforts for improving living conditions, reducing poverty and enhancing national development (FAO, 2012a, b). The fact that both men and women are factored in determining per capita income and living standards means it is important to equitably integrate women's resources in all aspects of life. On the average, gender inequality costs subSaharan Africa about $US105 billion, about 6% of the region's GDP, with the implication of jeopardising efforts for inclusive human development and economic growth. It is estimated that 1% increase in gender inequality reduces a country's GDP by 0.75% (UNDP (2016b). The social policy dimensions of women's citizenship discussed above are framed by several powerful institutions which govern social relations and practices such as ethnicity, kinship and marriage which are particularly influential and are all underpinned by religious beliefs and practices mostly within the context of African Traditional Religion (ATR), Christianity and Islam. "Whilst these institutions and practices have been undergoing changes in the past years, their rules, regulations and gender ideologies remain very resilient in normalising gender inequalities and rendering women as perpetual minors in society" (Tsikata, 2007). As a result, a very few women in Christianity and ATR become leaders and women are not allowed to lead prayers in Islam. ATR 29

especially, serves as a source of power, influence, domination, and oppression in society normally expressed through men to control women (Nukunya, 2003; Tsikata, 2007; Bougangue, 2017). Women's personal ideologies are chosen for them either by the state, society or family based on gender-biased structures. Indeed, like adolescents in psychosocial crisis (Gross, 1978; Erikson & Erikson, 1998; Crain, 2011; Macnow, 2014), women are in democratic crisis of citizenship identity versus confusion over their role and status in society due to structural inequalities. They are in a situation of finding answers to the existential questions: "Who am I? Who can I be"? (Macnow, 2014). However, this is a pivotal stage of democratic development, with the possibility of reconciling their status in society with the expectations of true democratic governance. In the light of this, there is the need for the establishment and strengthening of existing women's pressure groups and organisations as well as individual gender activists in collective spirit to radically effect changes in the present injustice and hostile governance (Stevens, 1983). Undoubtedly, given the present technological advancement, the expected changes will not occur automatically (Erikson & Erikson, 1998; Macnow, 2014). For women to be empowered, recognised and liberated from the present disguised imperialism, it takes the acquisition of skills through education and training. Since the present state of women in democracy has the potentials of modification (Erikson & Erikson, 1998; Macnow, 2014), this paper calls for radical structural transformation in political spaces through quota system and funding of women in political contest at all levels, removal of structural barriers such as gender roles and most importantly, equal access to and sustenance of education and training as well as creation of employment for females. The achievement of gender equality, women's empowerment and democratic freedom by 2030 as SDG 5, will be a mirage unless there is commitment to removal of patriarchal structures that collide with gender responsive policies and legal structures. Removing gender-biased structures will find women in top positions in jobs which will facilitate gender equity in decision-making. In all these, the media have a role to play especially in presenting gender issues to the public. Responsible gender discussions should be held especially on abilities of women in politics or in top hierarchy of public service rather than expression of doubts and condemnation of women. Since women have better repayment rates than men, putting financial resources in the hands of women in the form of loans will place them on a relatively even platform to promote gender equality (Cheston & Kuhn, 2002). Access to resources alone will not automatically translate into 30

equality or empowerment. At the agency level, women should have the ability to use the resources to achieve their aspirations. Thus, women's empowerment at the agency level will establish a formidable base for social change (World Bank, 2001; Cheston & Kuhn, 2002). In all, education stands tall as the most empowering tool for removing all structures of injustice against women by changing attitudes of men towards gender roles and positioning women to challenge and effect changes in society (Cheston & Kuhn, 2002; ICRW, 2010, 2014). ―Women and men must be equal partners in managing the challenges our world faces – and in reaping the opportunities. Both voices are critical in ensuring the Fourth Industrial Revolution delivers its promise for society‖ (Klaus Schwab in Cann, 2016).

The Fourth Industrial Revolution that is focused more on STEM Skills is likely to further deprive economies of women‘s talents and deteriorate economic growth unless women are given education and training in STEM skills (Cann, 2016). Indeed, there is collision of patriarchy and policies (Atta, 2015) in the present system of democracy which requires a new wind of democratic transformation in political spaces to blow away all social injustices for freedom and justice. References Acheampong, E. & Agyei-Mensah, S. (2006). Itinerant Gold Mines? Mobility, sexuality and the spread of gonorrhea and syphilis in the twentieth century century Ghana. In Oppong, C. Oppong M. Y. P. A. & Odotei, I. K. (Eds). Sex and Gender in the era of AIDS: Ghana at the Turn of the Millennium. Accra. Sub-Saharan publishers Adaina, L. Y. (2012). Women in Ghanaian Politics: a case study of the Fourth Republic.Masters Dissertation Submitted to the Department of Political Science and International Relations, College of Development Studies, Covenant University, OTA. Addo, Marry-Anne (2012). Advancing gender equality and empowerment of women: Ghana's experience. UNDCE Vienna Policy Dialogue. Atta, P. G. (2015). Education inequality: How Patriarchy and Policy Collide in Ghana. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science. Vol. 5 No. 7(1):1-18.

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Awumbila, M. (2001). Women and Gender Equality in Ghana. In Tsikata, D. (Ed). Gender Training in Ghana. Accra: Woeli Publishers. Azikiwe, A. (2009). Women and Politics in Ghana.. Pan-African News Wire. Retrieved on 10http://panafricannews.blogspot.com 1stJune, 2011. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995). Critical Area G ‗Women, Power and DecisionMaking.‘ Bortei-Doku Aryeetey, E. (2000). The Participation of Women in the Ghanaian Economy. In Ayeetey, E., Harrigan, J & Nissanke, M. (Eds). Economic reforms in Ghana: the Miracle and the Mirage. Oxford, Accra and Trenton: James Curry. Bougangue, B. & Kumi-Kyereme, A. (2015). Maternal health clinic attendance in Awutu-Senya District, Ghana. International Journal of Economics & Social Science. Vol. 5.pp. 65-79. Bougangue, B. (2017). Socio-Cultural Dimensions of Maternal Healthcare in Ghana. PhD Thesis, Faculty of Social Sciences, Universti Malaysis Sarawak. Bratton, K. A.& Ray, L. P.(2002). Descriptive Representation: Policy Outcomes and Municipal Day-Care Coverage in Norway. American Journal of Political Science, 46(2), pp. 428–437. Camfed Ghana (2012). What Works in Girls‘ Education in Ghana: A critical review of the Ghanaian and International Literature. Prepared For the Ministry of Education and the Girls‘ Education Unit,Ghana Education Servicewith support from DFID, Ghana. Chattopadhyay, R.& Duflo, E. (2004). Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India. Econometrica 72(5), pp. 1409–1443; Cheston, S. & Kuhn, L. (2002). Empowering women through microfinance. Draft, Opportunity International. Pp5-46. Crain, W. (2011). Theories of development: concepts and application (6th Ed). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc. Cann, O. (2016). Gender equality is sliding backwards, finds our global report. World Economic Forum, Geneva. 32

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Hagman, M. (2013). Maternal mortality: Gender and access to health services. The case of Ghana. Journal of Politics and International Studies, Vol.9. ISSN 2047-7651. Heintz, J.(2005). Gender, Employment and Poverty in Ghana. A background paper prepared for the 2005 Progress of the World's Women. New York: UNIFEM. Ikpe, U. B. (2004). Attitudes of politicians to electoral process in Nigeria.A paper presented at a workshop on sustainable democracy in Nigeria. International Center for Research on Women (2008). Toward 2015: Mixed progress on women and development.ICRW. International Center for Research on Women (2010). Targeting poverty and gender inequality to improve maternal health. In Paruzzolo S., Mehra, R, Kes, A. & Ashbaugh, C. (Eds). ICRW. International Center for Research on Women (2014). Improving the lives of married adolescent girls in Amhara, Ethiopia: A Summary of Evidence. Documents (4). In Edmeades, J., Hays, R. & Gaynair, G. (Eds.). ICRW. International Conference on Population&Development (1994). Population and development. programme of action adopted at the International Conference on Population and Development. Cairo: United Nations Publications. International Institute for Democracy & Electoral Assistance (2012). Inter-Regional Seminar on “Women‟s Political Empowerment – Translating Women‟s Participation in Politics into Critical Actions and Influence” organized by the International Institute for Democracy in Accra, the Republic of Ghana. Kotey, A. N. & Tsikata, D. (1998). Gender relations and land in Ghana. In kuenyehia (Ed), Women and Law in West Africa: A Situational Analysis of some key Issues Affecting Women. Accra: WALWA. Lambert, M., Perrino, S. E. & Barreras, M. E. (2012). Understanding the barriers to female education in Ghana. Blue Kitabu Research Institute, Boston, MA and University of Southern California Dornsife, Los Angeles CA.

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Lewu, M. (2005). Women's Political Visibility and Media Access: the case of Nigeria. In Omojola, O (ed). Pp 112-124. Macnow, A. S. (2014). MCAT Behavioural science review. NY City. Kaplan Publishing pp. 220. Magadi, M. A. & Curtis, S. L. (2003). Trends and determinants of contraceptive method choice in Kenya. Studies in Family Planning. 34(3): 149–159. Minka-Premo, S. & Dowuona-Hammond, C. (2005). Recommendations for Integrating Gender Issues into the Land Administration Project: Review of Land and Gender Studies and Identification of Resources in Ghana. Report Submitted to the Land Administration Project, Accra. Nukunya, G. K. (1975). Land Tenure and Agricultural Development in the Anloga area of the Volta Region (Mimeo). Legon: University of Ghana. Nukunya, G. K. (2003). Tradition and change in Ghana: An introduction to sociology (2nd ed.). Accra: Ghana Universities Press. Offei-Aboagye, E. O. (1996). Women in Employment and Industry in Ghana? Accra. FriedrichEbert Foundation. Omotola, S. J. (2007). What is this gender talk all about after all? Gender and politics in contemporary Nigeria. African Study Monographs. 28(1). Oni, S.O. (2009). Women and Political Participation in Nigeria: A Comparative Study of Lagos and Ogun State. (unpublished Masters‘ Thesis) Covenant University, Ogun State, Nigeria. Opare, J. A. (2003). Kayayei - The Women Head Porters of Southern Ghana. Journal of Social Development of Africa. 18(2): 33-47. Plan International (2012). Progress and obstacles to girls‘ education in Africa. Retrieved from org/girls/.../Progress%20and%20obstacles%20to%20gi. Preston, S. H. (1989). Resources, knowledge and child mortality: Selected readings in the cultural and behavioural determinants of health. A comparison of the US in the late nineteenth century and developing countries today. In Caldwell, J. C. & Santow, W. G. (Eds.). Canberra: Health Transition Centre. 35

Republic of Ghana (1992). The constitution. Abridged, Accra: NCD. Stevens, R. (1983). Erik Erikson: An introduction, New York, NY St Martins Press. Pp48-50. Tsikata, D. (2007). Women in Ghana at 50 Still Struggling to Achieve Full Citizenship? Ghana Studies. 10(2007):163-206. United Nations (2000). The Millennium Summit: The Millennium Declaration, Wednesday, 6 September, to Friday, 8 September 2000. New York. UNICEF (2012). All children in school by 2015: Global initiative on out-of-school children. Retrieved fromunesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002257/225788e.pdf UNDP (2016a). Gender equality and women participation in politics and political processes in Ghana: the role of political parties. UNDP (2016b). Africa Human Development Report 2016: Accelerating Gender Equality and Women‘s Empowerment in Africa. UN Women (2017a).Inter-Parliamentary Union. ―Women in national parliaments, as at 1 June 2016‖at:http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/leadership-and-political-participation/factsand-figures#sthash.Tzu419oW.dpuf UN Women (2017b). Facts and figures: Leadership and political participation. Womenin parliaments.

http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/leadership-and-political-

participation/facts-and-figures#sthash.Tzu419oW.dpuf World Bank (2001). Engendering development: through gender equality in rights, resources, and voice-summary. www.worldbank.org/gender/prr/engenderingsummary.pdf. World Bank (2012). Gender Differences in Employment and Why They Matter. World Bank. World Development Report.

36

Appendices Table 1: Number of women in parliament from 1960 - 2017 1960

196

1969

1979

1992

1996

2000

2009

2013

2017

5 Total

104

104

140

140

200

200

200

230

275

275

10

19

1

5

16

18

23

20

29

37

18.2

0.7

3.5

8

9

9.5

8.3

10.5

13.1

Seats Wome n Percent 9.6 -age Source: Adaina, 2012 and Updated by Author Table 2: Level education between men and women in Ghana from 2000 to 2010. Level of

Number

Total

Women

Men

23.5

28.3

18.3

0.4

0.4

0.5

2.1

1.9

2.3

26.6

26.6

26.6

19.9

19.4

19.9

Educatio n Never attended School

Nursery

4,836,027 87,794

Kindergarten 432,005 Primary 5,482,963 JSS/JHS

37

4,048,059 Middle School

10.0

8.9

11.2

8.5

7.4

9.7

1.7

1.2

2.2

1.8

1.7

1.9

1.2

1.1

1.3

2.4

1.7

3.1

1.8

1.2

2.5

2,067,507 SSS/SHS 1,756,714 Secondary School

349,221

Vocational/Tech nical/Commerci al School

369,365

Post Middle/PostSecondary

243,739

Certificate Post Secondary Diploma

484,766

Bachelor Degree 373,641 Postgraduate

68,610

0.3

0.2

0.5

Total

2,060,041

100.0

100.0

100.0

Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2014).

38

Table 3: Percentage distribution of employed persons by occupation and sex , 2010 Type of Occupation

Both Sexes

Female

Male

Managers

2.5

2.4

2.5

Professionals

5.4

4.1

6.7

& 1.9

0.9

2.9

1.3

1.6

Sales 21.2

31.6

10.2

Skilled

Agricultural, 41.3

37.8

45

Forestry

&

13.6

16.9

0.6

9.6

6

7.6

4.4

Other Occupations

0.2

0.1

0.3

All Occupations

100.0

100.0

100.0

N

10,243,476

5,237,942

5,005,534

Technicians

Associate Professionals Clerical

Support 1.5

Workers Service

&

Workers

Fishery

Workers Craft & Related Trades 15.2 Workers Plant

&

Medicine 4.9

Operators

&

Assemblers Elementary Occupations

Source: GSS, 2014

39

Table 4: Percentage distribution of employed persons aged 15 years and above by employment sector and sex, 2000 and 2010 2000 Employment

2010

Both sexes

Female

Male

Both sexes

Female

Male

Public

6.4

4.5

8.3

6.2

4.5

8.1

Private Formal

8.5

6.0

10.9

6.8

4.1

9.7

Private Informal

83.9

88.8

79.1

86.2

91

81.2

Semi-

0.8

0.4

1.2

0.1

0.1

0.2

& 0.4

0.2

0.5

0.5

0.3

0.7

Sector

Public/Parastatal Local International NGOs Organisations*

-

-

-

0.05

0.03

0.1

Other*

0.1

0.0

0.1

-

-

-

All Sectors

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

N

7,428,374

3,679,487

3,748,887

10,243,447

5,237,92

5,005,52

5

2

Source: GSS 2014

40

The Politics of Online Media and Democracy in Political Populism in the Philippines: Reflections of the first 100 days of the Duterte Government1 Linda A. Lumayag & Ivie C. Esteban Universiti Malaysia Sarawak & Mindanao State University - Iligan Institute of Technology [email protected] & [email protected]

Abstract President Rodrigo Duterte rose to power by defying conventions in a highly-charged Philippine presidential elections ever in May 2016. The main objective of this article is to explore the role of online media in shaping the Duterte political persona and how this ascription impacts on the kind of government Duterte wants to pursue, and vice-versa. How does social media shape the Duterte leadership in comparison with the mainstream media? What themes are produced and reproduced in the context of populist politics? This paper departs from the traditional notion of ethnographic study of immersing in the community by attempting to utilise virtual ethnography as a method of data collection. Analysis will be based on texts from two online social media and three online mainstream newspapers published during the first 100 days of his assumption to power. The unfettered control of the social media and the unprecedented participation of the masses may help to understand the populist strategy of Duterte in his attempt to gain the support of the people. This paper would argue that political influence by the media is no longer the control of the state apparatus. Mass access to social media and other forms of media channel could change the landscape of political control in the Philippines.

1

This is a draft document. Do not quote. Kindly email the corresponding author for the final draft of this article. 41

Introduction and context .…how the “world outside and the pictures in our heads” are represented to a democracy through the lens of a commercial press….

This paper explores how media perceives the first 100 days of the Duterte government. In this particular paper, we look at the role of the online mainstream papers and the social media through Facebook and Twitter in projecting the leadership and governance of President Duterte. In a highlywired society and significantly well-connected citizens of a political state, public engagement with the state needs to be studied. Philippines is an interesting country to begin with, considering its chequered historical past. Philippines was the first nation-state to elevate their resistance against foreign control, that, having gained independence way back in 1898 from the clutches of imperial Spain, only to experience another round of colonisation in the hands of the Americans and shortly thereafter by the Japanese. Vestiges of these resistance acts are explicit in the way society behaves against any form of inequality, imagined and real. The media industry in recent past in fact plays a crucial role in changing the political environment in the Philippines. For instance, the Marcos dictatorship put to an end in the 80s because of the combined force of both broadcast and print media by calling the Filipino people to rally behind the leaders who wanted to end the Marcos rule.

Similarly situated, the Arab Spring that started in Tunisia in 2010 and swept across Egypt, Libya and Saudi Arabia was a movement that could be traced back from the active involvement of the social media in information exchange and sharing. This movement is prodominantly pushed by the young generation who are savvy as well understand the importance of connecting oneself to the rest of the world.

The role of the media in shaping democracy in modern society reminds us of the Lippman-Deway Debate in the 1920s (Chapman and Knoedler 2006) as to how public interest is pursued in the media so that the citizenry is given space to participate in whatever great and small issues of the day. In this classic debate it challenges the press - and the new technologies that facilitate it - to perform its duty to inform the public fully about the actions taken by the governmental elites and experts (Chapman and Knoedler, 2006, p. 138). Thus, Lippman sees the press as an elite group that should evaluate the policies of government and present well-informed conclusions about these key 42

debates to the public, while Dewey sees the press as a necessary instrument of democracy that should engage citizens in understanding for themselves the central questions of our times, be they local, national, or global issues. In Marxist view, the media is an institution that propagates hegemonic control over people‘s political and social spaces and hence this control is critical. The media as an ideological state apparatus together with other institutions in religion, education and culture, according to Louis Althusser (1970) is installed to perpetuate political dominance especially in a vastly fragmented and vacuous society so as to maintain political power. Media control may mean state ownership of the media apparatus or may also mean What are media? The media system is ―one of society‘s key set of institutions, industries, and cultural practices‖ (Masterman 2001, p.16). The term media refers both to the means of communication (radio, recorded music, internet, print, film, television, video) and the products or texts of these mediums (television shows, film productions, social media accounts). The central media (print, radio and television) are the ways we ―imagine ourselves to the world‖ (Couldry 2003, p. 7).

This is on the assumption however that the media is fully owned by the government (or public), which means to say that media policy always favours the interest of, demand protection of the government from any resistance and dissent. Not all countries in the region purports to follow this line of thinking. The Philippine media, no doubt is controlled by oligarchs, but major print media, film and broadcast media are privately owned. In recent historical past, the Philippine media played instrumental role in the shaping the contours of democracy and its fundamental function is to check on the excesses of the governing state. Briefly, what comes to mind was the Marcos years, when within the media industry, a wedge of resistance slowly played up against abuse power, militarisation,

The editorial is an important part of any broadsheet paper. It carries the official position of the paper on matters affecting the nation, community or people and this position is political in the sense that editorial may

43

Now, the onset of online social media where, to paraphrase James Fallow (1996, p. 238), ―citizens, teachers, political leaders, and communicators of each era have an obligation not to abandon the concept of active, democratic self-rule, but instead to find ways to make it work in the circumstances of their age‖.

Is online media damaging democracy? Or is online media facilitating citizen participation? Viewed thru the lens of political sociology, mass media in the Philippines shared a significant role in the history of the country. During the reign of then President Marcos, mass media were privately owned and independent of government control. It was multilingual but leadership was exercised by the English language press. It should be known that the press was centered around Manila and its environs and was only meant to its educated, middle class readers. The bias on coverage in favour of great Manila (or Luzon for that matter) has created a deep schism as far as engendering knowledge of the life and culture of people outside Imperial Manila. The May 2016 presidential elections have changed all that - as politics is mediated by virtual engagement between citizens and political control. Interestingly, dubbed in 2014 by TIME as the Selfie Capital of the World, Makati, the business centre of the Philippines as the Selfie Capital of the world (www.time.com/selfiescities-world-rankings/), for example, shows the impact social media would have to the political environment in the country.

This paper attempts to understand the role of online media in creating a Duterte image in the first 100 days of his rise to power. We look at the issue pursued by the media during the first 100 days of the Duterte government and how each medium position itself attempts to understand how Duterte achieves the promise of change in the Philippine society. Duterte‘s shocking electoral victory seemingly marked a repudiation of not only the Aquino administration, but also the whole democratic system that was created after the ouster of the Ferdinand Marcos dictatorship in1986, exactly three decades earlier (Heydarian 2017, p. 40).His mercurial character, provocative rhetoric, and constant flip-flopping on policy statements sent stock markets wild and brought the Philippine peso to its lowest levels in almost two decades. And yet, the foul-mouthed and controversial Filipino leader continuously maintained extremely high trust and approval ratings at above 80 percent (Heydarian 2017, 40).

44

Media Politics, Democracy and Contestation

In the Philippines, 54 million from an estimated 102 million population are connected to the internet. The average age of voters is 23.5 and they are called ‗millennials‘, purportedly young voters of the millennium who provide 46% of the electorate. 'Free Facebook' deals from the country's telcos mean unprecedented social reach: In total there are an estimated 44.2 million active internet users, 42 million active social-media users, and 36 million active mobile social users in the country. Facebook reported 268 million conversations about the election—leading it to call the 2016

Philippine

polls

the

‗most

engaged‘

elections

in

Asia

Pacific

(http://www.campaignasia.com/article/the-du30-phenomenon-how-social-media-won-thepresidency-in-the-philippines/426945). On global scale, about 1.25 billion are Facebook users, although in China, Facebook is inaccessible and therefore Chinese citizens rely on QQ with 820 million users, or Q Zone, 625 million and WeChat 355 million ((boyd 2007).

The rise of the electronic media as a vehicle for public culture, cultural politics, the struggle over the means of content of cultural production (see for example, Rudolph 1992), had begun to play a significant part in Philippine politics. In countries where social media is muzzled, for example, in China where foreign social apps are not available for fear of foreign influence most probably related to resistance movements against an authoritarian and fascist state. Russia and Egypt are another examples where personal blogs and social media accounts are closely monitored to weed out potential dissenters. In one of the ethnically-diverse regions in southeast Turkey, the population of Mardin was reluctant to engage in local politics at the recent elections and a few showed interest by following or liking posts which have political colour (Diller 2016). Local people prefer instead not to reveal their political position or preference and argue that Facebook, for example, is a site devoted to family and friends. Diller et al. (2016) shared that, Facebook is primarily used for maintaining good relationships with friends and relatives, so public silence on local political issues is important for peaceful coexistence both online and offline (p. 142).

In general, therefore, social media reinforces the prior conditions of politics in the town, including the absence of debate over local politics and the suppression of opposition views, but facilitates the expression of Kurdish solidarity with Kurds in other countries (p.143). 45

Traditionally, print media industry is predominantly owned and controlled by the government, such as in the case of Malaysia where the popular New Straits Times is owned by the UMNO political party as well as Berita Harian, in Bahasa Malaysia. In Thailand, up until 1990s the military had practically total control of print and broadcast media although there is a seemingly freer control this time. While the Thai military government in its current set up is back in its grip on print and broadcast media, ensuring that even academics are refrained from commenting on political issues confronting Thai government. Being owned by the government, they are the mouthpiece of government policies and interests. The Philippine print media, however, is not owned or ―controlled‖ by the government. In fact, it is a private enterprise whose members of editorial board come from media business industry, usually rich capitalists who also venture into other industries controlled by old members of the oligarchs. While it is safe to assume that the media industry represents the ideas of the state since the beginning, there has always been a history of a direct confrontation between the print media and the state, for example, during the Marcos dispensation when his ―lieutenants‖ who were expected to carry out his command decided to resist against the state. Smartphone usage in the Philippines is high. With about half of the population, 53 million of them, with an average age of 23 years, owned at least a smartphone. In addition, access to mobile internet is rather convenient (see Attachment A for a list of internet providers and data packages that look reasonable and easy.)

One interesting feature in the internet provider is knowing that social media applications like Facebook, Twitter and Instagram are popular among users, these features are part of the provider package. It is no doubt that access to these features extends one‘s social relationship in social media, however, additional access to other websites that would incur new charges on the part of the user. This limitation has an unlikely impact in the way users. More than one-third of social media users are worn out by the amount of political content they encounter, and more than half describe their online interactions with those they disagree with politically as stressful and frustrating. http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/10/25/the-political-environment-on-social-media/, accessed on 8 March 2017.

46

It is interesting to note how social media is the new site of political contestation (www.newmandala.org), and people coming from within and beyond the borders are provided a space to engage on issues they are passionate about.

Accordingly, much of the most impactful

money is spent online, calling on expertise in building networks, conversations, and communities using social networking platforms, combined with applications designed to amplify messaging‖ (J of Information Policy, 6, 2016).

Disinformation campaign in the social media is real as Williams (2017) from the New Republic has published in January 2017. Rappler, a relatively new online news portal found out a pattern of disinformation campaign in the social media that somehow meant ―to shape public opinion, tear down reputations, and cripple traditional media institutions‖. In a 3-part series detailing the process of disinformation intended to shift the opinion of social media users, highlighting, first, a strategy of ―death by a thousand cuts‖ - a chipping away at facts, using half-truths that fabricate reality by merging power of bots and fake accounts on social media to manipulate real people. A bot is an application that performs an automated task, such as setting an alarm, telling you the weather or searching online (www.cnet.com/how-to/what-is-bot/). So in the case of bots being used in political campaigns or to surge an issue in Facebook, for instance, it only takes one task to set the alarm by multiplying through sharing of messages.

It is telling that both Facebook and Twitter social worlds have become the best channel to share their political voice for or against the Duterte and his government. As Williams (2017) shared, Duterte‘s social media campaign began while he was the mayor of Davao, where he allegedly ran death squads to curb rampant drug dealing and other street crime. In November 2015, when he decided to run for

president, he enlisted a marketing consultant named Nic Gabunada to

assemble a social media army with a budget of just over $200,000. Gabunada used the money to pay hundreds of prominent online voices to

good social media with pro-Duterte comments,

popularize hashtags, and attack critics. Despite being vastly outspent by his rivals, Duterte swept to power with almost 40 percent of the vote. After the upset victory, the new president‘s spokes- man issued a warm thanks to Duterte‘s 14 million social media ―volunteers.‖ (Williams 2017, in the New Republic)

47

Duterte as a populist politician We might start from an interesting characterization of populist leaders offered by the philosopher and political commentator Pierre-André Taguieff, in an interview with the French news website Atlantico. ―In terms of the leaders‘ posture, populism can be defined as a political style, compatible with any ideological content, that involves direct appeals to the people, rejection of mediation, and criticism of established elites. This also includes the promise of change, a rhetorical gesture that populist leaders have in common with all modern political leaders. But they differ from the latter by featuring a charismatic authority, which explains the fact that they are either admired or hated with equal intensity.‖

Methodology

Sources of data

Two main sources of data were three major online news in the Philippines, namely, the Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI), Philippine Star and Manila Bulletin, and the social media of Facebook and Twitter. In the first source, we used the editorial of the three broadsheets right after Duterte was officially sworn into office on 30 June 2016 until the 100th day in office. In the second source, we followed both Facebook and Twitter world and identified potential respondents on the basis of whether their FB and Twitter accounts are declared public. Then, we trimmed it down further to two hashtags respondents used i.e. #Duterte100Days and #Duterte100DaysofChange.

Method of data collection

This study covers public Facebook posts and tweets that use the hashtag #Duterte100Days and #Duterte100DaysofChange. The hashtags were used as keywords to gather Facebook post and tweets of netizens, relating to the first one hundred days of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte. Since the posts and tweets are made public, the researcher took screenshot of the posts and tweets including the netizens who posted or tweeted them. While the tweets gathered necessarily mention the hashtags, Facebook posts gathered include posts which do not necessarily uses the hashtags but nevertheless are displayed as results when the hashtags were used as search keywords. 48

Method of data analysis Content analysis is used in order to understand the bulky raw data from two sources. In the first source, 59 editorial from the three papers directly interrogate the Duterte government and on this basis, the team identified categories based on the selected editorial. Out of the 300 editorial pieces, 59 were included in the study. In the second source, hashtags were used to churn out potential virtual respondents. This study included 190 FB accounts and 180 Twitter users and analysis was done based on the activities social media users do within the specified period of time.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

In this section, we make sense of the raw data from two sources: three online newspapers and the social media as demonstrated in Facebook and Twitter. We attempt to present two sets of data to make a clear demarcation as far as themes that emerged from the sources are concerned. The first part of the section is related to editorials of Philippine Daily Inquirer, Philippine Star and Manila Bulletin. As shown in Table 1, editorial that discoursed on the extent to which Duterte verges on authoritarianism and a looming condition of a fascist government. In fact, many statements that questions the wisdom of President Duterte in his drive to wipe out drug addiction, corruption and so forth that he seemed are reasons why Philippines remain in backwater in relation to infrastructure development and social conditions of Filipinos.

Table 1: Major themes identified from three* online news media Themes

Count

―Messiah effect‖

Percentages

9

16.7%

War on drugs & Extra judicial killings

13

23.2%

Democratic Space

27

48.2%

Duterte persona

4

7.0%

Others

3

5.0%

Total

56

100%

* Philippine Daily Inquirer, Philippine Star and Manila Bulletin 49

Messiah effect ―Expectations‖, ―rousing‖, ―promising‖, ―marching‖, ―praying‖, ―milestones‖ are some of the telling words that Duterte presidency has pinned on the Filipino psyche, based on the editorials of three (3) major online newspapers in the Philippines which were published during the first 100 days of his government. A day after Duterte was installed as the 16th President, PDI positioned itself by showing that high expectations developed in every starting administration attempting to dismantle prevailing political system is bound to fail the hopes of the people.Duterte embarks his administration with many promises of addressing social problems as emphasised during his inauguration, leaving the people to feel hopeful for a peaceful society and social progress as a whole.Duterte‘s first State of the Nation Address (SONA) highlights government agendas exclusively programmed for the poor such as lifting the economic status of those who are in the poverty line as well as the workforce in the Philippine society.Duterte‘s signing of the executive order empowering Freedom of Information shows honesty and true commitment of his promise of a transparent government during pre-election period.On his first day as the Philippine President, Duterte showed no mercy pertaining to red tape happening underground in the government, as he sees it as the cause of public distrust over the government, by emphasizing his action to end it despite existing anti-red tape law.Duterte‘s terminology, ―right-sizing,‖ refers to an action of cleaning the mess in the bureaucracy that creates burden on the side of the people of poor services by way of trimming the bureaucratic fat, which he means the red tape.President Duterte pledges to the Filipino masses of a clean and fast-processing government. A clean and fast-processing government refers to a corruption and red tape-free government.Duterte‘s first 100 days already brought many changes in the country. The people, on the other hand, could see these changes in the backyard, beginning the changes on the streets where gangsters and drug offenders largely decreased in numbers and public servants now eager to work and enforce laws strictly. In the political arena, he managed to topple down big government personalities involved in crimes mostly in illegal drug trading and wipe out any passage for corruption in any government agencies. And lastly he succeeded in retaining the Philippines as one of the fastest growing economies in East Asia and the Pacific (Note: Duterte is fortunate to have inherited a positive economic outlook as spillover of the Aquino administration).Duterte was left by the previous administration with almost 50

everything good that has already been set up, from economic progress, good diplomacy, and prestige in the world arena, hoping for him not to waste them all.

War on Drugs and Extra Judicial Killings

The second theme that came out strongly is the issue of war on drugs accompanied by extra judicial killings (EJKs). Twenty three percent (23%) of the editorial of the three papers were related to Duterte‘s main campaign mantra nicely said as ‗Change is Coming‘ i.e. the eradication of drug menace in the country. While the three papers‘ discourse was in sync with Duterte‘s campaign, at the same there are apprehensions as to the way it is pursued when the approach and the strategy may have ran counter to the ideal of preserving moral fibre of the Philippine society.

An unnumbered drug syndicates and users have been recorded to be shot dead by police personnel in their antidrug operations since Duterte‘s first day of office as the Philippine President.The antidrug campaign of Duterte does not excuse police generals from being investigated and prosecuted if found guilty over drug-related involvements.High-ranked police officials who takes part of drug trafficking as said to be committing ―treason‖ according to Duterte.Duterte‘s harsh approach on his antidrug campaign paves way to criticism about the government‘s misuse or overuse of power that can lead to violation on civil rights of the people even those who are involved in drug trafficking, arguing that he must be extremely cautious with his actions to avoid future clash with the citizens.Finance Secretary Carlos Dominguez of Duterte‘s administration lobbies his economic agendas for country‘s progress, pointing out mainly his new advocacy in public service. The ―war on drugs‖ is planned to be extended for another 6 months with a tougher approach in dealing with drug syndicates due to the persistence of such illegal activities in the country. Duterte‘s first 100 days already brought many changes in the country. The people, on the other hand, could see these changes in the backyard, beginning the changes on the streets where gangsters and drug offenders largely decreased in numbers and public servants now eager to work and enforce laws strictly. In the political arena, he managed to topple down big government personalities involved in crimes mostly in illegal drug trading and wipe out any passage for corruption in any government agencies. And lastly he succeeded in retaining the Philippines as one of the fastest growing economies in East Asia and the Pacific. 51

The antidrug campaign of Duterte has seen to be a threat against transparency in the government as reflected upon the pressures put towards Sen. De Lima for calling for an investigation for the State’s killings of drug traffickers and the failure of the PNP to submit for congressional inquiry.Duterte’s administration is losing tract on securing its dignity as Duterte himself attacks Catholic leaders who keep on bathmouthing him on his antidrug campaign, stating that dignity is within Catholic faith and that human rights and a right for a second chance of life must still be served to drug offenders.

Democratic Space

It is noteworthy that democratic space as a theme came out the strongest out of the five themes identified. In this category, there are many issues that the editorial of the three newspapers attempt to show, that ranges from the undignified way of killing innocent victims of the Tokhang Campaign, coal-powered energy industry that affects the already volatile condition of the environment, the plan to lower income taxes that would increase taxes of goods and services, the unsolicited critical stance against the Catholic church to Duterte‘s vitriolic voice against the United States and the European Union and, in the national scene, his aggressive criticism to individuals and groups who seem to oppose his authoritarian ways. The recent detention, for example, of a sitting senator Leila De Lima, a strong opposition voice in the Senate and who pointed at Duterte as the brainchild of the infamous death squad originated from Davao when he was still a mayor for 22 years. PDI stresses on how the De Lima case has become a ‗stand alone‘ case that could send shiver to potential Duterte enemies. …If President Duterte is to be believed, De Lima‘s entire government career has been dedicated to nothing but making sure that illegal drugs lord it all over the entire country and that every Filipino citizen is turned into a drug pusher or addict. Unfortunately for De Lima, this version peddled by the President, his men, and social media operations has gained ground in the consciousness of the Filipinos until it took hold of public opinion and became, for all intents and purposes, the truth on the matter. (http://opinion.inquirer.net/102168/duterte-trump-populism#ixzz4aSTgMeoX, accessed on 5 March 2017.). 52

One of the dangerous paths that Duterte is treading is his harsh approach on antidrug campaign that paves way to criticism about the government‘s misuse or overuse of power that can lead to violation on civil rights of the people even those who are involved in drug trafficking, arguing that he must be extremely cautious with his actions to avoid future clash with the citizens. In addition, fear has been stressed out in the public regarding the sensed immunity enjoyed by vigilantes. As a result, the government accepted the responsibility and created a space for a fair trial against them.The right to a due process has been discredited by the government when it is now propagating a shoot-to-kill order against drug offenders. Duterte‟s administration is losing tract on securing its dignity as Duterte himself attacks Catholic leaders who keep on bathmouthing him on his antidrug campaign, stating that dignity is within Catholic faith and that human rights and a right for a second chance of life must still be served to drug offenders. In another issue, Duterte wanted to demonstrate another populist strategy to Due to its plan on decreasing the income tax rate from 32 percent to 25 percent that will cause VAT increase to supplement the resulting decrease in tax collection, the administration met criticisms with its proposed tax reforms, arguing that the increase of VAT would only increase the prices of commodities that will result to further burden to the poor people. Increasingly, authoritarian regimes like Duterte‘s are deploying social media to disseminate social propaganda, crack down on dissent, and maintain their grip on power. What began as a tool of freedom and democracy is being turned into a weapon of repression (Williams 2017).

Duterte persona

Another interesting theme that came out in the editorial is that of its attempt to decipher just who is the man sitting on the Presidential throne in the Philippines. Here the editorial catches those situations when Duterteconfuses his audience with a host of pronouncements that do not seem to be ―politically correct‖, for instance, when he likened himself to Hitler, and that of his ability to kill people who would continue to support drug addiction in the country. His statement on Hitler drew 53

the ire of the Jews and took offence of what he said, but later on apologised for it. Another situation was when he likened then President Obama to a ―son-of-a-whore‖ in his dislike of the United States to the point that a planned meeting on the sidelines of the APEC Summit in 2016 was cancelled. In reflection, Duterte employs tactic to blur distinction between truth/real and untruths/imagined, and seemingly he is successful in this. When his statements create confusion in national or international scene, his army of defenders through his appointed men will come out and attempt to interpret his statements or to defend him. Facebook army of volunteers are conduits of defence which will then be posted and reposted on Facebook walls or twitted or retwitted on Twitter.

The second part of this section is to present the findings on how Facebook and Twitter users present their diverse voices in the virtual world.

Table 2: Social media support for Duterte within the first 100 days

Social Media

Support

Did not Support

Uncertain

Total

Facebook

148 (77.8%)

32 (16.8)

7 (3.68%)

190 (100%)

Twitter

114 (63%)

80 (33.3%)

6 (3.3%)

180 (100%)

Total

262 (70.8%)

112 (30.2%)

13 (3.51%)

370

Re-affirmation of Duterte as a great leader

Both Facebook and Twitter showed overwhelming support for Duterte. The hashtags 100days, Duterte100, changecoming are major hashtags that sustain the virtual support for the President. It is noted that support for Duterte on Facebook and Twitter is more 70.8%. About one third of the sample, did not support him with those opposing his war on drugs which has become violent as it progressed. Opposition to Duterte is also expressed in the way

54

Table 3: Distribution of activities on Facebook based on hashtag within Duterte's first 100 days in office Facebook Activity

Frequency

Percentage

Commented on a post

92

48.42%

Shared a photo

23

12%

Shared a video

10

5.26%

Shared a status

4

2.1%

Shared an article

45

23.68%

Posted a status

10

5.26%

Posted a video

3

1.57%

Posted a Photo

1

0.5%

190

100%

Total number of respondents

On the part of smartphone users, access to Facebook and other web applications in the Philippines depends on data plan or package one holds. Although it may be cheap to access social media applications and therefore users ability to get involved in citizen politics, the usage and extent of use is limited to posting a status or sharing an article, photo or video. This means that they are able to read whatever is shared on the FB wall and the furthest they can go is share the post, article or video without necessarily doing a self-check whether said article, photo or video is true or fake or unsubstantiated statement (Tables 3, 4). Otherwise, smartphone users need to buy or top up their data plan in order to view attachments etc. During the 100 days period, Facebook users captured in 55

this study, did not initiate/provide an idea for friends within one‘s circle. The common activity that they did was either to comment on a post, or share the post in both Facebook and Twitter. It may be said that this activity alone smacks of just say, automatic and normal response to comment, like, repost or share. Finding ways to know whether resources fed to them on their social media is fabricated or not is not even considered. Table 4: Distribution of activities on Twitter within Duterte’s first 100 days in office Twitter Activity

Frequency

Percentage

Re-tweeted a video

4

2.22%

Re-tweeted a photo

0%

0%

5

2.77%

Tweeted/re-tweeted an article

37

20.55%

Tweeted (an idea/event/info)

92

51.40

Tweeted a video

17

9.4%

Tweeted a photo

25

13.88

180

100%

Re-tweeted a post

Total number of respondents

Those who did not support Duterte on FB and Twitter suggest that the 16 million who voted for Duterte were not the majority arguing that if votes for all the other presidential candidates were combined, it could be more than 16 million. In light moments, Duterte‘s supporters are called dutertards - a coined term for Duterte and being mentally retarded; on the other hand, those who do not support Duterte are known as yellowtards - a term to signify yellow and retard, and further identifying it to Aquino. Non-supporters of Duterte continue to argue that Duterte is not fit to be President now that the country knows how he behaves in the national scene. His personal vitriolic 56

character who loved to cuss even in formal occasions demonstrate a much deeper psychological problem, according to users of FB and Twitter. Lastly, non-supporters shared that the high survey rating of Duterte (about 70%) is not credible as well as generalisable as there were only over 1000 respondents for this exercise.

Online mainstream paper as pro yellowtards

Another very strong sentiment especially on FB is the allegation by Duterte supporters that the online mainstream media, namely, PDI, Philippine Star and Manila Bulletin do not support Duterte and they are out to wedge an ax against their President. This justification is sufficient to trigger more army of volunteers to do online trolling.

OFW support for Duterte There are more than 10 million Filipinos working and residing abroad. In the run-up to last year‘s presidential elections, Facebook was a thrive of political voices miles away from where the real political exercise was held. The 1.3 million Filipinos who are eligible to vote must have at least stayed in their country of residence for a year or more and they are legitimate Philippine-passport holders. According to a Commissioner in the Philippine Commission on Elections (Comelec), the month-long overseas absentee voting (OAV) exercise that allows Filipino citizens working or residing outside the Philippines, showed that both Duterte and Marcos won the Presidency and Vice-Presidency posts, respectively. With 31.65% (432,706) of the votes from overseas Filipinos from the 1.37 million registered voters overseas, this election saw the highest turnout in a decade, as shared by the Comelec (newsinfo.inquirer.net/785664/duterte-marcos-win-overseas-voting). In Malaysia, for example, Duterte won about 70% of the OAV votes, while in Singapore, it is about 80% (http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-economy/Policy-Politics/Filipinos-abroad-bet-on-Duterte-forchange-at-home). There are 59 Philippine posts abroad and both Duterte and Marcos won, with the latter winning in 49 out of 59 posts. Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr., the son of the former President of the Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was popularly known as the former dictator, ran for the vice presidency post but lost to Leni Robredo, the only woman contender in the race.

57

It is interesting to explore why overseas Filipino voters pinned their hopes on Duterte for the muchdesired change that they envision for the Philippines. Overseas Filipinos are the first agency that receives the kind of national image that leadership and governance the Philippines portrays to the outside world. Philippines has been sending thousands of talented skills abroad and they leave the shores by the thousands daily, widely abused via the bureaucratic red tape and discriminated against even before their departure from their homeland, as well when they begin to work in an alien society and culture. Living away from the Philippines means enduring hardships, discrimination, abuses and exploitation and the longing to be with families they left behind. Filipinos overseas always lament the fact that representatives of the Philippine government do not seem to show empathy and support in their employment and personal struggles as foreign workers in another country. Complaints are abundant on the inability of front line government workers stationed in Philippine Labour Offices (POLO) and Philippine Embassies abroad (see Lumayag 2006, for example), and overseas Filipinos could only hope that something could be done about this sheer indifference

and

apathy

especially

those

in

the

domestic

service

sector

(http://primer.com.ph/blog/2016/09/14/dole-hotline-1349-launched-for-labor-and-employmentqueries-and-complaints/). Duterte‘s personality and political tactics to win the hearts of the Filipinos though seem legendary, such support is substantiated with a real confrontation against the Philippine state. While his persona as a leader is populist - loosely used in this situation -, inside and outside political campaign sorties, he is able to read the people‘s pulse way better than any presidential candidates ever presented to the Filipino voters. For overseas Filipinos, what Philippines needs at this juncture in history is strong leadership and is brave to inject change in an elite-dominated political structure. Duterte is viewed as an outsider, the first from Mindanao who understands the plight of the poor as he projects himself to be among the majority of poor Filipinos. From the perspective of OFWs, by putting Duterte in charge of the Philippines, he would be able to bring change in a Manila-centric based power and development and redirect development focus on Mindanao and less developed areas regions of the Visayas island. Certainly, OFW voters also welcome the resolution of the drug problem in the Philippines and believe in a simplistic solution through the 'tokhang' (‗tuktokhangyo‘ or knock and plea) campaign of getting rid of the drug addicts, pushers and distributors through killings. As Duterte himself believed, killing is justified when one is drug addict unless the person surrenders and promise to begin a new life. For OFWs, inculcating a fear of death in the 58

Duterte government would also lessen their anxieties over family members being hooked on drugs and squander away their hard-earned remittances. Children of OFWs especially those who live on their own or under the care of their aged parents and relatives may be vulnerable to drugs, and OFW apprehension is best expressed in the way they press on the Duterte Campaign to wipe out drug menace in the Philippines within six months in office.

In another level, overseas workers who went back to the Philippines during the first 100 days in office expressed satisfaction in short-term changes they observed while vacationing in the Philippines. They posted photos on their FB wall and magnify it into something worthy of notice. Examples of these changes were the disappearance of long queues in public offices, easy access to taxi service since illegal touts are fearful to hover over the airport vicinity, free wifi service in airports, or elimination of ‗tanim-bala‘ (putting bullet inside the luggage of victim) at the airport.

IMPLICATIONS AND TENTATIVE CONCLUSION

In the history of Philippine presidential elections, the May 2016 elections were the most divisive, politically-charged and it was the first time ever that political campaign strategies were more diverse and, innovative and creative. It was during this election that one cannot afford to remain a bystander and apolitical with more than 80% of the total electorates both within and outside the Philippines came out in droves. In fairness, Duterte was so far the only presidential candidate that was able to forge alliance from individual and friends from all political hues regardless of education, economic position and geographical locations.

His ability to break the barrier by

garnering support from political leaders and supporters from different political persuasions.

President Duterte is considered an outsider of Imperial Manila and yet was able to capture the imagination of those who were not familiar to issues and cultural idiosyncracies of people who support him. It may be said that, to some extent, political supporters have not really studied him well or have underestimated his capability as a rising authoritarian leader in the Philippines, although Thompson seemed to argue that it was the support of the elite and the middle class that catapulted him to power. He put people from various political persuasions - left, right and centre and in that sense, there would be less propensity to engage in a major political tussle to unseat him. 59

In the virtual world of social media, Duterte‘s supporters and an army of trolls will continue to suppress dissent and silence opposition to his governance style. Ordinary voices in the social media will be orchestrated voices that only express praises to Duterte while the dissenting voices are suppressed, victimised and threatened. While the founding of Facebook could be groundbreaking as a channel to people‘s voice, as what Mark Zuckerberg wanted us to believe, authoritarian regimes have however converted it into an apparatus that muzzled dissent.

Could fascism once again ring in the Philippines? Walden Bello, a known progressive, a former academic, activist and a one-term senator argues that Duterte could fit the bill as a fascist leader. Loosely speaking, fascism refers to all kinds of social movements and leaders that depart from conventional leadership to one that uses force to reach their political objectives. Why looming fascism? The voters who put Duterte to power seem to relish his combative, fiery and down-to-earth strategy to resolve complex structural problems of poverty, drugs, terrorism, corruption, etc. that the country is facing. It is not that the supporters did not know the authoritarian tendencies of Duterte even before taking the highest national position. In fact, in a lot of ways, it is because of his demonstrated ―no-fear‖ attitude towards anything that supporters are attracted to him. No doubt the social media plays a critical role under Duterte however the ability of users to differentiate between fabricated stories and facts is equally important if only to pursue a real transformation of the Philippine society. Eventually it will be a society that does not condone violence to silence the minority or to suppress the rule of law in order to eliminate the drug menace. It is also very important that thinking virtual users of online media need to engage all parties in the business of online politics rather than to maintain silence.

References Abiera, Aileen. (2016). President Duterte‘s Foreign Policy Challenges. Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs, August 1, 2016, p. 202 - 208.

Champlin, Dell P. and Knoedler, Janet T. (2006). The Media , the News and Democracy: Revisiting the Dewey-Lippman Debate. Journal of Economic Issues, 50,1, p.135-152. Couldry, N. (2003). Media rituals: A critical approach. London: Routledge. 60

Curato, Nicole (2016). Politics of Anxiety, Politics of Hope: Penal Populism and Duterte‘s Rise to Power. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 3/2016, 91-109. Ellison, N.B. & boyd, d (2013). Sociality through Social Network Sites. In Dutton, W.H. (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Internet Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.151-172.

Heydarian, Richard Javad (2017). Rodrigo Duterte and the populist backlash against globalisation. Harvard International Review, 38, 3, p. 36-41.

Mastermind, L. (2001) A rational for media education. In R. W. Kubey (Ed.), Media literacy in the information age: Current perspectives (pp. 15-68). New Brunswick, NJ: Transactional Publishers. McCargo, Duncan (2016). Duterte‘s Mediated Populism. Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs, August 1, 2016, p.185 - 190.

Miller, Daniel; Elisabetta Costa, Nell Haynes, Tom McDonald, Razvan Nicolescu, Jolynna Sinanan, Juliano Spyer, Shriram Venkatraman and Xinyuan Wang. (2016)How the World Changed Social Media. California: UCL Press. (2016)http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1g69z35.9

Rudolph, Lloyd I. (1992) The Media and Cultural Politics. Economic and Political Weekly, 27, 28 p.1489-1491, 1493-1496.

Stack, Michelle and Kelly, Deirdre M. (2016) Popular Media, Education, and Resistance. Canadian Society for the Study of Education, 29, 1, p. 5-26. Thompson, Mark R. (2016) Bloodied Democracy: Duterte and the Death of Liberal Reformismin the Philippines, JournalofCurrentSoutheastAsianAffairs, 3/2016, p. 39–68.

Thompson, Mark R. (2016) The Early Duterte Presidency in the Philippines. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 3/2016, p. 3-14.

(.

).

New Media, Old Money: Digital Technology, Social Media, and the Challenges to

Campaigning and Democracy. Journal of Information Policy, 6, 2016, p.67. www.time.com/selfies-cities-world-rankings/. Accessed on 6 April 2017. 61

www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/534597/scitech/technology/top-5-cybercrimes-complaints-inthe-philippines-according-to-pnp/ https://newrepublic.com/article/138952/rodrigo-dutertes-army-online-trolls. Accessed 15 March 2017.

62

The Internet and Political Campaign: Malaysian Trends Marshelayanti Mohamad Razali, Siti Noranizahhafizah Boyman & Nafisah Ilham Hussin Universiti Pendidikan Sultan Idris

Abstract The Internet have become an important tool for political campaigns in recent years. With the advent of this new technology, it has changed the ways of political parties to reach the voters particularly during the campaigning period. In Malaysia, the Internet has widely used in politics since the 1999 general elections. Therefore, this paper will examine the trends of the Internet use in political campaigning in Malaysia. Specifically, this study will analyze the role played by the Internet in conveying political messages to their voters. Generally, the study found that the Internet, specifically the social media continues to become among an important tools in disseminating political messages both by the government and the opposition parties during the campaign period. The trend is important to examine in order to understand the ways political messages were delivered by political parties and this is significant for the future Malaysian politics, as there was growth in the number of Internet use in politics. To conclude, this article depicts the political impact of the Internet use and suggest more studies need to be conducted in the future on the role played by the Internet in Malaysian politics as a whole. Keywords: Political Campaign, The Internet, Malaysian politics. Introduction The 12th general election in Malaysia has been remarks by many as one of the most crucial elections since its independence in 1957. Since then, the government has been dominated by the rulling coalition called the Alliance and its successor, the Barisan Nasional (BN) (Moten, 2013b). This political party is so dominant in Malaysia because it represent ethnic interests in the country, both in Peninsular Malaysia and Bumiputeras of Sabah and Sarawak, as the objective of this party is to include the major ethnic groups into a single coalition for electoral and governance purposes (Tunku Mohar Mokhtar, 2013). Malaysia helds 13 general elections since its independence. Of all general elections held, BN remains powerful and maintain its dominance in all states assemblies, except for few years. For instance, BN lost to Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) in Kelantan since 1990, PAS in Terengganu in 1959 and 1999, Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) in Sabah in 1985, 1990 and 1994. However, the 2008 general elections mark the worst performance of BN in which it lost five states to opposition, namely Penang, Perak, Kedah, Selangor, and Kelantan. It is also the first time in history that the BN lost five states altogether and marks the worst performance of BN government after the 1969 elections. As a result, Malaysia‘s political landscape has shifted, and 63

some political analyst called this as ―political tsunami‖ in Malaysia. Most of the research on elections focuses on the parties and candidates, campaign strategies, and the results itself. However, less studies conducted on the Internet use in political campaign, as the Internet use in Malaysian politics can be traced back in the late 1990s. This article analyses the Internet and political campaign in Malaysia by referring to its usage by political parties in 2008 and 2013 general election. Election in Malaysia Elections play an important role in Malaysia and it has been consistently functioning. Elections in Malaysia have been held at regular intervals, i.e. in every five years according to the constitution of Malaysia. Of all the twelve elections held, six took place approximately 5 years after the previous elections, while another six were held after about 4 years of the previous elections Table 1.Elections in Malaya and Malaysia

General Election

Years

Interval years

1st General Election

1959

5 years

2nd General Election

1964

5 years

3rd General Election

1969

5 years

4th General Election

1974

4 years

5th General Election

1978

4 years

6th General Election

1982

4 years

7th General Election

1986

4 years

8th General Election

1990

5 years

9th General Election

1995

4 years

10th General Election

1999

5 years 64

11th General Election

2004

4 years

12th General Election

2008

5 years

13th General Election

2013

-

Elections in Malaysia has undergone many changes since the first election held. There were increased number of political parties andcandidates contested, the number of seats, so was the number of voters. During the first national election, there were only 1,280,000 registered voters (Sopiah Suid & Nor Zahidi Alias, 1994), however the number of voters has increased since then. After half a century, this number had increased to 10,701,054 in the 2008 general election and 13,105,407 in the 2013 general election (Sinar Harian, 2013). This shows an increase number of voters from year to year, in line with the population growth in Malaysia.In terms of voters, there were slight decreased in the 2008 general election with 72.8 percent to 72.2 percent in the 2004 general election.However, 2013 general election showed an increase of 12.64 percent of voter turnout when 84.84 per cent voters has recorded to cast their votes (Sinar Harian, 2013). The lowest voter turnout were recorded in the 1986 general election, where the percentage dropped to 70 percent from the previous general election (Sopiah Suid & Nor Zahidi Alias, 1994). Since independence, it was the first time in the history when the percentage of voter turnout dropped to 70 percent. However, the level of voter turnout in this country is among the best as compared with other countries, which the record shows the percentage of less than 60 percent.

Table 2. Number of Registered Voters and Voting Percentage of 2004, 2008 and 2013 general election General

Number of Registered

Voting Percentage

election

Voters

2004

9,756,097

72.8 %

2008

10,701,054

72.2 %

2013

13,268,002

84.84 %

65

Political Campaigning in Malaysia Media plays an important role in motivating people to cast their votes to a specific political party. Citizens will get the information regarding the candidates, issues and programs via the media. Campaigning during election in Malaysia before the 2008 general election can be said as traditionally based, i.e. poster wars, flags and banners, door-to-door campaigns, ceramah (small group discussions), as well as campaigns via mainstream media. Television, radio, newspaper, and magazines has played their role greatly in providing news and information on elections especially throughout campaigning period. These mainstream electronic and printing media are controlled by the BN, such as Media Prima Berhad, Star Publications (Malaysia) Berhad, Utusan Group (Malaysia) Berhad, Nanyang Press Holdings Berhad, Sin Chew Media Corporation Berhad and Tamil Nesan, thus they has fully utilized media in order to persuade people to vote for its candidates (Kenyon & Marjoribanks, 2007). Although print and broadcast media are privately owned, they retain close links with the governing parties. Alternatively, the Internet became part of the opposition parties‘ communication and information tool. They use it to overcome bias and negative reporting to the local mainstream media as the media is highly controlled by the government. Blog written by individuals, journalists and political parties became powerful. Although it is difficult to determine the accuracy and credibility of information posted on it, due to its mostly anonymous, the Internet remains as the popular options to receive news and updates. Besides, The Printing Presses and Publications Act does not apply to the Internet, as it is on printing media only, so news site do not require a permit to set up operations. In other words, there is no yet official regulation of the Internet. Although there are no laws limiting use of the Internet in Malaysia, due to certain factors, the government has begun to impose a number of restrictions. This is due to the occurrence of various incidences of unscrupulous slander carried out via this medium. Therefore, the political campaign in Malaysia shows its changing trends particularly since the 2008 general election. The Internet and Campaign Strategies: Malaysian Trends With the advent of Information, Communication and Technology (ICT), the political campaign also shows it changing trends particularly since the 2008 general election. It was used widely by political parties during elections. The Internet use in politics in Malaysia can be traced back in the late 1990s, particularly the 1998 general election. It serves as a public sphere for citizens (Ali Salman & Mohd Safar Hasim, 2011). 66

The Internet is regarded as the new media. Basically, new media refer to those digital media that are interactive, incorporate two-way communication and involve some form of computing as opposed to old media (Logan, 2010). The traditional media are less interactive and provide only one-way communication. Unlike traditional media, new media allow greater participation for users who are no longer merely passive recipients of information but who are instead active producers of content and information (Logan, 2010). The Internet possesses the above-mentioned characteristics. Website, blogs, social networking sites and chat rooms permit flexible interactions between users, either on a one-to-one, one-to-many, many-to-one or many-to-many basis, and the producer is able to interact with recipients. The Internet has the ability to increase access to information, facilitate discussion, develop social networks and offer alternative and convenient venues for sharing and changing ideas. The 1999 general elections shows significant change of political campaigning in Malaysia, in which the government introduced new ICT policy with the emphasis is on the role of the Internet for political campaigning. It has seen the use of the Internet by political parties to reach voters (Tamam & Govindasamy, 2009). In the beginning, the Internet is regarded as the alternative source of information for Malaysian, especially news on politics. They started to utilized this medium right after the dismissal of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in 1998. That incident has created shockwaves throughout the country and his supporters calls for justice and truth through various means namely reformasi movement. In addition, they also make use of the Internet by creating websites urging support for Anwar Ibrahim and serving as channels for expression of critical viewpoints. Since then, Malaysian uses the Internet to obtain additional information on politics as well as election news, such as the political parties‘ websites, blogs and emails. 2008 General Election The 2008 general election was held on March 8, 2008. It was held a little over a year before the eleventh Malaysian Parliament was due to dissolve (Tunku Mohar Mokhtar, 2008).The Dewan Rakyat (the House of Representatives) was dissolved by Yang di-Pertuan Agong on the advice of the Prime Minister, on February 13, 2008. Therefore, the election campaign period covered thirteen days and remarks as the longest campaign period in Malaysia‘s electoral history since 1969 (Moten, 2013a). The results were unexpected as BN lost its two-thirds majority in the Dewan Rakyat for the first time in its history. BN also lost five states to the opposition parties.

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BN‘s campaign strategy is directly to the electorate, and they were extensively depends on the traditional campaign strategies. Posters, leaflets, billboards, flags and banners appeared everywhere. With the theme of ―Security, Peace, Prosperity‖, they highlighted the achievements of the coalition government and attacks on the opposition (Moten, 2013a). As BN controlled major media outlets, they were also bought advertising space in newspapers with approximately 1,100 pagesof full-page colours ads in all local newspapers (Moten, 2013a). By using advertising as a medium of political campaign will make voters influence to vote for their choices (Chinnasamy & Izyan Roslan, 2015). Despite of that, BN were also used the mainstream media to urge voters to elect its candidates (Tunku Mohar Mokhtar, 2008). Rajaratnam (2009) compared the role of mainstream media against the online media. She compares the news articles of The Star (mainstream media) and Malaysiakini (online newspaper) throughout the campaign period for the 12th general elections and found that both differed in the stance taken, quality of news coverage as well as frequency of reporting. The study found that the Internet is an alternative medium for political news and analysis, and therefore it becomes one of the factors lead to the lost of BN in several states during the recent elections. Besides, the Prime Minister also admitted that they lost in the ―cyber war‖. The opposition parties relied heavily on ceramah and door-to-door campaigning, as they were getting very little coverage by the mainstream media.Despite of this, the opposition also using the new media, i.e., the Internet, specifically through the parties‘ websites, weblogs of candidates and You-Tube and they made greater use of this medium to reach the voters (Tunku Mohar Mokhtar, 2008). As an alternative media platform, the Internet was found to be influential since no one party is able to dominate or monopolise its content, meaning that many people are able to access a message without it first passing through any gatekeepers. The Internet has become an important source of political information and news for most Malaysians, and has been found to be an alternative channel that supplements the traditional news media without having actually replaced it as a channel of political information (Ismail Sualman, Ilias Md Salleh, & Norsham Firdaus, 2008; Wan Asna Wan Mohd Nor et al., 2011)

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2013 General Election The 2013 general election was held on May 5, 2013. It was noted to be the most interesting election in the history of Malaysian, as it focus was on the first-time voters and young voters. For BN, they still mainly using the mainstream media such as those owned by Media Prima (TV3, NTV7, TV9) and main newspaper agencies such as Utusan, The Star and others as a medium of campaigning. In addition, Prime minister, Najib Razak is also active involvement social media in engaging local communities through blogs, Facebook, Twitter and other online platforms (Nazrin Shahnaz Binti Peer Mohamed, 2013). This time, the ruling parties started to utilized the new media to attract the first-time anf young voters. The opposition still continues to captured the followers by using the new media. Websites, blogs as well as youtube were used extensively in the previous elections, additionally, during this election campaign, they started to maximize the new media through the social networking sites. It has played a vital role in conveying political messages and debates and continues to report significantly in the election period (Chinnasamy & Izyan Roslan, 2015). It can be concluded that both BN and opposition were actively engaged on social media networks and especially Facebook. Facebook has become the most used social media website globally and replaced printed media or broadcast media (Chinnasamy & Izyan Roslan, 2015). The social networking sites have proved successful in gaining voters‘ trust and spreading the political information better than the broadcast media or print media. 2018 General Election? With an increase number of mobile phone users, it is not impossible that ‗cyberwar‘ between voters will continues as the mobile phone has also emerged as a must-have device in people‘s life nowadays, regardless of their age, education and income differences. The mobile phone is no longer serve as a basic tool of communication, i.e. to make and receive calls, and to send and receive text messages. Nowadays, it has been used to achieve political ends as it has evolved beyond being a simple mobile device into a tool for political activity, organisation and mobilisation. It has been used widely to send political messages, keep up with political news and has also been used to record political activities.

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The political scientists have also given attention to the political impact of mobile phones, although formal research related to the political uses of mobile phones remains fairly limited. There are a number of studies that have reported that mobile phones, together with the Internet, have become an instrument of political pressure and mobilisation. Hermanns (2008) argued that the mobile phone may have an influence in politics in terms of building networks, spreading information and mobilising activists. It creates a democratic space as it is used by a wide range of people. It is also becoming a means for political organisation, such as spontaneous gatherings and protests. Furthermore, through conversations and text messages, it provides an alternative information source, where information and rumours are easily disseminated over a short period of time. Text messages also help provide citizens with more information about events and contribute to higher voter turnout, as users of mobile phones have immediate and unmediated communication with people in their social network (Suarez, 2006). In another study, the changing ways of people‘s engagement with political action led Lim & Lee (2009) to study the impact of mobile phone use in the public sphere. By examining South Korea‘s experiences, they found three ways in which mobile communication is used for political purposes, namely texting and political mobilisation, mobile phones in street protest and mobile broadband and live streaming of candlelit vigils. Korea is one of the most mobile-rich countries in the world and mobile hotspots are sprouting up in major urban areas. As a result, mobile phone use has seen a dramatic increase. The study demonstrated how Koreans have actively utilised these new technologies to express their opinions, criticise government policies and advance their political agenda. Modern-day mobile phones, particularly smartphones, are equipped with various functions enabling them to go beyond the making of voice calls and sending of text messages. For instance, downloading news applications enables users to easily access news content anywhere and at any time. A study conducted by Shim, You, Lee, & Go, (2014) found that mobile phone users are likely to access political news features via their mobile devices. This result shows that the informationseeking motive is influenced by the mobile news applications as well as by the device‘s accessibility. With the widely chat applications available nowadays, it serves as a medium for people to discuss issues and spread information via several channels. Recently, there are many chat applications available via both the Internet and mobile phone. Among the widely used chat

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applications via mobile phone nowadays in Malaysia are ―WhatsApp‖ and ―Wechat‖. These applications were widely used in Malaysia in early 2013. In Malaysia, the last 10 years have seen a rapid growth in the number of Internet and mobile phone users. Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) reported that Malaysia had a relatively high degree of Internet penetration . Nowadays, with the rapid growth of mobile technology, people can access the Internet via their mobile phones. With the introduction of mobile broadband, and currently with mobile data, Malaysians enjoy wide access to the Internet. As people can access the Internet by using their mobile phone, the number of mobile phone users in Malaysia has grown significantly, that each Malaysian may now own more than one mobile phone. Therefore, ‗the new media‘ expands to the use of the mobile phone rather than the Internet. If the Internet was used widely during the previous general elections via website, social networking sites and blogs, it is expected that chat applications will be utilized extensively for the next general election. Conclusion Media and politics are inseparable. It is very influential in providing news and updates in election especially during the campaign period. The print and electronic media are the powerful tools in influencing public opinions and shaping their political perceptions. In Malaysia, the approach of political parties to its voters has shifted in line with the use of ICT. Taken together, this article contributes in understanding and discovering the Internet use, particularly in the political sphere. Although there are a number of studies examining the Internet use among Malaysian, this paper focused on the Internet use in political campaign. It is suggest as more studies need to be conducted in the future on the role played by the Internet in Malaysian politics as a whole. References Chinnasamy, S., & Izyan Roslan. (2015). Social Media and On-Line Political Campaigning in Malaysia, (December), 123–138. Wartaean Harian. (2013). Bilangan Pemilih PRU 2004, 2008 dan 2013. 10 Februari 2013. Hermanns, H. (2008). Mobile Democracy: Mobile Phone as Democratic Tools. Politics, 8(2), 74– 82. 71

Kenyon, A. T., & Marjoribanks, T. (2007). Transforming Media Markets: The Cases of Malaysia and Singapore. Australian Journal of Emerging Technologies and Society, 5(2), 103–118. Lim, H., & Lee, J. (2009). Mobile Communication, Political Participation and the Public Sphere. Media. Nazrin Shahnaz Binti Peer Mohamed. (2013). Championing Political Campaigning Toward First Time Voter. Komunikasi, 29(2), 79–86. Tunku Mohar Mokhtar. (2008). The Twelfth General Elections in Malaysia. Intellectual Discourse, 16(1), 89–100. Tunku Mohar Mokhtar. (2013). Elections and Electoral System. In A. R. Moten (Ed.), Goverment and Politics in Malaysia (2nd Edn.). Cengage Learning. Moten, A. R. (2013a). 2004 and 2008: Deviating General Elections. In A. R. Moten (Ed.), Goverment and Politics in Malaysia (2nd Edn.). Cengage Learning. Moten, A. R. (2013b). Society, Politics and Islam: An Overview. In A. R. Moten (Ed.), Goverment and Politics in Malaysia (2nd Edn., pp. 1–36). Cengage Learning. Rajaratnam, U. D. (2009). Role of Traditional and Online Media in the 12 th General Election , Malaysia. Communications, 1(1).

Ali Salman, & Mohd Safar Hasim. (2011). New Media and Democracy : The Changing Political Landscape in Malaysia. Media, 81(1), 15–21. Shim, H., You, K. H., Lee, J. K., & Go, E. (2014). Why do people access news with mobile devices? Exploring the role of suitability perception and motives on mobile news use. Telematics and Informatics, 32(1), 108–117. doi:10.1016/j.tele.2014.05.002 Sopiah Suid, & Nor Zahidi Alias. (1994). Elections in Malaysia: Facts and Figures. Kuala Lumpur: NSTP Research and Information Services. Ismail Sualman, Md Salleh, I., & Firdaus, N. (2008). Media dan Pilihan Raya: Kajian Kes di Pilihan 72

raya Kecil Permatang Pauh, Pulau Pinang (Media and Elections: A Case Study of By-elections in Permatang Pauh, Penang). In Politik Malaysia. Shah Alam: UPENA. Suárez, S. L. (2006). Mobile Democracy: Text Messages, Voter Turnout and the 2004 Spanish General Election. Representation, 42(2), 117–128. doi:10.1080/00344890600736358 Ehar Tamam, & Govindasamy, M. (2009). Political Communication Research and Practices in Malaysia. In L. Willnat & A. Aw (Eds.), Political Communication in Asia (pp. 135–154). Routledge. Wan Asna, W. M. N., Salfarina, A. G., Mohamad Zaini, A. B., & Zainon, H. (2011). Patterns of Internet and Traditional Media Use for Political Information and Political Participation in Malaysia. International Journal of Cyber Society and Education, 4(1), 31–38.

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Elections, Youth and Leadership Understanding and Rethinking Youth Policy in Malaysia Abdulwahed Jalal Nori Institute of Strategic and International Studies ―No one is born a citizen; no nation is born a democracy. Rather, both are processes that continue to evolve over a life time. Youth must be included from birth. A society that cuts itself away from its youth severs its lifelong; it is condemned to bleed to death‖ Kofi Annan UN Secretary General (United Nations, 2004: p.271). Abstract This study aims at policy study proposal which will provide a greater understanding of the changing nature of Youth in Malaysia and an important part of providing a youth perspective on the government‘s broader agenda that equip young Malaysian to fully participate in all aspect of their life. Investing in young people is essential to prepare Malaysian and its people for the challenges of the future. Providing young Malaysian with the support they need to succeed is part of governing in the long-term national interest. Therefore, the Malaysian government should be determined to elevate the quality and rigour of policy making for young people and to do so hand in hand with young people. Any youth policy making must ensure that young people‘s needs and perspectives are taken into account in all government business and that have an eye for the consequences of tomorrow as well as today. Growing up is a challenge and the transition to adulthood can be a difficult one for some young people. At the same time the policy should recognises that today‘s generation of young Malaysians face new and unique challenges—challenges like different social and family patterns, rapidly changing technology, an evolving labour market and climate change. Keywords: Youth Policy, Rethinking, Participation Introduction The 2011 Arab Spring was a clear signal to governments and ruling parties around the world that the time had come for reform & rethinking their youth policy. The young Arabs in the Middle East and North Africa were demanding nothing less than sweeping political, social and economic change. The Arab spring, clearly demonstrate that youth are an increasingly potent force, capable of instigating major social, economic, and political change. Although generally perceived by Malaysians to be ignorant on political issues, young people 21 to 35 year-olds account for nearly 45% of all eligible voters in Malaysia and could soon become the primary force in determining the issues and discourse of public policy and debate in the country.

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However, it is important to note that young people generally grow up in incredibly varied circumstances, with different priorities and perspectives. While youth does not exist as a single group, there is an urgent task in understanding what is happening in young people‘s lives generally. It is obvious that restructuring economy has not been sufficient to insure jobs for many young people. How young men and young women negotiate their future varies, depending on cultural and national context. Young Malaysians are growing up in a world in which the use of new media technologies has brought the consumer markets to them. Although not all young Malaysian have the same access to consumption, the marketing youth through products is widespread, creating a superficial sameness based on age. Furthermore, young people also subject to varies forms of education and training on an increasing scale for longer periods of their lives. It is very important to acknowledge that their involvement in education and training in increasing numbers is not necessarily related to a greater appreciation on their part of education in itself nor is it generally related to educational reforms which favour young people. Young people are often forced to seek refuge in education because they cannot find work. Therefore, it is important and timely to offer a new theoretical perspective on Malaysian youth which takes these complexities into account. Particularly it is very important to look at the extent to which young people are seen as citizens in their own right rather than as incomplete adults whose rights can be ignored.

The concept of youth What does being ―young‖ mean? Many would debate that being young need not necessarily be associated with age. The United Nations defines youth as persons between the ages of 15 and 25 years. The National Youth Development Policy of Malaysia defines youth as peopleaged between 15 and 40. Youth have been the subjects of a massive amount of research over the last few decades. In general, most of the researchers assume that young people constitute a distinct category of people: as nonadults. A central and recurring theme in the studies is the problematic nature of being a young person and the even more problematic nature of becoming adult. Much of the literature about youth has inherited assumptions from developmental psychology about universal stages of development, 75

identity formation, normative behaviour and the relationship between social and physical maturation. Yet very little work has been done to clarify the theoretical basis of this categorisation based on age (Wyn & White 1997). S. Allen in her seminal article in 1968 argued that the concept of youth needed to be reassessed. She pointed out that, ‗it is not the relations between ages that create change or stability in society, but change in society which explains relations between different ages‘ (Allen 1968). Other scholar however, pointing out that the sociology of youth was yet to develop a conceptual framework for understanding both the transitions young people pass through as they become adult and the different experiences of young people from different social groups. Gill Jones for example, argued that it is ‗misleading to emphasise the qualities or otherwise of ―Youth‖ per se, since the young are neither a homogeneous group nor a static one‘ (G Jones 1988). Her conclusion was that youth is most usefully conceptualised as an age-related process. This means that the focus on youth is not on the inherent characteristics of youngpeople themselves, but on the construction of youth through social processes (such as schooling, families or the labour market). Young people engage with these institutions in specific ways, in relation to historical circumstances. Therefore, the way they develop or grow will influence the type of adults they will become. Youth is an important life stage in human development. It covers a wide range, with young people entering as children and moving through adolescence on their way to becoming independent adults. It is significant period of development physically, psychologically and socially). It is also a period of enormous change in how young people relate to themselves and the environment around them. At this time, most young people question their identity, values and interest.

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Malaysian youth development and challenges Youth development is defined by scholars as a process that prepares a young person to meet the challenges of adolescence and adulthood, and achieve his or her full potential. It is promoted through activities and experiences that help youth develop social, ethical, emotional, physical, and cognitive competencies. According to Global Youth Index & Report 2016, Malaysian youth constitute 46.5 per cent ofthe total population. This quantum of population is a great asset for Malaysia if they are harnessed and utilised in the right direction. Interestingly, the transition of society from one generation to another is critical to the formative and developmental aspiration of such society. That is why a society that prepares its youth for the sake of future aspirations will not only secure her future development, but will also prepares her next set of leaders with the challenges of national reconciliation and development.

Malaysia is facing a less well-known, but perhaps even more difficult predicament: demographics. The existence of a relatively large youth cohort with the population serves to exacerbate nearly all dimensions of its political, social and economic problems. The challenges for youths that are central to Malaysia‘s economic development are numerous and varied — they include unemployment, under-employment, social, health and many otherissues. These issues differ among groups within the states in the country (by gender, educational level, ethnicity, religion, rural-urban). One consequence of the social process we have described in this paper is that often young people do not have the power to shape their lives as they might otherwise have done. Focusing on the process of marginalisation offers a way of grasping the systematic nature of the exclusion of some groups of young people from full participation in society and its institutions. The speed of technological advancement is a significant challenge Malaysian youths are facing. Today young Malaysian has never known a world without constant access to mobile smart phones, internet, email and social media. Young people are leading the way with new technology, the way it transforms our access to information and knowledge, and our ability to communicate and connect 77

with each other. Although the present cohort of youth has numerous advantages, it also faces a complex and rapidly evolving situation where new opportunities coexist with major challenges. Fierce competition is affecting the marketplace, and its rules and practices in the country. Youths often remain in a vulnerable situation and lack the requisite knowledge and skills to adapt to the changing economic and social environment. Many who are otherwise productive and energetic remain unemployed and continue to lack sufficient support. Some of them have special needs that require attention. These include those living on the streets, those living with HIV/AIDS, those with disabilities and those who are facing social issues. Unfortunately, the many youth policies and programmes to address these challenges do not seem to have resulted in a great deal of success. Weakness is due to a number of factors, including the inadequacy of information about youths that is necessary in the design ofpolicy, weak coordination among a host of government agencies and donors, and the failure to draw policies on a number of contemporary youth themes, such as youth and economy, youth development, youth subcultures, youth transition and youth marginalisation. Any policy should start with the understanding of the changing nature of youth and exploring the issues from the perspective of new life patterns that see the current generation making adult choices in a highly individualised context. There is a need to create a new perspective which emphasises diversity and difference, democracy and equality in dealing with youth experience. At the same time it should provide the structure and foundations to address the priority issues of concern that have been raised by youth. Malaysian youth have significant potential to be engaged in active roles to develop themselves, their communities and their nation. This approach can work for young people in three ways. One is for the benefit of youth (as target beneficiaries); second is with youth as partners, and third is for programmes and policy to be shaped by youth as leaders. This is a dynamic approach which depends on the local context

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and development intervention. On that account, a national youth policy should demonstrate the country‘s commitment to, and strategic directions for, promoting and progressing the well-being and participation of young people and create opportunities for the young to become ―skilled, healthy and productive to develop the country and specific strategies to translate the policy into action. Policy recommendation Investing in young people is essential to prepare Malaysia and its people for the challenges of the future. Providing young Malaysian with the support they need to succeed is part of governing in the long-term national interest. The government must be determined to elevate the quality and rigour of young people and must to do so hand in hand with young people. Any youth policy making the government has to ensure that young people‘s needs and perspectives are taken into account in all government business and that have to be an eye for the consequences of tomorrow as well as today. Recommendations to Ministry of the Ministry of Youth and Sports:The Ministry of Youth is a state organ whose work is purely must be non-partisan. The Ministry has the mandate to genuinely campaign for the meaningful inclusion of the youth in governance and affect positive development. For meaningful participation, the ministry should not be politicized and represent the youth by acting upon their initiatives. There should be decentralization where provinces can make decisions without prior need to follow all the bureaucratic channels. Capacity building initiatives, business trainings, leadership workshops and seminars from local to national level should be carried out to sensitize the youth about their rights and opportunities. Transparency is one of the key issues that is needed in order to ensure both quantitative and qualitative positive participation of the youth. At the same time youth must actively participate in creating desired futures. This means not merely providing content on the knowledge base of the future but ensuring that they participate in envisioning the futures they desire. Recommendations to Political parties: political parties have become a source of division in the country and the solidarity that used to exist amongst the youth has been eroded due to party politics. Beyond party politics there is a state in which national interests transcends personal 79

interests. Many researchers have observed that governance, democratization and political leadership are propelled by political parties. Thus there is need to rethink youth leadership and re-align the constitutions of these parties to ensure tolerance, free interaction with the youth of other political parties and extend a some peacebuilding campaigns within their party structures. Recommendations to Civil society organizations: civil society organizations should foster some advocacy initiatives centred and captured at grassroots level. Promote grassroots associations and youth led organizations. Citizenship and rights based organizations should work to sensitize the youth on their role in governance and democratization without prior hostility with the state. Civil society organizations and students union should also decentralize their operations and increase ownership of their processes by the youth. Promote youth leadership even in their leadership. Policy must be proactive, not merely responding to the latest crisis (youth suicide), but scanning for change and developing policy that can deal with youth‘s changing needs (Gidley & Sohail 2002) Policy must be systemic and holistic because focusing only on the visible level of the problem ignores the deeper systemic issues (how technology leads to joblessness, for example) and worldview issues (the breakdown of meaning and community in modern and postmodern society). The policy must also address the deepest metaphorical level of personal narrative— the story youth tell themselves and others. Policymakers also need to recognize that there is a cultural sea change (paradigm shift) occurring, namely, popular disenchantment with the dominant materialist worldview that grounds Western culture. Youth are part of this desire to see ethical and spiritual values become central to policy and action in all spheres of life. Finally, youth desire futures based on truths. Can we create a world incorporates integrity and authenticity? If not, of what use are the futures we are creating?

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References Allen, S. 1968, ‗Some theoretical problems in the study of youth‘, The Sociological Review, vol.16, no.3, pp.319-31. Azimi, H., 2005. Helping Malaysian Youth Move Forward: Unleashing the Prime Enablers. Azimi, H., S. Turiman and T. Ezhar, 2002. Youth organization in malaysia: development and potential enhancement. Universiti Putra Malaysia Jones, G.1988, ‗Integrating process and structure in the concept of youth: a case for secondary analyses, Sociological Review, vol.36, no. 4, and pp.706-32. Global Youth Index & Report 2016, the Commonwealth Secretariat Marlborough house. United Nations Development Program (UNDP). (2005).Achieving the millennium development goals Malaysia. Retrieved March 15, 2005 from: www.undp.org.my. Jennifer Gidley & Sohail Inayatullah, 2002. Youth futures: comparative research and 
 transformative visions. Praeger Publishers.

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Political Violence and its Effects on Democracy in North Eastern Nigeria: A Case study of Gombe State Mohammed Umar Bashir University of Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria Email: [email protected] Kamsiah Bt. Ali University Malaysia Sarawak, 94300 Kota Samarahan Sarawak, Malaysia Email: [email protected] Lucy Sebli Siedelson University Malaysia Sarawak, 94300 Kota Samarahan Sarawak, Malaysia Email: [email protected]

Abstract Democracy being a system of government that majority of the citizens gives their sovereign powers to few elected representatives to take decisions in governance on their behalf, has made democracy to be the most acceptable system of governance in Africa and Nigeria today. Thus democratic system of government is expected to have a high level of freedom and human rights such as freedom of participation in election, right to vote and be voted for. Even though democratic system makes a country to be a legitimate government base on the acceptability of the majority; the same system is being questioned for encouraging acts of political violence in North Eastern Nigeria. Despites this challenge not many scholars have given attention to the effects of this violence on democracy particularly in the North Eastern Nigeria. This paper through an in-depth interviewed with political stakeholders, who have been in politics before and after the introduction of violence into the political arena, will address this issue. Others include political party‟s leaders from the two political parties in North Eastern Nigeria were also interviewed to examine the effects of political violence on democracy in North Eastern Nigeria. This study discovered that political violence has became institutionalised as it is no longer hidden that various groups of youth with difference names are used to assassinate any perceived strong political opponents. These acts of violence not only question the legitimacy of political democracy but also deprived others from political participation.

Keywords: - Political Violence, Effects, Democracy, North Eastern Nigeria 1.

Introduction

Democracy being a system of government that majority of the citizens gives their sovereign power to few elected people to take decision in governance on their behalf, had make democracy to be the most accepted system of governance in Africa and Nigeria today. Thus democratic system of 82

government is expected to have a high level of freedom and human rights such as freedom of participation in elections, right to vote and be voted for etc. Even though democracy makes a country a more legitimate government based on the acceptability of the majority; the same system is being questioned for encouraging the acts of political violence in the north eastern Nigeria. Many elections in Nigeria and in the North East has witness so many cases of violence before and during elections as a democratic country. This is in an attempt to consolidate its democratic system as against the military regimes which is seen as full of human right violations but yet when it comes to elections and campaigns for political office, the process seems not to be democratic. This is due to the constant use of various youth groups with difference names by the politicians for political violence in the north eastern states and Nigeria in general. These groups include Yan-Kalare in Gombe state, Sara-Suka in Bauchi state, ECOMOG in Borno and Yobe states, Shunku Boys in Adamawa state and Banu-isra il in Taraba state etc. What could be the reason be reason for the use of these groups for elections violence? Could this be connected with the impression developed by the politicians that politics is the only means of wealth and power particularly to those who have tested the fruits of political power and what is the effect on political democracy? Despite this challenges not many scholar have pay attention to the effects of this political violence on democracy. Therefore this paper examines this political violence and its effects on democracy in the north eastern Nigeria. 2.

Concepts of Political Violence

Scholars like Gurr, (1970) and Zimmermann, (2011), refers political violence to all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors - including competing political groups as well as incumbent- or its policies. While, Ayang-Nyongo, (1993), Diouf, (1995) and Nzogola- Ntalaja and Lee, (1997), further elaborated that for violence to be political, there must be an intention to change the political processes. Thus, the state feels threaten and resorts to aggression to protect itself; this amount to state violence which is a variant of political violence (Fashina, 1989). Furthermore, Garver, (1977) and Fashina, (1989), agreed that political violence means the use of force, usually but not necessarily, physical force, in order to harm or destroy human beings or non human objects, with the intention of preserving or altering political institution, system, government or policies. An act may account as an act of violence, both when used to maintain an existing arrangement and when used to change it.

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While, Garver, (1977) argues that, the exercise of power is related to the experience of violence. He submits that violence is not so much a matter of physical force but more of violation of a person. Person can be violated either in their bodies or in their inability to make their own decision without external influence. In addition to the inability for people to take decision on their own as stated by Garver, (1977) and Fashina, (1989), political violence in North Eastern Nigeria involve physical force where people are being injured and some time even lead to death. As such other scholar like Nwosu, (1991) traced the roots of political violence which is common during campaign and elections to the general election organised by the British colonial masters in 1959 as a means of transition from colonial rule for the independence of Nigeria. Since then election has been characterised with different types of violence. While in explaining the reason why politics is still characterised with violence Yadudu, (2008) added that political violence is employed by politicians to advance their stay in office or to unseat an incumbent. Even though, Yadudu‘s discussion on political violence explained some of the reasons why politicians employ violence, but could not look at the effects on democracy in Nigeria particularly in the North East. Thus this paper will address those gaps to contribute to the existing knowledge on the effects of political violence in Nigeria and North East in particular. 3.

The Concept of Democracy

The word democracy was said to have been derived from the Greek word ―demokratia‖ which means the rule of the people or majority (Laski, 1933). Democracy has also been defined in different ways by different scholars each trying to explain it according to how it is practice. Hence, there is no universal definition of democracy. As such, democracy may mean different things to different people. History had shown that over the years, the meanings of democracy have changed to many directions to give a meaning that sued what its entails in different societies and at several times (Chemhuru, 2010). While, Collier, Levitsky and Collier, (2007) in support of the above assertion, stated that, when you look at the concept of democracy, one will find an endless views over the appropriate meanings and definitions. Though the different views by different scholars are not what matters, but the recognition of the contested status of a given concept and also the meaning of each should be understood within its own frame work. Collier, Hidalgo, & Maciuceanu, (2006) further stated that politics being the means of determining democracy, democratic system can be rated as high or low due to how it is practice. Hence, there are needs to look at those circumstances that lead to each level. As such those definitions focus on few attributes that are seen as producing a 84

viable standard in producing democracy not the way other scholars see from the characteristics of the society and economy. According to Dalton, Shin, and Jou, (2007), democracy should be rank based on the institutional and procedural terms to cite free and fair elections, multiparty competition and majority rule as defining elements. Scholars like Dahl, (2001), was of the viewed that free voting based on the principle of political equality is the basic norm that renders legitimacy to a political authority. Holding regular elections based on national standard is not enough sign for good democracy. Certainly there are other requirements, as also opined by Hillary Clinton, in her speech at the African Union in Addis Ababa in 13 June 2011, where she emphasised that despites the need for free, fair and transparent elections, a true media reports, independent judiciaries and the protection of the minorities are also necessary. Democracy should also be followed with some dividends such as economic opportunities and jobs where the standard of living of it people must be improved (Clinton, 2011). Therefore base on these definitions this paper examines whether political violence has a place in democracy or not and what are the effects in democracy in Nigeria and North East in particular.

4.

Democracy in Nigerian context

Nigerian democracy started after independent in 1960, of which it began as a federal states with three regional governments namely, North, East and West and later in 1964 it was followed by the creation of Mid Western Region. However, these were followed by the civil war that led to the abolition of the regional governments. Consequently, the civil war does not only led to the abolition of the regional system but also led to the Nigeria‘s military coup of 1966 as well as in its second and third republics (Dudley, 1973; Adele, 2012). The previous Nigerian regimes were aborted as a result of the high levels of violence that

was generated by intra and interparty violence (Adele, 2012). Though, the Military coup of 1966 led to the abolitions of the regional governments, it has also given birth to the creation of 12 states across the country (Baba, 2013). This has also led to the autonomy for some various ethnic groups. In 1999, Nigeria‘s military handed over to democratically elected government, after dominating the country‘s post-independence experience which denied Nigerians hope for a return towards democratic governance and respect for human rights.

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After the return of democratic system of governance in 1999, Nigeria makes all efforts to maintain the democratic system of governance, but unfortunately, Nigeria is still suffering from many impediments that are responsible for the delay in its democratic consolidation. These impediments were traced to some factors starting from the ethnic crisis that resulted to the civil war, which was linked to the colonial master‘s legacies. Consequently these resulted to the regionalisation of Nigeria as mentioned above and as also opined by Ngaji, (2003). Unfortunately, the regionalisation happen to divide the country according to ethnic groups which further gives rooms for more ethnic considerations instead of common interest which are still the facts in today‘s politics (Onapajo, 2012). Nevertheless, the Nigerian people preferred democratic system of governance as the most effective alternatives for more freedom of association and societal developments compared to other systems of governance. But in the contrary, the Nigerian political elite, are after their own interest not for the majority as such the dividend of democracy is not encouraging, compare with the expectations of the people (Adejumobi, 2010). This may be due to how the politicians conceived the political arena as a mean of looting the Nigeria abundant economy for their personal interest and that of their families. As structurally, African countries are up to date suffering from poverty, of which Nigeria is not an exception. This makes the people easily susceptible to negative manipulation and violence, especially during elections (Omotola, 2008). However, Nigeria was able to have a transition from one civilian government to another in 2007; the elections were full of political violence as reported by scholars and various human rights organizations. Though violence was also recorded in the nationwide polls of 1999, as it was further affirmed by the reports of the Amnesty International (2007), where they mentioned that, the elections of 1999 were marred by the wide spread of political violence that led to so many killings. Furthermore, the 2003 elections experienced the most widely reported elections that have the worst electoral frauds. The local government elections in 2004 was said to have witness the same abuses (Human Rights Watch, 2007a; Opukri, 2012). Based on the poor ratings of the previous elections by Nongovernmental organizations and other international observers, the hope was that some modifications will be made to improve the electoral process. In 2007 the electoral process seemed to be worth than the past due largely to lack of proper policy adjustments both in terms of security and technical modifications that will ensured free and fair elections (Opukri, 2012). One year before the 2007 general elections in 2006, so many cases of

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political assassinations were reported (Amnesty International, 2007; Adele, 2012). This means there was no any positive change from the previous elections. Hence, the 2007 Nigerian election was reported as among the worst experienced among others in the world (Human Rights Watch, 2007b). Nonetheless, as all the parties intensified campaign in preparation for the 2007 general elections, violence increases between rival political parties throughout the country (Amnesty International, 2007). This is due to how the politicians perceived violence as the means of political victory. In the year 2011 after Nigerian had becomes acclimatised with democracy, its commitments for continuity with the democratic system deepened, despite the horrible experience of the earlier elections. Nigeria in efforts to correct some anomalies of the past has introduced Electoral Reform Committee‘s ERC; as a result of recommendations and suggestions that were made in 2008. However, apart from the recommendations and suggestions several shortcomings that are challenging the quality and credibility of the elections in Nigeria were identified. ERC make a move to address the prevailing cases of impunity and electoral violence in Nigerian elections to a more democratically accepted type. As a result in June 2010 the National Assembly and the State Houses of Assembly endorsed the first amendments on the 1999 Constitution. This subsequently led to the financial autonomy of INEC and the policy that prevented the INEC‘s Chairperson and National Electoral Commissioners from being members of any political party. Despites the violence involved in 2011 election, it was said to be better than 2007 (Bekoe, 2011). However, the 2011 election ends up with post election violence; immediately after the result was announced in favour of the incumbent, the opposition party complained that the election was rigged by the ruling party. As a result violence irrupted which claimed the lives of 800 people and displacing 65,000 other innocent citizens (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Furthermore the violence at the end turns out to be religious crises between Muslim and Christians in Kaduna one of the Northern state (Human Rights Watch, 2011). This is due to how religion is being politicized in Nigeria, making it to be one of the factors that degenerate to a serious violence in political democracy. This is because religious conflicts tend to be more tense compared to non religious conflicts as also opined by Fox, (2004). In other words politics with religious sentiment are other factor that leads to violence during elections.

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Therefore, if we look at democracy in the Nigerian context we may understand that some of the apparatus that qualified system to be democratic are missing. This may be due to how democracy is miss conceived or is practiced and not only that the notion that electoral democracy is the key for political legitimacy is underrated, when it comes to creating legitimacy (Rothstein, 2009). Rothstein, further maintain that, legitimacy in political democracy can be created and be maintained at the input but it can also be destroyed at the output. As such political legitimacy depends much on the quality of the administration of the government than the capacity of the electoral process in creating effective representation (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008). That is to say power can be assess through the electoral process but that is not all, as the dividend of democracy has to be observed and maintained through the respect for majority views. Whereby given the essence of democracy, as it was referred to as ―Rule of the people by the people‖ (Lindberg, 2006). Unfortunately this situation seems not be obtainable in Nigeria and North East and Gombe state in particular the cases of political violence in the North Eastern states can further prove that. 5.

Empirical Reports and Cases of Political Violence in North Eastern Nigeria

The International Human Right Commission (IHRC), in it petitions to its office in 2014 on the alleged extra judicial killing in Gombe state between 2003 and 2009, revealed that over 70 cases of political inspired extra judicial murders, mostly of perceived opponent of the former Governor Danjuma Goje of Gombe state. According to the IHRC reports published in newspapers on the 6 of January 2014, and signed by its Nigerian Ambassador claimed that the Kalare thugs harassed, intimidated, assaulted, tortured and brutally murder many innocent citizens in Gombe state. The reports stated that somebody who was burnt with his two sons in his house, furthermore a renowned politician and business man who contested for house of assembly in 2007 after he defected from the PDP to the defunct Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) was strangled to death and his body was abandoned in his car in a mysterious circumstance (IHRC, 2014). Despite the facts that over 70 people lost their lives in an extra judicial murder committed as result of political violence perpetrated by a thugs group known as Kalare and their masters. While the then Governor Goje displayed a nonchalant attitudes to this acts, as none of the culprits was brought to justice. Thus, this incident leads to the belief that, the criminal thugs were working on behalf of the then Government and its loyalists (IHRC 2014).

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Political violence thugs vandalised over 13 cars at a PDP rally at the Northern Senatorial District Campaign in Dukku local government of Gombe state few minutes before the end of the campaign before the 2015 general elections when the armed thugs realized that official are not willing to give them their welfare of fifty thousand Naira (50,000) cash as promised forcing other supporters to take their heels (David, 2015). Similarly, the Gombe police command at two different occasions paraded 56 and 30 Kalare allegedly to have involved in robbery, killing, raping, and terrorising people. According to the police report, the said 56 arrested political thugs had made confessional statement to several murder cases in the state (Daily Trust Newspaper 2013, July 2nd). According another report by the BBC news, analysis and comment on Africa with a caption ―Eleven people have been killed in an attack in eastern Nigeria targeting the deputy governor of Adamawa state‖

reported a case of political violence that targeted the deputy governor of Adamawa state

which claimed the lives of 11 people the attack was suspected to be by opposition political party (BBC, 2013 April 7th). Similarly, in Bauchi state one of the North Eastern Nigeria who shared a border with Gombe state from the west also has the record of political violence. This state was reported to have cases of political violence notably during the post election violence of 2011, the same year a gubernatorial candidate under ACN was attack by political thugs sponsored by People Democratic Party (PDP) during the attack seven people were injured. Furthermore, in another attack 32 people were killed in 2011 by political thugs in Bauchi including 11 corps members and 72 churches were also burnt over presidential election results (Bello, 2015). According to research by Action on Arm Violence AOAV (2013), reported that Political violence groups in Bauchi which is known as Sara-Suka is the group that are used by the politicians for violence particularly during election times. This group of youth who are mostly drugs users and divided into sub groups who are mostly involved in stabbing and sometimes and slaughtering of political opponents and anyone that happened fall into their victims. They are usually hired by politician during elections to intimidate voters particularly in areas where they don‘t have supporters (AOAV, 2013). While in Taraba state another state in the north eastern Nigeria has witness several cases of politically based violence between different supporters of political parties. During elections at all levels an example is the local government election of 2004 where 30 people lost their lives as result of class among supporters of different candidates, similarly in 2011 general elections two people were killed as a result of political violence (Daily Trust Newspaper 2011, April 19 th). These 89

empirical evidences show how democratic system in Nigeria and North Eastern Nigeria are bedevilled with act of violence sponsored by politicians for political victory in the recent years.

6.

Democracy before the youth Violence in Nigeria

Democracy in Nigeria before the transformation violent group was linked to political vanguards. As such all the political parties aspiring for political position moves along with their political vanguards for security of their aspirants and in the same vein maintains orderliness and proffer solutions in case there is an outbreak of law and order. Therefore the issue of political vanguard is not completely new in Nigerian politics. However, they differ in context and origin because the political vanguard foundation does not necessarily hinged to violence but rather to maintain peace and order when the need arise and to ensure the safety of their master in case of any in eventuality. Nevertheless, the origin and context of youth that are involved in political violence now a day‘s differs significantly to that of the political vanguards as this days youth uses violence as a means of existence. Similarly, politician‘s use these youth as a means of winning elections as such they perpetrate and perpetuate violence to ensure the victory of their political sponsors and settle scores between two opposing politicians and between the opposing violent groups. Thus, emergence of youth as an agent of political violence in democracy has made a shift from what democracy is known to be in the past. This was also observed by the political patron and a party leader during in depth interview when he was compare political vanguards and youth groups that use for violence in the North eastern part of Nigeria. Thus he said, Well, differences exist between what obtains before and now because the then politics is not accompanied by violence as the political process lacks frequent abuses and wanton killings by the vanguards instead what the vanguards normally do is to cut a tree in front of your house if they believed that you constitute a threat to their political master but certainly taking of human lives is out of it. The politics then is fairer because if you are qualified you will be voted for irrespective of your alliance with any political party provided you have something to deliver to your constituency (IDI with APC political party leader). 90

From the response above it is evident that democracy before and now is absolutely not the same as it is practiced now. Politics before is not acculturated with violence because the worst a political vanguard can do is to cut a tree in front of your house to deny you sitting under a shade so as to prevent you from holding political activities in front of your house. Also you may be voted into any political office if you are qualified and or you have something to deliver. However, with the transformation of youth into violent group, politics has changed dramatically which paved way for incessant taking of lives in the name of politicking. He further maintained: In the past the population is not high like now as can be seen even from our educational system where elementary four are the teachers and holds high position in the society. But now even a degree holder teaches in primary school while some are yet to gain employment. So you see things changes as a result of population explosion. As such many youth were left unemployed which makes them resort to join violent groups (IDI with a political party leader). In a view expressed by political stake holder 1 and an elder statesman claimed that politics before has nothing to do with youth wing and to him creation of youth wings generated the politics associated with violence now. Though women wing existed before it does not lead to any violence because of women nature and has this to says: When I started my political sojourn, there is nothing like youth wings but women wings because the moment you created youth wings comprising able bodied youth and who are not gainfully employed, the consequences is that they will start to clamour for their rights and those rights that does not belongs to them capable of creating what is called “Banga” in the process (IDI with a political stake holder). The transformation of youth into political activities according to the political stakeholder itself is part of the factors that contributed to violence in politics. This is because youth groups are claiming that they have a right over their sponsors as they sometimes go to the offices of the politicians to harass and intimidate them as they were responsible for their victory. This may be due to the fact that the youth played a major role in rigging and the actualization of their sponsors and which they felt must be rewarded for. 91

7.

Democracy in Gombe North Eastern Nigeria today

Democracy in the North Eastern states and Gombe in particular has taken a dramatic twist because politics now is associated with money and violence as against what obtains before where the notion of venturing into politics has to do with ideology. In the contrary democracy has taken another dimension where is based on how much you have or how many political youth groups you have that rig election for you. This means politics depend how buoyant you are and not how capable you or what you will deliver. According to the political stake holder 1, who also commented on how politics has shift from being an ideological orientation to that of material gain: People joined politics not because of ideological stance but rather for the material benefit they will derive. Even the youth we are talking about ventured into politics because of what they can get and not because of what they can contribute to the society. The problem now is that politics is beclouded with sentiment as any political office you wanted to contest will be judged by what you have at hand and not what positive contribution you may bring to the society at large (IDI with a political stakes holder).

Certainly, when money and violence becomes the major determinant factors for contesting any political office, then there is every possibility that it may not yield good result. Therefore, looking at the above explanations, one will wonder as to what will be the politician‘s priorities if elected to office under this circumstance. In responding to this question the political stake holder, conceded: If it happens that the politician gives money either to political thugs, god father or to the electorates in order to influence their votes, the first thing if elected will be to recover the money he spent at the detriment of developmental projects he is expected to embark on. Because the politicians are not charity organization that dashed out money likes that (IDI with a political stakeholder 1).

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Therefore these could be one of the reasons why the politicians use different youth groups for violence as they also spend money on these youth to ensure their victory. The irony is that they may want to recover the money they invested. Moreover according to one of the political stakeholder, Instead of going into politics to canvass for votes with the sole intention of embarking on developmental project or to better the lot of the citizenry, they however uses youth to induce people vote for a candidates out of their own wish. They use all sort of means including intimidation, blackmail and harassment in order to achieve their political objective. These attitudes made the electorates to submit blindly to the politician‟s whims and caprices. If you don‟t want to be harassed, intimidated or injured, the worst you can do is to sit down and keep quiet (IDI with a political stake holder 2).

The attitudes of sitting while watching how political violence bedevilled the political democracy in North Eastern states is not unconnected with the reasons why it has eating deep into the political democracy. 8.

Effects of violence on Politics and Democracy

The violence attitude in our politics today has spill over effect on both human lives and properties as it was found to have affected both politics and democracy in the state. The experience shared from the perspective of former political stakes holders and elder statesmen were used extensively to compare politics in Gombe state and in the north eastern states. These include both before and after the transformation of youth into political violence activities such Kalare and etc. The elder statesman 1, while commenting on the effect of political violence on political democracy in Gombe state and North East observed: Political had brought a lot of serious effect on political democracy by creating lots of problems. The problems ranges from de-enfranchising voters during election as well as preventing free and fair elections as voters were not allowed to vote for candidates of their choice (IDI, with a political stakeholder 1).

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The elder statesman, while commenting above started that the effect political violence on democracy has a lot of consequences on politics and democracy. Meaning the effect is much that one cannot instantly quantify. Furthermore, ―when he was asked that, does creation of youth group for political violence has a devastating effect on electoral process in the states particularly at our polling stations‖ this was his response: Of course yes because the creation or manifestation of violent youth groups into the political limelight in the north Eastern state and Nigeria al large, became a problem to the electoral system, as they distract any voting going on at the polling booth thereby constituting themselves as a nuisance to the entire system. Their distractive attitude during elections becomes a problem definitely (IDI with a political stake holder 1). While, in his own contribution the elder statesman 2, substantiated on the above evidence given by the elder statesman 1, where he laid emphasis on the level of intimidation in the politics and democratic system in Gombe state. Thus he maintains: In fact from my own assessment of the situation, the intimidation was too much as those with clean intention will not be allowed to scale through. The current political travail is that you play by the game of engaging in hide and seek politics. The fact is that those who have good intention were shown the way out either by hook or crook. The actions mostly are to restrain you from aspiring as they will detain and even kill you if you refused to succumb to their evil ways (IDI, with a political stakeholder 2).

This is to say the intimidation by the politicians particularly the ruling party who have control on security agencies had even gone to the level of even locking their opposition in the police custody. Thus, making it difficult for the political opponents to carry out their political campaigns, as they are been deprived by the ruling party through all means of intimidation. 94

However, the PDP party leader in contrast to the above opinion asserted that the blame poured on the ruling party is boned out of envy and sheer sentiment as he claimed that the transformation happened during the previous administration and their party ought not to be blamed for crime they have not initiated. He further, opined that: The youths are being misled by their political god fathers to do one thing or the other that they feel they cannot do it themselves. This includes threatening or even killing their political opponents or enemy and at the end of the day the godfather may not have control over the youth like Kalare that is what happened that time. At that regime the “Kalare” do travel with their godfathers for campaign, and in the process if they come across a less privilege contesting the race, Kalare will threaten or even kill the opponent (IDI with PDP party leader). This study was made to understand that this political violence group does not only attacks political opponents but they do not even spare their sponsor or their relatives when it comes to violence during campaign or elections. While, in continuation of the assessment of the effect violence on democracy one of the elder statesman asserted that violent activities includes forcing voters to vote even against the candidates of their choice for fear of intimidation from them. As such he maintains: Violent groups like that of Kalare were used to intimidate voters by compelling them to vote for candidates they did not desire for the fear of resultant consequences. They normally do this by snatching and stuffing of ballot boxes if they noticed that there is a foul play in the polling booth. Also they instil fear into the minds of the electorates and mostly people succumb to their wish for fear of losing their lives. You can see that this is not democracy as democracy is about free and fear political participation (IDI, with a political stakes holder 2).

From the response above it became clearer that intimidation in politics portrays bad democracy capable of electing people who are not well educated and cannot in any way represent the people 95

because of the way he assumed political responsibility. Moreover, APC leader was of the same view with the political stakeholder 2 where he claimed that violence perpetrated by youth or sponsored by politicians is not an indication of real democracy. This is because it does not allow fair and free participation in politics as such he concluded that such attitudes can only discourage the rightful people from engaging in politics. Particularly when he was asked does politics with violence indicate a sign of good democracy, this was his position: it will not help our nascent democracy at all because the right people will not contest for fear of intimidation thereby leaving the mantle of leadership in the hands of those who do not merit such. The violent behaviour in politics made me to become discourage in politics and not to contest for anything as i want to live a peaceful life and have a happy ending (IDI with APC party leader). However, elder statesman 1, differs with the above respondents where he holds that even though activities of political violence has effect on democracy it does not mean it will be concluded as a bad democracy where he lamented that: no, you cannot say it is not a good democracy, is a democracy with some problems here and there but not to conclude as a bad democracy. The only thing is to trace the problem with a view to solving it (IDI with a Political stake holder). Despite the position of political stakeholder 1 on political democracy in Gombe state and North East the political stakeholder 2 while answering the question on what will be the future of politics in the North East in spite of political violence, he conclusively emphasised by stating that: well, first all, I don‟t see any bright future in respect of politics in the state with violence youth group. So, clearly, I want to see the Gombe of tomorrow without the “violence” (IDI with a political stake holder 2). This shows how the citizens of Gombe state and North East in general are eager to get rid of the menace of political violence as it has lots of effects on both the society and the political democracy.

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Nevertheless, democracy seems to be the most acceptable source of governance despites the fact that is being bedevilled with violence. Having known from the above responses that politics are beclouded with sentiment and above all using violence to achieve political objective, Elder statesman 1 was asked to clarify on the issue of whether or not the politicians can do without violence having tested the advantages of using political thugs in achieving their political objectives, this was his response: of course! It is even better to play politics without thuggery and violence. There is no reason for political thugs. No reason. The issue of politics is an issue of voluntary engagement. It is also an issue of convincing people to join your political party, not by coercion, nor by force, or intimidation. It is not necessary to use thugs to achieve result in politics. So, thuggery has no place in a decent politics or democracy (IDI with a political stake holder 1). Similarly, the political stakeholder 2 holds the same view with the political stakeholder 1, where he rightly maintains: ―In fact, politicians can very well do without the “political violence”. While the APC political party leader further elaborated by saying: politicians will definitely do without political violent groups, if you want to play a decent politics, what you what to do is just to campaign and advertise your manifesto and if the electorates agree with you they will vote you. I think is better (APC Political party leader). The APC political party leader was of the view that politics can be done without political violent groups like the Kalare and so on but on the condition that ―if‖ the states and Nigeria at large wanted to play a decent politics. Politics globally is not accompanied by violence because any political process that is hinged to violence will not be free, fair and above all become a credible election. The danger of this is that those who do not have the might of leading will find themselves occupying political offices without corresponding agility to solve societal problems. 9.

Discussion

This Section discussed the effect of political violence on political democracy in Gombe state and North Eastern Nigeria. Before the transformation of youth into political violence in Gombe and 97

North Eastern Nigeria, there are political rivalries in the politics of Nigeria. However, in the northern part of Nigeria, there are political vanguards that seem to protect their political sponsors that differ in context and orientation with political violence today. The vanguards protection ranges from serving as a body guards to their political aspirants to avert any foul play from opposing political groups, maintain orderliness during campaign and election, they also serve as agents of their party in various polling station to ensure fair and free election. Most importantly, the vanguards do not force anyone to vote for their masters during election. The worst the vanguards can do at that time is to cut down a tree that is planted in front of the house of the opponent so as to deny the opponent enjoy the shade of that tree or hold any political meetings as it was explained by the PDP party leader during the IDI in Gombe. The existence of such political vanguard was also explained in the work of Ya‘u, (2003), where he stated that, in some of the northern states like Kano, there was political vanguards groups who are called ―Yanbanga‖ in Hausa language meaning ―Vanguards‖ that were recruited by the politicians to intimidate and harass the political opponent though they existed in a different world because the vanguards were not involved in intimidation and harassment as ―Yandaba‖ but they also share many things in common (Ya‘u, 2003). The commonest thing the ―Yanbanga‖ and ―Yandaba‖ share are immunity to metallic weaponry and most of them are matured adults and fearless. While ―Yanbanga‖ are more of political security volunteers based on party ideology unlike the ―Yandaba‖ who more violent and mostly hired by the politicians (Ya‘u, 2003). However, political violence perpetrated by youth in politics today differs with that of the vanguards as stated above and most importantly violent perpetrated by the youth in the North Eastern states like in Gombe state started under the cover of youth wing (Bashir, 2013). The essence of forming youth wing is to influence their peer groups to join the political party they belong with a view to achieving political victory. Their involvement into politics took a dramatic twist as their political god fathers misled them and they were metamorphosed into violent groupings capable of disrupting the peaceful coexistence of the state. Furthermore the activities of political violence which have spilled over effect may not be unconnected with the way they hold themselves during and after election as they were mostly involved in violent activities. These include intimidation, destruction of lives and properties, harassment, snatching of ballot boxes as holds by the PDP party Leader during the IDI in Gombe state. Nevertheless, the organisation of young people into political parties in democratic countries started in the 20th century but it wasn‘t violent as it is today.

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In places like Poland and Romania Russell, (2005) and Poguntke, (2006), asserted that in established democracy, youth are rewarded with employment and some other incentives for their participation in political activities. Also the youth involvement centres on the way they give their own contribution to the party by attracting more followership (Hooghe, Dietlind, Patrick & Stouthuysen, 2004; Cross & Young, 2008). Unfortunately, the findings from this research indicated that political violence has so many negative effects on political democracy. However, the effects do not only stop on the political democracy but transgress to loss of both human lives and properties. It is also important to understand that the political violence did not just started out of mere coincidence but precipitated by some motivational tendencies that cajoled the youth to join the violent groups. Moreover, the use of youth as agents of violence was traced to the unrelenting quest for political power and position by the political elites. Consequently, such actions results to violence due to how the political elites blocked others from meeting their social needs and political ambitions (Galtung, 2006). The effect of political violence in Gombe state and North Eastern Nigeria goes intimidation but assassination of political opponents as well. This may not be unconnected with the competitive nature of politics where the revolutionary group who are the oppositions and who want to take over the political power from the conservatives (the ruling party) whose main aim is to maintain the political power at all cost (Calveiro, 2010; Uwaifo, 2012). Consequently, the opposition party feel they are being deprived as such they have to look for means of counteracting the violence by the ruling party. Thus, making the political violence becomes parts of political democracy particularly as it involved conflicting interest between two groups over political power (Godowoli, 2003). The ultimate result is conflict and violence, which was found to be both through ethnic instigation and through the use of youth groups as agent for such violence with little incentives as also observed by (Wilkinson, 2004). However, the effect of political violence on political democracy are multi dimensional in nature as also discovered in Sindh and Punjab by Shapiro et al., (2012). As such the effects of this violence on the political democracy have gone to the extent of denying the right of the voters to vote the candidate of their choice by forcing them to vote for candidates out of their own volition. This evidence was given by Mbaya, (2013), Thus, undermining the rights to votes and be voted for, as provided in the Nigerian 1999 constitution. Looking at how violence is bedevilling the political democracy the North East and Nigeria in general, it is clear that the legitimacy of political democracy is being challenged by violence as also observed by Baba, (2013) and Omotola, (2008). 99

Moreover, it seems there is a misconception about political democracy in Nigerian context and Gombe in particular, where democracy is assessed by simple periodic elections and transition from one civilian administration to another. This misconception was also opined by Chemhuru (2010), where he stated that, the concept of democracy had been changed by different society to suit their interest. Despite the fact that the political democracy is being bedevilled by violence, it was claimed by the ruling party as a good democracy. This was also affirmed by a political stakeholder and elder statesman, who said that even though, the politics, is marred by violence, it is still a democracy with some problems here and there. This research argued that for democracy to be seen in its form, there are certain ingredient that accompanies it which seems to be missing in the type of politics that are played in the North Eastern states and Nigeria in general. This is because the institutional procedural terms that allow free and fair elections were not followed as holds by Dahl, (2001) and Dalton et al., (2007). This is more so in view of the fact that the dictates of politicking is being undermined and thereby debasing the basic norms of legitimising political democracy in North Eastern Nigeria. These are due largely to how violence is used as a tool for winning elections which mostly result to the death of many innocent people and political opponents (Adele, 2012). Similarly, the violence nature in the politics of Nigeria generally had also shift from the politics of ideology to the politics of money due to the bedevilling nature of poverty as rightly maintain by Omotola, (2008). This research confirmed the position of Omotola, where political stakeholder and elder statesman 1 elaborated extensively on the subject matter in an IDI. Unfortunately, victory in today's political democracy is contingent upon who has what to spend on either the party machinery or the political thugs to contend with. The situation which the political stakeholder and elder statesman 2 refer to as “the highest the intimidation, the more successful you become”. Therefore, the underlying question is that, will there be dividend of democracy in such a situation where the politicians use money and violence to acquire political power. Contrarily, the priority of the political elites is not to improve or provide the basic necessities to their subjects (Adejumobi, 2010). Certainly the first thing is to recover the money spent during campaign and elections as stated by the political stakeholder and elder statesman 1 during in depth interview. Consequently, this led to the mismanagement of public funds and undermining the majority interest in favour of personal interest. This is due to the intuitive and orientalism of democracy as a means of sharing the scarce resources by the political elites as holds by Jawondo, (2011). In addition this violence in search of political power had turn political democracy into a battle ground as it‘s become a do or die affairs. 100

10.

Conclusion

This study discovered that political violence has became institutionalised as it is no longer hidden that various groups of youth with difference names are used to assassinate any perceived strong political opponents. These acts of violence not only question the legitimacy of political democracy but also deprived others from political participation. Secondly, political violence is being perceived as a means of winning elections and a means of acquiring wealth, both by the political aspirants and their godfathers. This has made political violence to prevail in political democracy in Gombe state and North Eastern Nigeria in particular. Lastly, political violence were used in all respects to the extent of fermenting violence with a view to scare away voters and political opponents both during campaign and on election days to snatch ballot boxes and stuff ballot papers in favour of their political sponsors as well force electorates to vote candidate out of their volition. This acts of violence under normal circumstances has no place true democracy as such for democracy to answer its name there is a need reorganise our system of democracy.

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NEWSPAPERS

Daitly Trust Newspapers Nigeria 19th April 2011 2nd July 2013

105

Analisis Sokongan Pengundi Pasca Krisis Menteri Besar di Kedah Siti Noranizahhafizah Boyman, Marshelayanti Mohamad Razali & Siti Muslihah Ismail Universiti Pendidikan Sultan Idris Abstrak Kertas kerja ini membincangkan sokongan pengundi pasca krisis Menteri Besar di Kedah. Pada Pilihan Raya Umum (PRU) 2008 yang lalu, Kedah telah dirampas oleh Pakatan Rakyat (PR) dan berjaya diambil semula oleh BN pada PRU 2013. Namun, pada awal tahun 2016, telah timbul krisis Menteri Besar yang melibatkan pemecatan Dato‘ Sri Mukhriz Tun Dr Mahathir dan digantikan dengan Dato‘ Seri Ahmad Bashah Md Hanipah. Justeru, kajian ini akan meneliti kronologi krisis yang berlaku dan menganalisis sokongan pengundi kepada entiti yang penting iaitu BN dan kepimpinan Dato‘ Seri Ahmad Bashah Md Hanipah. Perbandingan sokongan pengundi dilakukan di kawasan DUN Ayer Hitam (N.04) dan Bakar Bata (N.12) untuk menilai sokongan dan penerimaan pengundi. Penelitian ini akan disusuli dengan perbincangan yang akan menjelaskan sokongan dan penerimaan pengundi terhadap BN pada masa kini dan juga PRU akan datang. Kata Kunci:Krisis Menteri Besar, Barisan Nasional, Kedah, Mukhriz Tun Dr Mahathir, Ahmad Bashah Md Hanipah Pengenalan

Negara yang mengamalkan sistem demokrasi membolehkan rakyatnya memilih pemimpin atau wakil mereka dengan mengundi. Oleh itu, peralihan kepimpinan dalam sesebuah institusi politik adalah satu fenomena lazim dengan mengadakan pilihan raya

seperti yang diamalkan oleh

Malaysia. Walau bagaimanapun, dalam sejarah politik Malaysia seringkali berlaku krisis-krisis kepimpinan politik terutamanya yang berkaitan dengan kedudukan Menteri Besar. Antara beberapa contoh krisis peralihan kepimpinan politik yang melibatkan Menteri Besar pernah berlaku ialah di negeri Kelantan sekitar tahun 1977 (Yahaya, 1977), Kedah pada tahun 1996 (Sobri & Hafidz, 2002), Perak pada tahun 2009 (Siti Noranizahhafizah & Jayum, 2013), Terengganu pada tahun 2008, 2014 dan 2016 (Mohd Nasrul Hafiz & Nur Alya, 2016). Selangor pada tahun 2014 (Mstar, 19 Disember 2014) dan awal tahun 2016 krisis Menteri Besar di Kedah kembali bergolak.

Krisis kepimpinan politik yang berlaku di Kelantan pada tahun 1977 berpunca daripada rancangan menjatuhkan Menteri Besar ketika itu Muhammad Nasir (Datuk) melalui undi tidak percaya 106

(Yahaya, 1977). Manakala di Kedah pada tahun 1996 adalah berhubung perlantikan Sanusi Junid (Tan Sri) sebagai Menteri Besar Kedah menggantikan Osman Aroff (Sobri & Hafidz, 2002). Kemudian pada tahun 2009, krisis kepimpinan politik berlaku di Perak melibatkan pertikaian tentang keabsahan kerajaan yang dibentuk oleh Pakatan Rakyat (PR) di negeri Perak. Krisis ini bermula apabila tiga Ahli Dewan Undangan Negeri (ADUN) Perak dari PR melompat parti dan mengisytiharkan diri mereka menyokong Barisan Nasional (BN). Keadaan ini memberi kejayaan kepada BN dan menyakinkan Sultan Perak untuk membubarkan kerajaan yang dibentuk oleh Pakatan Rakyat dan diganti dengan BN (Siti Noranizahhafizah & Jayum, 2013).

Sementara itu, krisis Menteri Besar Terengganu yang berlaku pada tahun 2008 melibatkan perlantikan Ahmad Said (Datuk) sebagai Menteri Besar yang menggantikan Idris Jusoh (Datuk Seri). Manakala pada 2014 pula adalah semasa perlantikan Ahmad Razif (Datuk) sebagai Menteri Besar bagi menggantikan Ahmad Said (Datuk). Sementara itu, pada tahun 2016 adalah disebabkan undi tidak percaya yang dikemukakan oleh Ahmad Said (Datuk Seri) semasa persidangan Dewan Undangan Negeri (DUN), namun ditolak oleh Speaker Dewan (Mohd Nasrul Hafiz & Nur Alya 2016).

Apakah pula yang berlaku di Selangor? Krisis kepimpinan politik yang berlaku di Selangor berlaku pada tahun 2014 dengan ‗Langkah Kajang‘ dengan episod perletakan jawatan Abdul Khalid Ibrahim (Tan Sri) sebagai Menteri Besar. Beliau telah digantikan dengan Mohamed Azmin Ali (Mstar, 19 Disember 2014). Seterusnya, krisis kepimpinan politik yang berlaku di Kedah pada awal tahun 2016. Krisis tersebut dikatakan berpunca dari pemimpin UMNO Kedah yang hilang kepercayaan terhadap Mukhriz Mahathir (Dato‘ Seri) sebagai Menteri Besar Kedah dan Pengerusi Perhubungan UMNO Negeri (Kohilah, 2016). Akhirnya pada 03 Februari 2016, Mukhriz mengumumkan perletakan jawatan sebagai Menteri Besar selepas Jemaah Pemangku Sultan Kedah memaklumkan beliau hilang sokongan majoriti di Dewan Undangan Negeri Kedah.

Justeru, kertas kerja ini menjelaskan kronologi krisis yang berlaku dan menganalisis sokongan pengundi terhadap BN dan kepimpinan yang baharu iaitu Dato‘ Seri Ahmad Bashah. Selain itu, perbandingan sokongan pengundi dilakukan di kawasan DUN Ayer Hitam (N.04) dan Bakar Bata (N.12) untuk menilai sokongan dan penerimaan pengundi. Akhir sekali, menjelaskan sokongan dan penerimaan pengundi terhadap BN pada masa kini dan juga PRU akan datang. 107

Kronologi Krisis Menteri Besar di Kedah

Krisis kepimpinan politik di Kedah dengan jelas berlaku pada awal 2016. Walau bagaimanapun, bibit-bibit krisis tersebut telah dapat dikenalpasti pada pertengahan April 2015. Jadual 1, menjelaskan satu persatu kronologi krisis politik di Kedah.

Jadual 1: Kronologi Krisis Politik di Kedah Tarikh

Peristiwa

12 April

ADUN Bukit Lada Datuk Ahmad Lebai Sudin secara terbuka

2015

mendesak Dato‘ Sri Mukhriz meletak jawatan sebagai Menteri Besar kerana gagal menyatakan sokongan secara terbuka terhadap Dato‘ Seri Najib sebagai Perdana Menteri, terutama berhubung isu 1MDB (Kamarul & Khairul, 3 Februari 2016).

18 April 2015

Badan perhubungan UMNO negeri mengadakan mesyuarat khas yang dipengerusikan

Dato

Sri‘

Mukhriz

yang

antara

lain

turut

membincangkan sokongan terhadap Najib, tindakan Dr Mahathir mengkritik Najib, serta tindakan Datuk Ahmad Lebai Sudin mendesak Mukhriz meletak jawatan. Selepas mesyuarat itu, hanya Timbalan Pengerusi Badan Perhubungan UMNO Kedah Dato‘ Seri Ahmad Bashah Bin Md Hanipah yang membuat kenyataan media menyokong kepimpinan Najib sebagai Perdana Menteri dan Mukhriz sebagai Menteri Besar, selain meminta Dato Sri‘ Mukhriz tidak memberikan sebarang kenyataan berhubung isu itu (Utusan Malaysia,19 April 2015).

4 Mei

Dato Sri‘ Mukhriz mempertahankan tindakan Dr Mahathir yang

2015

sering memberikan pandangan terhadap pentadbiran negara, termasuk mengkritik Dato Sri‘ Najib (Kohilah, 2016).

11

Selepas Perhimpunan Agung UMNO diadakan di Pusat Dagangan 108

Disember

Dunia Putra di Kuala Lumpur, Dato Sri Mukhriz mengadakan majlis

2015

makan malam meraikan perwakilan UMNO negeri Kedah di Saloma Bistro. Majlis itu turut dihadiri Dato Seri Muhyiddin Yassin serta naib presiden UMNO Datuk Seri Shafie Apdal, yang merupakan antara menteri yang digugurkan dalam rombakan kabinet pada Julai 2015 (Kohilah, 2016).

20 Januari

Timbalan Pengerusi Badan Perhubungan UMNO Kedah Dato‘ Seri

2016

Ahmad Bashah Bin Md Hanipah mengetuai beberapa ketua UMNO Negeri Kedah mengisytiharkan telah menyatakan hilang keyakinan dan kepercayaan terhadap pimpinan Dato‘ Sri Mukhriz Mahathir selaku Menteri Besar dan Pengerusi Badan Perhubungan UMNO Kedah (Harian Metro, 20 Januari 2016).

26 Januari

Jemaah Pemangku Sultan Kedah mengeluarkan kenyataan bahawa

2016

anggota jemaah itu berkecuali dalam krisis politik di Kedah serta menasihatkan pihak terlibat menyelesaikan perkara itu secara berhemah (Kohilah, 2016).

29 Januari 2016

Datuk Seri Najib Razak mengadakan pertemuan tertutup dengan Jemaah Pemangku Sultan Kedah di Istana Darul Aman

bagi

membincangkan pertukaran Menteri Besar Kedah (Harian Metro, 30 Januari 2016).

1 Februari

20 daripada 21 ADUN BN dipanggil menghadap Jemaah Pemangku

2016

Sultan Kedah di Wisma Darul Aman bagi membincangkan mengenai krisis politik yang membabitkan kedudukan Dato‘ Sri Mukhriz (Kohilah, 2016).

2 Februari 2016

ADUN pembangkang dipanggil menghadap Jemaah Pemangku Sultan di Wisma Darul Aman bagi membincangkan mengenai krisis politik 109

yang membabitkan kedudukan Dato‘ Sri Mukhriz (Kohilah,2016).

3 Februari

Dato‘ Sri Mukhriz mengumumkan perletakan jawatan sebagai

2016

Menteri Besar berkuat kuasa serta merta selepas Jemaah Pemangku Sultan Kedah memaklumkan Dato‘ Sri Mukhriz hilang sokongan majoriti di Dewan Undangan Negeri Kedah (Harian Metro, 4 Februari 2016).

Akhirnya, krisis ini berakhir dengan perlantikan Ahmad Bashah Md Hanipah (Dato‘ Seri) sebagai Menteri Besar yang baharu pada 03 Februari 2016 menggantikan Mukhriz Tun Dr Mahathir (Dato‘ Seri). Keputusan Pilihan Raya di Kedah

Pemerintahan kerajaan di negeri Kedah telah dikuasai secara berterusan oleh BN sejak Pilihan Raya Umum (PRU) yang pertama sehingga PRU 2004. Dapat dikatakan Negeri Kedah telah menjadi kubu kuat BN sehinggalah pada PRU 2004. Hal ini kerana pada PRU 2008, PAS berjaya merampas Kedah daripada BN. Walau bagaimanapun dapat dikuasai semula oleh BN pada PRU 2013. Jadual 2, merupakan ringkasan keputusan PRU DUN Negeri Kedah.

Jadual 2: Keputusan PRU di Kedah Tahun

Bil

PRU

Kerusi

Keputusan PRU BN

Jumlah

Pakatan

Pengundi

Pembangkang

Berdaftar

1959

24

24

-

268,025

1964

24

24

-

336,858

1969

24

14

10

388,858

1974

26

24

2

286,091

1978

26

19

7

443,656

1982

26

24

2

541,924

1986

28

25

3

598,594 110

1990

28

26

2

657,322

1995

36

34

2

724,758

1999

36

24

12

765,028

2004

36

32

4

821,901

2008*

36

14

22

873,674

2013

36

21

15

1041,068

* Pada tahun 2008, PAS berjaya menguasai Kedah. Sumber: Ensiklopedia Keputusan Pilihan Raya Umum Parlimen dan Dewan Undangan Negeri 1959-2004, (2008) & Laporan SPR, (2014)

Penguasaan BN di negeri Kedah begitu ketara apabila memenangi hampir keseluruhan jumlah kerusi yang dipertandingkan seperti pada PRU 1959 hinggalah PRU 1995. BN mengalami sedikit penurunan pada PRU 1999, namun meningkat cemerlang pada PRU 2004. BN mencatatkan kemenangan yang selesa di negeri Kedah sehinggalah PRU 2008, apabila buat julung kalinya BN tewas di negeri Kedah apabila hanya memenangi sebanyak 14 kerusi DUN berbanding Pakatan Rakyat (PR) yang memenangi sebanyak 22 kerusi DUN. Kekalahan tersebut menyebabkan negeri Kedah diperintah oleh PAS dan BN menjadi parti pembangkang selepas pilihan raya tersebut.

Bahagian seterusnya membincangkan keputusan PRU 2013 di kawasan DUN Ayer Hitam (N.04) dan Bakar Bata (N.12). Pemilihan kawasan ini adalah berdasarkan krisis Menteri Besar yang berlaku melibatkan ADUN di kawasan Ayer Hitam (N.04) dan Bakar Bata (N.12). Mantan Menteri Besar Kedah Mukhriz (Dato‘ Sri) merupakan ADUN Ayer Hitam (N.04) dan Menteri Besar baharu Kedah Ahmad Bashah (Dato‘ Seri) ADUN di kawasan Bakar Bata (N.12). Keputusan PRU DUN Ayer Hitam (N.04)

DUN Ayer Hitam (N.04) terletak di parlimen Jerlun, jumlah pengundi berdaftar di kawasan DUN Ayer Hitam berdasarkan PRU 2013 adalah sebanyak 29,567 orang (SPR, 2014).

Proses

persempadanan semula pada tahun 1994 menyebabkan berlakunya pertambahan kerusi di DUN Negeri Kedah sebanyak 8 kerusi iaitu dari 28 kerusi DUN kepada 36 kerusi DUN. Perubahan ini menyebabkan DUN Ayer Hitam (N.04) mulai wujud sejak tahun 1995. Jadual 3, menunjukkan keputusan PRU di kawasan Ayer Hitam (N.04). 111

Jadual 3: Keputusan PRU 2013 Ayer Hitam (N.04) di Kedah Tahun DUN

Calon Bertanding

Parti

PRU

1995

1999

20042

Bilangan Mejoriti Undi

N.03

Abdul Rahman Bin

BN

9,069

Ayer

Ariffin

PAS

7,352

Hitam

Hashim Bin Osman

N.03

Abdul Rahman Ariffin

BN

8,414

Ayer

Ust. Abd. Ghani

PAS

8,558

Hitam

Ahmad

N.04

Othman Bin Aziz

BN

10,759

Ayer

Ust. Abd. Ghani Ahmad

PAS

9,899

N.04

Othman Bin Aziz

BN

10,146

Ayer

Ust. Abd. Ghani

PAS

10,652

Hitam

Ahmad

N.04

Mukhriz Mahathir

BN

14,083

Ayer

Ust. Abd. Ghani Ahmad

PAS

11,637

1,717

144

860

Hitam 2008

2013

506

2,446

Hitam Sumber: Laporan Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya, (1995-2013)

Secara keseluruhannya, keputusan pilihan raya di Ayer Hitam (N.04) menunjukkan turun naik sokongan pengundi terhadap BN dan juga PAS. Sepanjang lima PRU bermula 1995 hingga PRU 2013, PAS dapat menguasai kerusi Ayer Hitam (N.04) sebanyak dua kali iaitu pada PRU 1999 dan

2

Proses persempadanan semula pada tahun 2003 menyebabkan kod DUN bertukar dari N.03 kepada N.04 pada tahun 2004. 112

PRU 2008. Jika dilihat dari segi majoriti, BN mendapat majoriti paling tinggi pada PRU 2013 mengalahkan jumlah majoriti pada PRU sebelum-sebelumnya.

Keputusan PRU DUN Bakar Bata (N.12)

DUN Bakar Bata (N.12) terletak di parlimen Alor Setar, sebelum ini ia dikenali sebagai Alor Merah (N.09). Pada tahun 2003, SPR telah melakukan persempadanan semula bahagian pilihan raya yang menyebabkan nama Bakar Bata telah digunapakai oleh SPR dalam persempadanan bahagian pilihan raya sejak tahun 2004 hinggalah sekarang. Pada 2015, kawasan ini mempunyai jumlah pengundi berdaftar sebanyak 28192 orang sehingga penghujung tahun. Daripada jumlah tersebut bilangan pengundi Melayu adalah yang tertinggi iaitu sebanyak 19181 orang, diikuti pengundi Cina 7517 orang, India 1400 orang dan lain-lain pengundi sebanyak 94 orang (SPR Negeri Kedah, 2016). Berdasarkan Jadual 4, keputusan pilihan raya di DUN Bakar Bata (N.12) menunjukkan BN memenangi kerusi kawasan ini dengan selesa walaupun ada turun naik sokongan pengundi. Jika dilihat daripada persaingan kerusi DUN Bakar Bata (N.12), hanya pada tahun 1982 sahaja melibatkan persaingan 3 penjuru iaitu antara BN, PAS dan DAP. Pada pilihan raya seterusnya persaingan kerusi di DUN Bakar Bata (N.12) hanya melibatkan persaingan dua penjuru sahaja iaitu antara BN dan PAS. Namun, mula berubah pada PRU 2008 dan PRU 2013 apabila pembangkang menukar strategi dengan menukar kepada calon PKR.

Jadual 4: Keputusan PRU Ayer Hitam (N.04) di Kedah Tahun

DUN

Calon Bertanding

PRU

1982

Part

Bilanga

i

n Undi

9592

N.09

Khalid Bin Hj Abdullah

BN

Alor

Ong Aun Boon

DAP 1636

Merah

Dato Haji Abdul Bakar Bin PAS

Mejoriti

7956

5673

3,919

11,384

4,949

Omar

1986

N.09

Dato Azizan b. Haji Taib

BN

113

Alor

Haji Suhaimi Haji Ahmad

PAS

6,435

N.09

Dato Azizan b. Haji Taib

BN

15,180

Alor

Chegu Nasrun Din

PAS

6,854

N.14

Ahmad Bashah Md

BN

9,558

Alor

Hanipah

PAS

3,965

Merah

Fadzil Bin Ahmad

N.14

Ahmad Bashah Md

BN

8,850

Alor

Hanipah

PAS

5,928

Merah

Fadzil Bin Ahmad

N.12

Ahmad Bashah Md

BN

11,091

Bakar

Hanipah

PAS

5,054

Bata

Ismail Bin Salleh

N.12

Ahmad Bashah Md

BN

8,232

Bakar

Hanipah

PKR

7,874

Bata

Rohani Binti Bakar

N.12

Ahmad Bashah Md

BN

11,999

Bakar

Hanipah

PKR

11,104

Bata

Mohd Eekmal Bin Ahmad

Merah 1990

8,326

Merah 19953

1999

20044

2008

2013

5,593

2,922

6,037

358

895

Sumber: Laporan Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya, (1995-2013) Sokongan Pengundi Pasca Krisis Menteri Besar di Kedah

Pengkajian ke atas sokongan pengundi ini dibahagikan kepada tiga bahagian iaitu membincangkan dapatan kajian yang berkaitan sokongan rakyat terhadap BN, Menteri Besar baharu Dato‘ Seri Ahmad Bashah dan sokongan pada masa hadapan.

3

Proses persempadanan semula pada tahun 1994 menyebabkan nama DUN Alor Merah di tukar kepada nama DUN Bakar Bata dan kod DUN bertukar dari N.09 kepada N.14 pada tahun 1995. 4 Proses persempadanan semula pada tahun 2003 menyebabkan kod DUN bertukar dari N.14 kepada N.12 pada tahun 2004. 114

Sokongan terhadap BN pasca Krisis Menteri Besar

Bagaimanakah sokongan pengundi di kedua2 kawasan pasca krisis Menteri Besar? Merujuk Jadual 5, responden kawasan Ayer Hitam (N.04) tidak menyokong penuh pemerintahan kerajaan BN kerana peratusan responden yang memberikan jawapan tidak bersetuju adalah yang tertinggi iaitu sebanyak 51 peratus, 14.5 peratus responden lagi memberikan jawapan tidak pasti dan hanya 34.5 peratus bersetuju dengan pemerintahan kerajaan BN sekarang. Sementara itu, nilai min yang dicatatkan berada pada tahap sederhana rendah iaitu 2.72, yang menunjukan responden di kawasan Ayer Hitam (N.04) ini tidak menyokong kerajaan BN selepas berlakunya krisis Menteri Besar ini. Dapatan kajian ini diperkukuhkan lagi dengan data kualitatif yang diperolehi dari responden yang jelas menolak pemerintahan kerajaan BN selepas berlakunya krisis Menteri Besar ini. Responden A: ―..Ishhh macam mana nk sokong BN.. kita boleh tengok sendiri kan UMNO la ni pon teruk kan . hat dok elok-elok Mukhriz jadi MB yang depa p buang tu pasai pa….‖

Berdasarkan data temu bual tersebut responden A menolak untuk menyokong BN kerana krisis kepimpinan ini. Jadual 5:Menyokong Pemerintahan Kerajaan BN di Kedah Menyokong Pemerintahan

TS

KS

TP

S

SS

Min

Kerajaan BN

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

Ayer Hitam

21

30

14.5

25

9.5

Bakar Bata

12.4

23.2

10.3

40

14.1 3.2

2.72

Sumber: Data Lapangan, 2016

Walau bagaimanapun, terdapat perbezaan sokongan yang jelas di antara responden di kawasan Ayer Hitam (N.04) dan Bakar Bata (N.12) kerana responden di kawasan Bakar Bata (N.12) pula majoritinya menyokong pemerintahan kerajaan BN iaitu sebanyak 54.1 peratus berbanding di kawasan Ayer Hitam (N.04) sebanyak 34.5 peratus yang menyokong kerajaan BN. Walaupun responden kawasan Bakar Bata (N.12) majoritinya menyokong penuh pemerintahan kerajaan BN, namun masih terdapat sebanyak 35.7 peratus responden yang tidak menyokong penuh pemerintahan kerajaan BN dan selebihnya iaitu 10.3 peratus responden memberikan jawapan tidak pasti. Nilai 115

min sederhana tinggi 3.2 di kawasan Bakar Bata ini menunjukkan kedudukan BN di kawasan Bakar Bata (N.12)

ini masih stabil kerana ramai responden yang menyokong penuh pemerintahan

kerajaan BN. Sokongan terhadap Menteri Besar baharu Dato’ Seri Ahmad Bashah

Bahagian ini akan menjelaskan sokongan pengundi terhadap Menteri Besar yang baharu iaitu Dato‘ Seri Ahmad Bashah. Merujuk Jadual 6, dapatan kajian di kawasan Ayer Hitam (N.04) menunjukkan sebanyak 68.5 peratus tidak bersetuju bahawa pemilihan Dato‘ Seri Ahmad Bashah sebagai Menteri Besar adalah keputusan yang tepat. Hanya 14.5 peratus bersetuju dengan pemilihan beliau dan 17 peratus lagi memberikan jawapan tidak pasti. Nilai min yang dicatatkan pada soalan ini berada pada tahap sederhana rendah iaitu 2.23 seperti yang ditunjukkan dalam Jadual 4.17. Nilai min yang sederhana rendah ini menunjukkan rakyat di kawasan Ayer Hitam (N.04) ini menolak perlantikan Dato‘ Seri Ahmad Bashah sebagai menteri Besar Baharu dan menganggap perlantikan beliau bukanlah keputusan yang tepat.

Jadual 6:Menyokong Menteri Besar Baharu di Kedah Pemilihan Dato‘ Seri Ahmad

TS

KS

TP

S

SS

Bashah sebagai Menteri Besar

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

Ayer Hitam

25.5

43

17

11.5

3

Bakar Bata

15.1

27

13

28.6

16.2 3.04

Min

Baharu adalah keputusan tepat. 2.23

Sumber: Data Lapangan, 2016 Bagi responden di kawasan Bakar Bata (N.12) pula, majoritinya bersetuju dengan perlantikan Dato‘ Seri Ahmad Bashah sebagai Menteri Besar. Sebanyak 45.1 peratus bersetuju bahawa pemilihan Dato‘ Seri Ahmad Bashah sebagai Menteri Besar adalah keputusan yang tepat. Hanya 42.1 peratus tidak bersetuju dengan pemilihan beliau dan 13 peratus lagi tidak pasti. Nilai min yang dicatatkan berada pada tahap sederhana tinggi iaitu 3.04. Dapatan ini menunjukkan sokongan yang berbeza di kedua-dua kawasan, dan sokongan responden terhadap ADUN di kawasan mereka adalah tinggi.

116

Sokongan kepadaBN pada PRU akan Datang

Adakah krisis memberi kesan kepada sokongan pengundi pada PRU akan datang? Merujuk Jadual 7, kedudukan dan sokongan BN di kawasan Ayer Hitam (N.04) dan Bakar Bata (N.12) pada masa akan datang menunjukkan keputusan yang berbeza. Di kawasan Ayer Hitam (N.04) kedudukan BN boleh dikatakan agak tidak kukuh dengan nilai min yang dicatatkan berada pada tahap sederhana rendah iaitu 2.7 seperti dalam Jadual 7. Sebanyak 45 peratus responden tidak bersetuju untuk memilih BN pada masa akan datang. 26.5 peratus pula tidak pasti sama ada akan memilih BN dan hanya 28.5 peratus bersetuju untuk memilih BN pada masa akan datang.

Jadual 7:Menyokong BN pada PRU akan Datang Anda akan memilih BN pada PRU

TS

KS

TP

S

SS

Min

akan datang.

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

(%)

Ayer Hitam

19.5

25.5

26.5

23

5.5

2.7

Bakar Bata

15.7

13

29.2

29.2

13

3.11

Sumber: Data Lapangan, 2016

Berbeza pula dengan kawasan Ayer Hitam (N.04), kedudukan BN di kawasan Bakar Bata (N.12) berada pada situasi lebih baik berbanding di kawasan Ayer Hitam (N.04) apabila majoriti responden bersetuju untuk memilih BN iaitu sebanyak 42.2 peratus. Sementara itu hanya 28.7 peratus yang tidak bersetuju untuk memilih BN pada PRU akan datang dan selebihnya sebanyak 29.2 peratus lagi memberikan jawapan tidak pasti. Nilai min pula berada pada sederhana tinggi iaitu 3.11 yang menunjukkan kedudukan BN yang cerah untuk terus mendapat sokongan pengundi pada PRU akan datang.

Kesimpulan

Secara keseluruhannya, dapat dirumuskan bahawa krisis kepimpinan politik ini secara langsung atau tidak langsung memberi kesan kepada sokongan pengundi. Hasil analisis yang dilakukan, kertas kerja ini menemukan beberapa perkara iaitu pertamanya, krisis kepimpinan politik ini telah bermula pada April 2015. Kedua, kertas kerja ini mendapati bahawa responden di kawasan DUN 117

Ayer Hitam (N.04) jelas menunjukkan penolakan terhadap BN dan Datuk seri Ahmad Bashah sebagai Menteri Besar. Sementara itu, bagi responden di kawasan DUN Bakar Bata (N.12) pula, penerimaan rakyat terhadap BN masih kukuh dan kurang terjejas. Penerimaan terhadap Dato‘ seri Ahmad Bashah pula berada pada tahap yang sederhana apabila kurang diterima DUN Ayer Hitam (N.04), namun diterima lebih baik di DUN Bakar Bata (N.12). Selain itu, kertas kerja dapat merumuskan bahawa sokongan responden di Bakar Bata (N.12) lebih tinggi kepada BN berbanding kawasan Ayer Hitam (N.04). Dapatan juga menunjukkan perkara yang sama untuk sokongan terhadap Menteri Besar yang baharu dan juga sokongan kepada BN pada PRU akan datang. Rujukan

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Sinar

Harian.

(2016).

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Percaya

Ramai

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Yang

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Kedah:

Kecewa. Sinar Harian, 4 Februari.

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Sudin

&

Hafidz

Hussein

(2002).

Konflik

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UUM, Sintok.

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UMNO Datang.

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119

State, Religion and Democracy Islam in Indonesian Politics and Foreign Policy in the post-Cold War era Ahmad Nizar Yaakub & Siti Zanariah Ahmad Ishak Universiti Malaysia Sarawak Abstract Constructivist theories like Alexander Wendt and Stephen Walt strongly believed that religion is an ideational construct which often been left out from the discussions by leading theories as an important factor in explaining developments in politics and international relations. In short, religion has an important role to play in shaping state policies in one way or another and the terrorists attacked in many parts of the world certainly led to an expansion of the debate on this topic. Therefore, it is unthinkable to leave out the factor of religion in discussing Indonesian politics and foreign policy when it has the largest Muslim population in the world. This paper argued that in the post Cold War era especially after the fall of Suharto and the beginning of the democratization process, Islam began to emerge as a growing force to a varying degree on the Indonesian political scene and somewhat influenced its foreign policy. The concern on Islamic identity among Indonesians, increasing number of Islamic parties and the elevation of leaders like Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) as President and later Hamzah Haz as Vice President showed the growing importance of Islam in Indonesian politics. At the same time, Indonesia‘s involvement in D8 and OIC, its concern on Bosnia, Palestine and the fight against terrorism to some extent showed the influence of Islam in its foreign policy. Keywords: democracy, foreign policy, Islam, politics Introduction Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world with 219.744 million people in 2015. It did not become an Islamic state but adopted ―Pancasila‖ as its main ideology with ―Belief in the absoluteness of God‖ as its first principle. It also adopted an ―independent and active‖ foreign policy. It is unthinkable to leave out the factor of religion (Islam) in discussing Indonesian politics and foreign policy. This paper argued that in the post-Cold War era, Islam began to be a recognized force in the Indonesian politics and foreign policy especially after the fall of the Suharto government. This had been assisted further when Indonesia moved towards a transition to democracy in 1998 which saw the making of electoral laws that allow for the formation of new political parties. At the same time, the Indonesian government also started to take step in increasing its international profile by pursuing a more active foreign policy especially on issues concerning the Islamic World. This paper began with discussing on the influence of religion in politics and foreign 120

policy from the Constructivist perspective. It then followed by identifying the role of Islam in Indonesian politics before and after independence especially under the Sukarno government. Then, this paper showed the growing influence of Islam in Indonesian politics and foreign policy in the post-Cold War era under Suharto government especially when he wanted to seek the political support from the Islamic organizations and groups as well as to project a higher international profile for Indonesia. After the fall of Suharto, the paper examined how Islam began to be a growing force and gaining more influence in Indonesian politics through the establishment of many Islamic political parties and how the reactions from the Muslim communities towards international affairs which concern the Muslim World influenced Indonesia‘s foreign policy.

Constructivism: The influence of religion in politics and foreign policy

In the post-Colonial era, countries with a sizable or majority Muslim population often adopted either secular or theocratic state identity. Secular Muslim states adopted an institutional separation between state and Islam. Meanwhile, Islamic states departed from the believed that there is no separation between the state (al dawlah) and religion (ad din). Islam is considered to be holistic teaching which can be applied in all aspect of life including politics and foreign policy (Azra, 2006: 7). According to Dawisha (1983: 5) in a theocratic political state identity (Islamic state), Islam would have a more direct influence on the formulation of state foreign policy, acting ―as a motivator, legitimator or simply a justifier‖. Meanwhile, in a secular state identity, Islam has a limited influence on the state domestic and foreign policies. However, this simple categorization did not capture the real dynamic of domestic political and foreign policies‘ operations in many Muslim majority countries where a conjunction of various Islam related national and international issues, institutions and events has increasingly come to shape the formally secular state‘s foreign policies.

In the post-Cold War era, Samuel Huntington stated that religion has become an important source of conflict in politics and international relations (Huntington, 1993). He considered much of the tensions and conflicts in religion to arise from Muslim and non-Muslim societies. These religious conflicts wrapped up into parts of what he called the ‗clash of civilizations‘. Constructivist theories like Alexander Wendt and Stephen Walt strongly believed that religion is an ideational construct which often been left out from discussions by other leading theories such as realism and liberalism as an important factor in explaining developments in politics and international relations (Yaakub, 121

2013). Basically, constructivists subscribe to the theoretical proposition that state‘s behavior is formed by the ―non-material factors‖ like ―identities, elite beliefs and social norms‖(Mingst, 2003: 76).

Meanwhile, Harris (2006) argued that in the post-Cold War era, an increasing number of

people started to identify themselves with a particular religion and that religion is conditioning national identity and influencing state foreign policy. In a similar view, Davidson (2004) stated that constructivists accepted that a society‘s religion, culture, ideology and nationalism are important in determining the foreign policy responses. Thus, religion has an important role to play in shaping a state domestic politics and foreign policies.

Islam, nationalism and the birth of the Indonesian Republic Islam has arrived on the Indonesian shore as early as 14th century through the Persian and Indian traders. Like in many parts of the Indonesian Archipelago, Islam and the traditional culture (adat) amalgamated well which appealed to the local people but to a varying degree to different races. As such, Islamic expression and commitment are different across the many islands in the Archipelago. Moreover, there were also differences in Islamic practices between Muslims from the Youth Group (Kaum Muda) and Elder Group (Kaum Tua) which saw armed clashes between them. In West Sumatra the Elders Group even sought the Dutch forces to defeat the Youth Group under Imam Bonjol in the Padri Wars (1821-1837) (Machmudi, 2008). In Java, the Javanese abangan followed a loose form of Islamic practices known to them as Agami Jawi. Meanwhile, the Javanese santri followed Agami Islam santri, a more strict Islamic practices (Carnegie, 2008).

During the Dutch colonial rule of the Indonesian Archipelago there were two most influential Muslim organizations namely Muhammadiyah which was formed in 1912 and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in 1926. The Muhammadiyah group followed the modernist approach and sought to reform the Indonesian Muslims whom they considered as being too backward and traditional. The Nahdlatul Ulama in contrast was more traditional in outlook and tried to protect and maintain the position and power of the religious leader (kiyai) (Yaakub, 2013). As a result of the division between the two groups, there was no united Islamic force to challenge the Dutch colonial rule.

The Japanese occupation of Indonesia in the Second World War saw the Japanese colonial authority established the Council of Muslim Organization called Masjumi in 1943. The Japanese saw Islam 122

can be a medium for them to propagate their ideology and propaganda. Ironically, through Masjumi, the Muhammadiyah group led by Ki Bagus Hadikusomo and Nahdlatul Ulama group by Abdul Wahid Hasjim were able to work together to seek independence for Indonesia and the creation of an Islamic state (Yaakub, 2013). Nevertheless, the nationalists who were seeking independence for Indonesia demanded the separation of state and religion. In order to solve the differences between the Islamists and the nationalists, a ‗Committee of Nine‖ was established which later agreed to accept ―Pancasila‖ with a provision that after the first principle of ―Belief in God‖ there will be an inclusion of Syariah law or Islamic law for the Muslims and a decree stating that only a Muslim is eligible to be elected as President (Hosen, 2007: 61; Elson, 2009: 118). The ―Committee of Nine‖ consists of Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, Abdul Wahid Hasjim, Abikoesno Tjokrosedjoso, Agus Salim, Ahmad Soebardjo, Hatta, Maramis, Muhammad Yamin and Sukarno. The settlement fell short of declaring Indonesia as an Islamic state. The settlement was known as the Jakarta Charter.

After the proclamation of independence by President Sukarno in 1945, the Vice President, Hatta made an announcement that for the sake of unity and the protest from the Protestant and Catholic leaders, the inclusion of Syariah law for the Muslims and a decree stating that only a Muslim is eligible to be elected as President would be removed from the Constitution (Hosen, 2007; Sukma, 2003). No doubt, the announcement was an act of betrayal at the highest order to the Masjumi leaders especially from theMuhammadiyah and NU by the nationalists led by Sukarno and Hatta. As a counter reaction, the apolitical Masyumi was later established as a political party in 1945. However, the Masjumi leaders postponed their protests against the Republican government under Sukarno as the latter were still in armed conflict with the returning Dutch colonial forces. A pocket of Islamic militant movements especially the Abode of Islam (Darul Islam) in Aceh, West Java, South Sulawesi revolted against the Republican Government as a protest of the betrayal and their aspiration to created an Islamic state (Azra, 2004; Yaakub 2013). These Islamic militant movements were later crushed by the Republican forces.

Independence was fully achieved in 1949 after the defeat of the Dutch colonial forces. In the same year, the Republican Government under Sukarno dropped the Jakarta Charter from the Indonesian Constitution (Carnegie, 2008). The action was considered by the Muslim leaders as a second betrayal by the Republican Government. It was also perceived that the government and the 123

Constitution wanted to marginalize Islam and reinforced the domination of Java especially the Javanese ethic group over others. In 1952, NU group left Masjumi Party as their leaders felt their roles were being marginalized (Fealy, Hooker and White, 2006: 45). The in-fighting in Masjumi and the withdrawal of NU had considerable impact to their votes in the first Indonesian General Elections in 1955 as many Indonesian Muslims preferred to choose the leftist and nationalist parties rather than the Islamic parties. The Masjumi Party only managed to garner 20.9 per cent and the newly established Nahdlatul Ulama Party obtained 18.4 per cent (Yaakub, 2013: 203). In the subsequent years, the Sukarno government quashed the armed rebellions by militant movements especially the Permesta which was unofficially supported by Nahdlatul Ulama Party. Meanwhile, the alternative government PPRI (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) was set up in West Sumatra to oppose the Central Government under Sukarno and it was unofficially supported by Masjumi Party and the lesser Partai Serikat Islam (The Indonesian Islamic League Party). Three of Masjumi Party top leaders including Mohammed Natsir had joined the PRRI in West Sumatra. As a result of their leaders‘ involvement, the Masjumi Party was banned by the Sukarno government (Samson, 1968; Carnegie, 2008; Yaakub 2013). Sukarno later introduced a new political system known as ―Guided Democracy‖ in 1959. The ―Guided Democracy‖ was to depict the rural Javanese village which focused on the idea of ―discussion and consensus‖. Through the new political system, a doctrine of NASAKOM (Nationalism, Religion and Communism) was established in order to appease the competing groups (Yaakub, 2013: 204). However, Sukarno leaned towards the nationalist and communist groups and arrested many leaders especially from the Islamic parties in the following years for opposing him.

Thus, it can be conclude that before and after independence, the nationalists and Sukarno government had betrayed the Islamic groups (Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama) and distrust the Islamic political parties especially the Majumi Party, Nahdlatul Ulama Party dan Partai Serikat Islam. The distrust on Islamic groups and Islamic political parties by the Sukarno government was reflected in its foreign policy. Once independent, the Sukarno government adopted the principle of ―independent and active‖ foreign policy. This principle actually worked effectively to exclude Islam as a factor in Indonesian foreign policy. Sukarno gave little attention to the Indonesia‘s relations with the Muslim and Arab World. In fact, his government put greater emphasized on relations with the Western countries and later alliance with the Communist countries especially the former Soviet

124

Union. Sukarno‘s declaration of Confrontation with Malaysia in 1963 also reflected to his little consideration on the shared religion and ethnicity in both countries. Coup, Islam and Suharto’s government in the Cold War

The failed coup in September 1965 saw the Army gained the upper hand in the Indonesian politics. The Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) was accused by the Indonesian Army to be the mastermind in the failed coup by some disgruntled middle ranking military officers. As a result, the Army and some Islamic political parties collaborated to crush the PKI. The Army under Suharto with the help from the Nahdlatul Ulama youth wing ―Ansor‖ conducted what can be called as mass killings of thousands of PKI leaders and members in retaliation to the murdered of five senior army general at Lubang Buaya (Bourchier & Hadiz, 2003: 82).

When Suharto took office as President, he showed a good gesture to the Islamic parties by releasing many of the leaders of Masjumi Party and other Islamic parties that were imprisoned by the Sukarno government. No doubt, this gesture was in return for the collaboration that the Islamic parties had given to the Army in eliminating PKI and the communist groups. Many of the Islamic parties and groups were hoping that the Suharto government would allow them to play greater role in the Indonesian politics. This was not happening as the Suharto government was just like the Sukarno government that distrusts the leaders of the Islamic parties and groups especially on their involvement in several earlier rebellions. At the same time, Suharto wanted the Army to be the dominant force in the Indonesian politics. The Suharto government even refused to allow the establishment of new Islamic political parties or lifted the banned on Masjumi Party (Bourchier & Hadiz, 2003).

In the subsequent years, the Suharto government forced the four Islamic political parties namely the Muslim Party of Indonesia (PMI), the Islamic Association Party of Indonesia (PSII), the Islamic Educational Movement and Nahdlatul Ulama Party to merge in to a single party known as the United Development Party (PPP). The party fundamental ideology was set to be ‗Pancasila‘ and not Islam. As a result of dissatisfaction in PPP, Nahdlatul Ulama group withdrew from the party and Indonesian politics to focus on educational, social and religious activities.

125

In the foreign policy, Islam had little influence on the Suharto government. The burning of the Al Aqsa mosque by the Israelis in 1969 led to a massive demonstration by the Indonesian Muslims in Jakarta. In order to appease the angry Indonesian Muslims, the Suharto government condemned the Israeli‘s action but it was done as part of the collective Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) voice. When the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) was established in Morocco in 1970 with a purpose to show unity and solidarity in the Muslim World, Indonesia declined to attend or be a member of the organization. Over the years, Indonesia finally participated in the OIC but only as a permanent observer (Banyu Perwita, 2007). It can be said that in the Cold War era under Suharto government, Islamic political parties and groups did not fare better than the Sukarno period as Suharto distrusted them due to the previous rebellions. Suharto even forced the Islamic parties to merge into one single party and to take up the state ideology as its ideology instead of Islam. As such, in foreign policy, Indonesia had minimal contact with the Muslim World.

Post-Cold War: Islam,politics and foreign policy in the led up to the fall of Suharto

In the post-Cold War era, President Suharto began to feel that his grip on the government and military was declining as a result of increasing challenge from the retired and senior military officers. According to Sofjian (2006), Suharto began to seek support from the Muslim masses. In 1990, he went to Mecca to perform ―hajj‖ with his family, some friends and cabinet ministers. The event was televised nationally. After that, in many Golkar Party‘s publication the usage of the title ―Hadji‖ and the adoption of an Islamic name ―Muhammad‖ was used for Suharto. To a large extent it was argued by Suryadinata (1997: 276) that the new Islamic credentials was used by Suharto for political strategy in order to win the votes from the Indonesian Muslims before the 1990 Indonesian General Election.

Suharto also encouraged his Vice President, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie (Habibie) to establish the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) in 1990. ICMI was used by Suharto to recruit civilians into his cabinet and Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) (People‘s Representative Assembly) (Porter, 2002). This basically gave the Muslim intellectuals an opportunity to be involved directly in Indonesian politics. At the same time, many of the Muslim organizations were 126

able to lobby the Suharto government to accept the ―Islamic values‖ such as lifting the prohibition of women wearing hijab, to ban the national sports lottery, to establish Islamic insurance and banking, to introduce halal logo on food products and to regulate Islamic marriages (Banyu Perwita, 2007).

In foreign policy, the Suharto government started to uplift the Indonesia standing and profile in the international politics through a more active participation particularly in the Islamic World. In 1990, the Suharto government sought and gained a full membership in OIC. Indonesia was elected Chairman of OIC in the 1993 Summit. With this new status, Indonesia began to forge closer relations with the Muslim countries through Suharto‘s official visit to Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Iran and Turkey. Indonesia even joined D8 (Developing 8 Muslim Countries) in order to develop closer economic collaboration. Earlier, in 1991 the Suharto government donated 100 million rupiah and 100 tonnes of rice to the PLO in support of the Palestinian cause (Sukma, 2003: 72). This was done due to the strong demand by the Indonesian Muslim organizations for Suharto government to do more for the Palestinian people. The following year, Suharto in his capacity as the Chairman of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) invited the PLO leader, Yasser Arafat to the Summit meeting in Indonesia. Again in 1993, Yasser Arafat and his wife Suha visited Indonesia where Suharto made a statement that ―Indonesia is ready to offer real support to the struggle of the Palestinian people‖ (Azra, 2006: 103).

.

Indonesia also took an interest in the Bosnian conflict when it recognized the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 20th May 1992. As the Bosnian conflicts accelerated into ―total war‖, the PPP and other Indonesian Muslim organizations especially the Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World (KISDI) and the Indonesian Council of Ulamas or Islamic Scholars (MUI) demanded the Suharto government to further support the Bosnian Muslims. As a result, Indonesia sent 200 medical officers to Bosnia-Herzegovina under the UN peacekeeping force. At the same time Suharto made a secret visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina on March 1995 when the conflict was still in full swing. No doubt his action was done in order to gain more political support among the Indonesian Muslims.

Thus, it can be summed up that in the post-Cold War under the Suharto government, Islam became more influential as a force when Suharto courted the Muslim masses and organizations through 127

greater political participation and adopted Islamic values to gain their support in elections. At the same time, the Suharto government became more active in championing the Muslim issues and plights largely due to the pressure from the Muslim masses and the intention to raise the image of Indonesia at the international level.

The financial and economic crises in the 1998 and later the massive civilian and students demonstrations finally led to Suharto government downfall. According to Porter (2002) despite the media hype on the role of students‘ demonstrations from the secular elite universities, most of the students demonstrations were from the Muslim University Students Action Front (KAMMI) which had affiliation in 63 public and private universities. The Islamic organizations especially the Muhammadiyah which initially supported Suharto also began to distance themselves from him as they were dissatisfied with the rampant corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN) in his government. When the demonstrations and riots became out of hand, Suharto called on the Islamic organizations for support but they shunned him and instead asked for his resignation and more political freedom.

Post Cold War: Islam in Indonesian politics and foreign policy after Suharto

In politics, the resignation of Suharto and the elevation of Habibie as the new President saw the transition from an authoritarian to a more democratic government. Habibie did not received strong support from his own Golkar Party and the military. As such he relied on the support of the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World (KISDI) and the Indonesian Council for Islamic Missionary Activity (DDII). He also appointed many members of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) to the cabinet posts such as Adi Sasono, A.M. Saefuddin, Fahmi Idris, Marzuki Usman, Soleh Solahuddin and Tuty Alawiyah. One of Habibie contributions was reforming the electoral process that allowed the establishment of 141 new political parties of which 42 were considered Islamic political parties (Sukma, 2003: 85). This encouraged greater participation of political parties in the 1999 General Election. However, only 20 so called formal and informal Islamic parties met the requirements to participate in the 1999 General Election. No doubt, Islam became an emerging force and gained greater foot-hold in the Indonesian politics.

128

Table 1: Indonesia’s Parliamentary Election Results (1999 and 2004) 1999

Votes

Seats

2004

Votes

Seats

PDI-P

33.74

153

PDI-P

18.53

109

Golkar

22.44

120

Golkar

21.58

128

PKB**

12.61

51

PKB**

10.57

52

PPP*

10.71

58

PPP*

8.51

58

PAN**

7.12

34

PD

7.45

55

PBB*

1.94

13

PKS*

7.34

45

PK*

1.36

7

PAN**

6.44

53

PKP

1.01

4

PBB*

2.62

11

PNU*

0.64

5

PBR*

2.44

14

PDI

0.62

2

PDS

2.13

13

Other Parties

7.81

15

Other Parties

12.39

12

Total

100.00

462

Total

100.00

550

Source: Abuza 2007: 25. *formal Islamic political parties **informal Islamic political parties

Based on Table 1, in 1999 the formal and informal Islamic political parties managed to capture 70 and 85 seats respectively. According to Abuza (2007: 22) the formal and informal Islamic political parties managed to capture about 33 per cent (155 seats) in the DPR in 1999. The formal Islamic parties are the ones that openly declared Islam as their political ideology and the informal Islamic political parties ―… declare(d) their identity as ‗open‘ political parties and adopt pluralism in their platform but remain dependent upon key segment in the Islamic community for support‖ (Sukma, 2003: 95). The alliance of Islamic political parties known as the ―Central Axis‖ succeeded in lifting Abduurahman Wahid (Gus Dur) from PKB and the voice of Nahdlatul Ulama as the new President in 1999. At the same time, PAN and Muhammadiyah leader, Amien Rais was elected the Chairman

129

of the MPR. The results indicated that if Islamic political parties are ―united‖ they can be an important force in the Indonesian politics. Unfortunately, Gus Dur‘s government managed to be in power for only 21 months as he was impeached by the MPR and replaced by Megawati Sukarnoputeri from PDI-P. Basically, Gus Dur provoked firstly, the alliance of the Central Axis by sacking Hamzah Haz from his cabinet, a chairman from PPP, secondly, having serious economic mismanagement and finally trying to open trade relations with Israel even when it was opposed by the majority of Indonesian Muslims. In order to appease the Muslim supporters and to maintain new support from the ―Central Axis‖, Megawati appointed Hamzah Haz as her Vice President. According to Banyu Perwita (2007: 163), Megawati viewed the Muslim supporters as an essential part of her political legitimacy.

Based on Table 1, in the 2004 General Election, the Islamic formal and informal political parties increased their seats to 233 (42 per cent) in the Indonesian People‘s Representative Council (DPR) from 155 seats (33 per cent) in 1999. Despite the Islamic political parties‘ strong presence in the DPR, they were not ―united‖. As a result, Susilo Bambang Yudhyono (SBY), a chairman of Democrat Party finally won the Presidential Election. Later, SBY appointed 10 cabinet ministers from the Islamic political parties in appreciation of their support in the election. SBY made every effort to show his government understood the aspiration of the Muslim masses. The Aceh Conflict ended when SBY government granted partial autonomy and the implementation of the Syariah law in the Aceh Province (Hosen, 2007: 218). SBY won again in the 2009 General Election but due to the new Constitution he was not allowed to run for the post of President for the third time

In April 2014 General Election, the five Islamic parties; the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), the National Awakening Party (PKB), the United Development Party (PPP), the Crescent Star Party (PBB) and the National Mandate Party (PAN) collectively won 32 percent of the vote compared to 26 percent in 2009 General Election (Paramewaran, 2017: 3). In the 2014 Presidential Election, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) won against former General Prabowo Subianto. The political parties in the government coalition under Jokowi managed to muster more than 65 per cent seats in the DPR of which 24 per cent came from the three Islamic parties namely PKB, PPP and PAN (Parlina & Ramadhani, 2016). Despite being in the government coalition, PKB, PPP and PAN did not support Jokowi‘s PDI-P candidate under Basuki ―Ahok‖ Tjahaja Purnama in the February 2017 Jakarta 130

Gubernatorial Election. Ahok had earlier angered the Indonesian Muslims for insulting the Quran, al-Maidah verse 51 which warned Muslims against taking Jews and Christians as allies. The Islamic parties pushed for his persecution for blasphemy charges. PKB, PPP and PAN later joined forces with the rival Democratic Party to endorse Agus Harimurti, the son of Yudhyono. Several huge demonstrations (half a million Indonesian Muslims in December 2016) were held in Jakarta to demand action against Ahok. Jokowi also attended the demonstrations on 4th Nov and 2nd Dec 2016 in an attempt to calm the tensions and to appease the hard-line Islamists for the sake of political stability. The Ahok controversy showed that the Islamic card was used in the Indonesian politics to mobilize the Muslims populace. In foreign policy, the end of the Suharto era, saw a rise of Islam‘s influence in Indonesian foreign policy but fluctuated due to the tension faced by successive governments. The Habibie government accommodated the demands of the Muslim organizations to a large extent even allowed the Muslims to carry out demonstrations in front of the US and other European countries‘ embassies but refused to condemn the US and its European allies‘ air strikes on Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan as they were the financial lenders to Indonesia through IMF and the World Bank after the 1997 economic and financial crisis. During Gus Dur‘s government, the Islamic factor is more evident in his foreign policy. He built strong relations with the Middle East countries and gained substantial investments and financial assistances from Qatar and Kuwait (Sukma, 2003). When he tried to open trade relations with Israel, it provoked angry reaction from the Indonesian Muslims. Gus Dur argued that during the Prophet Muhammad time, the Muslims did trade with the Jewish people. Nevertheless, the Indonesian Muslims could not stomach the Israeli government as it continued killing and suppressing the Palestinian Muslims. Due to his government‘s contradictory foreign policy and general incompetence, the Islamic political parties that pushed him to power became the ones that pulled him down.

Megawati government came to power with the strong support from the formal and informal Islamic political parties that saw Hamzah Haz from PPP became the Vice President. In foreign policy, Megawati focused on building relations with the US, Japan and European countries for economic reasons but neglected the relations with the Muslims and the Middle East countries. A week after the 9/11 terrorists attack on US soil, Megawati visited the US to extend condolences and to support President Bush‘s ―War on Terror‖. As a ―quid pro quo‖ President Bush granted US$657.7 million 131

financial aid to Indonesia and resumed military cooperation that was suspended after the Dili Massacre in1991 (Sukma, 2003: 132). The US and its European allies‘ invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan received strong condemnation from the Indonesian Muslims. MUI and the radical Muslim groups especially Islamic Defenders Front and Laskar Jihad called on Indonesians for jihad again US and its European allies (Azra, 2006). However, Megawati lackluster in responding to the Islamic cause in foreign policy angered the extremist Muslim groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) which can be associated with several terrorist attacks on Bali and Jakarta.

During SBY period, his Democrat Party government reliance on the support from the Islamic political forces had led to the growing influence of Islam as a factor in the Indonesian foreign policy. To show his government solidarity with the struggle of the Palestinians, SBY went to Cairo in November 2004 with several prominent Muslim leaders such as Hidayat Nurwahid from Islamic Party (PKS) who was also the Speaker of MPR, Din Syamsuddin from MUI, Hasyim Muzadi from NU and Amin Abdullah from Muhammadiyah to extend condolences on the death of the Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat (Al-Anshori, 2016: 183). During his visit to the US he shared the need to combat terrorism with President George W. Bush but he also raised the issue of the Palestinian people and the need for an independent Palestinian state as well as requested Bush to restart the Middle East peace process (Yaakub, 2013: 217). In May 2006, Indonesia hosted the D8 summit in Bali to enhance economic cooperation among the eight Muslim countries. Meanwhile at the Third World Islamic Economic Forum in 2007, SBY requested that Muslim countries should increase the flow of trade and investment among them by relaxing trade barriers (Yaakub, 2013: 217). He also stressed that Islamic countries should used their energy resources and commodities to get a better deal and fair exchange of knowledge and technology from the Western countries.

In foreign policy, Jokowi government has been accommodative to the call by Muslim populace and Islamic parties to the plight of Muslims around the world. On May 2016, Jokowi allowed the Rohingya Muslims boat people from Myanmar to land on Indonesian soil after the Indonesian Islamic parties demanded him to help on humanitarian grounds the Rohingya Muslims who face persecution from their governments. Moreover, on Feb 2017, King Salman Abdulaziz Al Saud made a 12 days visit to Indonesia which heralded as a new start for Indonesia cordial bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia as the guardian of the two holiest places for Muslims and Indonesia as the country with the largest Muslim population in the world. Indonesia also tried to amplify the 132

message of interfaith tolerance in the country. Religious Affairs Minister Lukman Hakim Syaifuddin commented that the dialogue of King Salman with Indonesia interfaith figures was done to convey a message of peace to the Indonesians and the world that ―… religions should not be used as a tool to achieve political goals that could lead to extremism, radicalism and terrorism‖ (Koswaraputra, 2017, para. 7).The visit by King Salman may have propped up Jokowi public standing among Indonesian Muslims and replenished his Islamic credentials which often questioned by the conservative Muslim groups and political opponents. According to Bayuni 2017, this will have many repercussions in the national political landscape, where Islam has become an important if not decisive factor.

Conclusion

Religion which constructivist considered as an ideational construct continues to be a salient factor in the domestic politics of many non-Western countries including Indonesia which has the largest number of Muslim population in the world. The Indonesian religious leaders and groups often played a role in the domestic politics since independence. The religious affiliation of political candidates, for example, in the Presidential Elections is often scrutinized by the Muslim population. The fluctuations of influence of Islam in Indonesian domestic politics over the years are due to the pressure of Indonesian populace, political parties and pressure groups which have some bearing on the foreign policy. In the post-Cold War era, Islam began to grow again as an important force in the Indonesian politics after the fall of Suharto and the rapid process of democratization. Gus Dur was the first religious and political leader who managed to ascend to power in 1999 which reflected the important of ―unity‖ among the Islamic political parties to be in power. On the whole, the Indonesian leaderships tended to court the Muslim masses when they were weak but as they grew stronger, the greater element of control was imposed on the Muslim masses. In foreign policy, Indonesian leaders quite often listen to the demand of the Islamic political parties and groups to take actions or to show supports concerning the plights of the Muslims all over the world especially in Bosnia, Palestine and Myanmar. At the same time, Indonesia slowly began to strengthen its relations with the Islamic countries and organizations such as Saudi Arabia, D8 and OIC.

133

References

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Religion, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria Ayandeji Lateef Akanbi & Ahmad Nizar Yaakub Universiti Malaysia Sarawak Abstract Nigeria is a plural and complex society based on her characteristic as multi ethnic, class, socialcultural and religion which have manifested in her domestic politics. Religion and ethnic have been adopted and utilized by the Political Elites as instruments of mobilization, patronage and sharing of the national resources. In view of this, most of the conflicts in Nigeria have assumed and attributed to religions and ethnics in character. More importantly, the political conflicts in Nigeria have undermined the peaceful co-existence among the people and overall development of Nigeria. The failure to address the religious and ethnic problems may thwart and disintegrate the nascent of Nigerian democratic government. This paper aims to analyse the relationship between religion, ethnicity and causes of the political conflicts in Nigeria democratic system. Based on this analysis, it concludes that the inability and weakness of successive governments to deliver the dividends of democracy and address the socio-economy and political problems have exacerbated the religious and ethnic conflicts. In order to overcome the problems, amongst the recommendations are good governance, justice, accountability and transparency as they would unify both ethnics and religious disparity that remains as an obstacle to the good governance and the overall development of Nigeria. Keywords: democracy, ethnicity, good governance, religion

Introduction Nigeria has become a reference point in the media and literatures, synonymous with conflicts due to her persistence and recursive of conflicts in which the ethnic and religion are the main basis for these violent conflicts.Diversity in nature and character of the Nigerian state is commonly assumed to be responsible for the deepening and frequents of this violent conflicts. However, the complexity in the polity of Nigeria state is responsible for the ineffectiveness and the weakness of the policy as a strategy to curb the violent conflicts. Conflict is an inevitable in all societies, therefore, the mechanism to checks and control these phenomena should be effective and empowered to achieve its goal and objective.

The diversity in nature may not be necessary responsible for the tension in the heterogeneous environment, most of the diverse nations in the worldutilize their diversity in nature to improve in their social-economy, technology development and others. In Nigeria, the situation is an opposite and the diversity of Nigeria has been a curse and a source of conflicts. The feeling of distrust and 136

lack of cohesiveness among the various ethnics and religious faiths has been manifested itself in the day-to–day activities and competition among the various ethnics and religions over the distribution of resources and privileges. The absence of cohesiveness, unity, and trust in the Nigeria polity has manifested and played the major roles in agitating for resource control by regions, call for Sovereign National Conference, control of state power and restructuring into true federalism.

However, the present democratic government of Nigeria haswitnessed series of conflicts from the ethnic and religious perspectives. The returning of democracy in Nigeria is like opening a can of worm due to the consistence protesting of the grievances by various ethnic groups and religious faiths to re-address what they perceived as injustice melted on them by military junta that has been in control of the affairs of the nation for about three decades. In the process of these protests, it escalated into violent conflicts that led to the killing of thousands of Nigerians and damage properties worth billions of dollars.

Moreover, it is unfortunate that the vacuum created by these conflicts in Nigeriaare yet to recover and still generating more and more disunity, suspicions among the populace. The implication of the violent conflicts is that it goes beyond the political sphere but cut across the socio-economy and image of the country as one of the unsafe nation in the continent. In addition, the resources that should have been used for the development and provision of infrastructure have being channel toward the compensations and rebuilding the structures damaged in the course of conflicts. Although the government of Nigeriaformulated several policies and establishedinstitutions as a strategy for the cohesiveness and unity of the nation but this institutions are weak and inadequate to achieve their objectives.

This paper argued that the failure of the Nigerian government to address the key issues of injustice and poverty, true federalism, policy and economy, restructuring, unemployment and corruption are among the factors responsible for the re-occurrences of ethnic and religious violent conflicts in Nigeria.

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Conceptual clarification

Ethnicity: According to Osaghae (1992) ethnicity is a social formation that rest upon the culturally specific practices and a unique set of symbol and cosmology. McMillan (2003) refereed to ethnicity as the consciousness of shared origin and traditions.

Smith (1991) elaborated that the main

attributes of ethnic communities capturing the essence of the concept as a collective of proper name, a myth of common ancestry and shared historical memories. One or more differentiating element of common culture is associated with specific home land and a sense of solidarity for significant sector of population. Ethnicity could also be seen as a pattern of relationship which tends to develop among the specific group of people when they co-exist and interact on the basis of their ethnic groups. Osaghae and Suberu (2005) asserted that ethnicityas a contextual discrimination used by members of specific ethnic groups against the others in competition or struggle for resources or power which often results in conflict. It is a basic and politically salient identity of Nigerians. However, most Nigerians tend to define themselves in term of ethnic where they belong to as opposed to others. In Nigeria, there are over four hundred ethnics groups andonly three considered important while the rest are considered minorities (Accord, 2016:4). This major ethnic groups are Hausa, Yoruba and Ibos. Following the heterogeneous in nature, therefore, the competition among these ethnics is inevitable and at the same times as the source of most the conflicts. Conflict:

A general view in the conflict and peace studies is that conflict is inevitable in all

societies. This perception includes that violent conflict which hampered development and socioeconomy of the affected nation. It is a great enemy to the humanity, and in most cases, the vacuum created by the violent conflict is irreparable. In other words, the conflict could also play positive roles to achieve certain goal and objective not to say that all conflicts are evils, the society still need it for the development and competition toward the development. However, it depends on the capacities and capabilities of the institutions and policies responsible for these, therefore, institutions meant for these, must be active and effective totheir tasks.

Lund (1997) posited that conflict is present when two or more parties perceived that their interests are incompatible, express hostile‘s attitudes, or pursue their interests through actions that cause 138

damage the other parties. These parties may be individuals, small or large group, and countries. Interest can be diverging in many ways on: i.

Over resources – territory, money, energy sources, food and how they should be distributed.

ii.

Over power - how control and participation in political decision-making are allocated.

iii.

Over identity - concerning the cultural, social and political communities to which people feel tied.

iv.

Over status - particularly those embodied in systems of government, religion, or ideology.

Nwolise (2004) asserted that conflict is a phenomenal product of ‗clash of interest‘ between one or more parties who may be individual, groups, state or a collection of any of these. His definition presents conflict as a product of clash or diverge interest. In view of this, conflict is an inevitable andthere will be clash of interest.However, it should be prevented to avoid escalating into violent conflict with the establishment of effective and capable internal management mechanism (policy).

Religion: Religioncould be views as a belief in the existence of God or Gods, and the activities that are connected with the worship of them. Nigeria is a multi –religious nation and as a secular nation, the constitution allowed anyone to practice their own faiths, that it is freedom to the religion according to the law of the land. Nigeria is a secular state where the government is not permitted by law to give a preferential treatment or support to any particular religion. In Nigeria, the average Nigerians are very religious.

Both ethnic and religion are forces to be reckoned with in the

instituting and executing socio-economic policy by the government. The religion has played an important and critical role in day-to-day activities in most of Nigerian lives and various establishments.

The three major religions in Nigeria are - Christian, Islam and traditional religion (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005:11; Omorogbe and Omohan, 2005:557). While Christianity and Islam remains the most popular religions,the traditional religion is the politically in-active among them. In this context, most of the interior or local communitiesin the southern part of the country associated with their traditional way of beliefs and worships that serves as a force of unification and identity. However, the Christian and Islam followers are the ones at each other‘s throats, always at conflict with each other. It is also worth tomentioned that, among these major religions, there exist many 139

sub-cleavages (sects) and intra-group conflicts among them. Within the Christian followers, there is a conflict of interest and popularity between the Pentecostal churches and the Orthodox churches including conflict between Protestant and the Catholic. In Islam also, there is contradiction between Ahmadiyya movement and the Sunnis (Egwu 2001). However, religious conflicts arises as a result of the claims of monopoly with regards to the religious truth while others cannot hold the truth at the same time, hence, the occurrence of friction, antagonism, incompatibility and dispute (Ayantayo,2005). In Nigeria, most of the conflicts arise between Christianity and Islam and the conflicts between two ethnics group usuallyescalates into the religious conflict.

Ethno-Religious Conflicts and Nigeria Democracy

Conflict exists everywhere and it is inevitable in every societies. It has been an endemic feature of most societies in the world for years and one of the most sensitive tasks confronting humanity today. Conflict exists irrespective of religious affiliation–traditional, Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, or political inclination- democratic or undemocratic and economic-developed or undeveloped. Almost all the countries in the world had experienced and some still experiencing one form of conflict or the other, but the degree and variation of the consequences depends on the internal management capacity and capability of the affected nation. The rising of ethnic and religious violent conflicts in Nigeria is alarming and most of these violent conflicts in Nigeria have been traced to the resumption of democratic system in Nigeria. The persisted ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria are increasingly more than ever before. The ethnic and religious violent conflicts in Nigeria have led to extensive killings and left thousands of innocent Nigerians dead and the properties worth billions of dollar destroyed in the causes of these violent conflicts, while the resources that could have been used for the development are being channel towards the compensations and the re-building of the damage structures that occurred during the conflicts.

Nigeria is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious andmulti-party systemthat made it as one of the most complex nation in Africa. The diversity in nature should be accepted with the spirit of competition for the development. The conflict is inevitable, but it should not led to the killing and damages of the properties. Nigerians are now utilizing the dividends of democracy under the pretext of ethnic and religion to protest and express their grievances and dissatisfactions due to what they perceived as an injustice melted on them under military dictator. 140

Democracy entails freedom, but the freedom must be expressed justly and in order. It should be within the accepted and established constitution, because expressing certain right may even be a threat to others. Democracy may be view as a security, freedom, provision and guarantee of the welfare, and the interest of the citizen. Regrettably, democracy in Nigeria is being abused and as a period of violent conflicts. The failure of any democratic government to guarantees the security, welfare and interest of its citizen, such government does not brand the democracy and the consequence of such government, will be the re-occurrences of the violent conflicts.

The long period of the military in Nigeria has been indicted for creating and increasing the gap of distrust and suspicion among the various ethnics groups and different religious faiths in Nigeria.Meanwhile the political elites utilized state power to pursue their primordial interest that fuels the ethnic suspicious and religious intolerance.

Based on the 2000 Annual Report on the Human Rights situation in Nigeria published in Nigerian Tribune Newspaper, 19 September 2001, Tell Magazine, 24 September 2001 and The Punch, 22 November 2002, Nigeria had witnessed over fifty ethno-religious conflicts since the return of democratic government in 1999. The ethno-religious violent conflicts persisted due the inability and weakness of the institutions that responsible to address these phenomena. Examples of these violent conflicts includes: the Modakeke and Ife communal crisis (1980 and 2000), Kano religious violent conflict ( 1980), Maitatsine religious violent conflict (1981), Bulunkutu and Kaduna ethnic violent conflict (1982), Muslim and Christian clashes in Ilorin (1986), Muslim and Christian clashes in Kano (1990), Owo religions violent crisis (2001), Kano religious violent conflict (2001), Ijaw and Itsekiri, ethnic violent conflict(2001), Odimodi, Ogulaga , Kano, Benue crises (2001), Oodua People Congres and Hausa community in Lagos, Apprapum and Osatura in Cross River, ethnic violent conflict in Ado-Ekiti, communal crisis in Owo, religious violent conflict in Kaduna, Communal crisis in Abuja, religious violent conflict in Bauchi (2002), religious violent conflict in Ibadan, religious violent conflict in Plateau (2003), Religious violent conflict in Katsina State, Bauchi State, Niger State and Kano state, religious violent conflict in Adamawa (2007), communal violent between Offa and Erin-ile (2007), religious violent conflict in Bauchi, Borno, Maiduguri,Kano, Niger and Katsina (2009) communal violent conflict in Jos (2010), crisis renew in Bauchi, Jos and Maiduguiri (2010) and post-election crisis in( 2011 ) and the current Boko-Haram 141

in North-East Nigeria. By and large, there was no year passes without the incidences of the ethnicsand religious violent conflicts (Falola, 2001).

The damages of these violent conflicts are not limited to the political sphere alone but it cut across the socio-economy, and the country‘s image. Regrettably, the resources that could have being used for the development and the provision of infrastructures would be channeled for the compensation and re-building of the structures damaged during the wars.

The political elites failed to help in thissituation; they employed and utilized the ethnics and religious aspects under the pretext of democracy to pursue their selfless agenda and increasing the trend of intolerance and distrust among the populace that resulted to most of these conflicts. Most of these violent conflicts sponsored by political elites who wanted to protect their own personal interest at the expense of the nation. The ethnic rivalry and religious intolerance has put the nation into danger list as one of the unstable nation in Africa. The International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance Report (2001) asserted that numerous actors have a stake in the promotion of ethno-religious conflicts because associate arithmetic of numbers underpinning the conflicts translate into jobs, contract, the creation of local governments and states as well as representation in the national assembly (Nnoli, 1978).

Therefore, the institutions and structures that employed to

satiate and perpetuate these tendencies have proved inadequate, weak, and failed.

Major causes of ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria There are several factors that are responsible for the reoccurrence of ethno-religion conflicts in Nigeria. The most prominent amongst is the high rate of poverty in the country due to the unfavourable state of Nigerian economic condition. At the same time, the high rate of unemployment among the populace, particularly, among the youth. As such, the youth in Nigeria has been the brain behind and responsible for continuous violent conflicts in the country since the return of democratic government in 1999. The returned of democracy in Nigeria is like opening a can of worms. The formations of various ethnic militant groups has been rising purposely to defend the interest of their ethnics. They lay claim to correct the injustice melted on them during the military regime and what they regard as marginalization from the national government with attempt to reverse the status quo. 142

The Odua People Congress (OPC), Arewa People Congress (APC) , Egbesu Boys, Niger Deltan Youth Militant, and Boko Haram are mainly consisted of the youths. They are the perpetrators of most of these ethnics and religious crises in Nigeria. The study established that high rate of poverty among the populace, particularly among the youth instigated as the major causes of these violent conflicts in the country.

According to Barber(1988), the long period of military rules in Nigeria hasbeen indicted as the majorcauses of the present violent conflicts of the ethno-religionconflicts in Nigeria. The long period of military rule has created suspicion and distrust among the ethnics and religious groups due to the favouring of the particular ethnic and religious group at the expense of the others. However, democracy also create an atmosphere and avenue to exercise freedom by giving room to express opinions and to allow the protest of the grievances and dissatisfactions which in most cases metamorphosed into violent conflict.

Another reason why the ethno-religious crisis is on the rise in Nigeria is due to the uses of religious and ethnicity as a medium of political discourse and campaign. In Nigerian politics, ethnic and religion have been the major tools that politicians employed to reach the people for their primordial interests. In addition, the insincerity among political elites to enact good government and promote sincere programme of national integration and profound good economic condition have resulted to the massive corruption in the public offices. In view of this, such political elite could get access to the excess wealth that could be used to sponsor the ethnic or religious violence.

The government strategy for National Integration Due to thecomplexity of Nigeria as a multi ethnics and multi religious nation, thegovernment initiated some mechanisms as strategy to achieve high degree of national integration among the citizen for the purpose of national unity and co-existence. Although, these mechanisms achieved their goals to a certain degree initially, but it is unfortunate, that in the long run, the ethnicity and high level of corruption among the political elites rendered most of these mechanisms ineffective and weak. Among the mechanisms are the establishment of compulsory National Youth Service Corp (NYSC), creation of more states, War Against Indiscipline (WAI), National Directorate for 143

Employment (NDE), Better Life Programme, National Orientation Agency (NOA) and Poverty Alleviation.

However, it is generally accepted that the effective and good implementation of

these projects are capable to eradicate or minimize the rate of poverty in the country and to create cohesiveness among the populace but due to the insincerity among the political elites, most of these projects became an instrument of divisions against its fundamental purposes. Even the elites have been deliberately using these institutions to pursue their selfish motives and agendas that triggered the agitation, suspicion, anger and ethnic rivalry among the people of Nigeria. However, the institutions that responsible to the national integration, justice and unity are now proved inadequate and weak to achieve the purpose. In addition, the inability and weakness of these institutions significantly responsible for the ethnic and religious violent conflicts experiencing in Nigeria today. The Implications of the ethno-religious violent conflict on Nigeria Democratic Government. The persistence of ethnic and religious violent conflicts in Nigeria posed threats and dangers to the corporate existence of the nation and the survival of the nascent democracy. The reoccurrences of the ethnic and religious violent conflicts in Nigeria have contributed to the devastating condition of the present state of Nigerian economy including high rate of death due to the inability to make ends meet by the poor families as a result of the high rate of poverty and unemployment. The reoccurrence of the ethnic and religious conflict has remains the great obstacle to the economic growth of the country because there will be few serious investors that are willing to invest in an unsafe environment and no nation can developed without investments that remains the vital instrument of the development.

Nevertheless, it‘s regrettable that the resources that should have been used for the development and provision of infrastructures to the nation have been channeled towards the compensation and rebuilding of the damaged structures in the course of these ethnic and religious violent conflicts. Apparently, the youths that are regarded as future leaders and the agents of positive change are now used as thetools of destruction in the violent conflicts. The consequences of these persistent ethnicreligious violent conflict are numerous and in most cases, the vacuums created by these violent conflicts are irreparable while some wounds remain unhealed. In view of this, it assumed that no amount of sacrifices enough to prevent this enemy of humanity.

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Conclusion This study has demonstrated that the persisted ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria is due to the failure of Nigerian leaders to establish good governments, effective programme of national integration and unfavourable state of economic condition. This led to the high rate of unemployment and poverty that are responsible for the reoccurrence of both ethnic and religious violent conflicts. It is clear that most of the ethnic and religious violent conflicts in Nigeria are youth oriented due to the high rate of unemployment and poverty among the youths.

The diversity in the nature of the nations is not automatically create tension but it gives room to competitions for the development and advances in technology and socio-economy. In Nigeria, the diversity has remains the sources of the conflict, hatred and underdeveloped due to the persisted conflicts based on the ethnic and religious differences. The inefficacy and insincerity of political elites have succeeded in creating social disintegration, political cleavages and high level of corruption in the system that led to the high level of unemployment among the populace in the country. However, the institutions that are responsible for the social integration, alleviation of poverty, and good governance are weak and inadequate.

The sustenance of the democracy is pertinent and non-negotiable for the development and economy improvement for the country.

In other way round, the Nigeria democratic system has been

perceived as the most expensive and costliest in Africa. In view of this, the excessive in runningcost of the governance has hampered economic development and affecting the creating of job opportunity for the masses, in view of this, the government should reduced their maintenance cost in order to save and creating more job opportunity and improved infrastructure.

It is also, suggested that, the people of high integrity and accountability should be entrusted with the political power and job creations should be the priority to empower the youths and to reduce the present of high rate of unemployment and poverty in the country for the sustainable peace and harmony. It is generally accepted that, injustice, corruption, inequalities, and abuse of power, ethnic rival and religious intolerance are endemic, therefore, the institutional framework must bere145

structured and empowered to work out all these irregularities in other to have full benefit and dividend of democracy for the Nigerian masses. References Akinyele, R. T. (2001). ‗Ethnic militancy and national stability in Nigeria: a case study of the Oodua People‘s Congress‘, African Affairs, 100:, pp. 623–40. Alubo, O. (2002). Democracy, ethnic contestations and conflicts in central Nigeria, paper presented for Advanced Social Science (CASS), 18–21 February, Abuja. Smith, A. (1991).National Identity. University of Nevada Press: Las.Vegas Ayantayo, J.K. (2005). Sociology Examination of Inter-Religious Conflict in Africa in I. O. Albert (ed.) Perspective on peace and Conflict in Africa, Ibadan, John Archers Publishers. Ibrahim, J. (1999). Ethno-religious mobilization and the sapping of democracy in Nigeria in J. Hyslop, (ed.), African Democracy in the Era of Globalization.: Witwatersrand University Press: Johannesburg, pp. 93–114. Idowu, W. O. (1999). Citizenship, alienation and conflict in Nigeria.Africa Development 24, 1–2: 31–55.Maier, K. 2000. Nnoli, O. (1978). Ethnic Politics in Nigeria. Fourth Dimension Publishers: Enugu. Nnoli, O. (1995). Ethnicity and Development in Nigeria. Aldershot: Avebury Oodua Peoples Congress. Constitution. (no date or publisher stated).. Osaghae E. E. and Rotimi T. S.(2005).A history violence and stability in Nigeria, CRISE Working Paper,No.6, Oxford Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity. Available from: (Accesed on 21 February,2017) Osaghae, E. (1998). ‗Managing multiple minority problems in a divided society : the Nigerian experience‘.Journal of Modern African Studies, 36, 1., pp.1–24.

Osaghae, E. (2001). From accommodation to self-determination: minority nationalism and the restructuring of the Nigerian state.Nationalism and Ethnic Politics. 7, 1., pp. 1–20. 146

Oxford Advance Learner‘s Dictionary Toyin Falola, (2001). Violence in Nigeria, The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies, University of Rochester Press: New York.

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Nigerian Political Culture and Electioneering Politics: A Comparative Study of the 2011 and 2015 General Elections Sakariyau Rauf Tunde, Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani & Ummu Atiyah Ahmad Zakuan Universiti Utara Malaysia Abstract The wave of democratisation process in the global politics has really influenced developed and developing countries and it is acknowledged to be the preferred form of governance. This dimension of democratic arrangement gains momentum in Africa and Nigeria embraces its application. However, election has become a formidable pillar towards democratic governance and since Nigeria‘s return to civilian rule in 1999, series of elections have been conducted in the country. Also, the trend of Nigerians political culture has also passed through different phases which have been displayed in most of the electioneering processes. This makes it imperative in this paper to explore the dimension of political culture in Nigerian electoral democracy. With the aid of comparison, the paper infers that there have been improvements in the political culture of Nigerian electorates and such is laudable and proving the country‘s readiness for democratic governance. Although, there are challenges such as the issue of vote buying and selling, electoral violence and irregularities, the electorates are showing more understanding towards the country‘s electoral democracy. The prospect of advancing Nigerian political culture is achievable, once the dividends of democracy are entrenched in the society. Keywords: Political Culture, Election, Democracy, Governance

Introduction The trend of democratisation is a global phenomenon that transcends across continents. It is on this basis that Nigeria, being the largest and formidable country in Africa, joined the league of democracies. However, since the return to the current democratic dispensation in 1999, Nigeria had conducted series of general elections. Precisely, five general elections have been conducted in every four years as stipulated in the country‘s constitution. But the elections have been guided with dynamics political culture among Nigerians which has effect on political behaviour of the electorates. The electoral politics has been subjected to violence due to the unhealthy rivalry usually display by the ruling party and the opposition. The former insisting on retaining power while the latter was desperate to unseat the incumbency. This positions Nigeria political culture on dogmatism and primordial sentiment which invariably questions democratic tendency of individuals and the people at large. Such leads to worrisome scenario whereby Nigeria democracy lacks 148

democrats and virtually all elections in the country is violent laden (Ojo, 2007). Though the struggle for power transfer in political transition is not limited to Nigeria, the issue of sit tight syndrome is noticed in the West African countries resulting to electoral violence that often accompanies elections in the region (Ibrahim, 2015). The experience of Ivory Coast under Laurent Gbagbo and Yahya Jammeh of Gambia testifies to political fierce and the unwillingness of the leaders to respect the people wish through electioneering system. The unfortunate scenario revolves around the readiness of the electorates to be used for violent political act by the politicians. The people‘s attitudes toward political issues reflect the level of political culture in the country. Considering the phases of elections in Nigeria‘s present fourth republic, the 1999 general elections did not witness much political violence due to the eagerness of the populace to wrestle power from the military dictatorships that had seized power since the flawed elections of 1983. As it has been established, since Nigeria political independence in 1960, the military had ruled the country for 29 years and truncated democratic transition severally before handing over the mantle of leadership to a democratic government on May 29, 1999. Meanwhile, the 2003 general elections that followed witnessed political violence and undemocratic behavioural attitudes not only within the political elites but also among their followers. Cases of clashes and attacks among members of party affiliations were reported leading to deaths of over one hundred and fifty people (Human Rights Watch, 2004). In fact the rancour in the 2003 elections reminded Nigerians of the ugly similar experience in 1983 which later resulted to military hijack of political power. The 2007 elections were conducted amidst irregularities and violence. Prior to the elections, the President, Olusegun Obasanjo, publicly stated that it would be a ‗do or die‘ affair. So, the level of political immaturity displayed in 2007 by politicians and their supporters attested to the utterances of the then incumbent president. As a matter of fact, the 2007 election, though produced the first civilian to civilian power transfer, it remains the worst outing in the history of electoral democracy in the country (Jibrin and Ibeanu, 2009). However, the 2011 elections could have been one of the finest electioneering politics in Nigeria with some level of improvement injected to the electoral process, the post-election violence that claimed over 800 lives signalled parochial political culture in the polity. The act of violence posed a serious threat to democratic system. In the conduct of 2015 elections, despite the tension it generated, coupled with hate speeches and campaigns by various political stalwarts, the outcome of the entire exercise was peaceful and the people political consciousness was commended by both 149

local and international observers (TMG, 2015, EUEOM, 2015).Given this, this study tries to explore the dimension of political culture in the 2011 and 2015 general elections. The paper is divided into six sections. Apart from the introductory part that gives background information on the subject of discourse, the second segment conceptualises political culture while the third section looks at the concept of election. The fourth section looks at the nitty-gritty of the study through comparative analysis of the 2011 and 2015 elections using political culture as a yardstick while concluding remark is captured in the last section. With the aid of data gathered from the field, the study is enriched with finding relevant findings.

The Concept of Political Culture Generally, understanding of people‘s behaviour and attitudes regarding political phenomenon constitutes political culture. Though like many other social science concepts, political culture does not have a generally acceptable definitions. It has been viewed by different scholars from different perspectives. The evolution of the concept was traced to Gabriel Almond and later became an interesting phenomenon as showcased in the book of Almond and Verba (1963) entitled ‗the civic culture‘. In their book, political culture is defined as the ‗distribution of patterns of orientation‘ but this view according to Stephen (1988) subjects the concept to individualistic behaviour. In other way, political culture can be seen as a symbolic interactions among people in a given society. This is similar to Lowel Dittmer‘s ‗symbol system‘ that looks at way in which people relate and react to societal issues especially the ones with political undertones. To Lowel (1977), political culture is simply political symbols inclusive in a system or polity. This perception negates individualistic tendency ascribed to previous definition and emphasises on collective political behaviours among the people resulting from cultural supramembership. As it is claimed that culture is a group norms and values which individuals belong (Stephen, 1988), political culture shares the sentiment of collectivism. The idea of cultural component as a major yardstick for political culture is supported by Ronald (1988) who argues that understanding societal culture is a better clue towards understanding people‘s political behaviours. Given this, there is synergy between political culture and political behavior. Put differently, having agreed on cultural context of political culture, Berkhofer (cited in Ronald, 2001:397) categorises this to ‗elite political culture‘ and ‗ethnic political culture‘ with the former 150

concentrating on peculiar behaviours and attitudes among the small powerful group in the society. On the other hand, ethnicity is used to create division among the populace to have primordial sentiment regarding political issues. For instance, the pattern of voting in Nigeria‘s electoral democracy has always been tailored along ethnicity and religion which determine the sharp division in the plural and heterogeneous nature of such society. However, to Aluko (2002), Nigeria‘s elite share similarity in terms of political culture when it comes to corruption and abuse of power. The trend of behaviours and attitudes within the elites as observed by Aluko is unique and to him, corruption is a unifying political culture which is embraced by Nigeria‘s elites. But the general masses can be easily incited with primordial sentiments for political gains and that is why electioneering contest depends largely on ethno religious affiliation as instrument and tool being used by the elites to divide the masses. Though the issue of ethnicity and religion as influencing factor places Nigeria‘s political culture on subjective nature, it has become a tool in the hands of political elites. The difference in the political culture of various states or societies justifies the three categorisation proposed by Gabriel Almond and Verba Sidney (1963). In their typology, political culture can be parochial, subject and participant. By parochial political culture, it signals a scenario whereby the people level of awareness on political issues is at extremely and remotely low. In such situation, the people hardly show interest in decision making process and government decides without input from the populace. The subject political culture has some level of awareness by the people but with little scope of dissent. In this case, people‘s participation and attitudes on political phenomenon is subjective and often guided by sentiment and bias which invariably blindfolded their objective perception of politics. This type of political culture operates largely in developing countries. However, the participant political culture is an advanced level of citizenry involvement in politics which enhances various influential role the people have on the government. This stage is usually tailored towards politics of ideology rather than subjective and sentimental political behaviour. Advanced democracies are characterised with participant political culture. Given these typologies, Nigeria‘s political culture shares the adjective of subjective political behaviours. The polarization nature of Nigeria‘s political arrangement reflects in the political culture of the country. This idea as raised by Kingsley (2015) has historical link with the country‘s preindependence setting and even before colonialism. Despite the amalgamation of 1914 that ensured the unification of various groups to form Nigerian state, the diversity of the people plays significant 151

role in their political activism and behavioural output. So, in order to understand the phenomenon of political culture in Nigerian context, one needs to consider the unity in diversity of the country. In essence, the fragmentation of Nigerian state is the basis for divisive political culture among the people which surfaces on ethno religious background as the major determinant of political behaviour in the polity. This argument is supported by Rach (2016) when he refers to Nigeria political culture as a complex and diverse with multiple ethnic diversity, social background, religious belief, economic status and civil society. It is a difficult task reaching a political compromise in such fragmented country where people have displayed division along ethnicity and religion rather than addressing the socio economic shortcomings in the society (Kingsley, 2015). Finally, the concept of political culture is better understood on the nature of societal setting. Like as it is obtainable in Nigeria and some African countries, ethno religious factor cannot be undermined in the understanding of political culture of the black race. This is similar to some other developing democracies in Asia and other parts of the world. Nevertheless, despite the disparity in political culture across the globe, the central assumption is that the symbol of culture would definitely reflect in political behaviour in any given society. And it is on this basis that Lowell‘s symbolism of political culture remains relevant to understanding of the concept in discourse. In as much as every society has its peculiar symbolic cultural system, political phenomenon cannot be detached from such cultural norms and values. Election and Democracy: The Synergy Election remains the legitimate process of transferring power in any democratic setting, it is agreed to be the pillar of democracy (Lindsberg, 2004, Omotola, 2009). Election allows the people to select or choose from the available options, representatives of their choice. It is basically a channel through which political participation is at its peak. As rightly noted by Attahiru (2014), the validity and sustainability of any democratic governance revolves around free and period election. In the observation of Molomo (2006), elections are viewed as hallmark of democracy and remain important instrument for electing leaders to public office. The centrality of election to democracy was confirmed by Aristotle (cited in Ojo, 2007:5) when he affirmed that ‗all citizens eligible for all offices‘. This showcases that election is of two major types; direct and indirect. Though the two concurs that election is the process of choosing people for particular jobs via voting, the former involved direct voting and it remains the most popular pattern of electing representatives. Each qualified voter goes to poll to elect leaders and any candidate that secures maximum votes would be 152

declared winner. The indirect election is a system whereby the voters do not directly elect their leaders but through an intermediary body that makes the final choice. The intermediary body is often referred to as Electoral College and such system limits the power of voters (Kapur, 2006). Meanwhile, Ojo (2007) sees more advantage in direct electioneering system because it stimulates people interest in public affair and ensures sense of public spirit. Meanwhile, despite the fact that democracy requires election, it does not comport to just any kind of election. Electoral democracy is expected to be free and credible and it is on this basis that Ojo (2007) argues that ‗election does not only serve as peaceful means of changing government, it also confers political legitimacy on the government‘. The credibility of election justifies legitimacy of democratic governance which substantiates people choice and keep leaders accountable. Given this, election is portrayed as the heartbeat of democracy (Anifowose, 2003).The indispensability of election to democracy appears to gain momentum in the representative form of democracy. It is obvious that in the modern democracy, elections are the only mechanism through which individuals responsible for governance are selected (Houkpe and Gounye, 2010). Any political arrangement that operates contrarily cannot lay claim to be democratic. The significance of election to democracy prompts Oni, Chidozie and Agbule (2013) to view it as the salient determinant of quality democratic system. The participatory connotation of democracy is guaranteed and entrenched in a competitive election (Omotola, 2009) that is embraced by the populace as being free and credible. Though democracy has variation ranging from capitalist, socialist and liberal, none denies the power of election as the process of political transition from one government to another. That is why any problem associated with elections would invariably have implications on democracy. In as much as free and fair election remains the hallmark of democracy, election malpractices or irregularities threaten consolidation of democratic system. In order to sustain democracy, the electoral process must be credible and transparent. However, it is paradoxically that elections which could have served as epitomic expression of popular will has been subverted severally in the history of Nigeria‘s electoral democracy. The level of electoral fraud in the previous electioneering exercise in the country signalled democratic hurdle in the most populous African state. Indeed, Nigeria has had problematic elections characterised with irregularities (Jibrin and Ibeanu, 2009). Since the return to democracy in 1999, the elections conducted in 2003 and 2007 were marred with violence and irregularities. The experience in 2007 remained the worst electioneering contest in the annals of Nigeria elections. This posed serious 153

concern on the country‘s readiness for democratic governance. Nevertheless, there was a kind of improvement in Nigeria‘s electoral system as showcased in the 2011 general elections (EUEOM, 2011). Though to some extent, the elections were credible, the outburst of post - election violence that claimed several lives exposed the weakness of political culture among Nigerians. The 2015 general elections became a watershed having witnessed a peaceful conduct. In fact, it was a paradigm shift that boosted Nigeria‘s electoral democracy (Sakariyau, Mohammed and Ummu, 2016). In lieu of this, the thrust of this study is to explore the level of political culture in the Nigerian electioneering politics with much emphasis on the 2011 and 2015 general elections.

Political Culture and Electioneering Politics in Nigeria: A Comparison of the 2011 and 2015 General Elections The 2011 general election was the fourth in the series of national electioneering exercise in Nigeria since the return to civilian government in 1999. The trend and nature of politicking that erupted during and after the elections shared similarity with the previous electoral contest in the country. However, it was administered amidst political system known for dichotomy and rivalry usually tailored on ethno religious affiliation and geo –political divisions. Prior to the conduct of the 2011 elections, there was a change in the leadership of the electoral umpire which resulted to the introduction of Attahiru Jega, a Professor of Political Science and renown academia, whom replaced Professor Maurince Iwu that was believed to have conducted the worst elections in 2007(Jibrin and Ibeanu, 2009). With attainment of mantle of leadership as the Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in 2010, Jega came up with some policies to reposition and redeem the image of the electoral body which has always been accused of partisanship and partiality (Nwosu, 2007). The first and drastic step taken by Jega and his team was to clean up the voters register which has often been used as an instrument for electoral malpractices (INEC, 2011). This was achieved through application of Direct Data Machine (DDC) and a software IFES that could detect multiple and underage registration (INEC, 2015). As rightly observed by Idayat Hassan5, the innovation brought into election administration by the Election Management Body (EMB) after the emergence of Jega was an indication for positive change in the electoral process. 5

th

Idayat Hassan is the Director of Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD). She was interviewed on 25 July, 2016. 154

Meanwhile, the ability and integrity of the Jega led INEC was questioned as a result of botched April 2, 2011 National Assembly elections which was postponed for week. Before the sudden postponement, voting procedures had commenced in some polling units and both electoral officials and observers were already deployed to the field (The Punch, April 3, 2011). The scenario awakened the primordial sentiment among electorates and people became uncomfortable with such ugly trend that created room for a kind of political cynicism. In fact, the mantra of conducting free and credible elections by the EMB was the reactions in the society. To Bolaji (2011), the postponement of the election made the citizens to be more apprehensive, sceptical and uncertain about the possible smooth political transition that has suffered setbacks in the political history of the country. However, the rational for the adjustment of the election time table was later justified with the manner in which the exercise was conducted. Despite the fear of low voters turn out due to the initial postponement, the enthusiastic among Nigerians concerning the 2011 elections was encouraging. Though the elections were commended to have improved compared to the previous polls, there were still some shortcomings such as under age voters, logistics issues and so on. Considering the European Union overall assessment of the Nigeria 2011 election, it was qualified as a foundation for democratic development in accordance with the international conventions and principles (EUEOM, 2011). The United States Ambassador to Nigeria during the exercise, Terence Mc Culley, also praised the electoral body for conducting election that could enhance democratic consolidation in Nigeria. According to him, ‗the election was an historic opportunity for Nigeria to consolidate its democracy and further expand its voice on the world stage‘ (Agbambu and Ajayi, 2011). Although the election days were peaceful, the violent act that erupted after the presidential elections showcased the poor level of political understanding and tolerance in the society. One of the underpinning factors that shaped the politicking in the 2011 elections was ethnicity. Like the previous elections in Nigeria, the prevailing influence of ethnic rivalry as a determinant of people‘s political behaviour could not be undermined during the 2011 general elections. The phenomenon of ethnic politics prior to the elections became noticeable when some Northern politicians within the ruling political party, Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), wrote a letter requesting the party leadership to restrain President Goodluck Jonathan6 from contesting the 6

Goodluck Jonathan became Nigeria President after the death of his boss. He hailed from South - South Geo Political Zone. The Northern political figures wanted shift of power to the North. 155

election. The plight of those Northerners was that power should be shifted to the North and that the exit of Umar Musa Yar‘Adua7 needed to be replaced with another Northern Politician so as to complete the eight years tenure of the zone having allowed the Southern counterpart to govern for same period of time (1999-2007). The proposal of the group headed by Ali Ciroma, former Minister of Finance, triggered the fragmentation within the diverse polity. It was not about letter alone, there was a threat by the proponents of this idea of power shift to make the state ungovernable that could jettison political stability in the country. Not surprising that the political campaigns and voting pattern reflected the divisionary setting on ethnic basis (Alabi and Sakariyau, 2013). The place of religion also played a key role in the 2011 election. The dimension of party flag bearers was

characterised with Muslim/ Christian tickets as the case of Congress Progressive Party (CPC) Muhammadu Buhari and Tunde Bakare and Christian/ Muslim joint tickets as the case of Goodluck Jonathan/ Nnamadi Sambo of the PDP. The last time Nigeria experienced an election without religious connotation was in 1993 when late Mashood Abiola and Babangana Kingibe both Muslims contested under the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and got an overwhelming votes from every nook and crannies of the country. Though the military regime of Ibrahim Babaginda annulled the 1993 presidential election, it remained one of the finest electioneering exercise in Nigeria that silenced ethno religious rivalry. But the case of 2011 election was different and what surfaced in the balloting happened to be an appeal to electorates‘ sentiment on ethno-religious setting. It was not surprising that Jonathan did extremely well in the Southern part of the country while Buhari scored largely votes in the North. This concurs with the claim that Nigeria‘s political culture has always been influenced by ethnicity and religion (Bello, 2015) In another perspective, Adetula (2015) pinpoints the issue of money politics as a yardstick in determining who gets what, when and how in Nigeria politics. This involves votes buying and selling and as puts by Ojo (2008) transcends sharing of money but includes distribution of materials. Money is crucial to any electoral democracy, however its abuse in the Nigerian context to influence peoples‘ political behaviour places the country political culture lower as displayed in the 2011 elections. The abuse of money and the inability of the electoral umpire to monitor and sanction offenders violating laws regarding political finance makes election in the country to become a contest for the highest bidder (Jide, 2015). Although to some analysts, the level of 7

Umar Musa Yar’Adua won the Presidential election in 2007 but died in office in 2010 which led to the swearing in of his Vice as substantive President. 156

education especially civic education serves as a causal for the use of money to influence voters‘ behaviour while others ascribe such to poverty and economic challenge, campaign expenditure in Nigeria has always been contradictory to electoral laws in respect to political party finance. The legal framework8 on political finance lacks implementation and such lacuna has been extensively extorted by politicians in Nigeria. Notwithstanding the causes, its consequence on political culture in Nigeria is overwhelming and to Ugwaja (2015) has implication on political participation of the citizens. However, despite the peaceful conduct of the 2011 elections and commendations from both local and international observers (Alabi and Sakariyau, 2013), the post-election violence in the North compounded the threat of identity politics on divisionary basis. The protest and demonstration aftermath of the elections claimed several lives and the most unfortunate incident in Bauchi State where 10 Youth Corp members that participated as ad hoc electoral officials were killed exposed the weakness of political culture in the country. The expectation of some of the perpetrators of such mayhem was victory for their preferred candidate and declaring a contrary result led to the post election violence. This singular action was a blow to the entire electoral process which threaten the survival of Nigeria‘s democracy. The preparation for the 2015 elections started earlier and a strategic plan (2012-2016) was introduced to serve as guidelines for effective management and administration of the general elections (INEC, 2015). The electoral commission embarked on several policies that could guarantee a better electoral conduct having realised the shortcomings of the 2011 exercise. The EMB did a massive restructuring and reorganisation of its departments and extended a hand of fellowship to relevant stakeholders. As a matter of fact, the robust partnership and collaboration enjoyed by the electoral commission during the 2015 elections was awesome. According to Amina Zakari9, the major stakeholders that partnered INEC in 2015 elections were the security, civil society organisation, university dons and some other professional bodies. This informed the level of advocacy and citizenry participation to be encouraging compared to the previous election. The administration of the 2015 elections was applauded by local and international observers (TMG, 2015, AUEOM, 2015, NDI, 2015) and unlike the 2011 elections, the 2015 experience witnessed a peaceful atmosphere in all the stages of electoral circle. The pre- election, during election and post8

Section 183 of the 1999 Constitution(as amended) of Federal Republic of Nigeria and Section 88 to 89 of the Electoral Act 2010(as amended) specified the amount of money to be used for political finance 9 th Amina Zakari is INEC National Commissioner. She made the remark during an interview conducted on 19 July, 2016. 157

election stages were adjudged peaceful and people‘s commitment towards the whole exercise was commendable (EUEOM, 2015). Definitely, the gesture that distinct the 2015 elections from that of 2011 revolved around certain factors which invariably propelled the electorates‘ behaviour towards participatory political culture. One of the contributory factors which opened up citizens‘ commitment and consciousness in the 2015 electioneering democracy was the campaigns against electoral violence largely from the civil society organisations. The level of advocacy and awareness by the civil society groups urging the populace to shun any form of violence no matter the outcome of the elections assisted in developing citizens political socialisation. Prior to the election days, the society was highly tensed with defamatory and hate speeches from various political parties and their supporters particularly from the fans of the two main contenders for the presidency seat, Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP and Muhammadu Buhari of the APC10, coupled with the insinuation and prediction about possible disintegration of Nigeria if the elections were poorly managed (Warisu, 2015). The political tension was unprecedented and such led to the formation and inauguration of Peace Accord by concerned notable individuals within and outside Nigeria to ensure that politicians and their supporters pledge and sign undertaken for violent free election (Ugbudian, 2015). With frequent political sensitisation from different media outlets and coupled with the citizens resolution and commitment for peaceful elections, there was a change in the political configuration of Nigeria. The election was adjudged free and credible and for the first time opposition defeated incumbency in the history of Nigeria politics. This is what Omotola (2015) qualifies as electoral turnover. The most interesting and welcoming development was the political maturity displayed by the incumbent president Jonathan through his telephone conversation congratulating the president elect, Muhammadu Buhrai ; such action worth being celebrated. It also testifies to political tolerance and embracement of improved political culture which brightens Nigeria‘s chance of democratic consolidation (Sakariyau, Mohammed and Ummu, 2016). Despite the success recorded in the 2015 elections, the phenomenon of ethno religious sentiment still surfaced in the voting pattern. The two prominent and popular contenders for the presidential slot received votes largely on the Northern and Southern dichotomy. In the survey of Bello Imam, a Professor of Politics, ethnicity and religion became key underlying factor that shaped political 10

The presidential election was keenly contested by the incumbent president Goodluck Jonathan of PDP and Muhammadu Buhari of the merger opposition party (APC). The APC was coalition of four opposition parties that merged and registered as one party in 2013. 158

behaviour among Nigerians during the 2015 general elections. According to him, the clamour for power shift to the North was reawakened which created political division and dichotomy of South versus North. As cited in Bello (2015:20), a respondent in the process of highlighting the reasons for the voting pattern in 2015 pinpoints that: ‗The determination of the North for power shift. Since the assumption of office by President Goodluck Jonation following the demise of President Umar Yar‘Adua from the North, the Northern elites have been uncomfortable with a situation which cut short their dream of being at the helm of the country‘s political leadership, at least for eight years. Jonathan‘s election in 2011 seems to have created more frustration for the North and the Northern elite. Therefore, during the preparation for the 2015 general elections, there was massive mobilisation of the peoples of the North across all divide to see the return of the North to power at Aso Rock in 2015 as a categorical imperative‘.

This opinion indeed reflected in the result of the presidential elections whereby the two candidates of PDP and APC scored much votes in their respective regions. Muhammadu Buhari received 12,374,840 votes in the three geo political zones of the North (North Central, North West and North East) against 3,852,075 votes secured by Goodluck Jonathan in the same zone. Similarly, the bloc of the votes in the South South and South East geo political zones was secured by Jonathan receiving larger number than Buhari except in the South West which neutralised the sentiment, though Abubakar Sulaiman11, a PDP Chieftain, views this from the slot of vice president allocated to the zone by the APC. Table 1 below indicates the number of votes secured by the two candidates on geo-political zones: Table 11: SUMMARY OF THE 2015 PRESENTIAL ELECTIONS RESULTS S/NO

ZONE

MUHAMMADU BUHARI GOODLUCK JONATHAN

1.

NORTH/CENTRAL

2,411,013

1,715,818

2.

NORTH/EAST

2,848,678

796,588

3.

NORTH/WEST

7,115,149

1,339,669

11

th

Abubakar Sulaiman was a former Minister of National Planning. He was interviewed on 14 July, 2016. 159

Sub-Total

12,374,840

3,852,075

4.

SOUTH/EAST

198,248

2,464,906

5.

SOUTH/SOUTH

418,590

4,714,725

6.

SOUTH/WEST

2,433,193

1,821,416

Sub-Total

3,050,031

9,001,047

TOTAL

15,424,871

12,853,122

Source: INEC, Abuja, Nigeria, 2015

The issue of ethno religious sentiment remains a major factor in Nigeria political culture and which poses threat to politics of ideology in the society. It has remained an avenue to divide the divided populace by politicians who usually appeal to the electorates‘ primordial sentiment in order to achieve their selfish political interest. However, by implication, such trend weakens the spirit of unity and creates more bias in any federal arrangement like Nigeria. Also, it showcases similar pattern of electioneering politics inherited from the colonial administration. Even this dichotomy reflects at micro politics whereby people are recognised on the basis of ethno-religious affiliation making it an easy ride for the majority to always have their way why minority keep being marginalised not only on political dimension but also in socio economic development. Nevertheless, the result of the South West geo political zone was an indication of an improvement on the political culture of voters in the region. The clamour for change of government really gained momentum in the zone and voters did that accordingly. Not only that, like what was obtainable in the 2011 elections, abuse of money was pronounced in the 2015 general elections (Adetula, 2015). None of the political parties and their aspirants abided by the political finance guidelines and it was reported that the amount of money spent in the last elections had never been witnessed in the history of electoral politics in the country. For instance, the PDP generated 21.27billion Naira as fund raising for the presidential election in which one of the donors, Mr Tunde Ayeni, a Business man, donated 2 billion12 which was a breach of section 93

12

Out of the 2 billion naira, 1 billion was said to be from Mr Tunde Ayeni and his partner while the remaining 1 billion was from unnamed friends. 160

sub section 1 of the Electoral Act (as amended) that stipulates that “A political party shall not accept or keep in its possession any anonymous monetary or other contribution, gift, or property, from any source whatsoever.‖ Also, subsection (2) (b) of the section says: ―Every political party shall keep an account and asset book into which shall be recorded: - the name and address of any person or entity that contributes any money or other thing which exceeds N1, 000,000.00. ” But going by the result, the ruling PDP lost most of the elective seats to the opposition party (APC) and such development countered the perception of highest bidder as far as the 2015 election was concerned. The Jonathan candidature had enough resources at his disposal but despite the flow of money to buy votes, the resilience of the people to alternate power concurs to an improved political culture compared to the previous elections. Though both parties were accused of vote buying and selling, the people resolution to try opposition party made them to desist from monetary intimidation and voted according to their wishes.

Nigerian Political Culture and Democratic Consolidation: Prospects and Challenges The impact of political culture on democratisation process is germane in any civil society. The level Political culture among the populace plays significant role in political participation and which invariably contributes to regime stabilisation. For democracy to be consolidated, the citizens‘ political culture are expected to be participatory and devoid of primordial sentiment (Ugwuja, 2015). Though it is a difficult task to avoid subjectivity in human political behaviour, the ability to control any form of bias places individuals‘ political culture high and enhances politics of ideology rather than politics of dogmatism. To a large extent political culture determines effective political participation. Considering the Nigerian context, the enthusiastic displayed by the electorates during the 2015 elections was a positive signal that projects Nigeria political culture towards sustaining democratic governance. Unlike the previous elections that were highly characterised with violence (Nwolise, 2007, Omotola, 2015), the last general elections were peacefully conducted due to the resolution by the people to conform to best practises. To Samson Itodo13, the viability of the EMB coupled with citizens‘ involvement in asserting their sovereignty remains a pact way for democratic consolidation in the country.

13

Interview with Samson Itodo, the Head of Research Policy and Advocacy, Youth Initiative for Advocacy Growth and th Advancement (YIAGA) conducted on 25 July, 2016. 161

Put differently, citizens‘ commitment was achieved during the 2015 national elections due to an improvement in the area of political sensitisation that enhanced political socialisation. The level of advocacy in the last election was greatly championed by the civil society groups and emphasis was placed on violent free election. With the support of the peace initiatives anchored by the National Peace Committee and subsequent signing of Abuja Peace Accord, the elections were violent free compared to the bloody experience in the 2011post election crisis (Warisu, 2015). This positive remark became an achievement in the history of electoral democracy in Nigeria via the commitment and support of the relevant stakeholders. In fact, the people have resulted to engaging the government on socio economic and political related issues and the inability of some leaders to carry citizens along reflected in the failure of power of incumbency (Alabi and Sakariyau, 2013). The citizens have been effective in changing non-performing political leaders legitimately through balloting and both 2011 and 2015 general elections testified to this when incumbent Governors and Senators lost elections. Such is a plus towards democratic consolidation as a result of electoral turnover (Omotola, 2015). However, the issue of ethno-religious connotation in Nigeria‘s politics weakens the spirit of participatory democracy that embraces ideology rather than sentiment. Nigeria is yet to overcome a voting pattern that would be ideological based. Since the inception of current democratic dispensation, the dimension of voting pattern has been revolving around ethnicity and religion which possess threat to democratic consolidation. Though ethnicity is ranked as one of the most employed variables in electioneering contest anywhere in the world (Osaghae, 2015), its application in the Nigerian context really questions the country‘s sincerity to comport to democratic virtues of tolerance and unity. Nigerian politicians and successive governments have not been able to sustain unification of the people despite the adoption of federalism as a system of government. Even the history of political party formation in Nigeria revolves around ethnic rivalry and such scenario resurfaces in the modern party configuration (Saka and Iferika, 2015). As rightly noted by Osaghae (2015), elections have been won and lost on mobilisation of voters along ethno-religious and regional lines. In addition, money politics which has been grossly abused in the Nigerian context which is another disturbing factor that shapes political behaviour. As mentioned earlier, money cannot be separated from politics but channelling it to vote buying and selling is antithetical to democratic virtues. The politics of money bag has complicated the political landscape in the country resulting to what 162

Adetula (2008) tags as ‗political entrepreneurship‘. The shady deal of vote buying and selling makes political leaders to be intoxicated with power and care less about good governance after all voters conscious could be easily bought over. According to Collier (2009:45),―One reason for the conflict between decent governance and the other options is money….How do you win a Nigerian election for an unknown candidate in only a few months, facing an entrenched opponent? The answer is you probably need a lot of money.‖ The weakness in the application of legal framework to curb such indecent attitude by relevant agency is worrisome and defeats the principle of equity and justice as entrenched in democratic governance. Also, in the 2011 and 2015 elections, political finance was abused and both political parties and their candidates flaunted the spending limits during electioneering campaigns (Adetula, 2015). The desperate move by politicians after the March 28 Presidential and National Assembly elections in 2015 led to the recorded of pockets of electoral violence during the Gubernatorial and House of Assembly elections held 11th of April. Several cases of violence were reported in some states which forced the electoral commission to suspend voting in volatile areas of Rivers, Ebonyi and Jigawa states respectively (INEC, 2015). This behaviour tells more on the political culture in the fragmented Nigerian society. Such political infraction in words of Habu Muhammed 14 exposes the immaturity on the part of political parties and their followers. To him, Nigerian political parties are to display maturity in the democratisation process of the country. Conclusion Electioneering politics in Nigeria is a process that has passed through several dimensions but the pattern of voting in elections keeps resounding the variable of ethno-religious division in the country. By and large, the political culture of Nigeria can be well captured and understood along this line. The consequence has always resulted to electoral violence which serves as a bane to free and credible electoral conduct in Nigeria. The post-election violence of the 2011 cannot be easily forgotten having claimed innocent lives and worthy properties destroyed. But the atmosphere in the 2015 general elections was peaceful and its conduct remains one of the finest in the series of electioneering in Nigeria. Such did not happen by chance, accumulated factors resulted to this which translated to orderly and mannered political behaviour as a yardstick for improved political culture. Though it was also an ethno-regional bloc votes, the balanced voting trend in the South

14

Interview with Habu Muhammed, a Professor of Political Science, Bayero University Kano, Nigeria. 163

West and Middle Belts15 areas signalled people resolution for change. In order to correct the anomalies of pockets of violence, under age voting, money politics and other shortcomings in the elections, it is suggested that legal framework needs to be strengthened to punish any violator of electoral acts. Also, the advocacy and sensitisation deserves more which should be a continuous exercise. The National Orientation Agency (NOA) is expected to be more vibrant in civic and political educations. The more the populace are politically orientated, the better for Nigeria electoral democracy. References Adetula, V.(2008) ‗Money and Politics in Nigeria : An Overview‘ in Adetula, V.(ed) Money and Politics in Nigeria IFES:Nigeria. Adetula, V. (2015) ‗Godfathers, Money Politics and Electoral Violence in Nigeria: Focus on the 2015 Elections‘Paper Presented at the Electoral Institute, Abuja African Union Election Observation Mission (2015) ‗Final Report on Nigeria‘s 2015 General Election‘ Publication of African Union Commission Alabi, A and Sakariyau, R.(2013) ‗Independent National Electoral Commission(INEC) and the Conduct of 2011 Elections in Nigeria‘ International Journal of Politics and Governance Vol 4 N0 1. Anifowose, R. (2003) ‗Theoretical Perspective on Elections‘ in R. Anifowose and T. Babawale(eds) 2003 General Elections and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria. Lagos: Friedrick and Frankad Publisher Attahiru, J.(2014) ‗Stakeholders and the Electoral Process in Nigeria‘ Paper Presented at the Annual Conference of the Department of Sociology, University of Lagos, Nigeria. Bello, I.(2015) ‗How and why Nigerians voted the way they did in the 2015 General Elections‘ Paper Presented at the Electoral Institute, Abuja. June 6 Bolaji, A.(2011) ‗2011 General Elections: So Far, So Good‘ Nigeria Matter Retrieved on 17th January, 2017. 15

Middle Belts states have a large population of Christians but the people voted massively for the Muslim Candidate during the presidential election. 164

Collier, Paul (2009) Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places, Harper.

European Union Election Observation Mission (2015) ‗Final Report on 2015 Nigerian General Election‘ Publication of European Union

Gabriel, A and Sidney, V. (1963) The Civic Culture Princeton: Princeton University Press Houkpe, M. and Gounye, A. (2010) The Role of Security Forces in the Electoral Process: the Case of Six West African Countries. Abuja: Friedrich Ebert Stiffing Human Rights Watch (2004) Nigeria‟s 2003 Elections: The Unacknowledged Violence Ibrahim, B.(2015) ‗Political Culture and Democratic Transition in West Africa: The Nigerian Experience‘ Universal Journal of Management Vol 3 No 3 INEC (2015), ‗2015 General Elections Report‘ Publication of Independent National Electoral Commission INEC (2011), ‗2015 General Elections Report‘ Publication of Independent National Electoral Commission Jide, O. (2015) ‗Nigeria‘s 2015 General Elections and Political Finance‘Paper Presented at the Electoral Institute, Abuja. June 6 Jibrin, I and Ibeanu, O. (2009) ‗The 2007 Elections and the Subversion of Popular Sovereignty in Nigeria‘ in Jibrin I and Ibeanu, O(eds) The 2007 Nigerian Elections and Subversion of Popular Sovereignty Abuja: CDD Publication Kapur, A.(2006) Principles of Political Science New Dehli : S. Chand and Company Kingsley, I. (2015) ‗Nigeria Decides: Political Culture and Participation‘ mbtnglobal.com March 26 Lowel,D.(1977) ‗Political Culture and Political Symbolism: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis‘ World Politics 29 52-83 Lindsberg, S.(2004) The Power of Elections: Democratic Participation, Competition and Competition in Africa Lund: Lund Political Studies 165

Molomo, M. (2006) ‗Democracy and Bostwana‘s Electoral System‘ Journal of African Elections Vol 5 No 2 Nwolise, O.(2007) ‗Electoral Violence and Nigeria‘s 2007 Elections‘ Journal of African Elections Vol 6 No 2 Ojo, E(2008) ‗Vote Buying in Nigeria‘in Adetula, V.(ed) Money and Politics in Nigeria IFES:Nigeria. Ojo, E.(2007) ‗Elections: An Exploration of the Theoretical Postulations‘ Journal of African Elections Vol. 6 No 2 Omotola, J (2015) ‗Opposition Merger, Electoral Turnover and Democratisation in Nigeria‘ Paper Presented at the Electoral Institute, Abuja. June Omotola, J.(2009) ‗Electoral Administration and Democratic Consolidation in Africa: Ghana and Nigeria in Comparative Perspective‘ Paper Presented at Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva 19-23 October, 2009. Oni, S., Chidozie, F. and Agbule, A.(2013) ‗Electoral Politics in the Fourth Republic of Nigeria‘s Democratic Governance‘ Developing Country Studies Vol 3 No 12 Osaghae, E. (2015) ‗Where was Ethnicity in the 2015 Elections in Nigeria?‘ Paper Presented at the Electoral Institute, Abuja Rach, F. (2016) ‗Nigeria: Political Culture‘www.prezi.comRetrieved on 10th January, 2017. Ronald, I (1988) ‗The Renaissance of Political Culture‘ The American Political Science Review Vol 82 No 4 Ronald, P. (2001) ‗The Concept of Political Culture‘ The Journal of Interdisciplinary History Vol 31 No 3 Saka, L and Solomon, I.(2015) ‗An Assessment of the Historical Development of Political Parties in Nigeria‘ in Habu, M(ed) The Patterns and Dynamics of Party Politics in Nigeria‟s Fourth Republic Published by the Department of Political Science, Federal University Dutse,Jigawa, Nigeria. 166

Sakariyau, R., Mohammed, A and Ummu, A. (2016) ‗Election Administration and Democratic Sustainability in Nigeria: An Assessment of the 2015 General Elections‘ The Social Science Vol 11 No 23 Stephen, C.(1988) ‗Defining Political Culture‘ The Western Political Quarterly Vol 41 No 3 Ugbudian, L(2015) 2015 ‗General Elections in Nigeria: The Role of Abuja Peace Accord‘Paper Presented at the Electoral Institute, Abuja Warisu, O. (2015) ‗Violence Free Elections: Perspectives on the Peace Initiatives on the 2015 General Elections‘www.inec.orgRetrieved January 10, 2017.

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Democracy Beyond Elections Melestarikan Pengurusan Sisa Pepejal Negara Dalam Aturan Demokrasi Muhammad Ariff Mohamad Nizam Ahmad Muziru Idham Adnan

Abstrak

Kepincangan alam sekitar yang sedang dihadapi dunia dewasa ini merupakan sebuah isu kontemporari yang perlu dipandang serius. Ancamannya telah memunculkan konsep pembangunan lestari dengan turut meletakkan pengurusan sisa pepejal sebagai antara punca berlaku kepincangan tersebut. Pengembangan ekonomi dan pembangunan pesat yang dihadapi negara membangun seperti Malaysia telah menyaksikan pertumbuhan perbandaran baharu bagi menampung pertambahan penduduk. Rentetan daripada rantaian faktor tersebut, telah meningkatnya penghasilan sisa pepejal yang mendatangkan pelbagai cabaran kepada sesebuah negara sehingga mendatangkan keperluan bagi mendasarinya secara demokratik memandangkan isu tersebut terarah daripada peringkat akar umbi kepada peringkat pemerintah. Oleh sebab itu, pembingkaian kertas kerja ini akan memberi fokus kepada Dasar Pengurusan Sisa Pepejal Negara yang membawa semangat pembangunan lestari bagi mendepani cabaran kepincangan alam sekitar yang mendatangkan kesan perubahan iklim dalam tata antarabangsa (international order). Kertas kajian ini juga akan meninjau Dasar Pengurusan Sisa Pepejal Negara dari konteks demokrasi dengan mengangkat nilainilai kelestarian alam sekitar dan seterusnya merumuskan tentang keperluan aturan demokrasi dalam menterjemahkan usaha-usaha yang telah direncanakan tersebut. Kata kunci: demokrasi, Dasar Pengurusan Sisa Pepejal Negara, pembangunan lestari, alam sekitar.

Mukadimah Sesungguhnya pembangunan itu adalah enjin yang memacu kelangsungan ketamadunan dunia pada hari ini bagi memenuhi keperluan perkembangan penduduk dunia. Namun begitu, di sebaliknya adalah suatu cabaran yang sedang mencabar soal kemanusiaan dan keselamatan dunia dengan mendatangkan kesan rumah hijau sehingga membawa fenomena perubahan iklim yang ketara semenjak separuh abad lalu (Hegerl et al, 2007; McKie, 2014; Kerry, 2014).

168

Pun begitu, konsep pembangunan yang digunakan bagi mengubah landskap sosial dan negara tersebut telah diseleweng dewasa ini dengan pelbagai aktiviti manusia yang membelakangkan khazanah alam sekitar.16 Misalnya di Malaysia, tahun lalu sahaja kita telah digemparkan dengan siri pembongkaran kebobrokan alam sekitar oleh Pertubuhan Perlindung Alam Malaysa (Peka) yang rancak dikesan merobek hutan di negeri Kelantan, Pahang dan Johor (The Sun Daily, 2016). Kerakusan aktiviti manusia yang sedemikian bukan sekadar melenyapkan khazanah hutan negara malah turut dikesan menjadi punca pencemaran sumber air negara seperti di Sungai Pahang dan Tasik Chini, Pahang (Sinar Harian, 2016). Lebih malang lagi, prinsip pembangunan yang sepatutnya mampu mengubah sudut pandang masyarakat Malaysia juga meleset tatkala pencemaran sumber air yang dikesan berlaku di Sungai Tebrau, Johor mutakhir ini adalah berpunca daripada sekecil-kecil aktiviti manusia, iaitu sampah (Berita Harian, 2017). Oleh sebab itu, kertas ini secara dasarnya akan memberi penumpuan terhadap isu alam sekitar yang sedang mencabar dunia sejagat dengan menjadikan sekecil-kecil aktiviti manusia yang bermula dari rumah – pengurusan sisa pepejal sebagai konteks perbincangan secara terarah di dalam kerangka sistem demokrasi yang diamalkan di Malaysia. Kelestarian Pengurusan Sisa Pepejal Negara

Kepincangan alam sekitar yang sedang dihadapi dunia sejagat pada hari ini dilihat dengan spektrum yang meluas selari dengan pemaknaan konsep pembangunan lestari oleh Suruhanjaya Dunia tentang Alam Sekitar dan Pembangunan (1987) dengan meletakkan konsep tersebut sebagai memenuhi keperluan generasi masa kini tanpa menjejaskan sebarang keperluan generasi hadapan. Lantaran itu, konsep pembangunan lestari tersebut telah disepakati 178 buah negara anggota Pertubuhan BangsaBangsa Bersatu (PBB) termasuk Malaysia di Brazil melalui Deklarasi Rio tentang Alam Sekitar Pembangunan 1992 (Agenda 21) dengan turut memberi fokus kepada pengurusan sisa pepejal

16

Prof. Emeritus Datuk Dr. Ibrahim Komoo (Utusan Malaysia, 2016) melihat alam sekitar secara komprehensif dengan menghimpunkan warisan alam di sekeliling kita meliputi tanah, batuan, landskap, tumbuhan dan haiwan yang memberi manfaat kepada manusia dan masyarakat selain menjadi komponen asas sebelum soal kesejahteraan masyarakat dan pertumbuhan ekonomi diberikan perhatian. 169

sebagai antara komponen yang perlu dititikberatkan dalam perencanaan pembangunan yang lestari.17 Pertumbuhan ekonomi yang rancak dan pertambahan penduduk seterusnya didokong oleh kepesatan proses perbandaran yang telah merintis kepada peningkatan penghasilan sisa pepejal di Malaysia. Kesan berantai tersebut telah memberi cabaran kepada pemerintah bagi memastikan sisa pepejal diuruskan dengan efektif memandangkan pengurusannya yang lemah merupakan antara punca utama masalah alam sekitar di Malaysia (Hassan, 2000; Mohd Dinie Muhaimin Samsudin dan Mashitah Mat Don, 2012; Muhamad Azahar Abas dan Seow, 2014).18Kelemahan dalam pengurusan sisa pepejal bukan hanya tertumpu kepada soal teknikal operasi tetapi turut merangkumkan perihal politik, perundangan, sosio-budaya, alam sekitar dan ekonomi (Siti Aisyah Saat, 2013). Bahagian ini akan menyoroti perihal pengurusan sisa pepejal perbandaran negara yang telah rancak didebatkan oleh masyarakat umum dalam pelbagai konteks seperti pembersihan awam, sistem pengutipan sampah, penswastaan pengurusan sisa pepejal dan tapak pelupusan sampah.19 Sorotan Pengurusan Sisa Pepejal Perbandaran Negara Pengurusan sisa pepejal perbandaran merupakan isu yang sering mendapat perhatian masyarakat umum sejak pengurusannya berada di bawah pihak berkuasa tempatan (PBT) yang sejajar dengan Jadual Kesembilan Perlembagaan Persekutuan (Abas dan Seow, 2014). 20Menurut Agamuthu dan teman pengkaji (2009), pengurusan sisa pepejal di Malaysia terkebelakang dan hanya berkembang secara berperingkat pada lewat dekad 70-an. Proses perbandaran telah merumitkan permasalahan tersebut dan lantaran itu, pemerintah telah menemukan kaedah penswastaan sebagai langkah

17

Pengurusan sisa pepejal telah difokuskan di dalam Agenda 21 menerusi Bahagian 2: Pemuliharaan dan pengurusan sumber (Deklarasi Rio, 1992). 18 Kementerian Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan (2005) meletakkan pengurusan sisa pepejal perbandaran sebagai perkhidmatan kebersihan asas yang penting bagi menjamin kesihatan warga bandar dan luar bandar serta memelihara alam sekitar. 19 Hasnah Ali dan teman pengkajinya (2012) merumuskan bahawa masalah sisa pepejal di kawasan perbandaran menjadi fokus umum kerana kesannya bukan sekadar terhadap pencemaran malah turut menjadi punca berlakunya banjir dan mendatangkan pelbagai wabak penyakit. Manakala, Prof. Emeritus Datuk Dr. Ibrahim Komoo (Berita Harian, 2016) pula berpandangan bahawa pengurusan sisa pepejal merupakan penyumbang kepada masalah alam sekitar sejak awal kemerdekaan dan seterusnya menuju pembangunan negara yang pesat sehingga menjadi isu kritikal di kawasan perbandaran sejak awal tahun 1980-an. 20 Kesan alam sekitar dan ancaman wabak penyakit yang berpunca daripada sisa pepejal telah meningkatkan kesedaran dan perhatian masyarakat dunia tentang pengurusan sisa pepejal. Malah faktor ini juga mempengaruhi mereka menolak pembukaan tapak pelupusan berhampiran dengan kejiranan mereka (Eusuf et al, 2011). 170

penyelesaian yang komprehensif bagi mendepani isu pengurusan sisa pepejal untuk jangka masa panjang.21 Perhatian pemerintah terhadap pengurusan sisa pepejal lebih terarah dengan pelancaran Pelan Tindakan Malaysia Bersih dan Indah (Action Plan for a Beautiful and Clean Malaysia, ABC) yang diperkenal pada tahun 1988. Meskipun tidak diperaku oleh PBT, namun pelan tindakan tersebut merupakan dokumen penting dalam mengatur strategi pengurusan sisa pepejal perbandaran negara dengan memfokuskan kepada sistem pengurusan yang efektif dan menyeluruh – dengan mengambil kira faktor pengutipan, penghantaran, pelupusan, kesihatan awam dan pekerja, keupayaan kewangan dan kepentingan alam sekitar. Melalui pelan tindakan ini jugalah, amalan kitar semula diperkenal kepada masyarakat Malaysia (Muhamad Azahar Abas & Seow, 2014; Agamuthu & Victor, 2011). Usaha kerajaan dalam memantapkan pengurusan sisa pepejal perbandaran diteruskan dengan pengenalan Pelan Strategik Nasional tentang Pengurusan Sisa Pepejal pada tahun 2005 dan diikuti dengan pelancaran Pelan Induk Pengurangan Sisa Nasional pada tahun 2006 yang merupakan sebahagian daripada pelan strategik tersebut. Secara keseluruhannya dua dokumen ini merangkumkan soal sisa pepejal dan pembersihan awam secara menyeluruh selain strategi bagi meminimakan penggunaan sumber semula jadi, memaksimakan pengurangan beban alam sekitar dan mengurangkan sisa pepejal melalui pemantapan amalan kitar semula (Kementerian Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan, 2005; Agensi Kerjasama Antarabangsa Jepun, 2006; Moh & Latifah, 2016). Pelan strategik tersebut juga telah mengenengahkan kerangka pihak berkuasa di peringkat kerajaan, sektor swasta dan masyarakat awam yang memfokuskan kepada tiga peningkatan

kesedaran

terhadap

peminimaan

sisa;

(ii)

perkara asas iaitu (i)

pengukuhan

kerjasama

dalam

membudayakan amalan kitar semula (3R); dan (iii) peningkatan institusi bagi mengukuhkan dasardasar kerajaan bagi meminimakan penjanaan sisa seperti yang tertera di dalam Gambar 1.

21

Penswastaan pengurusan sisa pepejal perbandaran pada tahun 1995 sememangnya bermanfaat dari segi kecekapan dan kewangan yang selama ini membelenggu PBT di Malaysia (Agamuthu et al, 2009; Utusan Malaysia, 2011). 171

Gambar 1: Pihak berkepentingan dan strategi ke arah peminimaan sisa Sumber: JICA (2006)

Keseriusan kerajaan berhubung pengurusan sisa pepejal perbandaran sekali lagi telah diterjemah dengan perwartaan Akta Pengurusan Sisa Pepejal dan Pembersihan Awam 2007 (Akta 672) yang didebatkan di Parlimen selama sepuluh tahun dan dijangka bakal membawa perubahan yang ketara kepada pengurusan sisa di Malaysia (Agamuthu et al, 2009). Institusi khusus bagi mentadbir urus sisa pepejal perbandaran telah dibentuk seperti Jabatan Pengurusan Sisa Pepejal Negara (JPSPN) dan Perbadanan Pengurusan Sisa Pepejal dan Pembersihan Awam (SWCorp).22

22

Jabatan Pengurusan Sisa Pepejal Negara (JPSPN) bertanggungjawab dalam menyediakan sistem pengurusan sisa pepejal dan pembersihan awam yang lestari, bersepadu dan berkesan dari segi pengoperasian dan kewangan (Jabataan Pengurusan Sisa Pepejal Negara, 2017). Manakala, Perbadanan Pengurusan Sisa Pepejal dan Pembersihan Awam (SWCorp) pula ditubuhkan di bawah Akta 673 yang bertujuan untuk mentadbir urus akta tersebut (Utusan Malaysia, 2016). 172

Akta 672: Halatuju Baharu Sisa Pepejal

Meskipun Akta 672 ini diwartakan pada tahun 2007, namun atas faktor kekurangan peraturan sokongan, penguatkuasaannya hanya bermula pada tahun 2011. Penggubalan Akta 672 ini mempunyai signifikasinya yang tersendiri kerana menyaksikan pemusatan pengurusan sisa pepejal kepada kerajaan Persekutuan daripada Kerajaan Negeri dan Pihak Berkuasa Tempatan dan serentak dengan itu penswastaan penuh kepada syarikat konsesi juga dikuatkuasakan setelah hampir 14 tahun berada di dalam tempoh interim (Kementerian Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan, 2011; Agamuthu dan Victor, 2011).23

Pemusatan pengurusan sisa pepejal yang hanya melibatkan tujuh buah negeri di Semenanjung Malaysia termasuk Wilayah Persekutuan tersebut secara dasarnya telah memindahkan kuasa eksekutif kepada kerajaan persekutuan untuk mentadbir urus sisa pepejal dan pembersihan awam. Manakala, bagi negeri-negeri di Semenanjung Malaysia yang tidak menerima pakai Akta 672 pula tidak akan terlibat dengan sebarang pengambilalihan dan penswastaan pengurusan sisa pepejal (Bernama, 2011).24 Justeru itu, peranan kerajaan persekutuan dan kerajaan negeri dalam memuktamadkan pengambilalihan fungsi pengurusan sisa pepejal dan pembersihan awam amat penting bagi memastikan penguatkuasaan Akta 672 berjalan dengan lancar di setiap kawasan PBT. Dalam konteks institusi, penguatkuasaan ini juga semacam satu rejuvenasi pengurusan sisa pepejal negara yang sebelum ini tidak terarah dengan melibatkan tiga cabang kerajaan – persekutuan, negeri dan PBT yang bertanggungjawab dalam menyediakan perkhidmatan pengurusan sisa pepejal (Kementerian Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan, 2005). Walaupun begitu, Siti Aisyah Saat (2013) berpendapat bahawa penstrukturan institusi kerajaan dalam mentadbir urus sisa pepejal hanya terhad kepada makluman awam dan tiada penyahpusatan (decentralization) untuk memperkasa masyarakat umum. Malah, kajian beliau turut membuktikan bahawa budaya politik di 23

Pemeteraian perjanjian konsesi pengurusan sisa pepejal dan pembersihan awam pada tahun 2011 adalah bagi tempoh 22 tahun yang melibatkan tiga buah syarikat iaitu Alam Flora Sdn. Bhd. (WP Kuala Lumpur, WP Putarajaya, Pahang, Terengganu dan Kelantan), SWM Environment Sdn. Bhd. (Johor, Melaka dan Negeri Sembilan) dan Environment Idaman Sdn. Bhd. (Kedah dan Perlis) dengan pemantauan yang ketat oleh Kementerian Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan dan Perbadanan Pengurusan Sisa Pepejal dan Pembersihan Awam. Sepanjang menjalani tempoh interim tersebut, syarikat konsesi yang terlibat perlu berdepan dengan kaedah yang berbeza-beza dalam mengendalikan pengurusan sisa pepejal berdasarkan kehendak PBT. 24 Kementerian Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan (Parlimen, 2015) memaklumkan bahawa Akta 672 tersebut tidak terpakai di Malaysia Timur buat masa ini. 173

Malaysia yang kurang bekerjasama dan penglibatan yang tidak aktif daripada organisasi di peringkat negeri dalam pengurusan sisa pepejal yang menjadikan peranan kerajaan persekutuan amat penting bagi menyatukan pihak yang berkepentingan dalam melestarikan dasar pengurusan sisa pepejal.

Pasca Penguatkuasaan Akta 672

Pemusatan pengurusan sisa pepejal yang dilaksanakan melalui Akta 672 bertujuan bagi menyeragamkan pengurusan sisa pepejal negara di bawah kelolaan Jabatan Pengurusan Sisa Pepejal Negara (JPSPN). Bagi melicinkan operasi pengurusan sisa pepejal di peringkat negeri dan kerajaan tempatan, Perbadanan Pengurusan Sisa Pepejal dan Pembersihan Awam (SWCorp) ditubuhkan pada tahun 2008 di bawah Akta 673 bagi menggalas tanggungjawab tersebut daripada PBT secara menyeluruh, bersepadu dan keberkesanan kos (Unit Perancang Ekonomi, 2013).

Bahagian ini akan memberi fokus kepada Akta 672 (serta Akta 673 khusus kepada SWCorp) dan langkah-langkah yang telah diambil kerajaan melalui akta tersebut pasca penguatkuasaan pada tahun 2011.

Akta 672, Konsesi & Masyarakat Umum

Sebagaimana yang telah dinyatakan, pendebatan berhubung pemusatan pengurusan sisa pepejal melalui Akta 672 dan kuasa eksekutif yang telah diberikan kepada kerajaan persekutuan oleh kerajaan negeri dan PBT sememangnya perlu diberikan perhatian oleh masyarakat umum, malah di peringkat Parlimen sendiri perdebatan tentang pengurusan sisa pepejal telah berlangsung selama sepuluh tahun lamanya. Dengan termeterainya perjanjian antara kerajaan persekutuan, kerajaan negeri dan syarikat konsesi serta penguatkuasaan Akta 672 pada tahun 2011, maka beban pengurusan sisa pepejal perbandaran telah berpindah kepada kerajaan persekutuan melalui JPSPN dan SWCorp. Namun begitu, sehingga kini, penguatkuasaan Akta 672 dan keberadaan JPSPN serta SWCorp itu sendiri masih kurang disedari oleh masyarakat umum yang masih merujuk kepada PBT berhubung perkara yang 174

berkaitan dengan sisa pepejal dan pembersihan awam.25 Perkara ini selari dengan dapatan kajian yang telah dijalankan oleh Fauziah Shahul Hamid dan teman pengkajinya (2010) yang mendapati majoriti responden yang terlibat dengan kajian tersebut (69%) tidak menyedari akan kewujudan akta tersebut meskipun mereka mengambil perhatian berhubung isu pengurusan sisa pepejal di Malaysia.

Walaupun penguatkuasaan akta ini diyakini mampu menyelesaikan permasalahan pengurusan sisa pepejal yang dihadapi negara khususnya PBT dan masyarakat umum, tetapi Muhamad Azahar Abas dan Seow (2014) yang berpandangan sebaliknya menyimpulkan bahawa perkhidmatan pengurusan sisa pepejal yang disediakan oleh syarikat konsesi di Malaysia seringkali mendapat kritikan umum. Perihal ini juga telah dirumuskan oleh Rozita Abdul Mutalib (2013) di dalam kajiannya bahawa kualiti perkhidmatan pengurusan sisa pepejal yang dikendalikan oleh syarikat konsesi merundum meskipun kos pengoperasian meningkat. Manakala, perihal kesedaran dalam kalangan masyarakat umum tentang tatacara pengurusan sisa pepejal pula akan ditimbulkan oleh pihak syarikat konsesi bagi mendepani sebarang kritikan dan aduan berhubung perkhidmatan yang disediakan. Asingkan Demi Kelangsungan Tapak Pelupusan Melalui Akta 672 juga, kaedah Pengasingan Sisa Pepejal Di Punca (PSDP) diperkenal dan dilaksanakan secara mandatori berkuatkuasa pada 1 September 2015 yang memerlukan warga perbandaran di negeri-negeri yang terlibat mengasingkan sisa baki (juga dirujuk sebagai sisa dapur atau sisa domestik) dan sisa yang boleh dikitar semula.26 Pelaksanaan kaedah PSDP ini telah diselarikan terlebih dahulu dengan sistem kutipan 2+1 yang telah diperkenal sebaik pemeteraian Akta 672 dibuat antara kerajaan persekutuan, kerajaan negeri dan syarikat konsesi.27 Penguatkuasaan peraturan tersebut merupakan langkah pengurangan sisa yang diambil oleh pihak kerajaan melalui kaedah perundangan bagi mengurangkan penjanaan sisa pepejal di tapak pelupusan yang didominasi oleh sisa kitar semula. Langkah tersebut juga mampu memanjangkan 25

Pertindanan kuasa antara SWCorp dan PBT jelas menimbulkan kekeliruan dalam kalangan masyarakat umum berhubung pengurusan sisa pepejal meskipun Perbadanan tersebut telah mengambil alih pengurusan tersebut sejak 2011 melalui kuasa eksekutif yang diberikan di bawah Akta 672 dan Akta 673 (Muhamad Azahar Abas dan Seow, 2014). 26 Kaedah PSDP ini juga dilihat sebagai pelengkap kepada pembudayaan amalan kitar semula yang disasarkan melebihi 22 peratus pada tahun 2020 (Harian Metro, 2016). 27 Kaedah pengutipan 2+1 merujuk kepada kutipan dua kali seminggu bagi sisa baki dan kutipan sekali seminggu bagi sisa kitar semula, sisa kebun dan sisa pukal. 175

jangka hayat tapak pelupusan sampah sedia ada memandangkan kekurangan tapak pelupusan merupakan antara isu mendesak dalam pengurusan sisa pepejal (Zaini et al, 2008). Tapak Pelupusan Pekan Nenas di Johor, misalnya masih beroperasi meskipun telah melangkaui jangka hayatnya dan lokasinya yang berdekatan dengan kawasan kejiranan dan tadahan air hujan telah mendapat perhatian penduduk dan wakil rakyat – Parlimen Tanjong Piai dan Dewan Undangan Negeri kawasan Pekan Nenas (Sinar Harian, 2016). Selain jangka hayat tapak pelupusan, faktor kekurangan tapak pelupusan juga didorong oleh kesukaran untuk mendapatkan lokasi tapak pelupusan baharu bagi mengantikan tapak pelupusan sedia ada yang kebanyakannya telah menghampiri dan melangkaui tempoh operasi yang ditetapkan (Mohd Armi & Mohd Yusof, 2015). Faktor dorongan ini terpakai di dalam situasi Tapak Pelupusan Pekan Nenas yang dicadang untuk digantikan dengan tapak pelupusan sanitari di kawasan Gelang Patah, namun cadangan tersebut ditangguhkan atas lokasinya yang mendapat bantahan daripada masyarakat setempat dan wakil rakyat di kawasan berkenaan (Sinar Harian, 2014; Sinar Harian, 2016). Pendemokrasian Isu Pengurusan Sisa Pepejal “Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.” ―Isu alam sekitar sebaiknya dikendalikan dengan penglibatan rakyat di pelbagai peringkat. Di peringkat kebangsaan (negara), setiap individu seharusnya boleh mendapatkan sebarang maklumat berhubung alam sekitar yang dimiliki oleh kerajaan dengan setimpal, maklumat ini termasuklah tentang bahan-bahan dan aktiviti-aktiviti yang merbahaya di dalam masyarakat, dan peluang untuk terlibat di dalam proses membuat keputusan. Kerajaan perlu memudahkan dan menggalakkan penglibatan dan kesedaran umum dengan menyebarluaskan maklumat yang

176

berkaitan. Kemudahan untuk mendapatkan sebarang prosiding penghakiman dan pentadbiran, termasuklah penebusan dan pemulihan perlu disediakan.‖ (Deklarasi Rio tentang Alam Sekitar Pembangunan 1992)

Pertama dan terutamanya, konsep demokrasi itu sebagaimana dimaksudkan oleh sarjana Austin Ranney merujuk kepada kerajaan berasaskan rakyat dengan berpaksikan prinsip kedaulatan undangundang, kesaksamaan politik, perundingan awam dan pemilihan bermajoriti (Ranney, 1949). Secara kontekstualnya, pendemokrasian isu pengurusan sisa pepejal yang ditekankan di dalam kertas ini merujuk kepada penglibatan umum dalam membuat keputusan yang berkaitan sebagaimana yang dinyatakan di dalam Prinsip Kesepuluh Deklarasi Rio di atas. Menurut Renn (2004), penglibatan umum telah menjadi keperluan dalam proses penggubalan dasar dan undang-undang kerana melibatkan pelbagai individu dan kumpulan masyarakat merentasi kepakaran, nilai kemasyarakatan dan keadaan sebagaimana yang telah diamalkan di kebanyakan negara maju seperti di Amerika Syarikat dan dalam kalangan negara Eropah. Pendekatan yang telah diambil oleh kebanyakan negara maju tersebut selari dengan ketetapan yang diambil menerusi Agenda 21 bagi mencapai pembangunan yang lestari: "Critical to the effective implementation of the objectives, policies, and mechanisms agreed to by Governments in all program areas of Agenda 21 will be the commitment and involvement of all social groups..." ―Objektif, dasar dan mekanisme yang telah diputuskan oleh Kerajaan penting untuk merangkumkan bidang-bidang di dalam Agenda 21 yang perlu dilaksanakan sertamerta dengan kebertanggungjawaban dan penglibatan pelbagai kumpulan masyarakat…‖

(Bab 23, Agenda 21, 1992)

Manakala, Hove (2000) berpandangan bahawa penglibatan umum diterjemahkan dengan pelbagai pihak terlibat bersama dalam proses membuat keputusan dari latar yang berbeza termasuklah dari kalangan orang awam, pemain industri, badan bukan kerajaan, kesatuan pekerja, kumpulan pengguna, cendekiawan dan lain-lain. Justeru itu, bahagian ini akan terbahagi kepada dua fokus soal penglibatan masyarakat melalui ruang aktivisme dan politik serta melalui media komunikasi. 177

Demokrasi Penyertaan: Pengaruh Aktivisme & Peranan Politik

Hove (2000) melihat penglibatan yang meluas daripada pelbagai pihak mampu menemukan penyelesaian bagi sebarang isu alam sekitar melalui maklumat dan pengetahuan yang disalurkan oleh mereka yang terlibat. Perkara ini jelas selari dengan Bahagian 3, Agenda 21 yang meraikan pelbagai kumpulan masyarakat seperti generasi muda, golongan wanita, petani, orang asal, pekerja, kesatuan pekerja, pemain industri dan para cerdik pandai Gerakan Aktivisme Suara Akar Umbi

Penglibatan pelbagai kumpulan masyarakat dilihat mampu membentuk sebuah gerakan aktivisme yang tertumpu kepada perihal alam sekitar bagi menyebarluas keseadaran awam dan menyuarakan pandangan secara terbuka berhubung hak-hak sivil dan dasar yang berhubungkait dengan alam sekitar. Dalam konteks alam sekitar di Malaysia, kumpulan pembantah anti-Lynas dirujuk sebagai gerakan aktivisme yang menentang pembukaan kilang pengurusan bahan radioaktif tersebut di Pahang yang akan memberi kesan buruk terhadap alam sekitar dan masyarakat setempat (The Guardian, 2012).

Bantahan gerakan aktivisme tersebut telah mendapat perhatian daripada Ahli Parlimen sehingga menjadi isu hangat yang didebatkan di peringkat badan legislatif berkenaan dengan menyaksikan ketetapan diambil untuk membentuk sebuah Jawatankuasa Pilihan Khas Parlimen (PSC) berhubung Projek Lynas Advanced Material Plant (LAMP) – bermatlamat untuk meneliti isu-isu yang dibangkitkan pihak awam serta piaiwaian keselamatan projek itu (Utusan Online, 2012).

Kelantangan gerakan aktivisme menyuarakan pendapat dan menyebarluaskan maklumat tentang projek LAMP sewajarnya digunapakai bagi kebanyakan isu berkaitan dengan alam sekitar termasuklah soal pengurusan sisa pepejal. Gerakan aktivisme yang dilihat lebih dekat dengan masyarakat akar umbi mampu memainkan peranan dan melicinkan pengoperasian syarikat konsesi pengurusan sisa pepejal di lapangan awam melalui projek-projek sivil. Malah, gerakan ini juga dilihat sebagai pelengkap kepada peranan yang dimainkan media dalam membentuk kesedaran awam tentang tatacara pengurusan sisa pepejal yang betul. 178

Prinsip hak kebebasan bersuara merupakan suatu aturan dalam sistem demokrasi yang memberi ruang kepada gerakan aktivisme untuk menterjemahkan kreativiti mereka dalam bentuk pandangan dan cadangan kepada pihak yang berkepentingan. Dalam konteks pengurusan sisa pepejal, badan yang dipertanggungjawabkan dan syarikat konsesi seharusnya memanfaatkan gerakan aktivisme untuk menemukan idea baharu dan bersesuaian dengan masyarakat sekaligus memantapkan sistem pengurusan sisa pepejal negara. Di samping itu, Hove juga berpendapat bahawa penglibatan pelbagai pihak yang meluas mampu menemukan jalan penyelesaian dan faktor tersebut juga mempengaruhi keputusan yang dibuat – dari bawah (akar umbi) berbanding dari atas (kerajaan) selari dengan pelaksanaannya yang menyeluruh selain membentuk rasa kebertanggungjawaban bersama.

Pemain Politik Pelengkap Demokrasi Penyertaan

―Parti Hijau sangat relevan untuk diasaskan di negara ini pada waktu ini kerana sayamelihat alam sekitar kita tidak dijaga dengan baik.‖

(Zainal Abidin, 2017)

Kenyataan pelantun lagu Hijau tersebut amat optimis bahawa sebuah parti politik mampu menjadi benteng mempertahan agenda alam sekitar di dalam aturan demokrasi. Makanya, bahagian ini akan memfokuskan kepada politik sebagai saluran bagi mengangkat hal-hal alam sekitar dalam konteks pengurusan sisa pepejal. Selain gerakan aktivisme, penglibatan politik juga memainkan peranan yang berimpak besar dalam mendasari isu-isu alam sekitar di Malaysia. Meskipun Blowers (seperti yang dipetik oleh Hove, 2000) lebih menjurus kepada penglibatan merentasi pengaruh politik yang lazimnya berkait rapat dengan unsur meraih undi. Akan tetapi, beliau akur akan peranan yang dimainkan oleh pemain politik juga relevan dalam membentuk idea dan mendapatkan pengaruh daripada masyarakat umum dalam bentuk sokongan terhadap sesuatu isu dan dasar yang berkaitan. 179

Merujuk kepada bantahan projek LAMP sekali lagi, gerakan aktivisme bukan sekadar membentuk kesedaran dalam kalangan masyarakat akar umbi, malah telah turut menarik perhatian Ahli Parlimen selaku pembuat dasar untuk membawa bantahan tersebut ke peringkat Parlimen. Dalam konteks pengurusan sisa pepejal di Malaysia pula, perkhidmatan yang disediakan oleh pihak syarikat konsesi merupakan fokus yang diberi tumpuan oleh pemain politik. Mengambil isu pengurusan sisa pepejal di Johor yang membabitkan pemilik premis tidak bercukai di Senai pada tahun lalu yang telah mendapat perhatian daripada Ahli Dewan Undangan Negeri (ADUN) Kawasan Senai, Wong Shu Qi (DAP) sehingga persefahaman telah dicapai antara pemilik premis, badan yang dipertanggungjawabkan, PBT dan syarikat konsesi (The Star, 2016). Situasi berbeza pula dimainkan oleh Ahli Parlimen Kulai, Teo Nie Ching (DAP) yang tampil membangkitkan isu pembuangan sampah haram dan pembakaran terbuka di Pasar Awam Kelapa Sawit sejak tahun 2015 dan telah beralih ke lokasi baharu di Taman Wawasan, Kelapa Sawit – langkah tersebut dilihat sebagai satu bentuk tekanan yang diberikan oleh pemain politik kepada pihak yang dipertanggungjawabkan untuk mengambil langkah yang efektif dan drastik (Sinar Harian, 2015; The Star, 2017). Isu pengurusan sisa pepejal sememangnya mempunyai nilai tambah kepada pemain politik bagi tujuan pembingkaian agenda (agenda setting) dengan tampil sebagai pendesak demi hak-hak sivil masyarakat umum. Misalnya seperti isu tapak pelupusan sampah di Simpang Renggam mutakhir ini – penglibatan politik oleh Parti Amanah Negara (PAN) telah dimanfaatkan dengan menekan pihak yang terlibat untuk tindakan segera agar pencemaran tidak berlaku lagi di Sungai Benut dan tidak lagi menjejaskan bekalan air di Loji Rawatan Simpang Renggam (MalaysiaKini, 2017; Sinar Harian, 2017). Pemain politik sifatnya seperti pembetul, pendesak dan perantara bagi pihak kerajaan dan masyarakat umum dalam sesuatu isu berbangkit – dan begitu juga dalam perihal pengurusan sisa pepejal. Merujuk tapak pelupusan di Pekan Nenas sebagai contoh, tapak pelupusan di Pekan Nenas telah melangkaui jangka hayat pengoperasiannya dan menjadi antara bahan kempen ADUN Pekan Nenas, Yeo Tung Siong (DAP) semasa Pilihanraya Umum Ke-13

180

(PRU13) pada tahu 2003. Malah, perkara tersebut terus difokuskan beliau sepanjang berkhidmat sebagai wakil rakyat di kawasan berkenaan. Malahan, Yeo Tung Siong secara demokratiknya telah menggunakan isu tapak pelupusan sampah di Pekan Nenas ini dengan mengumpulkan suara penduduk di kawasan tersebut melalui memorandum yang ditujukan kepada pihak kerajaan. Langkah tersebut diikuti dengan sesi dialog yang diadakan sebagai ruang menyuarakan pandangan akar umbi bersama penduduk di Kampung Ulu Pulai setelah cadangan untuk memindahkan Tapak Pelupusan Pekan Nenas ke sebuah Tapak Pelupusan Sanitari di kawasan Gelang Patah mendapat bantahan (Sinar Harian, 2013). Usaha beliau berhubung perkara tersebut terus disuarakan setelah hampir tamat penggal perkhidmatannya yang bimbang akan memberi kesan kepada kawasan tadahan air. Malahan, beliau juga menyeru penglibatan masyarakat umum untuk menjayakan pelaksanaan kaedah pengasingan sisa pepejal di punca sebagai langkah alternatif mendepani krisis sedemikian (Sinar Harian, 2017). Tuntasnya, masyarakat akar umbi adalah asas kepada sistem demokrasi. Justeru itu, penyertaan pelbagai kumpulan masyarakat merupakan elemen terutama dalam aturan demokrasi yang diikuti dengan perwakilan yang diputuskan secara majoriti melalui institusi kepartian dan seterusnya adalah perundingan awam bagi menegakkan hak-hak sivil. Lantaran itu, kenyataan yang dikeluarkan oleh Zainal Abidin tersebut memperlihat bahawa keabsahan yang dimiliki pemain politik melengkapi gerakan aktivisme yang dibina dari akar umbi bagi mengangkat perihal alam sekitar di dalam aturan demokrasi. Dalam konteks pengurusan sisa pepejal, masyarakat akar umbi khususnya pemilik premis yang membayar cukai di kawasan PBT perlu tampil menyertai sebarang perundingan awam dan membangkitkan perihal berkaitan pengurusan tersebut, manakala, pemain politik perlu sentiasa cakna dengan kekurangan yang didepani masyarakat agar penyampaian dasar pengurusan sisa pepejal negara berjalan dengan sempurna.

181

Media dan Komunikasi Perorangan

Penglibatan media berperanan sebagai entiti penting dalam menyediakan ruang untuk memperkasa penyertaan awam dalam menyampaikan pandangan mereka (public opinion) bagi menyebarluas kesulitan dan kelebihan yang didepani dalam menguruskan sisa pepejal mereka. Hal ini selari dengan pandangan Lasswell (seperti yang dipetik oleh Pavel, 2010) yang menyifatkan bahawa media berperanan membentuk pandangan awam (public opinion) yang menjadi cermin bagi seluruh masyarakat melalui tiap-tiap liputan yang disampaikan. Pandangan tersebut telah dikukuhkan dengan pemikiran Mohd Yusof Othman (2010) yang meletakkan mediadewasa ini tidak lagi berperanan sebagai saluran penyampaian maklumat kerana kekuatan media dalam menyampaikan maklumat tersebut mampu membentuk pola pemikiran masyarakat umum. Selain itu, media juga berperanan sebagai saluran utama dalam membentuk kesedaran umum tentang sesuatu usaha yang murni dan dalam konteks pengurusan sisa pepejal adalah seperti amalan kitar semula dan kaedah pengurusan sisa pepejal di punca. Seperti di Cuba, dapatan kajian oleh Mosler et al. (2008) menyimpulkan bahawa pengiklanan dan kempen kesedaran yang disebarluas melalui media memberi nilai tambah kepada penyertaan awam bagi setiap sesi bermaklumat dan aktiviti yang berkaitan dengan pengurusan sisa pepejal. Kesimpulan tersebut dapatlah dipadankan juga dengan dapatan kajian oleh Fauziah Shahul Hamid et al. (2010) yang mendapati bahawa hampir majoriti responden (69%) yang terlibat tidak maklum akan pewartaan Akta 672 pada tahun 2007 atas faktor tiada pemakluman daripada pihak kerajaan. Sebagai saluran suara masyarakat, peranan yang dimainkan oleh media perlulah terlebih dahulu sejajar dengan konsep demokrasi – menjamin hak kebebasan bersuara bagi tiap-tiap masyarakat umum. Jaminan tersebut akan memberdaya elemen demokrasi seperti penyertaan awam yang diikuti dengan perundingan awam tentang perkara-perkara berbangkit seperti pengurusan sisa pepejal. Maka dengan itu, dalam hal-hal pengurusan sisa pepejal, media adalah saluran bagi mempergiat kempen kesedaran awam, menyedia ruang penyaluran aduan, menyiarkan maklumat terkini berhubung bidang tersebut dan menjamin ruang kebebasan bagi masyarakat umum untuk menyuarakan pandangan tentang pengurusan sisa pepejal tersebut. Lantaran itu, tindakan yang diambil oleh beberapa pemain politik seperti yang telah dinyatakan di bahagian penyertaan awam merupakan cerminan kepada peranan yang harus dimainkan oleh media 182

dalam memantapkan dasar pengurusan sisa pepejal negara itu sendiri dan perkhidmatan yang disediakan oleh syarikat konsesi di bawah pihak kerajaan. Bagi pemain politik, penyertaan mereka dalam isu seperti pencemaran sungai akibat tapak pelupusan sampah, masalah sampah longgok haram dan kualiti perkhidmatan yang disediakan memberi kelebihan politik kepada mereka untuk tujuan pembingkaian agenda (agenda setting) sekaligus menjadikan media sebagai saluran mendesak pihak kerajaan untuk melaksanakan sesuatu perkara. Kesimpulan Meskipun sampah pada hakikatnya dipandang enteng oleh kebanyakan daripada kita, namun secara rumusannya dapatlah disimpulkan bahawa anggapan tersebut merupakan punca terutama berlakunya kepincangan alam sekitar khususnya kepada negara membangun seperti Malaysia. Peningkatan janaan sampah khususnya sisa kitar semula telah memendekkan jangka hayat tapak pelupusan, manakala tapak pelupusan konvesional pula mendatangkan kesan kepada sumber bawah tanah dan udara persekitaran. Tambahan pula, mentaliti kelas ketiga yang masih wujud dalam kalangan masyarakat kita juga antara punca sungai di Malaysia didapati tercemar akibat pembuangan sampah selain lokasi-lokasi utama yang dijadikan tapak pembuangan sampah haram. Lantaran itu, bagi mendepani sebarang kemungkinan pada masa hadapan, pemerintah telah mendasari perkara-perkara berbangkit yang telah didokumenkan menjadi panduan halatuju pengurusan sisa pepejal negara. Pun begitu, aturan demokrasi yang terhad dalam perangkaan dasar tersebut telah merencatkan pelaksanaannya sebagaimana yang telah direncanakan. Justeru itu, pendekatan dua hala seharusnya digunapakai bagi memperkasa peranan pelbagai pihak daripada peringkat akar umbi kepada peringkat pemerintah kerna kedua-duanya saling melengkapi bagi mencapai setiap daripada inisiatif yang telah ditetapkan di dalam dokumen tersebut. Kegagalan dalam mengurus sisa pepejal dengan kaedah yang betul bukan sekadar mendatangkan kepincangan kepada alam sekitar malah akan turut memunculkan pelbagai wabak penyakit dalam kalangan masysarakat sehingga menguggat keselamatan sosial dan menyaksikan kemerosotan pembangunan negara. Dalam mendepani kesan negatif yang berpanjangan ini, tidak dapat tidak peranan dalam pemulihan dan pemeliharaan alam sekitar adalah sesuatu yang perlu sentiasa ditambah baik melalui aturan demokrasi yang diperkukuh bagi mencapai matlamat tersebut dengan membuka ruang kepada penyertaan awam dan para pembuat dasar untuk berunding secara terbuka sebelum keputusan dibuat berdasarkan majoriti. 183

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188

Towards Improving the Strategies for Combating Corruption in Nigerian Democratic Era Ibrahim Kawuley Mikail & Mohammad Ainuddin Lee Iskandar Abdullah School of International Studies Universiti Utara Malaysia [email protected]

Abstract Corruption is a destructive agent for national development and economic growth to any states in the globe. The trajectory and sinister of corrupt practices have attracted the policy makers and the stakeholders in any nation states to design a policy framework and strategies for combating the menace of corruption. In this respect several strategies were been made to tackle the tragedy of corruption but corruption is still on. This paper focused on the ways towards improving the existing strategies for combating corruption in Nigerian democratic dispensation. The paper adopts interview techniques for data collection from the participants and the data was analyzed manually as prescribed in the qualitative research. The study revealed that holistic approach and collective responsibility through enlightenment campaign, attitudinal change, discipline and moral values shall entrench in order to improve such strategies for combating debasement in the country. The paper recommends that government political will, autonomy to anti-graft institutions, holistic approach to both public, private and civil societies shall be adopts towards improving the strategies for fighting corruption in Nigeria. Keywords: Improving strategies, Corruption, Anti-graft measures, Democratic era.

Introduction Globally, corruption became point of discourse that cut across all nation states, ranging from developed nations, countries in transitions, and developing societies of the third world states. Corruption stem from diverse political, socio-economical, institutional and historical factors. It thrives in a state with fragile democratic institutions, weak rule of law, and lack of political will to wage war against it. In fact, the insidious tendencies of defilement has cover the international arena which require urgent attention by both international community and supra- national and international organizations. These ailment has distorted development and decline the infrastructural facilities to move forward.

189

Internationally, some strategies, programs and policies were been advocated towards fighting debasement and sanitizing the system so as to enhance the political climate, livelihood and future prospects of the entire citizens in their respective states and the world at large. The war against corruption received global, regional and national perspectives which attribute the representatives of devastated nations to convene what they called Lima Declaration against corruption in September, 1997 and the Global Coalition of Civil Society of Africa in Maputo, Mozambique declared that corruption is ―a crime against humanity‖ was follow in November, 1997 (Igbuzor, 2008), as well the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention against Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 2000 and later the UN convene a meeting in attendance of 103 member states as UN Convention against corruption in 2003 respectively (Moulin, 2006). The above giant stride efforts of international community and the international agencies culminated their member states and other nation states to adopt a new platform for combating debasement in their respective states so as to sanitize the political economy in their states, Nigeria inclusive. There are several attempts towards fighting corrupt practices in Nigeria since independence but they are either aborted in ill-function which they yield inadequate result. Divergent strategies have been adopted by different countries or government in its effort to control corruption (Isaac, 2013). Various strategies have been put in place in Nigeria to address the problems of corruption in government by previous administrations. Successive government in Nigeria have made concerted efforts or strategies to address the issue of corruption. The past strategies were among Corrupt Practices Decree 1975 of Murtala/Obasanjo military regime; Ethical Revolution of Shagari civilian administration; War Against Indiscipline(WAI) of Buhari/Adiagbon military government; Code of Conduct Bureau 1990 of Babangida‘s military oligarchy; Failed Bank Tribunal and WAIC of Abacha‘s military junta and among others ( Waziri, 2010). Despite the above efforts of the past administrations, corruption is still on just like a bush fire in Nigerian political and socio-economic system (Ogundiya, 2012). But the policies and programs ended up with propaganda and enlightenment campaign not for the elimination or reduction the menace of corruption (Mikail, 2016). These scenario, vindicates the fourth democratic republic during President Obasanjo to established twin‘s anti-graft agencies Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission and Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (ICPC and EFCC) and their components solely for combating the scourge of corruption in the country. Nevertheless, these strategies were been in their action but the corruption is at alarming rate 190

particularly during past President Goodluck Jonathan administration (2009-2015), but now it slash a little bit due to some measures taken by the current administration. Notwithstanding, the level of improving such strategies for combating corruption is not highly encourage that some suspected corrupt officials were been cemented under the carpet in the present dispensation of President Buhari. This paper is here to interrogate the ways towards improving the strategies for combating corruption in Nigerian democratic era. Literature review Various strategies have proliferated to combat the plague of public corruption, which exists everywhere, but wreaks its most debilitating havoc in the worldwide anti-corruption campaign, including international agencies, state‘s effort for both developed and underdeveloped nations, development banks, transnational companies, business organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGO‘s), mass media and civil society organizations with anti-corruption mandates (Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, US Department of State, fighting Global Corruption: Business Risk Management 2001 cited in Jacobs and Wagner,2007). Indeed, the war against corruption received global, regional and national perspectives which attribute the representatives of devastated nations to meet in Peru‘s capital city to announced Lima Declaration against corruption 1997. Furthermore, in November, 1997, Civil Society Organizations (CSO's) convene towards supporting the Global Coalition for Africa in Maputo, Mozambique denounced that corruption is ―a crime against human beings and the humanity‖. After one month the OECD Anti-Bribery Conference was also adopted (Igbuzor, 2008). Therefore, everyone in this context, including researchers, global financial agencies of Breton wood institutions (IMF and World Bank) development agencies, donors, NGO‘s, and National governments have now adopted the fight against corruption as a battle cry (Enweremadu, 2012). In 2003, the UN Convention was embraced, this envisages UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and Related Offenses was likewise embraced in July at the second conventional session of the Assembly Heads of State and Government of the African Union. In the previous one and half decades, nearly policies and techniques set up to battle defilement (Igbuzor, 2008).These giant stride effort by International and Regional organizations have directed and instill consciousness 191

to member states to establish their own anti-corruption strategies or to revisit the previous one in order to meet the present demand for combating horrible corruption in their respective states. These efforts consolidates the nation states to designed a policy framework and strategies for the combating corruption or to redefine their existence ones so as its basic objectives for fighting corruption or reducing it to the barest minimal. In fact, new approaches for coalition between public officials, private division and civil society, networking; and cooperation from regional and global bodies with maximum support from development agencies. Some nation states such as Ghana, Uganda, and Nigeria have conducted a survey on the level of defilement. These surveys were considered as new strategy and methods to combat corruption in the year 2000 and were supported by the World Bank (Ayee, 2008). There are oversea anti-corruption unit (OACU) and serious fraud office (SFO) in UK, the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA); anti-corruption agency (ACA) in Malaysia; corruption eradication commission (KPK) in Indonesia (Siddique, 2010), as well as the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong; The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in Singapore (Quah, 2007 and UNDP, 2005); while in Africa we have Kenyan anti-corruption commission, Scorpion of South Africa, (Lamumba,2012); EFCC and ICPC in Nigeria and among others (Mikail, 2016). The fact is that, all these commissions and agencies were established purposely towards eradicating or diminutives corrupt practices in both public and private sector management in the above nation‘s states in particular and the global community. In fact, these were among the strategies vindicated by divergent states as precipitated by the international community or the stakeholders of that states in order to enhance their political economy against all misnomer in response to national development and economic growth. Strategies for combating corruption Nigerian perspective Strategies for combating corruption is the process, procedures and legislations that government takes for fighting against corruption and corrupt practices in the state. In the same direction, the role of government to set out broad anti-corruption framework through legislation, administrative, policies and regulations (Igbuzor, 2008). In this respect, Lamorde (2012) hinted that the holistic national strategy to combat corruption it involves diverse actors from both

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government and non-government sector in the fight to combat corruption due to the magnitude and endemic nature of the problem‖. At this juncture, each state has its own plan of action or strategies design for fighting corruption. It depends on is policy formulation and legislation as well as the level of corruption in the state. In Nigeria, there was so many strategies that previous government put in place as well as the present administration since transition to democracy in 1999 in order to combat the menace of corruption for the betterment of the state and National Development (Mikail, 2016). Corruption and anti-corruption fights have been at the heart of national political discourse and actions in Nigeria since independence in October, 1960. Almost all the regimes that have come to power in Nigeria strongly denounced corruption, without any form of external pressure, while also proposing measures (inauguration of commissions of inquiry, anti-graft agencies etc.) against it (Kolajo, 2002). From the perspectives of Alapiki and Amadi (2012) in addition to the existing criminal and penal codes that have existed since the colonial era, the military rule in Nigeria made impressive body of laws against corruption and financial crimes. The laws and decree include the following: i.

Investigation of Assets (public officers and other persons) Decree of 1968

ii.

The Corrupt Practices Decree 1975

iii.

Public Officers (special provisions) Decree 1976

iv.

Recovery of Public Property Decree 1984

v.

National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Act, 1990

vi.

The Promulgation of the mutual Assistance in Criminal matters within the common wealth (Enactment and Enforcement) Act No.13 of 1988 designed to bring Nigeria‘s municipal law in line with Harare scheme (i.e. to deal with crime and money laundering).

vii.

The Public Complaint Commission Act Cap377, Laws of federation 1990

viii.

The Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act Cap, Laws of the federation 1990

ix.

The Criminal Code Act Cap 77, Laws of the federation1990

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x.

The Penal Code Northern States Federal Provisions Act-Cap 345, Laws of the federation 1990

xi.

Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act 1990

xii.

Recovery of Public Property (special military Tribunal) Act Cap 389, Laws of the federation 1990

xiii.

Failed Bank (Recovery) of Debts and Financial Malpractices Act No.18 of 1994

xiv.

Advanced Fee Fraud and other Related Offences Act No.13 of 1995, intended to deal with the menace of the so-called ―Nigerian fraud letters‖ or ―419‖

xv.

The Foreign Exchange (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act No.17 of 1995

xvi.

The Money Laundering Act No.3 of 1995

xvii.

The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act of 2000

xviii.

The Economic and Financial Crimes Act 2004

xix.

The Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit

xx.

The Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) Act

xxi.

The Public Procurement Act 2007 (Amadi and Alapiki, 2012; Waziri, 2010 and Igbuzor, 2008).

In fact, there are several programs initiated by previous regimes on combating corrupt practices aimed at sanitizing the system. These programs include: Ethical Revolution of Shagari administration (1979-83); War against Indiscipline (WAI) General Buhari military regime (198385); Mass Mobilization for Self Reliance and Social Justice (MAMSER) of General Babangida‘s military oligarchy (1985-1993); and War against Indiscipline and Corruption (WAIC) of General Abacha‘s military dictatorship (1993-98) respectively (Igbuzor, 2008). Unfortunately, the above programs and commissions for anti-corruption crusade were either decay or not functioning, due to the regime change, lack of policy continuity and absence of political will to crush against corrupt practices in the affairs for both public and private sector in Nigeria (Akhaphe, 2014). This challenges motivate the fourth democratic government of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo to revisit the anti-corruption Acts and Decrees to embark on inaugurating the new anti194

graft Acts, strategies and agencies so as to deal with the challenges of corruption in the nation. This paved the way for establishment of Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related (ICPC) in 2000; Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2004; Waziri (2010). In fact, these two anti-graft institutions were held responsible to address the menace of corruption in democratic dispensation during President Obasanjo and beyond. He further established some subsidiary or component to aid the work of these anti-graft institutions towards his exit in 2007 thus: The Nigerian Extractive Industrial Transparency Initiative (NEITI); Bureau for Public Procurement (BPP); Technical Unit on Governance and Anti-corruption Reforms (TUGAR) (Waziri, 2010). Though, due to the debilitating nature of corruption in the country, President Yar‘adua came up with the policy of e-payment to aid the above strategies in public financial management and returning your leftover funds to the federation account at the end of each year in order to enhance probity and public accountability in governance. More so, the present administration of President Muhammadu Buhari have consolidated the e-payment approach and came up with single treasury account (TSA); Bank Verification Number, and blocking using Nigerian ATM cards in abroad as measure to improve accountability and blocking leakages in financial transactions for both public and private sector in the country. Though, the blocking of ATM Cards in abroad has really affect our Nigerian students who study in overseas because, they don‘t have means for generating money elsewhere. Methodology This paper employ exploratory research in order to seek the opinions of the informants or participants on the known situation of the phenomenon so as to generate adequate information on the phenomenon for viable theoretical framework (Sekeran and Bougie, 2013). This could be done through in-depth interview from the informants as guided in qualitative research. The researcher duly analyze the data through manual analysis after transcribing the data from the informants. The data was collected from 12 informants which represent public officials of anti-corruption agencies, politicians, civil societies and members of the academia. Indeed, this research is basically qualitative. Meanwhile, the research questions was accompanied with the responses from the participants on analyzing this paper and then discussion of findings interrogates the linked between the data and the views of previous scholars in order to show the areas of their agreement and intellectual dispute with the informants position. 195

Data presentation and analysis The research questions accompanied with the responses of the participants as highlighted above as well the discussion of the finding would follow later. The researcher ask the below questions and obtain the following responses. 1. What are the strategies for combating corruption in Nigeria? The informant‘s respondent that there were some institutional strategies for fighting corruption in this democratic era. These institutions comprises Economic and Financial Crime Commission EFCC, and Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related (ICPC). Though, before the advent of EFCC &ICPC there was Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal for asset declarations to all public officials before assuming office as well as during their years in public service. They further pointed that these anti-graft institutions (EFCC, ICPC and CCB) were created by law to combat corruption. EFCC practices for enforcement of laws of combating corruption. Moreover, the role of the EFCC is very important in our democratic dispensation. EFCC was established by President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2003 to compliment the role of combating corruption by the ICPC. This was a very good strategy because the agencies were able to try corrupt officials (Informants 1, 3, 10, 11, 12 Academician I& III; Politicians APC&PDP; & NEITI/TUGAR Staff).

Meanwhile, all the respondents attested that the first strategy for combating corruption in Nigeria was the establishment of ICPC. During the dispensation of President Olusegun Obasanjo such institutions like the ICPC is for fighting corrupt cases in public domain which was established in 2000. They further contends that, at the institutional level, the government of former President Olusegun Obasanjo actually carried out a major revolution in terms of tackling the problem of corruption by establishing two major important institutions; the ICPC and EFCC. This was the foundation for the strategies for fighting corruption in current democratic dispensation.

In fact, the establishment of these agencies is in conformity with the views of Gashinbaki (2013); and Enwerenmadu (2010) that, these twins‘ anti-graft agencies was enacted to discharge their responsibility in addressing anti-graft strategies and framework in the 196

country. In fact, these institutions offered reasonable authority and command to combat debasement and its associate offences (Enwerenmadu, 2010). More so, the anticorruption institutions needs to be evaluated in conformity with political climate and governance of a specific country (Huther and Sha, 2000). The success for these institutions hinged on the level of corrupt practices, transparency and quality of governance. 2. Does the strategies are effective for combating corruption in Nigeria? In response to the above question the informants hinted that the effectiveness of the organization determines by its nature as regards to their autonomy, authority and the appointment of their head via National Assembly not by the President (Informant 11 Politician PDP). At this juncture these agencies cannot perform effectively without autonomy from the government. Meanwhile a participants vindicates that the organization and measures for combating corruption are very effective. (Informant, 12 NEITI/TUGAR Staff). This validates that their strategies for combating corruption within the framework of their organization are effective, unless they have some hitches elsewhere.

In this regards some informants contends that, the organization is somehow effective in doing its service but some constraints like judiciary, funding and training are the external threat that is disturbing the organization in meeting its basic need. Though, despite the constraints against these agencies but they are effective to combat corruption, but what we require is only to address our challenges like funding, training and manpower (Informants 6,7&8 ICPC PRU;ICPC Legal& EFCC staff). Indeed, this is in line with the management viewpoint from Drucker (2006) effectiveness refers to getting the right things done. In fact, as per as they are doing things as expected they are effective.

Basically, all these institutions has the strategies for fighting corruption in their domain. These strategies would not be as effective as expected. Indeed, the strategies are not that effective but they did their best (Informants, 1&11 Academician I & Politician PDP). The above informants conformed that the strategies are well spelt out, despite the internal challenges facing the strategies for combating corruption in Nigeria. Waziri (2011) submits that the anti-graft institutions will be efficient if operates within the context of public

197

accountability and transparency initiatives. At this juncture, the holistic approach shall be put in place in order to tackle the menace of corruption squarely in the nation.

In combating corruption, there is need for collaboration within the spheres of life (i.e. economic, social legal, administrative and moral system) of the problem can be targeted (Mullinge and Lesetedi, 2002). Been, corruption is multifaceted trend emerging at different forms and dimension (Regional Anti-Corruption for Africa 2011-2016); Mullinge and Lesetidi, (2002); and Shehu (2015). This will enhance the effectiveness of the strategies for combating corruption in one wing and engage all phases of the society (i.e. public officials, civil society organizations, religious and traditional institutions, and private sectors etc.) so as to combat the saga of debasement at right angles Shehu (2015).

3. Which ways towards improving the strategies for combating corruption? In responding this question, the informants persistently believed that collective responsibility through enlightenment campaign, attitudinal change, discipline and moral values shall entrench in order to improve such strategies for combating debasement in the country. Accordingly, head of government, top government functionaries, anti-corruption agencies cannot fight corruption alone, unless they joined with all sectors and classes of the society. This enable both the government, civil society and private sector to have a collective efforts against corrupt practices aimed at improving the situation. This can be done through enlightenment/awareness campaign, attitudinal change, discipline and ethical orientation.

Because, you cannot fight corruption without awareness campaign so as the entire populace should be aware on the insidious ailment of corruption in order to shun away from. Furthermore, attitudinal change, discipline and ethical moral values and orientation were vehicles for changing the societal norms and values that would attributes towards improving the strategies for combating debasement in the country.

The above responses from the informants are in conformity with the view of Langestidi (1999) that ultimately, all sections of the society must bear the responsibility for combating corruption because all are involves willingly or unwillingly in debasement. In all corrupt transaction it requires buyer and the seller. This efforts involves the government, civil 198

society, traditional and faith based organizations, private sector and individual common man in the society in order to address the menace of corruption and corrupt practices collectively. In fact, media and civil society organizations are twin‘s significant figure to fight the scourge of debasement in the global arena (Alawode, 2008). Therefore, Igbuzor (2008) observed that freedom of information and protection of whistle blower are the basis for antigraft to further the investigation on any corrupt scandals as well as to the media for enlighten the public on corrupt cases. To enlighten the public on the dangers of corruption and the indicted corrupt officials to stigmatize their ill-gotten wealth. This is collective duty for all segment of the society both public, CSO‘s, mass media and other agencies. Effective discipline helps people to become acquainted and prevent their attitude from one phenomenon and enhance them to act in accordance with the moral conduct (Telep, 2009). This would enhance the general society to change their negative attitude on corruption towards positive one. It will also improve the moral ethical values of the society so as they would refrain from corrupt tendencies to the positive attitudes of change and development.

Meanwhile, good leadership, democratization, honesty, and transparency would reduce the gravity of corruption in the society. Leadership by example is the paramount ground for the success of any anti-corruption crusade. Whereby those who are in charge of fighting corruption should fear God and be honest in conducting their duties. Therefore fighting corruption cannot take place without purposeful and sound leadership, honesty, and transparency as stipulated by the informants. This is line with the assertion of Chukwuemeka, Ugwuanyi and Ewuim (2012) that strong fighting against debasement in Nigeria needs sound leaderships that shows its consciousness, personal sacrifice, integrity and honesty.

Furthermore, the informants suggest that given autonomy and independent to the anti-graft institutions would enhance them to perform their service effectively without any hindrance or interference. They emphasis that the anti-corruption agencies must become independent, it will enable them to carry their duties effectively and judiciously without any hindrance. These agencies must be empower and strengthening by the government so as to discharge their role on anti-corruption crusade effectively (Informants, 2, 3, 5, 6 &8 Academician 199

II&III; ICPC Preventive and ICPC PRU & Expert). This is in conformity with the assertion of Adagba (2012); & Shehu (2015) that enhancing the political will and autonomy to the anti-graft institutions may elevated them to perform effectively and coherently without undue interference by political elites (Adagba, 2012; Shehu, 2015).

They also stressed the need for financial autonomy to the anti-graft institutions as pointed out by the respondents that there is a need for financial autonomy to all anti-graft agencies so as to meet the need for the anti-corruption crusade (Informants, 2, 5, 6&8). In fact, Sufficient funds shall be provided to all anti-graft agencies so as to ensure them to discharge their duties and meet the require mandate (Idris, 2011, Adagba, 2012, Shehu, 2015).

4. What are the possible ways towards enhancing the strategies? In this regard, the informants have suggests that empowering twins anti-graft institutions, it has to do with the enhancement of these institutions. Moreover, the long-term solution has to do with building institutions and to strengthen the ones that we have (Informants 1, 3, 4, &6). In this respect, Idris (2012) submitted that institutions should be strengthened to have full pledge autonomy in performing their services without any obstacle. Because, the greatest challenge in fighting corruption in Nigeria is the weak or fragile institutions for combating corruption (Shehu, 2015).

Moreover, the financial autonomy will makes the anti-grafts institutions viable, effective and sustainable in effecting their role on combating corruption in the public domain. Meanwhile, removing immunity close and the establishment of special tribunal courts for handling the cases of corruption are also the ways towards improving the strategies for combating debasement in the country as pointed out by the informants. This has corroborates with the Chukwuemeka, Ugwuanyi & Ewuim (2012) that the government shall establish special courts for treating the cases of corruption will led to speeding up the trial of corruption and minimize the level of corruption. Furthermore, the court shall be at higher level and must be independent to ensure the independence of judiciary (Idris, 2011; BelloImam, 2015; and Shehu, 2015).

200

However, these measures would aid the anti-grafts agencies to perform better as well as to improve their strategies for fighting corruption and sanitize the political system of the country. Because if there is adequate funding to the anti-grafts institutions, political will, autonomy and special courts for treating the cases of corruption it would makes the strategies to become effective and sound on fighting corrupt practices to both government and private management in Nigeria.

Discussion of findings The above findings, shows that there are institutional strategies for combating corruption (EFCC, ICPC &CCB) and their regulations and mandates was solely for combating corruption in the country. While the EFCC & ICPC was established in the fourth republic by the former President Obasanjo and the CCB was already in place since military regime of general Babangida‘s oligarchy. Though, the informants attested that fourth republic strategies (EFCC &ICPC) were good strategies with remarkable achievement in combating corruption in Nigerian state. Because, they are held responsible to address anti-graft strategies and framework in the country.

Furthermore, the strategies for combating corruption by these institutions (EFCC&ICPC) are also effective in dealing with corrupt practices, despite, some challenges disturbing the institutions. In this respect, the informants pointed out that the strategies are effective but they are suffering with some challenges (paucity of funds, inadequate training to their staff, shortage of manpower, political interference among others), therefore, the said strategies would be more effective and sound in dealing with corrupt cases as per as they address these challenges.

Meanwhile, holistic approach as regards to collective responsibility through enlightenment campaign, attitudinal change, discipline, and ethical moral values shall be entrench to all our socio-economical, political, and cultural systems as well as to both public, private and civil society organizations. Therefore, the collective effort of both public, private and civil society organizations and the entire citizens would assist towards improving the strategies for combating corruption in Nigeria. Finally, addressing some hitches such as immunity 201

close, lack of special courts, and financial autonomy among others would enable to the strengthening for anti-corruption institutions and also led to improving the strategies for fighting corruption in the country.

Concluding remarks The paper concludes that there are strategies for fighting corruption in Nigerian fourth republic which embodied within the institutional framework (ICPC, EFCC) with their mandates towards combating the menace of corruption in the country. Despite the fact that the said strategies were effective in discharging their responsibilities but they are facing some challenges that hinder them to perform more effective. However, if some challenges such as funding, autonomy, staffing, training and special courts would address the problem and sanitize the system. Based on the above analysis so far, the paper recommends among others: i.

That the anti-graft institutions shall be autonomous in discharging its responsibilities without any interference from the government. The political will of the government in fighting corruption shall be put in place to offer both political and financial independence to the institutions to enable them to discharge their responsibility coherently.

ii.

The holistic approach shall be put in place to cover both public domain and private sector management and civil society organizations, faith based organizations and traditional institutions to join hand together in waging war against corrupt practices in the system and the entire country.

iii.

Enlightenment and awareness campaign on ethical and moral values, honesty and discipline as well as the negative side of immorality or moral decadence, corruption and fraudulent activities etc. shall be put in place so as to inculcate the spirit of honesty, discipline and probity in the mindsets of our society.

iv.

The government shall offer adequate funding to all anti-corruption agencies to enable them to discharge their responsibilities diligently and judiciously. This would aid them to have adequate manpower, training, facilities and logistics in carrying out their duties.

v.

Good leadership, democratization, honesty, and transparency would reduce the gravity of corruption in the society. There is urgent need for leadership by example 202

so as to change the society and the entire populace. This would aid the strategies towards achieving their mandates. vi.

Strengthening the anti-graft institutions and the voluntarily bodies such as civil society organizations and community based organizations in anti-corruption crusade so as to wage war against corrupt practices in all sectors in the society.

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Ethnic Dimension in Electoral Politics Polemik Identiti Dalam Kalangan Pribumi Sabah: Antara Kadazandusun Murut (KDM) Atau Momogun? Tony Paridi Bagang Universiti Teknologi MARA Sabah [email protected]

Abstrak Masyarakat pribumi Kadazandusun Murut (KDM) merupakan kumpulan etnik terbesar di Sabah namun masih agak kebelakang dari aspek ekonomi, sosial dan politik. Salah satu masalah yang menjadi halangan besar ialah kurangnya kesatuan dalam kalangan pemimpin politik mereka malahan masih berlaga dalam pelbagai isu asas umpamanya isu identiti. Artikel ini merupakan pemerhatian yang sedang berjalan terhadap polemik identiti masyarakat pribumi Sabah khususnya dalam kalangan masyarakat pribumi KDM, Rungus dan suku etnik Dusunik, Murutik dan Paitanik. Perdebatan berkaitan dengan cadangan istilah Momogun sebagai suatu kategori bagi menggantikan istilah ―lain-lain‖ dalam penggunaan rasmi serta menjadi ‗payung‘ bagi masyarakat Kadazandusun, Murut, Rungus, Tatana, Kimaragang, Sungei, Lundayeh serta etnik-etnik yang berkaitan telah mendapat reaksi yang pelbagai daripada elitis politik KDM, pemimpin gerakan sivil (NGO) seperti Momogun National Congress (MNC), KDCA, USDA, Sabah Momogun Rungus Association (Samora) dan umumnya dalam kalangan masyarakat Kadazandusun Murut itu sendiri. Artikel ini cuba untuk menelusuri dan mengupas polemik identiti yang berlaku dalam kalangan masyarakat pribumi Sabah khususnya etnik Kadazan, Dusun, Murut, Rungus serta suku etnik yang tergolong dalam kelompok Dusunik, Paitanik dan Murutik.

Pengenalan Terkenal dengan kepelbagaian etnik dan budaya, selain daripada kedudukan geografinya yang terletak di kepulauan Borneo dan juga dikenali sebagai salah sebuah negeri di Malaysia Timur, negeri Sabah semakin mendapat tumpuan daripada pelbagai lapisan masyarakat sama ada di dalam dan di luar negara. Sesuai dengan diskripsinya sebagai ‗negeri di bawah bayu‘ Sabah menonjolkan keunikan yang pelbagai baik dari segi sejarah, budaya, ekonomi dan politik yang tersendiri. Sabah yang kini semakin pesat membangun telah memperlihatkan dinamika pembangunan yang dapat dilihat dari pelbagai aspek serta perubahan demografi penduduk yang turut berkembang. Secara statistiknya, Sabah 206

mempunyai penduduk seramai 3,206,742 juta penduduk yang merangkumi warganegara Malaysia dan bukan warga negara (Jabatan Perangkaan, 2010). Daripada jumlah tersebut, seramai 2,316,963 juta penduduk merupakan warganegara yang terdiri daripada Bumiputera dan bukan bumiputera (Cina, India dan Lain-lain). Secara terperincinya, bagi kategori Bumiputera di Sabah, jumlahnya ialah seramai 1,965,309 juta penduduk yang terdiri daripada kaum Melayu (184,197); Kadazan/Dusun (568,575); Bajau (450,279); Murut (102,393) dan Bumiputera Lain (659,865). Fakta statistik ini jelas memperlihatkan kepelbagaian etnik yang terdapat di Sabah dan tidak menghairankan ianya menyumbang kepada pelbagai isu serta polemik yang berkaitan dengan etnisiti apatah lagi dinamika terhadap politik negeri Sabah. Masyarakat Kadazandusun Murut (KDM) sememangnya sudah sinonim danmenjadi deskripsi umum kepada masyarakat luar (bukan Sabahan) sebagai refleksi umum identiti negeri ini meskipun terdapat etnik-etnik lain seperti Rungus, Kadayan, Bisaya, Brunei dan banyak lagi. Namun begitu, jika ditinjau isu identiti dalam kalangan masyarakat KDM, ianya seolah-oleh masih berada di masa lampau di mana isu ini masih lagi menjadi perdebatan sehingga menjadi polemik dalam kalangan pemimpinpemimpin politk dan masyarakat mereka sendiri. Justeru, artikel ini cuba untuk menelusuri dan mengupas polemik identiti yang berlaku dalam kalangan masyarakat pribumi Sabah khususnya etnik Kadazan, Dusun, Murut, Rungus serta etnik dan sub-etnik yang tergolong dalam kelompok Dusunik, Paitanik dan Murutik28. Latar belakang Kadazandusun di Sabah Penduduk Sabah terdiri daripada pelbagai etnisiti yang sebahagiannya besarnya mempunyai persamaan dari segi bahasa pertuturan dan budaya. Kelompok masyarakat yang mentuturkan bahasa Murutik dan Dusunik dikatakan kelompok masyarakat yang terawal di Sabah. Kelompok ini mempunyai persamaan daripada Bahasa yang digunakan justeru dirujuk sebagai Borneon stock (Ranjit Singh, D.S.,2011). Meskipun demikian, masyarakat Murut Sabah adalah berbeza dengan masyarakat Murut di Sarawak khususnya sub-kumpulan Tagal yang kebanyakkannya tinggal di Kalimantan, Indonesia dan sebahagian kecilnya di Sarawak (ibid). Bagi masyarakat Kadazandusun, ianya dikatakan mempunyai kaitan dengan sejarah dengan masyarakat Visaya dan Tagalog di Filipina. Berdasarkan pada rekod pada tahun

28

Dalam artikle ini, perkataan ‗pribumi‘ adalah merujuk kepada masyarakat atau komuniti etnik Dusunik, Murutik dan Paitanik. 207

1911, masyarakat Kadazandusun merangkumi 41% (78,951 orang) daripada saiz populasi sejumlah 208,951 pada ketika itu29. Menurut Rutter, Owen. dan T.R William (dipetik dalam Ranjit Singh., D.S. (2011)) masyarakat Kadazandusun dikatakan berasal daripada tanah besar Asia yang telah berhijrah ke Sabah. Kebanyakkannya Kadazandusun tinggal di kawasan Barat Sabah. Kumpulan utama ialah Kadazan Penampang dan Papar, Rungus di Kudat, Lotud di Tuaran, suku Bundu di Tambunan dan Ranau manakala Liwan di Banjaran Crocker (ibid). Terdapat juga kumpulan suku etnik yang mixed origin terutamanya Kwijau dan Tatana (Fr. A.G. Lampe, (1962) dipetik dalam Ranjit Singh., D.S. 2011).

Istilah ‘Kadazan’ Istilah Kadazan, meskipun sudah menjadi salah satu identity masyarakat pribumi di Sabah, masih menjadi perdebatan bagi sebilangan masyarakat pribumi di sini. Jelasnya, ketiadaan teori mahupun sumber yang kukuh berkenaan dengan istilah Kadazan, jelas menunjukkan perkataan 'Kadazan' lewat digunakan. Hanya pada tahun 1961, Donald Stephens telah memperkenalkan perkataan ‗Kadazan‘ di mana pada ketika itu parti United National Kadazan Organisation (UNKO) baru ditubuhkan. Usaha Donald Stephens sebenarnya sudah jelas kelihatan sebelum UNKO ditubuhkan lagi di mana beliau sebagai editor kepada suratkhabar Sabah Times telah kerap menggunakan istilah ini dan seterusnya mempromosi Bahasa Kadazan dalam Sabah Times.Tidak dinafikan Bahasa Kadazan dengan mudah mendapat pengiktirafan daripada British kerana pada ketika itu disebabkan Donald Stephens mempunyai hubungan yang agak akrab dengan pihak British. Apabila gagasan Malaysia dicadangkan oleh Tunku Abdul Rahman dalam ucapannya di Singapura pada Mei 1961, ianya telah mencetuskan reaksi yang pelbagai kepada semua pihak termasuklah Sabah, Sarawak dan Brunei (Roff, M,, 1969; Ongkili, 1989). Salah satu reaksi penentangan terhadap cadangan gagasan Malaysia adalah datang daripada Donald Stephens sendiri yang menyatakan cadangan tersebut tidak memberikan faedah kepada Sabah (ibid). Malah surat terbukanyadi North Borneo News & Sabah Times, July 1961 kepada Tunku Abdul Rahman yang jelas menyatakan bahawa idea gugusan Malaysia tidak akan memberikan kemerdekaan kepada Sabah tetapi hanya akan menjadikan ianya sebagai 29

Rujuk Ranjit Singh, D.S (2011) 208

sebahagian daripada koloni Tanah Melayu (Luping, 1989).30Namun Tun Fuad telah mengubah pendiriannya setelah diyakinkan oleh Lee Kuan Yew semasa persidangan Commonwealth Parliamentary Association di Singapura, pada Julai 1961.31 Ini tertakluk kepada persetujuan untuk memelihara (safeguards) kepentingan wilayah Borneo. Beliau juga meminta jaminan bahawa Borneo mempunyai autonomi apabila berada dalam persekutuan (ibid). Persetujuan Donald Stephens untuk bersama-sama menubuhkan Malaysia merupakan titik tolak kesedaran politik dalam kalangan pemimpin tempatan dan masyarakat pribumi. Dalam proses ke arah pembentukkan Malaysia, usaha untuk mendapatkan sokongan masyarakat pribumi khususnya dalam kalangan pribumi Kadazan dan Dusun amat penting. Meskipun tidak ada satu kumpulan etnik yang dominan melebihi 50 peratus jumlahnya namun Kadazandusun merupakan kumpulan yang terbesar, diikuti etnik Bajau, Murut, Melayu, Melayu Brunei serta lain-lain bumiputera dan Cina(Sabihah Osman, 2008). Keadaan ini menyebabkan politik Sabah dan penyekutuannya menghadapi pelbagai rintangan serta usaha yang seringkali rapuh disebabkan ketiadaan dominasi etnik yang cukup besar untuk menguasai kumpulan etnik lain (ibid).

Mengambilkira

akan

kepentingan

kesatuan

pribumi

khususnya

dalam

kalangan

Kadazandusun, Donald Stephens telah menggunakan istilah Kadazan sebagai label umum bagi merujuk pribumiKadazan dan Dusun kerana beliau yakin ianya dapat menyatukan pribumi bukan Islam dan lebih bersifat positif dari segi istilahnya berbanding perkataan

30

Antara kandungan surat terbuka itu ialah, “ If we had been asked to join Malaysia at the time Malaya achieved independence and Britain made it possible for us, the story would have been a different one. Now that Merdeka has been Malaya‘s for some years, and we are still struggling towards it, Malaya‘s proposal that we join as the 12th, 13th and 14th States savours of imperialism, of a drive to turn us into Malayan colonies…To join Malaya, while we are still colonies, only means we cease to British colonies, and become Malayan colonies…the implication is to hand (ourselves) over to your control.‖ (North Borneo News & Sabah Times, July 1961 dipetik dari Luping, 1989). 31

Lee Kuan Yew pada waktu itu telah membuat tawaran biasiswa kepada sepuluh pelajar Sabah untuk belajar di universiti di Singapura. Ini telah menambat hati Tun Fuad Stephens dan seterusnya bersikap positif 31. Sejurus persidangan CPA Tunku mempelawa Tun Fuad Stephens ke Kuala Lumpur untuk menyaksikan lagi pembangunan pesat yang berlaku di Tanah Melayu selepas mencapai kemerdekaan. Suasana ini telah menambah lagi keyakinan Tun Fuad Stephens bahawa dengan menyertai gugusan Malaysia, ianya akan memberikan banyak manfaat dan faedah kepada Sabah. Lantaran daripada perundingan di persidangan Commonwealth Parliamentary Association di Singapura, Malaysian Solidarity Consultative Committee (MSCC) telah ditubuhkan dan Tun Fuad Stephens menjadi pengerusi. Beliau dikatakan sangat gembira kerana beliau merasakan telah diberi penghormatan untuk dirujuk tentang apa jua perkara berkenaan penubuhan Malaysia (Luping, 1989). 209

‗Dusun‘ yang dianggap mempunyai konotasi yang negatif. Secara literalnya, Dusun merujuk kepada kebun dan oleh itu ianya dikaitkan dengan kemunduran, primitif, jauh ketinggalan malah pemikiran yang sempit dan tidak dinamik (Sabihah Osman, 1986). Berbeza pula dengan perkataan ‗Kadazan‘ yang menggambarkan kemajuan dan moden disamping mengketengahkan darjat sosio-ekonomi yang progresif (Sabihah Osman, 2008). Meskipun istilah ‗Dusun‘ telah digunakan oleh British untuk merujuk populasi majoriti di kawasan Pedalaman Borneo tetapi kebanyakkan golongan intelligentsia Kadazandusun lebih memilih istilah ‗Kadazan‘ bagi menjelaskan latarbelakang etnik mereka dan percaya bahawa Kadazan merupakan nama etnik tulen masyarakat tersebut manakala Dusun adalah istilah yang diberi oleh pihak British semata-mata (Reid, 1997). Rata-rata masyarakat pribumi di Penampang dan Papar memilih istilah ‗Kadazan‘ dan menolak ‗Dusun‘ sebagai label mereka (Daily Express, 22 March 2009). Pemimpin Kadazandusun seperti Donald Stephens dan Peter Mojuntin turut menyatakanpenggunaan istilah ‗Kadazan‘ bukan sahaja pemangkin sokongan moral kepada masyarakat pribumi Dusun disamping memartabatkan status sosial mereka malah dijadikan landasan menyatukan pribumi khususnya Dusun dan sub-etnik yang lain (Sabihah Osman, 2004). Selain itu, istilah ‗Kadazan‘ merupakan pengaruh daripada misionari Kristian (Suraya Sintang, 2003). Menurut Ismail Yusoff (dipetik dari Suraya Sintang, 2003), istilah Kadazan telah diperkenalkan oleh misionari Kristian atas kepentingan agama. Misionari Kristian dikatakan terlibat dalam pembentukkan istilah Kadazan melalui cadangan hasil kajian teologi untuk menggunakan nama ‗Kadazan‘ bagi menggantikan istilah Dusun. Hal ini dapat dibuktikan dalam kajian yang dibuat oleh Rev. Thu En Yu di dalam tesis Master of Theologibeliau (ibid).

Seterusnya, penubuhan parti United National Kadazan Organisation (UNKO) pada tahun 1961 telah menguatkan lagi usaha menjadikan istilah ‗Kadazan‘ sebagai identiti kepada masyarakat pribumi Dusun. Atas kapasiti dan kedudukan Donald Stephens pada ketika itu sebagai pemimpin UNKO dan juga Ketua Menteri Sabah pertama yang dilantik oleh British, beliau telah menjadikan label Kadazan bagi merujuk etnik Dusun (Daily Express, 20 Ogos 2016). 210

Bantahan Masyarakat Dusun Meskipun label Kadazan telah dijadikan sebagai salah satu kategori etnik di Sabah bermula pada tahun 1963, namun terdapat masyarakat pribumi Dusun yang enggan dilabelkan sebagai Kadazan bagi merujuk indentiti etnik mereka.Menurut Sabihah Osman (2008), ekoran daripada ketidakpersetujuan dengan penggunaan istilah ‗Kadazan‘ ramai penyokong Dusun menyertai parti United Nasional Sabah Organisation (USNO) yang mana telah membuka keahliannya kepada semua etnik di Sabah. Pada masa yang sama, pemimpin masyarakat pribumi Dusun seperti G.S. Sundang, O.K. Sodomon dan Datu Idan Kari turut tidak bersetuju dengan istilah Kadazan dan bantahan ini telah membawa kepada penubuhan parti politik United Nasional Pasok Momogun (Pasok Momogun) yang dipimpin oleh G.S Sundang (ibid).Menurut Mohamad Yaakub (1989) keengganan etnik Dusun menerima istilah ‗Kadazan‘ telah menyebabkan kontroversi dalam kalangan pribumi Kadazan dan Dusun yang berlarutan lebih kurang 30 tahun (dipetik dalam Suraya Sintang, 2003). Proses ke arah pembentukkan Malaysia yang kian rancak telah berjaya mengetepikan polemik identiti dalam kalangan pribumi Kadazan dan Dusun sementara dan usaha lebih tertumpu terhadap perundingan yang berlaku di antara Persekutuan Tanah Melayu, Singapura dan Sarawak tentang hak-hak rakyat Sabah. Pada tahun 16 September 1963, setelah melalui beberapa fasa perundingan maka gagasan Malaysia telah menjadi realiti. Berbalik kepada polemik identiti dalam kalangan Kadazan dan Dusun, isu identiti kembali menjadi kontroversi khususnya dalam kalangan pemimpin Kadazandusun. Konflik yang berlaku di antara Joseph Pairin dan Mark Koding dikatakan bersifat peribadi tetapi pada masa yang sama kedua-dua tokoh politik ini merupakan presiden persatuan kebudayaan iaitu Pairin mengetuai persatuan kebudayaan Kadazan atau dikenali sebagai Kadazan Cultural Association (KCA) manakala Mark Koding merupakan presiden United Sabah Dusun Association (USDA). KCA bertekad untuk menggunakan istilah Kadazan kerana ianya dikatakan betul secara sejarahnya tetapi USDA tetap dengan pendiriannya bahawa istilah yang tepat adalah Dusun (Arnold & Tony.,2011). Susulan daripada penyingkiran Mark Koding daripada Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) apabila Koding

dikatakan

dihantar

bertemu

dengan

pemimpin

persekutuan

untuk

membincangkan‗Sabah Formula‘ sebelum pilihanraya negeri pada tahun 1986 diadakan, 211

Koding bersama dengan pemimpin Dusun yang lain seperti Kalakau Untol dan Kasitah Gadam telah menubuhkan parti baru yang dikenali sebagai Angkatan Keadilan Kemajuan Rakyat Sabah (AKAR). Menyedari akan kesan yang mungkin mengugat sokongan pribumi Dusun dan sokongan terhadap Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), Pairin bertindak mengikut jejak Donald Stephens dengan menggunakan label etnik untuk menyatukan pribumi Kadazandusun. Pada 5 November 1989, delegasi KCA sebulat suara bersetuju meminda nama KCA kepada Kadazan Dusun Cultural Association (KDCA) sempena konferensi ‗Kadazan Cultural Association Fifth Biennial‘. Menurut Pairin, dengan adaptasi perkataan ‗Dusun‘ di dalam KDCA, ianya merupakan permulaan baru bagi identiti etnik negeri ini dan menyahkan tanggapan bahawa KCA hanyalah khusus untuk Kadazan (Reid, A., 1997.; Daily Express, 6 November 1989; Borneo Mail, 18 August 1989). Menurut Uesugi Tomiyuki (dipetik dalam Sabihah Osman, 2008), meskipun kontroversi penggunaan istilah ‗Kadazan‘ berpanjangan namun pada tahun 1998, ianya telah diterima secara rasmi dengan sedikit perubahan yang mana istilah ‗Kadazan‘ telah ditukar kepada Kadazandusun sebagai label bagi merujuk pribumi Kadazan dan Dusun. Momogun National Congress (MNC) Momogun National Congress (MNC) telah ditubuhkan secara rasmi pada 3 Jun 2015 di mana HE Tan Sri Bernard G. Dompok merupakan presiden dalam Jawatankuasa Protem. Sebelum penubuhan MNC, sebenarnya sudah ada usaha pada tahun 2013 apabila sekumpulan pesara kerajaan, peniaga dan belia secara tidak formal berbincang akan cabaran dan masa depan Kadazan, Dusun, Murut, Rungus, Lotud, Tatana dan suku etnik lain di Sabahdan memikirkan bagaimana cara menghadapi pelbagai isu dan cabaran yang datang (MNC, 2016). Susulan daripada perbincangan yang tidak formal tersebut, ianya telah membawa kepada perbincangan intelektual pada 1 November 2013 yang dihadiri oleh 13 peserta. Perbincangan ini telah menjadi titik tolak kepada empat mesyuarat utama yang dipengerusikan oleh Datuk Verus Aman dengan tagline PISOMPUUVAN INITIATIVE (PI) yang berakhir sehingga 14 March 2014 (ibid).Perbincangan dan perdebatan yang berlaku disepanjang PISOMPUUVAN INITIATIVE (PI) tertumpu kepada faktor-faktor yang mempengaruhi perperpaduan dalam kalangan suku etnik. Seterusnya pada 23 September 2014 sesi intelektual PI ini menjadi PI Tea Parties dan dinamakan sebagai PISOMPUUVAN 212

MOMOGUN (PM) Tea Parties.Atas dorongan dan sokongan yang membina daripada kalangan ahli PISOMPUUVAN MOMOGUN (PM), mereka sebulat suara bersetuju untuk menterjemahkan pelbagai cadangan, pandangan mahupun ide-ide yang diutarakan dengan menubuhkan sebuah badan bukan kerajaan ataupun NGO yang berdaftar. Pada 3 Jun 2015, MNC secara rasminya telah didaftarkan sebagai sebuah Badan Bukan Kerajaan (NGO) dan beberapa bulan selepas penubuhannya, MNC telah menggadakan mesyuarat Agung yang pertama kali pada 2 April 2016. Datuk Henrynus Amin telah dipilih menjadi presiden MNC bagi tahun 2016 – 2019 (ibid). Dengan kewujudan MNC yang mempunyai matlamat dan objektif yang disifatkan pragmatic dalam memperkasakan masyarakat pribumi (tertakluk kepada definisi dalam klausa 27 Perlembagaan MNC), ianya mendapat pelbagai reaksi daripada para pemimpin politik KDM, golongan intelligentsia Kadazan, dan masyarakat pribumi Kadazandusun, Murut, Rungus serta suku etnik yang berkaitan seperti Tatana, Tombonuo, Liwan, Tindal, Lotud, Lundayeh, Kimaragang dan sebagainya. MNC telah memperkenalkan istilah ‗Momogun‘ sebagai terma generik merujuk kepada etnik Dusunik, Paitanik dan Murutik di Sabah. Di dalam Perlembagaan MNC Klausa 27(1), perkataan ‗Momogun‘ secara jelas merujuk kepada multi-ethnic natives or indigenous peoples of Sabah which shall be determined by the Supreme Council (MNC, 2017). Menurut Bernard Dompok, MNC akan menjadi platform kepada perpaduan dalam kalangan ‗Momogun‘ tanpa mengira ideologi politik dan latar belakang serta bersama-sama memperkasakan masyarakat ‗Momogun‘ dalam pelbagai bidang yang diceburi. Sejarah telah membuktikan bahawa isu perpaduan dalam kalangan masyarakat pribumi menyebabkan masih ramai masyarakat ini belum mengecapi kejayaan yang membanggakan (Daily Express,10 Ogos 2015).Presiden MNC, Datuk Henrynus Aminturut menekankan sudah tiba masanya kategori bangsa di Sabah khususnya bagi nama suku kaum diberikan kategori bangsa yang diiktiraf dalam borang-borang rasmi kerajaan (Daily Express, 20 April 2016).Pada masa yang sama, matlamat dan misi MNC lebih memfokuskan kepada perpaduan, transformasi dan pengupayaan (empowerment) dengan melaksanakan 8-Points Momogun Economic Blueprint untuk memperbaiki dan memperkasa sosio-ekonomi Momogun (Daily Express, 23 April 2016; 1st Installation and Oath Taking Ceremony 2016 – 2019 of MNC, 2016 & Konvensyen Nasional MNC, 2016)

213

Polemik Identiti Kembali Diperdebatkan Penggunaan istilah ‗Momogun‘ yang dicadang oleh MNC sebagai nama generik merujuk kepada etnik Dusunik, Paitanik dan Murutik di Sabah mahupun anak negeri atau masyarakat pribumi Sabah seperti yang ditentukan oleh Majlis Tertinggi MNC telah kembali semula menjadi polemik dalam kalangan masyarakat Kadazandusun Murut (KDM).Persatuan Kebudayaan Kadazandusun atau KDCA menolak cadangan MNC merujuk anak negeri Sabah sebagai Momogun dengan alasan ianya tidak praktikal (Daily Express,22 April 2016). KDCA berpendapat bahawa Momogun bukan bangsa tetapi hanyalah perkataan lokal yang merujuk kumpulan msyarakat yang mendiami sesuatu kawasan di mana ianya boleh merangkumi pendatang tanpa izin atau pun pelarian yang sampai di Sabah. Momogun juga tidak seharusnya disamakan dengan Dayak di Sarawak kerana ianya hanya akan menambah kekeliruan dan memanjangkan perdebatan identiti (ibid).Setiausaha Agung KDCA Datuk John Anthony menegaskan pendirian KDCA dengan jelas menolak istilah ‗Momogun‘ untuk kegunaan rasmi dan hanya nama Kadazandusun sahaja digunakan seperti yang telah dipersetujui oleh pemimpin terdahulu semenjak tahun 1961 (Daily Express, 24 April 2016).

Selain KDCA yang tidak bersetuju dengan istilah Momogun, Kadazan Society Sabah (KSS) turut senada dengan KDCA (Daily Express, 24 Julai 2016). Presiden KSS Datuk Marcel Leiking menyatakan bahawa MNC sepatutnya mendapatkan persetujuan daripada parsatuanpersatuan etnik terlebih dahulu dan tidak boleh beranggapan bahawa semua bersetuju dengan istilah Momogun (ibid). Malah menurut beliau lagi, ―…it is inappropriate to assume that the various ethnic bodies representing their communities are agreeable to any proposed name as their race‖ (ibid). Pandangan ini turut disuarakan oleh Setiausaha Agung Parti Bersatu Sabah Datuk Johny Mositun bahawa apa jua istilah rasmi untuk menggantikan KDM seharusnya mendapat persetujuan daripada etnik Dusunik, Paitanik dan Murutik (Borneo Post, 12 Julai 2016). Johny Masitun turut membidas kenyataan Henrynus berkenaan istilah Momogun merujuk kepada Anak Negeri (Natives) kerana MNC tidak ada locus standi untuk berbuat demikian (Daily Express, 12 Julai 2016). Perdebatan mengenai istilah Momogun telah berlarutan beberapa bulan sejak kenyataan MNC mengketengahkan istilah Momogun. Henrynus Amin bertegas bahawa Momogun 214

merujuk kepada masyarakat yang bertutur Dusunik, Murutik dan Paitanik dan istilah ini tidak akan menggantikan Kadazan, Dusun atau pun Kadazandusun sebagai identiti etnik masing-masing (Daily Express, 23 April 2016). Oleh itu, Momogun adalah ―Anak Negeri‖ walaupun penggunaannya terhad kepada masyarakat Dusunik, Murutik dan Paitanik (ibid & Daily Express, 20 April 2016). Hujah Henrynus disokong oleh Presiden Sabah Momogun Rungus Association (SAMORA) Datuk Jelani Hamdan untuk menggunakan istilah Momogun menggantikan KadazanDusun Murut (KDM) atau pun KadazanDusun Murut Rungus (KDMR) dengan alasan ianya lebih bersifat universal dan tidak mengelirukan (therakyatpost, 2016). Meskipun MNC telah membuat kenyataan untuk menjelaskan isu Momogun namun ianya tidak meredakan polemik yang berlaku. Menteri di Jabatan Perdana Menteri dan selaku Presiden Parti Bersatu Rakyat Sabah (PBRS) Tan Sri Joseph Kurup menyatakan pandangannya bahawa ianya terserah kepada masyarakat itu sendiri sama ada dilabel secara kolektif sebagai Kadazandusun atau Momogun. Beliau menegaskan polemik yang berlaku akan mengucar-kacirkan perpaduan dalam kalangan masyarakat pribumi justeru mencadangkan kajian perlu dibuat untuk menangani isu ini (Daily Express, 3 Mei 2016). Pendirian Joseph Kurup merupakan ―jalan tengah‖ dikala polemik identiti rancak diperdebatkan. Turut tampil menyuarakan pendirian berhubung isu ini ialah Presiden Angkatan Perubahan Sabah (APS) Datuk Seri Wilfred Bumburing. Beliau berpendapat bahawa isu identiti tidak akan dapat diselesaikan melalui KDCA dan MNC (Borneo Post, 14 May 2016). Bumburing menegaskan komuniti yang berkaitan amatlah besar kerana terdapat persatuan lain lagi seperti USDA, SAMORA, Sabah Tatana Cultural Association (STCA), Persatuan Kimaragang, Persatuan Lotud dan lain-lain lagi (ibid). Pada masa yang sama, Datuk Donald Peter Mojuntin menyatakan kekecewaan beliau terhadap polemik yang berlaku meskipun sudah melalui kemerdekaan lebih 50 tahun. Seharusnya fokus utama adalah masa depan masyarakat dan bukannya nama semata-mata (Daily Express, 22 Mei 2016). Polemik identiti ini seumpama kembali kepada masa lampau dan berbalik kepada punca ketidak perpaduan dalam kalangan etnik Kadazandusun. Ini sudah pasti tidak akan mendatangkan manfaat malah akan menyebabkan jurang perbezaan yang lebih besar dalam kalangan Kadazandusun, Murut, Rungus dan suku etnik yang berkaitan. Sebagai institusi Kadazandusun yang dihormati, pemimpin agung Kadazandusun atau lebih dikenali sebagai Huguan Siou, Tan Sri Joseph Pairin menyeru agar polemik identiti ini dihentikan (Daily 215

Express, 28 Julai 2016). Pairin menegaskan pertikaian tentang label etnik tidak seharusnya berlaku kerana setiap etnik bebas untuk memilih label etnik masing-masing (ibid). Namun, teguranPairin tidak memberi hujah dan justifikasi yang dapat meredakan polemik yang berlarutan. Malah, kenyataan Pairin dibidas oleh naib presiden Angkatan Perubahan Sabah (APS) Paul Kadau kerana kenyataan Pairin hanya mengelirukan etnik-etnik di Sabah (Daily Express, 3 Ogos, 2016). Pada hemat penulis, Pairin tidak ingin melibatkan institusi Huguan Siou dalam kancah perdebatan isu Momogun kerana institusi ini merupakan lambang kesatuan

masyarakat

Kadazandusun.

Walau

bagaimanapun,

Pairin

seolah-oleh

mengabsahkan pendirian yang diutarakan oleh KDCA dan juga Parti Bersatu Sabah membantah istilah Momogun dan mengekalkan Kadazandusun.

USDA Bersama Beberapa Kumpulan NGO Lain Turut Membantah MNC terus mendapat bantahan terhadap cadangannya untuk menggunakan istilah Momogun. United Sabah Dusun Association (USDA) bersama-sama dengan Persatuan Kimaragang Sabah Bersatu, Persatuan Tobilung Bersatu Sabah, Persatuan Sino Kadazan Durun Murut Sabah, Pertubuhan Tindal Bersatu Sabah, Persatuan Bangsa Tombinuo Sabah, Persatuan Kaum Sukang Sabah, Persatuan Dusun Subpan Segama Lahad Datu, Persatuan Suang Lotud Sabah, Persatuan Kebudayaan Dan Kebajikan Etnik Kujau Gana Nabai Sabah dan Persatuan Dusun Kujau Sabah telah menyatakan pendirian mereka membantah cadangan istilah Momogun (Daily Express, 14 Okt 2016; Utusan Borneo, 12 Dis 2016). Presiden USDA Datuk Ewon Ebin menyatakan bahawa istilah Momogun tidak terkandung dalam Perlembagaan Persekutuan (Daily Express, 14 Okt 2016) dan Momogun juga tidak mempunyaiBahasa oleh itu tidak wajar diklasifikasikan sebagai satu bangsa (Borneo Post, 30 Okt 2016). Beliau turut menegaskan kumpulan etnik Dusunik menolak cadangan MNC kerana mereka tetap ingin mengekalkan nama etnik masing-masing (ibid).Bagaimanapun naib presiden MNC Sylvester Disimon menjelaskan bahawa kritikan terhadap MNC merupakan tindakan ahli politik yang mempunyai kepentingan politik semata-mata dengan mengketengahkan sentimen kesukuan (tribalism) (Borneo Post, 26 Okt 2016).

216

Konvensyen Nasional Momogun 2016 Perdebatan isu Momogun tidak mematahkan semangat MNC untuk cekal dan terus mara ke hadapan sejajar dengan matlamat dan objektif penubuhannya. Untuk mengabsahkan cadangan istilah Momogun sebagai identiti rumpun bangsa bagi masyarakat pribumi Dusunik, Murutik dan Paitanik, MNC telah menganjurkan Konvensyen Nasional Momogun 2016 pada 29 Oktober 2016 bertempat di Dewan Masyarakat Bandaraya Kota Kinabalu, Sabah. Konvensyen ini diadakan sebagai landasan untuk mendapatkan pengiktirafan daripada NGO yang mewakili suku etnik masing-masing dan memberi ruang dan peluang kepada para perwakilan untuk menyatakan pendirian mereka. Menurut Presiden Pengasas dan Penasihat Kehormat MNC, H.E Tan Sri Bernard Dompok (2016: 2), beliau berkata; This Momogun National Convention 2016 will go down in history as the beginning of the rise of the genuine and deeply felt sense of belonging and oneness among Dusunic, Murutic and Paitanic linguistic groups in Sabah. Through the galvanisation in this convention, of their common desire and interest to be jointly and generically known as MOMOGUN, a unity is forged which we have been seeking for since 50 years ago.

Mesej H.E Tan Sri Bernard Dompok jelas menekankan aspek perpaduan yang sudah pasti memberi impak positif terhadap masa depan Momogun. Malah Tan Sri Datuk Seri Panglima Joseph Kurup turut menyokong penganjuran konvensyen ini demi memupuk dan mengeratkan perpaduan, keharmonian dan menyatupadukan etnik-etnik Orang Asal Negeri Sabah sebagai kunci kejayaan (Konvensyen MNC 2016). Di dalam ucapan Presiden MNC Datuk Henrynus Amin sekali lagi bertegas agar trend pemikiran yang bersifat kesukuan (tribalism) yang keterlaluan haruslah ditolak bersama kerana inilah yang menyebabkan perpecahan dan pertelingkahan serta punca kemiskinan, kemunduran ekonomi dan kelemahan politik (ibid). Konvensyen yang hanya berlangsung selama sehari sahaja telah melakar sejarah masyarakat Dusunik, Murutik dan Paitanik di Sabah. Sebanyak 21 NGO yang mewakili suku etnik masing-masing telah bersetuju untuk menerima istilah Momogun sebagai nama rumpun masyarakat Dusunik, Murutik dan Paitanik (Borneo Post, 30 Oktober 2016). Deklarasi ini secara tidak langsung menjawab kepada pelbagai kritikan terhadap MNC dan mengiktiraf akan perjuangan visi dan misi MNC dalam aspek sosial, ekonomi dan politik. Meskipun KDCA, USDA dan KSS tidak menyertai konvensyen tersebut, Henrynus tetap berharap 217

MNC akan senantiasa bersedia untuk berbincang secara konstruktif berkenaan isu Momogun (ibid). Kadazandusun Murut atau Momogun? Polemik identiti yang kembali didebatkan membawa mesej yang harus dilihat dari lensa yang positif. Sejarah membuktikan bahawa istilah ‗Kadazan‘ telah menerima tentangan daripada pemimpin etnik Dusun khususnya di kawasan pedalaman. Nama ‗Dusun‘ pula dianggap mempunyai konotasi yang negatif dengan alasan nama ‗Dusun‘ dikaitkan dengan kemunduran sosial dan ekonomi. Pada tahun 1960an, Donald Stephens bertekad dan mengiktiraf label Kadazan sebagai identiti etnik Kadazan dan Dusun serta suku etnik yang lain dengan tujuan menyatukan masyarakat pribumi bukan-Islam. Bagaimanapun, isu identiti masih tidak mencapai jalan penyelesaian yang tuntas malah menyumbang perbalahan Kadazandusun. Donald Stephens sendiri mengakui bahawa label etnik Kadazan yang diperkenalkannya merupakan satu kesilapan (Kinabalu Sunday Times, 19 February 1967, dipetik dalam Daily Express, 22 March 2009). Kenyataan ini disokong oleh Tan Sri Herman Luping di mana beliau mengakui bahawa; The mistake we made in 1961 was to call everybody Kadazan – that was a mistake. What we should have done is to have the label Kadazan on top and then below this Kadazan, we have Dusun, we have Kuijau. While we have the Kadazan, we should have also allowed Dusun at the same time. Instead, we tried to swallow the pride of some of these people who want to be called Dusun (Daily Express, 22 March 2009).

Menyedari bahawa krisis identiti dalam kalangan etnik Kadazan dan Dusun hanya akan membantutkan masyarakat Kadazandusun dalam mengecapi kemajuan sosial, ekonomi, budaya dan politik, maka istilah Kadazandusun telah dipersetujui sebagai identiti yang merujuk kepada etnik dan suku etnik seperti yang diperuntukan di dalam Perlembagaan KDCA32. Bagaimanapun, istilah yang Kadazandusun masih tidak dapat memuaskan hati pelbagai etnik dan suku etnik Kadazandusun di Sabah. Persatuan Kadazan Sabah (KSS) mencetuskan semula perdebatan isu identiti dengan alasan tidak ada etnik atau suku etnik yang dilabel sebagai Kadazandusun justeru identiti etnik hanyalah Kadazan ataupun Dusun (Arnold, P. &Tony P.B., 2011:183)

32

Lihat http://kdca.org.my/about/kadazandusun 218

Istilah Momogun yang dicadangkan oleh MNC sebagai identiti rumpun bangsa bagi etnik Dusunik, Murutik dan Paitanik adalah satu langkah kehadapan untuk mengakhiri polemik identiti yang berlaku. Ini bukan hanya bertujuan untuk menggantikan nama kaum atau bangsa dalam borang rasmi kerajaan tetapi untuk perpaduan dalam kalangan ‗Momogun‘. Memetik ucapan Datuk Masidi Manjun, beliau berkata sudah tiba masanya ‗Momogun‘ bersatu padu kerana sudah terlalu lama ‗Momogun‘ dipolitikkan sehingga menyebabkan perbalahan sesama sendiri (Daily Express, 3 Julai 2016). Tanpa mengira ideologi politik, ‗Momogun‘ harus menjaga dan memperkasa antara satu sama lain dalam hal ekonomi, sosial dan budaya agar ianya dapat memastikan masa depan yang baik serta mempunyai daya saing dengan bangsa lain. Intipati mesej Masidi merupakan keyakinan beliau terhadap MNC yang merujuk kepada matlamat dan objektif MNC khususnya dengan pelancaran 8Points Socio Economic Agenda. Resolusi penerimaan istilah ‗Momogun‘ yang dicapai semasa Konvensyen Nasional Momogun 2016 dianggap satu lagi langkah pragmatik MNC. Pada 26 Januari 2017,Presiden MNC Datuk Henrynus telah menyerahkan Deklarasi Momogun kepada Menteri Kerajaan Tempatan dan Perumahan Sabah Datuk Seri Panglima Haji Hajiji Haji Mohd. Noor. Deklarasi ini akan dibawa ke mesyuarat Majlis Hal Ehwal Anak Negeri Sabah untuk dibincangkan (MNC, 2017). Dengan penyerahan deklarasi tersebut, ianya dapat diterjemahkan sebagai komitmen MNC yang bukan retorik semata-mata untuk melaksanakan misi dan visi untuk kepentingan ‗Momogun‘. Untuk menjawab kepada persoalan sama ada Kadazandusun Murut atau Momogun, masih belum ada jawapan yang dapat menyelesaikan polemik ini meskipun pelbagai inisiatif, wacana serta perdebatan yang berlaku.Label nama etnik Kadazandusun Murut (KDM) diguna secara umum oleh masyarakat luar manakala masih ramai lagi tidak tahu akan istilah Momogun. Pemerhatian yang dibuat oleh penulis khususnya golongan muda Kadazandusun Murut dan suku etnik yang lain kurang mengambil tahu akan isu identiti ini. Namun tinjauan penulis terhadap suku etnik yang lain seperti Tatana, Rungus, Lundayeh dan beberapa lagi etnik lain termasuklah Kadazan dan Dusun, kebanyakkan mereka ingin di labelkan mengikut etnik masing-masing. Tinjauan ini amat konsisten dengan kajian yang persepsi yang dibuat oleh Arnold & Tony (2011) di mana kebanyakkan KDM ingin mengekalkan identiti etnik masing-masing daripada menggunakan label Kadazandusun. 219

Politik Identiti? Menelusuri perdebatan mengenai identiti dalam kalangan masyarakat Dusunik, Murutik dan Paitanik atau ‗Kadazandusun‘, ianya mengketengahkan politik identiti yang digunakan oleh pemimpin politik. Menurut Arnold & Tony (2011), isu identiti ini sudah kian lama dipolitikkan untuk kepentingan pemimpin politik peribadi. Perdebatan tentang isu identiti yang bermula sejak awal tahun 1960an sehingga hari ini meskipun telah melalui beberapa fasa perdebatan dan persetujuan tetapi apa yang dapat dikenalpasti adalah peranan persatuan-persatuan kebudayaan dan persatuan etnik seperti KDCA, USDA, KSS, MNC dan SAMORA masing-masing mengketengahkan pendirian dan matlamat perjuangan demi kepentingan ahli-ahli mereka. Tidak dinafikan persatuan-persatuan ini diterajui oleh pemimpin politik yang mempunyai agenda politik yang tersendiri. Umpamanya, presiden KDCA Tan Sri Pairin Kitingan adalah merupakan presiden Parti Bersatu Sabah, USDA pula diketuai oleh Datuk Ewon Ebin juga merupakan pemimpin politik kanan parti UPKO dan MNC yang dipimpin oleh Datuk Henrynus Amin, merupakan bekas setiausaha agung PBS dan kini hanya kekal sebagai ahli biasa sahaja. Bagaimanapun, pemerhatian ini amat bersifat umum oleh itu kajian yang lebih mendalam boleh dibuat pada masa akan datang. Kesimpulan Polemik identiti dalam kalangan masyarakat pribumi Dusunik, Murutik dan Paitanik atau Kadazandusun Murut (KDM) untuk menentukan rumpun bangsa masih belum berakhir. Cadangan MNC untuk menggunakan istilah Momogun telah mendapat kritikan dan tentangan kuat daripada KDCA, USDA dan KSS. Isu identiti yang tercetus dari awal tahun 1960anini merupakan satumenifestasi politik etnik yang menyumbang kepada perbalahan dalam kalangan Kadazandusun Murut (KDM) malah memberi kesan terhadap pencapaian sosial dan ekonomi mereka. MNC yang baru setahun jagung ditubuhkan telah mengambil langkah berani mencadangkan istilah untuk menggantikan nama bangsa ―Lain-Lain‖ dalam borang rasmi kerajaan dan bermatlamat untuk memupuk perpaduan, memperkasa sosioekonomi dan mengupayakan (empowering) masyarakat ‗Momogun‘ dalam pelbagai bidang. Meskipun penjelasan dan justifikasi dibuat oleh MNC berkaitan isu Momogun namun ianya tidak menghentikanpolemik yang berlaku malah perdebatan diantara pemimpin politik dan persatuan-persatuan kebudayaan seolah-oleh KDM kembali ke masa lampau. Istilah Momogun telah disalah anggap kerana istilah tersebut dipercayai akan menggantikan label 220

identiti etnik Kadazan, Dusun, Murut, Rungus, Tatana dan sebagainya. Tanggapan ini menyebabkan isu identiti kembali dipolitikan oleh pihak-pihak yang berkepentingan. Sehingga hari ini, tidak ada keputusan yang tuntas terhadap nama rumpun bangsa mahupun label identiti etnik bagi merujuk masyarakat pribumi Dusunik, Murutik dan Paitanik. Namun komitmen MNC menyerahkan Deklarasi Momogun kepada kerajaan negeri menunjukkan keseriusan MNC untuk menterjemahkan visi, misi dan matlamatnya dan sekaligus berkongsi dengan pihak kerajaan negeri untuk mencari jalan penyelesaian tentang isu ini.

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MNC. (2016). Buku Perasmian Konvensyen Nasional Momogun 2016. MNC: Kota Kinabalu. MNC. (2016). 1st Installation & Oath Taking Ceremony 2016 – 2019 of Momogun National Congress: United Towards Economic Empowerment. MNC: Kota Kinabalu. Ongkili, James P. (1989). Political Development in Sabah, 1963-1988. Dalam Sabah: 25 Years Later, 1963 – 1988. Edited by Jeffrey G. Kitingan and Maximus J. Ongkili. Institute for Development Studies (IDS): Kota Kinabalu, Sabah Reid, A. (1997). Endangered identity: Kadazan or Dusun in Sabah (East Malaysia). Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 28: 120–136. Roff, M. (1969), The rise and demise of Kadazan Nationalism. Journal of Southeast Asian History. 10 (2): 326 – 343. Sabah

ethnic

people

want

to

be

known

as

Momogun.

http://www.therakyatpost.com/news/2016/05/15/sabah-ethnic-people-want-to-be-known-as/. Diakses pada 5/4/2017 Sabihah Osman. (2008). Pembangunan Politik Sabah: Satu Penelusuran Sejarah. Kinabalu: Jurnal Perniagaan & Sains Sosial. 14:1-28 (2004). Kadazandusun Nationalism. Dalam Warisan Budaya Sabah Etnisiti dan Masyarakat. Disunting oleh Mohd. Sarim Hj. Mustajab. Kota Kinabalu, Sabah: Universiti Malaysia Sabah. M/s:217 – 227. (1986). Perkembangan Politik Sabah. Dalam Hairi Abdullah et.al. Sabah Perubahan dalam Pembangunan. Bangi: UKM/Yayasan Sabah. M/s 71-134. Suraya Sintang. (2003). Penganutan Agama Islam Dan Kristian Di Kalangan Masyarakat Kadazandusun Di Sabah. Jurnal Usuluddin. 18: 59 – 80. The Momogun National Congress. (2017). http://momogun.my/ diakses pada 15 Januari 2017 Tunggolou, F. R. (1999). The origins and meanings of the terms "Kadazan" and "Dusun". Penampang: Kadazandusun Language Foundation. 222

Suratkhabar Borneo Post. (12 September 2016). 15 associations against ‗Momogun‘ proposal. Suratkhabar Borneo Post (Sabah). (30 Oktober 2016). MNC hopes to continue engaging with KDCA, KSS, USDA on „Momogun‟ issue. Suratkhabar Borneo Post (Sabah). (ibid). 21 bodies agree to use ‗Momogun‘. Suratkhabar Borneo Post (Sabah). (ibid). ‗Momogun‘ declaration signed. Suratkhabar Borneo Post (Sabah). M/s.1 (ibid). Ewon: Without language, how can ‗Momogun‘ be a race? Suratkhabar Borneo Post (Sabah). (25 Oktober 2016). Momogun language only pollutes race. Suratkhabar Borneo Post (Sabah). (14 Mei 2016). Issue cannot be settled by KDCA and MNC – Bumburing. Suratkhabar Borneo Post (Sabah). M/s.4 (26 Oktober 2016). MNC vows not to waver on Momogun agenda. Suratkhabar Borneo Post (Sabah). (12 Julai 2016). Get consent from KDM community for group classification – Mositun. Suratkhabar Borneo Post (Sabah). Daily Express. (20 Ogos 2016). UNKO launched, prefer Kadazan not Dusun. Suratkhabar Daily Express. M/s. 14. (3 Julai 2016). Sudah tiba masa untuk Momogun Bersatu: Masidi. Suratkhabar Daily Express. (30 Oktober 2016). Majority in favour of ‗Momogun‘. Suratkhabar Daily Express. M/s. 1. (20 Oktober 2016). Mamagun backs move to unite all under Momogun. Suratkhabar Daily Express.

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(3 Ogos 2016). Pairin‘s statement confusing ethnic communities: APS. Suratkhabar Daily Express. (14 Oktober 2016). Groups ‗no‘ to Momogun label. Suratkhabar Daily Express. (28 Julai 2016). Let‘s stop arguing, says Pairin. Suratkhabar Daily Express. (22 Mei 2016). Focus on future and not names: Donald. Suratkhabar Daily Express. (24 Julai 2016). KSS disagrees over the use of Momogun. Suratkhabar Daily Express. M/s. 2 (12 Julai 2016). MNC has no lgal standing to make demand: PBS Sec-Gen. Suratkhabar Daily Express. (23 April 2016). MNC glad KDCA on same page with them on Momogun issue. Suratkhabar Daily Express. (20 April 2016). Henrynus: Sabah natives should be called Momogun. Suratkhabar Daily Express. (22 April 2016). Not apt to term all Sabahan natives Momogun: KDCA. Suratkhabar Daily Express. M/s.2 (24 April 2016). Not Momogun, please: KDCA. Suratkhabar Daily Express. (3 Mei 2016). Whether to be called Kadazandusun or Momogun: Kurup. Suratkhabar Daily Express. (10 Ogos 2015). Real chance to unite as Momoguns: Dompok. Suratkhabar Daily Express. Luping, Herman. (2016). A history of the term Kadazandusun. Daily Express, 7 Ogos 2016. Suratkhabar Daily Express. M/s. 19 Raymond Tombung. (2016). Rethink rejection of ‗Momogun‘. Borneo Post, 30 Okt 2016. Suratkhabar Borneo Post (Sabah). M/s. 9. Richard. Joe J. (2016). Forget about finding a label and move on. Daily Express, 24 Julai 2016. Suratkhabar Daily Express. M/s. 19 224

Utusan Borneo. (12 Disember 2016). Dua Persatuan Turut Sokong Bantah Guna Istilah ‗Momogun‘.Utusan Borneo (Sabah) Borneo Mail. (18 August 1989) Daily Express. (22 March 2009)

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Contemporary Issues and Anticipation Support of the Ethnic Minority Groups in Malacca Y. X. Fang, Sarjit S. Gill & A. T. Talib Universiti Putra Malaysia Abstract This paper attempts to present the political support of the ethnic minority groups namely the Baba Nyonya, Portuguese, and Chitty in Malacca. They have been marginalized in socio-economic and political development which has raised some concerns in Malaysia. Many of the unresolved issues arising infer to influence their political support in the next 14th General Election. Though these ethnic minority groups are small in number, they are also an important bloc in some electoral areas where they are highly populated. In such area, they are the ―king maker‖ when there is a narrow fight between two competing parties. There were six informants from the community leaders were involved in the Focus Group Discussion (FGD) in identifying some key issues. Social-economic and community issues have been identified through a Focus Group Discussion (FGD). Besides, a quantitative approach was employed using a survey. A total of 240 respondents from the three ethnic minority groups were involved in this study. The survey data was analyzed using statistical test. There was about 50.5% of the respondents will vote for the opposition in the next GE-14. In contrast, only 36.3% of the respondents will vote for the current ruling party, BN. This implies to an urgent awakening call on the fragility of the support and the importance of these ethnic minority groups in helping to restore and balance lost support in future elections. Keywords: ethnic minority groups, political support Introduction Political stability in Malaysia has been conscientiously influenced by the ethnic composition of the country. It is undeniable that Malaysia emerges to be one of the most successful states in restraining its multi-ethnic problems. This is exceptionally true in the context of inter-ethnic rivalries in the Peninsula, especially between the majority indigenous Muslim Malays and the immigrant Chinese and Indians, where basic differences could be neglected for the sake of achieving common goal of independence in 1957 (Jawan, 1991).

The plurality nation in Malaysia has brought about

challenges especially in the context of development. The proportionate share of the wealth, power, and/or social status in the society has been monopolized by the majority groups and being exercised over by the minority groups.

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Hence, this article focuses on the contemporary issues faced by the minority communities in Malacca namely the Baba Nyonya, Portuguese, and Chitty. These groups of minority have long been contact with the mainstream society since the post-colonial era itself. Although the minority are small in number, but they are also part of the contributor to the country‘s development. In the context of politics in Malaysia, factor of ethnicity has been the key determinant of the success of a grand coalition government. For example, in Chenderiang, N46, Datuk Dr Mah Hang Soon won the state seat in last general election where a substantial number of the Orang Asli populates at that area. Nevertheless, these groups of minority have been marginalized and are only summoned into mind by those politicians when in needs of time especially during the general election. Since the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, there are sufficient evidence to suggest that there is growing discontentment among the non-Muslim, nonMalay indigenous, or Dayak groups of Sarawak (and Sabah) stemming from two main factors – political proscription and economic discrimination (Jawan, 1991). The grand coalition model of ethnic-based political parties has been practices by Malaysia where by all ethnic groups have been represented in the national government, namely the National Front (BN). However, the voice of the minority has not been heard and represented by the grand coalition as they think the minority numbers is small and not important. Hence, the writing of this paper was conducted with the aim of analyzing and acknowledging the contemporary issues faced by the minority community. As mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. In parallel to that, the minority community also has their privilege to exercise their rights in order to sustain their position in the society. This article is divided into three main parts. The first part relating to literature review, exploring the background of the minority selected upon this study, following with the methodology applied, and research findings.

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Socio-Economic and Community Issues In this pluralistic society of Malaysia, it has brought about several challenges especially in the context of community development. Malaysia has been very well-off whereby it possesses wealthy cultural diversity, religions and languages (Gill, Talib, & Jawan, 2012). Due to the diversity phenomena, it has been a modern enterprise whereby the needs of mandating uniformity and permit variety are in tension with each other, and the state must strike a balance between them (Cheung, Lee, & Nedilsky, 2009) Minority often relates to a group that is negligibly small. Under such circumstances a group finds it nearly impossible to assert its claim and to articulate its existence in society (Kymlicka, 1995; Kymlicka & He, 2005). Malaysia consistently supports "bumiputeras," the so-called sons of the soil, in its economic policies, its distribution of government funds, and in its hiring for government positions. In the social context, it only revolves among the majority on the other hand neglected the minority. Does it mean that the minority is not important though their society representation is small? Malacca is known as ‗The Historical State‘ in Malaysia which located in the southern region of the Malay Peninsula, next to the Straits of Malacca. It has an estimated population of 860 000 as of 2014 colourise with the beauty of unique cultures from its different ethnic composition (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2014). The state is enriched with the presence of these groups of minority, Baba Nyonya, Portuguese, and Chitty. The Portuguese is the oldest colonial master to conquer Malaya (known as ‗Tanah Melayu‘ at the time) in 1511 with its dominant power across the Asean Continent. The landing of the Portuguese in Malaya was known with the downfall of the Malacca Islamic Sultanate sovereignty at that time. Khoo (1979) claimed that the historical records of Malacca revolve around the activities of the Portuguese and British colonial master from

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1511 to the early 19th century. This community practices Christianity in their daily life and can be found in the Portuguese Settlement, Ujong Pasir, Malacca. The Portuguese are granted with the Bumiputera status and are given the opportunity to invest in Amanah Saham Nasional, just like the others Bumiputeras but, most of them cannot afford to invest due to their poor socioeconomic status (Gill, Talib, Harun, Choo & Fang, 2016; Gerard, 2003) The Baba Nyonya are commonly known as the ‗Peranakan Chinese‘. The term ‗Baba‘ refers to the male Peranakan Chinese and ‗Nyonya‘ refers to the female Peranakan Chinese or else ‗Bibik‘ for the elderly Peranakan women (Peter & Jennifer, 1998). The unique history of this ethnic group started when the Chinese traders travelled between the Malay Archipelago and China set their footprint in Malacca, Singapore and Penang and then continued to live in the Straits Settlements after marrying the local Malay women (Gill, Talib, Harun, Choo & Fang, 2016; Ding, 2008). The Chitty community is made up of a small number of populations in Kampung Gajah Berang about 50 families approximately around 400 people comprising of the nine Hindu castes namely Chitty, Pillai, Neikar, Rajah, Padayachi, Mudaliar, Pathar, Konar, and Kullen (Samuel 2006). Just like the Peranakan Chinese, the Tamil traders came from Panai in Tamil Nadu, India settled down in Malacca and freely intermingled with the local Malays and Chinese Settlers during the sovereignty of the Sultanate of Malacca (Yap, 1989). The families in this community keep their faith in Hinduism and conversed using Malay language in their daily life . Tourism sector has bloom in visitors into the state with its well preserved history buildings and monuments. The minority in Malacca which includes the Portuguese, Baba Nyonya and Chitty have been contributing to the economics of this sector. For example, the Portuguese Settlement draws in local and foreign visitors for its grand annual San Pedro (Water Festival). The Chitty museum preserves and presents historical knowledge

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to the tourist while the Jonker Street promotes the culture of the Baba Nyonya community. Although this minority community is small-scale, they has been contributing to the state economic. It has been reported that the participation of certain minority ethnic groups in Malacca tourism especially among the Baba Nyonya and Portuguese is slightly slow compare to the Malays, Chinese and Indians (Shariffuddin & Zahari, 2014). The authority should understand that though these minority ethnic groups are small in number, how often do their grievances and voices are overheard and reach out by the majority and the authority? If their voices has not been heard by the authority especially the state government, how well do their welfare been taken care of? One of latest issues that affect the livelihood of the Portuguese is the Melaka Gateway Project (The Sun Daily, 2015). The implication of this project will impact on the livelihood of the Portuguese, especially the fisherman in the area, as well as the settlement‘s cultural and historical value. What will happen to the survival of this community after the authority dognaps their rice bowl? Hence, this paper generally would discuss issues of the minority groups in Malacca as there are not much issues being reported by the mainstream media. Methodology A quantitative approach was employed using survey. There were 240 respondents from the three ethnic minority communities in Malacca namely the Baba Nyonya, Portuguese, and Chitty were involved in this study. Besides, there were six informants from the Baba Nyonya, Portuguese and Chitty community leaders were involved in the Focus Group Discussion (FGD) in identifying some key issues related to these communities. The survey data was analyzed using statistical test.

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Results and Discussion The respondents were varied from the age of 21 to 90 years old as long as they are eligible voters. There were 37.5% (90) respondents from the Baba Nyonya, 20.8% (50) from the Chitty and 41.7% (100) from the Portuguese minority groups. Majority of the respondents were Christian, 46.3% (111) as the Portuguese practiced Christianity following by the Baba Nyonya who practiced Buddhism, 31.3% (75) and the Chitty practiced Hinduism. Majority of the respondents graduated from the secondary level of education with 34.6% (83). There were only 31.7% (76) of the respondents managed to pursue their studies until the pre-university and tertiary level. There was majority of 37.1% (89) of the respondents worked in the private sector. In terms of monthly income, majority of the respondents were below the average income group, RM1001-RM2000. Support for GE-14 (Parliament) With relevant to the unfavourable perception of the respondents, thus the anticipation support for GE-14 will be discussed. Findings from the FGD will be included to further explain on their issues that reflect their support.

Table 1: Anticipation Support for GE-14 Party

(N = 610)

(%)

Barisan Nasional (BN)

87

36.3

Pakatan Harapan

117

48.8

PAS

4

1.7

Will not vote

32

13.3

Total

240

100

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From the table above, majority of the respondents, 50.5% will vote for the opposition including both Pakatan Harapan and PAS in the next GE-14. In comparison with the support for BN, 36.3%, the result doesn‘t show a significance differences and thus not convincing enough for the BN government to secure the minorities‘ votes. Thus, the ruling party still can wins back the votes of these minority groups by tackling on the issues and engaging with the community. Support Based on Ethnic Groups Table 2 below shows the anticipation support for GE-14 based on the minority communities in Malacca.

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Table 2: Anticipation Support Based on Ethnic Group Majority of the Portuguese and Baba Nyonya respondents intended to support the opposition whereas the Chitty respondents, 78% remained their support towards the ruling party. The Chitty has been and will continue to preserve their loyalty towards the ruling party as they feel that their future wellbeing is closely related with the relationship of the present government (Moorthy, 2009). Party/ Ethnic

BN

Pakatan Harapan

PAS

Will not Vote

Total

n (%)

n (%)

n (%)

n (%)

Baba Nyonya

24 (26.7)

50 (55.6)

1 (1.1)

15 (16.7)

90 (100%)

Chetty

39 (78.0)

6 (12.0)

-

5 (10.0)

50 (100%)

Portuguese

24 (24.0)

61 (61.0)

3 (3.0)

12 (12.0)

100 (100%)

Total

87 (36.3)

117 (48.8)

4 (1.7)

32 (13.3)

240 (100%)

The support of these ethnic minority groups could be possibly explained from the FGD data obtained. The unresolved issue by the state government has directly links on the unfavorable support of these minority communities. Similarly, these groups have also been sidelined by the state government from the socio-economic development perspective. One of the most crucial issues is erosion of the culture. They were hardly given a chance to promote their own culture as it was monopolized by Briged Seni which has not been preserving the originality of the cultures. Most of the contract has been given by the government to other parties whom the government prefers rather than giving the opportunity for these minorities to promote their culture and at the same time for some income-earning. Besides, the funding allocation was also insufficient and with many

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bureaucracy red tape. Finally, the minority communities have also perceived themselves as being marginalized. Suggestions Minorities are actually simple individuals who want to be taken care in terms of their welfare without demanding much on power and monetary greed. From the analysis in a study, they are not well prepared for the 6% GST tax as it has been causing financial burden with their low-income household in order to sustain their lives of the family (Gill, Talib, Harun, Choo & Fang, 2016). The ruling government should look into this matter seriously by providing funding assistance and better job employment to the minorities. Besides, the ruling government should look into the matter of the performance of the Chief Minister. The minorities in Malacca, Baba Nyonya, Portuguese and Chitty community are not satisfied on how the Chief Minister manages the state welfare and people. Furthermore, in order to think of moving forward, the ruling coalition should solve the issues that has been pending for several years and remains unsolved. Conclusion Generally, the three minorities are facing some similar issues like fading off and misinterpretation of the culture mainly due to the intervention of Briged Seni that perform on behalf of the minority. Besides, they feel the involvement and immersion of the government should be more profound for the community sustainability. A leader for each of the community should be appointed to avoid leadership crisis and also ensure the welfare of the minority is more surveillance.

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Acknowledgements This research is funded by the National Council of Professors, Malaysia.

References Cheung, S., Lee, J.T, & Nedilsky, L.V. (2009). Marginalization in China. United States, U.S: Palgrave Macmilan. Department of Statistics Malaysia. (2014). Retrieved from www.statistics.gov.my. Ding Choo Ming. (2008). Pantun Peranakan Baba: Mutiara Gemilang Negeri-Negeri Selat. Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. Gerard Fernandis. (2003). The Portuguese Community at The Periphery: A Minority Report on The Portuguese Quest for Bumiputera Status. Kajian Malaysia, Vol XXI, 1 & 2, 285-301. Gill, S.S., Talib, A.T., & Jawan, A. J. (2012). Unity in diversity: Malaysian experience and approach. Paper presented at the International Seminar on One ASEAN ONE Community: Political, Religious and Socio-Cultural Issues and Challenges, Nakon Si

Thamarat,

Thailand.

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Gill, S.S., Talib, A.T., Harun, M.R., Choo, Y.K., & Fang, Y.X. (2016). Perception and acceptance of the ethnic minorities towards the ruling coalition. Serdang: National Council of Professors (MPN). Jawan, A. J. (1991). The ethnic factor in modern politics: The case of Sarawak, East Malaysia. Centre for South-East Asian Studies: University of Hull. John, E. Farley. (2000). Majority-minority relations (4th ed.). United States of America, U.S: RR Donnelley & Sons Company. Khoo, K.K. (1979). Melaka dalam zaman moden. Jebat, 9, 32-43. Kymlicka, W. (1995). Multicultural citizenship: A liberal theory of minority rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kymlicka, W. & He, B. (2005). Multiculturalism in Asia. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Peter Lee & Jennifer Chen. (1998). Rumah Baba: Life in a Peranakan House. Singapore: Singapore History Musuem. Shariffuddin, N.S.M & Zahari, M.S.M. (2014). Community participation toward states tourism development: A case of Melaka Baba Nyonya and Portuguese minority. In Sumarjan et al. (Eds), Hospitality and tourism (pp. 599 – 602). London, UK: Taylor & Francis Group. The Sun Daily. (2015). Residents call on govt to intervene Portuguese Settlement land reclamation works. 25 March.

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Yap, E.M. (1989). Komuniti Chetti Melaka: Satu Pengenalan. Jurnal Antropologi dan Sosiologi. Jilid 17. 1989. Bangi: Jabatan Antropologi dan Sosiologi, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.

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The 11th Sarawak State Elections in Perspective II Patronage Democracy and Class Conflict in Rural of Sarawak : Case Study during 2016 Sarawak State Election in Telang Usan Constituency Jeffrey Ngau Lenjau Universiti Malaysia Sabah Abstract Historically, the origin of patronage democracy in Sarawak can be track out since the Brunei Sultanate rule (Brown, 1970; Sebli, 2008 & Faisal, 2013). To demonstrate, Brunei Sultanate rule rely on divided numerous jajahan (district) concept which had been used and moulded since Brooke Dynasty (1842-1940) until nowadays (Sebli, 2004; Faisal, 2008 & Hafizan, 2012). In addition, elected leaders which appointed by government from aristocrat class during Brunei Sultanate rule also, still persistence and resemble in the modern Sarawak politics (Rousseau, 1973; Milne & Ratnam, 1974:246). To enumerate, patronage democracy definitions is a distribution of state resources/allocation towards his loyal supporters especially during election in order to maintain and sustain it political power (Chandran, 2004, Mersat, 2006 & Lenjau, 2015). On the other hand, class conflict means competition among different background and ideologies of people towards scare resources. To clarify, the best example to analyze the interaction between patronage democracy and class conflict was at N.77 Telang Usan constituency during 11th Sarawak State Election in 2016. Therefore, this study have three main objectives namely; (1) to explores the relationship between patronage democracy and class conflict in Kenyah politics; (2), to analyze the main issues arouse during 11th Sarawak focusing on N.77 Telang Usan only and; (3), to access the implication between patronage democracy and class conflict upon towards Kenyah society unity. Additionally, this is a qualitative research. To gathering the information, this study used participant observation, academic journal, in depth interview, content analysis and newspaper. Keywords: Patronage Democracy, Class Conflict, Telang Usan Constituency, Kenyah

238

Pengenalan Kawasan Ahli Dewan Undangan Negeri (ADUN) N.77 Telang Usan adalah majoritinya terdiri daripada etnik Orang Ulu (Kayan, Kenyah, Penan, Kelabit dan sebagainya) dan termasuklah etnik Iban. Justeru itu pada pilihan raya negeri Sarawak 2016 telah menyaksikan pertarungan politik paling sengit di antara parti politik Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB) yang diwakili oleh Dennis Ngau. Manakala, parti politik pembangkang pula daripada Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) yang diwakili oleh Roland Engan. Memang tidak dapat sangkal lagi, kawasan N.77 Telang Usan adalah kubu kuat kepada Barisan Nasional (BN) sejak tahun 2001 sehingga 2016. Kontradiksinya, daripada perspektif undi popular pula, undi popular BN di kawasan N.77 Telang Usan adalah merosot dan tidak konsisten.

Misalnya, undi popular BN pada tahun 2001 adalah

berjumlah 1029 undi. Manakala, peningkatan kepada jumlah undi popular meningkat kepada 2771 undi pada tahun 2006.33 Sungguh pun begitu, jumlah undi popular BN bagi tahun 2011 dan 2016 mengalami kemerosotan dua penggal berturut-turut iaitu berjumlah 845 undi dan 167 undi sahaja. Dari konteks komposisi pengundi di N.77 Telang Usan pula, kawasan majoriti pengundi etnik Kenyah iaitu fokus utama kajian ini

adalah

terletak di kawasan San dengan jumlah pengundi sebanyak 1, 142 undi sahaja. Antara kampung - kampung Kenyah dalam kawasan San ini ialah Long Tap, Long San, Long Selatong Dikan, Long Selatong Tepalit, Long Julan, Long Apu, Long Anap dan Long Palai.

33

Jeffrey Ngau (2011). Pengaruh faktor etnik dalam pilihan raya negeri Sarawak 2011: Refleksi daripada kawasan pilihan raya Telang Usan, Conference on Elections and Democracy in Malaysia, University Malaysia Sarawak, 9-10 November 2011.

239

Pernyataan Masalah Secara dasarnya, pembentukan sesebuah parti politik di Malaysia adalah berlandaskan kepada kepentingan sesebuah kaum etnik berkenaan.34 Sebagai contohnya di Semenanjung Malaysia, parti politik United Malay National Association (UMNO) adalah mewakili kepentingan etnik Melayu, Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) adalah mewakil kepentingan etnik Cina, Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) pula mewakili kepentingan etnik India dan sebagainya. Pada waktu yang sama, hal yang sama turut berlaku dalam perkembangan politik di Sarawak. Misalnya, PBB mewakili kepentingan etnik Melayu Sarawak35 dan Sarawak United People‟s Party (SUPP) mewakili kepentingan etnik Cina. Manakala Parti Pesaka Anak Sarawak (PESAKA) dan Sarawak National Party (SNAP) mewakili kepentingan majoriti etnik Dayak. Lanjutan daripada itu, isu yang ingin dirungkai dan dikupas secara terperinci dalam permasalahan kajian ini ialah bagaimana pula dengan perjuangan politik dari masyarakat berkelas seperti etnik Kenyah? Apakah parti politik yang menaungi politik Kenyah tersebut menjaga hak dan kepentingan kelas kelas sosial yang wujud dalam masyarakat Kenyah itu sendiri?Adakah layanan parti politik berkenaan terhadap dua kepentingan kelas yang berbeza dilayan secara secara adil dan saksama atau sebaliknya? Pada hakikatnya, politik Kenyah khususnya di Sarawak didominasi sepenuhnya oleh golongan bangsawan Kenyah (Jeffrey Ngau, 2015). Lebih lebih lagi, situasi ini dapat dikenal pasti daripada

jawatan disandang dari peringkat Temenggung sehingga ke

peringkat ketua kampung yang selari dengan ideologi pihak kerajaan sahaja. Di samping

34

Nathaniel Tan & John Lee (edited), (2008). Political Tsunami : An End to Hegemony in Malaysia? Kuala Lumpur :Vinlin Sdn Bhd; Amer Saifude Ghazali (2009). Geografi Pilihan Raya Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur : Penerbit Universiti Malaya; Mohd Noor Yazid (2011). Percaturan Kuasa dan Politik Pilihan Raya, Kual Lumpur :Utusan Publications & Distibutors Sdn Bhd; Hashim Yaacob (2012). Memahami politik menjelang pilihan raya ke-13, Selangor : Pekan Ilmu Publications Sdn Bhd; Amer Saifude Ghazali (2015). Geografi Politik dan Pilihan Raya kelantan, Kuala Lumpur : Penerbit University Malaya. 35 Sanib Said (2015). Politik Melayu Di Sarawak 1946-1966 : Bersatu Ke Mercu Kuasa, Kuching :InfoGrafik Sdn Bhd.

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itu, hal ini berpunca daripada jawatan tersebut diwarisi secara keturunan oleh kelas bangsawan Kenyah sahaja.36 Daripada perspektif yang berbeza, perjuangan politik Kenyah dari kelas sosial rakyat biasa (panyen) terus dipinggirkan dan diabaikan dalam konteks politik moden Kenyah. Rentetan daripada ketiadaan peluang dan ruang diberikan kepada golongan biasa Kenyah berkenaan, kelompok kelas ini mengambil langkah alternatif menyuarakan kepentingan hak kelas mereka menerusi politik pembangkang. Sebenarnya, hal ini disebabkan kerana; (1)dominasi penuh oleh golongan bangsawan Kenyah menerusi warisan untuk jawatan politik tertentu dan diperkukuhkan lagi dengan lantikan secara politik; (2), parti politik BN di Telang Usan memperjuangkan kepentingan kelas bangsawan Kenyah ; (3), pemilihan jawatan sebagai Ketua Kampung, Penghulu, Pemancha dan Temenggong ekslusif untuk golongan bangsawan Kenyah sahaja; dan (4), kelas pemimpin bangsawan Kenyah lebih mementingkan kepentingan parti politik berbanding soal kebajikan rakyat di peringkat akar umbi. Oleh hal yang demikian, hal ini telah mencetuskan konflik kelas yang berpanjangan dan berterusan di antara kelas bangsawan dan kelas rakyat biasa Kenyah. Hal ini telah menampakkan ketegangan hubungan kedua dua belah kelas sosial Kenyah ini semakin meruncing pada masa kini. Yang pasti sekali, konflik kelas yang terpendam sekian lama telah pun ditransformasikan dan diterjemahkan kepada perjuangan ideologi parti politik Kenyah pada alaf baharu ini. Objektif Kajian (1) Untuk menerokai perkaitan di antara demokrasi penaungan dan konflik kelas dalam politik etnik Kenyah

36

Lian (1987). Farmer Perceptions and economic change - The case of Kenyah Farmers of The Fourth Division, Sarawak, PHD Thesis, Australia National University; Armstrong (1991). People of the same heart : The social world of the Kenyah Badeng, PhD Thesis, University of Sydney.

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(2) Untuk menganalisis isu isu yang berbangkit semasa pilihan raya negeri Sarawak 2016 khususnya di N. 77 Telang Usan (3) Untuk mengakses implikasi perkaitan demokrasi penaungan dan konflik kelas terhadap perpaduan politik etnik Kenyah

Metodologi Kajian Kajian ini memberi fokus kepada kawasan N.77 Telang Usan sebelum dan selepas pilihan raya negeri Sarawak pada tahun 2016. Selain itu, pengkaji telah melawat beberapa buah kampung etnik Kenyah di Baram seperti Long Sobing (Tinjar), Apau Gun (Tinjar), Long Watt (Tutoh), Long Aya (Tinjar), Long San (Baram) Long Selatong Dikan (Baram), Long Anap (Baram),Long Anap (Baram) dan Long Palai (Baram) semasa pilihan raya negeri Sarawak berkenaan. Untuk metod pengumpulan data kajian ini, pengkaji menggunakan beberapa metod seperti temubual secara mendalam, journal akademik yang berkaitan, risalah yang diedarkan semasa berkempen dan penyertaan ikut serta. Bagi responden yang ditemubual, pengkaji menemubual kedua dua buah kelas sosial Kenyah ini. Ini bertujuan untuk memastikan dan memperolehi sumber informasi yang seimbang di antara kedua dua belah pihak.

Dapatan Objektif Kajian 1 Daripada perspektif sejarah, asal usul demokrasi penaungan di N.77 Telang Usan boleh dijejaki sejak pemerintahan Kesultanan Melayu Brunei pada abad ke 16. 37 Namun begitu, daerah Baram (N.77 Telang Usan) diserahkan kepada pemerintahan Charles 37

Fong Hon Kah (2008). A history of the development of Baram River Basin in Sarawak, Kuching : The Sarawak Press Sdn Bhd; Faisal S. Hazis (2013). State Formation and Strongmen Politics in Faisal S. Hazis and Stanley Bye Kadam-Kiai, ‘Politics and Local government in Sarawak’, Kota Samarahan : Penerbit Universiti Malaysia Sarawak.

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Brooke pada tahun 1885. Yang pasti, corak pentadbiran Kesultanan Melayu Brunei dan Charles Brooke hampir sama kerana Charles Brooke mengadaptasi sistem pentadbiran Kesultanan Melayu Brunei.38 Namun begitu, dalam pentadbiran Charles Brooke pula, beliau mengutamakan para pemerintah pihak British untuk mentadbir manakala pihak tempatan untuk mengurus pentadbiran di peringkat akar umbi sahaja.39 Bagi memantapkan pentadbiran Charles Brooke di wilayah Baram ketika itu, perkara yang utama beliau laksanakan ialah menyerap masuk para pemimpin terbilang Kenyah ke dalam pentadbiran beliau. Hal ini disebabkan etnik Kenyah ketika itu sangat mentaati pemimpin mereka kerana; (1), melindungi penghuni rumah panjang daripada serangan pihak musuh ; dan (2), mengguna konsep derhaka sebagai memperkukuhkan lagi institusi politik traditional Kenyah ketika itu. Lantaran itu, situasi ini memperlihatkan kesatuan politik Kenyah teguh ketika itu sahaja. Selain itu juga, dalam usaha Charles Brooke memperluaskan kuasa beliau di Baram, beliau turut mewujudkan dan memperkenalkan jawatan jawatan baharu seperti Penghulu, Pemancha dan Temenggong. Ini bertujuan untuk mempermudahkan urusan pentadbiran pihak British di wilayah Baram yang luas tersebut. Yang jelas, golongan bangsawan Kenyah mendominasi jawatan jawatan baharu berkenaan sehingga ke alaf baharu ini menerusi warisan daripada keluarga terdahulu.40 Memag tidak dinafikan lagi bahawa kelas bangsawan Kenyah berada di kedudukan yang selesa sejak pemerintahan Brooke. Namun demikian, situasi ini terjejas apabila elemen sistem politik moden diperkenalkan di Malaysia pada tahun 1960an sehingga kini. Menerusi sistem politik moden, pemimpin dipilih menerusi undian popular bukan dilantik 38

Lucy Sebli (2004). Patronclientship and factionalism in Iban politics in Sarawak. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Hull, England. 39 Naimah (1999). Administrators and the services : The Sarawak Administrative Service Under The Brooke Rajahs and British Colonial Rule, Kuala Lumpur : Oxford University Press. 40 Jeffrey Ngau (2015). Politik Demokrasi Penaungan Dalam Politik kenyah Di Sarawak : Kajian Kes Di Long San Semasa Pilihan Raya Negeri Sarawak 2011, Tesis Sarjana, University Malaysia Sarawak.

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berdasarkan sistem warisan semata-mata. Namun begitu, situasi ini begitu asing sekali dalam sistem pentadbiran politik Kenyah kerana kelas bangsawan Kenyah mempunyai kelayakan untuk mentadbir. Lantaran itu, ini telah mengakibatkan keharmonian rumah panjang Kenyah berpecah belah akibat perbezaan ideologi politik ini. Tambahan itu, hubungan di antara kelas bangsawan dan kelas biasa Kenyah semakin renggang ke hari ini. Dapatan Objektif Kajian 2 Pilihan raya negeri Sarawak 2016 merupakan pilihan raya paling sengit dalam sejarah politik Kenyah di Baram. Hal ini disebabkan beberapa isu yang utama yang diuarkanuarkan semasa kempen pilihan raya negeri Sarawak 2016 bagi kawasan N.77 Telang Usan seperti berikut :

Isu Pembinaan Empangan Baram41 Asas kepada isu pembinaan empangan Baram telah timbul sejak tahun 2008 sehingga kini. Hal ini berpunca daripada rancangan asal pembinaan empangan Baram adalah bertujuan untuk melonjakkan pertumbuhan ekonomi penduduk luar bandar khususnya di Baram. Dari sudut lain, isu rancangan pembinaan empangan ini dipertikaikan kerana beberapa faktor yang penting iaitu; (1) persetujuan pembinaan diambil di kalangan para pemimpin (bangsawan) Kenyah sahaja tanpa melibatkan suara rakyat Kenyah ; (2), penentangan rancangan empangan ini telah dilakukan secara terus terang di kampung kampung yang bakal tenggelam menerusi mogok besar besaran pada tahun 2013 dan; (3), para pemimpin bangsawan Kenyah menghebohkan rancangan empangan berkenaan 41

Surat rasmi yang bertarikh 14/01/2016 telah dikeluarkan dan menyatakan bahawa rancangan pembinaan empangan Baram telah diberhentikan. Pada masa yang sama, kandungan surat bertarikh 14/01/2016 menyebut pembatalan mengambil hak NCR di sepanjang sungai Baram yang terkena impak empangan Baram dan kawasan tapak empangan berkenaan.

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menerusi media massa pihak kerajaan tanpa berunding dengan rakyat terlebih dahulu. Lanjutan daripada situasi ini, keadaan ini menimbulkan kemarahan rakyat khususnya etnik Kenyah rakyat biasa agar projek berkenaan dibatalkan serta merta.42

Mempolitikkan Keperluan Asas Keperluan asas yang dimaksudkan disini seperti bekalan air bersih, elektrik, jalan raya yang berturap, klinik kesihatan, jaringan komunikasi yang baik dan sebagainya. Namun demikian, kebanyakan keperluan

asas yang disenaraikan diatas amat diperlukan di

seluruh Baram. Hal ini disebabkan keperluan asas ini merupaka nadi kehidupan penduduk khususnya yang tinggal di luar bandar. Namun demikian, tidak semua keperluan asas diatas disalurkan kepada penduduk Baram sekiranya kampung berkenaan didapati menyokong kepada pihak pembangkang. Dengan erti kata lain, keperluan asas ini akan disalurkan kepada kampung kampung yang hanya memberi kesetiaan penuh kepada pihak kerajaan sahaja.43 Isu Tanah44 Isu tanah merupakan isu paling sukar untuk diselesaikan di kalangan etnik Kenyah sejak tahun 1970an lagi.45 Hal ini disebabkan pindaan demi pindaan dikenakan terhadap rang 42

The Borneo Post (17/04/2012). NGOs stage protest against Baram Dam,p.6; The Borneo Post (24/04/2012). Ceremony marred by protests against dam project, p.8; The Borneo Post (6/05/2012). Committee wants Baram Dam scrapp; The Borneo Post (22/11/2014). GASAK continues protest against proposed Baram dam project, p.6; The Borneo Post (3/12/2014). PKKS taken to task over statement on Baram dam, p.12. 43 Kenyataan ucapan daripada YB Dennis Ngau sempena kempen pilihan raya politik di Long San pada 2 April 2016 sempena Program memperkasakan wanita anjuran Pergerakan Wanita PBB Ranting San Hilir dan dirasmikan oleh YB Tuan Anyie Ngau Ahli Parlimen P.220 Baram bersama YB Encik Dennis Ngau bertempat di Dewan Long San, 1 April 2016 sehingga 3 April 2016 dengan kerjasama cawangan Bapa, Pergerakan Wanita dan Pemuda PBB N.77 Telang Usan. 44 Semasa pilihan raya negeri Sarawak, terdapat sebuah surat bertarikh 5/09/2013 yang menyatakan pembatalan pengambilan tanah NCR di sepanjang Sungai Baram yang dinyatakan oleh Sherrina Hussaini, Acting Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Resource Planning and Environment.

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undang undang tanah berkenaan. Lantaran itu, isu tanah sering kali ditimbulkan semasa pilihan raya umum mahupun negeri khususnya di Telang Usan. Semasa pilihan raya negeri Sarawak 2016, isu tanah turut menjadi kontroversi khususnya penghapusan hak hak orang asal Baram di sepanjang sungai Baram. Hubungan Etnik Kenyah Kayan Yang Tergugat dan Tercalar Daripada perspektif sejarah, asas perkembangan politik di Baram dibentuk oleh dua etnik terbesar dalam kategori Orang Ulu iaitu Kenyah - Kayan. Asas kepada hubungan etnik Kenyah - Kayan di kawasan Baram adalah menerusi kepimpinan Temenggong Oyong Lawai Jau (Kenyah - Long San) dan Penghulu Lalang (Kayan - Long Laput) sekitar tahun 1950an dan 1960an.46 Bagi menghormati dan menjaga silaturahim di antara kedua dua etnik ini, kedua dua pemimpin daripada dua etnik terbesar ini menjadi pepimpin utama. Namun demikian, hubungan ini ditimbulkan semasa pilihan raya negeri Sarawak 2016 khususnya daripada penyokong pihak kerajaan di Baram. Penyokong pihak kerajaan mendakwa calon PKR Roland Engan tidak layak bertanding kerana perwakilan Kenyah iaitu Anyie Ngau sudah memegang sebagai Ahli Parlimen Baram. Sepatutnya, calon PKR yang bertanding semasa pilihan raya negeri Sarawak 2016 adalah seharusnya daripada etnik Kayan. Walau bagaimanapun, calon Roland Engan tetap bertanding pilihan raya negeri berkenaan selepas mendapat mandat daripada pucuk kepimpinan parti politik yang dinaunginya itu. Mempolitikkan Institusi Kemasyarakatan Orang Ulu di Baram Yang pasti, mempolitikan institusi kemasyarakatan Orang Ulu di Baram adalah punca utama kepada keruntuhan perpaduan dalam rumah panjang mahupun sesama 45

Isu kupasan perbahasan utama oleh Yb Micheal Teo Khing dan YB Baru Bian di Eastwood Valley Miri pada 12 September 2015 sempena Fund Raising Dinner : Mesyuarat Agong Tahunan. 46 Ritchie. J., (2006). Temenggong Oyong Lawai Jau : A Paramount Chief in Borneo, Kuching : Wisma Printing Sdn Bhd.

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individu. Secara tradisionalnya, institusi kemasyarakatan Orang Ulu terbahagi kepada dua kategori kepimpinan yang utama iaitu; (1) kepimpinan golongan bangsawan Kenyah dan; (2) kepimpinan golongan rakyat biasa (commoner) Kenyah.47 Asas kepada kepimpinan tradisional ini ialah pemimpin yang dipilih dalam kelompok kelas sosial masing masing dipilih secara majoriti oleh suara rakyat. Kemudian, pemimpin yang dipilih hasil daripada rakyat dalam kelas sosial masing masing mendapat persetujuan oleh ketua kampung turut daripada golongan bangsawan Kenyah. Namun pada masa kini, institusi kemasyarakatan Orang Ulu tidak lagi mengamalkan sistem politik tradisional ini lagi. Yang pasti, jawatan sebagai Ketua Kampung dan Ketua Masyarakat dilantik secara langsung daripada parti politik pihak kerajaan. Dengan erti kata lain, hak rakyat jelata yang ingin memilih pemimpin kegemaran masing masing sekaligus dihapuskan sama sekali.48 Pencemaran Sungai Akibat Daripada Pembalakan dan Penanaman Komersial Seperti Ladang Sawit. Di kawasan Baram, pencemaran sungai merupakan masalah utama yang sering dihadapi oleh penduduk di Baram. Hal ini disebabkan kerana dua faktor utama; (1) aktivit pembalakan haram dan; (2), penanaman ladang kelapa sawit. Bagi pencemaran sungai akibat pembalakan Baram, hal ini banyak sekali terjadi di Sungai Baram. Hal ini Sungai

47

Di kampung Long San, di antara pemimpin rakyat biasa (commoner) yang terkenal seperti William Jalong Lian, Peter Ukang Lusat dan Uko Avan Usang Adam Kedua dua pemimpin rakyat biasa ini dipilih secara majoriti dalam kelas rakyat biasa sahaja tanpa campur tangan daripada kelas bangsawan Kenyah.Dengan erti kata lain, pembahagian dan pemilihan seseorang pemimpin itu dihormati oleh kedua dua belah kelas berkenaan. Malah, untuk memegang jawatan sebagai ketua bagi kelas bangsawan dan kelas rakyat biasa Kenyah memerlukan dua orang pihak sahaja bagi setiap kategori kelas sosial masing masing. Namun demikian, sistem ini tidak diguna pakai apabila campur tangan pihak politik. Dalam konteks politik Kenyah pada masa kini, pemilihan Jawatankuasa Keselamatan dan Kemajuan Kampung (JKKK) dilantik secara langsung berdasarkan ideologi pihak kerajaan sahaja. Sekiranya didapati mana mana pihak yang membantah polisi pihak kerajaan, individu tersebuk layak dipecat. 48 Kempen ucapan daripada calon PKR Roland Engan di Long Loyang dan Apau Gun pada 30/04/2016.

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Baram terletak dekat dengan syarikat pembalakan di Baram iaitu Samling Company.49 Manakala, pencemaran sungai akibat penanaman ladang kelapa sawit pula berlaku di kawasan Long Aya, Tinjar.50 Akibatnya, sukar untuk memperolehi sumber makan daripada hutan pada masa kini. Perjuangan Politik Kenyah di Telang Usan Yang Semakin Mengecil, Menyusut Dan Berpecah Belah Etnik yang paling terkesan akibat daripada persempadanan semula kawasan Telang Usan pada tahun 2016 ialah Kenyah. Hal ini disebabkan terdapat dua tempat pembuangan undi yang dominasi oleh etnik Kenyah iaitu kawasan San dan kawasan Lio Mato. Namun demikian selepas persempadanan semula, kawasan San kekal dalam Telang Usan manakala kawasan Lio Mato dipinda ke bahagian Mulu. Situasi ini sekaligus melemahkan kekuatan politik Kenyah. Pada masa yang sama, gabungan usaha kawasan San dan kawasan Lio Mato menentang sehabis habisnya rancangan empangan Baram di masa hadapan sedikit terjejas. Hal ini kerana impak rancangan pembinaan empangan Baram sangat terkesan terhadap kedua dua kawasan penempatan Kenyah di Baram ini. Dapatan Objektif Kajian 3 Implikasi kesan daripada perkaitan demokrasi penaungan dan konflik kelas yang pertama ialah jarak sosial di antara kelas bangsawan - agensi kerajaan semakin rapat dan erat sekali. Semasa pilihan raya negeri Sarawak 2016, kerjasama institusi kemasyarakatan Kenyah dengan parti politik pihak kerajaan sukar untuk dipisahkan. Malah, kedua dua belah pihak turut saling bantu membantu dalam memenangi pilihan raya negeri Sarawak khususnya di Telang Usan. Buktinya, lawatan Kementerian Pertahanan Malaysia, Datuk

49

Temubual bersama dengan James Dungau Lawai, 52 tahun, (kelas sosial, bangsawan Kenya) dari Long Sebatang pada 24 Mac 2016. 50 Temubual bersama dengan Siban Ngau Ngo, 54 tahun, (kelas sosial, bangsawan Kenyah) dari Long Aya pada 30 April 2016.

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Seri Hishamuddin51 ke Sekolah Menengah Kebangsaan Temenggong Datuk Lawai Jau pada 10 Apri 2016 bertempat di kampung Long San. Pada masa yang sama, ketibaan Datuk Seri juga disambut penuh meriah oleh wakil Parlimen Baram Anyie Ngau dan wakil ADUN Telang Usan Dennis Ngau, ketua ketua masyarakat, para ibu bapa, para guru dan penduduk kampung yang berhampiran. Implikasi kedua ialah hubungan kelas bangsawan Kenyah dan kelas rakyat Kenyah semakin renggang dan ketara sekali. Hal ini mempunyai perkaitan dengan perlantikan pemimpin masyarakat Kenyah yang dilantik secara terus oleh parti politik tanpa mendapat persetujuan bersama daripada rakyat jelata. Daripada perspektif yang berbeza, pemimpin yang digemari di peringkat akar umbi sepatutnya dipilih oleh rakyat terlebih dahulu. Rentetan daripada itu, pilihan raya negeri Sarawak 2016 khususnya parti politik PKR di Telang Usan telah menterjemahkan isu berkenaan sebagai bahan utama kempen politik parti berkenaan. Implikasi yang ketiga ialah isu kebebasan bersuara. Menurut Rusnisuri Abdul Rashid & Nor Faradiana Rosli (2014) mendefinisikan bahawa kebebasan bersuara satu tuntuan asas dalam sistem demokrasi. Tambahah itu, melalui sistem demokrasi ini, hak rakyat untuk menyatakan pendapat dan bersuara dalam pembentukan undang - undang dan dsar kerajaan yang akan dilaksnakan ke atas mereka sentiasa terjaga dan terjamin. Namun demikian, situasi ini berbeza dan bertentangan semasa pilihan raya negeri Sarawak 2016 di Telang Usan. Kebebasan bersuara dalam media massa yang dikawal oleh pihak kerajaan sepenuhnya. Hal ini bersangkut paut dengan isu rancangan pembinaan empangan Baram.52Yang pasti, kelas bangsawan Kenyah yang memimpin akan 51

Antara pegawai pegawai yang turut mengiringi Datuk Seri Hishamuddin Bin Tun Hussain ke Long San ketika itu seperti Abdul Rahim Bin Mohd Radzi, Haji Zulkifli Bin Mohd Zain, Mohd Johari Bin Baharun, Raja Mohammad Afendi Bin Raja Mohammad, Affendi Bin Jahi Buang, Mohd Zaki Hj Mohtar dan Datuk Stephen Mundaw. 52

Jeffrey Ngau, 2014. The implications of controlled mass media towards Malaysian InternalSecurity: Historically Chronology from Kilometer (KM) 15 Village, Baram, Sarawak. Media and Society Conference, 21-22 April 2014 at DeTar Hall, Univesity Malaysia Sarawak. (POSTER PRESENTATION)

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menggunakan peluang berkenaan untuk menguar-uarkan kempen politik mereka menerusi media massa pihak kerajaan. Namun demikian, situasi ini berbeza dengan kelas rakyat Kenyah yang kurang diberi perhatian dan fokus dalam media massa pihak kerajaan. Hal ini disebabkan berpunca daripada kelas rakyat Kenyah tidak bermaya dalam parti politik kerajaan. Pada masa yang sama, situasi ini bersangkut paut dengan kekebalan dominasi penuh oleh kelas bangsawan Kenyah dalam segenap jawatan politik Kenyah di peringkat akar umbi. Dengan erti kata lain, parti politik PBB di Telang Usan untuk menjaga kepentingan hak kelas bangsawan Kenyah sahaja. Implikasi yang keempat ialah nilai demokrasi di luar bandar khususnya Baram semakin pudar dan kurang subur. Hal ini disebabkan hak kebebasan untuk bersuara dan hak penentuan sendiri pemimpin yang digemari oleh rakyat adalah sifar. Sebagai buktinya, lihat dua buah kampung Kenyah di Baram iaitu kampung Long San dan kampung Tepalit. Hal ini disebabkan kerana calon asal kedua dua ketua kampung ini digemari oleh rakyat di kampung masing masing. Oleh kerana tidak mempunyai ideologi yang sama dengan pihak kerajaan, kedua dua pemimpin ini dilucutkan serta merta daripada jawatan mereka sebagai ketua kampung. Implikasi yang terakhir ialah keterpinggiran peranan politik kelas rakyat biasa dalam urusan pentadbiran kampung. Secara tradisionalnya, kelas rakyat biasa (commoner) mempunyai ketuanya tersendiri. Tambahan itu, ketua kepada kelas rakyat biasa ini dilantik secara majoriti oleh kelompok kelas rakyat sendiri tanpa campur tangan daripada kelas bangsawan Kenyah. Di samping itu, peranan ketua kelas rakyat biasa ini sebagai (1) memimpin dalam kelompok kelas rakyat biasa sahaja; (2) membicarakan kesalahan kesalahan yang dilakukan oleh individu kelompok kelas rakyat biasa sahaja53 dan; (3)

53

Merujuk kepada Sistem Adat Kayan Kenyah 1994, denda bagi setiap kesalahan terbahagi kepada tiga bahagian yang utama iaitu; (1) bahagian maren atau paren; (2) bahagian hipui atau keta’u; dan; (3), bahagian panyin. Dalam sistem adat Kayan Kenyah 1994 menjelaskan bahawa semakin tinggi status sosial individu, semakin tinggi dendanya. Hal ini disebabkan tingkah laku dalam kelompok pemimpin bangsawan

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sebagai orang perantaraan dalam mempertahan hak dan menjaga kepentingan kelas rakyat biasa di peringkat akar umbi. Walau bagaimanapun, sistem ini lenyap dalam sistem pentadbiran politik moden Kenyah. Hal ini disebabkan campur tangan secara langsung pihak kerajaan menerusi ketua kampung dalam memilih keanggotaan baharu yang selari dengan ideologi politik pihak kerajaan sahaja. Kesimpulan Yang nyata sekali, pilihan raya negeri Sarawak 2016 khususnya di N.77 Telang Usan telah menggunakan jaringan demokrasi penaungan demokrasi yang telah dibentuk sejak zaman Kesultanan Melayu Brunei lagi. Tambahan pula, peranan institusi masyarakat Kenyah pada pilihan raya negeri berkenaan yang berkempen untuk parti kerajaan telah menjelaskan dan mengesahkan bahawa elemen demokrasi penaungan dan konflik kelas saling terkait di antara satu sama lain. Lantaran daripada situasi ini, ini telah mengakibatkan hubungan politik seharian di antara kelas bangsawan dan rakyat biasa Kenyah adalah renggang dan berpecah belah sekali. Dengan erti kata lain, legasi sistem pentadbiran Kesultanan Melayu Brunei dan Dinasti Brooke telah diserap semula dan masih lagi digunakan sehingga ke hari ini.54 Rujukan Armstrong. R., (1991). People of the same heart : The social world of the Kenyah Badeng, PhD Thesis, University of Sydney.

Amer Saifude Ghazali (2009). Geografi Pilihan Raya Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur : Penerbit Kenyah akan menjadi ikutan (public figure) kepada kelompok masyarakat kenyah yang lain. Contohnya ‘berian ngivan’ apabila pengantin perempuan tinggal bersama sama dengan pengantin lelaki, pengantin lelaki perlu memberi ‘berian ngivan’ kepada keluarga pengantin perempuan bergantung kepada status sosial (bahagian Marudi) ; (1) maren atau paren - dua tawak atau RM5,000; (2) Hipui or keta’u - satu tawak atau RM2,500 dan; (3), Panyin - one agung atau RM1, 250 ( Sistem Adat Kayan Kenyah 1994: 165-166). 54 Antara pengkaji pengkaji yang menyokong hujah ini seperti Milne (1973); Roff (1974), Lucy Sebli (2004); Faisal (2008); Zaini & Nidzam (2009) & Hafizan (2012).

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Universiti Malaya Amer Saifude Ghazali (2015). Geografi Politik dan Pilihan Raya kelantan, Kuala Lumpur : Penerbit University Malaya.

Faisal, M.S.AH., (2008). State Power and social forces : political change among the Muslim bumiputera in Sarawak, 1970-2006. PHD Thesis, University Sains Malaysia. Faisal S. Hazis (2013). State Formation and Strongmen Politics in Faisal S. Hazis and Stanley Bye Kadam-Kiai, ‗Politics and Local government in Sarawak‘, Kota Samarahan : Penerbit Universiti Malaysia Sarawak.

Fong Hon Kah (2008). A history of the development of Baram River Basin in Sarawak, Kuching : The Sarawak Press Sdn Bhd.

Jeffrey Ngau (2011). Pengaruh faktor etnik dalam pilihan raya negeri Sarawak 2011: Refleksi

daripada kawasan pilihan raya Telang Usan, Conference on Elections and

Democracy in Malaysia, University Malaysia Sarawak, 9-10 November 2011.

Jeffrey Ngau (2014). The implications of controlled mass media towards Malaysian Internal Security: Historically Chronology from Kilometer (KM) 15 Village, Baram, Sarawak. Media and Society Conference, 21-22 April 2014 at DeTar Hall, UniversityMalaysia Sarawak. (POSTER PRESENTATION)

Jeffrey Ngau (2015). Politik Demokrasi Penaungan Dalam Politik kenyah Di Sarawak : Kajian Kes Di

Long San Semasa Pilihan Raya Negeri Sarawak 2011, Tesis Sarjana,

University Malaysia Sarawak.

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Hafizan, M. N., (2012). The Patron-Clients Relation in the Melanau community - Case Study in Kampung Bruit, Sarawak, MA Thesis, University Sains Malaysia.

Hashim Yaacob (2012). Memahami politik menjelang pilihan raya ke-13, Selangor : Pekan Ilmu Publications Sdn Bhd Lian (1987). Farmer Perceptions and economic change - The case of Kenyah Farmers of The Fourth Division, Sarawak, PHD Thesis, Australia National University. Lucy Sebli (2004). Patronclientship and factionalism in Iban politics in Sarawak. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Hull, England. Milne, R.S., (1973). ‗Patrons, Clients and ethnicity : The case of Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia‘, Asian Survey, Vol. XIII, No.10, October, pp. 891-907. Mohd Noor Yazid (2011). Percaturan Kuasa dan Politik Pilihan Raya, Kuala Lumpur :Utusan Publications & Distributors Sdn Bhd Nathaniel Tan & John Lee (edited), (2008). Political Tsunami : An End to Hegemony in Malaysia? Kuala Lumpur :Vinlin Sdn Bhd Naimah (1999). Administrators and the services : The Sarawak Administrative Service Under The Brooke Rajahs and British Colonial Rule, Kuala Lumpur : Oxford University Press.

Ritchie. J., (2006). Temenggong Oyong Lawai Jau : A Paramount Chief in Borneo, Kuching : Wisma Printing Sdn Bhd.

Roff, M., (1974). The politics of belonging: political change in Sabah and Sarawak,

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Kuala Lumpur : Oxford University Press. Rusnisuri Abdul Rashid dan Nor Faradiana Rosli (2014). Demokrasi dalam Hak bersuara. Dalam Abdul Rahman Abdul Aziz, Ahmad Zaharuddin Sani Ahmad Sabri dan Muhammed Nor Azman Nordin, ‗Demokrasi di Malaysia‘, Kuala Lumpur : Legasi Press Sdn Bhd. Sanib Said (2015). Politik Melayu Di Sarawak 1946-1966 : Bersatu Ke Mercu Kuasa, Kuching :InfoGrafik Sdn Bhd.

Zaini Othman & Nidzam. S., (2009). Barisan Nasional, hegemoni dan pembangunan politik Sarawak dalam Nidzam Sulaiman dan Zaini Othman (Eds). Pilihan Raya dan PEmbangunan Politik Sarawak, Kota Kinabalu : University Malaysia Sabah.

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Analysis of News Framing Strategy in a Local Newspaper During Sarawak State Election 2016

Awang Ideris Awang Daud, Siti Haslina Hussin, Khadijah Mohamad Tuah, Malia Taibi, Siti Zanariah Ahmad Ishak & Nor Khalista Amit Universiti Malaysia Sarawak Abstract Newspapers play an important role in political election campaigns. The 11th Sarawak State Election in 2016 witnesses Barisan Nasional winning 72 out of the 82 seats contested. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate how Utusan Sarawak, alocal Malay language newspapers targeting mostly Bumiputera readers, frame the news for all political parties and candidates involved in the election. Adopting the qualitative approach, data were gathered within the official periods of political election campaign starting from 26 April 2016 to 6 May 2016. Election news that appeared on the front page and in home section during the eleven days of campaigning were content-analyzed to determine the framing schemes used during the campaigning period, the most dominant frame used, and the slant of the news. Findings indicate the news can be categorized into four frames with strategic news frame being the dominant frame. The slant of the news favors the current ruling party which is Barisan Nasional. Also, different news framing strategies are used at different stages of the political campaign. Keywords: media, media framing, election, Sarawak State Election

Introduction

Media, especially newspapers is one of the powerful entities in almost every country. Newspapers educate people on societal knowledge through the national and international information reported. Khalid and Ahmed (2014) describe that ―newspapers help in the emergence of public opinion and in building up of images through news reporting, expressing views, informing the public and thereby facilitating public discussion on issues of importance‖ (Khalid & Ahmad 2014, p.6).

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In democratic country, in particular, newspapers and politics are inseparable in their existence. They both need each other, where by politicians need the media to convey their agenda, and the news media need the politicians to write their stories. The needs become more visible especially during election campaigns. During this period, political parties and candidates use newspapers to report their manifesto or agenda that will secure votes of the electorates. On the other hand, news personals will frame stories about political parties and candidates in various ways in order to draw interests of the readers. They use different frames in addressing the issues or stories to the general public.

A substantial number of studies done in the Western countries identify four different kinds of media frames. They are game frame, issue frame, personality-centered frame and episodic frame. The game frame, also known as strategic frame or horse race focuses on candidates‘ strategies, win-or-lose aspect of the campaign and the politician‘s selfish interests (Graber, 1993; Jamieson, 1992; Petterson, 1993). On the other hand, the issue frame emphasizes policy issues, problem and solutions in campaign coverage (Rhee, 1997). Nonetheless, the personality-centered frame tends to give special coverage that seems to prefer individual actors, including his or her personal characteristics (mannerism, speaking style, polling stance) or physical attractiveness (hair color and style, clothing choice) (Brade, 1996; Devitt, 2002; Herzog, 1998). Finally, the episodic frame covers event centered news stories that describe facts or individual actors (Porto, 2001).

Framing is one of the major tools which media personals use to address different issues to the general public. Entman (1993), pointed out that to frame means to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text (Entman, 1993 p. 52). Gamson and Modihliani (1987) define frames as words, images, phrase and presentation styles that a speaker uses when relaying information about an issues or event to an audience. On the other hand, Neuman et al. (1992, p. 60) define

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news frames as ―conceptual tools which media and individuals relay on to convey, interpret and evaluate information‖. Another definition is that framing is ―the process of calling attention to some aspects of reality while obscuring others, which might lead to different reactions‖ (Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007 p. 13). Whereas, Griffin (2003) describes framing as ―the selection of a restricted number of thematically related attributes for inclusion in the media agenda when a particular object is discussed.‖(Griffin 2003 p. 364).

Entman (1993) suggests that frames or framing manifested from a text is able to influence thinking. The concept of framing offers a way to describe the power of a communicating text and becomes a tool to influence the audience. ―One‘s frame in thought can have a marked impact on one‘s overall opinion‖ (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p. 106). By framing certain topics of an issue, news personals can give several interpretations of meaning to the same issue or message. Thus, influencing the public perception of some reality.

Framing is useful in understanding the role of the media in electoral processes. Framing analysis indicates how media determines what information should be conveyed and how that information is represented and portrayed before it is received by the audience (Fong & Ahmad Ishak, 2010). In Malaysia, Mat Yassin, Zainuddin and Jen (2103) used framing analysis to explain issues portrayed by political incumbents in social media during the 13th General Election. Their study examined what frames were used by the elections candidates or their administrators when posting in the Facebook. In another study, Md Sidin Ahmad Ishak and Yang Lai Fong (2013) also used framing analysis to explain how two Malaysian Chinese newspapers – Sin Chew Daily and Nanyang Siang Pau – reported the Galas and Batu Sapi by-elections. One of their findings show that episodic frame is the most dominant frame used by both newspapers. On the other hand, a study by Aini Maznina A. Manaf and Nerawi Sedu (2015) reveals that issue frame is a

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dominant frame, especially when they focus on the characterization and information of issues in the newspapers during the 13th General Election.

In this paper, we report the results of a framing analysis of election news by Utusan Sarawak during the 11thSarawak State election. The specific aspects analysed were: (1) the frequency of the frames used on election campaign news during the campaigning period; (2) the most dominant frame used on election campaign news during the campaigning period; and (3) the sources of election campaign news during the campaigning period.

Method of the Study This study adopts the qualitative approach that involves content analyses of 341 news stories reported in a local Malay newspaper in Sarawak, the Utusan Sarawak, during the 11-day official campaigning period of the 11th Sarawak State election in 2016. Prior to the data collection, a coding sheet was developed to enable objectivity of the research through the quantification of qualitative data collected that ease their analyses. In this study, the data are news stories which are generally narrative by nature. The usage of a standard coding sheet thus facilitates the researchers to do counts of the news stories guided by the predetermined criteria. As a result, patterns of the news stories can be identified as well as other peculiar characteristics and differences of the news stories such as the framing schemes used.

Before the actual data collection exercise, the raw coding sheet was initially tested using some news stories that appeared in Utusan Sarawak in which the researchers had randomly chosen news stories appearing on 1 April 2016 and 5 April 2016. This process is done to ensure reliability and feasibility of the mode of data collection process. Thus, at

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this testing stage, every single news stories was thoroughly content-analyzed and examined in order to identify how it can be accommodated into the coding sheet.

After having gone through the meticulous process and several revisions, the final version of the coding sheet to be used in the actual data collection process includes the following components: news title, page, candidates and constituencies, issue highlighted, news source, news on the chief minister, and news slant. As a result, the criteria of news stories to be considered in the study may contain any if not all of the following: 

Words such as ―pilihanraya (election)‖, ―kerajaan (government)‖, ―pembangkang (opposition), ―penyokong (supporters)‖ and ―pengaruh (influence)‖.



Name of candidates and constituencies contested.



Political party contesting.



Issue or issues highlighted.



Competitive elements such as critiques or debates between government and opposition political parties.



Words like ―undi (vote)‖, ―pengundi (voter)‖, ―mengundi (voting)‖

The news stories incorporated in the study are those reported on the front page and in the home news sections of the newspaper. Data collected were keyed into the statistical software, SPSS version 20 for analysis. Descriptive statistics such as frequency counts were generated alongside some charts to explore the patterns of these news stories. In addition, cross-tabulations of the data were also performed to acquire comparative perspectives of the phenomenon of interest. Findings and Discussion The present study has three main objectives. Firstly, the study aims to identify framing schemes used throughout the political campaigning period. The analyses of news stories show that the Utusan Sarawak uses four types of framing schemes to report news of the 259

11th Sarawak State election throughout the official campaigning period. The four framing schemes include (i) strategic framing scheme; (ii) issue framing scheme; (iii) personality framing scheme; and (iv) episodic framing scheme.

The findings summarized in Table 1show that the number of news stories on election for the period between 26 April 2016 until 6 May 2016 varies. A total number of 341 news stories were reported in Utusan Sarawak during the period of study. The most number of news stories on the election appeared at the beginning period of the campaign, 26 April 2016, with a total of 56 news stories. This result is somewhat expected because that date marked the early stage of the campaign and political parties acknowledged the importance of firstly to introduce their candidates fielded in the election. Therefore, the political parties together with their candidates did not want to miss this opportunity and platform to do so. However, the number of news stories then started to lessen starting on 27 April 2016 until 2 May 2016 with the number of new stories ranges only between 22 and 34. The least number of news stories was detected on 30 April 2016 with about 22 only that represent about 6.5 percent of the total news stories.

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Table 1: Number and Percentages of News Stories Reported during Official Campaigning Period

Date

Number of News Stories On Election

Percentage (%)

26 April 2016

56

16.4

27 April 2016

24

7.0

28 April 2016

26

7.6

29 April 2016

27

7.9

30 April 2016

22

6.5

1 May 2016

30

8.8

2 May 2016

33

9.7

3 May 2016

34

10.0

4 May 2016

27

7.9

5 May 2016

30

8.8

6 May 2016

32

9.4

Total

341

100%

The declining trend of the number of news stories on the election could likely be due to the fact that political parties focus more on candidates‘ manifesto as well as campaigning

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activities on the ground. This is evidenced by the usage of specific and comprehensive framing schemes for every election news and campaign reported in the newspaper. Meanwhile, the least number of news stories on election on 30 April 2016 might be attributable to the maximum usage of advertising space in the prime news and local news sections of the newspaper. On the other hand, the equal number of news stories appearing on 1 May and 5 May 2017 indicates the peak of campaigning period. In these two periods, it was found that the usage of all framing schemes by the newspaper was at the maximum. Also, issues in the news on these two dates were also similar for example, critiques toward opposition political parties, opposition parties contesting among themselves in a constituency, native customary right (NCR) land, support for the Chief Minister Adenan Satem, contesting candidates and the ruling party, Barisan Nasional. The second objective of the study is to analyze the dominant framing schemes used throughout the campaigning period. The results of the study suggest that the four framing schemes used to frame news stories on the election in Utusan Sarawak. The framing schemes include strategic framing scheme; issue framing scheme; personalitycentered framing scheme; and episodic framing scheme. Diagram 1 depicts the breakdowns of the news by framing schemes.

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3.2

STRATEGIC FRAMING (GAME & HORSERACE) ISSUE FRAMING

12.3

15.8 68.6

PERSONALITY FRAMING EPISODIC FRAMING

Figure 1: Election News Framing Schemes in Percentages for the Period between 26 April 2016 until 6 May 2016

The results show that about 68.8 percent or 234 of the news stories on the 11th Sarawak State election in Utusan Sarawak during the campaigning period adopted the strategic framing scheme. It is then followed by issue framing and episodic framing that were used in about 15.8 percent and 12.3 percent of the news stories respectively. Personality-centered framing scheme was the least popular strategy used in the news stories which registered only about 3.2 percent of the total news stories analyzed. In a nutshell, in terms of news framing schemes, it was dominated by strategic framing scheme followed by issue framing scheme, personality-centered framing scheme and episodic frame scheme.

Another aspect analyzed is with regard to news sources. Figure 2 shows that the ruling party dominates the news source category during the campaigning period that recorded about 77 percent of the total news stories. k in these news stories. Often, he was reported to show support of the leadership of the Chief Minister of Sarawak, Tan Sri

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Adenan Satem, the ruling political party and the approved federal budget for Sarawak‘s development. Besides the political figures mentioned earlier, Datuk Amar Abang Johari Tun Openg, Minister of Housing Sarawak, the political incumbent for Satok constituency, was also ―popular‖ in the news stories particularly on issues like NCR land, critiques of the opposition party, supports to other Barisan Nasional candidates and the development of the state of Sarawak.

RULING PARTY 11%2% 3% 7%

OPPOSITION PARTY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS/NGOs 77%

REPORTERS PUBLICS

Figure 2: News Sources In contrast, only seven percent of news stories reported during the election campaigning period were sourced from individuals in the opposition political party. Most of the issues referred to them were concerning matters such as contestation among themselves for a particular constituency and time limit for the opposition party‘s leadership from Peninsular Malaysia to campaign throughout the designated period. Although quite rare, there were also news stories coming from the opposition party that highlighted some positive elements of the ruling party. Lastly, as the Figure 2 depicts, the two least reported sources of news stories during the election campaigning period are the NGOs, government officials, and the public.

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Table 2: News Sources and News Slants Slants News Source

Ruling Party

Support

Support

Critiques of

Critiques of

Ruling

Opposition

the

the

Government

Party

Government

Opposition

Total

Neutral

212

0

0

47

3

262

2

9

7

3

2

23

5

0

0

2

3

10

Reporters

5

0

0

2

31

38

General public

3

0

1

4

0

8

227

9

8

58

39

341

Oppositon Party Public Officers / NGO

Total

Based on the results summarized in Table 2,the news stories on the 11th Sarawak State election during the official campaigning period was predominantly supporting the ruling political party totaling about 212 news stories out of 341 of them. Most of these 212 news stories were sourced either from the ruling political party leader or the candidates. Other news sources‘ contribution in terms of their support of the ruling government was relatively far less. Meanwhile, the source of news stories that focuses on the support of opposition party is obviously they themselves. In terms of critiques toward the government as well as towards the opposition party, it is as anticipated that both opposing parties will criticize one another. Lastly, reporters were deemed to stay neutral in their reporting of political election related news throughout the campaigning period.

In

265

summary, Utusan Sarawak carries more favorable news stories about the ruling party than that of the opposition parties. Lastly, the third objective of the study is to examine the strategies of usage of different frames during the campaigning period. Figure 4 shows the news slants and their framing schemes. It is obvious that the strategic framing scheme is the most frequently used in framing the news stories appearing Utusan Sarawak during the campaigning period of the 11th Sarawak State election in 2016. Further breakdowns of the usage of this strategic framing scheme specifically indicate that about 134 of the news stories are meant to support the existing ruling political party and at the same time they used similar strategy to criticize the opposition party (i.e. 50 news stories). On a different note, the strategic framing scheme was less used to support opposition political party or to criticize the ruling political party.

Support Critique Critique Support Ruling of the of the Oppositi Neutral Govern Govern Oppositi on Party ment ment on Episodic Framing 35 1 0 4 1 Personality Framing 9 0 0 0 2 Issue Framing 46 1 0 3 3 Strategic Framing 134 9 8 50 33

Figure 4: News Slant and News Framing Scheme The second most common news framing scheme used in the campaigning period is issue framing scheme. It is found that about 46 news stories used issue framing scheme in news reporting that favor the ruling political party. This is completely in contrast with

266

just a news using similar strategy that highlights the support to the opposition political party.

The third most popular news framing scheme used was the episodic framing scheme. The results in this study points out that a total of 35 news stories that appeared in Utusan Sarawak during the campaigning period adopted the episodic framing scheme in the news stories which shows the support to the ruling party. Similar strategy was also used in framing the news that show critiques toward the opposition political party (i.e. four news stories). In contrast, only one news story that uses episodic framing scheme to indicate support of the opposition political party. Lastly, the least used news framing scheme was the one that was based on personality. All nine news stories that espouse personality-centered framing scheme were showing the support toward the ruling political party.

Further analysis was also conducted to explore the news framing schemes used by date during the official campaigning period of the 11th Sarawak State election in 2016. Table 3sums up the results from the analysis. Out of the total 341 news stories, 234 of them used strategic framing scheme, 54 issue framing scheme, 42 episodic framing scheme and 11 personality-centered framing scheme. Specific breakdowns show that strategic framing scheme of the news stories was heavily used on the first day of campaigning period which was on 26 April 2016. This strategy seems to be less prominently used after that date. Although lesser in terms of counts, the results seem to suggest that issue framing scheme was quite relatively more of use at the early stage of the political campaign period from 26 April to 30 April 2016. On the contrary, episodic framing scheme usage was more visible at the later phase of the campaigning period (i.e. from 2 May 2016 until 6

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May 2016). Meanwhile, usage of personality-centered framing scheme in news stories does not seem to indicate any peculiar patterns. Table 6: News Framing Schemes By Date During Official Campaigning Period

Framing Date

Total

Strategic

Issue

Personality

Episodic

Framing

Framing

Framing

Framing

26 April

48

7

1

0

56

27 April

15

7

2

0

24

28 April

17

7

0

2

26

29 April

17

7

1

2

27

30 April

15

6

0

1

22

1 May

22

4

1

3

30

2 May

21

3

3

6

33

3 May

23

4

1

6

34

4 May

17

2

0

8

27

5 May

17

5

2

6

30

6 May

22

2

0

8

32

Total

234

54

11

42

341

Conclusion The framing method used in this study revealed the Utusan Sarawak‟s strategy that supports the government party in winning the state election campaign. Since Sarawak is a vast state, newspaper is still a significant source of news particularly for the rural area

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population. Election news had dominated the Utusan Sarawak content during 11 days of election campaign of the Sarawak State Election 2016. Newspaper not only carries the information role, most importantly it must be at the forefront in disseminating the information. It is essential for a newspaper to fulfill the readers‘ thirst to be the first to know a breaking news. Therefore, the number of election news published showed a ―V‖ shape graph. On the first day of election campaign, Utusan Sarawak published the highest number of election news and gradually the number was decreasing until in the middle of the campaigning week. After that, the number of election news published was slightly increased but never reach to the highest number as shown in the first day campaigning.

Utusan Sarawak which is one of the print newspapers has its own strategy in reporting the election news. Based on the framing analysis, four framing schemes were used namely strategic frame, issue frame, personality-centered frame and episodic frame. However, the most dominant frame was strategic frame. The frame was used in the news to highlight the fight by the government party to defeat the opposition party. The fight by the government party was described via the used of specific words such as ―landslide win‖, ―capture the strong hold‖ and ―challenge‖. These words have the connotation of war, fight and the element of win and lose. In addition, the news that used strategic frame showed a pattern of gradual decreasing but the number was fluctuated toward the end of campaigning day. Furthermore, the news published by Utusan Sarawak showed the characteristics of bias towards the government in terms of angle of reporting and news sources. Most of the news under the strategic frame supported the ruling party with the government officials as their news sources. These findings have sparked a question whether the ―old‖ reporting strategy by the newspaper company that support the ruling party will still relevant to be used at the backdrop of the democratic uprising practice in Malaysia.

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References Ahmad Ishak M.S & Fong Y. L. (2013) Covering Galas and Batu Sapi by-elections: Framing by Chinese newspapers. International Journal of Asia Pacific Studies, 9 (2), 16-47. Aini Maznina A. Manaf & Nerawi Sedu .(2015). Framing Islam-related issues during GE13: An analysis of Malaysian Mainstream newspapers. Intellectual Discourse, 23 (1), 29-52 Chong. D., & Druckman, J. M. (2007). Framing public opinion in competitive democracies. American Political Science Review, 101(4), 637-655. Devitt, J. (2002). Framing gender on the campaign trail: Female gubernatorial candidates and the press. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 79(2), 445–463. Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Towards clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of Communication, 43(4), 51-58. Fong, Y. L., & Ahmad Ishak, M. S. (2010). Covering religious conflict in Malaysia: How Sin Chew Daily framed the Lina Joy controversy. Malaysian Journal of Media Studies, 12(2), 11–22.

Gamson, W. A., & Modigliani, A. (1987). The Changing Culture of Affirmative Action. Research in Political Sociology, edited by Braungart, R. G. & Braungart, M. M. Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press. In Abate, A. (2013). The framing of the Ethiopian National Election by privately woned print media outlets in Ethiopia. A Thesis Submitted to Mid Sweden University Department of Media and Communication Studies. Herzog, H. (1998). More than a Looking Glass Women in Israeli Local Politics and the Media. The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 3(1), 26–47.

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Iyengar, S. (2005). Speaking of values: The framing of American Politics. The Forum, 3(3), 1-8. Mat Yassin, Y., Zanuddin, Z., & Jen, T. (2013). Winning the election seats of GE13. Preliminary statements of issues frame using Facebook. In Ismail, A. A., & Mohd Shariff, S. Z, Media and the 13th General Election (pp. 143-166). Putrajaya: SSIG. Neumann, W. R., Just, M. R., & Crigler, A. N. (1992). Common knowledge. News and the Construction of Political Meaning. Chicago. Porto, M. P. (2001). Framing the 2000 US presidential election: The coverage by the Brazilian media. In Annual Conference of the International Communication Association (ICA), May (pp. 24-28). Rhee, J. W. (1997). Strategy and issue frames in election campaign coverage: A social cognitive. Journal of Communication, 47(3), 26-48.

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Women in the Electoral Politics: a Case Study of 2016 Sarawak State Legislative Assembly Election Nadrawina Haji Isnin & Lucy Sebli Sieldson Universiti Teknologi MARA Sarawak & Universiti Malaysia Sarawak [email protected], [email protected] Abstract This paper examines the women‘s political participation as election candidates in Sarawak. The study will centre on the 2016 Sarawak State Election. The investigation aims to contribute to the existing resource on women's political participation in Sarawak and Malaysia in general. The generated data may support the clamour for more participation of women as election candidates in Malaysian politics, particularly in Sarawak. The objectives are to produce a comprehensive gender ranking of political parties‘ candidates list for 2016 election and to highlight issues pertaining to women's participation in this electoral politics. Of the 226 candidates (2 male candidates had won uncontested) contesting the election, 22 are women. In the previous 2011 election, there were just 15 female candidates. It is encouraging to see so many more women contesting in the state election this year. However, only seven female candidates out of 15, won their seats in the state election in 2011. Whilst for the 2016 election, only six out of 22 female candidates won their seats. Nevertheless, the votes garnered were lesser compared to 2011‘s state election. Further, one of the interesting features in this election is the ability of the triumph and the defeats to gain more votes from the male candidates which also indicated their popularity even though they were fielded for the first time (that is, female candidates from DAP (won) and PAS (lost)). Thus, a candidate‘s gender does not seem to be a major factor for voters in deciding when they decide whom to vote for in either in the 2011 and 2016 State elections. Nonetheless, their triumph in gaining more votes does not automatically translate into more female candidates for most political parties. On that note, women in Sarawak political arena are still facing a lot of setbacks due to various social realities in our society among them political parties‘ undemocratic selection of candidates, gender inequality etc. Meaning, the statistics discussed above suggest that women‘s representation even as election candidates is disproportionate to its size in the state‘s population. Furthermore, half the Sarawakian voters are represented by less than 10 percent female representatives. More so, the breakdown shows that male represents ranges from 60.0 percent to even 100.0 percent in some political parties (SUPP, SNAP and PRS did not field any women candidate). These statistics further strengthened the question of how serious are the political parties in pursuing women‘s wish to their political participation in the government. Therefore, this study will aim or attempt to establish that it is evident that men still dominate the electoral candidatures in Sarawak.

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Keywords: Gender, women’s political participation, Sarawak state elections Introduction Nomination for the 11th Sarawak State Election starts in earnest 25 April 2016 at 9 am with contests expected for all 82 state seats. Billed as the biggest state election in the history of Sarawak, candidates filed their nomination forms at 82 nomination centers located at government offices, multi-purpose halls, schools, colleges, libraries, government rest houses and indoor stadiums from 9 am to 10 am. The election this year witnessed voting for candidates for the 11 new constituencies that were created following a delineation exercise. The new seats to be contested are Batu Kitang, Stakan, Serembu, Bukit Semuja, Gedong, Kabong, Tellian, Bukit Goram, Murum, Samalaju and Mulu. The Election Commission (EC) had declared April 25, 2016 as nomination day and May 7, 2016 as the date for polling after the state assembly was dissolved on April 11, 2016 by Sarawak Chief Minister Tan Sri Adenan Satem. According to the EC, there are 1.14 million registered voters who are eligible to vote, comprising 1.1 million normal voters and 25,022 early voters and 106 postal voters (overseas). Early voting is fixed for May 3, 2016 while the actual voting process takes place on May 7, 2016 (Saibi Gi dan Jessica Jawing, 14 April 2016). A record number of 22 female candidates out of 228 candidates contested in the 11th Sarawak state election, which is the biggest representation of women candidates in the Sarawak election this time around. In 2011, there were only 15 female candidates. That is, an increase of seven female candidates contesting in this election. However the presence for few women as a first time candidates and few as incumbents, had indeed sparked a momentous reminiscence. This was evident as six women candidates out of 22, won their seats in the state legislative assembly. On the other hand, the increase number of female candidates over the last three state elections is evident that Sarawak is never short of female candidates. Specifically, there were eight women candidates in the 2006

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state election. Then, in 2011‘s state election there were 15 female candidates. Eventually, there were 22 female candidates in the 11th Sarawak state election. This is very significant, as the increase in the number of female candidates that won their election have garnered more votes in 2011 as compared votes obtained in 2006. An example is a considerable increase in the majority votes from 4,372 in 2006 to 7,595 votes in 2011 of a female candidate. Nevertheless, in 2016, there was substantial increase in the majority votes for three female incumbents and a sizeable decrease for two female incumbents. Therefore, this paper aims to contribute to the existing resource on women's political participation in Sarawak and Malaysia in general. The generated data may support the clamour for more participation of women as election candidates in Malaysian politics, particularly in Sarawak. By so doing, the objectives of this paper are to produce a comprehensive gender ranking of political parties‘ candidates list for 2016 (and a continuation of 2011) elections and to highlight issues pertaining to women's participation in this electoral politics. Profile of the 2011 Sarawak Women Candidates – an overview The most interesting feature of this election is the new faces of the political parties‘ lined up of women potential election candidates from both the Barisan Nasional (BN) and Pakatan Harapan (PH). For example, PBB maintained the three women incumbents for Semariang, Dalat and Lingga that is Sharifah Hasidah, Fatimah Abdullah and Simoi Peri; whilst SPDP retained the woman incumbent of Bekenu (in Bintulu). Rosey Yunus, a new BN direct candidates was formerly from SPDP and had joined the Parti Tenaga Rakyat Sarawak (TERAS). One new face as BN direct candidate is also a woman, Janet Lau contesting in N54 Pelawan. Regrettably, not all ten political parties including independent candidates fielded women candidates – an indication that many political parties in the country still display a high

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degree of gender bias. Even so, the breakdown is as follows: The Sarawak National Front (Barisan Nasional Sarawak/BN) comprises the four main political parties of Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB) fielded three female candidates and Sarawak‘s People Democratic Party (SPDP) had not fielded any female candidate. In the 2011‘s state election, SPDP fielded one female candidate. However, due to internal squabbles, the incumbent of SPDP had joined a new party of TERAS. She is considered as a direct candidate under the wing of BN together with another new face of direct candidate for SUPP. Whilst PBB and the new TERAS (TERAS‘s direct female candidate was previously form SPDP‘s female candidate) maintained the status quo for the female candidates and the other two components of BN decided that the party is better off without any female candidates. Parti Rakyat Sarawak (PRS) and Sarawak United People‘s Party (SUPP) failed to nominate female candidates. Even before PRS was established, the Dayak-based political party of Sarawak National Action Party (SNAP, which was formed in 1961) had solitary once fielded a woman candidate (Mrs Kong Yu Siung) back in 1969. In fact, PRS had never fielded any women in any of the election since their first inception in 2004. And after 12 years, PRS is still unsuccessful to nominate a female candidate. On the other hand, SUPP has line-up 13 candidates and 8 are new candidates and relatively young but there were no women fielded for this election. A similar note is also with PRS with 11 seats allocated but no female candidates. The record of non-female candidates for SUPP started way back in 2006 when the 2001 incumbent, Lily Yong and the new face Wong Zee Yeng representing SUPP had lost both their seats to the opposition party of Democratic Action Party (DAP). And 14 years later, male candidates are preferred over female candidates even though the re-branding of SUPP has captured the voters heart, still, female candidates remains marginalized.

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The oppositions on the other hand, presented 17 female candidates. Of this, there were three female incumbents from DAP and 14 new faces of female candidates. The breakdown of the 14 new faces are : two newcomer female candidates from Amanah; three newcomer female candidates in DAP; six newcomers for PKR; one newcomer woman for PAS and two newcomer women for STAR and none female candidates under the Independent‘s ticket. In fact, the opposition parties or Pakatan Harapan (PH) was a triumph because of their confidence in fielding more female candidates as compared to the ruling party of BN (only five female candidates). Pakatan Harapan (PH) comprises the Democratic Action‘s Party (DAP), People‘s Justice Party (PKR) and the newly established Parti Amanah Malaysia (Amanah). Pan-Islamic Malaysia Party (PAS) was no more part of the former Pakatan Rakyat (PR). Though not all 17 female candidates were victorious, but there assurance nominating these women is a significant decision towards the 30% representation of women in the political system in Malaysia. Meanwhile, PAS had never nominated any women candidates to contest in Sarawak election before 2011. However, in the 2011‘s Sarawak state election, two female candidates were nominated for the very first time, against two male incumbents. And in 2016, PAS decided to nominate only one female candidate out of 11 candidates. STAR, another new political party of Sarawak, fielded two female candidates. One of STAR‘s female candidates (Lina Soo) was actually an Independent candidate in 2006 state election and she was also a former PKR‘s Women Chief in 2011 but in 2016 decided to represent STAR.

There were no female candidates for

Independents in 2016. On the background of the candidates (male and female), most parties had a mix of professionals, lawyers, businessmen, from multinational companies, pensioners, entrepreneurs, former civil servants, civil servants and full-time politicians from outside the political system as well as those from within the party structure. They are aged

276

between 25 – 73 (Free Malaysia Today online, 25 April 2016). A similar feature in this state election is the law background for most of DAP‘s line up. There is also a mixture of new faces and seniors in the Sarawak state elections. This includes the five of Team Adenan that is Sharifah Hasidah Sayeed Aman Ghazali (Semariang), Simoi Peri (Lingga), Fatimah Abdullah (Dalat), Rosey Yunus (Bekenu) and newcomer Janet Lau (Pelawan). Janet Lau is the wife of the late Robert Lau Hoi Chew, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Transport who passed away in 2010. It is also interesting to observe that the constituency of Semariang witnessed the rival between two female candidates from BN-PBB and Amanah. Sharifah Hasidah (PBB) was up against Nani Sahari from Amanah. Another contending is a male candidate, Yusof Assidiqqi Ahmad Sharkawi from PAS. Whilst the DAP‘s incumbents are Violet Yong Wu Wui for the Pending constituency, Christina Chiew Wang See for Batu Kawah and Ting Tze Fui for Meradong. The other three female newcomer candidates are Irene Mary Chang Oi Leng (Bukit Assek), Yong Siew Wei (Repok) and Rinda Juliza anak Alexander for Pakan‘s constituency. PKR, I considered as a big winner in nominating six female candidates for the first time in the 11th Sarawak state election. Voon Shiak Ni is competing in a 5-cornered fight against BN in a new Chinese majority constituency area that is Batu Kitang together with DAP (Aziz Isa) and two Independent candidates. Athina Klaywa Sim (who practices Law in Ipoh, Perak) is also contesting in a new constituency area of Serembu. Athina is competing against STAR, Buln Patrik Rios, Miro Simuh (BN) and Nyomek Nyeap, an Independent candidate. PAS on the other hand is fielding the only female candidate Hamidah Mokhtar at Beting Maro, the ever popular constituency seat for PAS for the past three Sarawak state elections. She is contending against Andri Zulkarnean Hamden (Amanah) and Razali

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Gapor (BN-PBB). STAR, another local opposition party nominated two newcomer female that in Simanggang (Lina Soo) and Marudi (Pricilla Lau).

So, what about the female candidates? A day after nomination saw 22 seats allocated for women based on the respective parties as illustrated in Table 1. Three seats for PBB, one for Teras, one seat for direct BN female candidate and no women seats in PRS, SPDP and SUPP. The opposition parties fielded 17 female candidates, that is six women from DAP, six from PKR, two from Amanah, two from STAR and one woman from PAS. All the three female candidates and one female candidate in PBB and Teras are incumbents for 2006 and 2011 respectively and this is their third time nominated for the 11th state election except for Fatimah Abdullah. This is Fatimah Abdullah‘s fourth nomination for the state election. As for DAP, there were three women incumbents candidates, that is Violet Yong, Christina Chiew and Ting Tze Fui and three new faces of Yong Siew Wei, Rinda Juliza Andrew and Irene Chang, all with an average age of 39 or younger.

Based on Table 1, it is imperative to note that the overall percentage for female candidates is very much far and wide from their male counterparts. That is in 2011, the percentage of female candidates over male candidates is 7.04 percent as compared to 93 percent.

There is however a slight increase of the overall percentages for female

candidates in 2016 state election. Which is, 9.6 percent for female candidates and 90.3 that of male candidates. In fact, the political parties of DAP, PKR and Amanah had contributed to the increase of female election candidates. When this is breakdown further based on the political parties, the State BN has mere 6.1 percent of female candidates whereas the opposition parties are much higher, that is 16.7 percent.

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Table 1: Percentages of male and female candidates by political party, (2011) and 2016

Political parties

Total no.

Male

% Male

Female

% Female

(91.4)

(3) 3

(8.6) 7.5

(0) 0

(0) 0.0

(0) 0

(0) 0.0

(1) 0

(12.5) 0.0

Of candidates

State National Front / Barisan Nasional (BN) PBB

(35) 40

(32) 37

92.5 SUPP

(19) 13

(19) 13

(100.0) 100.0

PRS

(9) 11

(9) 11

(100.0) 100.0

SPDP

(8) 5

(7) 5

(87.5) 100.0

Direct candidates (Teras

13

11

84.6

2

15.4

(71)

(67)

(94.4)

(4)

(5.6)

82

77

94.0

5

6.1

(15) 31

(11) 25

(73.3)

(4) 6

(26.7) 19.4

(3) 6

(6.12) 15.0

2

15.4

& UPP) Total

Pakatan Harapan (PH) DAP

81.0 PKR

(49) 40

(46) 34

(94.0) 85.0

Parti

Amanah

Negara

13

11

85.0

279

(Amanah) Total

84

70

83.3

14

16.7

(3) 10

(60.0)

(2) 1

(40.0) 9.1

Other Opposition Parties and Candidates PAS

(5) 11

91.0 State

Reform

party

11

9

81.2

2

18.2

Dayak

5

5

100.0

0

0.0

(41) 35

(40) 35

(97.6)

(1)

(2.43)

100.0

0

0.0

(92.1)

(11) 3

(8.0) 4.8

(15) 22

(7.04) 9.6

(STAR) Parti

Bansa

Sarawak Baru (PBDSB) Independent

Total

(139) 62

(128) 19

31.0 TOTAL

(213) 228

(198) 206

(93.0) 90.3

Note: The figures in brackets () are based on 2011 Sarawak‘s state election. The figures of the total number of candidates are obtained from the local and national newspapers* whilst the percentages are calculated based on these figures (* Bernama, 2011; New Straits Times, 2011; Sunday Times 2016; The Borneo Post, 2011; 2016; Utusan Sarawak, 2011; 2016; Utusan Borneo, 2011; Berita Harian, 2011; 2016).

However, adding up the percentages for both the ruling and the opposition parties, the women candidates comprising scarcely 7.04 percent in 2011 and 9.6 in 2016. On that note, women in Sarawak political arena are still facing a lot of setbacks due to gender inequality. This was evident as some political parties in Sarawak today are relatively

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gender-exclusive (of women‘s political participation in their political parties), but the reality in terms of expected impressive women participation during elections seems not to be concomitant.

Meaning, the statistics discussed above suggest that women‘s

representation even as election candidates is disproportionate to its size in the state‘s population. Furthermore, 51 percent of the Sarawakian women voters are represented by less than 10 percent female representatives. Therefore, even if all the women candidates win, regardless of their political divide, it will only make up 10 percent or less of women state assembly representatives. The real question could be as simple and practical as requesting the number or quota of the party-women contesting for elections or political posts under various parties. Based on the statistics in Table 1, it is evident that men still dominate the number of candidates and even the percentages. The breakdown shows that male represents ranges from 81.0 to even 100.0 percent in all political parties. The highest percentages of 100 percent of male dominating the candidates are from PBDSB, PRS, SPDP, SUPP, and Independent. In other words, none of these parties fielded any female candidate. On the other hand, two political parties of BN-PBB and PAS each having second and third highest percentage of male candidates of 92.5 percent and 91.0 percent respectively proved that male candidates are preferred over female candidates. Table 1 also suggests, it is evident that whilst increasing the number of male candidates in their political parties to contest in this election, the female candidates are marginalised. Despite the impressive qualifications, especially those from the BN-PBB, the said political party, did not offer that many fresh faces to voters. For example is PBB, increasing the total seats from 35 in 2011 to 40 in 2016 also means an increase of 5 male candidates whilst the female candidates remained at its status quo of three female incumbents and two direct BN female candidates. This is shown in Table 1 that, there is a declined percentage of female candidates (from PBB) that is from 8.6 in 2011 to a merely 7.5 percent in 2016. The table also showed that PAS has an increase of 6 male candidates with a total of 11 male

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candidates in 2016 as compared to only 5 male candidates in 2011. Previously in 2011, two female candidates contested in the state election. However, in 2016, only one female candidate was left to contest. It showed a significant reduced percentage from 40 percent to merely 9.1 percent. I considered DAP and PKR as championed of female candidates as there are six female candidates for this election. Even though DAP fielded six female candidates, but in terms of percentage, the female candidates has a decreased of percentages from 26.7 percent in 2011 to 19.4 percent in 2016 (please refer to Table 1). Out of this, there were three incumbents and three new faces. Out of the three incumbents, only one retained the seat, that is Violet Yong Wui Wui whilst Christina Chiew and Ting Tze Fui failed to retain their seats. However, a DAP‘s new comer Irene Mary Chang Oi Ling won her first seat at Bukit Assek. In fact, the initial occasion DAP fielded a woman candidate was back in 1991 (Helen Long Sten). Then, 15 years later (in 2006) two newcomers (Violet Yong and Tze Fui) were recruited and won the election. PKR is the actual champion so to speak because the party nominated six female candidates. As evident in Table 1, a significant increase from 6.12 percent in 2011 to 15.0 percent in 2016 is apparent that PKR‘s amendments of its constitution in 2009 are serious in promoting the 30 percent increase of women in politics. As commented by Zuraida Kamarudin, Member of Parliament of Ampang, ―The ratio of the ruling party‘s MPs to the Opposition is 3:2. Which is, in Opposition ruled states, added Zuraida who is also Wanita PKR chief, Penang has two women MPs, one woman senator, five women state representatives out of 30 (16.66 per cent), and eight women councilors out of 48 (16.6 percent); Selangor has two women MPs, 15 state representatives out of 43 (34.88 percent), and 25 percent women councilors; Kelantan has one woman MP and three women state representatives‖ (Ho Kit Yen, 1 April 2016). Based on Zuraida‘s comments, these figures clearly show that the Opposition has a better sense of gender equality than Barisan Nasional. Hence, although by nominating six female candidates in this 11th State

282

election, it gave some space for women to participate in politics. Conversely, even though PKR amended its constitution in 2009, which included a 30 percent quota for women representation at all levels, the party has yet to achieve this. It is because none of the six female candidates won the seat in this election.

Meanwhile, Parti Amanah Negara (Amanah) is a newly established political party in August 2015, had two female candidates out of 13 candidates which is 15.4 percent in this state election. It is a bold move as Amanah is a group of progressive Islamists who were previously leaders of the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS). In the meantime, PAS created their own history when for the first time in Sarawak in 2011, the political party fielded two women out of five candidates. Conversely, their first time in fielding two women candidates is considered an achievement. However in 2016, only one female candidate was nominated as compared to ten male candidates. Beting Maro has always been a favoured constituency seat for PAS since 2001. And traditionally, it has always been a male candidate for this seat. However, in 2016, PAS decided to nominate a female candidate. Therefore it is interesting to study if the female candidate would be able to garner more votes or probably won the election. This statistics further strengthened the question of how serious are the political parties in pursuing women‘s wish to be election candidates. The Malaysian government who persistently voiced out their concerned about the 30 percent commitment for women to be in the decision making positions is really near to impossible. Evidently, Barisan Nasional has introduced two additional women candidates plus three incumbents. What is more, two of its main component parties of PRS, SPDP and SUPP had no women fielded this time around. This was despite the ―preaching‖ or ―hoping‖ for more women to be given the opportunity to become candidates in the 11th Sarawak state election as mentioned by

283

Wanita BN, Datuk Seri Shahrizat Abdul Jalil (The Brunei Times online, 3 March 2016; Bernama online, 31 March 2016). Whereas Minister of Women, Family and Community Development, Datuk Seri Hajjah Rohani Abdul Karim also echoed the same matter that is the PBB Women‘s Wing still had high hopes for the top leadership of the party of add another female candidate in the 11th Sarawak state election (The Star online, 16 April 2016; New Sarawak Tribune online, 17 April 2016; The Borneo Post online, 17 April 2016). On the other hand, there is no woman fielded as Independent candidate, as compared to 36 male candidates as Independent candidates, in this 2016‘s election. Previously in 2011, there was only one female candidate and 40 male candidates. Nominating the only woman candidate in the 2011 election was similar to the 1979 state election when the only Independent woman candidate was Imilda bt John Arun who garnered 557 votes (Election Commission, 1979).

In fact, the highest Independent women recruited as

election candidates were in 2001. That is a total of six Independent women candidates55. All the six women candidates came into electoral political for the first time. However, they did not make a comeback for the elections of 2004 and 2008 (parliamentary elections) and 2011 (recent State election). In contrast, there were 36 men nominating themselves as Independent candidates. However, by comparing all the political parties, it is evident that the opposition parties of Pakatan Harapan had made greater efforts to bring new female candidates. In particular, DAP and PKR are fielding six women each. DAP has increased from four women candidates to six, with three being incumbents and three more new entries, whereas PKR nominated all new six female candidates. At the same instant, DAP retained the incumbents who are still popular among the voters. 55

They were: Norita Azmi, Hajjah Dayang Saadiah Haji Mat, Florence Walter Samuel, Sharipah Hajijah Syed Jamil, Alice Alison Eng Choo and Alice Chua Bee Hun. Three women candidates representing the State National Front were: Sharifah Mordiah Tuanku Fauzi and Fatimah Abdullah (PBB) and Lily Yong Lee Lee (SUPP) (Election Commission Report, 2001).

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It is also worth mentioning that both PBB and SUPP are long-standing parties in Sarawak politics. Nonetheless, their long-standing track record did not seem to suggest their keen interest to field more women candidates. As mentioned above, PBB retained its women incumbents with two new female candidates. For now, the last instant SUPP fielded the party‘s female candidates were in 2006. Based on the sources that had been gathered, PBB, PRS and SUPP felt not confident enough to nominate new female candidates. On that note, this could be due to the fact that SUPP‘s as the second dominant party in the Sarawak Barisan Nasional, contested in 19 seats and lost eight seats - Pending, Batu Lintang, Padungan Kota Sentosa, Bukit Assek, Meradong, Kidurong and Engkilili - to the opposition in the 2006 state election. That is, a loss of the woman incumbent, Lily Yong who was re-nominated representing the party (in 2006). During the 2006 state election, Yong lost to Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) candidate Dominique Ng, who took the 1,417 vote majority. Further, through the party‘s new women candidate (Wong Zee Yeng, representing Meradong) was also introduced in 2006 but failed to secure a win for the party. No female candidates were nominated in SUPP‘s line up of election candidates after 2006. Even ten years later (2016), SUPP still favour the male candidates over the female candidates. In addition, is the issue of even after 53 years, there is still no Dayak women elected representatives in Sarawak. PRS, a Dayak dominant political party has been actively promoting male candidates over female candidates. Based on the sources that had been gathered, there was a female candidate suggested to Datuk James Masing, Chairman of PRS for this election.

Nevertheless, a male candidate was chosen over a female

candidate. It is also interesting to note that the Dayaks of Sarawak are traditionally strong supporters of BN but they have yet to break out of tradition by supporting their womenfolk to be elected people‘s representatives whether at state or federal level (Terry Tan, 6 April 2016, The Ant Daily online). An interesting statement made by PRS Women‘s Wing was that, the Wing lauded the suggestion that the party may consider

285

proposing a female candidate in the next parliamentary election. The reason is the Women‘s Wing noted that there are not short of capable and educated women members. In fact, the statement by the Women‘s Wing also commented that PRS. It stated that PRS‘s has equal number of women members in the party and women voters in their constituencies. They also revealed that the women members track record showed that women had been ‗King Makers‘ in PRS constituencies as they have recorded high number of voters turn out (Borneo Post online, 14 December 2016). The above discussion is analysed on the basis of party affiliations.

In terms of

percentage, the table simply reveals which political party is the most gendered representative. Accordingly, it was revealed by an executive from a political party that there are an instance of the ‗male dominated mode‘ in the electoral decision-making process has a discriminating effect. He was specifically referring to PRS. He observed that the value of political sphere exists in the constituency areas are still based on personal power, money, competence, winning or losing. The values he mentioned is familiar but also discriminating because he refers, ―politics continue to be influenced by men.

The triumphs (the achievers) Table 2: Female Seats Won Based on Political Party Political parties

Seats

Seats

Percentag

Female

allocatio

won

e of seats

seats

seats

of Female

won

allocation

won

seats won

3 out of

3

7.5

n

Female Percentage

BARISAN NASIONAL PBB

40

40

100.0

286

40 SUPP

13

7

54.0

0

0.0

SPDP

5

3

60.0

No female

0

0.0

PRS

11

11

100.0

candidates

0

0.0

Direct Candidates

13

11

85.0

2 out of

1

7.69

4

4.87

2

6.45

0

0

0

0

2

2.38

0

0.00

0

0.00

None

None

(Teras & UPP) Total seats won

13 82

72

88.0

5 out of 82

OPPOSITION DAP

31

7

23.0

6 out of 31

PKR

40

3

7.0

6 out of 40

Parti

Amanah

13

0

0.0

Negara (Amanah) Total

2 out of 13

84

10

12.0

14 out of 84

Other Opposition Parties and Candidates PAS

11

None

0.0

1 out of 11

State

Reform

11

None

0.0

party (STAR) Parti Dayak

Bansa Sarawak

Baru (PBDSB)

2 out of 11

5

None

0.0 No female

287

Independent

36

None

0.0

candidates

Total

82

None

0.0

None

None

None

Total seats won

82

10

12.0

None

None

None

Reference: Utusan Borneo (8 May 2016)

Table 2 above clearly stated that even though the opposition parties offered more seats for female candidates of DAP and PKR but in terms of winning this election, PBB is far more victorious. Four of five female candidates in PBB won the election whereas the sole opposition party was DAP. DAP manage to grab two out of six female seats whilst PKR and Amanah lose all the contested female seats regardless of a sudden increase of female election candidates for PKR in this election. The 10th or even the 11th Sarawak state election clearly indicated that gender is not an issue when voting is concern. This is evident from the number of votes or even majority votes received by all the women candidates. The female candidates have no problem in gaining more votes as indicated in Table 3 below. Based on the 15 years of election in Sarawak, from 2001 – 2016, I had listed the table below for easy reference. The sources are from various newspapers based on local or federal newspapers. Table 3 shows the number of votes and majority votes garnered by the female candidates in Sarawak state elections form 2001 to 2016. A very interesting battle throughout the span of four Sarawak state elections among the female candidates was in fact a fight between three political parties of PBB, SUPP and DAP. The female candidates successfully received huge number of votes and majority votes for those who won. On the other hand, those who lose the election were able to garner good amount of votes.

288

Table 3: Female Candidates Votes Garnered in the Sarawak State Elections 2001-2016 2001

2006

2011

2016

Votes (V) Candidates

Votes (V) /

Votes (V) /

/

Votes (V) /

Parties /

Majority votes

Majority

Majority

Majority

constituencies

(MV)

votes (MV)

votes

votes (MV)

(MV) Won by SUPP‘s male Ranum ak Nani

PAS / N3

Mina

with

Shahari

Tanjong Datu

5,605

votes

(majority

=

5,053)

Sharifah

PBB / N7

Hasidah

Semariang

Won

by

SUPP‘s male Ranum

Tanjong

Mina

with

Dato but

3,585

votes

gained

=

1,002

(majority

5365 (V) 2,488 (MV)

Won by SUPP‘s Violet Yong

DAP / N10

Wui Wui

Pending

male Sim Kheng Hui with 11,918 votes (majority = 7,981)

for

ak

2,183)

-

Lost seat

votes

8,008 (V) 5,431 (MV)

Representing Amanah

in

Semariang. Nani

Shaari

lost

the

election

and

gained

389

votes. Won the election by 9,795 (V) 7,760 (MV)

14,375

Won the

11,632 (V)

(V)

election by

4,372 (MV)

7,595

12,454 (V)

(MV)

5,012 (MV)

289

Won

Soo Lina

by

Won by SUPP‘s DAP‘s

male

Independent /

male Chan Seng Voon

Lee

N11 Batu

Khai with 11,625 Shan

with but gained

Lintang

votes (majority = 8,806 7,388)

votes

(majority

Lost seat

290 votes

Representing STAR - 331 (V)

=

3,407) Won

Christina Chiew Wang See

SUPP‘s

male

DAP / N13

Alfred Yap Chin

Batu Kawah

Loi

won

uncontested

4,329 (V) –

by

SUPP‘s male Tan Joo Phoi with

6,755

votes (majority

This seat was 7,439 (V) 543 (MV)

=

PAS / N15

male

Noraini

Muara Tuang /

Satem

with

Hamzah

N16 Muara

11,017

votes

Tuang (2016)

(majority 9,708)

Adenan

=

by

PBB‘s

male

Mohd

Ali

Mahmud with votes

(majority

Lingga / N28 Lingga (2016)

-

=

Lost seat but gained 3,196 votes

6,327)

PBB / N23 Simoi Peri

with 13,225

(MV)

Won

7,863

Kui HJian

(V) and 8,381

4,180) Won by PBB‘s

won by Sim

3245 (V) 1,870 (MV)

Not contesting

3,652 (V) 2,506 (MV)

Won the election by 4,169 (V) 2,943 (MV)

290

2001 Parties / Candidates

constituencies

2006

2011

2016

Votes (V) Votes (V) /

Votes (V) /

/

Majority votes

Majority

Majority

Votes (V) /

(MV)

votes (MV)

votes

Majority

(MV)

votes (MV)

Won by Snowdan lawan

PKR / N25 Ibi uding

Balai Ringin / N30 Balai

-

Ringin (2016)

1,559

with 4,145

(representing

votes

SNAP)

(2,885

Not contesting

majority votes) 1,260 (V) Seat won by SUPP with 1,516

DAP / N40 Ting Tze Fui

Meradong / N46 Meradong

-

5990 (V) 3,578 (MV)

(2016)

6,884 (V)

majority

2,679

votes . Ting

(MV)

Tze Fui lost the seat but gained 5,349 votes

Alice Lau

DAP / N47

Won by SUPP‘s Won

by

Seat won

Not

Kiong Yieng

Bawang Assan /

male Wong Soon SUPP‘s male

by SUPP

contesting

291

N53 Bawang

Koh with 9,465 Wong

Soon with 1,808

Assan (2016)

votes (majority = Koh

with

majority

votes

votes.

7,096)

6,840 (majority

=

2,504)

Alice Lau lost the seat but gained 5,508 votes

Fatimah Abdullah

PBB / N50 Dalat / N56 Dalat (2016)

6,288 (V)

7,449 (V) 6,524

Won

(MV)

uncontested

PKR / N51 Suriati

Balingian / N58

Abdullah

Balingian

-

-

but gained 871 votes

SPDP / N61 Bekenu / N71

-

Bekenu (2016)

Suboh

PKR / N62 Lambir / N72 Lambir (2016)

-

4,946 (V)

4357 (V) 3,072 (MV)

Won

Zulhaidah

(MV)

election by 7,107 (V) 6,330 (MV)

Lost seat

(2016)

Rosey Yunus

4,990

Won the

3,714 (MV)

contesting Won the election by 6,009 (V) 4,789 (MV)

by

PBB‘s

male

Swim

bin

gained

Jema‘ah with

3,104

4.331

votes

(majority

Not

votes =

Lost but

Not contesting

292

2,824) Nurhanim Hana Moksen *

PKR / N6 Tupong

Voon Shiak

PKR / N13 Batu

Ni *

Kitang

Athina Klyawa Sim *

-

-

-

-

PKR / N18 Serumbu

Norina Umoi

PKR / N32

Utot *

Simanggang

-

-

2,887 (V)

883 (V)

-

-

-

-

1,218 (V) -

580 (V) 6,503 (V) -

Yong Siew

DAP / N45

Wei *

Repok

BN won by -

majority -

-

-

-

Rhinda Juliza DAP / N47 Alexander * Irene Mary Chang Oi Ling *

Pakan

946

votes -

285 (V) Won the

DAP / N51

-

Bukit Assek -

Janet Lau

SUPP / N54

Ung Hie *

Pelawan

Priscilla Lau

STAR / N54

* Nurzaiti

-

-

-

Pelawan

-

-

Amanah / N58

-

-

election by 11,392 (V) 4,497 (MV)

-

-

8,724 (V) 4,312 (MV)

597 (V) 1,244 (V)

293

Hamdan * Elia Bit *

Balingian PKR / N76 Marudi

-

-

-

4,106 (V) Lost the

Hamidah

PAS / N29

Mokhtar

Beting

election to -

BN and gained

-

-

3,051 (V)

Note: Names with * means that their first time contesting in 2016 Sarawak state election. Source: Data from 2001 and 2006 are adapted from the Election Commission Reports. The 2011 election results are cited from all newspapers dated April 17, 2011. These newspapers are: New Sunday Tribune, Metro, The Borneo Post, Utusan Borneo, Utusan Sarawak, Berita Harian, The Star, New Straits Times.

. The 2016 election results are cited from all newspapers dated 8th May 2016.

These newspapers are: Malaysiakini (online), New Sunday Tribune, The Borneo Post, Utusan Borneo, Utusan Sarawak, Berita Harian, The Star, New Straits Times, Sarawak Voice (online).

On the other hand, based on the number of votes, the women candidates (as mentioned in the first paragraph above), garnered in their incumbencies, showed that they could survive in the ―so called men‘s exclusive world‖. Indeed it is a clear indication that if more women are given the same opportunity, they could do better than men. On that note, over the past three state elections (2006, 2011 and 2016), there were clear support for women candidates from the voters. One might consider that during the 1960s for example, men were much likely to support the male candidate than female, because of the political parties at the time were few. That trend reversed in more recent decades, as more political parties surfaced with few female candidates and the female candidates were able to garner votes.

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In 2011, DAP‘s DAP fielded four female candidates. They were Violet Yong in Pending, Ting Tze Fui in Meradong and two new faces, Alice Lau Kiong Yieng in Bawang Assan and Christina Chiew in Batu Kawah. Out of this, three female candidates won the election. Yong, won against cardiologist Sim Kui Hian of SUPP in Pending with a majority of 7,595 votes while Ting, defeated Ling Kie King of SUPP in a straight-fight. Christina Chiew, a newcomer who holds a Master‘s degree in biochemistry, turned out to be a giant killer, beating Tan Joo Phoi, assistant minister in the chief minister‘s office. Chiew, the youngest DAP candidate in the election, won the Batu Kawah seat with a majority of 543 votes. On the other hand, pharmacist Lau, also a first-timer, failed to wrest the Bawang Assan seat from SUPP heavyweight Wong Soon Koh, who won by a 1,808-vote majority.

Knowing the strong support for the three DAP‘s roses as mentioned above, they were again nominated in the 2016 election. Adding to the list was Irene Mary Chang Oi Ling, the wife of the late Wong Ho Leng from Bukit Assek constituency. Of this, the biggest winner of the female candidates was Violet Yong Wui Wui. Representing DAP since 2006, Violet Yong continue to receive enormous votes. In 2006, she received 11,632 votes and this increased to 14,375 in 2011 but slightly decreased to 12,454 in 2016. It is interesting to note here that Sim Kheng Hui won the Pending seat in 2001 but received much lesser votes that are 11,918. Thus, an evident those voters have their preference for Violet Yong for three consecutive election years. Another victorious female candidate was the first timer, Irene Mary Chang. Although receiving less votes (11,392 votes and 4,497 majority votes) as compared to the late Wong Ho Leng (13,527 votes and 8,827 majority votes), Irene won the election and probably will continue to represent DAP for the next few rounds of election.

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Meanwhile, in 2011, first-time DAP newcomer, Christina Chiew Wang See who became the youngest candidate to be elected after winning the Batu Kawah constituency back in 2011 won a merely majority of 543 votes obtained against a male incumbent (SUPP‘s Tan Joo Phoi). However, the 2016 election witnessed her lost to SUPP‘s Chairperson, Sim Hui Kian. Facing the same fate as Christina was Ting Tze Fui. Tze Fui, another DAP‘s female incumbent won the Meradong seat in 2011 state election but lost in 2016 to SUPP‘s male candidate.

As for PBB‘s female candidates, all four of them have an increase of votes obtained in 2016 as compared to 2011‘s election. Sharifah Hasidah obtained 9,795 votes compared to 8,008 votes in the previous election. Fatimah received 7,107 votes (or won with a 6,330 majority votes). She previously won the seat uncontested in 2006. Simoi received 4,169 votes (as compared to 3,652 votes in 2011) while Rosey, as the direct candidate from Teras, acquired 6,009 votes. Previously she obtained 4,946 votes.

Hence, the 2016 election offered voters the largest number of women candidates in Sarawak history compared to 2011 election. From a total of 15 female candidates in 2011 to a total of 22 female candidates from various ethnicities suggest more option to the voters.

Basically all the ethnicities of Sarawak are represented here, namely,

Malay/Melanau, Kedayan, Iban, Bidayuh and Chinese. Despite the women‘s triumph in gaining more votes does not automatically translate into more female representatives in the government executive level. Meaning, the statistics discussed in Table 2 or 3 above suggest that women‘s representation even as election candidates is disproportionate to its size in the state‘s population. Furthermore, half the Sarawakian voters are represented by less than 10 percent representatives.

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Banging on women voters not women candidates

It is observed that since 2006, that a peculiar feature on the women issues is the begging for women voters are more vital than banging for women candidates. There were few occasions when women supports are thumped on. For Sarawak‘s, there has been a request even from UMNO Women‘s President then (Rafidah Aziz) and the current UMNO‘s President (of the Women‘s Wing / Shahrizat Jalil) for example in 2006 that more women should be recruited as election candidates. In fact, over the electronic media, there has also been a call for more women in the coming election. Consequently, women activists and women scholars had been very vocal about this matter. This was again speaking of, in 2008 for the parliamentary election and the recent (March) 2011 prior to the 10th Sarawak state election. The Women, Family and Community Development Minister, Shahrizat Abdul Jalil hope to see at least 30 percent of those holding decision-making positions at both government and private sectors in Sarawak are women. She believed this target could be achieved in the foreseeable future because of the strength of women in the state and the existing government policies on women leaders (Borneo Post online, March 17, 2011).

Then, back in December 2010, there has been a call for women votes as indicated by the Bengoh‘s incumbent and Assemblyman Dr Jerip Susil. He pointed out that the important role of women voters to work together and to ensure the seat remains with Barisan Nasional.

This is because the women voters comprised 46 percent of the 20,000

registered voters in the constituency (The Borneo Post online, December 14, 2010).

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On that note, Fatimah, the deputy head of PBB Women‘s Wing said that more than 50 percent of the 979,796 eligible voters in Sarawak this time, were women who were staunch supporters of the Barisan Nasional (Bernama, 2011; Borneo Post, 2011). In support of Fatimah‘s comment, Chan (2011) argued that women voters outnumber men in more than half of the seats. Chan‘s report was based on the statistics from the Election Commission as of the fourth quarter of 2010 in the electoral rolls. Based on the report, in total, there are 490,526 or 50.06 percent women voters while the men make up 489,270 or 49.94 percent. Accordingly, the women in Sarawak outnumber men in more than half of the seats in the state constituencies. Further, the women are the majority in 40 out of 71 seats, which are (1) Tanjong Datu, (2) Pantai Damai, (3) Demak Laut, (4) Tupong, (5) Samariang, (6) Satok, (7) Padungan, (8) Pending, (9) Batu Lintang, (10) Sadong Jaya, (11) Simunjan, (12) Sebuyau, (13) Lingga, (14) Beting Maro, (15) Balai Ringin, (16) Bukit Begunan, (17) Engkilili, (18) Batang Ai, (19) Saribas, (20) Layar, (21) Bukit Saban, (22) Kalaka, (23) Belawai, (24) Semop, (25) Daro, (26) Jemoreng, (27) Meluan, (28) Ngemah, (29) Machan, (30) Bukit Assek, (31) Dudong, (32) Bawang Assan, (33) Pelawan, (34) Dalat, (35) Balingian, (36) Tamin, (37) Pelagus, (38) Katibas, (39) Baleh and (40) Piasau.

On that note, the statistics provided by the Election Commission

mentioned that in each of these seats, women outnumber men by anything from 30 to 1,300 voters. In fact, Pending, the seat with the highest number of voters in the state at 29,488, also has the most number of women voters with 14,915. Coming in second is Pelawan with 14,850 women voters and third, Batu Lintang with 14,575. Based on the latest statistics of voters in 2016 (Mohd Roji Kawi, 3 Mac 2016), reported in Berita Harian online that there are 1,141,294 voters. Of which, the female voters outnumbered the male voters. That is 571,462 female voters and 569,832 male voters, that is 50.07 percentage of female voters and 49.92 percentage of male voters. And the majority of voters come from those ages between 40 to 49 that is 269,728 whilst voters

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age between 30 -29 (237,440), 50 – 59 (239,843); 60 – 69 (153,129); 21 – 29 (136,755); 75 – 79 (70,703); 80 – 89 (25,916); and 90 and above is 7,690. It is also crystal clear that the political parties are making all possible efforts in the state to lure women voters during the election campaigns and on the eve of Sarawak polls. Though this time again women candidates appear to have been sidelined in the distribution of tickets by various parties such as SUPP, PRS and SPDP. Whilst it is worth mentioning that only 22 out of the 248 candidates in this election are women. In Kanowit, for instance, ADUN for Ngemah, Alexander Vincent commented that women voters played an important role to determine the winning of BN in this election and women are loyal voters who stand behind the Chief Minister of Sarawak (the late Adenan Satem). He commented that there were more than 50 percent of women voters in Ngemah and their loyalty proves that they are not easily influenced by outside matters (Watt Zacchaeus, 5 April 2016).

Conclusion The present study concentrates on the political participation of women as election candidates in Sarawak‘s state elections. In light of this, a critical analysis of the Sarawak state election brings out the fact that the choosing of election candidates is the prerogative of the political leadership. This study bring to light the fact that democracy which should be built on the three pillars of liberty, equality and fraternity has proved ineffective and unsuccessful in realising its goals to empower women in different level of society. It is a pity that the selection of candidates is not always based on an objective assessment of the candidates‘ capabilities and acceptability among the society at large. Often sycophancy towards political leaders played a much larger role in the selection process.

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For example, when asked why a female candidate is not chosen in a particular political party, even though women are an ardent loyalist of the party. Therefore, here lies the importance of state sponsored empowerment of women. In other words, until and unless the existing political party system is transformed into a more transparent system, it is the right of the leadership to ensure the participation of women at all levels including reserved election seats and offices of chairperson in a non-political office. In the case of Sarawak‘s state election of 2016, it is easier for a Malay dominated political party such as (part of) PBB to nominate the Malay female candidates whereas the Dayak political parties of PRS and SPDP, and the Chinese SUPP party finds it difficult to even nominate a female candidate. Is it because of the norms of addressing of women should be more of domestic in nature (as data revealed from the fieldwork). If this is the case, then, why did PKR have nominated more Dayak women as compared to PRS and SPDP? Or why is DAP or even PAS and newly establish Amanah (as members were from PAS) is more acceptance to female candidates compared to SUPP? This study further reveals that the women entering the electoral fray is much depending on the political leadership and not in the women‘s or individual‘s own right. As gatekeepers, the leadership has the final say. It could be deduced that the leadership may decide to be more acceptance or tolerable to female candidates not because of the political party system but the policy it adheres to. That is, is the policy of the political party adopted a more open policy for female candidates or otherwise? Or, do the gatekeepers still have this mentality that women are secondary members of the society, and yet not fit to be as the primer members of the society? In whatever case it is, it is also a clear evident that the banging of women voters is more vital than nominating more women as election candidates. It is disheartening to know that female candidates are less popularly among the ruling party of BN especially for SUPP, SPDP and PRS whilst the opposition parties are more tolerable to female candidates.

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Visual Space Usage in Ruling and Opposition Party Election Banners Siti Haslina Hussin, Ting Su Hie, Malia Taibi & Awang Ideris Awang Daud Universiti Malaysia Sarawak Abstract Election banners is a costly form of political advertising and continues to play an important role to influence voters alongside campaign speeches and walkabouts despite the emergence of social media as an alternative medium for campaigning. This paper presents a stylistic analysis of the use of visual space on election banners put up by the ruling and opposition parties during the 2016 state election campaign in Sarawak, Malaysia. Using Crystal and Davy‘s (2006) framework, 30 election banners put up in various locations in Sarawak were analysed for graphetic features which includes colour, space given to text, photograph and party logo and the artistic features of these elements and typographical features which includes capitalisation of text and punctuation. The graphetic feature analysis revealed that the ruling party election banners tended to have photographs of candidates, but the opposition party were more likely to use the space for conveying their message on issues. The analysis of typographical features showed that opposition parties were inclined to use capitalisation, but they were similar to the ruling parties in the use of punctuation, particularly commas for connecting phrases and question marks for rhetorical questions designed to engage the electorate. The study indicates that election banners may be a more important channel for opposition parties to influence voters‘ opinion because mainstream newspapers are often affiliated to the ruling party.

Introduction In election campaigns, political advertising take the form of campaign speeches, broadcast advertising, walkabouts, online media messages and campaign materials such as election posters, banners, flyers and fishtails. Election banners has remained an important form of political advertising to influence voters. In countries like France,

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Belgium, Germany and Ireland, election poster activities take up 20% of the campaign communication budgets (Dumitrescu, 2009). In terms of densities of election posters, Austria has registered the highest in Europe (Burkert-Dottolo, 2004 as cited in Russmann, 2012). In Malaysia, the 2013 parliamentary election has cost the ruling party (Barisan Nasional, BN) almost RM100 million to print campaign materials and distribute them all over Malaysia (Kamarudin, 2015). Use of election posters during campaigns is costly but political parties and candidates continue to invest in this form of political advertising because it is seen as having an influence on voting patterns. Election posters are also seen as the only means to reach voters when parties and candidates do not have access to the media (Norris, 2000, as cited in Dumitrescu, 2009, p. 942), and this channel is particularly important to opposition parties because mainstream newspapers are often affiliated to the ruling party. Election posters and banners play an important role in the election campaign. They convey the party‘s general campaign messages and allow the party to send unmediated messages directly to the voters (Russmann, 2012). For example, Dumitrescu‘s survey (2012) found that in Belgium, election posters play a more crucial role to show the campaign strength of a party than in France. The strategy of using posters is different for major and minor parties. Dumitrescu (2012) reported that the major parties use election posters to signal their power whereas the minor parties use posters with an informative purpose, that is, to provide additional information to voters in order to increase their voter base. The content of the election posters also differ with party status, in that the major parties use the design to highlight the qualities that make them attractive to voters as opposed to minor parties which focus on their party and ideology (Dumitrescu, 2012). The use of Facebook as a tool for political communication has increased from the 2008 parliamentary elections to the 2012 parliamentary elections in Romania (Pătruţ & Monalache, 2013). Pătruţ & Manolache‘s (2013) analysis of 50 election posters used inthe Romanian 2012 parliamentary campaigning showed that most of them transmitted information about the candidate‘s identity (number/position on the voting paper),

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photograph, party logo, party name, and slogan. The posters hardly attacked the opposition parties or politicians. Instead they made references to ideology and political values. Using manipulated campaign posters about a fictional party, Bremmer (2012) studied the effect of visuals in European campaign posters, and concluded that effective campaign posters need to contain the candidate‘s image and the issue in text form in order to attract the voters‘ attention and help them to form a positive attitude towards the party or candidate, and remember the poster better. The effectiveness of election advertising depends on the voter‘s recognition of images and icons associated with the party (Whalen, 2012). ―By studying election posters, we can better understand how propaganda has been used to influence public opinion and how messages are designed for audiences‖ (Seidman, 2008 p.413). In Malaysia, little is known about strategies used in election campaign materials to influence voters, much less about the usage of visual space on the election banners and posters. Most studies focus on voter perceptions and behaviour (e.g., Besar, Fauzi, Ghazali, & Ghani, 2014; Besar, Ghani, Jali, & Lyndon, 2015) and the impact of online media in the 2008 and 2013 parliamentary elections in Malaysia (e.g., Gomez, 2013; Lim & Ong, 2006; Rajaratnam, 2009). The impact of campaign materials on voters cannot be ignored because a huge amount of budget is spent on campaigns in Malaysian elections. For example, although Section 19 of the Elections Act does not allow candidates to spend more than RM200,000 in their campaigns, in reality the expenditure of candidates from the ruling party exceed this amount (Lee, 2007; Weiss, 2000). Furthermore, despite the rise of Internet as an alternative medium for campaigning, Sualman, Salleh and Firdaus‘s(2008) survey of 1,049 registered voters in Permatang Pauh constituency has shown that election poster is the third most trusted media during elections in Malaysia, after candidate‘s photograph and television. This study also found that poster is the second most effective media, after campaign speeches, in determining whether a candidate wins the election. However, only Aman (2014) attempted a language analysis of the manifestos of two main political parties in the 13th Malaysian

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parliamentary elections. The ruling party used a lot of colours, photographs, and font colours and sizes to highlight their leader compared to the opposition party. The textual analysis revealed that the ruling party used clauses whereas the opposition party used phrases in their manifesto. The ruling party also used more personal pronouns (exclusivewe, inclusive-we, I) to manipulate the social relationship with the electorate. More studies are needed to examine the strategies used by the political parties to influence voters because political advertisements use vague and ambiguous language to misinform and strike fear among the electorate (Kaid, 2000). Since voters‘ recognition of images and icons associated with the party influences the effectiveness of election advertising (Whalen, 2012), the use of visual space by various parties during elections need to be studied. This paper presents a stylistic analysis of the use of visual space on election banners put up by the ruling and opposition parties during the 2016 state election campaign in Sarawak, Malaysia. Methodology

Research site

Sarawak is located on the Borneo Island, and is one of the 14 states in Malaysia. The population of Sarawak is 2.6 million, 8.3% of the Malaysian population of 31.7 million (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2016). Sarawak is divided into 11 administrative divisions and for election purpose, the state is divided into 82 constituencies comprising 1,113,522 registered voters (The Star, 2016). The Chief Minister of Sarawak during the election was Adenan Satem, who took office on 28 February 2014 when Abdul Taib Mahmud stepped down after 33 years in office. However, Adenan Satem passed away in January 2017. Although he became the

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Chief Minister for almost two years only, the 2016 state election was the first time for Adenan Satem to lead the ruling party (Barisan Nasional, BN). It was also a test of his popularity as a new chief minister at that time. His election machinery created ―Team Adenan‖ concept to represent BN and its component parties as the ruling party that would govern the state. To the opponents, the ―Team Adenan‖ concept was used to dissociate BN with Najib Abdul Razak, the Prime Minister of Malaysia who is the national president of BN. This is because of controversies surrounding him such as 1MDB issue which involves misappropriation of funds and the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST). Some of these issues also appear on election banners. In Sarawak, BN comprises Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB), Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP), Sarawak Progressive Democratic Party (SPDP), and Parti Rakyat Sarawak (PRS). In the 2016 state election, United People's Party (UPP) was direct candidate under BN. The opposition parties include Democratic Action Party (DAP), Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), Parti Se-Islam Malaysia (PAS), Parti Amanah Negara (PAN), State Reform Party (STAR), Parti Bangsa Dayak Sarawak Baru (New PBDS).Besides political parties, independent candidates can also contest in the state election. Corpus of the study The data for this study were taken from 30 election banners during the 2016 state election in Sarawak, Malaysia which was conducted on 7 May 2016. The data were collected in the Kuching, Sibu and Miri divisions. These urban areas are considered the hotly contested seats by the ruling and opposition parties in both state and national level elections compared to the electorate in the rural areas who usually support the ruling party. The election banners are pieces of cloth or plastic material tied to wooden posts, and usually measure 3 feet by 12 feet. They do not include wooden boards. The election banners were put up on roadsides by the contesting parties after the announcement of the

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voting date by the Election Commission on 25 April 2016. In Malaysia, election banners, fishtails and posters can only be put up in the two weeks between the announcement of the candidate nomination date and election date. The election banners of the ruling and opposition parties put up on roadsides and roundabouts were photographed in different parts of the three cities during the two weeks prior to the election day. Hundreds of photographs were taken but there were only 30 different election banners. Besides banners, there were also fishtails and posters but they were not included as the data for this study. The banners were those from the major political party (Barisan Nasional, BN which comprises component parties such as Parti Pesaka Bumiputra Bersatu (PPB) and Sarawak United People‘s Party (SUPP), and the opposition parties comprising Democratic Action Party (DAP), Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) and Parti Amanah Nasional (PAN). There were also banners put up by independent candidates who did not belong to any political party. The 30 election banners collected comprised 15 BN, 11 DAP, 2 PAS, and 2 independent candidates. In this paper, the text in the election banners in Malay and Iban are presented in the original language and a translation is given but if the text is in Mandarin characters, a literal translation is given right away. Data analysis procedures

The election banners were analysed using the stylistic framework of Crystal and Davy (1969). This framework has been extensively used till now for analysis of political advertisements. For example, election political posters and slogans in Nigeria (Gbelekale, 2014; Robert, 2013; Sharndama & Mohamed, 2013). This framework has also been used

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for other forms of stylistic analysis such as magazine advertisements (Li, 2009; Zhu, 2006). Crystal and Davy‘s (1969) stylistic framework approaches the analysis from three levels. The first level deals with speech versus writing, and analyses graphetic features, namely, type size and colour. The second level of stylistic analysis deals with typographical features which include punctuation, capitalisation and spacing. The third level examines textual features which include choice of lexical items, syntax and semantics. Crystal and Davy (1969) defines semantics to encompass meaning of stretches of text longer than the single lexical item. Table 1 details the three levels of stylistic analysis and the elements analysed.

Table 1. Framework of stylistic analysis for election banners Level of

Elements

Definition

color

The usage of any colours

Examples

stylistic analysis Level 1

besides Black and White

Graphetic

in the text and background

features

of the banner is considered as coloured. size

The usage of photo and logo that fill up from top to bottom of the banner is considered big. This does

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not mean they cover the whole page of the banner. Proportionately, the size can be said using 30%40% of the whole page. artistic

The usage of effects such as shadow, outline and emboss in the text, photo and logo is considered as artistic. The same goes for the usage of different types of fonts and sizes of the text, combined with colours is also considered as artistic.

Level 2

Capitalisation

capitalised.

Typographical features

The whole message is

Punctuation

The usage of punctuation marks such as question mark, exclamation mark

TAK NAK GST (DON‘T WANT GST) Mana RM2.6 Bilion? (Where is RM2.6 Billion?)

and ellipses.

Results

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Graphetic features of election banners

The analysis of how visual space is used on election banners constitutes Level 1 of stylistic analysis according to Crystal and Davy (1969). This section describes the results from the analysis of the graphetic features on colour, size and artistic effects of text, photographs and logos in the election banners. The colour in the election banners shows the colour of the political parties and the colours of the Sarawak flag. For instance, the BN colour is blue and the banners of political parties within the ruling party used blue as the background. SUPP, one of the component parties of BN, included some yellow colour on some of the banners to show the colour of their own political party which is yellow. On the other hand, one of the opposition parties DAP used red on all their banners, and contrasted it with white colour for the text and background because red is DAP‘s party colour. The use of yellow may appear ambiguous because both the ruling and opposition parties used it. When the ruling party used yellow as the background or text, it was to signify SUPP which is the component party of BN but when DAP used yellow, it is to signify the Sarawak flag colours (red, yellow, black). This is because the DAP mascot, the hornbill named Pahlawan Ubah (meaning ―Change Warrior‖), is created to include the three Sarawak flag colours and this mascot is only used for election campaigns in Sarawak to arouse feelings of patriotism towards the Sarawak state. Another opposition party, PAS, used green as the background or text colour in its election banners. The visual space of the election banners comprises three elements: photograph of candidate, party logo, and text. The percentages were estimated in multiples of ten (e.g., 10%, 20%) for ease of analysis. Table 2 shows the results from the analysis of space usage in the 30 banners analysed. The banners of the opposition parties used more text

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(average of 72%) than photographs compared to the ruling party banners (average of 48%). Table 2. Percentage of visual space on election banners for candidate‘s photograph, party logo and text Election

Photograph of

banner

Ruling party (n=15)

Opposition parties

Party logo

Text

0-70%

0-30%

0-100%

31%

15%

48%

0-40%

10-20%

40-90%

22%

13%

72%

candidate

Range Average Range Average

(n=15)

The ruling and opposition parties differed in the use of photographs in the election banners; only two out of 15 opposition banners included the candidate‘s photograph (1 DAP and 1 independent candidate) whereas 13 out of 15 BN banners included photographs. Out of that, five BN banners had both the photograph of the candidate of that particular constituency and the Chief Minister who is also the president of the PPB, a component party of BN. Eight of the 15 banners had single photographs, which could be of the candidate or the Chief Minister. The use of the Chief Minister‘s photograph on the BN banners reinforced the ―Team Adenan‖ campaign strategy (Figure 1). During the 2016 state election, ―Team Adenan‖ is the war cry of the BN political campaign because of the popularity of the Chief Minister who took office for the first time in 2014, and this was his first state election as the Chief Minister of Sarawak. The ―Team Adenan‖ concept

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also tapped into the sentiments of the people of Sarawak who wanted to give him a chance to form the next ruling government in the state.

Figure 1. Election banner with photographs of Chief Minister (left) and candidate (right)

The opposition parties did not use photographs on the election banners; the candidates‘ photographs appeared on large posters which are not part of the data for the present study. For the opposition parties, the banners were for conveying their messages on issues, which makes it more important to use the space for text rather than the candidates‘ photographs or the mascot. Figure 2 shows an example of a DAP banner where the text occupied 80 percent of the election banner, compared to the BN banner (Figure 1) where the text occupied 60 percent of the visual space. The DAP used text to attack the ruling party. The text was in Mandarin and English because DAP mainly caters to the Chinese electorate.

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Figure 2. DAP banner with text occupying 80% of the space

The graphetics on the election banners did not show much artistic flair. The most common is using shadow and outline of the text and photographs, which appeared in 13 out of 30 election banners. An example of candidates‘ photograph with a shadow can be seen in Figure 1.

Typographical features of election banners

Level 2 of stylistic analysis according to Crystal and Davy (1969) consists of an analysis of the use of typographical features which include capitalisation and punctuation. This is one of the principles of design involving appearance of text. The banners of the opposition parties showed more use of capitalisation than the ruling party banners. Out of 30 election banners, 14 used capital letters for the text (5 ruling party; 9 opposition parties). For example, ―TAK NAK GST‖ (meaning ―Don‘t want GST‖); GST refers to Goods and Services Tax. The text ranged from three words to 15 words in three to four lines. In terms of readability, usage of capital letters makes it difficult to read because the

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letters appear in square blocks. However, in election banners, the use of capital letters seems to place emphasis on the importance of the message. As for punctuation, nine out of 30 election banners used exclamation and question marks. The use of exclamation and question marks was similar for the ruling and opposition party banners: four from ruling party, and five from opposition parties. For example, ―Mana RM2.6 Bilion?‖ (Meaning ―Where is RM2.6 Billion?‖). The issue of 2.6 billion has been hotly debated which involves the crediting of this amount into the prime minister Najib Razak‘s personal account. The amount is claimed to be donated by a Saudi prince but the issue is misappropriation of funds. The following examples show the use of rhetorical questions to engage the electorate and exclamation marks to make a strong statement:

1. Three years no flyover, I resign! Do you dare? (literal translation from Mandarin) 2. Menteri kaya, rakyat miskin? Ubah! (Meaning ―Rich ministers, poor people? Change!‖) 3. Adenan bans DAP leaders, but welcomes UNMO ministers!

This analysis of punctuations marks did not include commas which were extensively to join sentences instead of conjunctions. From the aspect of typographical features, the banners of the opposition parties used more capitalisation than those of the ruling party but punctuation use was similar. Discussion

The study provides empirical evidence to show that the differential use of visual space by the ruling and opposition political parties to persuade voters in the 2016 Sarawak State

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Election. From the analysis of the election banners, two major differences between the ruling and opposition parties emerged in the use of visual space on the election banners, and textual features of the messages. Firstly, the opposition parties use more texts in their banners compared to the ruling party which uses more photographs. To highlight their messages, the opposition parties use more capital letters, which are sometimes coloured differently from the rest of the text and background. On the other hand, the ruling party use more photographs in the election banners. Most of the ruling party banners have two photographs, but the chief minister‘s photograph is always bigger than the candidate‘s photograph, perhaps to accord respect to the chief minister. Interestingly, those photographs are so large that they occupy almost the whole space from top to bottom of the banner. The findings of this study on visual space usage on election banners concur with those of Aman (2014) on the manifestos of Malaysian political parties. In Belgium and France, the major parties have attractive designs in their election posters, unlike minor parties which highlight their party and ideology (Dumitrescu, 2012). The images of the candidate and party icons are important because they help voters to recognise the party (Whalen, 2012). Bremmer (2012) stated that the candidate‘s image and the issue in text form help voters to form a positive attitude towards the party or candidate. In this context, the opposition banners which are mostly in text form may not be remembered because Răşcanu (2003) as cited in Pătruţ & Monalache, 2013) believes that ―individuals and human faces are stored more easily than objects, objects more easily than actions, shape than colour, and the colour is remembered more accurately than numbers‖ (as cited in Pătruţ & Monalache, 2013, p. 3). Therefore, the ruling party make better use of visual space on election banners, similar to the major parties in Belgium and France, as reported by Dumitrescu (2012). The opposition parties in Sarawak and the minor parties in Belgium and France did not take advantage of the potential of visual space in their propaganda.

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Even for voters who are well-informed and have decided who to vote for, the election banners can still influence them through repetition. Răşcanu (2003) believes that:

the first time, the poster is overlooked, the second time, it is noticed but not read, the third time, it is read but not reflected upon, this occurs the fourth to the fifth time that people see it and start discussing with friends about it; the sixth time, we try to establish agreement or disagreement with what is communicated and, in the seventh stage, we manage to achieve this goal. (as cited in Pătruţ & Monalache, 2013, p. 3)

While the analysis of visual space usage on election banners in this study has uncovered strategies used by different political parties to persuade voters, a language analysis of the messages on the election banners will reveal more of the propaganda messages of the contesting parties in the election. Voter reactions also need to be studied to understand the impact of the banners on the voting patterns of the electorate.

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References Aman, I. (2014). Manifesto pilihan raya dan prestasi parti politik utama Malaysia dalam Pilihan Raya Umum ke-13: Suatu analisis linguistik. Malaysian Journal of Society and Space, 10, 65-82. Besar, J. A., Fauzi, R., Ghazali, A. S., & Ghani, M. H. A. (2014). Political perceptions in the 2013 general elections: A case study in the federal territory Kuala Lumpur. Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, 9(2), 135-161. Besar, J. A., Ghani, M. H. A., Jali, M. F. M., & Lyndon, N. (2015). Pola politik kaum dalam pilihan raya umum Malaysia ke-13: Kajian ke Negeri Selangor. Malaysian Journal of Society and Space, 11(9), 99-111. Bremmer, M. (2012). The effects of visuals, focus and congruency in European campaign posters on attention, recall and attitude. Unpublished Master‘s thesis, University of Van Amsterdam, Amsterdam. Crystal, D. & Davy, D. (1969). Investigating English style. London: Longman. Department of Statistics Malaysia. (2016). Population distribution and basic demographic

characteristic

report

2010

(Updated:

05/08/2011).

https://www.statistics.gov.my Dumitrescu, D. (2009). Spatial visual communications in election campaigns: Political posters strategies in two democracies. Doctoral dissertation, The Ohio State University. Dumitrescu, D. (2012). The importance of being present: Election posters as signals of electoral strength, evidence from France and Belgium. Party Politics,18(6), 941-940. Gbelekale, H. A. (2014). Stylistic analysis of selected political campaign posters within the Ijebu-Ode Municipality, Ogun State, Nigeria. Https://www.academia.edu/9789539/STYLISTIC_ANALYSIS_OF_SELECTED_P

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OLITICAL_CAMPAIGN_POSTERS_WITHIN_THE_IJEBUODE_MUNICIPALITY_OGUN_STATE Gomez, J. (2013). Malaysia‟s 13th General Election: Social media and its political impact.

TU_ASEAN

Political

Outlook,

57.

http://mediamalaysia.net/wp-

content/uploads/2013/09/GE13_Social_Media_James_Gomez-090913.pdf

Kaid, L. L. (2000). Ethics and political advertising. In R. E. Denton (Ed.), Political communication ethics – an oxymoron (pp. 147-150). Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers. Kamarudin, R. P. (2015, August 3). Why Malaysian elections cost billions. http://www.malaysia-today.net/why-malaysian-elections-cost-billions. Lee, J. C. H. (2007). Barisan Nasional – Political dominance and the General Elections of 2004 in Malaysia. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 26(2), 38-65. Li, M. (2009). The stylistic analysis of magazine advertisement: Atkins chocolate chip granola bar. Asian Social Science, 5(9), 63-69. Lim, H. H., & Ong, K. M. (2006). Electoral campaigning in Malaysia. In C. Schafferer (Ed.), Election campaigning in East and Southeast Asia (pp. 55-78). Hamsphire, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited. Pătruţ, M. & Monalache, M. (2013). The political poster: An advertising tool on Facebook. International Conference SMART 2013. Social media in academia: Research and teaching, 231-236. Rajaratnam, U. D. (2009). Role of traditional and online media in the 12th general election, Malaysia. The Journal of the South East Asia Research Centre for Communications and Humanities, 1(1), 33-58. Russmann, U. (2012). Going negative and going positive: Political parties‘ communication strategies in election posters, campaign advertisement and press

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releases

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National

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http://paperroom.ipsa.org/app/webroot/papers/paper_14728.pdf. Seidman, S. A. (2008). Studying election campaign posters and propaganda: What can we learn? International Journal of Instructional Media, 35(4), 413-421. Sharndama, E. C. & Mohammed, I. (2013). Stylistic analysis of selected political posters and slogans in Yola Metropolis of Adamawa State of Nigeria. Asian Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 1(3), 60-68. Sualman, I., Salleh, I. M., & Firdaus, N. (2008). Media dan pilihanraya: Kajian kes di parlimen

Permatang

Pauh,

Pulau

Pinang.

https://www.academia.edu/1293001/Media_dan_pilihan_raya_Kajian_kes_dl_piliha n_raya_kecil_Permatang_Pauh_Pulau_Pinang The Star (2016, May 1). Sarawak polls: 24,604 early voters to cast ballots on Tuesday http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2016/05/01/sarawak-polls-early-voting-ontuesday/ Weiss, M. L. (2000). The 1999 Malaysian General Elections. Issues, Insults, and Irregularities. Asian Survey, 40(3), 413-455. Whalen, K. (2012). Defacing Kabul: An iconography of political campaign posters. Cultural Geographies, 20(4), 541-549. Zhu, L. (2006). The linguistic features of English advertising. CELEA Journal, 29(1), 7178.

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Contesting Democracy Aristotle’s Description of Democracy as a Mob Rule: an Analysis Basiru Musa Bayero University Abstract The paper carefully analyses the reasons for and effects of Aristotle‘s description of democracy as a ‗mob rule.‘ The paper utilises the Democratic Correlates Prism as its theoretical lens and employs the qualitative, documentary method as its tool for data collection and thematic analysis as the method of data analysis, where relevant themes and sub themes are drawn. The findings of the paper include, democracy is a mere mob rule because it is planned and led by the largely unorganised and often uneducated masses; democracy could not facilitate even development because of the shambolic nature of the atmosphere that it is operated; democracy could not guarantee sound human and physical security because it is often hijacked by the corrupt elements in society, who only promote their selfish interests at the expense of the needed public good or interest. These findings have implications for the growth, popularity, continuity and future of democracy as a system of government and it is on this basis that the paper recommends that, there is the urgent need to have a rethink on those that operate democracy, the democratic platform should be made much more organised and less chaotic in order to pave way for sustainable societal and national development and ensure human and physical security for all, effective mechanisms should be put in place to prevent corrupt people in society from gaining access to the democratic platform and future research could be conducted on the best and most secure alternative system of government to democracy. Keywords: Democracy, Mob rule, Aristotle, Analysis

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Introduction Democracy is regarded the world over as the best form or system of government that promotes popular participation and overall human and socioeconomic development of the people. This is so, following the fact that a true democracy is characterized by equality, sovereignty of the people, respect for human life, the rule of law, which has within it three basic elements of equality before the law, supremacy of the law and protection of individual liberty or the inalienable rights of the citizens, such as right to life, right to liberty, right to freedom of speech and expression, right to own property and so on (Heater, as cited in Enemuo and Anifowose, 1999). Furthermore, democratic equality implies one man, one vote regardless of differences in wealth, religion, intelligence, ethnic background and so on. It also connotes the equal right and opportunity of all citizens to hold political office. Based on the element of political equality of all is the principle of popular sovereignty, the notion that ultimate political power or sovereignty rests with mass of people. In practice, popular sovereignty is expressed through the representation and majority rule. It is through their representatives that the people express their will. The representatives decide what, in their opinion, the people or electorates want, and if their judgement is faulty, the people can express their disapproval at the next election by voting them out (Held, 1993). According to Heater, respect for the dignity and worth of the human body and mind, is a basic ingredient and requirement for democracy to endure. It is also necessary, he notes, that government be based, as far as possible, on an ‗impersonal law, rather than on the unpredictable whims of men.‘ In other words, a democratic government should be based on the rule of law. A democratic regime should also respect certain basic freedoms

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for its citizens, such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of conscience, freedom of assembly and freedom from arbitrary arrest. Theoretical Framework/Prism: The Correlates of Democracy One useful way to gauge or measure a developing state or country‘s potential to achieve democracy is to focus on ―democratic correlates‖. Where these correlates exist in the greatest number and measure, the probability of democracy is greater in number and measure; conversely, where they are largely absent, democracy has the smallest chance of succeeding. They are: Economic Correlates: i.

National wealth,

ii.

A market or mixed economy and

iii.

A middle class.

Political Correlates: i.

Freedom of communication,

ii.

A stable party system,

iii.

Civilian control over the military,

iv.

A strong, independent judiciary and

v.

Political and social pluralism.

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Cultural Correlates: i.

Tolerance of individual and group differences and

ii.

Pervasive belief in democracy. Historical and geographic Correlates:

i.

Previous democratic experience and

ii.

Existence of democratic neighbours (Magstadt, 2009).

Philosophical and Analytical Reasons for Aristotle’s Description of Democracy as a ‘Mob Rule’ But, for the Father of Politics and Political Science, Aristotle (354-322 BCE), democracy does not represent the best form or system of government. For him, it is a ‗mob rule‘, that is a rule or system of government by the shambolic or unorganised masses or people, as democracy gives them the ultimate political power or sovereignty. In fact, this is visibly clear in his tripartite typology of political systems, where on one hand, he sees only Aristocracy, Monarchy and Constitutional government or Polity as the good or best systems of government because they strive to advance or promote the common good or happiness of their subjects or citizens. But, on the other hand, he sees Tyranny, Oligarchy and Democracy as the bad or perverted governments, as they only advance or promote the selfish interests of their rulers, as opposed to the common good or happiness of their subjects or citizens (Dye, 1996). Borrowing from Plato (428-347/470-399 BCE), part of the reason for Aristotle‘s description of Democracy as a ‗mob rule‘ is related to the fact that the majority of the masses who are the rulers or leaders in a democracy are largely and naturally unintelligent, peevish and unorganised, in fact most of them (80 to 90%) are not literate. For this, they belong to the class of farmers dominated by the biological drive of eating

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(appetite/abdomen), as opposed to the philosopher-kings who are dominated and illuminated by the spirit of reasoning and continuous learning for a better and more united and egalitarian society, state and the world (Lintott, 1992). It is also instructive to learn or note that intelligence is crucially important to the highly challenging and demanding task of governing, leading or ruling. Aristotle‘s contention or argument in this context is that, democracy is largely operated by people who lack this necessary ingredient, which is intelligence. As such, for him, how would they effectively and efficiently lead, rule or govern a state and in turn, lead such a state to the Promised Land of prosperity, wealth, full employment and overall human and societal development, as opposed to the prevailing squalor, grinding poverty, serious socioeconomic crises and anomie seen in most democracies of the world today, including that of Nigeria. Conclusion Democracy may remain the most popular system of government for many, because of the almost unfettered latitude or freedom it gives to people or the voting public. But, sincerely speaking, there is much to be desired from the type of democracy that is currently being practised in the world, especially in the Third world states, including African states, such as Nigeria. There is a sense and intellectualism in Aristotle‘s description of the world‘s most popular system of government as a ‗mob rule‘. But, I conclude by asking the question: How could Aristocracy, Monarchy and Polity serve as the best alternatives or substitutes for democracy in contemporary national and international politics?

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References Anifowose, R. and Enemuo, F., (1999), Elements of Politics; Sam Iroanusi Publications, P.O.Box 1078, Surulere, Lagos. Dye, T. R. and Ziegler, H., (1996), The Irony of Democracy; Wadsworth, C.A. Held, D., (1993), Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West; Polity Press, Cambridge. Lintott,

A.

(1992).

Aristotle

and

democracy. The

Classical

Quarterly

(New

Series), 42(01), 114-128. Magstadt, T.M., (2009), Understanding Politics: Ideas, Institutions and Issues; Cengage Learning, Belmont.

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Introducing Invested Democracy: A New Stabilizer for the World's Most Unstable Form of Government? Jason Jellison Thongsook College Abstract The American Union is teetering on the brink of collapse for the second time since the late 1700‘s. The American democratic model was copied among many of the world‘s nations due to the unrelated financial success of the United States. However, the research paper demonstrated that many of those democracies are actually less than one century old. Curiously, it has become commonly known that many of the world‘s democracies are also starting to destabilize- much like the American model. The research illustrated what has gone wrong and offered a novel solution to attempt to stabilize America, then other democracies. The research illustrated that Great Thinkers in both hemispheres harbored grave reservations about democracy. It further outlined seven key global events that enabled the democratic age, a hidden truth that Benjamin Franklin borrowed to help reinvent democracy, significant philosophical developments that were pregnant with democratic implications, as well as the sinister political behaviors that routinely destroy democracy. It concluded with a new system to help stabilize America and other World Democracies. Keywords: Democracy, Treason, Corruption, Tyranny, Failed State Introduction Democracy. Now there is a four-letter word1. It is among the most unstable forms of government out of all forms of government known to man.

Critics of

researchers who would support alternate forms of government are often so arrogant that they even include democracy in evolutionary theory. The Bangkok Post (2017) suggested that those critics unfairly penalize undemocratic nations as lesser than their own. Moreover, in justly banned American art, they even have called Southeast Asians barbarians. However, in his landmark article The 3R‟s: Race, Reform, and Ruin in America, former civil rights leader Hugh Murray2 (2012) revealed that the true end result

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of democracy is actually the wholesale nationalization of foreign nationals via the political pursuit of victory. In other words, the politicians eventually sell their democracy to someone else than to those to whom it truly belongs to in order to monopolize elections. The research paper highlighted that democracy has one of the shortest shelflives of the known forms of government and introduced democracy‘s next evolutionary step so as to stabilize an otherwise foredoomed system of government. The concept is critical because many democracies are moving down on the Global Stability Index and, in the case of South Africa, are even bordering on becoming failed states. (The World Bank: Political Stability Index, 2015)

Background

The One-Man-One-Vote system suffers from an inherent ethical flaw. Those whom have blood and treasure invested in a nation inherently have much more invested in said nation than those whom do not. Yet, today‘s democratically elected politicos seem more interested in representing foreign nationals than their own citizens. The United States Government- Census Bureau (2010) indicated that 10% of the U.S. Population is ―Percent Who Are Foreign Born.‖ (See Appendix A) Moreover, the retired civil rights icon Hugh Murray penned in Murray (2012) that many of the non-European races settling in the U.S. do not ever assimilate into U.S. culture. He cited the African American population as an example. They are a race that has been in America in excess of 350 years.

The [U.S.] Hart-Cellar Act has allowed for massive immigration of Latin American minorities over the past 49 years and they are well-known to block vote for the United States Democratic Party. (Kennedy, 1968)/ (Coulter, 2015) Dr. Jason Richwine (2009) demonstrated that the immigration trend after the Hart-Cellar Act transformed into a

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mass-importation of low-skilled immigrants who tend to have low I.Q.‘s, pass on those low I.Q.‘s to their youth, as well as escalate the public welfare cost on a per-capita basis. (Richwine, 2016) Dr. Richwine illustrated those were the effects of globalization and they are a source of instability in American democracy.

People with neither roots, nor ancestry, nor time, nor civil service in a nation have far less invested than those who have all of the above. This begs an obvious question: Why should someone with none of those qualities have the same voting power as someone with all of those qualities? Speaking through Meredith (2015), Harvard scholar Michael Morse noted that the U.S. does withdraw voting rights for convicted felons even if they have all of the qualities listed in the above. (Roots, ancestry, time, etc...) Ergo, the case has already been successfully made in America for malleable voting rights. The research expands upon that successful paradigm. The Problems with Democracy In order to thoroughly understand why the world‘s democracies are growing unstable, one must understand its history. Many of the Great Greek Thinkers and Great Eastern Thinkers have all panned democracy and the empirical evidence in current times does seem to support their thinking; at least in-so-far as America is concerned. Addressing the remarks of the Great Greek Thinkers, one must understand the limitations of their era. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle could not have dreamed of societies as large as they are today. Nor could they have envisioned modern systems of commerce or the limited societal responsibilities of a modern citizen. Dr. Daniela Cammack stated via Cammack (2013) that, in the Greek Era, citizens eligible for the vote were active in Civic Life on an everyday basis. (pp.1-5, 53, 174) Now cognizant of those limitations, one may commence with a discussion of the aversion to democracy.

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Many researchers analyzing democracy begin their philosophical research with Socrates. The Socratic disillusionment with democracy was actually recorded by Plato (399-B.C.). In The Apology, Socrates made it clear that he harbored doubt in the will of the people and, indeed, Socrates‘ peer-approved death sentence proved to be a darkly ironic example of just what democracy is capable of. He made it abundantly clear that the average man was not well-educated enough to make wise decisions over a polis of any kind.

Roochnik (1995) eloquently explained that Plato was highly critical of democracy because of the fact that it tended to be based on rhetoric. The rhetorical process tends to force the mind off of large-scale discussions and on to small-scale matters. Ergo, in the eyes of Plato, a well-reasoned decision becomes difficult to make because discussions are simply too shallow. Thus, Socrates maintained that the uninformed make decisions too in-depth for them and Plato maintained that those very decisions are two-dimensional in thought. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016) completed this by introducing Aristotle‘s divided government. Aristotle classified government into six types- half of them normal, half of them perverted. He branded democracy as perverted. Although he did see the benefits of democracy, it was recognized that democracy becomes a system wherein the poor tyrannize the affluent. Hence, while the great democratic debate has raged for thousands of years, one could simplistically make a case arguing that the Great Greek view of democracy was thus: Uninformed electorate → Two-Dimensional Thinking → Perverted Multitudes = Tyranny of the Majority

Ancient Buddhist Thinkers

While the eastern thinkers of antiquity never directly saw democracy, they did record occasional insights that arguably reflected where they would have stood on

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democracy. The entire overarching canon of Theravada Buddhism is mapped in the Abhidhamma Pitaka, or Basket of the Special Doctrines. (Muller, 104 B.C.) It becomes all too clear that the Theravada Denomination of Buddhism is entirely centered on the individual when one reads through these core canonical texts. It is also commonly-known amongst those who reside in The Kingdom of Thailand that Theravada Buddhism is routinely taught from a small group of Enlightened Monks, or one Enlightened Teacher. Buddhism can be individualistic in nature, but not generally democratic. The writings of other great Buddhist Monks such as Phra Anuruddha (8th Century B.C.) and Bodhidharma- the founder of Zen Buddhism- follow precisely the same path. (Pine, 1987) Phra Bojo Guksa was responsible for what is now one of the largest denominations of Korean Buddhism. The Jogye Organization of Korean Buddhism (2012) provided an excellent overview of still extant texts, including some in the Northern Ming Buddhist Canon that had survived the Mongolian invasion. It seems that his focus on unison and ultimate clarity of mind as the Buddhist ideal will suffer from compatibility issues if paired with modern democracy. (pp.88-111) The political environment on the Korean Peninsula seems to substantiate that view.

In China, the Pure Land Order of Buddhism was based off the teachings of one man‘s

interpretation

of the

Sukhavati

Vyuha Sutra- The Five Pure Land

Sutras(Dhamakara, 650 C.E.). These teachings were Mahayana in origin and spread to Japan. Still extant, the order preaches that the teachings as taught are the only true way to Enlightenment. Ergo, democracy is once and again rendered null under the particular order. However, it should be noted that Buddhism from the Mahayana Zone ideologically diverges from that of the Theravada Zone as to the point of common welfare. In essence, Mahayana Buddhists believe that the quest for religious illumination should be less focused on the individual and more inclusive on masses of people.

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Yet, that Mahayanan inclusivity has certainly not fostered democracy in China. Hua-yen ching translated a famous treatise recounting the deeds of Buddha for the Chinese onto dozens of bamboo scrolls. (Ching, 400 C.E.) While his sources had Mahayanan influences, that never spelled democracy for China. The Mahayana effect could solely be found through the notion that a Monarch was obligated to care for his people.

This effect may have been furthered along by the Confucian philosopher

Mencius. (Indiana University Northwest, 2017)

Other Eastern Considerations

While there are many more significant eastern thinkers than just the aforestated, the research presented thus far largely encapsulates much of Asia and the Far East. However, the subject of overlap presents some significant considerations in the east. Hinduism, Taoism, Confucianism, Shintoism and Buddhism share an eclectic combination of chronologies and methodologies that have haphazardly overlapped each other at times. Thompson (2005) kept a timeline as to key dates of Buddhist exportation and importation.

The timeline spans approximately two millennia.

Hence, Taoist

influence can be found in Chinese Buddhism because Taoism predates the arrival of Buddhism in 25 C.E. (p. xx) Therefore one can see the influence of enduring Daoist masterpieces such as the works of Zhuangzi as translated by Serjeski (2016). As Daoist influence flavors Buddhism in China, some of Zhuangzi‘s teachings such as finding sufficiency by being in a state of contentment would match the modern Buddhist Philosophy of Sufficiency Economy as developed by H.M. the Late King Bhumibol Adulyadej. (Royal Thai Consulate-General, 2014) Summary

In summary, most of the aforementioned Great Eastern Thinkers knew neither the democratic age, nor democracy. H.M. the Late King Rama IX was the sole exception to

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that research paradigm. As Plato, Aristotle and Socrates became ingrained in the west they had no audience in the east. Ergo, Zhuangzi may be Socrates to a man of eastern decent. The Eastern mindset and Western mindset are largely incompatible to this very day.

The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of Western Democracy At A Glance

Antiquity really offers little in the modern sense of democracy. Only men would have had the right to vote in an ancient democracy, not women, and those men would not generally have included slaves. Hamilton (2008) reinforced the notion that democracy probably has its roots in family decisions and- just as in various democracies of the world today- some of those decision making bodies are more democratic than others. The genesis of democracy probably can be found in the family.

A fair number of cautious historians would designate ancient Athens as the point where societal democracy took root and flowered. Yet, it should be noted that Harvard University‘s Liu Junning (2015) pointed out that Athenian democracy was not modern democracy. It was more of a direct democracy where the people themselves would make the decisions. Modern societies have grown too large for that and instead tend to favor more of a Roman model. Tridimas (2013) at the University of Ulster indicated that the democracy of ancient Athens was volatile and only lasted approximately 200 years. Saint Anselm College (2017) noted that the Roman Republic only lasted 500 volatile years. Accounting for the Civil War, it could be argued that American rebirth of democracy only lasted for an average of approximately 113 uninterrupted years at a time. The History Leading to the Democratic Age

Before the paper introduces the concept of Invested Democracy, it would be very helpful if one were to look more closely at the history that led to the age of democratic

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rule. The paper has already visited some of the reservations of the Great Greek Thinkers. It also has reviewed some of the more critical thoughts of significant eastern thinkers, as well as glanced the birth, fall, and rebirth of quintessential democracies. While the paper cannot hope to encapsulate several thousand years of history in but a few pages, it can touch many of the key points of democratic history.

Important Historical Developments in Western Political Theory

The research identified seven critical events that transpired as key towards allowing the rebirth of democracy on such a large scale two millennia post-mortem. First, Kaster (2006) of Princeton University recalled that Mos Maiorum was an unspoken Roman code of conduct that regulated citizen behavior and duties in the Roman State. Mos Maiorum was slowly obliterated in the corruption of Rome and, in time, that would allow for the modern conception of individuality. Ancient citizens bore many societal duties in the democracy of antiquity and the absence of Roman morality allowed for other forms of government that would eventually require less of their citizens.

Second, Floyd (2005) highlighted the synthesis of St. Thomas Aquinas that created Natural Law- a concept that can be found in every major western legal code onto this day. Natural Law holds that people have particular rights by virtue of being people. The concept was probably synthesized from Aquinas (1272) and Psalm 4:2. (The Holy Bible, 1611) The uniformity of Natural Law allowed for relative conformity across many western legal codes and that would allow for significant ease in the globalization of democracy.

Third, the British Library Board (2017) highlighted that the Renaissance would take root in the very late 14th century. It ushered in increasingly grand state architecture that instilled great pride within the centers of its citizens. Grand architecture is an

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enduring part of any great nation and, unwittingly, it could be argued that this architectural revolution was paving the road for the modern Nation State, as arguably founded by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). Fourth, Martin Luther (1517) nailed his 95 Thesis to the door of All Saint‘s Church on October 31, 1517 which kick-started the Protestant Reformation. This was a key step towards the rebirth of democracy as well as a key step towards a worldwide democratic age due to two factors: Foremost, Martin Luther‘s anti-papal thesis inspired the average person to question God, King and Country for the first time and that would ultimately inspire people to question any autocratic government. Secondly, the splitting of the Catholic Church allowed Lutheranism (Protestantism) to overtake large swaths of Europe and, in a century or two, the New World. The stage was now dressed for a worldwide political revolution even though citizens of the time could not yet see it.

Fifth, Sir Thomas Moore had written one of the first modern books to deal with the concepts and limits of an artificial Nation State. Although written at nearly the same time as the 95 Thesis, More (1551) was the first English translation available. The book was wildly successful and its very name (Utopia) is universally recognized by all Native English Speakers to this day. The book only served to further the impact of Lutheranism and Protestant-secular statecraft, although that was probably unintended.

Sixth, Nicolo Machiavelli wrote his landmark work The Prince around 1513 with the earliest version available to commoners in 1532. Machiavelli (1532) was the first major western political work to break away from the bonds of Christianity. The concept of Machiavellianism in the most technical of terms meant to analyze a political problem and find solutions in methodology that may be unchristian.

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Finally, Michel de Montaigne wrote his Essais in approximately 1580. Montaigne (1625) provided an early English translation and Michel Montaigne inadvertently helped foster the modern concept of individualism in Chapter IX of Volume III. The work as a whole is a 1,000 page collection on the nature of humanity that is still routinely learned by political theorists. In its era, the work was standard learning for any well-educated nobleman. Thus, it would spread to the colonies of North America and into hearts of revolutionary blood. The American Founding Father’s Thoughts on Democracy

Contrary to popular belief, the American Founding Fathers were not all so enthused about the concept of democracy. They were well-aware that democracy was prone to factionalization and they were well-aware of its short lifespan. The modern Nation State hailed from the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia as translated by the British Foreign Office (1648). Having won the Revolutionary War, the Founding Fathers now possessed thirteen new Nation States and the question of the hour was one that was as old as people: How best do we govern ourselves?

A monarchy was quickly determined to be out of the question but the American Founding Fathers were well-educated in the classics, as well as political theory. (Constantelos, 2002) The Founding Fathers were besot with thirteen unruly colonies that were perfectly happy to stay as thirteen different nations but that system was simply too inefficient. The Colonists soon found that they needed a stable currency, some type of uniformity of law, as well as some kind of Executive. The idea of a British replacement was rejected… but someone had been promoting an idea.

The Iroquois Six Nations stand as a little-known fact of history but, per Feathers (2007), Benjamin Franklin had long been aware that the Native American Iroquois Nation had united their warring factions by what could be described as a democracy. He was

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also aware of the fact that this union had brought an enduring peace to the Iroquois. He was further aware that the Native Americans had seemingly surmised a way to stabilize a system of government that they had no idea previously collapsed under dramatically more advanced civilizations. He was in awe of what the Native Americans had accomplished and encouraged colonists to copy the idea.

As a signatory to the Treaty of Paris, he probably knew that he would eventually get his chance. (Adams, 1783) As observed by Tocqueville (1831) in Chapter II, Part II of Volume I of his masterpiece Democracy in America, democracy came rather naturally to the colonists because they were completely on their own in the days of Jamestown and other early settlements. Hence, they simply assumed that they would be making most of their own decisions. (p.53) Thus, the American War of Independence was successful because the colonists were largely returning to a system that they had long-known. The question now was simply how to perfect the system?

Constantelos (2002) recalled that the Founding Fathers were wary of Athenian (Direct) Democracy because it sparked civil war. They were also aware that the Roman system eventually dissolved into dictatorial tyranny, as well as a bloated republic that collapsed in upon itself. Still, the Iroquois had Ben Franklin thinking. The match had been lit for democracy… but how to control the fire?

In the end, they decided to reinvent the old Roman model. They sought to prevent a dictatorship by looking to checks and balances from Montesquieu‘s Book XI in The Spirit of the Laws.(Montesquieu, 1750) James Madison decided to modernize the republic by limiting the demands on its citizens. He also knew that tyranny generally exists in two cases: Tyranny occurs when the majority-will abuses the minority (The Federalist # 51, 1788), or when power falls into too few hands. (The Federalist #10, 1788)Thus, the system not only would feature dual-sovereignty and popular-sovereignty, but it also

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would relegate as much power as possible to local townships.

The new Federal

Government would refresh the Roman model with a Congress, Senate and President whose capacities would be more spelled-out. State offices were devised and their duties would be sternly separated so that each party knew their boundaries. A supreme court with lifetime appointees was devised to settle any confusion or issues that could not be agreed upon.

Critically, the Founding Fathers did not believe in an equal slice of

America for each citizen. They believed in equal access to the revenue stream for each citizen and barely a scant ―general Welfare‖ is mentioned in (The Constitution of the United States, 1787). (p.1)

It is precisely on the point of social welfare- as well as globalization- where modern democracy starts to breakdown. (Semuels, 2016) President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was largely correct in foreseeing that income inequality would be the eventual ruin of democracy. (Some would argue that economics actually were the chief cause of the American Civil War.) President Roosevelt had hoped to install what was often coined the Second Bill of Rights to attempt to prevent income inequality from rising but it did not come to pass.

Summary

In summary, the Great Greek Thinkers had mixed feelings regarding democracy; sometimes expressed with outright scorn. Meanwhile, great thinkers of eastern antiquity simply did not envision any sort of a democratic world. Democracy rose for only a brief while in ancient Athens and Rome, but fell for over a millennia. Many notable reforms took place from the 13th to 16th century that inadvertently made the western hemisphere conducive to a rebirth of a largely bygone system of government.

The American

Founding Fathers were not very fond of democracy but, having few other options, reinvented and plagiarized what is to date arguably the most creative form of democracy.

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That reinvention was done with help from the Iroquois Indians. America became a beacon of wealth around the world. Many nations rushed to photocopy the model- not necessarily mindful of the dubiously short historical lifespan on democracies.

This

ushered in the modern democratic age.

General Data on Democracy Proliferation and Lifespan The University of Hawai‘i (2016) expressed that many historians trace 18th century scholar Alexander Tyler as the source of a reliable paradigm that held the average life of a democracy to be around 200 years. Table 1 shows the average lifespan of what the research called ‗the Big Three,‘ i.e. the three most original democracies in world history:

Table 1: Average Lifespan of Three Most Original Democracies Nation

Lifespan in Centuries

Secondary/Additional Lifespan in Centuries

Ancient Athens

2

Ancient Rome

5

U.S.A.

0.75

U.S.A.

→

Average Lifespan

2.31

1.5

Source: (Roser, 2017) Table 1 suggested that Tyler‘s stage-based theory seems correct, at least on a simplistic level. Roser (2017) also illustrated the number of democracies from 1800Present: (See Graph 1)

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Graph 1: Number of Democracies from 1800-2000

# of Democracies in the World 90 80 70 60 50 # of Democracies in the World

40 30 20 10 0 1800

1850

1900

1950

2000

Roser (2017) If Tyler‘s theory and demonstrated democratic failures hold true, then the world is presently perched on a perilous branch because the majority of democracies in this world are LESS than two centuries old. Furthermore, as previously demonstrated in Table 1, American democracy FAILED at less than one century, and is struggling again at barely 1.50 centuries after the first collapse. Graph 2 shows the percentage of World Citizens living in a democracy, auto/anocracy, or a colony from 1815 to 2015:

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Graph 2: Numbers of World Citizens in Trillions, 1825, 1875, 2015 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5

Colony Auto/Anocracy

2

Democracy 1.5 1 0.5 0 1825

1875

2015

Source: (Roser, 2017)

Roser (2017) clearly illustrated that the world was at its most balanced point around 1875. Relatively even percentages of the world‘s citizens were living across the plurality of governances at that time. Withal, by 2015 the world had become decidedly less balanced as most of the world‘s citizens now live in some form of democracy, which has thus far proved to have a very low lifespan. Put more mathematically, see Table 2.

Table 2: Number of Global Democracies in 1910 compared to 2010: Year

Number of Democracies

1910

11

2010

87

Roser (2017)

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To review, the majority of the world‘s democracies are rather new. They are wellbelow Tyler‘s threshold of two centuries. The world‘s premiere democracy- Americahad a failure in its union not even halfway to Tyler‘s two-century mark and it is wellknown to be struggling again at 1.5 centuries past its civil war. If Tyler‘s theory and the experiences of antiquity hold fast, the world could see a massive collapse of democracy.

Discussion

First, a note is in order. There are some political science detractors who would highlight the fact that the author of the paper did not mention the contributions of Augustine, Cicero, Hegel, Locke, Mill, Polybius, Rousseau, and some other very important great thinkers. That is true, however the paper only serves to introduce a new concept and has highlighted most of the contributions that the research deemed keen to the democratic age and modern complications. The paper apologizes to any followers of other philosophers who feel slighted by an absence but, in the end, the research paper is neither a book nor thesis. It only introduces a new concept. It should further be noted that the author did not cite the Magna Carta as the Iroquois democracy ran perfectly well without knowledge of it. Going back to Alexander Tyler‘s Eight Stages of Democracy (See Appendix B), Tyler claimed that democratic citizens will go from apathy to dependence and subsequently into dictatorship when democracies collapse from excessive social welfare. (Stages 6, 7, 8) A predictable question would then be How on Earth could democratic people go back from democracy to into bondage? The author of the research paper believed that the answer is simple: drugs and state welfare

345

Wearden (2017) explained that the election of Donald Trump as U.S. President in tandem with England‘s exit from the European Union and automation have caused an angry backlash felt around the world. For the last forty years, well-known Global Elites have benefited from open borders, multiculturalism, free trade, cheap labor, as well as increasing automation. One-Worldism (now called Globalization) made the likes of Bill Gates, Mark Zuckerberg, Warren Buffet, the Koch Brothers, George Soros, et al very wealthy.

Unfortunately, it also brought chronic underemployment, transnational

terrorism, cultural destruction, poverty, as well as many other horrors onto previously harmonious citizenries. Indeed, those clearly are the challenges of the author‘s age. Wearden (2017) illustrated that the average person has expressed their displeasure at the ballot box- in effect a modern Boston Tea Party4- and the ensuing revolt has caught these elites off-guard. Predictably, they want to keep their profits going as they are insulated from the awful side-effects of their global enterprise and they are devising radical ways to stay at the top of the world economic order.

To that end, two major developments are building. First, Harvard Professor Mankiw (2016) explained that a Universal Basic Income (UBI) is a welfare scheme wherein a person gets a base income whether they work or not. Second, The States and Localities (2016) stated that 26 out of 50 American States (52%) have legalized marijuana in one way or another. In vino veritas, alcohol is also freely available in all 50 American States. The agenda is crystal clear: First, give idle people a means to procure basic goods. Second, sanction the means to alter their mental state so as to forget about their dreary lives. Thus, the Global Elites hoard their wealth as everyone becomes poor. This seems to be a very Tyleristic definition of ‗bondage,‘ indeed.

Democracy is not democracy when all roads lead to more of the same. After all, if the government allows or supplies intoxicants at a tax and people require those intoxicants to prevent their suffering, then they will never be in a position to challenge

346

that paradigm in-so-long as the paradigm continues. The rich stay rich. The poor get poorer and there is little possibility of revolution.

Democracy becomes but a Red

Herring5. Meanwhile, to insure success of the scheme, immigration of the uneducated continues because that insures an unwinnable competition for scant jobs against ‗minorities.‘ Unable to win, people fall upon a UBI, state-sponsored intoxicants, and the children of the rich never have to compete for lofty jobs. In reality, that is precisely what the rich Global Elites6 want. It was facilitated through Ted Kennedy‘s treasonous 1965 Hart-Cellar Act and globalization. …but now there are problems. Nobody expected the populist revolt sweeping the globe today. Globalization currently hinges on a one man, one vote paradigm as deft manipulation of immigration can rapidly lopside national demographics in favor of a chosen political party. This general phenomena has also emerged in many of the world‘s other democracies and so numerous democracies are growing unstable around the world. The research offers Invested Democracy to balances the scales.

Concept The research viewed the current ‗one-man, one vote‘ scheme as outdated and proposed a new stage so as to stabilize American democracy.

Dubbed ‗Invested

Democracy,‘ it offered a point-based voting-marketplace replacement that would largely resolve globalist-derived inequities. (See Table 3) The concept allows for the gaining and reducing of voting points, much like currency in a modern economy. (See Table 4) Anyone can get to the top or bottom.

Native Americans living on a reservation

automatically are at the top and convicted felons are at the bottom. An election is won under America‘s established Electoral College system & other existing political systems based on whoever amasses the most points in a given election.

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Table 3: Proposed Scale for Selected Populations Selected Population

Political Currency

Native American on Reservation

6

Veteran

6

Deceased Veteran (Immediate Family)

6

Civil Service/Government Servant

5

One or more Centuries of Ancestry

5

Citizen

1

Felon

0

Jellison (2017) Table 4: Proposed Point Exchange System Selected Population

Point Exchange

Non-Citizen to Citizen

+1

Citizen to Non-Citizen

-1 to -6

Addition to Civil Service/Government

+4

Military Service or Deceased Ancestor, +5 Immediate Family or Self Dishonorable

Discharge:

Includes -5

Immediate Family Members Felony Conviction

-1 to -6

Loss of Citizenship

-1 to -6

Jellison (2017)

The value of Invested Democracy lies in stabilizing an already unstable form of government already extant in the west. It is not intended as a means of importing democracy to the east. In effect, Invested Democracy is the right choice for countries that

348

already have democracy. For them, it is simply the next step. For the Far East, it is extra insulation against western political collapse.

Invested Democracy automatically prioritizes ALL Native Americans who live on a reservation and thus increases their voting power more towards what it should be. The research proposal also allows for ANYONE to get to the top of the voting scale IF they do their patriotic duty, potentially increasing societal harmony. In that sense, it somewhat restores the Mos Maorium of ancient Rome- a sense of civic duty that most modern democracies lack.

Absent that sense, the modern citizen has grown to depend on

generous welfare from the state, does little productive work, and has generally lost all willingness to fight in a war so as to protect the very state that keeps them alive. Viceversa, Invested Democracy also allows for ANYONE to go to the bottom of the scale if they fail to maintain their civic duty through the commission of a felony. The Consequences of a U.S. Democratic Collapse

The U.S. and China are currently the two remaining world superpowers as Russia continues to slowly recover from the 1991 implosion of the U.S.S.R. The U.S.A. has been a stabilizing agent in many volatile regions of the world for decades. While the U.S.A. is currently looking more inwards, it still has the capacity to respond to global affairs. However, should its democracy implode or should the American Union yet again fail, that capacity will likely vanish. It is less likely that all 50 American States would be able to remarry given their severe ideological differences on immigration and globalization. In fact, those very differences might even do more harm than the run-up to the U.S. Civil War (War Between the States). It has become routine for many urban centers and cities throughout many American States to fall into the very excesses that doomed previous democracies while rural areas try to preserve a traditional American way of life. Nasser (2015) clearly indicated that the Native Caucasian population of America is on an arc to become a minority in a mere 30 years and many conservative

349

scholars such as Huntington (1993) doubt that America will survive the changes. Ultimately, the consequence of a democratic failure of the U.S.A. would be reduced global stability, chaos, as well as a destabilized nuclear actor. It could influence other democracies to do the same. Invested Democracy seeks to forestall that.

Final Considerations

Democracy may be a doomed system of government in a globalized world. Graph 1 previously illustrated that the number of democracies have increased nearly 80-fold since the year of 1800. Yet, the University of Chicago Law School as spoken through Ginsburg (2009) found that the average lifespan of a constitution in the same period in time is only 17years.

It is commonly known taught the three major periods of ancient

Egypt lasted 3000 years. Ancient Mesopotamia also lasted 3000 years. The Imperial House of Japan ruled for 2600 years and, per The Language Journal (2012), the average lifespan amongst the world‘s ten-longest serving dynasties was 1679.1 years. (One of those dynasties is still functional.) Table 6 graphically illustrates the difference in life between an autocratic dynasty and the average life of a globalized constitution:

Table 6: Difference in Service-Life Between Ten Oldest Dynasties and All Modern Constitutions Type of Government Autocratic

Dynasty,

Average Lifespan in Years 10 1679.1

Longest All Constitutions, Post-1789

17

Source: University of Chicago Law School (2009), Public Records

It should be noted that in Thailand, our Monarchy has been graciously standing for eight centuries.

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Conclusion

Democracy has historically been a road to cultural desolation. No democratic Nation State has demonstrated the longevity of a strong dynastic or autocratic state. Every democracy known is of a low lifespan. Now facing globalization, the citizenry is made to endure the sale of their culture to globalism. More aspects of the Invested Democracy system are yet to be perfected as it is a new concept. The system is not meant to be perfect at this time but is a new idea that addresses the weaknesses of democracy in the face of globalization. No political theorist could envision the onset or consequences of globalization and, as such, the democratic model must be strengthened with mechanisms that balance the rights of existing citizens while concurrently encouraging new citizens to be good citizens. Stability itself hangs in the balance.

351

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Ginsburg, T. E. (2009, Spring). The University of Chicago Law School: The Lifespan of Written Constitutions. Retrieved February 7, 2017, from http://www.law.uchicago.edu: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/magazine/lifespan

The Language Journal. (2012). Top Ten Dynasties in the World that Ruled the Longest. New York City: Editor Day Translations.

Bangkok Post. (2017). Thailand seen as more corrupt last year. Bangkok: Bangkok Post . The World Bank: Political Stability Index. (2015, January). Political stability- country rankings. Retrieved February 7, 2017, from http://www.theglobaleconomy.com: http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/wb_political_stability/

Geert Hofstede. (2017). United States in comparison with China. Helsinki: Geert Hofstede.

University of Hawai'i. (2016). On the demise of democracy. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i.

Junning, L. (2015, Jluy 23). Direct democracy isn't feasible in modern societies: By Liu Junning, Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University. Retrieved February 9,

2017,

from

http://www.swissinfo.ch:

http://www.swissinfo.ch/directdemocracy/opinion_-direct-democracy-isn-t-feasible-inmodern-societies-/41557818

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California Public Schools. (2017). Similarities and Differences between the Roman Empire and the United States of America. Sacramento: California State Government. Tridimas, George. (2013). War, disenfranchisement and the fall of the ancient Athenian democracy. Newtownabbey: University of Ulster.

St. Anselm College. (2017). History of Rome- Roman Republic Timeline. Manchester: St. Anselm College.

Kaster, R. (2006). Values and Virtues, Roman. Princeton: Princeton University.

British Library Board. (2017, January 1). Online Gallery: Illuminating the RenaissanceA timeline of contemporary European events, 1400-1550. Retrieved February 9, 2017, from http://www.bl.uk: http://www.bl.uk/onlinegallery/features/flemish/timeline.html Luther, M. (1517). 95 Theses [Translated into contemporary English by Doubleday Publishers, 1961]. New York City: Doubleday.

United States Census Bureau. (2010). 2006-2010 ACS 5-Year Selected Population Tables Geographic Comparison Tables (GCTs). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Federal Government.

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Footnotes

1

A ‗Four Letter Word‘ is an American idiom that translates to a forbidden expletive. In

this case, the author is using the nuances of Native English to suggest that many people are frustrated with their democracies all around the world. It is not meant as a point of bias. 2

Hugh Murray is a retired American Civil Rights Icon who worked with Martin Luther

King Jr. during America‘s 1960‘s Civil Rights movement. He now openly acknowledges that the movement was a dismal failure. He is one of the last American Civil Rights leaders alive and one of few to escape assassination or other untimely demise. Mr. Murray holds two advanced degrees from the USA and lectured at university in China for a number of years. 3

‘wanna-be‘ is an American idiom that roughly translates to someone or something that

foolishly desires to copy someone or something famous. The author is again using the nuances of Native English to illustrate a point. 4

The Boston Tea Party was a precursor to the American War of Independence whereupon

angry colonists dumped British tea into the Harbor of Boston as an act of obscenity against the British Parliament and excessive taxation devoid of representation. 5

‘Red Herring‘ is an American expression that signifies something as a distraction or a

façade. 6

The author capitalized ‗Global Elites‟ as to refer to the wealthiest 1% who still support

globalization.

This would largely include the World Leaders who meet in Davos,

Switzerland every year for the World Economic Forum.

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Appendix A

Source: The United States Government-Census Bureau (2010) 2006-2010

ACS

5-Year

Selected

Population

Tables

Geographic Comparison Tables (GCTs) Census GCT Number

Table

Table Title

2000 SF4 Equivale nt*

GCT0501

Percent Who Are Foreign Born

GCT-P10

Percent of the Native Population Born in their State of Residence GCT0601

(Including Puerto Rico)

GCT-P10

Percent of People 1 Year and Over Who Lived in a Different GCT0701

House in Either the U.S. or Puerto Rico 1 Year Ago

GCT-P10

Percent of People 1 Year and Over Who Lived in a Different GCT0702

House Within the Same State (Including Puerto Rico) 1 Year Ago GCT-P10 Percent of People 1 Year and Over Who Lived in a Different

GCT0703

State (Including Puerto Rico) 1 Year Ago

GCT-P10

GCT0801

Mean Travel Time to Work

GCT-P12

GCT0803

Percent of Workers Who Traveled To Work by Carpool

GCT-P12

Percent of Workers Who Traveled To Work by Public GCT0804

Transportation

GCT-P12

Percent of Workers Who Worked Outside of County of GCT0805

Residence

GCT-P12

GCT1105

Average Household Size

GCT-H8

362

Percent of People Who Have Completed High School (Including GCT1501

Equivalency)

GCT-P11

GCT1502

Percent of People Who Have Completed a Bachelor's Degree

GCT-P11

GCT1503

Percent of People Who Have Completed an Advanced Degree

GCT-P11

Percent of People Who Speak a Language Other Than English at GCT1601

Home

GCT-P11

GCT1603

Percent of People Who Speak English Less Than "Very Well"

GCT-P11

GCT1701

Percent of People Below Poverty Level

GCT-P14

GCT1702

Percent of Related Children Below Poverty Level

GCT-P14

GCT1703

Percent of People 65 Years and Over Below Poverty Level

GCT-P14

GCT1901

Median Household Income

GCT-P14

GCT1902

Median Family Income

GCT-P14

Percent of the Employed Civilian Population in Management, GCT2401

Business, and Financial Occupations

GCT-P13

Percent of the Employed Civilian Population in Service GCT2403

Occupations

GCT-P13

Percent of the Employed Civilian Population in Manufacturing GCT2404

Occupations

GCT-P13

Percent of Occupied Housing Units That Were Moved Into in GCT2504

2005 or Later

GCT-H8

Percent of Occupied Housing Units With 1.01 or More Occupants GCT2509

Per Room

GCT-H8

GCT2510

Median Housing Value of Owner-Occupied Housing Units

GCT-H9

Median Monthly Housing Costs for Owner-Occupied Housing GCT2511

Units With a Mortgage

GCT-H9

363

*All equivalents to Census 2000 SF4 are roughly determine. Source: United States Census Bureau (2010)

364

Appendix B Alexander Tyler‘s 8 Stages of Government Stage

Societal State

1

Bondage to Spiritual Faith

2

Spiritual Faith to Courage

3

Courage to Liberty

4

Liberty to Abundance

5

Abundance to Complacency

6

Complacency to Apathy

7

Apathy to Dependence

8

Dependence to Bondage

Source: University of Hawai‘i (2016) Note: Alexander Tyler suspected that these stages would occur over the course of 200 years. However, the author of the research paper suspects that globalization will greatly accelerate this cycle and The University of Chicago Law School (2009) strongly supports that hypothesis in their text. (p.6- see ethnic heterogeneity)

365

Appendix C

Democratic Mortality Rate 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50%

Democracies Extant at 18 Years

40%

Democracies Extant at 50 Years

30% 20% 10% 0% Democracies Extant at 18 Years

Democracies Extant at 50 Years

Source: The University of Chicago Law School (2009) Note: The University of Chicago determined that approximately 7% of all democratic constitutions perish within the first two years on a global basis, but said mortality jumps to 15% as a mean when looking to Latin America and Africa for the same period in time.

366

Appendix D

Average Lifespan in Years of Democratic Constitution by Area 35 30 25 Europe

20

Asia

15

Latin America

10

Africa

5 0 Europe

Asia

Latin America

Africa

367

Human Dignity as a Criterion of Democracy Pavel Doubek Deakin University Abstract Legal and social science describe democracy with its basic elements, for example the distribution of state power, pluralism, elections, liberty, equality, human rights, protection of minorities. The character of democratic society (and thus the distinction between democracy and totalitarianism) can be seen also in the relation between the state and the individual. When the state works for the individual and respects his or her choices, we can say that this state should be democratic. On the other hand, if the state is ignorant to the wishes and desires of its own citizens and treat the individual rather as object of state interests than as an independent human being, we should be very reluctant to consider that state as democratic. It should be noted, however, that the distinction is not always that clear. The conception of modern democratic state requires that the state should be govern by the principle of rule of law and should respect, protect and fulfil the fundamental human rights and basic freedoms of every human being, which means that state should above all be respectful to the right of everyone to make autonomous decisions about one‘s life. In this paper I wish to focus on conception of human dignity and autonomy of a will of a person with respect to his or her right to physical integrity covered by Article 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I will analyse the law and practice of involuntary sterilization of Roma women in Czechoslovakia during the Communist regime and non-consensual vaccination policy in contemporary Czech law. On these two examples we will see the different state approach to the rights of the most vulnerable people, which helps us to understand better the values on which democracy is built and also the distinction between democracy and totalitarianism. Introduction Legal and social science describes democracy with its basic elements, for example the distribution of state power, pluralism, elections, liberty, equality, human rights, protection of minorities.

368

The character of democratic society (and thus the distinction between democracy and totalitarianism) can be also seen in the relation between the state and the individual. When the state works for the individual and respects his or her choices, we can say that this state should be democratic. On the other hand, if the state is ignorant to the wishes and desires of its own citizens and treat the individual rather as object of state interests than as an independent human being, we should be very reluctant to consider that state as democratic. It should be noted, however, that the distinction is not always that clear. The conception of modern democratic state requires that the state should be govern by the principle of rule of law and should respect, protect and fulfil the fundamental human rights and basic freedoms of every human being, which means that state should above all be respectful to the right of everyone to make autonomous decisions about one‘s life. In this paper I wish to focus on conception of human dignity and autonomy of a will of a person with respect to his or her right to physical integrity covered by Article 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I analyse the law and practice of involuntary sterilization of Roma women in Czechoslovakia during the Communist regime and nonconsensual vaccination policy in contemporary Czech law. On these two examples we will see the different state approach to the rights of the most vulnerable people, which helps us to understand better the values on which democracy is built and also the distinction between democracy and totalitarianism. This paper aims to assess the interface between the state, respectivelly public state´s interests and individual, respectivelly individual´s dignity and human rights. It examines the concept of human dignity and human rights in light of the issue of involuntary medical interventions.

369

Relationship Between the State and the Individual in the Health Care Issues The Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the “Constitution”) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter referred to as the “Charter”) express that it is only permissible to exercise the state power within legal limits, obligations may only be imposed by law and within its limits, while maintaining the fundamental rights and freedoms, and the legal limits of the fundamental rights and freedoms must respect the conditions laid down in the Charter.56 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine lays down in Article 2 that the ―interests and welfare of the human being shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science”. It is a general principle of current medical law stressing that in the conflict of interests between the state and the individual, the priority should be given to the human being. Explanatory report to this article holds that “the whole Convention, the aim of which is to protect human rights and dignity, is inspired by the principle of the primacy of the human being, and all its articles must be interpreted in this light.”57 It should be stressed, however, that the Convention itself limits the patient´s right to make autonomous decision concerning his or her body and life, since the Article 26 lists exceptions when a free will of patient can be override.

56

Article 2 (3) of the Act No. 1/1993 Coll., the Constitution of the Czech Republic and Article 2 (2) and 4 (1) of the Act No. 2/1993 Coll., the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. 57 Council of Europe. (1997). Explanatory Reportto the Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity of theHuman Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine:Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. Retrieved from https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680 0ccde5.

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Paternalism v. Partnership Czech health care system can be described as paternalistic. Paternalism refers to the relationship between a doctor and his or her patient. When a doctor considers himself/herself as a father (in latin „pater―) who knows better what is good for the patient, we can say that this relationship is paternalistic. Paternalistic approach is reluctant to include patient into the decision making process, because it is a doctor who has a relevant know-how, therefore the doctor should make the decisions about the treatment. On the other hand the partnership conception is built on autonomy of a will and considers patient and doctor rather as partners, who communicate the proposed treatment, however the patient is the one, who makes final decision.

Human dignity Human dignity is a legal and philosophical conception that is understood differentlyaround the world. Some legal systems consider human dignity as a fundamental human right that has the same value as other human rights like right to life, right to speech, right to vote, etc. Other legal systems on the other hand consider human dignity as a core value that has a supreme position in the system of human rights. While the former conception of human dignity sets forth that human dignity should be limited like any other human right (it should be for example acceptable to torture terrorist suspect in order to receive information that should thwart terrorist attack), the latter conception insists that human dignity should never be restricted (even in situation when there is an imminent threat to health and lives of other people). The case law of European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as “the ECHR”) nevertheless sets forth that human dignity is a fundamental value and must not be limited, otherwisesuch an action should be inconsistent with Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights

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(hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”) which prohibits torture, and other forms of cruel and inhuman treatment and punishment. Human dignity stands for the basic elements of our humanity. Human dignity refers to an indivisible and interdependent right to make autonomous decisions about my own life. I expect that others will treat me like an independent human being rather than mere object of social relations. Ahron Barak argues that essential element of human dignity is a physical and moral integrity of person.58

Right to Physical Integrity of Person While the human dignity shloud be considered as a supreme value, the right to physical integrity of person is widely considered as a „mere― human right that can be limited if some circumstaneces occur, especially when an individual threatens health or life of others. However it does not mean that right to physical integrity is not important. On the contrary, this right has high importance as it is evident from the ECHR case law, international treaties as well as from reports and recommendations of international human rights bodies (hereinafter reffered to as „international soft-law“). In case Y. F. v. Turkeythe ECHR has argued that even minor compulsory medical intervention constitutes an interference with this right.59 In a case V. C. v. Slovakiathe ECHR holds that arbitrary breach of this right can attack the human dignity and amount to degrading and inhuman treatment.60

58

BARAK, Aharon. (2015). Human Dignity – The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. p. 237. Barak holds that „the dignity of a human being is his free will; the freedom to shape his life and fulfill himself. It is a person´s freedom to write his life story. At the core of a person´s humanity stands the autonomy of her will, which means that person herself – she, and no one else – determines her destiny.“ (p. 144.). 59 Y. F. v. Turkey, Application No. 24209/94, ECHR Judgment 22 July 2003, para 33. 60 V. C. v. Slovakia, Application No. 18968/07, ECHR Judgment 8 November 2011.

372

Protection of physical and moral integrity of a person is enshrined in Article 8 (X and Y v. Netherlands, Benderskiy v. Ukraine)61 and Article 3 (V. C. v. Slovakia)62 of the Convention, as well as in Article 5 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine.63 Limitation of the right to physical integrity Article 26 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine states that the measure limiting fundamental right 1) must be in accordance with the law, 2) must pursue a legitime aim and 3) must be necessary in democratic society.The first criterion can be described in a way that restrictions of fundamenal rights must not be arbitrary, but must be regulated by law.64 The second criterion is much more interesting due to different conception of „legitime aim― among the national legislations and practices. In history people were restricted in their liberty and treated involuntarly because of eugenic, social and racial interest, and these interestswere part of the offical state policy supported with legislation and judiciary. Nowadays, it seems to me, that only two legitime aims justify involuntary intervention into the physical integrity of a person: a protection of health of a patient himself/herself and a protection of health of others.

61

X and Y v. Netherlands, Application No. 8978/80, ECHR Judgment 26 March, para 22. Benderskiy v. Ukraine, Application No. 22750/02, ECHR Judgment 15 November 2007, para 59. 62 V. C. v. Slovakia, Application No. 18968/07, ECHR Judgment 8 November 2011, para 144. 63 Article 5 which states that „an intervention in the health field may only be carried out after the person concerned has given free and informed consent to it.” I can also refer to the Article 17 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities that regulates fundamental rights of people with disabilities. 64 The European Committee preventing Torture (hereinafter referred as to „ the CPT „) holds that „any derogation from this fundamental principle (right to be treated with free and informed consent) should be based upon law and only relates to clearly and strictly defined exceptional circumstances.“ In: Council of Europe. (1998). Involuntary placement in psychiatric establishments - Extract from the 8th General Report of the CPT, para. 41. Retrieved from: http://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/standards#psychiatry-social

373

Public interest that justified involuntary medical interventions I pointed out that Aricle 2 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine gives preference to the interests and welfare of the human being over the sole interest of society or science.65History of law and medical practice shows that both, the principle of priority of human being and the principle of non-discrimination has been violated since time immemorial.However, the systematic violations of human rights has never occured in a society that fully respects the aforementioned principles. Contrary, societies that prefer public interests over the private interests of individuals or discriminate certain groups of people are more willing to violate human rights of individuals. Involuntary medical interventions were jusitified by eugenic, social and economic public interests. This is also the case of involuntary sterilization of Roma women in the Czechoslovakia. Eugenics Eugenics can be explained as quazi scientific discipline targeted on artificial improvement of the human race.66 The purpose of eugenics is to support and protect reproduction of people with desirable characteristics (good health, high IQ) and prevent reproduction of people with undesirable characteristics (for example people with mental disorder).67 I can point out to the case of Buck v. Bell68 when US Supreme Court decided that eugenic involuntary sterilization is in compliance with US Constitution. We can divide eugenics into a positive and a negative. Positive eugenics aims at promoting the reproduction of healthy and strong individuals69, while negative eugenics seeks to eliminate those, whose are the „burden― to social progress. Public Defender of Rights argued that Czech and Czechoslovak eugenics considers sterilization as a “selective 65

Please see also the Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights For more information about eugenics, please see: Genetic generation. Introduction to Eugenics. Retrieved from: http://knowgenetics.org/history-of-eugenics/. 67 Please see book The Origin of Species by Charles Darwin. 68 Buck v. Bell. Judgement No. 292. US Supreme Court Judgement 2. 5. 1927. 69 I can mention as an example Nazi Germany, where „desirable couples― were supported to have a children and were sanctioned if a woman underwent an interruption. 66

374

therapeutic and prophylactic method aimed at control the sexual life of “inferior people” and set a limits of this “inferiority”.70 Social Interests Hereinafter I point out that involuntary sterilization of Roma women in Czechoslovakia has been performed in order to solve social and economic problems. Justification of involuntary medical interventions by social interests thus closely relates to economic and also to eugenic reasons. Social justification of involuntary medical intervention seeks to protect social welfare of patient, his or her family or possibly the welfare of whole society. I wish to mention three judgements which deal with forced sterilisation of women with disability and are justified with the „best interest― of women concerned. In a case of Re Eve the Supreme Court of Canada denied the socially justified sterilization of women with metal disorder and held that the benefits of non-therapeutic sterilizationare disputable and cannot be compared to the physical harm of a person.71On the other hand in the case of Re B72 the House of Lords held that social interets should be taken into account when considering what is the best interests of person concerned.73 The third judgement I wish to mention at this point is a case of Re A, when the Court of Appeal argued that „social reasons for carrying out of non-therapeutic invasive surgery is not part of the present state of the law.“74

70

Public Defender of Rights. (2005). Final Statement of the Public Defender of Rights in the Matter of Sterilization Performed in Contravention of the Law and Proposed Remedial Measures. Brno. Retrieved from: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/CZE/INT_CERD_NGO_CZE_70_8507_ E.pdf. p 65. 71 E (Mrs) v Eve, No. 2 S.C.R. 388. Judgement of the Supreme Court of Canada (1986). 72 Re B (1988) AC 199 (House of Lords of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland). 73 DAVIES, Michael. (1996). Textbook on Medical Law. London: Blackstone Press Limited. 74 Re A, No. 1 FLR 549, [2000] 1 FCR 193. Judgement of Court of Appeal (civil division). (2000).

375

Economic Wellbeing Third public interest that we have to take into account when analysing involuntary medical treatment is economic interest. The protection of wellbeing of a society has a narrow link to social as well as to eugenic interets. As pointed out above, we can argue, that sterilization of disabled women, who is not able to carry out the duties of motherhood, is justified in the interest of social wellbeing as well as economic wellbeing, because it saves the budget from the expenditures on the social benefits.75 Criterion of medical necessity

Limitation of the right to physical integrity must fulfill the criterion of necessity in democratic society and must be proportionate.76 This criterion means that the measure limiting human right is only one possible in order to protect certain public interest, in other word it is not possible to use any more considerate measures.77 All involuntary

interventions into thephysical integrity of a patient must respond to theactualthreat to

health of the patient or others, in words

of the ECHR, it mustcorrespond to a pressing social need.

The intervention must be also proportionate to the „legitimate aim pursued“.78

75

Similar concerns can be raised upon the reasoning of treatment in the end of life situations, including euthanasia. 76 Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania, Application No. 33348/96, Judgment 17 December 2004. 77 The ECHR considers the question of the necessity in the case Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, when the ECHR states as follows: ―Firstly, "necessary" in this context does not have the flexibility of such expressions as "useful", "reasonable", or "desirable", but implies the existence of a "pressing social need" for the interference in question.“77In the judgement Olsson v. Sweden, ECHR sets forth that „the notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.“In: Olsson v. Sweden, Application no. 10465/83, ECHR Judgement 24 March 1988. In: Kmec, J., Kosař, D., Kratochvíl, J., Bobek, M. Europen Convention on Human Rights. Commentary. 1. ed. Praha: C. H. Beck, 2012, p. 885. 78 Herring gives an example: ―If a terrible disease were to take a grip on the population, threatening to kill thousands of people, it is not difficult to believe that the court would permit the taking of blood from a person who appeared to have an antibody. Also, perhaps, if, in order to a save another person´s life, a very minor invasion of another person were required (such as the taking of a hair), a court might be tempted to authorize it. In: HERRING Jonathan. (2014). The medical law and ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 173.

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When there is no sufficient evidence that the

criterion ofneccessity is fulfiled, the principle

“infavoremlibertatis‖ should be applied. Involuntary Sterilization of Roma Women in the Czechoslovakia The Communist regime ruled in the Czechoslovakia between the years 1948 – 1989. Nondemocratic totalitarian regime annuled freedom of speech, freedom of movement, expropriated private property, eliminated human rights and basic freedoms of every individual staying on Czechoslovak territory, as well as suppressed the rights of minorities,

especially

Roma

ethnic

minority (the

largest

ethic

minority in

Czechoslovakia). Cahn holds that „the history of Roma is not a happy one. Soon after their arrival in Europe Roma were excluded in Western Europe, and periodically subjected to raw persecution.“79The Roma society in Czechoslovakia was nearly annihilated in holocaust during the World War II. After the war the Roma community was subject to discrimination and oppression under a communist reigme, because it was believed that they get their share of social and economic difficulties of the early communist society.80The anti-Roma policy was discriminatory and was influenced by eugenic ideology and social and economic interests of the major society. It was rather general hostility toward Roma people that gave rise to eugenic policies and practices which goal was to assimilate the Roma ethic group within the major Czech society with means of forced resettlement of Roma families and reduce Romani birth rates with means of compulsory sterilization of Roma women.

79

CLAUDE, Cahn. (2015). Human Rights, State Sovereignty and Medical Ethics – Examining Struggles Aroud Coercive Sterilization of Romani Women. Leiden/Boston: Brill Nijhoff and Hotei Publishing, p. 1. 80 It should be stressed at this place that many members of Roma community were poor, uneducated and dependent on social allowances. Because of lack of resources and informations, they were extremly vulnerable, suggestible and easily influenced.

377

The practice of involuntary sterilization of Roma women was subject to investigation by dissident group Charter 77 and Public Defender of Rights Otakar Motejl 81. The dissident group Charter 77 classified aforementioned state policy as mearly reaching the crime of genocide.82 The

remarkable

feature

of

the

sterilization

practices

was

their

covert

nature.83Czechoslovak authorities were very vigilant in covering the anti Roma policy and keep secret everything that has anything to do with sterilization and Roma people. The state therefore did not enact any legislation that expressly forced Roma people to undergo sterilization. There was however legal regulation that is considered as a legal basis for involuntary sterilization. The section 35 of the Decree of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs of the Czech Socialist Republic No. 152/1988 Coll. states that ―citizens who have undergone a medical intervention under special regulations in the interest of a healthy population…can receive financial allowance…within one year after the medical surgery”. The practice shows that this allowance (hereinafter referred as to “the sterilization allowance”) was connected to sterilization surgery and was intended to persuade Roma women to undergo sterilization. Czechoslovak dissident group the Charter 77 as well as the Public Defender of Rights gathered enough evidence proving that sterilizations were performed with considerable support from policy-makers and 81

Public Defender of Rights. (2005). Final Statement of the Public Defender of Rights in the Matter of Sterilization Performed in Contravention of the Law and Proposed Remedial Measures. Brno. Retrieved from: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/CZE/INT_CERD_NGO_CZE_70_8507_ E.pdf 82 "Unless persistent failures of the policy result in a consistent review of all itscomponents, Czechoslovak institutions will very soon reach a situation in which they willface charges of committing a crime against section 259 of the Criminal Code (the genocide act)“. In: HAVEL, Václav; HEJDÁNEK, Ladislav. Document of Charter 77 – No. 23 [online]. vons.cz, 2007. Full document available in Czech language retrieved from: http://www.vons.cz/data/pdf/infoch/1978/INFOCH_15_1978.pdf. Retrieved from: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/CZE/INT_CERD_NGO_CZE_70_8507_ E.pdf, p. 25. 83 Segregation practices of Roma people we also within the system of education that was fully acknowledged in D. H. and Others v. Czech Republic, Application no. 57325/00, ECHR Judgement 13 November 2007.

378

national structures and other public authorities. Roma women were highly supported, influenced and sometimes even forced to undergo sterilization, despite of Czechoslovak women who usually knew nothing about the sterilization allowance. I can mention for example the document of City Council of Brno called ―Proposal to improve care of Gypsy population‖ which was focused on “promoting health education to reduce fertility and thus preventing undesirable sprawl of Gypsy families”.84 Although the Roma women usually signed the consent form for sterilization, the victims later said that they had no idea of what they were consenting with. The Public Defender of Rights concluded that women lacked free will to consent, because of the pressure of public authorities and influence of financial allowance. Furthermore the consent was not ―informed‖, because women did not receive information on purpose of medical intervention, its outcomes or side effects.85 In some cases women signed the consent form in a state when they were preparing for operations and were under the influence of drugs with sedative effect. Despite the fall of communist regime in 1989, the practices of compulsory sterilization of Roma women had continued. We can see two landmark events that changed the practices: Firstly in 1991 the Decree No. 152/1988 Coll. including the sterilization allowance was annulled, secondly in 2011 the Health Service Act86together with Specific Health Service

84

The Statement of Municipaly Office of Brno from 15. 12. 1970, In: Final Statement of the Public Defender of Rights in the Matter of Sterilization Performed in Contravention of the Law and Proposed Remedial Measures, p. 47. 85 I can mention a case of sterilization Mrs. G. that Public Defender of Rights had investigated: “Mrs. G states that she was sterilized in 1979 in a Most hospital. Nobody had justified the need for the intervention to her. A social worker had been retaining her child allowance for two-and-a-half years until she would undergo sterilization. In the hospital she had been told that she would no longer be able to have children. She had signed a paper as she had had to. Mrs. G. stated that she found both writing and reading difficult. She had been promised CSK 2,000 for the intervention, which had later actually been paid.” In: Final Statement of the Public Defender of Rights in the Matter of Sterilization Performed in Contravention of the Law and Proposed Remedial Measures, p. 55. 86 Act No. 372/2011 Coll., on Health Services and the Terms and Conditions for the Providing of Such Services (Health Services Act), as amended later (hereinafter reffered to as the “Health Services Act“).

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Act87with strict sterilization regulation was adopted. It is still under the debate whether the state should be liable for nonconsensual sterilizations that were occurred between the years 1989 – 2011. I can sum up that sterilization of Roma women was a tool of a social work and covert official state policy. Human rights of an individual were violated in a name of „higher goods― – eugenic, social and economic. The doctors did not consider woman as an independent human being with full right to make autonomous decision about her health and reproduction. Contrarily, the woman‘s rights were marginalized and her personality destroyed to the extent that she could consider herself rather as a mere object in the hands of public interest, than an individual human being. Despite the massive violation of human rights during the Communist reigme, Czech government is still reluctant to proposethe adoption of legal regulation that would make possible reparation for sterilized women and their families. Compulsory Vaccination in the Czech Republic The purpose of vaccination is to prevent the incidence and spread of infectious diseases among people.88 In order to ensure the high level of vaccination coverage of population (and thus to create the so-called collective immunity), vaccination is compulsory in the Czech Republic, however there is no statutory vaccination obligation in many European states89. Health Services Act lays down general obligation to undergo involuntary medical treatment.90 However, the obligation to undergo vaccination is enshrined in provision of

87

Act No. 373/2011 Coll., on Specific Health Services, as amended later (hereinafter reffered to as the “Specific Health Services Act“). 88 Adoption of certain immunization state policy is also positive state obligation under the right to health enshrined in International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. Please see General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12). 89 Austria, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Canada. 90 Provision of Section 38 (7) of the Health Services Act

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Section 46 of the Act on Protection of Public Health91 and the detailed conditions for vaccination92 are enshrined in secondary legislation93. I would like to highlight compulsory children vaccination, because it is very controversial and raise many difficult legal and ethical questions.94Consent to vaccination is given by children‘s parents who sometimes object the vaccination, because they believe it is not in the best interest of the protection of health of their children 95. However if parents refuse to give a consent to vaccination, they commit an administrative offence96 and every parent can face a financial penalty up to 10 000 CZK (395 USD). The compulsory vaccination cannot be forcibly enfroced, since coercion is possible only when there is an imminent threat to the patient‗s health or health of other people. 97 I mentioned above an example of psychiatric drug with sedative efffect that can be legally administred to the aggresive patient. Vaccination, however, is considered as a preventive measure, rather than emergency treatment. I wish to stress furthermore that Czech law does not contain any legal regulation of the state‘s liability for injury caused by vaccination, however the Constitutional Court express an opinion (as „obiter dictum―) that state should estabilish the compensation mechanism.98

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Act No. 258/2000 Coll., on protection of public healthand amendment to some related Acts (hereinafter reffered to as „the Act on Protection of Public Health―). 92 Determination of disease, type of vaccine, dosage of vaccine, vaccination period, etc. 93 Degree No. 537/2006 Coll. on the vaccination against infectious diseases (hereinafter reffered to as the ―Degree―) 94 Children has duty to undergo vaccination of Infarix Hexa Vaccine which contains vaccines against Diphtheria, Tetanus, Pertussis, Invasive disease caused by Haemophilus Influenzae B, Polio and Hepatitis B vaccination. The Degree lays down that children must undergo vaccination in the very age (from 9th week). 95 It should be noted that Infarix Hexa Vaccine contains vaccines against diseases that are not present among children (Hepatitis B), are not transmitted from person to person (Tetanus) or does not occur on the Czech territory (Polio since 1961, Diphtheria since 1995). 96 Section 29 (1) (f) of the Act on Administrative Offences 97 Provision of Section 38 and 39 of the Health Services Act 98 Compulsory vaccination case I., No. Pl. US 19/14, Constitutional Court Judgement 21 January 2015

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The statutory regulation of compulsory vaccination does not allow any exception, apart from health contraindication of children. Therefore the prescribed vaccine must be accepted by the parents without any reservation. Law does not allow to take into account conscience and thought, ethical and philosophical beliefs of parents or their simple concerns about the health of their child. The „turning point― was the latest Constititutional Court‘s Judgement on compulsory vaccination99, when the Court concluded that parents possess so called „conscience reservation― that allows them to refuse the compulsory vaccination. The Court however specified the conditions of conscience reservation and stressed that it should be apllied in the very limited circumstances. In case Solomakhin v. Ukranie the ECHR holds that „compulsory vaccination – as an involuntary medical treatment – amounts to an interference with the right to respect for one‟s private life, which includes a person‟s physical and psychological integrity“100 I am of a view that compulsory vaccination pursues a legitime aim, since it seeks to protect public health from infectious diseases. On the other hand I do not think that legal regulation will satisfy the criterion of necessity, because children must undergo vaccination in very vulnerable age, even against diseases that does not present among children, are not transmitted from person to person and does not occur on the Czech territory. Relatively good epidemiological situation in the Czech Republic and comparable conditions in other European countries, where the vaccination is voluntary, should be also taken into account. Last but not least it should be stressed that the state imposes compulsory vaccination upon children in the interest of society, but concurently waives its liability for possible damages caused by vaccination.

99

Compulsory vaccination case II., No. I.ÚS 1253/14, Constitutional Court Judgement 22 December 2015. Solomakhin v. Ukraine, Application No. 24429/03, ECHR Judgement 24 September 2012, para. 33.

100

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Conclusion Involuntary sterilization of Roma women in the Czechoslovakia is an example of massive human rights violation. Sterilization did not pursue the legitime aim to protect health of women and rather was govern by discrimination and eugenic ideology. These acts were therefore incompatible with human dignity of women concerned. Considering the fact that this inhuman treatment represents part of official state policy, I can consider the reigme as non-democratic from the human dignity perspective. It would require further in-depth analysis whether the non-democratic situation from the human dignity perspective had continued even after the year 1989. In any caseit is questionable whether the state fulfil its positive obligation to protect women againts medical malpractice, since the former legal regulation was insuficient and there were no effective measures that can prevent such a malpractice, possibly still influenced with anti-Roma ideas. I said above that compulsory vaccination pursues a legitime aim and partly has a therapeutic benefit for children concerned, thus I do not think that compulsory vaccination breaches human dignity of childrens. State on the other hand, imposes upon children an inappropriate burden for the sake of public health and at the same time refuses its liability for possible injuries. It should be stressed however that refferring to the Constitutional Court Judgemnet No. I.ÚS 1253/14, parents can turn to „conscience reservation―and refuse to consent to vaccination. They have also (at least theoretical) right to file an action and seek damages, ifany injury will occur. I can conclude however that it should be crucial aim of democratic state to ensure that all medical intervention into the physical integrity of person be performed voluntairly with free and informed consent101 and if any injury will occure there should exist effective tools how to seek the damages.

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Simackova also argues that „the long-term objective of state that respects the freedom of its citizens should be that all medical procedures are performed on the basis of free and informed consent“ In:

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The human dignity is very „fragile―. Especially people wih mental disabilities, elederly people, minors or people restricted in their liberty are particularly vulnerable. One of the most important role of contemporary democratic legal state is to protect, respect and fulfill the human dignity and fundamental human rights and freedoms of every human being. If state fails to cope with this task or even contributes to human rights violations, there can appear legitime question whether such a state is still democratic.

Compulsory vaccination case I., No. Pl. US 19/14, Constitutional Court Judgement 21 January 2015, para. 2.

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Grassroots Politics, Political Networks and Patronage Penyingkiran Dr. Patau Rubis dari Parti SNAP dan Kekalahan Dalam Pilihan Raya Negeri pada tahun 1996 Suzanne Anak Atar & Baszley Bee B. Basrah Bee Universiti Malaysia Sabah Abstrak Dr. Patau Rubis merupakan seorang aktor politik Bidayuh yang sangat dikenali pada kemunculan sulung beliau dalam politik setelah menang bertanding di kawasan DUN N.2 Tasik Biru dalam pilihan raya DUN Sarawak pada tahun 1983. Kemenangan Dr. Patau Rubis membolehkan beliau dilantik sebagai Ahli Dewan Undangan Negeri bagi kawasan tersebut. Kemunculan Dr. Patau Rubis dalam arena politik DUN N.2 Tasik Biru meletakkan beliau sebagai seorang yang dilihat bertanggungjawab sepenuhnya memastikan kemenangan bagi parti SNAP dan BN untuk dua penggal berikutnya di kawasan tersebut. Namun, karier politik Dr.Patau Rubis tidak bertahan lama ekoran penyingkiran beliau dari kabinet dan parti SNAP. Beberapa isu dibincangkan seperti pembangunan pekan baru Bau, politik penaungan dan isu masa depan politik Bidayuh pada tahun 1996. Meskipun beliau bertanding di dalam pilihan raya negeri pada tahun 1996, beliau telah kalah dan antara faktor kekalahan beliau banyak didorong oleh kekuatan jentera BN, Dr.Patau Rubis bertanding sebagai calon Bebas, kekangan kewangan serta desakan dan gesaan golongan ahli politik Bidayuh yang mempengaruhi minda masyarakat Bidayuh di DUN N.2 Tasik Biru. Kaedah yang digunakan untuk mengutip data ialah melalui temubual yang telah dibuat bersama dengan beberapa ahli politik Bidayuh. Akhbar, laporan serta dokumen daripada agensi kerajaan negeri yang berkaitan turut digunakan. Kajian mendapati penyingkiran dari parti SNAP dan kekalahan dalam pilihanraya DUN 1996 telah secara perlahan menamatkan karier cemerlang politik Dr Patau Rubis. Meskipun kalah namun beliau tetap kekal memberi sumbangan kepada masyarakat Bidayuh serta ideologi politik ‗Sarawak for Sarawakian‘. Kata kunci: Bidayuh, pilihan raya, Dewan Undangan Negeri Sarawak, Sarawak National Party (SNAP), Dr. Patau Rubis.

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Pengenalan Kepimpinan merujuk kepada seseorang individu yang mampu mempengaruhi individu lain, kumpulan, organisasi dan seumpamanya kepada pencapaian matlamat tertentu. Pada asasnya pemimpin ialah seorang yang membimbing dan menunjuk ajar, bersesuaian dengan

kedudukan

sebagai

individu

yang

lebih

berilmu,

lebih

bijak

dan

bertanggungjawab terhadap pengikut atau anak buahnya (Ahmad Attory Hussain, 2010). Kriteria ini bertetapan dengan penampilan Dr. Patau Rubis apabila dicalonkan oleh parti SNAP bagi kawasan DUN N.2 Tasik Biru pada pilihan raya DUN tahun 1983. Beliau merupakan seorang ahli politik Bidayuh yang dilihat begitu menyerlah dalam arena politik Bidayuh dan SNAP pada ketika itu. Beliau mula dituduh bertanggungjawab dalam mencetuskan konspirasi pengkhianatan kepada parti SNAP apabila beliau dikatakan telah memberikansokongan kepada calon bebas dalam pilihan raya umum 1995 untuk menentang calon parti BN. Pada masa yang sama Dr. Patau Rubis merupakan orang nombor dua dalam parti SNAP bergandingan dengan Datuk Amar James Wong yang selaku presiden parti. Dalam menghadapi krisis tersebut, sokongan terhadap parti dan pemimpin menjadi suatu kebimbangan kepada SNAP dan masyarakat di DUN Tasik Biru. Namun, kebimbangan tersebut ternyata meleset apabila masyarakat Bidayuh terus memberikan sokongan kepada parti SNAP. Politik penaungan dijadikan tanda aras utama mengapa sokongan serta kesetiaan yang diberikan oleh masyarakat Bidayuh yang begitu padu terhadap parti SNAP dan BN. Kertas kerja ini cuba membincangkan krisis politik yang berlaku di DUN Tasik Biru pada tempoh 1995-1996 khusus meninjau sebab musabab kepada pudarnya hayat politik Dr. Patau Rubis dalam perjuangan politik masyarakat Bidayuh DUN Tasik Biru. Profil DUN Tasik Biru Kawasan pilihan raya DUN Tasik Biru terletak di dalam sebuah daerah yang kecil iaitu di Daerah Bau. Kawasan pilihan raya DUN Tasik Biru telah diletakkan dalam kawasan

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Parlimen P.162 Mas Gading bersama dengan kawasan DUN N.1 Opar. Kadar keluasan Daerah Bau adalah 884.4 kilomter persegi. Sementara itu, jumlah penduduk yang mendiami kawasan Daerah Bau boleh dibahagikan kepada tujuh buah zon penduduk iaitu Zon Krokong yang mempunyai 19 kampung, Zon Serumbu (18 kampung), Zon Jagoi (11 kampung), Zon Bratak (15 kampung), Zon Singai (14 buah kampung), Zon Melayu (9 kampung) dan Zon Cina (17 kampung). Keseluruhan kampung yang membentuk landskap demografi di kawasan Daerah Bau adalah perkampungan adalah terdiri daripada 66 perkampungan (Pejabat Daerah Bau: 22 Januari 2017). Jika dilihat daripada trend pengundian yang dilakukan oleh parapengundi di kawasan Tasik Biru dengan mengambil kira rekod pengundian pilihan raya DUN 1969 sehingga 1991, secara keseluruhannya berpihak kepada parti BN. Dr. Patau Rubis Dan Politik Bidayuh Dr Patau Rubis lahir pada 21 Mac 1946 merupakan seorang anak jati berketurunan Bidayuh. Beliau berasal daripada Kampung Blimbin, Krokong yang merupakan sebuah perkampungan yang terletak di dalam Daerah Bau. Mendapat pendidikan awal sekolah rendah serta sekolah menengah di Bau dan di Kolej Tunku Haji Bujang, Miri. Dr. Patau Rubis kemudiaannya melanjutkan pelajaran ke peringkat tertiari dalam bidang perubatan di Universiti Ottawa, Canada. Dr. Patau Rubis membuat latihan industri beliau di Ottawa Civic Hospital. Sebelum menyertai arena politik, beliau sebelum itu pernah ditugaskan di beberapa buah hospital daerah dan bahagian dalam Sarawak dan di Hospital Umum Kuching Sarawak seterusnya dilantik sebagai Timbalan Pengarah Kesihatan Negeri Sarawak pada tahun 1980-an. Beliau mula bergiat aktif dalam arena politik pada tahun 1982. Dr.Patau Rubis menyatakan bahawa sebab utama beliau memasuki arena politik kerana kebanyakkan daripada pemimpin politik Bidayuh dimanipulasi oleh parti PBB. Beliau memilih untuk menyertai SNAP kerana melihat hanya parti ini yang memperjuangkan prinsip perjuangan ‗Sarawak hanya untuk orang Sarawak‘ atau „Sarawak for Sarawakian‟. (Rubis, 2015). Semasa Dr. Patau Rubis berada dalam arena 387

politik Sarawak beliau pernah dilantik sebagai Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri dan Pembangunan Komuniti pada tahun 1987. Jawatan terakhir beliau ketika menjadi seorang ADUN adalah beliau telah dilantik sebagai Timbalan Menteri/ Menteri Muda Pembangunan Infrastruktur Negeri Sarawak pada tahun 1989. Di samping itu, beliau merupakan seorang wakil rakyat bagi Parlimen P.126 Mas Gading sejak dari tahun 1983 sehingga 1995. Beliau sebelum itu menjawat jawatan Timbalan Presiden Sarawak National Parti (SNAP)yang meletakkan beliau dalam barisan ahli parti politik yang berjaya dalam parti komponen BN. Dalam pilihan raya DUN Sarawak pada tahun 1983 kawasan DUN Tasik Biru. mengalami krisis perebutan kerusi di antara dua parti komponen BN iaitu parti SNAP yang mencalonkan Dr. Patau Rubis dan PBB yang mencalonkan En. Peter Minos. Namun, Ketua Menteri Sarawak iaitu Datuk Patinggi Abdul Taib Mahmud telah memilih Encik Peter Minos dari PBB mewakili parti BN pada pilihan raya tersebut. Keputusannya, Dr.Patau Rubis yang bertanding bagi mewakili parti SNAP telah pun berjaya mengalahkan Encik Peter Minos. Dr. Patau Rubis memperolehi 7,064 undi (Laporan Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia, 1983:36). Seterusnya Dr. Patau Rubis juga mengekalkan prestasi bertanding tanpa kalah pada pilihan raya DUN tahun 1987 dengan memperolehi undian sebanyak 6,569 undian mengalahkan Wilfred Rata Nissom daripada Parti Bersatu Dayak Sarawak (PBDS) (Laporan Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia, 1987:40). Begitu juga dalam pilihan raya DUN Sarawak pada tahun 1991, Dr. Patau Rubis memenangi 7,759 undi mengalahkan Abdul Karim Hj. Ayub calon bebas, Aloysius Dom Nagok calon Parti Negara dan Patrick Anek Uren calon PBDS (Laporan Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia, 1991:67). Namun begitu, karier politik beliau dalam BN tidak bertahan lama apabila beliau telah disingkirkan atas tuduhan memberikan sokongan kepada seorang calon bebas yang menentang calon BN dalam pilihan raya peringkat Parlimen pada tahun 1995. Beliau telah dilucutkan jawatannya dalam parti serta jawatan sebagai Timbalan Menteri Kewangan dan Kemudahan Awam.

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Penyingkiran Dr. Patau Rubis Bagi menjelaskan faktor penyingkiran Dr. Patau Rubis dari parti BN Sarawak, berikut adalah beberapa insiden yang mencetuskan krisis politik di kawasan DUN Tasik Biru. Antaranya ialah; Disingkir dari Kabinet dan Perletakkan Jawatan Dari Parti SNAP Pada 27 September 1995, Dr. Patau Rubis telah disingkir daripada Kabinet Negeri. Ini berikutan tindakan beliau yang dikatakan seolah-olah ‗menikam belakang‘ parti dengan memberikan sokongan kepada beberapa ahli politik yang bertanding sebagai calon BEBAS di dalam pilihan raya tahun umum 1995. Keahlian parti beliau pula telah digantung pada 9 November pada tahun itu dan beliau telah diminta untuk menghantar surat tunjuk sebab kepada pihak parti untuk menjelaskan tindakan beliau yang dikatakan menyokong calon bebas. Hasil temubual bersama dengan Dr. Patau Rubis, beliau menjelaskan bahawa beliau sepatutnya berada di pimpinan yang teratas dalam parti. Dr. Patau Rubis bertegas dengan prinsipnya serta berpandangan bahawa sebagai seorang pemimpin politik, tidak sepatutnya wujud jurang antara kaum dan perasaan pilih kasih serta mengutamakan kepentingan bagi satu kaum sahaja. Beliau berhujah bahawa semangat Malaysian iaitu kebersamaan terhadap semua bangsa dan bukan sahaja untuk satu bangsa seharusnya disemai dalam politik Malaysia. Apabila beliau mempertikaikan perkara tersebut, maka pimpinan politik telah mencetuskan krisis untuk menjatuhkan karier politiknya dengan menuduh beliau membantu calon bebas dalam pilihan raya umum Parlimen tahun 1995 (Rubis, 2015). Dalam pada itu, media telah mengumumkan bahawa Datuk Amar James Wong menyerahkan keputusan penggantungan keahlian beliau kepada pihak Central Executive Committee (CEC) (The Sarawak Tribune, 1996). Walau bagaimanapun, Dr. Patau Rubismenjelaskan bahawa beliau dengan sukarela telah menarik diri daripada parti kerana lambat laun beliau juga akan disingkirkan. Keberadaan beliau dalam parti SNAP sememangnya tidak lagi diperlukan dan tidak ada sebab untuk

389

terus kekal dalam parti tersebut. (Rubis, 2015 ;The Sarawak Tribune, 1996). Isu Pembangunan Pekan Baru Bau Isu pembangunan pekan Bau yang baharu juga adalah antara isu pembangunan yang mengisi slot krisis politik di kawasan Tasik Biru pada pilihan raya DUN 1996. Isu pembangunan pekan baharu yang dirancang oleh kerajaan negeri di pekan Bau ini tidak dapat dilaksanakan berikutan aktiviti perlombongan emas yang hendak dijalankan semula di kawasan Tasik Biru dan di Gunung Tabai, Krokong. Pekan Bau terkenal dengan aktiviti perlombongan emas sejak abad ke-18 dan ke-19. Aktiviti perlombongan emas giat dijalankan semasa zaman pemerintahan Kesultanan Brunei dan zaman pemerintahan Dinasti Brooke. Namun begitu, aktiviti perlombongan emas tersebut telah dihentikan kerana semasa kerja penggalian emas dijalankan, mata air di bawah tanah telah pecah sehingga memenuhi kawasan perlombongan tersebut. Hasilnya, terbentuklah sebuah tasik yang besar yang dinamakan Tasik Biru. Apabila rancangan perlombongan emas hendak dibangunkan semula di Daerah Bau, penduduk Cina di pekan Bau yang sudah lama menetap dan mendirikan perniagaan mereka di pekan Bau terpaksa dipindahkan ke suatu kawasan yang baharu mengikut keputusan kerajaan negeri. Rancangan pembinaan pekan baharu Bau dan juga perlaksanaan perlombongan emas semula adalah dirancangkan semasa Dr. Patau Rubis masih menjadi ADUN Tasik Biru. Namun, setelah beliau dipecat daripada kabinet negeri dan dari parti, media sering melaporkan bahawa Dr. Patau Rubis menggunakan rancangan pembinaan pekan baharu Bau sebagai salah satu daripada isu politik terutamanya dalam kalangan kaum Cina untuk menentang kerajaan negeri. Namun begitu, Dr. Patau Rubis menjelaskan bahawa isu tersebut sengaja digembargemburkan untuk menentang beliau. Malahan beliau menjelaskan bahawa aktiviti perlombongan emas yang hendak dijalankan mengalami masalah berpunca daripada perselisihan faham mengenai kadar ‗shareholder‘ di antara syarikat perlombongan dan juga ahli politik yang terlibat termasuk Dr. Patau Rubis sendiri. (Rubis, 2015). Isu ini

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mulai reda apabila Datuk Patinggi Tan Sri Haji Abdul Taib Mahmud ketika dalam rangka lawatannya ke Bau menjelaskan kedudukan sebenar isu projek pembinaan pekan baharu Bau yang menjejaskan pemilik kedai khususnya peniaga Cina. Kerajaan negeri telah mengabaikan rancangan pembinaan pekan baharu bagi Bau berikutan daripada bantahan yang telah diterima daripada pemilik kedai (The Sarawak Tribune, 1996). Isu ini telah memuncak sehingga memaksa Ketua Menteri Datuk Patinggi Tan Sri Haji Abdul Taib Mahmud memberikan amaran kepada masyarakat Cina yang terlibat. Ketua Menteri memberi pilihan kepada peniaga Cina yang terlibat bahawa jika mereka tidak menginginkan projek itu dilaksanakan maka mereka seharusnya memilih untuk menyokong kerajaan (The Sarawak Tribune, 1996). Isu Politik Penaungan Untuk Kesejahteraan Masyarakat Di DUN N.2 Tasik Biru Di sebalik krisis yang melanda Dr. Patau Rubis, ramai dalam kalangan masyarakat Bidayuh yang simpati akan nasib beliau. Malahan ramai yang mengatakan bahawa apa yang berlaku ke atas beliau adalah helah kerajaan negeri yang sengaja mahu mengeluarkan pemimpin Bidayuh dari menjawat jawatan tinggi dalam negeri. Pandangan tersebut segera dibidas oleh Datuk Patinggi Tan Sri Abdul Taib Mahmud bahawa beliau tidak bertanggungjawab ke atas Dr.Patau Rubis (The Sarawak Tribune, 1996). Di samping itu, ramai daripada kalangan masyarakat Bidayuh melihat Dr. Patau Rubis sebagai seorang yang terlalu bercita-cita tinggi untuk kepentinganperibadinya. Malahan beliau sendiri mengangkat dirinya sebagai “champion of the Bidayuh”. Sememangnya tidak dinafikan bahawa Dr. Patau Rubis memang lantang dalam bersuara dan dilihat tidak mementingkan diri untuk kepentingan peribadinya. Namun kelantangan suara dalam mempertahankan kepentingan rakyat dilihat tidak mencukupi dengan sekadar Dr. Patau Rubis menunjukkan sifat memberontak terhadap kerajaan. Namun begitu, jelas politik penaungan yang diamalkan oleh parti SNAP yang merupakan parti komponen BN tidak mampu ditolak oleh pengundi di Tasik Biru. Politik penaungan amat penting bagi masyarakat di kawasan luar bandar terutamanya DUN Tasik Biru yang terletak dalam 391

kategori luar bandar. Pada kebiasaannya, segala projek pembangunan akan diluluskan berdasarkan permintaan masyarakat tempatan dan projek itu akan diagihkan semasa pilihan raya. Manakala penyokong pembangkang akan dikemudiankan dari mendapat projek kerajaan. (Mersat, t.t.). Oleh yang demikian, meskipun ramai dalam kalangan masyarakat di Daerah Bau yang bersimpati dengan nasib yang menimpa Dr. Patau Rubis, mereka tidak boleh berbuat apa-apa selain dari terus menyokong kerajaan bagi membolehkan mereka menikmati kemajuan dari segi pembangunan infstruktur di kawasan mereka. Sokongan mereka terus dizahirkan kepada parti SNAP dan parti BN. Hal ini jelas dizahirkan dengan rancangan pembinaan pekan baharu Bau. Amaran serta peringatan keras telah dilakukan terhadap penduduk di Daerah Bau terutamanya kaum Cina di Pekan Bau agar mereka agar menyingkirkan Dr. Patau Rubis sekiranya tidak mahu projek perlombongan emas dijalankan sehingga memusnahkan perniagaan serta penempatan mereka di dalam pekan Bau. (The Sarawak Tribune, 1996). Isu Masa Depan Politik Bidayuh di DUN Tasik Biru Ramai dalam kalangan pemimpin komuniti Bidayuh tidak berpuas hati dengan nasib yang menimpa Dr. Patau Rubis. Oleh yang demikian, satu sesi penjelasan mengenaikedudukan sebenar Dr. Patau Rubis dalam arena politik Tasik Biru diperjelaskan oleh pemimpin politik masyarakat Bidayuh yang lain. Kebimbangan dalam kalangan masyarakat Bidayuh mulai timbul berikutan dengan sentimen yang bersifat penganiayaan terhadap Dr. Patau Rubis. Seramai 80 orang pemimpin komuniti Bidayuh dari Daerah Bau telah diberikan penjelasan oleh tujuh orang pemimpin politik serta kerajaan dalam satu sesi dialog. Tujuan dialog ini diadakan adalah untuk memberikan pejelasan mengenai pemecatan Dr. Patau Rubis dari Kabinet Negeri. Pemimpin berkenaan terdiri dari Micheal Ben Panggi (Timbalan Menteri Pembangunan Tanah), Peter Minos (Presiden Dayak Bidayuh National Association (DBNA) ), ADUN Bengoh, William Tanyuh Nub, Wilfred Nissom, Sora Rusah, Lawrence Sinos (Setiausaha Bagi Kesemua Parti Kepada Ketua Menteri) dan Datuk Abdul Rauf Abdul Rahman (Ketua Setiausaha Politik Kepada Ketua Menteri). 392

Demi meneruskan kelangsungan politik Bidayuh di DUN Tasik Biru, akhirnya parti SNAP melalui Setiausaha Politik Kepada Ketua Menteri iaitu Encik Lawrence Sinos mengumumkan bahawa parti tersebut akan mencalonkan seorang calon baharu kawasan DUN N.2 Tasik Biru pada pilihan raya 1996 (The Sarawak Tribune, 1996). Encik Peter Nansian Ngusie telah dinamakan oleh parti SNAP untuk bertanding di kawasan DUN Tasik Biru bagi menggantikan tempat Dr. Patau Rubis. Oleh yang demikian, masa depan politik Bidayuh terutamanya di kawasan DUN Tasik Biru selepas Dr. Patau Rubis mula digalas oleh Encik Peter Nansian Ngusie (Sunday Tribune, 25 Ogos 1996:1).

Faktor Kekalahan Dr. Patau Rubis dalam Pilihan Raya DUN Sarawak Tahun 1996 Setelah disingkirkan dari parti SNAP, Dr Patau Rubis telah mengambil keputusan bertanding sebagai calon bebas. Walau bagaimanapun, Dr. Patau Rubis telah mengalami kekalahan. Berikut dibincangkan faktor kekalahan beliau: Kekuatan jentera BN Kekuatan jentera BN dapat dilihat kukuh kerana BN merupakan parti yang berkuasa. BN Sarawak mempunyai rekod pentadbiran dan reputasi kepimpinan yang mantap sejak dari tahun 1963.(Nordi Achie, 2012:6). Perkara yang dekat dengan masyarakat di kawasan DUN Tasik Biru adalah aspek pembangunan dari segi rekod pentadbiran dan reputasi kepimpinan yang mantap sejak dari tahun 1963. Satu lagi aspek yang menjadi aset penting kepada BN Sarawak ialah fokus terhadap kebajikan dan pembangunan prasarana untuk rakyat luar bandar. Penekanan terhadap aspek ini turut diperkukuhkan melalui bantuan kerajaan pusat menerusi pelbagai kementerian dan agensi pembangunannya. Dengan cara ini, BN dapat memikat perhatian dan mengikat kepercayaan rakyat luar bandar terhadap parti tersebut. Lantaran itulah, amat sukar untuk menggugat pengaruh dan kedudukan BN di kawasan luar bandar. Tambahan pula, sebahagian besar daripada

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ADUN yang dipilih untuk bertanding sememangnya berasal-usul dari luar bandar dan terasuh dalam persekitaran masyarakatnya sendiri. Pastinya mereka lebih memahami keperluan rakyat luar bandar. Di sini terzahirnya kebijaksanaan strategi pucuk pimpinan BN Sarawak dalam aspek memilih calon-calon untuk DUN kawasan luar bandar (Nordi Achie, 2012:7-8). Dalam kes Dr. Patau Rubis, beliau tidak berpeluang untuk menang dalam pilihan raya 1996 adalah kerana bertanding sebagai calon bebas iaitu tidak mewakili sebarang parti. Duaperkara ini dilihat tidak memberikan sebarang keyakinan kepada para pengundi di kawasan DUN Tasik Biru untuk memberikan undi kepada Dr. Patau Rubis. Bertanding sebagai calon bebas Setelah Dr. Patau Rubis meletakkan jawatan dan keluar daripada parti SNAP pada 16 Ogos 1996, beliau telah mengatakan bahawa akan bertanding dalam pilihan raya DUN. Dr Patau Rubis merancang untuk bertanding dengan parti barunya iaitu parti STAR (The Sarawak Tribune, 1996.) Namun begitu, Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya telah mengumumkan bahawa parti STAR tidak boleh lagi menggunakan sebarang simbol mewakili parti tersebut atas sebab parti tersebut belum didaftarkan.(The Sarawak Tribune, 1996). Oleh yang demikian, Dr. Patau Rubis terpaksa bertanding sebagai calon bebas dengan menggunakan simbol anak kunci. Beliau telah tewas dengan memperolehi 4,474 undi. (Laporan Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia, 1996:92). Kekangan kewangan Faktor kekangan kewangan untuk berkempen juga adalah antara sebab mengapa Dr. Patau Rubis gagal untuk mempertahankan kemenangan beliau dalam pilihan raya. Beliau mengakui bahawa beliau sememangnya mempunyai masalah kewangan dalam meniti perjalanan politiknya terutamanya dalam menghadapi pilihan raya DUN Sarawak 1996. Dr.Patau Rubis juga memberitahu kepada para penyokongnya bahawa beliau tidak

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mempunyai sumber kewangan yang mencukupi. Dr.Patau Rubis juga menceritakan bahawa semasa pilihan raya DUN 1996, beliau hanya mempunyai wang tunai sebanyak RM40,000 sahaja untuk digunakan (Rubis, 2015). Desakan Golongan Ahli politik Bidayuh yang mempengaruhi minda Faktor kekalahan Dr. Patau Rubis juga sangat kuat dipengaruhi oleh desakan pemimpin yang lain yang memegang kerusi DUN di kawasan Bidayuh. Pemimpin Bidayuh kerap kali turun berkempen dan mengeluarkan kenyataan akhbar supaya masyarakat Bidayuh terutamanya masyarakat di DUN Tasik Biru untuk sentiasa bersama menyokong kerajaan. Contohnya, Micheal Ben Panggi yang pada ketika itu merupakan Timbalan Menteri Pembangunan Tanah merangkap ADUN N.15 Tebedu menceritakan pengalaman beliau sendiri ketika dilucutkan daripada kabinet pada 1983 dan beliau tidak pernah menyoal keputusan yang dibuat sebaliknya bersedia untuk merendah diri serta tidak cemburu dengan orang lain (The Sarawak Tribune, 1996). Kenyataan yang dikeluarkan oleh Micheal Ben Panggi seolah menyifatkan bahawa Dr. Patau Rubis memprotes keras tindakan yang telah dilakukan oleh kerajaan BN terhadap penyingkirannya dari kabinet. Malahan, gesaan supaya masyarakat Bidayuh di Bau supaya tidak memberikan sokongan kepada Dr. Patau Rubis juga telah disuarakan oleh Datuk Robert Jacob Ridu yang merupakan Speaker DUN Sarawak merangkap juga bekas ADUN N.11 Tarat pada tahun 1983. Datuk Robert Jacob Ridu mengingatkan supaya kaum Bidayuh perlu bersatu dan berkerjasama dengan kerajaan BN negeri untuk memastikan pencapaian yang besar serta tahap ekonomi yang memuaskan. (The Sarawak Tribune, 1996). Kesimpulan Dr. Patau Rubis merupakan seorang pemimpin yang sangat ‗keras‘ dan mendesak serta berani mencabar pimpinan tertinggi dalam negeri. Namun begitu, beliau dilihat tidak begitu bijak bermain politik dan dalam menonjolkan diri dalam arena politik. Semangat

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dan kepimpinan yang ditunjukkan oleh Dr. Patau Rubis untukmemperjuangkan keperluan komuniti Bidayuh adalah suatu sikap yang harus dipuji. Namun begitu, dalam arena politik, sikap yang bersifat terlalu keras, mendesak dan berani mencabar ketua adalah bukan suatu sifat pemimpin politik yang bijak dan wajar. Dr. Patau Rubis telah disingkirkan dan terpaksa bertanding atas tiket bebas dan berakhir dengan kekalahan. Kekalahan ini terus memudarkan politik Dr. Patau Rubis dalam masyarakat Bidayuh. Rujukan Ahmad Attory Hussain. (2010). YB oh YB! Antara Peranan dan Tanggungjawab. Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publication & Distributors Sdn. Bhd. Acheh, Moliadi. (2004). Sejarah Penglibatan Kaum Bidayuh Dalam Politik Di Sarawak, 1970 – 2004. Universiti Malaya. Chang Pat Foh. (2006). History of Iban Settlements around Kuching City Sarawak, Kuching: The Sarawak Press Sdn. Bhd. Mersat, Neilson Illan. 2007. ―Diaspora Politik‖ Peribumi Iban dan Pilihan Raya Dewan Undangan

Negeri

Sarawak

2006.

Retrieved

http://www.ums.edu.my/fksw/images/files/BIL13-2007/Diaspora%20Politik.pdf. Nordi Achie. Pemerintahan Barisan Nasional Di Sarawak, 1963-2006: Satu Analisis. Jurnal Malaysia Dari Segi Sejarah, 2012: 40:90. Laporan Suruhanjaya Pilihan raya Malaysia, Laporan Pilihan raya Umum Dewan Undangan Negeri Sarawak 1979. Laporan Surhanjaya Pilihan raya Malaysia, Laporan Pilihan Raya Umum Dewan Undangan Negeri Sarawak 1983. Laporan Surhanjaya Pilihan raya Malaysia, Laporan Pilihan Raya Umum Dewan 396

Undangan Negeri Sarawak 1987. Laporan Surhanjaya Pilihan raya Malaysia, Laporan Pilihan Raya Umum Dewan Undangan Negeri Sarawak 1991. Laporan Suruhanjaya Pilihan raya Malaysia, Laporan Pilihan raya Umum Dewan Undangan Negeri Sarawak Tahun 1996. Sunday Tribune, ―STAR candidates cannot use common symbol: SPR Party not registered yet‖, 25 Ogos 1996. Sunday Tribune, ―BN to field 15 new faces New Barisan candidates are all graduates‖, 25 Ogos 1996. Sunday Tribune, ―STAR candidates cannot use common symbol: SPR party not registered yet‖, 25 Ogos 1996, hlm. 1. Temu bual dengan Dr. Patau Rubis, Kuching pada 2 Oktober 2015. The Sarawak Tribune, ―Dr. Patau Rubis is too ambitious for his own good‖, 6 September 1996. . The Sarawak Tribune, ―Datuk Jeli to Patau: Take lesson in humility, 23 March 1987 The Sarawak Tribune, ―Dr Patau Rubis can no longer serve Bidayuh community effectively, Peter Nansian can do better job: Anwar‖, 6 September 1996. The Sarawak Tribune, ―Govt won‘t take away top jobs from Bidayuh‖, 4 September 1996. The Sarawak Tribune, ―Chinese community in Bau advised to make wise decision‖, 7 September 1996.

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Sarawak Tribune, ―Shop owners oppose project which has been turned into political issue: Taib Bau township plan scrapped‖, 3 September 1996. The Sarawak Tribune, ―Shop owners oppose project which has been turned into political issue: Taib Bau township plan scrapped‖, 3 September 1996. The Sarawak Tribune, ―Dr Patau resign from SNAP‖, 17 Ogos 1996.
 The Sarawak Tribune, ―SNAP pick new man for Tasik Biru‖, 28 Januari 1996. The Sarawak Tribune, ―Dr Patau not concernd over timing of his explanation‖, 23 Januari 1996. The Sarawak Tribune, ―Dr Patau to remain suspended SNAP forms committee to prepare for the State Election‖, 22 Januari 1996. The Sarawak Tribune, SNAP to decide Patau‘s fate at CEC?‖, 14 Januari 1996. The Sarawak Tribune, ―Dr Patau‘s immediate task‖, 15 Mac 1987. The Sarawak Tribune, ―Bidayuh leaders ―quite satisfied‖ with explanation given on Dr Patau‘s sacking,‖ 28 Januari 1996. The Sarawak Tribune, ―Ridu: Bidayuhs must remain united‖, 30 Januari 1996. The Sarawak Tribune, ―Dr Patau resign from SNAP‖, 17 Ogos 1996.

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Citizen Participation in Local Governance: the Case of Selected Barangays of Amai Manabilang, Lanao del Sur Tagorda, Yasmin A. Mindanao State University [email protected]

Abstract This study (2016) determines the status of citizen involvement in the barangay governance of Amai Manabilang, Lanao del Sur, a municipality inhabited by settlers of different origins. The respondents involved seven (7) key informants and 259 resident respondents. Using a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches in the collection of the data, and being descriptive-relational in nature, simple statistical tools of analysis was also employed. The survey illustrates that knowledge and awareness of the respondents on the nature of barangay and the provision on citizen participation and their perception and attitude were deemed significant in decision of the respondents to participate or not. The degree of participation of the citizens in various avenues, except for purok meetings is between moderate and low. Moreover, barangay assemblies, meetings, consultations, discussions between the officials and the respondents are done infrequently, thus providing no opportunity for the residents to voice out their demands. Finally, the kind participation is merely supportive, not active decision-making, the symbol of a truly meaningful participatory democracy. Keywords: local governance, decentralization, participatory democracy, barangay, purok, Social Sciences

INTRODUCTION

The right of the citizens to convey their views and share especially in the decisions that affect them is a mark of a modern and democratic society. People participation springs from guarantees cited in most national constitutions of the world including the Philippines with the passage of the 1991 Local Government Code (LGC). It is one of the most remarkable changes that have taken place since the restoration of democracy as it issued a revolution in governance, devolving substantial power, responsibility and resources from

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the national government to the local governments (Rood, 1998). The opportunities to involve in governance are extended to the smallest and basic political unit of the government; the Barangay. The people of the barangay have a community of interests; however, it is often neglected not only by the local officials but most often by the community residents, considering it as only good for beautification projects. This is demeaning, since according to the Code; the barangay is to perform the vital task of implementing national government policies and projects in the community. It is also in charge of minor protective and improvement activities and serves as a medium for rural road reconstruction, health and social services (LGC, 1991).

Despite the ample opportunities given to Barangay residents to express their views on any issue that affects their lives, it is sad to note than even after almost 3 decades since the enactment of RA 7160, it is perceived that the mechanism of Barangay Assembly is not working effectively. Observations show that most barangay residents do not take part in the affairs of the governance of their barangay. Some communities or barangays in the Philippines are successful at getting their citizens to participate than others. Most often, barangay officials are still challenged by the prospect of getting their constituents to involve in governance.

Stimulated by the provision of mechanisms on citizen participation by the LGC of 1991, and also by literatures that emphasize the importance of citizen participation in the governance of their community, this study (2016) determined the status of citizen involvement in the Barangay governance of Amai Manabilang, Lanao del Sur. In particular, it identified the level of knowledge, perception and attitudes of the respondents on the nature of Barangay and Citizen Participation. The degree of participation of the respondents in barangay governance was also determined together with the factors that influenced their participation or non-participation.

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This study does not only benefit Amai Manabilang but also other local government units (LGUs) as results will provide a replicative value on how other LGUs can evaluate their own barangays‟ performance in as far as theapplication of the Code‘s provisions on participatory governance is concerned, thereby enriching the existing knowledge and literature on the subject. This study is also of significance in identifying the factors to the consistent pattern of low participation in local governance thus making a step ahead towards meeting the challenges to achieving a truly genuine and meaningful participation.

CONCEPTUAL/THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Local Governance and Decentralization

Local governance refers to the processes through which public choice is determined, policies formulated and decisions are made and executed at the local level and the roles and relationship between the various stakeholders which make the society. It can be defined as the exercise of political, economic, and administrative authority to manage local affairs (Miller, 2002).

Beetham (1996:30) argues that local governance has the potential to democratize because of its greater capacity for responsiveness and representativeness. For example, elected councilors may be more accessible and have greater incentives to recognize local demands, and a wider range of representation is likely especially of women and ethnic minorities.

Blair (2000:21) also argues for the potential of local governance to democratize, through its promise that ‗by building popular participation and accountability into local governance, government at the local level will become more responsive to citizens‘

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desires and more effective in service delivery‘. His view of democratic local governance thus depends on the accountability of elected representatives (Institute of Development Studies, 2002). These views consider citizens‘ role in local governance from the logic of representative democracy. Citizens participate in and contribute to achieving greater equity and poverty reduction through electing more representative and accountable residents into local government (Institute of Development Studies, 2002).

One way in which central government can promote participation in local governance is through meaningful decentralization processes that sanction the transfers of political powers and fiscal resources to local units of governance, thereby creating opportunities for development to be defined at the local level. (Blair, in Institute of Development Studies, 2002).

Decentralization, the main framework of the Code, aims to further strengthen the capacities of both the government and non-government actors to engage each other in directing local development, thus encouraging participation at the local level. Romero (2005) emphasized: ―Building effective participatory mechanisms at the local level provide strategic opportunities to enhance democracy. It improves information flow, accountability and due process. It gives a voice to those most directly affected by public policies and programs where citizens have adequate and equal opportunity to express their preferences giving way to effective participation that produce decisions that are more legitimate because people have been involved in making them.‖

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From a planner‘s points of view, participation through decentralization may be considered desirable because it is seen as a means of making plans more closely reflective of local needs and it may be a means of mobilizing local support and resources for development projects. From politicians‘ standpoints it may be advocated as a basic human right and a necessary extension of the democratic process – as a way of achieving "participatory democracy" rather than merely "representative democracy" ( Ayee, 2000).

Citizen participation is considered to be the very heart of Democracy. The governments of the developing nations have been called upon to take interest in local government matters and decentralization processes and to take enhanced responsibility for local planning and policy-making. As part of the process of designing and preparing long range plans, local leaders are being called upon to manage limited financial resources in more innovative ways, to work towards strengthening the community social capital as well as to maintain the existing infrastructure and to develop inclusionary planning techniques while addressing community matters/ concerns (Musliu).

Participation is the right of the people to become involved in decisions that affect their lives. Citizens seem more likely to participate at local level because it is the level that is most directly linked to them. According to Sydney Waldman (cited in Fianza, 1982), participation is a process whereby decision-making is set up in a manner that constituencies significantly affected by decisions are the ones that make them.

The UN definition on the otherhand links participation inextricably with development. It defines popular participation as the: 1) mass sharing of the benefit of development; 2) mass contribution to development; 3) mass involvement in the decision-making process for development (in Alfiler, 1998: 442). It is further contended that:

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Participation is a process in which the people are directly and actively involved in the planning and implementation of rural development programs and projects. In the decision making process, the people should be allowed to participate in four stages: (a) defining the situation requiring a decision; (b) choosing the preferred alternatives; (c) determining how to best implement the decision once it is made; and (d) evaluating the consequences of the action taken. Thus Participation should not only be viewed as a matter of public hearing but actual involvement in planning and implementation of a program (UNSCD, in Alfiler, 1998:442)

Analytical framework Decentralization Local Government Code 0f 1991

SOCIO DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISCTICS KNOWLEDGE ON THE NATURE OF BARANGAY AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

PERCEPTIONS AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS PARTICIPATION IN BARANGAY GOVERNACE

DEGREE OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN BARANGAY GOVERNANCE

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What does it take for citizen‘s to participate? First, the individuals themselves are crucial in promoting meaningful participation, this is because the citizens themselves are in the best position to articulate their needs and create appropriate solutions. It is thought that when an individual has knowledge about the powers that are granted to him and that he really feels powerful that he could change things, the more that he will participate. If the individual accepts his roles and responsibilities and is quite confident that he has the capability to mold himself and the environment, then the more he will engage. The participatory mechanism under the Code will work at its best with citizens who are aware and knowledgeable of their roles and functions and at the same time, they have a positive perception of the affairs of their barangay. It is deemed that when citizens are knowledgeable yet they do not feel efficacious about their actions, it is likely that they will not engage.

The strategies adopted to open new spaces for citizens are also largely dependent on the position taken by the government. Local governments‘ willingness to engage citizens in governance and their ability to intelligently exploit newly created legal spaces are also crucial.This is to stress that the leadership style or political will of barangay officials (who actively involve their members) becomes a factor in promoting citizen participation. Indeed, the kind of leadership style exercised by barangay officials are determinant to the achievement of meaningful citizen participation, that is; when people‘s voices are heard by unreceptive ears, nothing positive might happen. Finally, the citizen‘s measurement of their leaders‘ performance is thought to have some bearing on the citizen‘s involvement in their governance. People are largely seen to participate when they are satisfied with the delivery of services by their officials. When barangay officials‘ emphasize in their actions that they are more focus in delivering the demands and interests of their constituents, rather than promoting their self-interests, then they are more likely to gain support and participation from their constituents. People‘s

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perception of the importance of transparency in barangay governance is very important. If the people themselves do not see anything positive in the governance of their barangay, then most likely the much needed support cannot be expected.

METHODOLOGY

This undertaking is descriptive in nature which aims to describe the scope and limitations of people‘s participation in the governance of the selected barangays. The researcher explored the knowledge and attitudes of the respondents and identified the factors to participation and non-participation. The methodological triangulation was used in collecting data necessary for this study. This combined qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques. An open-ended interview guide was used to get information from the key informants while a structured questionnaire was administered to the residentrespondents.

To further increase the validity and analysis of the data, content analysis of some secondary sources such as books, journals, magazines, municipal profile and documents and other sources online were resorted to. The study is conducted in the Municipality of Amai Manabilang with Apartfort, Francfort, Mansilano, Natangcopan and Sumugot as sample barangays while the mayor and 5 barangay officials acted as key informants. A total of 259 resident- respondents were interviewed using a structured questionnaire. This being descriptive-correlational in nature, employed frequency, percentages and Somer‘s d in the analysis of data.

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RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Of the socio demographic characteristics tested, variables such as highest educational attainment, ethnic affiliation and number of years residing in the barangay are seen to have influence on the degree of participation of the respondents. It appeared that those who are highly educated tended to have a higher understanding of their roles and the importance of participation. It entails citizens who have proper communication skills and lobbying expertise to be able to articulate their opinions. Second, Barangay Sumugot in the aggregated data results, showed moderate to high attendance to both Barangay Assembly and meetings. It is to be emphasized that more than 90% of the residents of this Barangay are Ilocano immigrants, and that the feeling of familiarity and cooperation is strongly ingrained in them. Finally, those who have stayed longer in the Barangay are more inclined to be a part of the governance of their barangays.

It has also been found out that those citizens who are knowledgeable of their roles and responsibilities marked higher participation. The Knowledge and Awareness on the respondents on the nature of Barangay and the provision on Citizen Participation under the Local Government Code is placed in the moderate level (45%), 31% registered to have a high level of knowledge, while some 24% are not cognizant of the purpose of the Barangay. Majority of these residents are conscious that the primary purpose of the creation of the barangay is for them to have an avenue to articulate their demands.

Most of the residents knowledge is taken from the various sources such as (ranked as follows) barangay officials, neighbors, barangay posters/fliers, friends, and etc. A significant result from the key informant interview reveals that most of the officials lack the understanding on why citizen involvement is an advantage to local decision-making, a reason to why dissemination of information and knowledge on citizens‘ rights is infrequently conducted.

407

Perception wise, majority of the respondents, did not see participation as neither negative nor positive (64% moderate) instead, 23% sees it negatively, while only 13.1 % see participation as positive. Probing deeply into this result, it appears that most of those who feel that the performance of their barangay is satisfactory actually have several issues with their officials. A very glaring negative observation is the absence of one particular barangay captain in their community for most of his term. There was no opportunity for them to consult or to meet with him or some of the local council members. Moreover, the respondents stressthat their opinions are not valued by the officials and the decisions as to what the project and programs of the barangay are seldom done with the consent of the community. This response is not even negated by most of the officials; admittedly, one was an absentee official who just delegate his responsibilities to his subordinates. The barangay officials who were interviewed conceded that gathering the residents to participate has been a difficult challenge especially when the Department of Interior and Local Government (who supervises Barangay) press them with deadlines, not just to adopt legislations but also in the conduct of Barangay Assemblies. Using Somer‘s d analysis, it is evident that a significant degree of relationship is found between the knowledge and perception on citizen participation and the actual participation of the respondents. The higher the knowledge of their roles and responsibilities and their perceived efficacy, the more they become engaged in the different activities.

408

PERCEPTION AND ATTITUDE ON PARTICIPATION NEGATIVE MODERATE POSITIVE

Total

30

32

0

62 (24%)

26

90

2

118 (45%)

PARTICIPATION

3

44

32

79(31%)

Total

59 (23%)

166 (64%)

34(13%)

259

KNOWLEDGE AWARENESS

ANDLOW ON

THEMEDIU

NATURE OF BARANGAYM AND

CITIZENHIGH

The degree of participation of the citizens in the various avenues, except for purok meetings is registered from moderate to low (78.3%) only 21.7% were deemed to have high degree of participation in the different modes of participation. The data revealed that barangay assemblies (except for Brgy. Sumugot), meetings, consultations, discussions between the officials and the residents are done infrequently, thus providing no opportunity for residents to participate and voice out their demands.

In general, the respondents pointed out reasons such as positive attitude, encouraged by positive performance of officials, voting for the officials, as factors in the choice of residents to participate, while those who were low on participation pointed to non familiarity of their roles and responsibilities, having no time to spare, non encouragement of officials, and negative attitude as reasons for non participation.

Given these information, It is unfortunate that after more than two decades of the enactment of the Code, the mechanisms set forth are not working effectively since most residents do not take part in the affairs of governance and when they do, their actions are merely supportive, not active decision –making, the symbol of a truly meaningful

409

participatory democracy. This is what Arnstein stress as ―empty ritual of participation and having the real power to affect the outcome of the process‖. Informing citizens of their rights, responsibilities, and options can be the most important first step toward legitimate citizen participation. However, too frequently the emphasis is placed on a one-way flow of information - from officials to citizens - with no channel provided for feedback and no power for negotiation. Under these conditions, particularly when information is provided at a late stage in planning, people have little opportunity to influence the program designed "for their benefit." The most frequent tools used for such one-way communication are the news media, pamphlets, posters, and responses to inquiries. Meetings can also be turned into vehicles for one-way communication by the simple device of providing superficial information, discouraging questions, or giving irrelevant answers.

Citizen participation is not just a requirement of good governance, but also of a genuine democracy. However, a political context that is unsupportive to citizen involvement, the lack/ low level of citizen understanding on the necessity of their engagements, the lack of coalitions and networks to help citizens to articulate, and the low level of political efficacy of the citizens are but some of the identified challenges to achieving genuine citizen participation; this despite the institutional framework for participation already in place. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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410

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Tapales, et al. (1998) Local Government in the Philippines: A Book of Readings. Volume 1. Quezon City, Philippines: U.P.

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Sosmena, G.C. (1981). Decentralization and Empowerment. Manila: Local Government Development Foundation, Inc.

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Fianza, M.L. (1981).The Role of Citizen Participation in Political development: Some observations on the Current Philippine Experience. Development Administration Journal, Volume II (1-12), 55,70. Adorable, V.H. (1979). The Barangay and Citizen‘s Participation for Development. Philippine Political Science Journal, June 1979 (9), 47-75.

411

Hollsnteiner, M. (1976). People Power: Community Participation in the Planning and Implementation of Human Settlements. Philippine Studies, Volume 24

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Pagtolun-an, et al. (2002) Barangay Governance. Cagayan de Oro City: Capitol Institute for Research and Extension.

Participatory Development Plans of Barangays Acmac, Buruun, San Roque and Tubod. City Planning and Development Office, Iligan City

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Romero,D. (2005). Technology of Participation. Agenda. Volume 2005-1, Issue no.3 Retrieved July 9, 2008 from http://www.lvgp.gov.ph/Agenda3?news13.html

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Tingson, E.( ) Poblacion North: Adopting Particiaptory Governace in Barangay. Retrieved July 19, 2008 from Third World Studies Center. (2006) Access to Participation of Marginalized Sectors under the Local Government Code of 1991. (TWSC Policy Dialogue) Retrieved July 19, 2008. Other Sources The Readers Digest Great Encyclopaedic Dictionary, 1998. Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia Standard 2004. Microsoft Corporation.

414

Regional Dynamics in Electoral Politics Cabaran dan Masa Depan Federalisme di Malaysia: Sarawak di Bawah Pemerintahan Adenan Satem, 2014-2017 Frederick Michael & Arnold Puyok Universiti Malaysia Sarawak Abstrak Federalisme adalah satu sistem pemerintahan yang mempunyai dua peringkat kerajaan. Menerusi federalisme, budaya sosial dan politik sesebuah masyarakat di dalam negara atau wilayah boleh terus diamalkan disamping turut dipelihara menerusi peruntukan di dalam perlembagaan. Selain itu, federalisme adalah sesuai digunakan oleh negara atau wilayah yang mempunyai keadaan geografi yang luas dan masyarakat yang majmuk. Malaysia adalah salah sebuah negara di dunia yang mengamalkan sistem federalisme di dalam pemerintahan kerajaan. Amalan federalisme di negara Malaysia telah berhadapan dengan pelbagai senario politik yang mencabar khususnya di antara kerajaan pusat dengan kerajaan Sarawak. Sebagai salah sebuah negeri yang bersama-sama membentuk Malaysia, Sarawak telah berhadapan dengan pelbagai jenis cabaran dalam hubungannya dengan kerajaan persekutuan. Justeru, pelbagai isu politik yang berbangkit telah mewarnai senario politik persekutuan Malaysia seperti kedudukan Sarawak di dalam persekutuan, autonomi Sarawak dan pembangunan khususnya di kawasan luar bandar. Dalam pada masa yang sama juga, Sarawak di bawah pemerintahan Adenan Satem begitu lantang dalam membuat tuntutan melibatkan hak Sarawak seperti yang telah dijanjikan semasa rundingan pembentukan persekutuan Malaysia. Kertas penyelidikan ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis cabaran dan masa depan federalisme di Malaysia dari perspektif hubungan kerajaan persekutuan dan negeri di bawah pemerintahan Ketua Menteri Sarawak yang ke-5 Adenan Satem dari tahun 2014-2017. Kerangka kajian ini akan menggunakan teori federalisme yang telah dirangka oleh ahli sains politik terdahulu seperti Louis le Fur dan lain-lain. Selain itu, perlembagaan persekutuan yang berkaitan dengan peruntukan mengenai hak serta bidang kuasa Sarawak di dalam persekutuan juga akan dianalisa. Kata Kunci: federalisme, Sarawak, Adenan Satem, hubungan

415

Konsep Federalisme Federalisme merupakan sebuah organisasi politik yang menggabungkan wilayah-wilayah yang merdeka dan berdaulat di bawah satu pentadbiran. Selain itu, menerusi federalisme juga, kepelbagaian dalam sesebuah negara akan lebih dipelihara disamping turut dapat menjamin perpaduan serta toleransi yang lebih erat102. Hak asasi kumpulan masyarakat yang minoriti akan dilindungi di bawah peruntukan perlembagaan negara berkenaan. Elazar dalam buku beliau yang bertajuk Exploring Federalism: Theory and Practice mendefinisikan federalisme sebagai satu mekanisme untuk membahagikan kuasa di antara dua peringkat kerajaan yang berbeza. Wilayah yang berada di bawah pentadbiran federalisme akan menikmati hak mereka serta memiliki autonomi sendiri disamping berkongsi kuasa pemerintahan bersama-sama dengan kerajaan pusat. Dalam pada masa yang sama juga, federalisme dapat melindungi kumpulan-kumpulan minoriti di dalam sebuah kumpulan yang lebih besar. Jaminan terhadap kebebasan untuk mengamalkan kepercayaan masing-masing turut dipelihara menerusi peruntukan perundangan yang sah. Justeru, sesebuah negara yang mempunyai kepelbagaian kaum, adat dan budaya seperti Malaysia amat sesuai untuk menggunapakai sistem federalisme. Secara praktikal, sistem federalisme wujud dan berkembang dalam suasana pluralisme, kebebasan dan demokrasi disamping turut berkembang dalam kepelbagaian parti wilayah, idea dan budaya. Negara yang memiliki keadaan geografi yang luas dan masyarakat yang majumuk sesuai untuk menggunakan sistem federalisme bagi memastikan identiti asal negeri atau wilayah sentiasa terpelihara di bawah sistem federalisme. Dari aspek identiti pula, sistem ini dapat mengekalkan keamanan, stabiliti dan kepelbagaian yang wujud di dalam sesebuah negara yang mempunyai perbezaan etnik, agama dan bahasa. Hal ini dapat dipelihara memandangkan sistem federalisme masih 102

International Journal of Humanities and Social Science. Vol. 2 No. 24 [Special Issue-December 2012]

416

mengekalkan autonomi wilayah yang membentuk persekutuan disamping wilayah berkenaan juga mempunyai kuasa untuk mempertahankan kepelbagaian yang wujud di dalam wilayah itu sendiri menerusi peruntukan undang-undang. Selain itu, dari segi efisiensi sistem ini pula, federalisme dapat meningkatkan kualiti penyampaian, memastikan keputusan dibuat dengan tepat di peringkat yang tinggi, melindungi serta mengelakkan pemusatan kuasa dan membuka ruang yang luas untuk perkembangan proses demokrasi103. Seterusnya, demokrasi bermula apabila rakyat di dalam sesebuah negara dapat terlibat secara langsung dalam politik dan pentadbiran negara. Demokrasi pada mulanya berkembang daripada sebuah kawasan yang kecil kepada skala yang lebih besar seperti sebuah negara. Apabila skala demokrasi menjadi semakin besar, ini akan memberi kesan pertambahan keluasan geografi sesebuah negara berkenaan. Oleh itu, semakin rakyat terpisah oleh keadaan geografi dan sukar untuk menyuarakan suara mereka maka, golongan elit politik di peringkat pusat akan mendominasi proses pemerintahan disamping menghadapi kesukaran untuk memahami serta memenuhi keperluan rakyat. Oleh yang demikian, situasi seperti ini akan membawa kepada penggubalan dasar dan polisi yang tidak popular, kurang sesuai dan tidak berkesan. Selain itu, sentimen keterasingan dan kekecewaan rakyat atas penggubalan dasar sedemikian akan mengundang bahana kepada sistem politik sesebuah negara berkenaan secara keseluruhannya. Sistem politik negara tersebut terdedah kepada kehancuran dan akan berlaku konflik yang berlarutan di dalam negara berkenaan. Justeru, untuk menangani permasalahan berkenaan, sistem federalisme merupakan sistem yang boleh digunakan untuk menyelamatkan sistem demokrasi di negara berkenaan. Sistem federalisme berakar umbi di dalam perlembagaan sesebuah negara yang harus mempunyai perkongsian kuasa yang jelas di antara kedua-dua buah peringkat kerajaan. 103

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) 2015.

417

Malahan, federalisme dan demokrasi tidak dapat dipisahkan oleh sebab ianya saling berkait antara satu sama lain. Mikhail Filippov dan Olga Shvetsova (2011) menyatakan bahawa : ―successful federalism requires well functioning democratic institutions, judicial system, integrated national political parties and appropriate electoral incentives created by democratic political competition. The basic finding of the literature is that only in well functioning democracies can federalism be a stable and effective form of government. And conversely, outside of the democratic context, federalism is ultimately an unstable form, which logically progresses either to territorial disintegration or to becoming a mere constitutional formality‖ Asymmetrical federalism merupakan satu bentuk federalisme yang memberikan hak dan autonomi yang berbeza kepada sesebuah wilayah atau negeri di dalam persekutuan104. Terminologi ini akan mengikat kedua-dua kerajaan untuk saling menghormati antara satu sama lain disamping untuk menjaga kepentingan wilayah atau negeri yang bersama-sama membentuk persekutuan agar tidak dipinggirkan oleh kerajaan pusat. Negara yang mengamalkan asymmetrical federalism lazimnya mempunyai perbezaan dari aspek kepentingan wilayah, budaya, sejarah dan perbezaan geografi yang ketara di dalam persekutuan. Sistem federalisme ini misalnya digunakan di negara Sepanyol dan Kanada. Seterusnya, dari aspek pengasingan kuasa, sistem federalisme merupakan sistem yang berkesan dan efisien bagi membentuk konsep pengasingan kuasa yang stabil. Lazimnya, di dalam sebuah persekutuan, ahli-ahli di dalam persekutuan akan saling mengawasi tindak tanduk masing-masing. Maka, imbangan kuasa di antara kedua-dua buah kerajaan akan dapat dilaksanakan disamping dapat mengelakkan pemusatan kuasa yang berlebihan khususnya oleh kerajaan pusat105.

104

Ibid. Ibid.

105

418

Kerajaan pusat lazimnya mengendalikan bidang kuasa yang penting seperti hubungan diplomatik, dasar luar negara dan pertahanan manakala kerajaan negeri akan mengendalikan hal ehwal yang berkaitan kuasa dalam negeri. Walaupun wujud pembahagian kuasa, namun kedua-dua peringkat kerajaan ini boleh menjalankan bidang kuasa bersama-sama mengikut peruntukan yang dinyatakan di dalam perlembagaan negara. Feeley dan Rubin (2008) berpendapat bahawa kebanyakan sistem federalisme yang ada di dunia adalah tidak stabil. Ketidakstabilan ini berpunca daripada langkah untuk mewujudkan identiti tersendiri bagi negara berkenaan atau dalam erti kata lain proses membina negara bangsa. Dalam keghairahan membina identiti negara, autonomi wilayah atau negeri di bawah persekutuan diabaikan. Maka, ini akan membawa kepada konflik di antara dua kumpulan yang mahu mencapai matlamat negara bangsa dengan kumpulan yang mahukan autonomi wilayah dicapai. Konflik yang sedemikian akan membawa kepada ketidakstabilan dalam negara persekutuan106. Menurut K.C Wheare (1964:10-11), sistem federalisme ialah satu sistem pemerintahan negara di mana wujudnya dua peringkat kerajaan iaitu kerajaan pusat dan kerajaan negeri. Disamping itu juga, beliau turut menyatakan bahawa setiap kerajaan ini hendaklah dihadkan kepada bidang kuasa masing-masing dan pada masa yang sama hendaklah bebas daripada campur tangan yang lain. Desentralisasi kuasa berlaku apabila wujud ketidakupayaan oleh kerajaan pusat dalam mengendalikan sesuatu perkara yang melibatkan kerajaan negeri. Tujuan desentralisasi kuasa ini adalah untuk memastikan keberkesanan tindakan yang dilakukan untuk menangani permasalahan yang berlaku di negeri berkenaan107. Selepas desentralisasi kuasa dilaksanakan, kerajaan negeri akan mengambil langkah yang sesuai untuk 106

Feeley, Malcolm M. and Edward L. Rubin, 2008, Federalism: Political Identity and Tragic Compromise. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 107 The Political Theory of Federalism, Malcolm M. Feeley, 2012.

419

menyelesaikan permasalahan berkenaan dan sekiranya kerajaan negeri gagal maka, kerajaan pusat boleh mengambil semula kuasa berkenaan lalu menggunakan kaedah yang lain untuk menyelesaikan masalah berkenaan. Penggabungan wilayah-wilayah yang bebas di bawah satu pentadbiran federalisme akan lebih menjamin keselamatan wilayah berkenaan daripada ancaman luar. Namun begitu, penggabungan

wilayah-wilayah

berkenaan

sebagai

sebuah

federalisme

akan

menyebabkan kedaulatan wilayah terbabit diserahkan kepada kedaulatan negara persekutuan. Penyerahan kedaulatan seperti ini bermakna pentadbiran negara adalah ditetapkan oleh kerajaan pusat. Prinsip asas yang digunakan di dalam sistem pentadbiran persekutuan adalah bersifat ―duality‖ atau dua jenis pemerintahan. Pemerintahan ini melibatkan pembahagian kuasa di antara kedua-dua buah kerajaan pusat dan kerajaan negeri. Persekutuan Malaysia misalnya menetapkan kerajaan pusat menguruskan bidang berkaitan pelajaran, pertahanan dan hubungan antarabangsa manakala kerajaan negeri menguruskan soal tanah, agama dan adat resam. Selain itu, pengkajian mengenai federalisme di dalam bidang sains politik juga bersifat parokial. Hal ini kerana, kebanyakkan daripada perbincangan atau pengkajian mengenai federalisme hanya tertumpu kepada model negara lain seperti ―American federalism‖. Pengkajian seperti ini menyebabkan fungsi sistem federalisme di dalam sistem pentadbiran negara kurang diberikan perhatian. Menurut William Riker, persekutuan ditubuhkan apabila terdapat sekumpulan kecil entiti politik yang berhadapan dengan ancaman keselamatan108. Oleh yang demikian, bagi menghadapi ancaman berkenaan, kumpulan entiti politik yang kecil tersebut bergabung membentuk persekutuan bagi membentuk kumpulan yang lebih besar agar dapat berhadapan dengan ancaman berkenaan. 108

Malcolm M. feeley, ‘The Political Theory of Federalism’, hlmn. 3.

420

Selain itu, tidak dapat tidak, sistem federalisme akan mendorong kepada pembentukan negara bangsa yang mana bergantung kepada keadaan geografi sesebuah negara109. Pembentukan negara bangsa ini turut dipengaruhi oleh bilangan kaum dan agama yang menduduki sesebuah kawasan. Namun, pembentukan negara bangsa sering kali berhadapan dengan cabaran dan dugaan. Prinsip pembentukan negara bangsa adalah berbeza dengan prinsip federalisme yang mana sebahagiannya bertujuan untuk mengekalkan budaya masyarakat minoriti di dalam sesebuah negara. Memandangkan sesebuah federalisme adalah hasil daripada perjanjian yang dilaksanakan di antara wilayah-wilayah yang terlibat maka, wilayah-wilayah berkenaan sudah semestinya akan membuat tuntutan bagi melindungi kedaulatan yang pernah dimiliki. Tuntutan seperti autonomi wilayah merupakan di antara tuntutan yang sering menjadi pertikaian di dalam sesebuah federalisme. Oleh itu, akibat daripada tuntutan-tuntutan demikian, para nasionalis akan terus memberikan tekanan kepada kerajaan pusat bagi memenuhi keinginan mencapai keadilan dalam ‗roh‘ perjanjian yang telah dimeterai. Keadaan yang tidak stabil seperti ini akan membawa

kepada

sentimen

yang

bersifat

anti-federalisme

disamping

boleh

menghancurkan sistem federalisme yang sedia ada jika ada wilayah yang terbabit bertindak keluar daripada persekutuan. Sistem federalisme dapat mengekalkan kuasa di peringkat negeri atau wilayah disamping membolehkan amalan-amalan yang telah sedia ada terus dipelihara. Keadaan ini merupakan di antara keunikan sistem federalisme yang diamalkan di hampir 80% sistem kerajaan di dunia. Walaupun kuasa di peringkat negeri atau wilayah boleh dikekalkan, kerajaan di peringkat persekutuan masih boleh membentuk sebuah kerajaan yang kuat serta menjalankan peranan seperti mana yang termaktub di dalam peruntukan perlembagaan. 109

Ibid.

421

Bagi negara yang mempunyai keadaan geografi yang luas, sistem federalisme merupakan sistem yang ideal serta sesuai untuk digunakan. Amerika Syarikat dan Malaysia misalnya mempunyai 50 dan 13 negeri yang berada di bawah pentadbiran kerajaan persekutuan. Selain itu, amalan federalisme juga membolehkan kerajaan di peringkat negeri atau wilayah menjalankan polisi awam yang mana turut boleh diperluaskan ke peringkat lebih tinggi disamping dapat mewujudkan kepelbagaian budaya politik di dalam persekutuan. Selain itu, dari aspek perlembagaan pula, William H. Riker di dalam jurnal beliau yang bertajuk The Origin and Purposes of Federalism110, berpendapat bahawa, sebuah perlembagaan akan bersifat federalisme seandainya: i.

Wujud dua peringkat kerajaan yang memerintah kawasan dan rakyat yang sama.

ii.

Setiap peringkat mempunyai kuasa dan autonomi terhadap wilayah yang diperintah.

iii.

Wujud jaminan dari aspek autonomi di setiap peringkat kerajaan.

Penubuhan sebuah kerajaan persekutuan yang mengamalkan sistem federalisme lazimnya mempunyai matlamat untuk meluaskan kawasan pemerintahan dalam persediaan untuk mengadakan hubungan diplomatik yang lebih agresif dengan negara-negara lain. Sistem ini merupakan sistem yang akan dapat mencapai matlamat untuk meluaskan kawasan pemerintahan tanpa menggunakan kekerasan. Sesebuah wilayah yang berhadapan dengan ancaman daripada negara luar lebih cenderung untuk membentuk sebuah persekutuan. Ahli politik yang memainkan peranan di dalam wilayah berkenaan mengambil keputusan untuk membentuk dan bergabung menjadi sebuah kerajaan persekutuan bagi menghadapi ancaman tersebut agar dapat mengurangkan implikasi buruk terhadap aspek politik, ekonomi dan sosial negara berkenaan. 110

John Kincaid (ed), Federalism, Volume I, SAGE Publication, 2011.

422

Selain itu, federalisme merupakan salah satu daripada tiga sistem politik yang terbesar digunakan sebagai sistem pemerintahan kerajaan di dunia.111. Sistem konfederasi dan kesatuan juga merupakan sistem politik yang terbesar dan digunakan dalam sistem pemerintahan di dunia. Namun demikian, terdapat perbezaan yang sangat jelas di antara ketiga-tiga sistem politik berkenaan khususnya dari aspek perolehan kuasa sesebuah wilayah. Sesebuah negara yang mengamalkan federalisme akan mempunyai ciri-ciri kerajaan persekutuan seperti yang berikut, iaitu: 

Mempunyai pembahagian kuasa berdasarkan kepada perlembagaan bertulis.



Legitimasi kuasa kedua-dua buah kerajaan akan ditonjolkan di dalam bidang kuasa masing-masing.



Kedua-dua peringkat kerajaan akan bertanggungjawab penuh ke atas penduduk di wilayah berkenaan.



Kedua-dua peringkat kerajaan mendapat mandat memerintah daripada penduduk



Setiap peringkat kerajaan wujud atas kapasiti hak dan kuasa kerajaan itu sendiri.

Di bawah perlembagaan Amerika Syarikat yang terdahulu, kerajaan negeri dan wilayah yang bebas bertanggungjawab untuk mengawal selia hal ehwal yang berkaitan dengan keselamatan dalam negeri, menyediakan pendidikan dan kebajikan rakyat dari aspek kesihatan dan keselamatan112. Namun begitu, fungsi kerajaan persekutuan kemudiannya diubah apabila Amerika Syarikat menghadapi krisis The Great Depression113 dengan 111

Jayum Jawan, 2003, Malaysia Politics & Government, KARISMA Publications Sdn. Bhd. Thomas M. Magstadt, 2009,Understanding Politics, Ideas, Institutions & Issues Tenth Edition, Wadsworth CENGAGE Learning, hlmn. 71. 113 The Great Depression berlaku pada tahun 1929-1939 yang menjadi sejarah hitam bagi negara Barat disebabkan oleh kemerosotan ekonomi yang teruk. Di Amerika Syarikat, pasaran saham jatuh menjunam pada Oktober 1929. 112

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memperkenalkan New Deal bagi mencipta peluang pekerjaan dan merangsang ekonomi negara114. Presiden Richard Nixon ( 1968-1973) cuba untuk memperkenalkan satu polisi yang baharu dikenali sebagai new federalism yang memfokuskan kepada peranan kerajaan yang lebih efektif dan efisien bagi menghadapi cabaran globalisasi. Dua fokus utama di dalam new federalism ini adalah untuk memberikan sumber kewangan kepada negeri disamping mengamalkan perkongsian sumber perolehan secara umum di antara keduadua buah kerajaan115. Selain itu, federalisme dapat membantu mempertahankan dan menjaga hak sivil dan politik masyarakat dengan menghadkan bidang kuasa kerajaan pusat. Sebagai timbang tara kepada sistem unitari116, sistem persekutuan memfokuskan kepada pemusatan politik dan pemerintahan. Hal ini dijelaskan dengan wujudnya pembahagian kuasa yang jelas menerusi peruntukan perlembagaan bagi kedua-dua peringkat kerajaan di dalam federalisme. Disamping itu, negara federalis dilihat sebagai sebuah struktur politik yang dapat memenuhi tuntutan kumpulan etnik minoriti dalam sesebuah masyarakat yang majmuk. Amalan federalisme di Malaysia bukan hasil daripada keinginan untuk mendakap atau menjaga kepentingan kumpulan minoriti sebaliknya lebih kepada untuk memperkukuhkan kedudukan kumpulan majoriti disamping turut dipengaruhi oleh faktor keselamatan dalam negeri.

114

Ibid. Ibid. 116 Sistem unitari membolehkan kerajaan pusat untuk menurunkan kuasa kepada kerajaan tempatan. 115

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Pembentukan Kerajaan di Tanah Melayu sehingga Penubuhan Persekutuan Malaysia Kedatangan Inggeris ke Timur bermula pada kurun ke-17 yang diketuai oleh Syarikat Hindia Timur Inggeris (SHTI). SHTI pada ketika itu bergerak secara aktif dalam melakukan penjelajahan untuk meluaskan pengaruh khususnya di dalam aktiviti perdagangan. SHTI juga berjaya mendirikan beberapa buah loji di sekitar kawasan di Tanah Melayu yang berfungsi sebagai pusat kegiatan perdagangan. Ketibaan Francis Light yang berkhidmat dengan Syarikat Jourdain Sullivan and de Souza tiba di negeri Kedah pada tahun 1771. Ketibaan Francis Light di negeri Kedah berlaku semasa keadaan politik di negeri Kedah berada dalam keadaan yang tidak stabil akibat daripada konflik dalaman pentadbiran di antara raja dengan pembesar di Kedah 117. Ini memberikan peluang kepada Francis Light untuk menghulurkan bantuan bagi meredakan konflik yang berlaku. Francis Light kemudiannya membuka petempatan di Pulau Pinang pada 29 Jun 1786. Pembukaan petempatan di Pulau Pinang menandakan usaha yang dilakukan oleh pihak Inggeris untuk meluaskan pengaruh berjaya dilaksanakan. Disamping itu, Francis Light juga mempertahankan Pulau Pinang apabila Sultan Kedah cuba untuk mendapatkan semula Pulau Pinang daripada Francis Light. Namun, usaha Sultan Kedah gagal dan Pulau Pinang sah menjadi milik SHTI pada tahun 1791. Negeri-negeri Selat (NNS) ditubuhkan pada tahun 1826 dengan menggabungkan Pulau Pinang, Melaka dan Singapura di bawah satu unit pentadbiran. NNS berkembang dengan pesat kerana kegiatan perdagangan di Kepulauan Melayu menjadi semakin maju. Melaka

117

Sultan Muhammad Jiwa menghadapi masalah apabila orang Bugis menyerang Kedah pada tahun 1770 disamping turut berlaku perselisihan faham di kalangan anak-anak raja yang melemahkan kerajaan Kedah.

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mempunyai kawasan yang strategik untuk perjalanan dari Barat ke Timur dan untuk berlindung dari tiupan angin monsun Barat Laut. Selanjutnya, perluasan kuasa oleh British di Tanah Melayu dilakukan menerusi pengenalan Sistem Residen di beberapa buah negeri di Tanah Melayu. Negeri Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan dan Pahang menggunapakai sistem ini di dalam pentadbiran negeri. Walaubagaimanapun, sistem ini terdedah dengan beberapa kelemahan sehingga memaksa British untuk menghapuskan sistem ini dengan mengadakan Perjanjian Negerinegeri Melayu pada 1 Julai 1896. Perjanjian ini membawa kepada penubuhan sistem pentadbiran yang baharu dikenali sebagai Negeri-negeri Melayu Bersekutu (NNMB) dianggotai oleh Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan dan Pahang. Perjanjian berkenaan sebenarnya menguatkan lagi pengaruh British di Tanah Melayu walaupun terdapat peruntukan-peruntukan yang khusus bagi memajukan negeri berkenaan. Selain itu juga, berlaku pemusatan kuasa kepada kerajaan pusat yang dikuasai oleh Residen-Jeneral di Kuala Lumpur. Pemusatan kuasa ini menyebabkan Sultan dan Raja Melayu kehilangan pengaruh di dalam pentadbiran disamping tidak memiliki kuasa sepenuhnya seperti yang dimiliki oleh Residen-Jeneral. Selepas Perang Dunia ke-2 tamat, British cuba untuk menukar status negeri-negeri di Tanah Melayu daripada status negeri naungan kepada negeri jajahan. Usaha oleh British ini dilakukan menerusi pengenalan sistem kesatuan yang dikenali sebagai Malayan Union. Menurut perlembagaan Malayan Union, semua negeri Melayu termasuk Pulau Pinang dan Melaka disatukan di bawah satu pemerintahan pusat kecuali negeri Singapura. Malahan itu, Malayan Union akan diperintah oleh seorang Gabenor British yang berkuasa penuh di dalam pentadbiran kesatuan. Prinsip kerakyatan secara jus soli akan dikuatkuasakan yang memberikan hak kerakyatan kepada kepada golongan bukan Melayu. Penubuhan Majlis Penasihat Pusat akan dianggotai oleh ahli-ahli yang dilantik oleh kerajaan British.

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Oleh yang demikian, penubuhan Malayan Union ini telah menerima tentangan yang hebat daripada penduduk di Tanah Melayu. Tentangan ini dibuat atas faktor seperti tindakan Harold MacMichael yang menggunakan ugutan untuk mendapatkan tandatangan sultan dan raja, pengurangan kuasa politik orang Melayu, pengenalan prinsip kerakyatan jus solidan kedudukan sultan dan raja yang semakin terancam akibat daripada pengenalan Malayan Union. Penentangan terhadap Malayan Union membawa kepada penubuhan parti United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) pada 11 Mei 1946. Penubuhan UMNO untuk dijadikan sebagai medium menyuarakan tentangan terhadap Malayan Union disamping juga mencari jalan penyelesaian untuk menukar sistem Malayan Union kepada sistem yang lebih menguntungkan penduduk di Tanah Melayu. Antara usaha yang dilakukan oleh UMNO ialah dengan menubuhkan Jawatankuasa Kerja pada bulan Julai 1946 yang bertanggungjawab menggubal satu perlembagaan baru yang boleh diterima oleh orang Melayu dan dapat melahirkan satu kumpulan pentadbiran yang cekap disamping menjadi asas perkembangan politik dan perlembagaan pada masa depan bagi mencapai pemerintahan sendiri. Usaha ini juga telah membawa kepada pemansuhan sistem Malayan Union secara rasmi pada 1 Februari 1948 dan digantikan dengan Persekutuan Tanah Melayu 1948. Setelah Malayan Union dibubarkan, satu Jawatankuasa Kerja telah dibentuk bertujuan untuk menggubal perlembagaan baharu bagi Tanah Melayu118. Hasil rundingan dan pakatan, Jawatankuasa Kerja ini mengemukakan laporan dan diterbitkan pada Disember 1946. Laporan yang dikeluarkan ini menerima tentangan daripada masyarakat bukan

118

Jawatankuasa ini dianggotai oleh empat orang wakil Raja-raja Melayu, dua orang wakil UMNO dan enam orang pegawai British yang dipengerusikan oleh Ketua Setiausaha Malayan Union.

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Melayu lantas golongan ini bertindak menubuhkan Majlis Tindakan Bersama Seluruh Tanah Melayu (AMCJA) yang dipimpin oleh Tan Cheng Lock119. Jawatankuasa Perundingan ditubuhkan dan dianggotai oleh pegawai-pegawai British dan orang bukan Melayu untuk membincangkan cadangan-cadangan mengenai penubuhan Persekutuan Tanah Melayu. Hasilnya, perlembagaan baharu digubal dan ditandatangan oleh raja-raja Melayu pada Januari 1948. Pada 21 Februari 1948, kerajaan Persekutuan Tanah Melayu diisytiharkan secara rasmi dengan beberapa syarat. Setelah Persekutuan Tanah Melayu ditubuhkan, maka beberapa buah parti politik telah muncul di persada tanah air dengan bermatlamatkan untuk mencapai kemerdekaan secara total daripada British. Parti politik di Tanah Melayu turut mengadakan kerjasama politik dengan menubuhkan pakatan dengan parti pelbagai kaum. Semasa Pilihan Raya Majlis Perbandaran Kuala Lumpur pada tahun 1952, UMNO Selangor dan MCA Kuala Lumpur telah mengadakan pakatan politik serta memenangi 9 daripada 12 kerusi yang dipertandingkan. Kemenangan pakatan politik ini membawa kepada penubuhan Parti Perikatan oleh Tunku Abdul Rahman pada tahun 1955 yang disertai oleh UMNO, MCA dan MIC. Dalam Pilihan Raya Umum Persekutuan Tanah Melayu 1955, parti Perikatan telah memenangi 51 daripada 52 buah kerusi yang dipertandingkan yang membawa kepada usaha ke arah rundingan kemerdekaan. Rombongan kemerdekaan ke London diadakan pada bulan Januari 1956 disertai oleh Tunku Abdul Rahman, seorang setiausaha, empat orang wakil raja dan empat wakil Perikatan. Rombongan ini telah mencapai kejayaan apabila Perjanjian London ditandatangani pada 8 Februari 1956 dan menerusi perjanjian ini maka tarikh kemerdekaan Tanah Melayu ditetapkan pada 31 Ogos 1957. Suruhanjaya Reid yang

119

AMCJA turut menggabungkan beberapa pertubuhan bukan Melayu seperti MDU, MIC, Liga Belia Demokrasi Baru Tanah Melayu dan beberapa buah kesatuan sekerja.

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diketuai oleh Lord Reid ditubuhkan bagi merangka perlembagaan baru Tanah Melayu sebelum mencapai kemerdekaan. Oleh yang demikian, perlembagaan Persekutuan Tanah Melayu yang digubal telah diluluskan oleh Majlis Perundangan Persekutuan pada 15 Ogos 1957 dan berkuatkuasa pada 27 Ogos 1857. Tanah Melayu diberi kemerdekaan pada 31 Ogos 1957 dan Tunku Abdul Rahman dilantik sebagai Perdana Menteri pertama dan Yamtuan Besar Negeri Sembilan, Tuanku Abdul Rahman dilantik sebagai Yang diPertuan Agong yang pertama Idea penubuhan Malaysia telah diumumkan oleh Tunku Abdul Rahman pada 27 Mei 1961 melalui ucapan yang dibuat di Hotel Adelphi, Singapura. Tunku berhasrat untuk mewujudkan kerjasama ekonomi dan politik yang melibatkan Persekutuan Tanah Melayu dengan Singapura, Sabah, Sarawak dan Brunei. Pengumuman yang dibuat oleh Tunku menerima pelbagai reaksi positif dan negatif sama ada dari dalam mahupun luar negara. Oleh itu, Jawatankuasa Perundingan Perpaduan Malaysia (JJPM) ditubuhkan bagi memberikan penerangan lebih jelas mengenai konsep Malaysia kepada orang ramai khususnya penduduk Sabah, Sarawak dan Brunei disamping mendapatkan kata sepakat daripada pemimpin-pemimpin politik di semua negeri yang terlibat. Sebanyak empat kali perjumpaan telah diadakan di Jesselton (21 Ogos 1961), Kuching (18 Disember 1961), Kuala Lumpur (6 Januari 1962) dan Singapura (1 Februari 1962). Suruhanjaya Cobbold ditubuhkan setelah satu rundingan dibuat antara kerajaan Persekutuan Tanah Melayu dengan kerajaan British pada bulan November 1961120. Suruhanjaya ini berfungsi untuk mendapatkan maklum balas daripada penduduk di Borneo mengenai pembentukan gagasan Malaysia. Suruhanjaya ini telah menjalankan tugas selama dua bulan bermula pada 19 Februari 1962 dan berakhir pada bulan April 1962. Menurut laporan suruhanjaya ini, lebih kurang 80% daripada penduduk Sabah dan

120

Dianggotai oleh Lord Cobbold, Anthony Abell dan David Waterson, Dato’ Wong Pow Nee dan Tan Sri Mohd. Ghazali Shafie.

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Sarawak menyokong pembentukan Malaysia dan sebahagian besar daripada mereka ialah kaum Bumiputera. Jawatankuasa Antara Kerajaan (JAK) ditubuhkan selepas Suruhanjaya Cobbold selesai menjalankan tugas bagi mendapatkan maklum balas penduduk Borneo mengenai Malaysia. JAK dipengerusikan oleh Lord Lansdowne dan Tun Abdul Razak sebagai Timbalan Pengerusi serta dianggotai oleh wakil-wakil kerajaan British dan wakil-wakil negeri Sarawak, Sabah dan Singapura. Jawatankuasa ini membentuk satu perlembagaan khusus yang melibatkan permintaan Sabah dan Sarawak berdasarkan memorandum yang diterima daripada parti-parti politik di Sabah dan Sarawak. Setelah segala proses rundingan dan perjanjian ditandatangani, maka pada 16 September 1963, sebuah negara baru yang diberi nama Malaysia telah ditubuhkan secara rasminya. Penubuhan Malaysia menggunakan

sistem

federalisme

sebagai

sistem

dalam

pemerintahan

yang

membahagikan bidang kuasa kerajaan kepada dua peringkat. Negeri Sarawak misalnya, mempunyai hak dan autonomi yang tersendiri di dalam Persekutuan Malaysia seperti mana yang telah dipersetujui di peringkat rundingan sebelum menubuhkan Malaysia. Latar Belakang Politik Sarawak Parti politik yang pertama di Sarawak diasaskan pada tahun 1959 dengan penubuhan Parti Bersatu Rakyat Sarawak121 (SUPP) yang diasaskan oleh masyarakat kaum Cina di Kuching. Bertitik tolak daripada penubuhan SUPP maka, pemimpin intelektual Melayubumiputera lalu menubuhkan Parti Negara Sarawak122 (PANAS) pada tahun 1960 diikuti dengan penubuhan Parti Kebangsaan Sarawak123 (SNAP) pada tahun 1961 yang mana keanggotaan parti SNAP di dominasi oleh masyarakat kaum Iban. Selain itu, wujud juga

121

Pimpinan Ong Kee Hui dan Stephen Yong sebagai Setiausaha. Diketuai oleh Datuk Bandar Abang Haji Mustapha dan Datuk Abang Othman sebagai Setiausaha. 123 Diketuai oleh J. S Tinker dan Stephen Kalong Ningkan sebagai Setiausaha. 122

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parti politik lain seperti Barisan Anak Jati Sarawak124 (BARJASA), Parti Pesaka Anak Sarawak125 (PESAKA) dan Sarawak Chinese Association126 (SCA). Parti-parti politik ini berjuang untuk mendapatkan kemerdekaan Sarawak daripada penjajahan British. Parti Perikatan Sarawak ditubuhkan pada bulan Januari 1963 dengan dipengerusikan oleh Temenggung Jugah dan Stephen Kalong Ningkan sebagai setiausaha. Penubuhan Parti Perikatan Sarawak mencapai kemenangan dalam pilihan raya yang diadakan dan berjaya membentuk kerajaan di peringkat negeri menjelang penubuhan Persekutuan Malaysia. Semenjak daripada itu, pakatan politik di Sarawak semakin berkembang dan meneruskan legasi pemerintahan sehingga ke hari ini walaupun beberapa buah parti politik sudah tidak lagi wujud atau bersama dengan perikatan Barisan Nasional. Pemerintahan perikatan Barisan Nasional Sarawak berjaya mengekalkan rekod pemerintahan sehingga hari ini walaupun berhadapan dengan pelbagai rintangan. Dalam Pilihan Raya Dewan Undangan Negeri (DUN) Sarawak pada tahun 2006, Barisan Nasional Sarawak di bawah pimpinan Tan Sri Abdul Taib Mahmud telah memenangi sebanyak 62/71 kerusi DUN yang dipertandingkan. Selain itu, dalam Pilihan Raya DUN Sarawak pada tahun 2011 pula, parti Barisan Nasional Sarawak menghadapi penurunan angka kerusi yang dimenangi berbanding tahun 2006 dengan hanya memenangi 55/71 buah kerusi DUN yang dipertandingkan. Parti Barisan Nasional kehilangan undi khususnya daripada masyarakat kaum Cina yang beralih kepada parti Democratic Action Party (DAP) yang memenangi sebanyak 12 kerusi DUN Sarawak. Oleh yang demikian, pengurangan jumlah kerusi yang dimenangi oleh Barisan Nasional dalam pilihan raya ke-10 ini memberikan isyarat buruk kepada pemimpin di peringkat negeri khususnya yang terpalit dengan beberapa isu seperti kronisme, pembalakan haram 124

Diketuai oleh Datu Tuanku Haji Bujang Osman dan Alfred Unteng Mason sebagai Setiausaha. Dipimpin oleh Temenggung Jugah. 126 Diketuai oleh Ling Beng Siew dan Cheng Ko Ming sebagai Setiausaha. 125

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dan sebagainya. Tan Sri Abdul Taib Mahmud selaku pengerusi Barisan Nasional Negeri Sarawak kemudiannya meletakkan jawatan selaku Ketua Menteri Sarawak pada 28 Februari 2014. Tugas dan tanggungjawab beliau digalas oleh Ketua Menteri Sarawak yang ke-5 iaitu Tan Sri Adenan Satem. Ternyata Tan Sri Adenan Satem berhadapan dengan cabaran yang amat besar apabila menggantikan Tan Sri Abdul Taib Mahmud selaku Ketua Menteri Sarawak selama 33 tahun. Aptah lagi, pilihan raya DUN Sarawak ke-11 semakin menghampiri tempoh untuk dilaksanakan. Namun, atas kebijaksanaan dan gaya kepimpinan Tan Sri Adenan Satem selaku Ketua Menteri dan pengerusi Barisan Nasional Sarawak, Barisan Nasional berjaya membentuk kerajaan baru dengan kemenangan bergaya apabila menang majoriti lebih 2/3 atau 72/82 kerusi pada Pilihan Raya Negeri ke-11 Sarawak. Kemenangan ini mengembalikan semula sokongan pengundi kepada Barisan Nasional Sarawak berbanding PRN ke-10. Latar belakang Hubungan Persekutuan-Negeri Sarawak dari tahun 1963 hingga 2011 Kerajaan pimpinan Stephen Kalong Ningkan berhadapan dengan cabaran dan dugaan semenjak beliau menjawat jawatan berkenaan. Cabaran pertama yang dihadapi oleh beliau ialah, masyarakat kaum Melayu ingin menggantikan Stephen Kalong Ningkan dengan pemimpin yang beragama Islam. Langkah yang diambil oleh kaum Melayu adalah dengan mencadangkan supaya cawangan untuk parti UMNO dibuka dan ahli daripada parti BARJASA dan PANAS akan dibawa untuk menyertai UMNO127. Namun, cadangan ini tidak terlaksana selepas tinjauan oleh pemimpin UMNO iaitu Ghazali Jawi mendapati bahawa UMNO tidak akan mendapat sokongan yang secukupnya daripada penduduk tempatan yang majoritinya berbangsa Dayak.

127

Rujuk Sarawak Tribune (7 Oktober 1963)

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Cabaran yang berikutnya berpunca daripada cadangan untuk membuka peluang kepada masyarakat kaum Cina agar dapat membeli tanah daripada masyarakat kaum asal menerusi rang undang-undang mengenai tanah pada tahun 1965. Cadangan rang undangundang ini menimbulkan keresahan dan tentangan daripada penduduk tempatan khususnya kaum Dayak. Hal ini turut mempengaruhi perubahan sokongan masyarakat kaum Dayak terhadap pimpinan Stephen Kalong Ningkan selaku Ketua Menteri Sarawak. Cabaran yang dihadapi oleh Stephen Kalong Ningkan seterusnya adalah berkisar tentang isu bahasa rasmi kebangsaan dan proses Borneosisasi dalam penjawat awam bagi negeri Sarawak. Bahasa Melayu dicadangkan untuk digunapakai di sekolah-sekolah dan dijadikan sebagai bahasa rasmi kebangsaan yang mana bertentangan dengan persetujuan yang telah dibuat sebelum bergabung untuk membentuk Malaysia. Stephen Kalong Ningkan juga dilihat lambat untuk menukar penjawat-penjawat awam negeri yang telah berkhidmat semasa era pemerintahan Brooke128. Hubungan di antara kerajaan Sarawak pimpinan Stephen Kalong Ningkan dengan kerajaan Persekutuan berhadapan dengan konflik pada tahun 1966. Selain berhadapan konflik dengan kerajaan pusat, Stephen Kalong Ningkan turut berhadapan dengan pertikaian kuasa di antara parti SNAP dengan BARJASA. Di dalam pertikaian kuasa berkenaan, Abdul Taib Mahmud telah disingkirkan daripada kabinet kerajaan negeri. Hal ini mengakibatkan beberapa orang Menteri dari parti PESAKA dan BARJASA turut meletakkan jawatan beberapa hari selepas penyingkiran Abdul Taib Mahmud. Konflik 1966 bermula apabila 21 daripada 42 orang ahli Dewan Undangan Negeri Sarawak menghantar surat kepada Yang di-Pertua Negeri Sarawak. Isi kandungan surat berkenaan menyatakan bahawa mereka tidak lagi percaya kepada pimpinan Stephen

128

Jayum A. Jawan, 1994, Iban Politics and Economic Development: Their Patterns and Change, Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, hlmn. 86.

433

Kalong Ningkan sebagai Ketua Menteri. Oleh itu, 21 orang tersebut menyarankan agar Stephen Kalong Ningkan meletakkan jawatan sebagai Ketua Menteri Sarawak129. Yang di-Pertua Negeri Sarawak kemudiannya mengarahkan Stephen Kalong Ningkan supaya meletakkan jawatan beliau. Namun, beliau menolak untuk meletakkan jawatan sebaliknya ingin membawa kes ini ke dalam Majlis Negeri agar dapat dibincangkan bersama-sama dengan ahli Majlis yang lain. Sekali lagi, permohonan beliau ditolak dan diarahkan untuk meletakkan jawatan sebagai Ketua Menteri Sarawak130. Stephen Kalong Ningkan juga menganggap bahawa pemecatan beliau dilakukan secara ultra vires oleh kerajaan pusat. Beliau juga mahu satu pilihan raya diadakan untuk membuktikan sama ada beliau tidak lagi mendapat sokongan majoriti daripada penduduk Sarawak. Tindakan sebegini dianggap akan dapat membantu beliau dalam mendapatkan semula sokongan rakyat dan mengembalikan semula kuasa politik kaum Iban. Oleh yang demikian, kerajaan persekutuan mulai mengambil langkah untuk mengisytiharkan darurat di Sarawak supaya ketidakstabilan politik di Sarawak dapat diredakan. Pada 15 September, darurat telah diisytiharkan dan ini memberi ruang kepada pindaan undang-undang yang membolehkan Gabenor memanggil sidang Majlis Negeri bagi menentukan kedudukan Stephen Kalong Ningkan. Pindaan undang-undang ini akhirnya dapat menyingkirkan Stephen Kalong Ningkan setelah 25 undi tidak percaya dikemukakan kepada beliau semasa persidangan Majlis Negeri berlangsung. Selepas pemecatan Stephen Kalong Ningkan, Penghulu Tawi Sli dilantik menjadi Ketua Menteri Sarawak yang ke-dua. Pemerintahan Tawi Sli selaku Ketua Menteri tidak banyak berhadapan dengan tekanan daripada kerajaan pusat. Namun begitu, Tawi Sli lebih banyak berhadapan dengan konflik bagi menyelesaikan konflik yang berlaku di antara parti-parti di dalam pemerintahan beliau. Pemerintahan beliau berhadapan dengan 129

Andrew Harding dalam 50 Years of Malaysia: Federalism Revisited, Marshall Cavendish, hlmn. 206. Ibid, hlm. 206. Penghulu Tawi Sli dilantik sebagai Ketua Menteri Sarawak.

130

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perebutan kuasa yang berlaku di antara parti SNAP dan parti BARJASA. Menurut Ross Larson, Tawi Sli digambarkan sebagai seorang pemimpin yang kurang berkeyakinan, tidak memiliki pendidikan yang tinggi dan bukan seorang ahli politik yang semulajadi. Oleh itu, walaupun beliau merupakan Ketua Menteri, namun segala keputusan yang dibuat oleh beliau banyak dipengaruhi oleh tiga individu iaitu Thomas Kana, Abdul Taib Mahmud dan Rahman Ya‘kub. Selain itu, State Operations Council (SOC) ditubuhkan menjelang pertengahan Julai 1969 bagi mengambil alih tugas pemerintahan kerajaan Sarawak. Penubuhan SOC ini berpunca daripada rusuhan kaum yang berlaku di Kuala Lumpur pada 13 Mei 1969 dan menyebabkan kerajaan psuat mengambil keputusan untuk menggantung semua perlembagaan di seluruh negara. Sarawak pada ketika itu sedang bersedia untuk menghadapi pilihan raya negeri yang dijadualkan dua minggu sebelum SOC ditubuhkan. Tawi Sli selaku Ketua Menteri Sarawak tidak dilantik oleh kerajaan pusat untuk menjadi pengerusi SOC dan ini berbeza dengan negeri-negeri lain di mana semua ketua negeri dilantik untuk mempengerusikan SOC. Hal ini menimbulkan kemarahan di kalangan pemimpin kerajaan. Kerajaan pusat menganggap bahawa pelantikan ini tidak dilakukan atas sebab semua Menteri di Sarawak telah menerima mandat daripada rakyat untuk mentadbir Sarawak. Namun begitu, pelantikan ini tidak dilakukan kerana kerajaan pusat tidak mempercayai Tawi Sli dan ahli kabinet beliau yang lain disamping ada petunjuk bahawa parti Pesaka mengadakan kempen menentang parti Bumiputera semasa menyampaikan ceramah di kawasan pilihan raya. Oleh itu, pengisytiharan darurat di Sarawak ditentang sekeraskerasnya oleh SUPP, SNAP dan Pesaka atas sebab peristiwa darurat tidak berlaku di Sarawak maka pilihan raya harus diteruskan. Namun, tentangan ini tidak dihiraukan oleh kerajaan pusat.

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Abdul Rahman Ya‘kub mengambil alih tanggungjawab selaku Ketua Menteri Sarawak yang ke-tiga. Pentadbiran beliau tidak banyak berhadapan dengan tekanan daripada kerajaan pusat sepertimana Ketua Menteri yang sebelum ini. Beliau memenangi pilihan raya Sarawak pada tahun 1970 kemudiannya dilantik menjadi Ketua Menteri Sarawak selama 11 tahun. Beliau kemudiannya dilantik menjadi Yang di-Pertua Negeri Sarawak. Abdul Taib Mahmud dilantik menjadi Ketua Menteri Sarawak dan menerajui negeri Sarawak selama 33 tahun. Abdul Taib Mahmud sebagai seorang ahli politik yang terlibat dalam pembentukan Malaysia sehingga menjadi Ketua Menteri boleh dianggap sebagai godfather bagi politik di Sarawak. Hubungan kerajaan pusat dan kerajaan negeri semasa pemerintahan beliau adalah baik serta berlangsung dalam keadaan yang lancar. Tatkala pilihan raya di Semenanjung Malaysia berhadapan dengan tsunami politik dalam PRU ke-12 dan PRU ke-13 yang menyaksikan Barisan Nasional di Semenanjung kehilangan 2/3 majoriti, Barisan Nasional Sarawak masih berjaya mengekalkan 2/3 majoriti di bawah kepimpinan Abdul Taib Mahmud. Gaya pemerintahan beliau yang unik menjadi beliau antara tokoh politik yang sukar untuk digugat oleh mana-mana individu.

Hubungan Persekutuan-Negeri di bawah Adenan Satem Tan Sri Adenan Satem menjawat jawatan sebagai Ketua Menteri Sarawak pada Februari 2014. Beliau merupakan seorang ahli politik yang mempunyai banyak pengalaman dalam politik sama ada di peringkat negeri mahupun di peringkat persekutuan. Maka, menggalas tanggungjawab ini bukanlah satu perkara yang mudah apatah lagi, Ketua Menteri Sarawak sebelum ini telah berkhidmat selama 33 tahun serta memacu pembangunan dan pemodenan di Sarawak. Cabaran pertama Adenan Satem selaku Ketua Menteri adalah

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dalam membuat persediaan bagi menghadapi pilihan raya DUN Sarawak ke-11 yang bakal berlangsung kurang daripada 3 tahun. Justeru, bagi memastikan negeri Sarawak terus membangun dan rakyat menikmati faedah yang sama rata di seluruh negeri, beliau telah memperkenalkan 53 buah polisi yang dijadikan sebagai dasar dalam pentadbiran beliau. Dasar berkenaan merupakan dasar yang bersifat holistik dan tidak hanya tertumpu kepada pembangunan infrastruktur semata-mata. Dasar yang digubal itu juga mampu menarik perhatian segenap kaum yang ada di Sarawak tanpa mengira latar belakang kaum dan fahaman politik. Malahan, dasar berkenaan bukan sahaja menguntungkan rakyat Sarawak tetapi mampu mengembalikan semula sokongan politik terhadap Barisan Nasional Sarawak. Lantaran itu, dasar yang diperkenalkan oleh Adenan Satem mengandungi 15 perkara utama yang menjadi tonggak kepada pentadbiran beliau. 15 perkara tersebut merangkumi anak Sarawak, pemansuhan dan pengurangan cukai, janji kerajaan kepada sekolah persendirian Cina, komitmen Petronas terhadap permintaan Sarawak, transformasi luar Bandar, tiada parti politik dari luar Sarawak, lebih autonomi dan penurunan kuasa kepada Sarawak, dasar pentadbiran baharu, penggunaan Bahasa Inggeris, alam sekitar, penguatkuasaan dan pengurusan hutan mampan, Sarawak harmoni, pendidikan teknikal, lebuh raya Pan Borneo Sarawak, guru di Sarawak dan hal-hal berkaitan tanah Sarawak. Segala polisi yang terkandung di dalam 15 perkara utama di atas telah dirujuk kepada kerajaan pusat dan turut dibincangkan agar mencapai persetujuan di antara kedua-dua belah pihak. Oleh itu, kebanyakan daripada polisi yang diperkenalkan oleh Adenan Satem telah diterima oleh kepimpinan pusat tetapi dilaksanakan secara berperingkat bagi mengelakkan pertindihan kuasa di antara kerajaan pusat dengan kerajaan negeri. Populariti yang dimiliki oleh Adenan Satem tidak dapat disangkal oleh mana-mana pihak mahupun pihak pembangkang. Hal ini dibuktikan dengan pencapaian oleh Barisan Nasional Sarawak dalam PRN ke-11 Sarawak. Dalam PRN ke-11, Barisan Nasional

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Sarawak berjaya memenangi 72/82 buah kerusi yang dipertandingkan berbanding dengan pencapaian Barisan Nasional semasa PRN ke-10 yang memenangi 55/72 buah kerusi. Fenomena demam Adenan dapat dirasai di mana-mana kawasan di Sarawak semasa kempen pilihan raya berlangsung dengan tagline ―Adenan fever‖. Selain itu, populariti yang dimiliki oleh Adenan Satem bertitik tolak daripada personaliti beliau yang mudah untuk diterima oleh rakyat Sarawak. Beliau seorang yang bersahaja, lemah lembut tetapi tegas dalam membuat keputusan demi kepentingan rakyat Sarawak. Dalam ucapan-ucapan beliau juga, beliau sering berseloroh namun diselitkan dengan mesej yang tegas berkenaan dengan sesuatu perkara. Permasalahan dan perjuangan yang dihadapi oleh rakyat Sarawak di dengar dengan baik oleh Adenan Satem. Secara tidak langsung, beliau menterjemahkan permasalahan dan perjuangan tersebut di dalam polisi yang diperkenalkan misalnya, mengenai perjuangan Sarawak untuk Sarawak. Seterusnya, beliau dilihat sebagai seorang statesman yang lantang dalam usaha untuk mengembalikan status negara Sarawak sebagaimana yang termaktub di dalam perjanjian penubuhan Malaysia. Usaha ini dilakukan menerusi tuntutan lebih autonomi dan penurunan kuasa kepada Sarawak daripada kerajaan pusat. Kerajaan negeri pimpinan beliau komited untuk meneruskan perbincangan dengan kerajaan pusat mengenai kadar royalty minyak daripada 5% kepada 20%. Sarawak juga mahu akan kuasa autonomi seperti yang termaktub dalam Perlembagaan Persekutuan, Perjanjian Malaysia 1963, Laporan Jawatankuasa antara Kerajaan dan Laporan Suruhanjaya Cobbold. Rundingan pertama telah berjaya dilaksanakan mengenai 13 perjanjian dengan kerajaan persekutuan untuk menurunkan kuasa melalui pemerkasaan tadbir urus kerajaan negeri. Rundingan fasa kedua pula memberikan tumpuan kepada undang-undang yang bercanggah dengan hak negeri berdasarkan Perlembagaan Persekutuan. Manakala,

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rundingan fasa ketiga melibatkan penurunan kuasa kepada Sarawak melibatkan perkara yang berkaitan dengan kewangan. Lantaran itu, tuntutan yang dilaksanakan oleh kerajaan Sarawak harus dilaksanakan dengan bijaksana bagi mengelakkan perkara-perkara yang tidak diingini berlaku. Kebimbangan mengenai kemungkinan kerajaan pusat akan menggunakan kuasa veto sepertimana semasa pemerintahan Ketua Menteri yang terdahulu harus dielakkan. Maka, Adenan Satem menggunakan kaedah yang penuh berdiplomasi semasa membuat perbincangan dengan kerajaan pusat disamping tidak terburu-buru untuk mencapai kata putus. Selain itu, Adenan Satem juga merupakan pemimpin yang bijak dalam menjalankan proses rundingan dengan kerajaan pusat. Beliau menggunakan dokumen yang sah di sisi undang-undang serta digunakan untuk rujukan banyak pihak semasa membuat tuntutan dan rundingan dengan kerajaan pusat. Dokumen berkenaan juga boleh digunakan sebagai bahan di mahkamah sekiranya memerlukan. Ini membantu usaha beliau untuk memastikan bahawa kerajaan pusat tidak dapat tidak mempedulikan dan mendengar tuntutan yang diusulkan oleh Sarawak. Selain itu juga, beliau juga merupakan seorang tegas dan teguh dalam pendirian. Ketegasan dan keteguhan beliau dalam pendirian dapat digambarkan menerusi pelaksanaan dasar pendidikan di Sarawak yang melancarkan dasar 90:10 bagi memastikan lebih ramai guru di Sarawak yang berasal dari Sarawak mengajar di Sarawak, penghapusan pembayaran tol, penarikan semula lesen pembalakan dan menghapuskan perkataan ―lain-lain‖ di dalam borang untuk mengisi nama kaum. Adenan Satem mempunyai pandangan yang tersendiri terhadap kerajaan pusat. Kenyataan dan tindakan yang dilakukan oleh Adenan Satem sering bercanggah dengan kerajaan pusat namun, beliau melaksanakan tindakan berkenaan secara berhemah agar tidak menerima kesan yang buruk seperti pemimpin yang terdahulu. Selain itu, beliau juga

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sering mengkritik dan menyindir kerajaan pusat dalam banyak perkara seperti hal yang berkaitan dengan pembayaran tol, bantuan untuk pendidikan kaum Cina, penggunaan bahasa Inggeris dan lain-lain perkara. Beliau juga sedar bahawa kerajaan pusat memerlukan Sarawak untuk memastikan kelangsungan pemerintahan Barisan Nasional maka, kesempatan ini digunakan oleh beliau untuk meminta dan mengeluarkan pelbagai jenis tuntutan kepada kerajaan pusat demi memastikan penduduk di Sarawak merasai faedah selepas menyertai pembentukan Malaysia.

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Centre-State Relations in Malaysia: Voices from the Periphery Neilson Ilan Mersat Universiti Malaysia Sarawak Abstract A federal system divides up power between the national government and the smaller local governments. The advantage of federal government is that it helps to address the needs of a geographically large country. The needs at the local level of each state differs and they should have different local governments to address those needs. Centre-state relations are shaped by various factors. More often than not states which are unwilling to operate within the parameters of national priorities are bound to be discriminated through insufficient financial support from the central government to implement development projects in the state. Of course from the federal government point of view such actions were considered imperative in order to force the recalcitrant state leaders. But such actions against any state government clearly deviate from a basic principle of federalism where any one state should be treated equally with those of other states irrespective of the political party they support. This paper examines the changing centre-state relations between Kuala Lumpur and Kuching since AdenanSatem took over as the new Chief Minister for Sarawak in 2014. Central to this changing trajectory was his leadership style when discussing issues which were related to Sarawak with federal leaders. AdenanSatem was very open and many times quite vocal on Sarawak issues. He put it quite bluntly to Najib that there was a need for the devolution of powers for Sarawak to expedite development activities in the state. His move was quite unprecedented since the previous Chief Ministers after Kalong Ningkan were quite subservient to the centre (Kuala Lumpur). One thing for sure is that the ―Adenan Factor‖ has brought Sarawak to the centre stage of Malaysian politics. Apparently Sarawak needs a lot of ―catch-up‖ work to do and thus Sarawakians anticipate much louder ―Adenan‘s Voice‖ even after his passing to continue his legacy in fighting for ―Sarawak‘s rights‖ within the federation of Malaysia.

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Introduction The population of Sarawak is about 2.5 million comprises of not less that 30 different ethnic groups. Sarawak has an area of about 124,000 square kilo meters of which is almost equivalent to the total area of the other 11 States forming the Peninsular Malaysia. Sarawak gained its independence from the British via the fomation of Malaysia in 1963. Since then the state has five Chief Ministers namely, Kalong Ningkan (1963-1966), TawiSli (1966-1970), RahmanYaakub (1970–1981), Taib Mahmud (1981-2014) and AdenanSatem (2014-present). The longest serving Chief of Sarawak was Taib Mahmud who ruled for a period of 33 years. Sarawak State legislative assembly has 71 seats and recently another 11 new seats were created. The last State election was held in 2016. Adenan’s Team

When AdenanSatem took over as the new Chief Minister the Centre-State relations changed and apparently not business as usual. Since assuming power as Chief Minister he has continued to surprise Sarawakians for wanting to change the way things are done and for trying to do the right thing. Most important of all he was trying to bring back the dignity of Sarawak. For example, after more than 50 years of independence Sarawak is still one of the poorest states in Malaysia. It was about time for Adenan to highlight Sarawak‘s case to Putra Jaya when the later was and is still desperate for support from BN Sarawak. Adenan also claimed that God had given him a new lease of life to ―do what I have to do‖ after his close shave with death due to a heart ailment three years ago. ―When God gives me a new lease of life, he must be trying to drop a message to give me a hint of what I have to do.‖

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Adenan argued that Sarawak had been more or less being ―short changed‖ by the federal government since independence in 1963 and that some of the promises unfulfilled. In a strong statement he said, ―We have been colonised by London (the British government) before the formation of Malaysia, and I certainly don‘t want to be colonised by Kuala Lumpur after we formed the country. Sarawakians would not accept it if we free ourselves from one colonialist only to be colonised by another.‖ (Free Malaysia Today Online, 20 February 2016).

Autonomy powers in some areas is required for Sarawak. The first phase of the negotiations involved 13 provision on administrative empowerment to the Sarawak government was in January 2016 where the negotiations involved three phases of discussions. (New Straits Times Online, 21 January 2016).Sarawak need to claim back some powers as ―there has been constant erosion of power given to us over the last 50 over years.‖ (New Straits Times Online, 21 January 2016)

Sarawak Nationalism

AdenanSatem also claimed that he was the Chief Minister for all races in Sarawak and thus he was protecting the interests of all Sarawakians. He condemened those who still called the Chinese as immigrants (pendatang). He allocated a substantial amount of government grant to Chinese schools in Sarawak. His latest decision which was welcomed by the Chinese community was regarding Unified Examination Certificate (UEC). The Sarawak State Government recognises UEC certificate in Sarawak. Two universities in Sarawak, Curtin University and Swinburne University also recognise UEC.

Among the non-Muslim natives AdenanSatem was instrumental in changing the term ―lain-lain‖ to ―Dayak‖. He agreed to the suggestion to use the word ―Dayak‖ instead of

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referring to them as ―others‖ or lain-lain which to him is a very degrading term. On a religious issue concerning the use of the word Allah he defended the Christians in Sarawak by allowing them to use the word ―Allah‖. In Peninsular Malaysia the word Allah is exclusively for the Muslim group and it is illegal for the Christians to use the word Allah be it in their printed materials or while giving sermon. The word Allah have been used by the Christians in Sarawak for more than 300 years. According to AdenanSatem, there is no law in Sarawak that prevents Christians from using the term ‗Allah‘ to refer to God. I will not permit such a law in Sarawak as long as I am the Chief Minister. Sarawakians had been living in peace for hundreds of years without quarrelling over religious issues, and for that people in the peninsula had a lot to learn from Sarawakians ―(The Borneo Post, 27 June 2014) Federal-State Relations

A federal system divides up power between the national government and the smaller local governments. The advantage of federal government is that it helps to address the needs of a geographically large country. The needs at the local level of each state differs and they should have different local governments to address those needs. In theory, federalism assumes that there exist diverse and separate communities who want to unite but they are at the same time eager to maintain their separate existence. More often than not centrestate relations is a federation is quite fluid. However it will be stable if the local leaders approve the concentration of power at the centre as a mean to safeguard the integrity of the country. In cases where states are controlled by a different political party relations between the centre and state might be quite fluid.

The federation of Malaysia was established in 1963 by an agreement between the Governments of Malaya, the United Kingdom, the leaders of the people of Sarawak, Sabah (North Borneo) and Singapore through Malaysian Agreement 1963 signed on 8th July 1963. Some of the books and articles that address the theme of centre-state relations

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are Harding (1991), Loh (1992) Puthucheary (1985) Ross-Larson (1976), Tilman (1963), Leigh (1974).

After the 2013 general elections Sarawak no longer at the back burner of Malaysian politics. One thing for sure was that without the support of politicians from Sarawak, BN may not be able to remain in power. Najib once said that Sarawak is a fixed deposit for BarisanNasional. Similarly the opposition leaders also acknowledged that Sarawak holds the key to Putra Jaya. Since then, federal-state relations has taken a new level with Sarawak leaders getting more vocal and critical of federal government and federal leaders.

The Sarawak sentiments was on the rise. AdenanSatem agreed with the sentiment expressed by the 'Sarawak for Sarawakians' movement but did not agree to secession from the Federation. "We, however, believe in full autonomy for Sarawak under the Constitution. We believe in the devolution of more federal power to the state which we are now negotiating with the Federal Government. A committee had been set up to look into the matter‖ (Borneo Post, 22 July 2015).But many Sarawakians are still sceptical of his leadership and quite disappointed that AdenanSatem did not elaborate on his call for more autonomy for Sarawak. To them, the call for autonomy without any clear agenda ―is nothing but slogan‖. ―It sounds good and loud, but like empty can, is hollow inside. Therefore, Adenan must list out the areas in which he wishes Sarawak to have its autonomy (Borneo Post, 12 June 2015). Heart Winning Strategies

His unique approach since becoming chief minister had surprised and won over many. His first strategy was to win the support of Sarawakians by claiming that he was the Chief Minister for all and not for any particular group in Sarawak. He then extended the olive branch and opened his door to the opposition leaders in Sarawak. He said that he was

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willing to work together with the opposition parties for the interest of Sarawak. Later, various initiatives aimed at improving the living standard in Sarawak were announced. His administration introduced 53 principles and initiatives for the benefit of all races(Borneo Post Online, 22 July 2016).

AdenanSatem managed to attract the attention of federal leaders and the entire nation on several issues that he raised. Some of those issues are deemed sensitive by the federal leaders and that the previous Chief Minister did not dare to discuss them openly.

a. More Teachers from Sarawak for Sarawak

One proposal made to the federal government with regards to education in Sarawak was for Sarawak to have 90 percent of the teachers in Sarawak are from Sarawak. One of the reasons was that many teachers from Peninsular Malaysia preferred to return to their home states after a few months serving in Sarawak. In his reaction he said, ―If they want to go back home, then let them. So that‘s why we have to increase the intake of Sarawakians as teachers. ―If there are not enough trained teachers from Sarawak to teach here, then more Sarawakians should be trained and be posted in the state here as they know the local issues well and are more sensitive to local needs,‖ (The Borneo Post Online, 26 February 2015).

Later the Ministry of Education approved the applications of 1,164 teachers to return to Peninsula Malaysia and Sarawak Education Department is tasked to work to reach a posting ratio of nine local teachers to one from outside the state under Initiative 90:10 by 2018. In September 2016 the ratio in primary schools of locals to teachers from outside the state is 78:20 (20,369 locals, 5,211 from Peninsular Malaysia and 517 from Sabah and Labuan) and for secondary schools, the ratio of local teachers to those from Peninsular

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Malaysia, Sabah and Labuan was 73:25:2 (10,628 locals, 3,687 West Malaysians and 229 from Sabah and Labuan).( Borneo Post Online, 28 October 2015).

To his critics this proposal ws a form of regionalism.Adenan was accused of perpetuating the sentiment by stirring emotions and building walls around Sarawak in the name of protecting the state. Regionalism would add another layer of division and Sarawakians should be deprived of good teachers from Peninsular Malaysia. His critic also asked whether police and army personnel from Peninsular Malaysia would be the next to be sent back (Free Malaysia Today Online, 3 May 2016). Also, his concern with the education in Sarawak prompted him to suggest that education should come under the state‘s control so that the needs of rural schools could be better looked after. He asked for some degree of autonomy in education and the money to improve rural schools (The Star Online, 18 August 2015).

b. Petronas and Oil Royalty One contentious issue with regards to federal state-relations is concerning ―oil royalty‖. This was ―an evergreen issue‖ frequently used by all political parties during their campaign in every election in Sarawak. His administration promised not to stop and to repeat the state's request for more oil and gas royalty. He was reportedly saying, ―I keep on reminding Petronas, if it‘s gas or oil from Terengganu or Kelantan, whatever, I do not care. But if it is from Sarawak, then I do care. Not successful yet, our talks on oil royalty, but I will not stop. We won‘t do it altogether. We‘ll do it step by step. And we want the royalty to be increased from 5% to more than 5%.‖ He promised that he will not stop asking for the royalty increment and put his promise in a poem or pantun form that he cited frequently in his speeches (Nyiurgadingpuncakmahligai, Sayangketupatberisiinti, Hancurdagingtulangberkecai, Belumdapatbelumberhenti) (Free Malaysia Today Online 12 August 2016).Higher royalty was needed as there was a rich-poor gap between

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peninsular Malaysia and the state and more money was needed for developing those areas.

While the negotiation on devolution of powers was still going on AdenanSatem shocked the country by suspending work permits for Petronas jobs in the state. The moratorium imposed by the state government was part of the overall push to ultimately raise Sarawak‘s share of revenue collected from its oil and gas wells. Adenan insisted that Sarawakians be given priority. He had urged Petronas to give more vacancies in the company to Sarawakians as there are people from the state who have the qualifications to hold senior Petronas posts. He threatened to cancel the work permits already given and replace them with Sarawakians. Of course that decision did not go down well with the oil company Petronas. It prompted the company to issue a statement that the retrenchment could not be avoided (The Star Online, 16 September 2016)

c. English Language and United Examination Certificate (UEC) Another decision made by Adenan‘s administration was to treat English as an important language though Malay language was the official language. Inter-departmental correspondence in English was allowed in Sarawak (The Star Online, 20 November 2015).Apparently this decision may not go down well among the Malay language activist who argue that the Malay Language and not English that should be given emphasis. His critics argue that this decision is against the national policy on language. Adenancriticised the federal government for its ―stupid‖ policy of refusing to endorse the globally-recognised UEC awarded to graduates of local Chinese independent schools. Even though the Federal Government may not recognize UEC but Sarawak Government and state institutions will recognize it. This was possible because the state civil service was strictly a state matter. He accused Putrajaya‘s policy would contribute to the

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country‘s brain drain problem as UEC graduates would continue working abroad after pursuing their studies there, declaring that Sarawak recognises the UEC (The Malay Mail Online, 21 March 2016 and The Star Online, 21 March 2016, New Straits Time Online, 16 January 2016.)

Sarawak State Elections 2016

The Sarawak state election 2016 was indeed a litmus test for AdenanSatem and his team. Prior to the Sarawak state elections, AdenanSatem‘s appealed to Sarawakian voters was loud and clear. "I am relying on your wisdom on this. I need a strong mandate for me to face Kuala Lumpur. A strong mandate will allow him to demand for greater attention from the Federal government to implement efforts to prosper the state including the request for greater autonomy by the Sarawak government. (New Straits Time Online, 16 January 2016).

He argued that another term or five more years was needed for him to rule Sarawak as there was so much catching-up to do. He argued that, ―In the last two years, we have made about 50 decisions – lowered electricity tariffs, abolished tolls, reduced ferry charges, infrastructure including the Trans-Borneo highway. If we can do this in two years, why not five more years to finish the work? That is my plea. If after five years I am no good, kick me out. I would be happy to retire‖(The Star Online, 20 December 2015).

A strong mandate will allow the Chief Minister to demand for greater attention from the Federal government to implement efforts to prosper the state including the request for greater autonomy by the Sarawak government. ―If I have a big and strong mandate, I can stand up to Kuala Lumpur and say ‗listen to me, I represent the whole of Sarawak‘... If I have a very weak mandate, they won‘t even bother to listen to me.‖(Malay Mail Online, 29 April 2016 and New Straits Time, 16 Jan 2016).

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From Najib‘s point of view strong mandate to form a state government would guarantee political stability and would be able to negotiate with the federal government for any form of development needed in the state, "The strong mandate is the voice of the people of Sarawak and we (the federal government) must respect the mandate given," (Astroawani, http://english.astroawani.com/malaysia-news/give-strong-mandate-cm-,

28

February

2016). Outcome of the elections

It was a big victory for BarisanNasional by winning 72 out of 82 seats. Apparently it was not only Adenan but Najib needed Sarawak‘s big win too. Najib‘s critics claimed that the ruling BarisanNasional alliance victory in a poll seen as a barometer of public support for Najib after months of political turmoil over scandals embroiling federal investment fund 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB).

From another point of view Najib has no reason to be happy. For example, according to Mahathir what the BN Sarawak achieved was to weaken the authority of the Federal Government which Najib leads. Najib is now going to be even more dependent on the support of Sarawak than before. Already he has given in to all of Sarawak‘s demands. There must be a balance in terms of power between the centre and the state to ensure interdependence between the two.‖ (Free Malaysia Today Online, 9 May 2016).Adenan retaliated by claiming that Mahathir Mohamad failed to do enough for his state in the 22 years he served as prime minister. The first-term chief minister qualified this with the number of visits Mahathir made to Sarawak during his rule, which he claimed could be counted with the fingers on both hands whereas Najib has visited Sarawak 47 times since he became prime minister in 2009 (Malay Mail Online, 12 March 2016).

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Responses from the Centre

At the federal level BarisanNasional (BN) leaders are facing various kind of issues which really keep them occupied. Najib‘s leadership is haunted by the on going 1MD scandal. The resignation of his deputy Tan Sri MahyudinYassin who later teamed up with Mahathir had worsened the political situation in the country. High profile corruption case in Sabah in early October 2016 had tarnished the country‘s image internationally. The economic slowdown with the price of raw materials such as petroleum bruised the country‘s economy. Apparently federal leadership are busy putting their house in order. From Sarawakians point of view this is the best time for the state to put up more bargains or to demand for opportunities lost for the past 50 years. The voices from Sarawak and even Sabah are getting louder by the day. Najib was quite positive to demands from Sarawak. Putrajaya needed Sarawak‘s cooperation to face global challenges that adversely affected Malaysia‘s oil revenue. "Sarawak must be at par with Peninsula Malaysia. Malaysia will succeed if Sarawak succeeds, as Sarawak is a key economic contributor and major oil and gas producer (Malay Mail Online, 12 March 2016).

The federal government responded by appointing a committee co-chaired by Nancy Shukri (from Sarawak) and AnifahAman (from Sabah) to pursue the devolution of state rights

for Sarawak and Sabah under the federal constitution. Nancy Shukri and

AnifahAman co-chaired the first high-level meeting on June 13, which was attended by the Attorney-General and representatives from the federal, Sarawak and Sabah governments (The Star Online, 28 June 2016). Sarawak has requested for the relevant historical documents to be considered in granting administrative and constitutional empowerment to the state.

451

Several opposition leaders in West Malaysia such as MohamadSabu and Azmin Ali argued that Najib could not check Adenan for fear of loosing support among the Sarawak parliamentarians. They argued that should Sarawak BN parliamentarians decide not to support anymore then his government will collapse. This was partly true because Sarawak BN contributed substantial number of seats for federal BN. The Malay language activists hadcriticised Sarawak‘s adoption of English as an official language alongside Bahasa Malaysia but the Chief Minister remained firm on the decision he first announced at last week‘s State Civil Service Day. Social and Cultural Affairs advisor RaisYatim said that the state government‘s move to use English could sow seeds of discord among the people. But Adenanwas very adamant about his decision on the use of English in Sarawak, ―Whether they agree with me in the Semenanjung (peninsula) or not, I don‘t care,‖ ―I made English the second language in Sarawak. Of course, Bahasa Malaysia is still the main language. We agree and have no issue with that. ―But what is wrong with us also being proficient in English? It‘s the language of science, learning, literature, technology, business, research, communication and international relations,‖ (The Star Online, 23 December 2015).

Conclusion

The discussion above is an attempt to explain why there was a political realignment in centre-state relations under AdenanSatem and the voices from the periphery (Sarawak) was getting much louder. Since he became the Chief Minister he had been quite vocal on certain issues which he considered as of interest to Sarawak. His main contention was that Sarawak was left behind compared to other states in Malaysia despite having plenty of natural resources such as oil. To catch-up Sarawak needs more development funds and power. Therefore devolution of power was essential. He was asking for what was due for

452

Sarawak based on the Malaysian Agreement 1963 signed prior to the formation of Malaysia and he ruled out secession from the federation. However one thing for sure is that Sarawakians anticipate much louder ―Adenan‘s Voice‖ even after his passing to continue his legacy in fighting for ―Sarawak‘s rights‖ within the federation of Malaysia. References Dicey, A.V, 1959. An Introduction to the Study of the Law of

the Constitution,

Basingstoke, England : Macmillan Education. Faisal S Hazis. 2012. Domination and contestation: Muslim bumiputera politics in Sarawak, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. Francis LohKokWah, 2009. Old vs New Politics in Malaysia, Strategic Information and Research Development Centre :Petaling Jaya. Harding, Andrew J, 1991.― Turbulance in the Land Below The Wind : Sabah‘s Constitutional Crisis of

1985-1986‖. Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative

Politics, 29(1) (March) (1991):86-101, King, Victor. 1993. ―PolitikPembangunan : The Political Economy of Rainforest Exploitation and Development in Sarawak,‖ Global Ecology and Biogeography Letters, Vol. 3, No.4/6, July-September, [pp.235-244]. Leigh, Michael Beckett, 1974. The Rising Moon: Political Change in Sarawak, Sydney University Press : Sydney. Loh, KokWah, 1992.Modernisation, Cultural Revival and Counter Hegemony: The Kadazans of Sabah in the 1980s. In Joel S. Khan and LohKokWah, eds, Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in

Contemporary Malaysia. Australia :

Asian Studies

Association of Australia in Association with Allen &Unwin :[pp. 225-253].

453

Milne, R.s &Mauzy, Diane K, 1978. Politics and Government in Malaysia, Federal Publications (S) Pte Ltd, Singapore. Milne, R.S., and Ratnam, K.J. 1974. Malaysia – New States in a New Nation, London : Frank Cass. Mohammad AgusYusoff,

2006. Malaysian Federalism : Conflict or Consensus,

UniversitiKebangsaan Malaysia : Bangi. OoiKeeBeng, JohanSaravanamuttu& Lee Hock Guan, 2008. March 8 Eclipsing May 13, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies : Singapore. Puthucheary, Mavis, 1985. Federalism at the Crossroads: The 1985 Elections in Sabah and their Implications for Federal - State Relations, Kuala Lumpur : Institute of Strategic and International Affairs (ISIS) of Malaysia. Puthucheary, Mavies and Norani Othman. 2005. Elections and Democracy in Malaysia, Bangi :UniversitiKebangsaan Malaysia [pp.118-152]. Roff, Margaret Florence. 1974. The Politics of Belonging : Political Change in Sabah and Sarawak, Kuala Lumpur : Oxford University Press. Ross-Larson, Bruce, 1976.Politics of Federalism : Syed Kechik in East Malaysia, Singapore : Bruce Ross-Larson, 1976. Searle, Peter. 1983. Politics in Sarawak 1970-1976 :Iban Perspective, Singapore: Oxford University Press. Tilman, Robert O, 1963. ―Malaysia: The Problems of Federation.‖ Western Political Quarterly 16 (14) (December) (1963) : 897-911, Weiss, Meredith, eds, 2015.Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Malaysia, Routledge : New York.

454

Wheare K. C, 1946. Federal Government. New York: Oxford University Press.

455

Kerjasama Politik PAS dan BN 1974-1977 Nur Ayuni Mohd Isa, Zaid Ahmad, Ahmad Tarmizi Talib & Mohd Faizul Azmi Universiti Putra Malaysia Abstrak

Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) merupakan parti telah menyertai kesemua pilihanraya iaitu sejak tahun 1955 sehingga kini. PAS masih teguh dan bertahan di dalam arena politik negara. PAS juga dilihat sebuah parti yang ekslusif yang membawa agenda Islam walaupun berada dalam kalangan masyarakat yang pelbagai agama di Malaysia. sebagai sebuah parti politik yang masih bertahan hingga kini, PAS PAS dilihat telah mengatur beberapa strategi dengan menjalankan diplomasi dan kerjasama politik dengan parti-parti lain walaupun mempunyai agenda yang berlainan dan kadangkala bertentangan dengan prinsip PAS itu sendiri. Oleh itu, timbul inisiatif daripada pemimpin PAS untuk manjalinkan diplomasi politik dengan bekerjasama dan menyertai gabungan pada 17 Januari 1974, denganUnited Malays National Organisation (UMNO), Malayan/Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), dan Malayan/Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) yang dinamakan sebagai Perikatan dan ditukar nama kepada Barisan Nasional (BN). Oleh itu, kajian ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji sejarah kerjasama politik antara PAS dan BN, pengaruh ideologi terhadap kerjasama politik, faktor berpecah dan kesan positif dan negatif hasil dari kerjasama berikut. Kajian ini menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif dengan memberi penekanan kepada analisis kandungan. Sumber data primer yang akan digunakan dalam kajian ini ialah dokumen-dokumen rasmi PAS iaitu Teks-Teks Ucapan Dasar Mesyuarat Agung (Muktamar) Tahunan dan Khas PAS dan dokumen rasmi PAS. Teks muktamar ini akan digunakan sebagai rujukan dalam memperlihatkan ucapan dan pandangan pemimpin utama PAS terhadap kerjasama politik. Sejarah memperlihatkan persetujuan PAS untuk bersama-sama UMNO dalam kerajaan campuran BN adalah kerana ajakan oleh Perdana Menteri Tun Abdul Razak terhadap Mohd Asri yang merupakan pemimpin PAS pada ketika itu. Dapatan kajian menunjukkan terdapat empat faktor utama yang mendorong PAS untuk bekerjasama dalam kerajaan campuran bersama BN iaitu bagi mencapai perpaduan bangsa melayu, demi rakyat dan negara, konteks semasa, keuntungan kepada parti untuk mencapai matlamat, visi dan misi parti berlandaskan Islam. kerjasama ini tidak mampu bertahan lama. Berlaku beberapa konflik antara PAS dan UMNO seperti pemilihan jawatan Menteri besar di mana masingmasing parti mempunyai calon yang tersendiri untuk diletakkan dan akhirnya Datuk Haji Mohamad Nasir yang dipilih. Konflik ini menyebabkan berpecahnya kerjasama politik ini di mana PAS disingkirkan oleh BN. Kesimpulannya mendapati ideologi hanya mempengaruhi dalam keputusan yang dibuat untuk bekerjasama dalam kerajaan campuran PAS dan BN, di mana PAS menjalinkan kerjasama ini bagi mencapai matlamat

456

perjuangan partinya untuk meneggakan syariat Islam terutamanya dalam sistem pemerintahan Islam. Namun begitu, kerjasama ini terputus disebabkan oleh beberapa konflik PAS – UMNO terutamanya tentang pemilihan jawatan Menteri Besar Kelantan pada tahun 1974 dan isu pengistiharan dharurat. Tindakan ini dilihat bersifat pragmatik dan retorik di mana kepentingan parti dan jawatan lebih diutamakan berbanding perjuangan agama seperti yang dilaungkan. Selain itu, perjuangan dan keperluan untuk bangsa rakyat dan agama dan negara seperti yang dijanjikan ketika mahu bekerjasama tidak lagi diutamakan. Kata Kunci: Kerjasama Politik, Ideologi Politik, PAS, UMNO, BN

Pengenalan

PAS merupakan salah satu parti yang menyertai kesemua pilihanraya iaitu sejak tahun 1955 sehingga kini. PAS juga merupakan parti pembangkang yang masih teguh dan bertahan di dalam arena politik negara. PAS juga dilihat sebuah parti yang ekslusif yang membawa agenda Islam walaupun berada di dalam masyarakat yang pelbagai agama di Malaysia.

Namun dalam konteks demokrasi, PAS perlu bijak mengatur strategi menjalankan diplomasi dan pakatan politik dengan parti-parti lain walaupun mempunyai agenda yang berlainan dan kadangkala bertentangan dengan prinsip PAS itu sendiri. Oleh itu, timbul inisiatif daripada pemimpin PAS untuk manjalinkan diplomasi politik dengan parti lain bagi mencapai tujuan utama PAS iaitu menegakkan syiar dan agenda Islam.

Sebagai sebuah parti politik berteraskan Islam, PAS mendakwa bahawa ideologi yang menjadi landasan perjuangannya dan apa jua keputusan politik yang dibuat adalah berasaskan lunas-lunas Islam. Dalam kenyataan dan ucapan pemimpin-pemimpin utama PAS, mereka telah menegaskan bahawa akan bekerjasama dengan parti yang hanya dapat menerima perjuangan PAS terutamanya memperjuangkan Islam dalam setiap perkara.

457

―Bagi PAS adalah tegas, jika ada pehak yang cuba berusaha untuk menghapuskan identiti atau cuba memesongkan khittahnya kearah lain dari aqidah Islamiah, bukan sahaja dikutuk malah semua ahli-ahli dan penyokong-penyokong PAS akan mempertahankannya mati-matian‖ (Mohd Asri, 1976). ―...lantaran itu kita memilih pendekatan ini dan sedang meneruskan perbincangan bagi mencapai persefahaman dan kerjasama dengan golongan dan kelompok yang dapat menerima dasar perjuangan Islam, sebagai satu sistem yang menyeluruh. Kita mesti mengkaji penyertaan kita

dalam

pilihanraya

agar

ianya

akan

lebih

berkesan,

Insya‘Allah.‖(Yusof Rawa, 1989) ―Kita adalah sebuah gerakan Islam yang memperjuangkan ‗rahmatan lilalamin‘ yang merupakan kesinambungan perjuangan junjungan besar Nabi

S.A.W.

Kita

bukan

sebuah

gerakan

perkauman,

kita

memperjuangkan keadilan sejagat. Kita sentiasa membuka kedua belah tangan untuk berunding dan bekerjasama dengan mana-mana pihak yang cintakan keadilan dan memerangi kezaliman. Kita berharap agar semua pihak memahami kita tentang perkara ini. Kita bertindak berdasarkan keikhlasan dan keikhlasan yang sama kita harapkan daripada rakan-rakan kita. ‖ (Fadzil Noor,1999) ―Majlis Syura Ulama (MSU) PAS telah pun mendepani prinsip dan dasar yang jelas dalam hubungan antara PAS dan pihak-pihak lain dengan membawa agenda tarbiyah – dakwah – siyasah oleh kepimpinan PAS. Sehingga kini, MSU memperakukan prinsip berikut: ―bersetuju

458

untuk meneruskan agenda kerjasama dengan mana-mana pihak dalam perkara kebaikan dan ketakwaan demi untuk memperkukuhkan Islam dan perjuangannya‖ (Hadi Awang, 2016).

Berdasarkan kepada ucapan yang dikemukakan oleh pemimpin utama PAS, PAS dilihat sangat komited dengan prinsip dan perjuangan parti terutamanya berkaitan dengan perjuangan Islam dan menolak untuk bekerjasama mana-mana parti

politik yang

menentang Islam. Namun demikian, sejarah menunjukkan bahawa PAS telah bekerjasama dalam kerajaan campuran bersama United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), Malayan/Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), dan Malayan/Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) yang dinamakan sebagai Barisan Nasional (BN) pada 17 Januari 1974.

Oleh itu, timbul persoalan sejauh mana PAS konsisten berpegang dengan prinsip dan ideologi Islam seperti yang didakwakan semasa melaksanakan kerjasama dengan parti lain? Kajian ini bertujuan menilai peranan dan pengaruh ideologi PAS dalam membuat keputusan untuk berkerjasama dengan BN.

Pengkaji telah mengunakan kajian dokumen yang diklasifikasikan sebagai kajian kualitatif. Sumber data primer yang digunakan dalam kajian ini ialah ialah dokumendokumen rasmi pas seperti teks-teks ucapan dasar dalam mesyuarat agung (muktamar) tahunan dan khas PAS, dokumen rasmi PAS dan manifesto PAS. Selain itu, pegumpulan data sekunder pula adalah melalui jurnal, disertasi, tesis, kertas kerja persidangan, bukubuku ilmiah, serta rujukan media cetak dan internet. dokumen dalaman PAS ini dapat

Kesemuadokumen rasmi dan

menjelaskan dengan setepatmungkin segala

perkembangan yang telah berlaku ke atas PAS dalam tempoh kajian.

459

Terdapat beberapa kajian sebelum ini berkaitan kerjasama politik PAS iaitu Mohd Sabri Noor (2016)131 yang mengkaji persaingan politik Melayu antara PAS, UMNO dan PKR, Kamarul Zaman (2015) mengkaji pengaruh kepimpinan ulama dalam kerjasama politik PAS 1974 hingga tahun 2004, Mazlan Ali (1998)132 yang mengkaji tentang kerjasama di antara PAS dan Semangat 46 (S46) daritahun 1988 ke tahun 1996, Mohd Izani Mohd Zain (2001)133 yang mengkajitentang pendemokrasian PAS di dalam kerjasama politik yang dijalinkan olehnya dari tahun 1990 ke tahun 1999, Sollehuddin Alyubi (2009)134 yang mengkaji tentang impak konflik politik PAS-UMNO kepada kestabilan politik dan keselamatan negara. Namun begitu, faktor atau pengaruh ideologi tidak dibincangkan dalam kajian mereka ini.

Terdapat banyak definisi ideologi yang telah dikemukakan oleh para pengkaji sebelum ini. David Mclellan (1995) menyatakan istilah ideologi adalah merupakan istilah yang sangat rumit dan mempunyai banyak tafsiran. Andrew Heywood (2012) menjelaskan bahawa kajian mengenai ideologi politik adalah menganalisis idea, doktrin dan teori yang berkaitan dengan politik dan telah merumuskan beberapa maksud dan ciri ideologi politik seperti berikut: I. II. III.

Sistem kepercayaan politik Tindakan yang berasaskan kepada idea-idea politik Idea-idea dalam mentadbir

131

Mohd Sabri Md Noor (2016). Persaingan Politik Melayu Di Semenanjung Malaysia, 1978-2013, Tesis doktor falsafah, Universiti Malaya 132 Mazlan Ali, (1998). Hubungan Semangat 46 dan PAS, 1988-1996: Satu Tinjauan terhadap Politik Malaysia, Tesis sarjana, Universiti Malaya. 133 Mohd Izani Mohd Zain, (2001). Islam dan Demokrasi: Kajian Kes mengenai Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) Dekad 90an, Tesis sarjana, Universiti Malaya. 134 Sollehuddin Alyubi Haji Zakaria, (2009). Politik Islam di Malaysia: Impak Konflik Politik PAS-UMNO kepada Kestabilan Politik dan Keselamatan Negara, Tesis sarjana, Universiti Malaya.

460

IV. V.

Idea politik yang mewakili pandangan umum Idea-idea yang mempengaruhi kesedaran keatas golongan yang ditindas dan dipergunakan

VI. VII. VIII.

Himpunan idea untuk melegitimasikan sistem politik atau rejim Doktrin politik yang mendakwa kebenaran dipihaknya Idea politik yang bersifat abstrak dan bersistematik

Menurut Andrew Heywood (2012) bagi golongan fundamentalis agama, mereka menggunakan kitab suci sebagai satu pembentukkan ideologi, iaitu dengan melaksanakan perintah-perintah yang ditetapkan oleh wahyu daripada Tuhan, maka mereka menyediakan program-program yang komprehensif untuk menyusun masyarakat. Mereka menolak ideologi-ideologi sekular disebabkan ianya tidak berasaskan kepada ajaran agama dan kurang prinsip moral. Secara ringkasnya, ideologi membawa kepada dua bentuk sintesis diantara kefahaman dan komitmen, pemikiran dan tindakan. Ideologi politik pada masa kini dapat dilihat dalam slogan, retorik politik, manifesto, dan polisi kerajaan.

Ideologi yang mendasari prinsip dan perjuangan PAS ialah Islam dan diterjemahkan dalam Perlembagaan PAS seperti berikut; Fasal 3; melaksanakan pemerintahan negara berlandaskan prinsip Islam, Fasal 4; iaitu seruan Allahu Akhbar, dalam undang-undang tubuh PAS Fasal 5 (i) dan (ii) telah termaktub secara jelas bahawa Islam adalah dasar kepada perjuangan PAS seperti berikut: ―Memperjuangkan wujudnya di dalam negara ini sebuah masyarakat dan pemerintahan yang terlaksana di dalamnya nilai-nilai Islam dan hokum-hukumnya menuju keredhaan Allah SWT‖

461

―Mempertahankan kesucian Islam serta kemerdekaan dan kedaulatan negara‖

Manakala dalam Fasal 6; segala usaha-usaha PAS hendaklah tidak bercanggah dengan dasar PAS iaitu Islam. Antara usaha PAS ialah berdakwah secara lisan, tulisan, dan amalan,

dan

menyeru

masyarakat

mengamalkan

kebaikan

dan

meninggalkan

kemungkaran dan mengikut syariat Allah. Menurut Mohd Asri (1971), konsep Islam yang menjadi perjuangan PAS adalah merupakan satu konsep yang membawa kepada terbentuknya masyarakat dan negara yang mengikut landasan Islam iaitu dengan menjadikan Islam sebagai pegangan hidup. ―sasaran tersebut tertulis jelas dalam undang-undang dasar PAS yang

berbunyi: memperjuangankan wujudnya didalam negara ini

sebuah mesyuarakat dan pemerintahan yang terlaksana di nilai-nilai hidup

dalamnya

Islam dan hukum-hukumnya menuju keredhaan Allah. ‖

(Mohd Asri, 1977)

Yusof Rawa (1983), turut menegaskan bahawa prinsip PAS tidak akan sama sekali berubah daripada menjadikan Islam sebagai dasar parti. Malah beliau turut menyatakan dalam ucapan mengenai PAS sebagai gerakan Islam: ―kita mencintai PAS bukan kerana ianya bernama PAS, tapi kita mencintainya kerana ia adalah satu perjuangan dan gerakan Islam yang telah menghimpunkan golongan terbesar dari kalangan umat yang mencintai Islam dan perjuangannya, kerana ia adalah simbol kepada keutuhan ikatan golongan terbesar umat dinegara kita dalam

462

merialisasikan

semangat

dan

keazaman

perjuangan

untuk

mengerakkan Islam di negara kita ‖ (1989,2). Seterusnya, perjuangan Islam juga diteruskan oleh Fadzil Noor

di mana beliau

menegaskan; ―PAS yang merupakan parti Islam yang mempunyai dasar, ideologi, pegangan yang konsisten seperti diperuntukkan dalam perlembagaan parti, tidak perlu berkrompomi dalam perkara-perkara dasar‖ (Fadzil Noor ,2002)

Hadi Awang menegaskan di mana kesemua ahli parti perlu istiqamah dalam memperjuangkan Islam dan berpegang pada perlembagaan PAS. Jelas beliau; ―Bagi mengukuhkan kedudukan dan keaslian dasar perjuangan PAS, maka kita wajib beristiqamah bersama Islam serta berpegang kepada dasar yang digariskan dalam perlembagaan PAS. Ianya menggariskan bahawa hukum yang tertinggi sekali dalam pegangan PAS ialah Kitabullah dan Sunnah Rasul Serta Ijma‘ Ulama dan Qiyas. Istiqamah dalam perjuangan ini memberi makna yang jelas bahawa sebarang tindakan kita, samada dalam aspek politik, dakwah, tarbiyah; semuanya mestilah dalam panduan hukum yang tertinggi ini, manakala batasan pegangan PAS ini hendaklah berpandukan konsep Tafaqquh Fi al-Din.‖ (Hadi Awang, 2014)

PAS sebagai satu gerakan Islam yang menjadikan politik sebagai satu wasilah untuk menegakkan Islam di negara ini. Oleh yang demikian, agenda Islam sentiasa menjadi

463

keutamaan PAS sejak daripada awal penubuhannya hinga ke hari ini. Daripada permulaan penubuhan PAS, setiap pemimpin parti dilihat memberi komitmen yang tinggi terhadap usaha-usaha menjadikan Islam sebagai dasar utama kepada parti.

Kerjasama PAS Dengan Parti Perikatan / Barisan Nasional (BN) (UMNO, MCA, MIC) 1973

Ketika PAS bekerjasama dengan parti Perikatan, PAS adalah dibawah kepimpinan Mohd Asri. Selepas peristiwa 13 Mei 1969, Mohd Asri telah dijemput oleh Perdana Menteri Tun Abdul Razak untuk bertemu beliau di Kuala Lumpur. Selepas pertemuan ini, suasana perhubungan di antara PAS dan UMNO Perikatan menjadi semakin baik. Kerajaan pusat dengan arahan Tun Abdul Razak telah mengambil alih persoalan hutang kerajaan Kelantan. Pada mulanya Tun Dr Ismail mencadangkan supaya kerjasama antara PAS dan UMNO hanya setakat negeri Kelantan. Namun pandangan itu tidak diamlbil kira, dan persetujuan telah dicapai untuk bekerjasama dengan semua peringkat.

Y.A.B Tun Abdul Razak dalam ucapan rasminya sebagai presiden UMNO di Kuala Lumpur pada 29hb Jun 1972 telah menyentuh secara langsung tentang hasrat untuk mewujudkan kerajaan campuran dengan PAS. menurut Mohd Asri (1972), PAS berlapang dada dan bersedia untuk

bekerjasama dengan sebarang parti lawan yang sanggup

bekerjasama dengan PAS.

Sebelum tawaran dari Perdana Menteri, Menteri Muda Pembangunan Negara dan Luar Bandar, Abdul Samad Idris telah dulu memberi tawaran kepada PAS untuk menyertai kerajaan campuran iaitu pada pada 12 Disember 1970, dan kemudiannya pada 29 April

464

1972 Abdul Ghafar Baba yang merupakan Menteri Pembangunan Negara dan Luar Bandar pada ketika itu juga menawarkan kerjasama membentuk kerajaan campuran ini.

Setelah menerima undangan dari UMNO, PAS telah merujuk kepada golongan ulama untuk mendapat pandangan dari segi hukum Islam, sama ada bersetuju atau tidak untuk menyertai di dalam kerajaan campuran yang terdiri dari berbagai-bagai golongan kaum dan agama.

Maka dewan ulama dengan penuh tanggungjawab telah menjalankan

tugasnya mengkaji secara mendalam, sesuai dengan kehendak hukum Islam, yang akhirnya memberikan pendapat bahawa menyertai kerajaan campuran adalah ―harus‖ (mubah). Dengan berdasarkan pendapat itu muktamar khas PAS telah membahas dengan panjang lebar pula dari segi politik dan implikasinya di mana akhirnya muktamar khas itu telah mencapai keputusan bersetuju PAS ikut serta dalam di dalam kerajaan campuran di semua peringkat (Mohd Asri, 1977).

Sebelum kerjasama tersebut dibuat, beberapa rundingan telah diadakan. Rundingan pertama telah berlaku pada 16 Ogos 1972, tiga wakil PAS, iaitu Mohd Asri, Hasan Adli Arshad dan Abu Bakar Hamzah telah bersemuka dengan dua wakil UMNO, iaitu Abdul Razak Hussein dan Dr Ismail Abdul Rahman. Antara intipati yang dibincangkan adalah mengenai tujuan pembentukan kerajaan campuran ini iaitu untuk menjaga kepentingan agama, bangsa dan negara, khususnya bangsa Melayu. Selain itu, PAS dijanjikan satu jawatan menteri dan dibenarkan menggubal undang-undang yang mengandungi nilai Islam dan dibenarkan mempergiatkan usaha-usaha dakwah dinegara ini (Kamarul, 2015).

Di peringkat pusat, PAS menuntut supaya ia diberikan dua jawatan Menteri manakala di peringkat negeri pula, PAS menuntut supaya ia diberikan dua jawatan Ahli Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan Negeri masing-masingnya bagi Terengganu dan Kedah serta satu

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jawatan Ahli Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan Negeri masing-masingnya bagi Perak dan Perlis. Selain itu, terdapat empat perjanjian mengenai pilihan raya ini di mana pilihan raya umum hendaklah diadakan pada waktunya, tidak ada sebarang pertandingan di antara PAS dengan Perikatan di dalam pilihan raya kecil di dalam kawasannya masing-masing, kawasan-kawasan pilihan raya yang dimenangi oleh PAS dalam Pilihan Raya Umum 1969 dianggap sebagai kawasan PAS dan tiada sebarang ikatan atau perjanjian untuk menghadapi pilihan raya umum yang akan datang.

Pada 28 Disember 1972, surat perjanjian dan akuan telah ditandatangani dengan rasminya antara Tun Abdul Razak bagi pihak UMNO dan Perikatan dengan Mohd Asri bagi mewakili pihak PAS. Akhirnya pada 1 Januari 1973, wujudnya Kerajaan Campuran dengan rasmi iaitu kerjasama antara PAS dan UMNO, MIC, MCA dan Perikatan (Wan Hashim Wan Teh, 1993, Kamarul Zaman, 2015).

Dalam satu persidangan majlis tertinggi Perikatan bagi membincangkan perkara khusus untuk menghadapi pihanraya 1974, Mohd Asri telah mencadangkan perikatan ditukarkan kepada nama Barisan Nasional (BN) untuk memberi wajah baru kepada perikatan. Cadangan ini mendapat sambutan baik dan dipersetujui oleh semua komponen.

Terdapat empat faktor utama yang mendorong PAS untuk bekerjasama dalam kerajaan campuran bersama BN iaitu bagi mencapai perpaduan bangsa melayu, demi rakyat dan negara, konteks semasa, keuntungan kepada parti untuk mencapai matlamat, visi dan misi parti berlandaskan Islam.

Faktor pertama ialah untuk memupuk masyarakat yang bersatupadu dan harmoni. Menurut Mohd

Asri (1976), fakor politik menentukan survival bangsa Melayu dan

466

bumiputera selepas berlaku peristiwa 13 Mei 1969, di mana perpaduan mesti diwujudkan untuk keselamatan negara. ―PAS dan UMNO adalah merupakan induk dari perpaduan kita.

dari

Ummat Islam dan bangsa Melayu adalah tulang

belakang

kekuatan politik negara. Jika tulang belakang

ini

apatah lagi jika patah, struktur negara ini Pada

akan

pecah

retak berderai.

ketika itu ummat Islam akan kehilangan wadah bangsa melayu

kehilangan tapak, yang Allah sahaja

mugkin tidak dapat dicari ganti. Hanya

yang maha mengetahui‖ (Mohd Asri, 1977).

Faktor kedua PAS bekerjasama dalam kerajaan campuran ialah demi untuk rakyat dan negara. Menurut Mohd Asri (1977), kerjasama ini adalah demi kepentingan negara dan kemajuan rakyat khasnya rakyat di negeri-negeri yang kurang maju seperti di Kelantan, Terengganu dan Kedah. Selain itu, PAS bersetuju membentuk kerajaan campuran dengan suatu pengertian untuk menjalankan dasar kerajaan dan program-programnya dengan tujuan untuk menghapuskan kemiskinan dan menyusun semula masyarakat, supaya jurang perbezaan ekonomi antara golongan rakyat dapat dikurangkan, di mana sesuatu golongan itu tidak lagi memonopoli mana-mana bidang ekonomi dan perindustrian (Mohd Asri, 1973).

Menurut Mohd

Asri, (1972) PAS tidak pernah menganggap bahawa pembahagian

kerusi, jawatan atau sebagainya

di dalam BN, sebagai soal pokok dan matlamatnya,

tetapi ianya sebagai manifestasi dari rasa kesedaran terhadap tanggungjawab bersama dan demi kepentingan agama, bangsa dan negara, dan keselamatan serta pembangunan Negara.

467

Faktor ketiga pula, kerjasama ini berlaku disebabkan keadaan semasa di mana selepas berlakunya peristiwa berdarah 13 Mei 1969. PAS melihat penyertaanya dalam BN merupakan ijtihad politik yang menjadi suatu kemestian yang perlu disokong dengan penuh keberanian dan keazaman‖ (Mohd Asri, 1974). Peristiwa 13 Mei 1969 telah mendesak PAS

bekerjasama membentuk kerajaan campuran

sebagai strategi

menguatkan semula perpaduan umat Islam Melayu (Azahar, 2005). Selain itu, kerjasama ini bukanlah semata-mata satu fenomena sahaja, malah ianya merupakan satu pendekatan yang sesuai dengan masyarakat yang wujud di Malaysia sekarang (Mohd Asri,1973).

Faktor keempat yang menyebabkan PAS bersetuju berkerjasama dengan kerajaan campuran adalah kerana untuk memastikan survival politik PAS yang mana pada ketika itu BN merupakan kerajaan pemerintah di mana dapat memberikan kelebihan kepada PAS dari segi kedudukan jawatan legislatif dan esekutif kerajaan, badan-badan berkanun dan sebagainya yang ada hubungan dengan kerajaan (Mohd Asri, 1976). Selain itu, PAS melihat kerjasama ini mampu untuk mendekatkan cita-cita penerapan nilai-nilai Islam dalam pentadbiran (Mohd Asri, 1976). Hal ini juga kerana PAS mempunyai beberapa matlamat ketika bersama BN.

PAS

berusaha untuk mencapai pembangunan jasmani dan rohani serta menegakkan

Islam sebagai agama Persekutuan, disamping mewujudkan suatu bentuk kerajaan yang kuat bagi memelihara keselamatan negara. PAS juga ingin menyelaraskan hubungan dengan gerakan - gerakan dakwah dan sosial dan hubungan dengan badan-badan dan pertubuhan Islam di luar negeri yang sama-sama sealiran fahaman bagi memperkuatkan ukhuwah islamia dan usaha-usaha untuk menerapkan prinsip-prinsip Islam dalam perundangan negara. PAS bercita-cita mencapai kejayaan yang lebih besar di bidang

468

pembangunan rohaniah bagi menyatupadukan seluruh tenaga umat Islam seta mewujudkan kesetabilan politik dan ekonomi melalui kerjasama kerajaan campuran ini (Mohd Asri, 1973).

PAS bersetuju untuk bekerjasma dalam kerajaan campuran ini kerana ianya tidak menjejaskan identiti PAS dan tidak membelakangi ‗aqidah Islamiah‘ (Mohd Asri, 1973). PAS yakin kerjasama dalam kerajaan campuran ini tidak akan menenggelamkan keperibadian dan dasar perjuangan parti-parti yang menyertainya (Mohd Asri, 1972).

Ismail Yusoff (2015) telah menyatakan bahawa PAS telah bekerjasama dengan BN demi permuafakatan Nasional walaupun PAS menganggap UMNO tidak Islamik, tidak demokratik dan gagal menjaga kaum Melayu. Setelah PAS bekerjasama dalam BN, penglibatan kerajaan pusat dalam hal ehwal Islam dan aktiviti agama Islam semakin meningkat.

Kerjasama ini tidak kekal buat selama-lamanya dan hanya sempat empat tahun sahaja berkongsi kuasa bersama BN. Telah berlaku beberapa konflik yang mana akhirnya membawa kepada perpecahan kerajaan campuran ini. Akhirnya PAS dikeluarkan oleh BN yang berpunca daripada beberapa krisis dan konflik (Wan Hashim,1993). Terdapat dua faktor utama yang dikenalpasti oleh penyelidik iaitu; konflik pemilihan dan perlantikan jawatan Menteri Besar dan exco jawatankuasa, bantahan terhadap Rang Undang-Undang Peristiharan Dharurat di negeri Kelantan, dan berlaku konflik akibat dari dendam lama yang masih belum terpadam antara PAS dan UMNO. PAS melihat, kerajaan pusat telah

469

campur tangan atas urusan negeri dalam hal perlantikan Menteri Besar selepas pilihanraya umum 1974 (Mohd Asri, 1981).

Kesimpulan

Ketika PAS

mengadakan kerjasama

politik, terdapat

perkara

utama

yang

dipertimbangkan oleh PAS adalah demi perpaduan dan keharmonian rakyat serta survival politik orang Melayu dan juga untuk mengembangkan Islam. PAS melihat kepada kebaikan dan peluang yang akan diperolehi berkaitan dengan kepentingan parti dan Islam. Namun setelah berlaku konflik politik seperti pemilihan jawatan menteri besar Kelantan dan sokongan terhadap pengishtiharan darurat antara parti dalam gabungan kerjasama ini yang akhirnya menyebabkan PAS disingkirkan daripada kerjasama gabungan ini. PAS dan UMNO dilihat tidak mampu untuk menyelesaikan konflik ini. malah ianya boleh dianggap sebagai tindakan pragmatik dan retorik terutamanya bagi parti PAS dan UMNO. Ideologi perjuangan PAS tetap tidak berubah, hanya pendekatan dan strategi yang digunakan sahaja berubah mengikut keadaan dan peluang yang ada.

Rujukan

Andrew Heywood (2012). Political Ideologies. An Introduction. Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

David Mclellan (1995). Ideology Second Edition. University of Minnesota Press.

Ismail Yusoff, (2009). Pemikiran dan Perjuangan Islam dan Politik Nik Abdul Aziz bin Nik Mat 1964-2004, Tesis doktor falsafah, Universiti Malaya.

470

Teks ucapan dasar Mohd Asri di dalam Mesyuarat Agung Tahunan PAS Kali Ke-18 pada 18 Jun 1971 (tidak bertajuk).

Teks ucapan dasar Mohd Asri di dalam Mesyuarat Agung Khas PAS Kali Ke-3 pada 28 Julai 1972 (tidak bertajuk).

Teks ucapan dasar Mohd Asri di dalam Mesyuarat Agung Khas PAS Kali Ke-3 pada 21 September 1973 (tidak bertajuk).

Teks ucapan dasar Mohd Asri di dalam Mesyuarat Agung Tahunan PAS Kali Ke-20 pada 13, 14 dan 15 Jun 1974 (tidak bertajuk).

Teks ucapan dasar Mohd Asri di dalam Mesyuarat Agung Tahunan PAS Kali Ke-22 pada 4, 5 dan 6 Ogos 1976 bertajuk ―Sikap Kita Sekarang‖.

Teks ucapan dasar Mohd

Asri di dalam Muktamar Tahunan PAS Kali Ke-

23 pada 23, 24 dan 25 Julai 1977 (tidak bertajuk).

Teks ucapan dasar Mohd Asri di dalam Muktamar Tahunan PAS Kali Ke- 25 pada 7, 8 dan 9 September 1979 bertajuk ―Tiga Wajah Cabaran‖.

Teks ucapan dasar Mohd Asri di dalam Muktamar Khas PAS Kali Ke-5 pada 2 Mac 1980 (tidak bertajuk).

Teks ucapan dasar Mohd Asri di dalam Muktamar Tahunan PAS Kali Ke- 26 pada 26, 27 dan 28 September 1980 bertajuk ―Kurun Hijrah Ke-15: Antara Harapan dan Cabaran‖.

471

Teks ucapan dasar Mohd Asri di dalam Muktamar Tahunan PAS Kali Ke- 27 pada 17, 18 dan 19 April 1981 bertajuk ―PAS dari Dekad ke Dekad‖.

Teks ucapan dasar Yusof Rawa di dalam Muktamar Tahunan PAS Kali Ke-29 pada 30 April dan 1 Mei 1983 bertajuk ―Ke Arah Pembebasan Ummah‖.

Teks ucapan dasar Yusof Rawa di dalam Muktamar Tahunan PAS Kali Ke-35 pada 1 dan 2 April 1989 bertajuk ―Membina Ketahanan Ummah‖.

Teks ucapan dasar Fadzil Mohd Noor di dalam Muktamar Tahunan PAS Kali Ke- 45 pada 28, 29 dan 30 Mei 1999 bertajuk ―Bersama Menegakkan Keadilan‖.

Teks ucapan dasar Fadzil Mohd Noor di dalam Muktamar Tahunan PAS Kali Ke- 48 pada 31 Mei serta 1 dan 2 Jun 2002 bertajuk ―Memantap Iltizam MenyemarakkanKebangkitan‖.

Teks ucapan dasar Abdul Hadi Awang di dalam Muktamar Tahunan PAS Kali Ke-60 pada 12, 13 dan 14 September2014 bertajuk ―Terus Beristiqamah‖.

Teks ucapan dasar Abdul Hadi Awang di dalam Muktamar Tahunan PAS Kali Ke-62 pada 2-4 Jun 2016 bertajuk ―Politik Matang ‖.

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Malaysian Politics Post GE13 Politik Pilihan Raya Menuju PRU-14: Kajian Kes Di Negeri Sembilan, Melaka dan Johor Junaidi Awang Besar Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia

[email protected] Abstrak Pada Pilihan Raya Umum (PRU) ke-13, 2013 yang lalu, prestasi Barisan Nasional (BN) telah menurun berbanding PRU 2008. Pasca PRU-13 memperlihatkan berlakunya beberapa peristiwa politiking yang dilihat kurang stabil seperti pergolakan dalaman antara parti dalam Pakatan Rakyat (PR) dan juga BN, penyingkiran golongan profesional dalam pemilihan pimpinan PAS pusat, pergolakan dalaman MIC, isu 1 MDB dan derma politik seterusnya membawa kepada penyingkiran Tan Sri Muhyidin Yassin sebagai Timbalan Perdana Menteri dalam penyusunan semula kabinet Kerajaan Malaysia serta penggantungan beliau sebagai Timbalan Presiden UMNO Malaysia. Justeru, adalah menjadi tujuan penulisan kertas kerja ini untuk melihat reaksi atau respon semasa hasil daripada peristiwa-peristiwa politiking tersebut dari segi persepsi dan tingkah laku politik dan isu-isu tertentu dalam kalangan pengundi dengan menjadikan Wilayah/Zon Selatan iaitu Negeri Sembilan, Melaka dan Johor sebagai asas kajian impak politik negara menuju PRU-14. Data primer diperoleh melalui kaedah soalselidik di kawasan kajian terhadap responden melalui satu set soalselidik terhadap 1,535 orang responden/pengundi di Wilayah Selatan.Data sekunder pula diperoleh melalui pengumpulan data daripada penyelidikan di perpustakaan, bahan bercetak, akhbar, laman blog dan bahan bercetak lain. Dapatan kajian mendapati isu yang sering dibangkitkan oleh responden adalah 93.0 peratus daripadanya menyatakan isu pemulihan ekonomi/harga barang/minyak sering dibualkan di kawasan mereka. Seterusnya 42.3 peratus menyatakan kredibiliti calon penting dalam penentuan pengundian dalam pilihan raya. Sebanyak 66.6 peratus responden menyatakan BN dijangka menang dalam pilihan raya umum di peringkat nasional. Keadaan ini menunjukkan responden/rakyat peka terhadap senario politik dan ekonomi negara. Mereka terkesan dengan keadaan ekonomi dan politik yang agak bercelaru pada masa kini. Justeru, pihak yang berkenaan perlu melakukan sesuatu agar keresahan rakyat tersebut dapat dirungkai melalui siri-siri penerangan/penjelasan yang meyakinkan untuk membentuk negara yang aman, sejahtera dan mengutamakan kebajikan rakyat.

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PENGENALAN

Pada Pilihan Raya Umum ke-13, prestasi Barisan Nasional (BN) telah merosot berbanding PRU 2008. Dalam keputusan PRU-13, BN telah memperoleh 133 kerusi parlimen daripada keseluruhan 222 kerusi yang dipertandingkan. Walau bagaimanapun, jumlah

tersebut

menurun

tujuh

kerusi

berbanding

PRU-12.

Pasca

PRU-13

memperlihatkan berlakunya beberapa peristiwa politiking yang dilihat kurang stabil seperti pergolakan dalaman antara parti dalam Pakatan Rakyat (PR) dan juga BN, pemenjaraan Dato‘ Seri Anwar Ibrahim, pertukaran jawatan Menteri Besar Selangor, penyingkiran golongan profesional dalam pemilihan pimpinan PAS pusat, pergolakan dalaman MIC, penubuhan Parti Amanah Negara (PAN/AMANAH) dan pembentukan gabungan pakatan pembangkang yang baru iaitu Pakatan Harapan (PH) dan Blok Ketiga (PAS dan IKATAN), isu 1 MDB dan derma politik seterusnya membawa kepada penyingkiran Tan Sri Muhyidin Yassin sebagai Timbalan Perdana Menteri dalam penyusunan semula kabinet Kerajaan Malaysia. Justeru, adalah menjadi tujuan kajian ini untuk melihat reaksi atau respon semasa hasil daripada peristiwa-peristiwa politiking tersebut dari segi persepsi dan tingkah laku politik dan isu-isu tertentu dalam kalangan pengundi dengan menjadikan Wilayah Selatan iaitu Johor, Melaka dan Negeri Sembilan sebagai asas kajian impak politik negara menuju PRU-14.

METOD DAN KAWASAN KAJIAN

Kajian ini dijalankan dengan dengan menggunakan kaedah survey/soal selidik serta pemerhatian di lapangan dan rujukan terhadap sumber sekunder. Data primer diperoleh melalui kaedah soalselidik di kawasan kajian terhadap responden melalui satu set soalselidik terhadap 1,535 orang responden (511 responden/pengundi di Johor, 509 orang responden di Melaka dan 515 orang responden di Negeri Sembilan). Di samping itu, Perbincangan Kumpulan Berfokus (Focus Group Discussion/FGD) juga diadakan dengan

474

6 kategori informan iaitu orang awam, kakitangan kerajaan, kakitangan swasta, ahli politik, NGO dan pelajar iaitu 39 orang di Johor, 14 orang di Melaka dan 32 orang di Negeri Sembilan. Data sekunder pula melibatkan buku, jurnal, tesis, akhbar dan sebagainya.Pemerhatian

di

lapangan

juga

dijalankan

untuk

memerhati

dan

merekodkan/foto perkara yang penting dan berkenaan dengan skop kajian.Data yang dikumpulkan dianalisis menggunakan pakej statistik (SPSS) dan hasilnya dipersembahan dalam bentuk ulasan, rajah dan jadual.

Kajian ini akan dilakukan di 3 negeri iaitu Johor, Melaka dan Negeri Sembilan. Bagi negeri Johor, kawasan yang terlibat dengan perbancian ialah di 20 kawasan Parlimen (merangkumi 22 kawasan DUN) iaitu Parlimen Segamat (DUN Jementah), Parlimen Sekijang (DUN Pemanis), Parlimen Labis (DUN Bekok), Parlimen Pagoh (DUN Jorak), Parlimen Ledang (DUN Tangkak), Parlimen Bakri (DUN Sungai Abong dan DUN Bukit Naning), Parlimen Muar (DUN Maharani dan DUN Sungai Balang), Parlimen Parit Sulong (DUN Sri Medan), Parlimen Ayer Hitam (DUN Yong Peng), Parlimen Sri Gading (DUN Parit Raja), Parlimen Batu Pahat (DUN Penggaram), Parlimen Simpang Renggam (DUN Machap), Parlimen Kluang (DUN Mahkota), Parlimen Sembrong (DUN Kahang), Parlimen Mersing (DUN Tenggaroh), Parlimen Tenggara (DUN Panti), Parlimen Pengerang (DUN Penawar), Parlimen Johor Bahru (DUN Stulang), Parlimen Kulai (DUN Bukit Batu) dan Parlimen Pontian (DUN Pulai Sebatang).

475

Zon Selatan (Negeri 9, Melaka & Johor)

Rajah 1: Peta kawasan kajian (Zon Selatan: Negeri Sembilan, Melaka dan Johor)

Bagi negeri Melaka, kawasan yang terlibat dengan perbancian ialah di 6 kawasan Parlimen (merangkum 20 kawasan DUN) iaitu Parlimen Masjid Tanah (DUN Ayer Limau dan DUN Taboh Naning), Parlimen Alor Gajah (DUN Rembia, DUN Gadek, DUN Machap dan DUN Durian Tunggal), Parlimen Tangga Batu (DUN Sungai Udang, DUN Pantai Kundor, DUN Paya Rumput dan DUN Klebang), Parlimen Bukit Katil (DUN Ayer Keroh dan DUN Bukit Baru), Parlimen Kota Melaka (DUN Kesidang, DUN Kota Laksamana, DUN Bandar Hilir dan DUN Telok Mas) dan Parlimen Jasin (DUN Merlimau, DUN Sungai Rambai, DUN Bemban dan DUN Rim).

Bagi Negeri Sembilan, kawasan yang terlibat dengan perbancian ialah di 8 kawasan Parlimen (merangkumi 12 kawasan DUN) merangkumi Parlimen Seremban

476

(DUN Ampangan dan DUN Temiang), Parlimen Teluk Kemang (DUN Port Dickson dan DUN Bagan Pinang), Parlimen Jelebu (DUN Pertang dan DUN Kuala Klawang), Parlimen Kuala Pilah (DUN Pilah dan DUN Sri Menanti), Parlimen Jempol (DUN Bahau dan DUN Jeram Padang), Parlimen Tampin (DUN Repah dan DUN Gemencheh), Parlimen Rasah (DUN Labu, DUN Bukit Kepayang, DUN Rahang dan DUN Mambau) dan Parlimen Rembau (DUN Rantau, DUN Paroi, DUN Kota dan DUN Chembong).

KAJIAN LEPAS: POLITIK PILIHAN RAYA DI MALAYSIA

Bagi kajian politik pilihan raya di Malaysia, terdapat beberapa kajian terdahulu yang telahdilakukan oleh beberapa orang penyelidik tentang parti politik dan pilihan raya.Namun begitu, kajian-kajian lepas itu lebih bersifatumum, dan tidak menyeluruh. Bagi kajian tentang parti politik, terdapat kajian-kajian lepas yang menyentuh tentang dasar perjuangan dan trend sokongan dalam pilihan raya.

Umumnya dalam konteks Malaysia, model pengundian yang menjadi asas perbincangan dan analisis politik dan pilihan raya Malaysia adalah model pengundian sosiologikal yang menyatakan wujudnya pengaruh kumpulan-kumpulan sosial seperti etnik, agama, kelas dan persekitaran tempat tinggal dalam tingkah laku pengundian. Pengaruh kumpulan sosial etnik adalah pendekatan popular yang sering digunakan oleh para pengkaji pilihan raya dalam menganalisis keputusan pilihan raya Malaysia (McGee 1962; Ratnam 1965; Vasil 1965 dan 1971; Ratnam dan Milne 1970; Ismail 1979; Crouch et al. 1980; Rizal dan Jumat 2002; Brown 2005; Balasubramaniam 2005 dan 2006; Mohd Fuad et al. 2011).

Yahaya (1978) dalam bukunya, Bulan Purnama Gerhana di Kelantan, cuba menganalisis kejatuhan PAS di Kelantan, sebab-sebab kejatuhannya dan kekuatan yang

477

masih tersembunyi dalam PAS, di samping membuat spekulasi untuk nasib PAS pada masa akan datang. Beliau cuba memberi tanggapan bahawa parti BERJASA, parti baru yang kononnya mahu mengambil alih kedudukan PAS sebagai partialternatif Islam di negara ini. Beliau juga melihat kedudukan UMNOdi Kelantan untuk melihat sejauh mana ia dapat berkuasadi negeri itu dan bagaimana Tengku Razaleigh Hamzahmerancang 'power game' nya untuk menjadikan Kelantansebagai 'base' politiknya, bagi tujuannya untuk menanjaknaik dalam hirarki politik UMNO dan Malaysia.

Di Malaysia juga kajian tentang politik dan pilihan raya pernah dibuat di Malaysia tahun 1990-an olehAfitra Salam (Jurnal llmu Politik 1993: 103). Kajian tersebut mendapati polapengundian pilihan raya umum di Malaysia sentiasa berkait dengan isu yangbercorak perkauman dan agama seperti dalam kalangan orang Melayu, Cina danIndia. Orang Melayu mengundi Barisan Nasional kerana mereka menjadi ahliparti UMNO (United Malays National Organization) dan parti tersebut menjadikomponen terbesar Barisan Nasional. Hal sedemikian juga diamalkan olehorang-orang Cina dan India dari parti MCA (Malaysian Chinese Association)dan parti MIC (Malaysian Indian Congress) dimana kedua-dua parti bercorakperkauman Cina dan India. Kedua-dua parti tersebut juga menjadi komponenBarisan Nasional (Commonwealth Comparative Politics: Mac 2001, 54).Ketiga buah parti besar tersebut bekerjasama dalam komponenperikatan sejak tahun 1955 dan sejak tahun 1974 menggunakan namaBarisan Nasional. Parti komponen tersebut sejak pilihan raya 1955 hinggaPRU 2004adalah parti majoriti yang memiliki kerusi di parlimen kerana diundi secaramajoriti oleh ketiga kaum tersebut. Namun di Malaysia, parti yangsemata-mata mementingkan perjuangan untuk satu kumpulan kaum/agamadan menang majoriti pada peringkat negeri. Misalnya parti Melayu (Islam)PAS (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia) menang majoriti dan berjaya menguasaikerajaan negeri di Kelantan dan Terengganu (1999). Pengundi di kawasantersebut sangat terpengaruh oleh faktor perkauman dan agama Islam sertatokoh

478

politik yang popular memimpin parti seperti Tuan Guru Dato‘ Nik AzizNik Mat di Kelantan dan Abdul Hadi Awang di Terengganu. Kajian Ahmad Kamar (1980) yang bertajuk, Islam Tercabar: Satu Pandangan Terhadap Perjuangan PAS, adalah lebih bercorak umum tentang PAS iaitu meliputi sejarah dan ‗ideologi‘, kepimpinannya secara umum dan organisasi. Kajiannya adalah luas namun tidak menekankan kepada satu-satu perkara secara mendalam. Menurut Funston (1980) dalam bukunya bertajuk Malay Politic In Malaysia: A Study of the United Malays National Organization and Party Islam menyatakan bahawa penubuhan PAS berpunca daripada sikap Dato‘ Onn yang cuba memasukkan bukan Melayu ke dalam kerakyatan Melayu, iaitu dengan membuka keahlian UMNO kepada orang bukan Melayu. Funston turut membincangkan tentang tujuan penubuhan PAS pada awalnya, di mana ia bertujuan untuk menjadi badan bertindak bagimenentang golongan ulamak di luar UMNO.

Lau (1983) dalam kajian peranan MCA daan DAP sebagai parti politik pejuang kepentingan kaum Cina selepas 1969 mendapati MCA tidak dapat menyuarakan dengan lebih berani mengenai hak yang diperjuangkan untuk kaum Cina kerana menghormati semangat pemuafakatan Barisan Nasional yang menguasai Kerajaan Persekutuan, namun berbeza dengan DAP sebagai parti pembangkang yang lantang memperjuangkan hak kaum Cina sehingga digelar sebagai ‗cauvanis‘. Lim (1990) dalam kajian pilihan raya kecil Parlimen Ampang dari aspek kelas sosial dan unsur perkauman mendapati pengundi di kawasan tersebut lebih mementingkan isu pertumbuhan ekonomi dan penyelesaian masalah sosioekonomi mereka berbanding unsur perkauman dan kelas sosial. Kajian oleh Khong (1991) menganalisis penggunaan isu, kaum, agama serta bahasa dalam pilihan raya umum 1990. Isu-isu yang dimanipulasikan dalam pilihan raya 1990 tersebut memberikan kelebihan kepada parti pembangkang iaitu PAS dalam isu agama, Semangat 46 dalam isu kaum dan bahasa dan DAP dalam isu kaum dan konsep ‗Malaysian Malaysia‘

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seterusnya parti-parti pembangkang tersebut berjaya memenangi beberapa kerusi DUN dan Parlimen dalam pilihan raya tersebut. Turut dihuraikan ialah prestasi parti-parti politik seperti PAS di Kelantan dan PBS di Sabah dalam aspek politik etnisiti dan politik pembangunan serta politik keagamaan di kedua-dua negeri yang diperintah oleh parti pembangkang tersebut. Tan (1992) dalam kajian politik perkauman di Kota Melaka dalam pilihan raya umum 1969-1990 mendapati kesetiaan kepada parti lebih dominan berbanding perkauman di samping faktor-faktor personaliti dan khidmat calon. Perpaduan dalam kalangan masyarakat Cina juga tidak terjejas meskipun mereka berlainan ideologi politik. Boey (1992) dalam kajian sokongan kaum Cina terhadap MCA dan DAP mendapati golongan yang berpendapatan dan berpendidikan tinggi lebih cenderung menyokong MCA berbanding DAP yang disokong golongan yang berpendapatan dan berpendidikan rendah dan kekalahan calon MCA dalam pilihan raya umum 1990 bagi DUN Kota Darulaman adalah kerana faktor perkhidmatan MCA yang kurang memuaskan, perselisihan dalaman MCA dan masalah calon yang dipertandingkan.

Teh (1996) dalam kajian trend pengundian kaum Cina di Pulau Pinang mendapati bahawa faktor ekonomi adalah penentu yang signifikan terhadap tingkah laku pengundian Cina dalam pilihan raya umum tahun 1995 di Pulau Pinang. Kajian tersebut juga menunjukkan bahawa sebilangan pengundi yang mengidentifikasikan diri mereka dengan parti tertentu tetapi tidaklah begitu setia kepada parti dan akan berubah sikap mengikut keadaan. Pendekatan pemilihan rasional dan pendekatan identifikasi parti penting dalam proses pembentukan trend pengundian Cina di Pulau Pinang. Leow (2001) dalam kajian pilihan raya 1999: tingkahlaku pengundi Cina di kawasan DUN Sri Kembangan mendapati faktor media massa, faktor sistem kepercayaan atau sikap politik dan faktor isu politik telah membantu pengundi mencorak keutamaan mereka iaitu mengawal kerajaan dan pembangunan tempatan yang berkesan. Wong (2001) dalam kajian perilaku pengundi Cina dalam pilihan raya 1999: satu kajian kes di kawasan DUN Rahang, Negeri Sembilan mendapati isu-isu pembangunan dan perkhidmatan yang diberikan oleh sesebuah parti dan calon pilihan raya merupakan penentu utama seseorang pengundi untuk menyokong parti yang bertanding.

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Goo (2002) dalam kajian kemenangan berterusan DAP di kawasan Parlimen Kota Melaka mendapati faktor kepemimpinan dan kelemahan BN yang menyebabkan DAP terus menang di kawasan tersebut. Kajian juga menunjukkan kaum Cina tidak mempunyai identifikasi parti yang tinggi sebaliknya mementingkan prestasi dan pencapaian parti kepada komuniti mereka dan ini menunjukkan bahawa pengundi Cina tidak setia kepada sesuatu parti sebaliknya hanya akan menyokong parti yang dapat memberi kepentingan kepada komuniti tersebut.

Muhammad Fauzi et al. (2003) dalam kajian tentang penyertaan politik masyarakat negeri Johor dalam Pilihan Raya Umum Ke-10 telah mendapati bahawa masyarakat di negeri Johor hanya cenderung untuk mendaftar sebagai pengundi. Tahap penyertaan masyarakat di negeri Johor masih sederhana tetapi signifikan kepada kemenangan parti pemerintah. Kajian ini juga menunjukkan bahawa walaupun terdapat pelbagai isu yang telah dimanipulasi oleh pihak pembangkang sepanjang tempoh berkempen sehinggalah ke hari pembuangan undi, rasa taat setia dan kepercayaan penuh pihak pengundi atau responden kajian kepada kerajaan yang memerintah masih tidak berganjak. Rekod cemerlang kemenangan parti pemerintah yang menyapu bersih kesemua kerusi DUN dan Parlimen pada pilihan raya umum yang lalu adalah sebagai buktinya.

Junaidi et al. (2010) dalam kajian pilihan raya kecil di kawasan Parlimen Hulu Selangor mendapati dari segi kriteria pemilihan calon, 81.7 peratus responden menyatakan mereka memilih calon yang mesra rakyat. Parti yang memperjuangkan isu pembangunan dan kemiskinan menjadi pilihan utama mereka (75.3 peratus). Majoriti responden menyokong, menghayati dan memanifestasi konsep ―1 Malaysia: Rakyat Didahulukan, Pencapaian Diutamakan‖ dan menyatakan prestasi kepimpinan Kerajaan Persekutuan berada pada tahap memuaskan. Mereka juga menyokong aspirasi kerajaan

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dalam memantapkan agenda pembangunan negara dan berpandangan Indeks Petunjuk Prestasi Utama (KPI) untuk wakil rakyat dan menteri akan mempengaruhi sokongan rakyat terhadap kerajaan. Hasil kajian juga mendapati 43.10 peratus responden menyatakan akan mengundi BN berbanding 34.0 peratus PKR. Dapatan kajian tersebut selaras dengan keputusan sebenar pilihan raya yang memihak kepada BN sebanyak 1,725 undi majoriti. Samsudin (2010) dalam kajian ―Media, Demokrasi dan Generasi Muda: Analisis Keputusan Pilihan Raya Umum Ke-12‖ telah mendapati bahawa kepercayaan kepada maklumat internet dan daripada kawan-kawan serta isu-isu yang dibangkitkan pilihan raya telah menyumbang secara positif terhadap keputusan PRU-12 yang memihak kepada gabungan parti pembangkang. Kajian ini juga menunjukkan bahawa isu-isu kenaikan barang, peluang pekerjaan, isu kesamarataan dan isu rasuah mempengaruhi responden berpuas hati dengan keputusan pilihan raya yang menguntungkan parti pembangkang.

Markus (2010) menyatakan dalam usaha untuk mengembalikan keyakinan dan sokongan pengundi Cina kepada MCA, parti tersebut perlu berubah dengan tidak lagi menggunakan strategi politik pembangunan yang hanya akan melahirkan masyarakat yang malas, kebergantungan dan pasif untuk menarik undi Cina, sebaliknya perlunya budaya politik pengisian yang bermakna seperti politik nilai, integriti, keadilan dan matang.

Junaidi et al. (2011) mendapati trend pengundian dalam setiap Pilihan Raya Kecil (PRK) antara tahun 2008 hingga 2011 menunjukkan sokongan terhadap BN/Kerajaan Pusat bergantung kepada undi yang disumbangkan oleh kaum Melayu manakala kekuatan undi Pakatan Rakyat bergantung kepada undi kaum Cina/Tionghua. Pengundi Melayu yang tinggal di kawasan luar bandar yang hanya menerima maklumat daripada media arus perdana seperti akhbar Utusan Malaysia, Berita Harian serta media elektronik seperti

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RTM dan TV3; yang juga dibelenggu kemiskinan yang masih serba kekurangan dari segi kemudahan infrastruktur yang amat dipengaruhi oleh sentimen ‗Politik Pembangunan‘ yang masih memerlukan bantuan atau ‗tongkat‘ serta mempunyai mentaliti bahawa orang Melayu sebagai ‗tuan‘ dan penduduk ‗asal‘ di Malaysia ini dan berpandangan hanya UMNO/BN yang layak dan sesuai mentadbir negara dan negeri berdasarkan pengalaman 56 tahun memerintah negara dan negeri, akan terus menyokong UMNO/BN.

Menurut Amer Saifude et al. (2011) dalam kajian tentang analisis pasca PRU-12 mengenai sokongan bukan Melayu kepada UMNO dan PAS telah menunjukkan bahawa pengundi Cina dan India telah memberikan sokongan penuh kepada calon pembangkang tanpa mengira etnik calon tersebut walaupun calon parti pembangkang adalah Melayu. Namun, parti pembangkang tidak mendapat sokongan sepenuhnya daripada etnik Melayu. Hubungan signifikan yang negatif membawa pengertian semakin ramai etnik Melayu dalam sesebuah kawasan maka sokongan kepada pembangkang semakin merosot. Kesimpulannya ialah UMNO dan PAS masih bergantung kepada sokongan etnik Melayu berbanding etnik lain dalam pilihan raya; namun peminggiran etnik lain, jika dilakukan akan turut menjejaskan prestasi mereka.

Lim (2012) menyatakan politik orang Cina adalah realistik mengikut situasi semasa yang mementingkan hak orang Cina apabila kegagalan pemimpin MCA memperjuangkan hak orang Cina pada tahun 1969 dan 2008 menyebabkan MCA telah kalah teruk pada pilihan raya nasional tersebut. Thock (2012) menyatakan ketika pra PRU-13, BN masih gagal memperoleh semula undi Cina yang mereka hilang pada PRU 2008 kerana pendekatan penyelesaian ‗gula-gula politik‘ dan ‗ala mi segera‘ tidak dapat diterima oleh pengundi Cina, sebaliknya mereka inginkan pengagihan peruntukan dan bantuan secara institusi dan sistematik. Markus (2012) menjelaskan meskipun Ong Tee Keat (OTK) tewas dalam pemilihan Presiden MCA 2010, pemimpin tersebut masih perlu diketengahkan dalam PRU-13 kerana ciri kepemimpinan beliau yang mempunyai

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kelebihan dari segi intelektualismenya, perjuangan politik yang konsisten, tiada skandal dan merentasi batasan kaum. Menurut Mujibu (2013) dalam kajian ―Perubahan Generasi dan Perkembangan Demokrasi di Malaysia Pasca Pilihan Raya Umum Ke-12‖ mendapati bahawa gabungan faktor-faktor perkauman, permuafakatan, pecah dan perintah, pengawalan dan pembangunan menjadi asas kekuatan BN mendominasi politik Malaysia. Namun, perubahan generasi, modenisasi dan kepesatan teknologi dikenal pasti sebagai penyumbang kepada kekalahan BN itu. Kemunculan generasi baru dalam pilihan raya jelas menunjukkan bahawa generasi di Malaysia telah beranjak dari generasi merdeka kepada pasca merdeka. Hal ini disebabkan perubahan generasi menuntut kepada perubahan strategi untuk memancing undi. Dalam hal ini, BN dikatakan gagal untuk untuk beradaptasi dengan perubahan tersebut. BN yang berterusan menggunakan politik pembangunan gagal tampil dengan strategi baru untuk memikat pengundi muda. Tambahan pula, beberapa isu, kontroversi dan kelemahan pentadbiran kerajaan diterajui BN memburukkan lagi reputasi BN di mata rakyat, terutamanya golongan muda. Mohd Jalaluddin et al. (2013) dalam kajian ‗Model Tingkah Laku Pengundian Dalam Kajian Pilihan Raya Di Malaysia‘ mendapati model identifikasi parti adalah masih dominan berbanding model pengundian lain di Malaysia. Pengundi lebih memilih parti berbanding faktor calon dan dan faktor isu. Faktor calon yang seetnik juga bukan merupakan faktor utama pemilihan dalam pengundian. Pengundi secara umumnya telah mengidentifikasi dengan parti-parti tertentu. Namun begitu didapati juga jumlah pengundi yang tidak mengikat dengan mana-mana parti dan cenderung kepada model pilihan rasional dan model retrospektif juga semakin membesar dan menjadi faktor penentu di kawasan-kawasan pilihan raya tertentu.

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Mohd Azri dan Sity (2012) dan Mohd Azri (2013) dalam kajian mengenai ‗Tingkah Laku Pengundian di kawasan Parlimen Labuan‘ mendapati pendekatan model pilihan rasional lebih dominan berbanding identifikasi parti dan sosiologi. Ini menunjukkan bahawa pengundi di Labuan lebih mengutamakan kepentingan yang memperlihatkan keuntungan kepada mereka terutamanya yang berkaitan dengan ekonomi, kebajikan, pembangunan dan kemudahan awam. Ruzaini Fikri (2013) menyatakan pilihan raya negeri dan parlimen 1959 di Kelantan menunjukkan bahawa isu kebajikan dan kuasa politik Melayu memainkan peranan penting dalam penentuan keputusan pilihan raya di Kelantan yang menyebabkan kekalahan parti Perikatan. Junaidi et al. (2014a) dalam kajian ‗Analisis Pilihan Raya Kecil (PRK) 2013-2014 di Malaysia dengan Menggunakan Pendekatan Teori Pilihan Rasional, Teori Identifikasi Parti dan Model Sosiologi‘ di kawasan DUN Kuala Besut (Terengganu), DUN Sungai Limau (Kedah), DUN Kajang (Selangor), DUN Balingian (Sarawak), Parlimen Bukit Gelugor (Pulau Pinang) dan Parlimen Teluk Intan (Perak) mendapati sokongan pengundi di kawasan DUN Kuala Besut dipengaruhi oleh identifikasi parti, DUN Sungai Limau (identifikasi parti), DUN Kajang (sosiologi), DUN Balingian (pilihan rasional), Parlimen Bukit Gelugor (sosiologi) dan Parlimen Teluk Intan (pilihan rasional). Keadaan tersebut dipengaruhi oleh sumber maklumat politik, corak kempen, etnik calon, faktor kekeluargaan, agama, perkauman dan politik pembangunan. Justeru, senario politik dan pilihan raya di Malaysia menarik untuk dikaji dengan mempunyai variasi atau kepelbagaian pola pengundian berdasarkan faktor kawasan/lokasi geografi, ideologi politik, tahap pembangunan dan persekitaran sosial yang unik dan menarik untuk dikaji.

Mustafa dan Mohamad Zain (2015) dalam kajian politik Kelantan, Malaysia menyatakan bahawa keunikan politik Kelantan yang sentiasa bergelora menjadi rebutan antara PAS dan UMNO/BN. Pertarungan sengit kedua-dua parti tersebut juga membabitkan persoalan agama dan ekonomi telah menyebabkan perpecahan serius dalam masyarakat Melayu di negeri tersebut.

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Junaidi et al. (2014b) dalam kajian PRK DUN Pengkalan Kubor, Kelantan mendapati bagi pola pengundian mengikut Daerah Mengundi, BN terus menang di kawasan pedalaman iaitu di Pengkalan Kubor, Kampung Ketil, Simpangan, Tujoh, Telaga Bata, Bunohan, Jubakar Darat, Bendang Pak Yong dan Telok Jering manakala PAS menang di kawasan pekan dan pinggir pekan iaitu Kampung Tebing, Kampung Geting dan Kedai Geting. Antara faktor yang dikaitkan dengan kemenangan BN dalam PRK tersebut ialah keberkesanan jentera pilihan raya BN, keputusan PRK tidak memberi impak kepada kedudukan Kerajaan Negeri dan Pusat, calon BN yang baik, dasar kerajaan yang ditunjangi UMNO dan BN diterima rakyat, penjelasan isu royalti minyak dan isu-isu lain yang berjaya ditangani dengan baik, masalah dalaman Pakatan Rakyat dan penurunan peratusan keluar mengundi. PRK ini dilihat memberi implikasi kepada pembangunan sosioekonomi dan politik iaitu dapat menjana pembangunan infrastruktur, arah sokongan pengundi, segi pengaruh PAS di negeri Kelantan, pengaruh terhadap BN. Justeru, keputusan PRK DUN Pengkalan Kubor ini perlu diambil perhatian oleh kedua-dua blok parti iaitu BN dan PR agar masing-masing memperkemaskan jentera dan perkhidmatan kepada rakyat, mengurangkan aktiviti politiking seterusnya bekerja semaksimum mungkin untuk kemajuan rakyat dan kawasan masing-masing menuju PRU akan datang.

Junaidi et al. (2014c) dalam kajian tentang tsunami politik bandar pada Pilihan Raya Umum 2013 di Malaysia mendapati bahawa ‗tsunami politik bandar‘ berlaku disebabkan oleh faktor akses pengundi bandar kepada sumber maklumat politik daripada media alternatif seperti facebook, twitter, laman web, blog dan juga SMS di samping faktor sokongan padu pengundi etnik Cina bandar dan sokongan golongan profesional dan pengundi muda kepada PR. Kos sara hidup yang tinggi dan manifesto PR yang berjanji mahu menurunkan harga bahan api, menurunkan harga kereta, mewujudkan pentadbiran yang lebih adil dan telus juga menjadi faktor kemenangan PR dalam PRU-13 di kawasan bandar.

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Mohd Fuad et al. (2014a) dalam kajian ―Realignment Pengundi Cina dalam PRU13‖ telah mendapati bahawa kegagalan BN memperoleh undi etnik Cina pada PRU 13 telah menjadi pengajaran bagi BN untuk membetulkan keadaan dari segi kepimpinan, isuisu, dasar, institusi, janji dan sebagainya. Pakatan Rakyat memperoleh kelebihan hasil sokongan pengundi Cina, maka pola pengundian etnik Cina yang berterusan dilihat boleh menggugat hegemoni BN seterusnya mewujudkan polarisasi kaum yang luas pada PRU akan datang.

Mohd Fuad et al. (2014b) dalam kaji selidik terhadap 300 orang responden di kesemua 16 Daerah Mengundi dalam PRK DUN Kajang mendapati bagi jenis kempen, manifesto parti dan calon menjadi medium utama dalam mempengaruhi sokongan responden kepada parti politik dalam PRK DUN Kajang. Isu-isu yang dicanangkan dalam kempen serta dibualkan oleh pengundi di DUN Kajang ialah isu perletakan jawatan ADUN Kajang, isu pergolakan dalaman PKR Selangor, isu pentadbiran Kerajaan Negeri Selangor, isu air, isu sosial, isu pembangunan dan isu alam sekitar. Keseluruhannya, persepsi terhadap dasar-dasar Kerajaan Negeri dan Kerajaan Pusat adalah positif namun pengundi mengharapkan agar isu ekonomi iaitu isu kenaikan harga barangan dan peluang pekerjaan dapat ditangani oleh pihak yang berwajib agar kehidupan mereka lebih baik. PRK DUN Kajang juga memperlihatkan pengekalan ‗status quo‘ iaitu kemenangan kepada PKR kerana impak keputusan PRU 2013 masih baru dan terkesan oleh pengundi di DUN Kajang.

Junaidi et al. (2015) dalam kajian Pilihan raya Kecil (PRK) Parlimen Permatang Pauh dan Parlimen Rompin 2015 mendapati isu nasional lebih mempengaruhi dalam PRK Permatang Pauh dan politik pembangunan terus ditagih oleh pengundi dalam PRK Rompin. Keputusan PRK ini menunjukkan BN dan PKR berjaya mengekalkan kerusi yang dimenangi oleh parti-parti tersebut pada PRU-13, 2013 yang lalu. Oleh itu, dalam

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PRK ini memperlihatkan pemimpin atau calon lama tetap dipilih oleh rakyat di kedua-dua kawasan ini. Ini menunjukkan ikatan identifikasi parti pengundi begitu kuat kepada BN di Rompin dan PKR (Permatang Pauh) walaupun kedua-dua parti ini meletakkan calon lama sebagai calon dalam kedua-dua pilihan raya kecil ini.

Junaidi dan Mohd Fuad (2016) dalam kajian trend pengundian Pilihan Raya Kecil (PRK) DUN Tenang (Johor), Kerdau (Pahang) dan Merlimau (Melaka) menunjukkan sokongan terhadap UMNO bergantung kepada undi yang disumbangkan oleh kaum Melayu. Ini mengukuhkan lagi hegemoni UMNO terhadap pengundi Melayu di persada politik negara hingga sekarang. Pengundi Melayu yang tinggal di kawasan luar bandar yang hanya menerima maklumat daripada media arus perdana; yang juga dibelenggu kemiskinan yang masih serba kekurangan dari segi kemudahan infrastruktur yang amat dipengaruhi oleh sentimen ‗Politik Pembangunan‘ yang masih memerlukan bantuan atau ‗tongkat‘ serta mempunyai mentaliti bahawa orang Melayu sebagai ‗tuan‘ dan penduduk ‗asal‘ di Malaysia ini dan berpandangan hanya UMNO/BN yang layak dan sesuai mentadbir negara dan negeri berdasarkan pengalaman 56 tahun memerintah negara dan negeri, akan terus menyokong UMNO/BN.

Junaidi dan Mazlan (2016) dalam kajian politik negeri Terengganu pada PRU 2013 mendapati bahawa keputusan PRU-2013 di negeri Terengganu mengejutkan ramai pihak terutamanya pengkaji politik dan pemimpin politik di peringkat nasional. Hal ini kerana fenomena kebalikan sokongan pengundi Melayu kepada BN/UMNO seluruh negara tidak terkesan di Terengganu sebalik hampir-hampir menyingkirkan pemerintahan BN di negeri Pantai Timur ini. Program ―PAS Ganti UMNO‖ anjuran Badan Perhubungan PAS Negeri Terengganu sejak tahun 2008 hingga 2013 di kesemua lapan parlimen di negeri ini menunjukkan kesan positif kepada PAS yang hampir menawan negeri Terengganu. Hampir kesemua kawasan DUN menyaksikan penurunan majoriti BN dan beberapa orang calon BN yang juga merupakan EXCO Kerajaan Negeri Terengganu

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tewas mengejut kepada calon baharu daripada PAS. Dari segi pola pengundian, PAS dan PKR menang di kawasan bandar yang mempunyai pengundi yang bermaklumat dan mengalami penembusan Internet dan media sosial yang baik, berbanding dengan BN yang menang kebanyakannya di kawasan luar bandar yang kehidupan rakyat serba miskin dan memerlukan bantuan pihak berkuasa serta hanya bergantung kepada sumber maklumat politik daripada media arus perdana. Penguasaan tipis BN di Terengganu juga menyaksikan Terengganu hampir-hampir terjebak dalam krisis politik berikutan pelantikan Ahmad Razif Abd Rahman (ADUN Seberang Takir) sebagai Menteri Besar baharu bagi menggantikan Ahmad Said pada Mei 2014. Ahmad Said dan beberapa lagi ADUN mengisytiharkan keluar UMNO sebelum menarik semula keputusannya itu.

Muhammad Hazim et al. (2016) dalam kajian mengenai reaksi rakyat Selangor mengenai senario semasa politik pasca PRU2013 menuju PRU-14 akan datang di kawasan DUN Teratai,Parlimen Pandan, Selangor mendapati bahawa isu ekonomi merupakan isu terpenting yang perluditangani oleh Kerajaan. Bagi isu domestik, isu gangguan bekalan air boleh menjejaskan sokongan rakyat kepadaKerajaan Selangor. Sebaliknya

responden

bersetuju

dengan

dasar-dasar

Kerajaan

Pusat

yang

mementingkankebajikan rakyat seperti pemberian BR1M, rumah mampu milik, bantuan kepada pelajar sekolah dan universiti.Oleh itu, pengundi di Selangor mementingkan kerajaan yang mengutamakan kebajikan rakyat di samping inginkankerajaan yang telus, adil dan berintegriti.

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HASIL KAJIAN DAN PERBINCANGAN

Sumber Maklumat Tentang Perkembangan Politik Nasional Atau Negeri

a) Media Cetak

Berdasarkan Jadual 1 didapati peratusan tertinggi responden mendapat sumber maklumat mengenai perkembangan politik nasional atau negeri di Johor sebanyak 44.0 peratus melalui media cetak Harian Metro dan di negeri Melaka 37.3 peratus, manakala responden di Negeri Sembilan memperoleh sumber maklumatmedia cetak Berita Harian tertinggi dengan peratusan 33.8 peratus. Di Johor, responden lebih cenderung merujuk akhbar Harian Metro kerana akhbar tersebut bersifat santai, memaparkan isu-isu sosial dan kemanusiaan, mempunyai grafik dan foto yang menarik dan difahami serta mesra pengguna. Di Negeri Sembilan pula, majoriti responden merujuk akhbar Berita Harian kerana akhbar tersebut memaparkan sesuatu isu dengan serius, pengolahan berita yang ‗straight to the point‘, grafik yang difahami dan memaparkan perkara yang dekat di hati rakyat.

Jadual 1: Peratusan sumber maklumat tentang perkembangan politik nasional atau negeri (Media cetak)

Media cetak

Johor

Melaka

Negeri Sembilan

Berita Harian

33.3

24.2

33.8

Utusan Malaysia

11.2

15.1

22.5

490

Harakah

2.9

4.9

5.8

Suara Keadilan

2.0

3.3

6.0

Sinar Harian

9.4

9.6

14.6

Harian Metro

44.0

37.3

27.0

Kosmo

6.8

9.2

12.8

New Straits Times

6.3

7.1

7.8

The Star

7.2

6.9

7.4

Akhbar Cina

15.1

14.1

15.0

Akhbar Tamil

5.1

6.1

10.1

Buku-buku politik

0.4

0.8

1.2

Poster

1.6

2.0

3.7

Risalah/flyer/brosur

2.03.5

3.9

3.9

b) Media Elektronik

Berdasarkan Jadual 2, peratusan responden memperoleh sumber maklumat tentang perkembangan politik nasional atau negeri melalui media elektronik TV3 adalah paling tinggi di ketiga-tiga negeri. Sebanyak 75.1 peratus responden di Johor memperoleh sumber maklumat melalui media elektronik TV3, 68.6 peratus di negeri Melaka dan diikuti 66.6 peratus di Negeri Sembilan. TV3 paling diminati untuk ditonton oleh responden di ketiga-tiga negeri kerana TV ini memaparkan audiovisual dan kesan video yang terkini, ‗up to date‘, pemberitaan yang menarik dan terkini serta rancangan filem yang sesuai dengan selera dan minat penonton.

491

Jadual 2: Peratusan sumber maklumat tentang perkembangan politik nasional atau negeri (Media elektronik)

Media elektronik

Johor

Melaka

Negeri Sembilan

TV1

37.4

31.4

37.7

TV2

24.5

28.7

31.8

TV3

75.1

68.6

66.6

NTV7

9.4

8.8

10.5

TV8

6.3

5.5

7.8

TV9

20.2

12.2

17.9

Bernama TV

2.0

1.2

4.5

Astro Awani

28.0

22.6

25.4

TV Al-Hijrah

2.9

3.7

3.5

Astro AEC

2.3

1.2

2.1

Radio

7.2

5.9

4.3

Papan Kenyataan Digital

0.4

0.6

0.8

c) Media alternatif/Internet

Jadual 3 menunjukkan peratusan sumber maklumat tentang perkembangan politik melalui media alternatif atau internet. Majoriti responden mendapatkan maklumat melalui media alternatif Twitter adalah tertinggi di ke tiga-tiga negeri dengan peratusan 46.0 peratus di Johor, 39.1 peratus di Melaka dan 34.2 peratus di Negeri Sembilan. Twitter diminati responden terutamanya golongan muda kerana paparan video, foto serta grafik, maklumat

492

dan bahan rujukan sosial, ekonomi dan politik yang ringkas namun dapat menyampaikan mesej yang jelas kepada pemilik akaun media sosial tersebut.

Jadual 3: Peratusan sumber maklumat tentang perkembangan politik nasional atau negeri (Media alternatif/internet)

Media alternatif/internet

Johor

Melaka

Negeri Sembilan

Blog

20.0

16.3

20.4

Laman Web

23.9

14.9

18.3

Facebook

8.8

7.5

8.7

CD/VCD

1.0

1.8

2.7

Twitter

46.0

39.1

34.2

E-mail

6.5

3.7

5.4

Youtube

1.8

1.0

2.9

Mp3

14.9

7.7

8.0

SMS

0.0

0.4

1.0

Telegram

1.0

2.4

3.7

We Chat

0.4

0.2

0.6

Instagram

1.2

1.0

1.2

WhatsApp

37.2

32.6

21.2

Skype

0.8

0.2

0.4

493

d) Sumber-Sumber Lain

Jadual 4 menunjukkan peratusan tertinggi maklumat mengenai perkembangan politik nasional atau negeri bagi ketiga-tiga negeri ialah sumber lain iaitu saudara-mara. Antara ketiga-tiga negeri, didapati responden memperoleh maklumat melalui saudara-mara tertinggi adalah di Melaka dengan 27.9 peratus diikuti negeri Johor 24.5 peratus dan 20.8 peratus di Negeri Sembilan. Responden di ketiga-tiga negeri tersebut lebih selesa untuk merujuk saudara-mara bagi mendapatkan maklumat politik kerana isu tersebut dapat dibincangkan dengan saudara mara dengan lebih rasional, terbuka, berlapang dada serta dapat menjelaskan sesuatu perkara berdasarkan pengetahuan dan kemahiran yang ada.

Jadual 4: Sumber maklumat tentang perkembangan politik nasional atau negeri (Sumber-sumber lain)

Sumber-sumber lain

Johor

Melaka

Negeri Sembilan

Ibu-bapa

8.4

5.9

7.4

Anak

7.8

10.6

6.0

Adik-beradik

10.0

9.8

10.9

Datuk/nenek

0.6

0.8

0.8

Cucu

0.6

2.4

1.7

Jiran

20.5

24.4

15.0

Rakan sekerja

14.7

19.3

18.1

Guru/pensyarah

1.2

1.4

4.1

Ahli politik/pemimpin setempat

2.3

4.9

6.2

Pemimpin NGO

1.2

1.8

3.7

Pemimpin agama

0.8

2.4

1.4

494

Majikan tempat kerja

0.4

0.8

1.2

Ceramah/kempen

3.1

4.9

5.4

Saudara-mara

24.5

27.9

20.8

Sumber Maklumat yang Paling Dipercayai

Berdasarkan Rajah 2 menunjukkan sumber maklumat yang paling dipercayai responden. Antara keempat-empat sumber, sumber maklumat yang paling dipercayai ialah media cetak di ketiga-tiga negeri iaitu tertinggi di negeri Melaka 45.2 peratus, manakala di negeri Johor pula 44.8 peratus responden mempercayai media cetak dan diikuti dengan Negeri Sembilan 39 peratus. Responden di ketiga-tiga negeri lebih mempercayai media cetak kerana media cetak bersifat menerang, statik, mudah dimiliki, pemaparan grafik dan foto yang meyakinkan di samping bersifat santai iaitu boleh dibaca dimana sahaja dan pada bila-bila masa yang sesuai dan terluang.

Negeri Sembilan Melaka Johor

Rajah 2: Sumber maklumat yang paling dipercayai (Ya-%)

495

Penilaian terhadap Sumber Maklumat

Rajah 3 menunjukkan peratusan responden sama ada membuat penilaian terhadap sumber maklumat. Didapati ketiga-tiga negeri menyatakan Ya dengan peratusan tertinggi iaitu 82.2 peratus di negeri Johor, 74.5 peratus di negeri Melaka dan 69.3 peratus di Negeri Sembilan. Responden masih berhati-hati dalam menerima maklumat mengenai politik dengan menilai terlebih dahulu sebelum mempercayai seterusnya menyebarkan maklumat tersebut kepada pihak lain. Ini menjadikan mereka lebih rasional dan matang dalam menerima maklumat politik di samping patuh kepada peruntukan undang-undang negara mengenai penyebaran sesuatu maklumat dan ingin menjaga keutuhan ikatan persaudaraan

Peratus (%)

terutamanya berkaitan isu-isu sensitif.

Johor Melaka Negeri Sembilan

Rajah 3: Membuat penilaian terhadap sumber maklumat (%)

496

Isu yang Dibincangkan

Jadual 5 menunjukkan dapatan bagi isu yang selalu dibincangkan di kawasan responden. Secara keseluruhannya, antara isu yang utama menjadi bahan bualan responden bagi ketiga-tiga buah negeri tersebut ialah pemulihan ekonomi/harga barang/minyak. Isu ekonomi merupakan isu yang dekat di hati rakyat kerana isu ini dihadapi setiap hari oleh mereka. Isu ekonomi juga bersifat ‗berantai‘ antara satu sama lain bermula daripada isu kenaikan harga bahan api seperti petrol dan diesel, pengenalan cukai GST sehinggalah kepada kenaikan harga barangan dan perkhidmatan. Seterusnya diikuti dengan isu/masalah sosial. Antara masalah sosial ialah gejala penyalahgunaan dadah, kelakuan sumbang dan melepak yang menjadi masalah utama dihadapi oleh penduduk terutamanya bagi golongan remaja. Isu seterusnya ialah kepimpinan. Masalah kepimpinan kini yang banyak

berlakunya

transformasi

menyebabkan

rakyat

tidak

dapat

menerima

keyataan/hakikat dan membawa banyak perubahan dan tentangan terhadap kerajaan.

Jadual 5: Isu yang selalu dibincangkan di kawasan responden (%-Ya)

Bil.

Isu

Johor

Melaka

Negeri Sembilan

1.

Pemulihan ekonomi/harga

94.5

91.4

93.0

barang/minyak 2.

Isu pembangunan setempat

15.3

16.9

19.4

3.

Isu petempatan/

21.3

17.3

14.0

perumahan 4.

Kestabilan dan perpaduan

9.0

8.1

11.8

5.

Isu tanah

10.0

5.7

3.7

6.

Rasuah/ salahguna

12.1

27.1

28.3

497

Kuasa 7.

Pekerjaan

19.6

23.6

24.5

8.

Pendidikan

9.2

11.8

15.9

9.

Isu kepimpinan

22.7

18.5

20.8

10.

Isu alam sekitar

12.7

13.2

7.6

11.

Isu/masalah sosial

34.8

34.1

33.3

12.

Isu air

6.7

3.3

7.2

13.

Isu kebersihan

7.4

10.8

13.6

14.

Isu perhubungan dan

6.1

10.2

8.7

pengangkutan

Ciri Pilihan dalam Mempengaruhi Pilihan Politik

Jadual 6 menunjukkan perbandingan ciri keutamaan yang mempengaruhi responden di negeri Johor, Melaka dan Negeri Sembilan untuk mengundi dalam sesebuah pilihan raya. Terdapat 5 ciri keutamaan iaitu bangsa calon, agama calon, parti calon, kredibiliti calon dan isu semasa. Berdasarkan Jadual 6, kesemua responden memilih kredibiliti calon dan diikuti agama calon memainkan peranan paling penting untuk mengundi dalam pilihan raya, manakala, bangsa calon merupakan ciri paling kurang mempengaruhi responden untuk mengundi kecuali responden di negeri Melaka. Bagi negeri Melaka, isu semasa paling kurang mempengaruhi responden untuk mengundi. Kredibiliti calon menjadi keutamaan responden untuk mengundi dalam sesuatu pilihan raya kerana peribadi calon berhubung secara langsung dengan perkhidmatan yang bakal diberikan setelah diberi mandat 5 tahun sebagai wakil rakyat. Calon yang mesra rakyat, kerap turun padang,

498

mempunyai sumber kewangan yang kukuh, kreatif dalam menyelesaikan sesuatu isu dan masalah, jujur, amanah serta tidak pilih kasih akan menjadi pilihan rakyat.

Jadual 6: Ciri keutamaan yang mempengaruhi responden untuk mengundi dalam pilihan raya

Ciri keutamaan

Johor

Melaka

Negeri Sembilan

Bangsa calon

2.5

5.1

5.0

Agama calon

36.0

35.6

34.2

Parti calon

6.7

11.6

16.5

Kredibiliti calon

44.8

45.4

36.9

Isu semasa

10.0

2.4

7.4

Keseluruhan

100

100

100

Pihak yang Diinginkan untuk Memerintah Negara

Jadual 7 menunjukkan peratusan responden sekiranya diberi peluang untuk membuat pilihan, pihak manakah yang diinginkan untuk memerintah Nasional (Parlimen) bagi ketiga-tiga negeri. Didapati majoriti masih memilih gabungan BN sebagai pemerintah bagi peringkat Nasional (Parlimen) dengan peratusan 66.3 peratus di Negeri Sembilan. Di Melaka, peratusan sedikit rendah memilih gabungan BN sebagai pemerintah dengan 57.6 peratus dan di Johor pula sebanyak 64.6 peratus yang masih memilih BN sebagai parti memerintah. Majoriti responden masih dengan BN untuk memerintah negara kerana BN telah berpengalaman dalam memerintah negara ini sejak merdeka hinggalah sekarang. BN juga telah berjaya mewujudkan sebuah negara yang aman, sederhana serta berkecuali, bertoleransi antara kaum, menguruskan ekonomi dan politik yang stabil di samping mempunyai hubungan antarabangsa yang baik di seluruh dunia. 499

Jadual 7: Sekiranya diberi peluang untuk membuat pilihan, pihak manakah yang diinginkan untuk memerintah Negara (Parlimen)

Gabungan parti

Johor

Melaka

Negeri Sembilan

BN

64.6

57.6

66.3

PH/Pakatan Harapan (PKR, DAP dan PAN)

12.3

16.3

12.7

Tidak pasti

20.9

24.4

18.8

Tidak menjawab

2.2

1.8

2.2

Keseluruhan

100

100

100

Pihak yang Diinginkan untuk Memerintah Negeri

Jadual 8 menunjukkan peratusan responden bagi ketiga-tiga negeri sekiranya diberi peluang untuk membuat pilihan, pihak yang diinginkan untuk memerintah Negeri (DUN) adalah BN. Respon tertinggi adalah di negeri Johor sebanyak 66.3 peratus, diikuti dengan Negeri Sembilan sebanyak 58.4 peratus responden memilih pemerintahan BN dan paling rendah di negeri Melaka sebanyak 56.8 peratus. Responden juga ingin mengekalkan BN sebagai pemerintah pada peringkat negeri kerana untuk memastikan hubungan antara kerajaan negeri dengan kerajaan pusat yang baik dan stabil serta mempunyai hasrat yang sama. Parti yang sama menguasai kerajaan negeri dan kerajaan pusat akan memudahkan urusan atau bidang kuasa pemerintahan sama ada yang melibatkan senarai bersama, senarai negeri mahupun senarai persekutuan yang termaktub dalam Perlembagaan Persekutuan.

500

Jadual 8: Sekiranya diberi peluang untuk membuat pilihan, pihak manakah yang diinginkan untuk memerintah Negeri (DUN)

Gabungan parti

Johor

Melaka

Negeri Sembilan

BN

66.3

56.8

58.4

PH/Pakatan Harapan (PKR, DAP dan PAN)

12.7

17.1

20.2

Tidak pasti

18.8

24.4

18.8

Tidak menjawab

2.2

1.8

2.5

Keseluruhan

100

100

100

KESIMPULAN Sebagai kesimpulannya, responden/rakyat peka terhadap senario politik dan ekonomi negara. Mereka terkesan dengan keadaan ekonomi dan politik yang agak bercelaru pada masa kini. Walau bagaimanapun di Zon Selatan (Negeri Sembilan, Melaka dan Johor) rakyatnya/pengundi masih memberi keyakian kepada pucuk kepimpinan sekarang dan isu-isu besar negara diharapkan dapat diatasi menjelang PRU-14 kelak. Walau pun senarionya begitu, pihak berkuasa tidak seharusnya berasa selesa dan yakin. Mereka perlu dalam jangka masa yang ada,terus melakukan perbagai program atau pendekatan agar keresahan rakyat yang masih ada dapat dirungkai melalui siri penerangan/penjelasan yang meyakinkan untuk membentuk negara yang aman, sejahtera, mengutamakan kebajikan rakyat dan terus memupuk keyakinan mereka terhadap kerajaan.Adalah juga disyorkan kajian ini perlu terus dilakukan enam bulan sekali untuk mendapatkan maklum balas seterusnya menjelang PRU-14.

501

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Universitas

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508

A Simulated Assessment of the Socio-economic Scenarios of Malaysia 2050 Yap Yin Universiti Malaysia Sarawrak

Abstract Malaysia is a multiracial country with a population of 26 millions. The four main ethnic communities are the Malay, Chinese, Indian and the indigenous people of Sabah and Sarawak. There were apparent economic imbalance among the ethnic groups resulting in an ethnic conflict in 1969. The Government formulated policies to restructure and to transform the economic scenarios of Malaysia. However, the delivery process resulted in unintended results which exacerbate the economic imbalance. The future scenarios generated by a system dynamic simulation model show that , without interventions, the nation is converging into a society with an ―entrepreneurial‖ strong market- dominant minorities and an impoverished ― indigenous‖ majority, with a positive reinforcing loop. Such scenario, if unaddressed,will become is a fertile ground for a backlash against the market-dominant minorities. Such scenario already happened in many developing countries.

Key words: Economic imbalance, System Dynamics, Unintended Outcome Introduction

Since independence in 1957, Malaysia is governed by a coalition of three major political parties comprising of UMNO (the United Malay National Organization), the MCA (the Malaysian Chinese Association) and the MIC (the Malaysian Indian Congress). Prior to 1957, Malaysia pursued a very marked laissez-faire or open market position towards both foreign and domestic capital. The ethnic stratifications which took place during that period are characterized by the Malay withrice farming, Indian

509

with rubber production and Chinese with tin mining. There was very little cross-patterned reticulation among the major ethnic groups.The British plantation companies appeared to be the main beneficiary while a large section of the rural Malay suffered increasing impoverishment and were dissatisfied with the distribution of wealth. On the other hand the differentiation among the Chinese took the form of an emerging urban capitalist class while the majority of the Indian were impoverished plantation workers. However a small professional and trading class among the Indian did take shape. Malaya became an independent nation in 1957. In 1963, Malaysia was formed. After the formation of Malaysia, the problem of ethnic stratification among the Malay, Chinese and Indian reflected a scenario where a majority group ( the Malay) having political power while the other minority groups having economic power ( the Chinese). At that time there was great imbalance in the ratio of economic ownership. The corporate equity of the Malay at that time was less than two per cent while the main stake holders of the corporate equity were the British companies which accounted for more than 60 per cent of the corporate equity. As a result, there was a feeling of relative deprivation among the Malay peasantry. In May 1969, a racialriots erupted in Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia.As a result of the racial riot, the government leaders proclaimed an emergency, suspended parliament and sought ways to diffuse the ethnic conflict.In June 1971, the Government formulated the New Economic Policy (NEP), which is basically a crafted statement of goals to be achieved over a 20-years period (by 1990).Nearly 47 years after the implementation of the New Economic Policy, the gap of economic imbalance among the ethnic groups have somewhat narrowed during the initial phase of the implementation (1970-1980). However,

510

during the second phase (1980-1990), much of the progress made during the first phase have been negated by the higher birth rates of the Bumiputera.The National Development Plan(NDP) replaced the NEP in 1991 as the NEP fell short its target.

The delivery process of NEP have resulted in unintended results which hinder the economic progress of the non-Bumiputera, including the Indigenous people of Sabah and Sarawak who were accorded the Bumiputera status, upon the formation of Malaysia in 1963. To determine the efficacy of the NEP and other subsequent policies implemented by the Government for nation building from 2000 to 2050, a system dynamic simulation model is constructed. The rationale for using the system dynamics model is as follows:

Nation building is a complex and non-linear problem which involves the interactions, the pace of the socio-economic development of the state as well as the rate of human capital accumulation as well as population dynamics of the nation. The problem is non-linear in the sense that the implementation of all

the development programs will not

necessarily result in sustainable growth. All the variables involved in nation building interact with one another and the problem is exacerbated by the fact that the variables are changing all the time.

The system approach is able to portray each variable as dynamic and as such it is possible to study the future scenario beyond the limitations of statistical analysis, to explore how government policy affect the

511

perceptions of the community . System approach provides the basis for the construction of a system dynamics simulation model which can be used to produce conditional, imprecise, projections of dynamics behavior modes.

The system dynamics model can provide a general summary of the current trends of the variables and inter-relationships of the variables which may influence the behavior of the system in the future.

The system dynamics model enables the decision makers to have a macro as well as a micro view of the model. In other words, the decision makers can see the trees as well as the forest. Such a perspective enables the researcher to identify the variable with high leverage effect on the objective of the model as well as the variables with low leverage effects.

512

Figure 1 System Diagram

Impact of Percentage Post Secondary education on Agriculture growth rate

Rate of Exit PSE

PSE Exit

Occupational Exit Percentage Agriculture

Malaysia Population

PSE Impact on Occupation

Occupational Exit Rate

Selectivity Ratio in Agriculture

Agriculture Sector Exit From Agricultural Sector

Growth in Agricultural Sector

Selectivity Ratio in Manufacturing Sector

Population Growth

Percentage Income Impact of social capital on income

Agriculture Exit Rate

Percentage Population

Total Population

Income growth rate Income with impact of social capital

Aggregate of Economic Variables with social capital

Occupation Occupational Growth

Income growth

Social capital

Selectivity Ratio in Occupation

Percentage Occupation

Occupational Growth Rate

Income Income exit

Selectivity Ratio in PSE

Agricultural Growth Rate Population Exit

Income Exit Rate

Impact of social capital on PSE

PSE Growth

Percentage in Post Secondary Education

Population Exit Rate

Impact of Income on Post Secondary Education

Rate of Growth PSE

Post Secondary Education

Weighted Agregate of Industrial Sectors

Tertiary Sector Exit Rate

Manufacturing growth rate

Tertiary Sector Exit Tertiary Sector

Population Growth Rate Percentage Pop Growth in Manufacturing Sector

Manufacturin g Sector

Percentage Manufacturing Exit from Manufacturing Sector

Selectivity Ratio in Tertiary Sector

Tertiary Sector Growth Rate Percentage Tertiary Sector

Tertiary Sector Growth

Manufacturing exit rate

The above stock flow diagram consists of seven stocks and thirty seven indicators. The social capital has eight domains and 48 indicators. Each stock consists of inputs from the four main ethnic groups of Malaysia. The growth rate and exit rate of each stock is based on the average rate over the 1980,1990,2000 and 2010 population census reports of Malaysia. As each stock is changing with time, the model can track the changes in terms of absolute value, percentages and parity for each ethnic group. As changes in one stock may impact upon the indicators of another stock, the impacts are programmed into the model. In this paper, the simulation runs consist of generating the following scenarios:

513



Population Dynamics



Selectivity Ratios of each of the main ethnic groups in the industrial sectors, occupational sectors, post-secondary education and social capital



The weighted aggregate of the selectivity ratios of the industrial sectors



The weighted aggregate of the ―hard economic variables‖

Population Dynamics of Malaysia Table 1 Simulated Population (%) (Malaysian Citizens) 2010

2030

2050

Malay

54.54

56.03

57.04

Other

12.92

15.55

18.49

Chinese

24.14

20.62

17.40

Indian

7.25

6.42

5.61

Others

1.27

1.36

1.43

Total

100.00

100.00

100.00

24.99

32.87

43.75

Bumiputera

Base Number (Millions)

The demographic dynamics of the major ethnic communities of Malaysia play a pivotal role in the eventual success of the New Economic Policy (NEP). The extension of the time frame of the NEP to restructure the

514

economic imbalance and the sustainability of the economic development of Malaysia depends on the interaction of the hard economic variables and the social capital of the major ethnic communities.The Vensim software is used to simulate the population of Malaysia from 2000 to 2050. Based on the actual data, there is a positive growth paths for the Malay and Other Bumiputera and by 2050, they will account for 57.04 % and 18.49 % of the population respectively while the percentage population of the Chinese and Indian will decline to about 17.49 % and 5.61 % respectively. This scenario portrays that by 2050, the population structure of Malaysia will converge into two groups, the indigenous group with majority political power and the minority groups with economic power.

Figure 2 Graph of Percentage Population of the ethnic groups Percentage Population 0.6 0.45 0.3 0.15 0 2000 Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage

2005

2010

2015

2020 2025 2030 Time (Year)

2035

Population[Chinese] : Model D Jun 22 2015 Population[Indian] : Model D Jun 22 2015 Population[Malay] : Model D Jun 22 2015 Population[Other Bumiputera] : Model D Jun 22 2015

515

2040

2045

2050 Dmnl Dmnl Dmnl Dmnl

TABLE 2 Simulated Runs of the Selectivity Ratios of Industrial Sectors (2000 - 2050) Ethnic

Selectivity Ratios by Sectors

Groups

Sectors

Weighted Aggregated Selectivity Ratios

2010

2030

2050

Agriculture

0.8766,

0.8346

0.9106

Manufacturing

0.9481

0.8775

0.8134

Tertiary Sector

0.9624

0.9976

1.031

Agriculture

2.729

2.867

2.329

Manufacturing

0.5280

0.8092

1.169

Tertiary Sector

0.6611

0.6390

0.6161

Agriculture

0.4472

0.3564

0.2912

Manufacturing

1.277

1.758

2.281

Tertiary Sector

1.253

1.258

1.260

Agriculture

0.5652

0.3062

0.1647

Manufacturing

1.309

1.423

1.549

Tertiary Sector

1.103

1.167

1.232

Malay

2010

2030

2050

0.9502

0.9513

0.964 6

0.8346

Other Bumiputera

1.2930

1.1449

Note : For the computation of aggregated selectivity ratios in the simulated output weights of 0.65,0.25 and 0.1 are assigned to Tertiary sector, Manufacturing sector and Agriculture sector respectively

516

1.418 4

1.1007

Indian

0.926 1

1.1784

Chinese

0.9045

1.204 5

TABLE 2 Simulated Runs of the Selectivity Ratios of Aggregated Economic Variables (2000 - 2050) Ethnic

Aggregate of the Economic Variables

Groups

2010

2030

2050

Malay

1.013

1.071

1.213

Other Bumiputera

0.4945

0.5731

0.6777

Chinese

1.312

1.803

2.486

Indian

1.161

1.600

2.119

Figure 3 Tree Diagram of the aggregated economic variables Income Imp act of social capit al on income

Income with impact of social capital

(Social capit al) Percentage Occup at ion (Percentage Population) Selectivit y Rat io in Occupation PSE Impact on Occup at ion (Select ivity Ratio in PSE) Aggregate of Economic Variables wit h social cap ital Imp act of social capit al on PSE Percentage in Post Secondary Education Selectivit y Rat io in PSE Percentage Pop ulat ion Social capital Selectivit y Rat io in Agricult ure Selectivit y Rat io in M anufacturing Sector

Weighted Agregate of Indust rial Sect ors

Selectivit y Rat io in Tert iary Sect or

The above tables shows that in spite of the NEP ( 1970-1990) ,National Development Policy (NDP) which replaced the NEP in 1991 , Vision 2020 and other subsequentdevelopment plans which are committed to instituting legislative reforms to help the Bumiputera to regain their parity share of

517

their equity have created unintended results. Both the Malay and the Other Bumiputera are still below their parity share of the industrial sectors while the Chinese and Indian are 41.84 % and 20.45 % above their parity shares.

Another reason is that in the globalized economy, the Chinese are increasing their

disproportionate wealth through networking with the

overseas Chinese principally from China, Hong Kong and Taiwan while the Indian network with the free market from India.135

In Table 2, the simulated aggregated economic variables growth paths of the ethnic groups again show unintended result. The ethnic group which is lagging significantly behind all the other ethnic groups is the Other Bumiputera. The main reasons are their late start in the process of human capital and wealth accumulation. For example,

the 1970 Population

Census Report of Malaysia there were 136,700 in the labour force of Peninsula Malaysia who were classified as Professional, technical and related workers, while the 1970 Sarawak Population Census reports that among the Land Dayaks( Iban) , Sea Dayaks (Bidayuh) and Indigenous People, 11,987 have received secondary education as their highest educational attainment and only 1987 or 3.04 % of them have completed Form 5 (School Certificate). Furthermore, the 2015 Labour Force Survey of Malaysia shows that among the labour force with either primary or no formal education, Sabah and Sarawak account for 40.83% and 27.30% respectively. At least 50% of them will still be in the labour force by 2030. Without functional literacy training, there will continue to stagnate in the

135

Amy Chua,”World On Fire”, Random House Inc.,New York, 2003

518

agricultural sector in the rural area or be employed as Elementary workers in the urban area.

Table 2 shows that the Malay have already attained their parity share in the aggregated economic variables from 2010 to 2050. This is due to impact of NEP. During the first decade of its implementation, to redress imbalance, the percentage of Malay labour force in Professional and Technical increased from 47 % in 1970 to 50.0 % in 1980. That leap was achieved by tremendous increase in Malay student intakes in tertiary institution. Due to changes in occupational classifications, the trend cannot be continued to 2000 and 2010.

Table 3 Distribution of Labour Force in the key Tertiary sub-sectors

Business sub-sectors

Other Indicators

Malay

Chinese

Indian

Bumiputera

NonMalaysian

Total

Citizen Wholesale Trade,

& Repair

Retail of

Vehicles Transportation

&

Storage

Accommodation Food

&

&

Beverage

Service Activities Information Communication

&

Number

696,765

160,657

626,714

123,344

157,929

1,765,409

%

39.47

9.00

35.50

6.98

8.95

100.00

SR

0.788

0.765

1.574

1.037

1.093

Number

237,000

45,098

128,323

60,054

35,291

505,766

%

46.86

8.92

25.37

11.88

6.97

100.00

SR

0.936

0.759

1.12

1.765

0.851

Number

374,309

9916

212,748

46,647

76,520

768,853

%

48.68

4.09

27.67

6.07

9.95

100.00

SR

0.959

0.348

1.227

0.902

1.215

Number

66,174

3387

50,699

17,627

12,326

150,213

%

44.05

2.26

33.75

11.73

8.21

100.00

SR

0.879

0.192

1.574

1.743

1.002

519

Number

137,213

12,834

94,823

26,945

3536

275,371

Insurance/Takaful

%

49.83

4.66

34.44

9.78

1.29

100.00

Activities

SR

0.995

0.396

1.527

1.453

0.158

Number

16,974

996

16,634

4186

802

39,392

%

43.09

2.53

42.23

10.63

2.04

100.00

Finance

&

Real Estate Activities

SR

0.860

0.215

1.872

1.579

0.248

Professional , Scientific

Number

109,432

9916

88,897

22,453

11,580

242,278

& Technical Activities

%

45.17

4.09

36.69

9.27

4.78

100.00

SR

0.902

0.348

1.626

1.377

0.581

Business sub-sectors by Ethnicity 2010 Source: Compiled from Economic Characteristics of Population 2010, Population Distribution & Basic Demographic Characteristics 2010.

The above table shows that as of 2010, more than 40 years after the implementation of the New Economic Policy, NEP, (1971-1990), on a national basis, the Malay and Other Bumiputera of Sabah and Sarawak are not able to attain parity in any of the seven key sub-sectors of the tertiary sector, which are expected to contribute more than 60 % to the GDP of Malaysia by 2020. Similar analysis for the 2000 Census Report data show the same conclusion except that the Indian and Non-Malaysian Citizens are making significant progress during the 2000 – 2010 period. The Indian have exceeded their parity share in six out of the seven subsectors while the Non-Malaysian Citizens have exceeded their parity share in two of the sub-sectors. It is ironical that the Other Bumiputera of Malaysia are lagging behind the Non-Malaysian Citizens in the key business sectors. Further compilation of the tertiary sector show that both the Malay and Other Bumiputera have selectivity ratios of 1.502 and 1.009 in the tertiary sub-sector of Public Administration and Defense. The Malay also have high selectivity ratio of 1.296 in Education.

520

The selectivity ratio gap between the Chinese and Indian with the Malay and Other Bumiputera is increasing with a positive reinforcing loop.The data of the 2010 Housing and Population Census Report show that the Chinese is an ageing population with the highest median age of 35 while the median age for the Malay and Other Bumiputera are 21 and 24 years old respectively. As such the Malay and Other Bumiputera are very heavily skewed towards the young. While a young population can be a source of energy and inventiveness for an ethnic community, it also places heavy demands on educational resources and is likely to be characterized by high unemployment . According to John M. Richardson (1996), “ A young unemployed population is a politically volatile population with high ideals and an attraction to simplistic solutions for complex problems and a predisposition to violence‖

Such a scenario is very volatile because the economically backward ethnic groups have voting power in the magnitude of 80 % and the scenario is ripe for a backlash against the economic dominant minorities. These backlash have occurred in Nigeria and Kenya and in 1998 a backlash occurred in Indonesia against the Chinese which nearly deteriorated to ethnic cleansing.

521

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http://www.systems-

thinking.org/arch/arch.htm#archtc Senge,Peter,(1990), ―The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization‖, Doubleday, New York. Senge, Peter (2005),‖The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook‖, London, Brealey Publishing. Snodgrass D.R. (1994), Successful Economic Development in a Multi Ethnic

Society:‖The

Malaysia

case‖,Harvard

Institute

of

International Development. Yin Yap (2008), ― The Use of System Dynamics Simulation Model to assess national unity and integration in Malaysia‖,28th International Conference of System Dynamics at Athens, Greece, 2008.

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Civil Society and Democratic Movements Bantuan Demokrasi Di Malaysia: Apa Yang Dilakukan Oleh Promoter Berprofil Rendah? Muhamad Takiyuddin Ismail Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia [email protected]

Abstrak Kajian mengenai bantuan demokrasi merupakan bidang yang terabai sepenuhnya di Malaysia. Berikutan isu pendanaan asing yang mendominasi politik Malaysia antara 2011 sehinggalah kini, kertas kerja ini bertujuan memperkenalkan promoter demokrasi berprofil rendah di Malaysia khususnya promoter demokrasi Eropah. Objektif kertas kerja ini ialah untuk melihat aktiviti dan bentuk pendanaan yang dilakukan oleh promoter demokrasi berprofil rendah. Berbeza dengan promoter demokrasi berprofil tinggi seperti Amerika Syarikat (AS), yayasan politik Jerman Stiftungen dan Open Society Foundation (OSF), promoter demokrasi berprofil rendah yang menyalurkan bantuan demokrasi ke Malaysia terikat dengan kod diplomasi yang lebih sihat. Dalam mana promoter demokrasi seperti AS dan Jerman turut terikat kepada kod ini, kedua-duanya menumpukan kepada program bukan serasi-rejim yang tidak menjadi fokus utama promoter demokrasi berprofil rendah dan lebih menjentik sensitiviti pemerintah dan pengkritik. Perbincangan mendapati aktiviti dan operasi promoter demokrasi berprofil rendah di Malaysia adalah sejajar dengan pendirian umum mereka yang lebih menumpukan kepada program serasi-rejim seperti tadbir urus baik, kesetaraan gender, komuniti terpinggir, alam sekitar dan menggalakkan penyebaran idea-idea kebebasan dan sivik. Penekanan ini sejajar dengan konsep pluralisme dalam promosi demokrasi dan melihat demokrasi sebagai satu proses jangka panjang. Mereka juga turut memberi penting pada Malaysia Timur dalam cakupan operasinya dan mempertauti enklaf demokratik pemerintah serta mendanai beberapa program kerajaan. Keperluan menjaga kepentingan nasional juga membataskan mereka untuk menjalankan

525

aktiviti yang lebih mengusik status-quo seperti bantuan pilihan raya dan bantuan parti politik. Implikasi kepada CSO Malaysia pula ialah, mereka disarankan mengadakan pertautan yang lebih besar dengan promoter demokrasi berprofil rendah untuk memudahkan aktiviti mereka tidak dibayangi oleh retorik politik promoter berprofil tinggi yang seringkali dilihat merugikan gerakan aktivisme Malaysia.

PENGENALAN

Bermula 2011 sehingga kini, isu pendanaan asing merupakan antara isu yang mendominasi politik Malaysia. Polemik yang berlangsung begitu membahang sehingga wujudnya dakwaan bahawa Malaysia sedang berada di ambang pertukaran rejim menerusi pendanaan yang dilakukan ke atas beberapa organisasi masyarakat sivil (CSO). Antara aktor yang sering menjadi sasaran pengkritik ialah National Endowment of Democracy (NED) dari Amerika Syarikat (AS), yayasan berkaitan parti, Stiftungen Jerman dan Open Society Foundations (OSF). Namun tumpuan terhadap aktor-aktor berprofil tinggi ini mengabaikan fakta bahawa terdapat pelbagai lagi promoter demokrasi yang turut memainkan peranan penting di Malaysia. Data Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD Creditor System) menunjukkan terdapat sembilan negara lain yang dicatatkan sebagai penyumbang bantuan demokrasi di Malaysia selain AS dan Jerman iaitu Norway, Sweden, Finland, Australia, Belanda, Kanada, United Kingdom, Ireland dan Jepun. Kertas kerja ini cuba untuk menelusuri peranan yang dimainkan oleh promoter demokrasi berprofil rendah di Malaysia. Bidang bantuan demokrasi merupakan bidang yang terabai sepenuhnya di Malaysia dan sehingga kini ia hanya

526

difahami umum (termasuk sarjana dan aktivis) sebagai pendanaan asing. Objektif kertas kerja ini ialah untuk melihat aktiviti yang dilakukan oleh promoter berprofil rendah.

MEMPERKENALKAN BANTUAN DEMOKRASI

Selepas kejatuhan komunisme, terdapat peningkatan yang begitu mendadak dalam perlaksanaan aktiviti bantuan demokrasi (Burnell, 2000:39-40).Pada awal 1990-an, bantuan demokrasi global hanya berjumlah USD2 billion tetapi jumlah ini meningkat menjadi USD14 billion pada 2010 iaitu selepas 20 tahun (Cornell, 2013:30).Kebanyakan sarjana menggunakan definisi Carothers (1999:6) yang melihat bantuan demokrasi sebagai bantuan yang dirangka khusus untuk merangsang ruang demokratik di negara-negara bukan demokratik atau memperluaskan lagi transisi demokrasi negara-negara yang telah membuka pintu demokrasi. Umumnya terdapat tiga bentuk bantuan demokrasi yang utama seperti dalam Jadual 1 (Carothers,1999:88; Santiso,2001:7). Jadual 1: Templat Bantuan Demokrasi Sektor

Matlamat Sektor

Jenis Bantuan

Proses Pemilih

Pilihan raya bebas dan Bantuan pemilih adil Parti-parti

politik Pembinaan parti politik

nasional yang kuat

Institusi Pemerintah

Perlembagaan Demokratik

527

Bantuan Perlembagaan

Kehakiman yang bebas Bantuan dan

efektif

kedaulatan

serta undang-undang

institusi

lain

berorientasikan undang-undang Perwakilan

badan Pengukuhan

perundangan

yang perundangan

cekap Kerajaan

tempatan Pembangunan kerajaan

yang responsif Tentera

tempatan yang Hubungan orang awam

prodemokratik

Masyarakat sivil

dan tentera

NGO advokasi yang Pengupayaan NGO aktif Warganegara

yang Pendidikan sivik

berpenddikan politik Media bebas yang kuat

Pengukuhan media

Kesatuan sekerja yang Pengupayaan kesatuan kuat

sekerja

Sumber: Carothers (1999:88)

Satu lagi pengkelasan yang berguna dalam bantuan demokrasi ialah melihat sama ada bantuan demokrasi itu bersifat serasi-rejim (regimecompatible) atau tidak serasi-rejim (not-compatible regime) seperti yang dikemukakan Bush (2015: 60-63).Program serasi-rejim adalah program

528

yang berprofil rendah dan tidak mungkin mengakibatkan kejatuhan atau pertukaran

rejim

dan

program

tidak

serasi-rejim

pulaadalah

sebaliknyaiaitu yang mewujudkan persaingan dan mobilisasi. Jadual 2 menunjukkan pengkelasan ini (Bush 2015: 60-61). Jadual 2: Pembahagian Program Bantuan Demokrasi Serasi-Rejim

Tidak-serasi Rejim

Perniagaan dan perusahaan

Pilihan Raya

Perlembagaan

Hak asasi manusia

Tadbir urus baik

Media

Kerajaan Tempatan

Parti Politik

Kumpulan wanita

Penyelidikan

Perwakilan Wanita

Kesatuan sekerja

Pendidikan Sivik

Anak muda

Masyarakat sivil (selebihnya)

Penentang

Resolusi Konflik Bantuan Kemanusiaan Bantuan Legislatif Kedaulatan Undang-undang

PROMOTER DEMOKRASI EROPAH Berbeza dengan AS, promoter demokrasi Eropah (dan like-minded group seperti Kanada) lebih menumpukan kepada pembangunan demokrasi untuk jangka masa panjang dan tidak menggunakan wacana seperti ―promosidemokrasi‖ (Carothers,2009). Berbanding elemen politik dan demokrasi, Eropah lebih menumpukan soal hak asasi manusia, isu sosial dan tadbir urus dan hak asasi wanita. Promoter demokrasi Eropah juga

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lebih gemar menyalurkan dana kepada pertubuhan multilateral seperti UNDP dan tidak meminati misi pilihan raya yang tidak menjadi fokus utama (Youngs,2008).

European Commission (EC)

Menerusi The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), EU memperuntukkan 1.3 billion euro untuk tempoh 2014-2020 untuk program demokrasi dan hak asasi manusia (ec.europa.eu). Antara tempoh 2002-2006, fokus EU di Malaysia telah diberikan kepada kesetaraan gender dan perlindungan masyarakat pribumi khususnya di Malaysia Timur (European Commission 2006; Chevallier-Govers, 2011:208;221). Bagi tempoh 2002-2006, terdapat tiga projek penyelidikan yang telah ditaja oleh EIDHR iaitu partisipasi politik wanita kepada Women‘s Development Collective (WDC) berjumlah 627,660 euro. Dua NGO yang terlibat dalam projek ini ialah All Women‘s Action Society (AWAM) dan Women‘s Centre for Change (WCC). Kedua ialah projek pengupayaan wanita India yang diberikan kepada Friedrich Naumann Stiftung (FNS) berjumlah 982,706.64 euro. NGO yang terlibat dalam projek ini ialah Era Consumer. Ketiga ialah projek mempromosikan kebebasan bersuara rantau ASEAN berjumlah 412,975.20 euro yang diberikan kepada sebuah NGO di United Kingdom, Article 19. NGO Malaysia yang terlibat dalam projek ini ialah SUARAM (European Commission, 2006). Bagi tempoh 2009-2011, enam projek telah ditaja oleh EIDHR melibatkan dana hampir 300,000 euro iaitu diskriminasi gender menerusi Persatuan Kesedaran Komuniti Selangor (PKSS/39,971 euro), kebebasan media menerusi CIJ (48,156), pendidikan hak asasi

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manusia (Konrad Adenauer Foundation dan Pusat Komas/50,000 euro), pengupayaan wanita miskin India (Friedrich Naumann Foundation dan Era Consumer /50,000), diskriminasi gender (The Equal Rights Trust dan Tenaganita) dan pendidikan kanak-kanak imigran dan pelarian di Sabah (Humana Child Aid Society/50,000) ((Chevallier-Govers 2011:223-224). Bagi tahun pembiayaan 2013-2014, tema hak asasi manusia, migrasi dan pelarian merupakan antara lima tema pembiayaan yang dilakukan EU melibatkan dana sejumlah 1,611,341 euro. Peratusan terbesar pergi ke beberapa NGO yang memfokuskan kepada projek di Sabah dan Malaysia Timur. Antara NGO yang menerima dana dari EU bagi tempoh ini ialah Humana Child Aid Society Sabah (680,000 euro), Pesticide Action Network Asia (100,000 euro), Pacos Trust (124,790 euro), Leonard Cheshire Disability Foundation (78,909 euro), Malaysian Centre for Constitutionalism and Human Rights (MCCHR/111,989 euro), dan

International

Centre

for

Migration

Policy

Development

(ICMPD/66,099 euro) (European Union Malaysia, 2013). Sejak 2008, EU juga menjalankan kerjasama dengan Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia Malaysia (SUHAKAM) dalam menganjurkan seminar tahunan hak asasi manusia.

Norway Norway merupakan antara aktor negara penting dalam promosi demokrasi. Antara tumpuan penting Norway ialah hak asasi manusia, gender, keadilan dan kedaulatan undang-undang serta masyarakat sivil (Foresti & Harris, 2011). Antara institusi-institusi yang berperanan penting sebagai promoter demokrasi

Norway

ialah

Norwegian

531

Agency

for

Development

Cooperation (NORAD), Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support serta Oslo Centre.Dalam konteks Malaysia, Norway menduduki tempat ketiga sebagai penyumbang bantuan demokrasi terbesar selepas AS dan Jerman dengan jumlah sumbangan USD2.54 juta untuk tempoh 2005-2014. Pecahan terbesar bantuan Norway pergi ke projek hak orang pribumi berjumlah USD1.33 juta bagi tempoh 2013-2014. Ia juga mendanai Transperancy International-Malaysia (TI-M) yang boleh dianggap merupakan penerima konsisten bantuan demokrasi Norway sejak 2009. Berdasarkan data-data dari laporan tahunan TI-M dan OECD, NGO tersebut memperolehi USD677,000 bagi tempoh 2011-2013 untuk projek anti-korupsi seperti tadbir urus hutan (FGI) dan reformasi pembiayaan parti. Sebuah lagi NGO yang dibiayai Norway dalam konteks FGI ialah ialah Borneo Resources Institute (BRIMAS) yang menerima USD421,000 bagi tahun 2008 dan 2012 untuk bantuan perundangan bagi perlindungan tanah adat yang terjejas oleh kegiatan pembalakan dan perladangan. Norway memberi perhatian pada isu seperti pembinaan empangan hidroelektrik yang menjadi kontroversi di Sarawak berikutan ia pernah melalui pengalaman yang sama dengan pembinaan stesen kuasa Alta yang melibatkan kaum peribumi Sami (Hului, 2014). Tumpuan terhadap pengupayaan wanita turut menjadi tumpuan dengan dana sejumlah USD106,000 antara tempoh 2009-2013 bagi membiayai projek koperasi yang dijalankan oleh Asian Women in Co-operative Development Forum (AWCF). Sweden Sweden merupakan antara penyokong demokrasi yang vokal dan penyumbang terbesar bantuan demokrasi. Fokus utama Sweden ialah hak wanita, kesetaraangender dan perlindungan minoriti (Andersson, 2014).

532

Sebahagian besar kerjasama pembangunan Sweden disalurkan menerusi NGO melalui Swedish International Cooperation Agency (SIDA). Sweden mempunyai polisi ketelusan dan keterbukaan yang digubal menerusi polisi ‗jaminan ketelusan‘. Polisi ini membolehkan semua dokumentasi dan informasi berhubung bantuan yang disalurkan Sweden boleh diakses dari laman sesawang Open Aid.se yang dikendalikan SIDA. Mengikut data OECD dan Open Aid.se, Sweden merupakan penyumbang bantuan demokrasi keempat terbesar ke Malaysia dengan sumbangan keseluruhan USD1.85 juta bagi tempoh 2005-2014. Melalui data sumber lain, antara NGO yang ditaja oleh SIDA termasuklah NGO yang mengkhususkan isuisu persekitaran dan komuniti pribumi tempatan seperti Sahabat Alam Malaysia (SAM), Pacos Trust, Persatuan Pengguna Pulau Pinang (CAP) dan Third World Network (TWN). Bantuan ini disalurkan menerusi Swedish Society for Nature Conservation (SSNC) (Swedish International Cooperation Agency, 2008). Finland Kedutaan Finland dalam kenyatan bertarikh 9 Oktober 2013 menyatakan yang FLC telah menaja NGO di Malaysia untuk bidang hak asasi, demokrasi, pendidikan dan persekitaran selama dua dekad. Bagi NGO luar negara, proses pendanaan dilakukan menerusi Funds for Local Cooperation (FLC) yang ada disalurkan terhadap beberapa kedutaannya. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Finland, 2001).Menurut laman sesawang kedutaan Finland Kuala Lumpur, fokus yang ditekankan ialah kesetaraan gender, pendidikan sivik dan kesedaran politik dan pembangunan partisipasi. Daripada jumlah keseluruhan USD324,000 yang disalurkan Finland bagi tempoh 2005 hingga 2014, hampir dua pertiga pergi ke

533

projek-projek bagi membiayai aktiviti yang dilaksanakan SUHAKAM antara 2007-2011 seperti sesi pendengaran, perundingan, penerbitan laporan tahunan dan pengwujudan laman sesawang. Rakan pelaksana bagi program ini ialah Era Consumer yang turut diberikan dana dalam menjalankan pemantauan hak asasi pada 2009 hingga 2011. Sabah dan Sarawak turut menjadi tumpuan Finland dalam fokusnya terhadap pengupayaan wanita. Ia telah menjalankan bengkel dan latihan hak asasi wanita yang dikoordinasikan oleh WAO pada 2011 dan 2013 untuk kaum wanita Bidayuh. Aktiviti ini dijalankan oleh Persatuan Wanita Desa Sarawak (WADESA). Selain itu, pemantau pilihan raya seperti MAFREL juga mengakui

yang kerajaan Finland bersama-sama IRI telah

menyumbang dana kepada pertubuhan itu bagi tujuan PRU-12 sebanyak USD50,000 (mStar 2010) Belanda Antara promoter demokrasi Belanda yang terkenal ialah Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) iaitu sebuah pertubuhan yang diasaskan oleh tujuh parti politik Belanda pada tahun 2000 untuk membantu parti-parti politik di negara demokrasi baru (FRIDE, 2010). Jumlah bantuan Belanda ke Malaysia secara relatifnya kecil dengan jumlah bantuan berjumlah USD128,000 untuk tempoh 2005-2014. Antara sumbangan yang dapat dikesan dari Belanda ialah projek reformasi pembiayaan parti kepada Transparency International-Malaysia (TI-M) berjumlah USD57,000 pada 2010 dan sumbangan pada Malaysiakini.

534

United Kingdom/Ireland UK menyalurkan bantuan demokrasi menerusi tiga agensi utama iaitu Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Department for International Development (DFID) dan Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD). Ia lebih memfokuskan isu-isu tadbir urus dan pentadbiran awam sejajar dengan sejarahnya sebagai penyedia kemerdekaan bagi bekas koloni-koloninya (Burnell, 2000b). UK menduduki tangga kesembilan sebagai penyumbang bantuan demokrasi terbesar ke Malaysia dengan jumlah hanya USD67,000. Antara program utama yang dijalankan berdasarkan data OECD ini ialah membantu advokasi pencegahan rasuah, memajukan kemahiran advokasi NGO Malaysia, pembinaan kapasiti untuk pemantauan PRU-13 dan promosi pendidikan hak asasi. Data OECD mengenai penyaluran ke sektor awam turut memperlihatkan beberapa program seumpamanya khususnya dalam pertautannya dengan pemerintah. Antaranya ialah lawatan pemantauan berhubung situasi politik, projek kesetaraan dan toleransi, penajaan lawatan Jawatankuasa Kira-kira Parlimen (PAC) ke London dan projek berkaitan siber dan keselamatan manusia. Kesemua program-program ini menelan pendanaan anggaran USD150,000. Menerusi data laman sesawang DFIP pula, Governance and Transparency Fund dicatatkan menyalurkan dana kepada International Budget Partnership (IBP). Ia merupakan sebuah program koloborasi selama lima tahun dengan CSO seluruh dunia untuk menggunakan analisis bajet dalam memajukan tadbir urus dan menangangani kemiskinan. Rakan IBP di Malaysia ialah Centre for Public Policy Studies (CPPS) yang menyertai program ini pada 2008, 2010, 2012 dan 2015. Selain itu, IBP dan kedutaaan British turut mempertauti IDEAS dan juga Transparency International-Malaysia (TI-M).

535

Ireland yang menyalurkan bantuan demokrasinya menerusi Irish Aid turut direkokan oleh OECD sebagai antara penyumbang bantuan demokrasi ke Malaysia berjumlah USD14,000. Namun tidak ada maklumat spesifik diberikan bagi penyaluran dana ini.

Australia Australia menyalurkan bantuan demokrasi menerusi AusAID. Biarpun menduduki tempat keenam sebagai penyumbang bantuan demokrasi terbesar ke Malaysia, sumbangan yang dicatatkan dalam data OECD hanya berjumlah USD130,000 iaitu hanya bagi tahun 2011. Bajet ini ialah bagi menaja MTV Exit Foundation, sebuah pertubuhan kebajikan di UK yang menumpukan kepada kempen anti-penyeludupan manusia dan bagi program latihan parti. Antara maklumat yang dapat dikesan dalam konteks program latihan parti ialah permohonan Parti Liberal Australia kepada AusAID bagi program Australia Political Parties for Democracy Program. Program ini merupakan program bagi parti-parti di Australia untuk menyalurkan bantuan dan kepakaran kepada parti-parti luar. Dalam dokumen yang diperolehi bagi tahun 2010 ini, Parti Liberal memohon AUS19,500 bagi menyediakan latihan kepada perwakilan parti politik Malaysia dari sudut kempen, komunikasi dan kemahiran organisasi. Program yang dijalankan selama 2-3 hari ini dijalankan dengan kerjasama IRI. Selain itu, data Direct Aid Program 2014-2015 menyatakan yang Pesuruhjaya Tinggi Australia di Kuala Lumpur telah menaja empat projek bernilai AUS94,484 (USD68,000). Salah satu projek yang dinyatakan ialah kesetaraan gender dan isu-isu syariah membabitkan wanita Muslim. Dalam aspek keselamatan, Australia juga ada dinyatakan menyalurkan

536

bantuan untuk kerjasama keselamatan dan anti-terorisme kepada Malaysia (Evaluation of European Commission 2009). Data OECD bagi penyaluran ke sektor awam menunjukkan yang kerjasama maritim merupakan fokus utama dalam hubungan ini melibatkan agensi seperti MMEA, RMC dan PDRM. Untuk tempoh 2010-2013, program-program seperti ini dianggarkan menelan anggaran belanja USD481,000. Kanada Kanada menyalurkan bantuan demokrasi menerusi Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade dan Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). CIDA aktif mempromosi bantuan demokrasi menerusi Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (CFLI). Berdasarkan laporan tahunanTransparency International-Malaysia (TI-M) pada 2009, kedutaan Kanada pernah menyumbang pada pertubuhan itu dan juga menyalurkan USD5,000 kepada MAFREL untuk projek PRU-13 (Arphan Ahmad, temubual, 6 Januari, 2016). Namun data lebih konkrit dan lebih terbuka mengenai pembiayaan Kanada dapat dilihat menerusi Newsletter pihak kedutaan. Khusus dalam hubungan ini ialah Newsletter Issue 7: Special Editionpada Mei 2015 dan Issue 8 pada April 2016 yang secara terperinci mengemukakan laporan berhubung pendanaan yang dilakukan CFLI kepada CSO di Malaysia untuk tempoh 2013-2015. Laporan seperti ini dapat dianggap merupakan inisiatif telus dan terbuka pernah dilakukan oleh mana-mana kedutaan luar di Malaysia. Antara CSO yang menerima pendanaan dan sokongan CFLI untuk 2013-2015 ialah PT Foundation, SIS/Musawah,

EMPOWER,

Justice

for

Sisters,

Transparency

International-Malaysia (TI-M), Women‘s Centre for Change (WCC),

537

IDEAS, SUARAM Penang, ALIRAN dan Projek Dialog. Bagi sesi 20152016, Pesuruhjaya Tinggi Kanada akan membiayai empat projek iaitu latihan kepada penterjemah komuniti bagi pelarian dan pencari suaka hak pelarian yang dijalankan oleh Asylum Access, reformasi SPRM yang dijalankan oleh IDEAS, promosi kepelbagaian agama menerusi seni oleh Projek Dialog dan penggubalan piawai standard bagi tempat perlindungan mangsa keganasan domestik yang dijalankan oleh Women‘s Aid Organisation (WAO). Dalam konteks pemerintah, kerajaan Malaysia turut menerima bantuan demokrasi

dari Kanada

keselamatan

Projek

dan

ketenteraan.

ini

berbentuk

kerjasama

termasuklah

berkaitan

penyeludupan manusia dan terorisme seperti pemberian dua bot maritim dan Military Training and Cooperation Program (MTCP) (High Commission of Canada in Malaysia, 2015).). Jepun Walaupun mengutamakan pembangunan ekonomi dan terikat dengan prinsip tidak campurtangan, Jepun tetap menyalurkan sokongan demokrasi yang kecil dan merupakan antara promoter yang berpotensi (Sato, 2014). Bantuan demokrasi Jepun berlaku menerusi dua saluran iaitu aktor negara dan aktor bukan negara. Dalam konteks aktor negara, Jepun merupakan promoter demokrasi Asia yang terbesar setelah program Arc of Freedom and Prosperity dilancarkan oleh Perdana Menteri, Shinzo Abe pada 2007. Dokumen Country Assistance Policy for Malaysia (2012) mendapati ‗demokrasi‘

tidak

disebutkan

langsung

dalam

prioriti

bantuan

pembangunan rasmi Jepun ke Malaysia. Namun begitu, masih wujudnya dua bentuk bantuan yang

boleh dikesan berhubung isu-isu berkaitan

demokrasi seperti data-data dalam laman sesawang kedutaan Jepun Kuala

538

Lumpur. Pertama ialah komitmen Jepun terhadap bantuan keselamatan maritim (pemberian bot laju). Keduanya ialah bantuan projek keselamatan insan akar umbi. Antara 1989-2015, dianggarkan hampir 150 pertubuhan telah menerima geran ini dan antara NGO-NGO berkaitan demokrasi yang dikesan menerima geran ini iaitu Women‘s Aid Organisation (WAO) (1995 dan 1998 berjumlah RM153,949/USD37,000), Era Consumer (2008 berjumlah RM115,150/USD28,000) dan PT Foundation (2012 berjumlah USD27,559/). Dari segi aktor bukan negara, Nippon Foundation merupakan aktor utama dalam program bantuan demokrasi Jepun. Pada 2006, Nippon Foundation menderma kapal latihan kepada MMEA dan juga USD2.5 juta pada 2009 untuk projek maritim. Namun penyaluran yang lebih penting ialah penyaluran yang dilakukan oleh The Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF) – satu dari 12 yayasan yang menunjangi The Nippon Foundation. SPF bertujuan mempromosikan kefahaman antarabangsa, kerjasama dan pertukaran dalam mencari model tadbir urus baru bagi masyarakat manusia. Dapatan laporan tahunan SPF antara 2000-2013 mendapati dua bentuk pertubuhan yang menerima geran SPF iaitu ekonomi dan penyelidikan seperti Malaysian Institute of Economic Research (MIER), The Foreign Policy Study Group dan Fakulti Ekonomi dan Pentadbiran Universiti Malaya. Kategori kedua yang lebih berkaitan dengan konteks kajian ini ialah kumpulan pemikir iaitu Malaysian Strategic Research Centre (MSRC) dan Institut Kajian Dasar (IKD). MSRC yang dikaitkan sebagai kumpulan pemikir bagi Najib Razak menerima dana bagi tahun 2001 dan 2002 dengan jumlah keseluruhan

9,883,185 juta yen

(USD82,186 nilai kini). Ia menumpukan kepada projek-projek berkaitan

539

pengajian antarabangsa dan keselamatan serantau. IKD pula menerima dana sejak 2006 hinggalah 2010 dengan dana keseluruhan 57,417,701 juta yen (USD477,474 nilai kini). Kesemua dana yang diterima IKD adalah bagi menjalankan program

Asian Renaissance: Capacity Building for

Future Leaders in Southeast Asia: Building a Better Asia. Taiwan Taiwan merupakan sebuah negara demokrasi baru semenjak penghujung 1980-an. Mempertimbangkan masyarakat sivil berperanan penting dalam transisi Taiwan ke demokrasi, pemerintah mempertauti masyarakat sivil dalam bentuk yang konstruktif. Perkembangan ini turut menyaksikan penubuhan promoter demokrasi pertama di Asia pada 2003, Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD). Data berhubung penyaluran bantuan demokrasi TFD ke NGO Malaysia sukar diperolehi dalam domain umum.. Satu-satunya data yang dikesan ialah penyaluran bantuan kepada SUARAM bagi penerbitan laporan tahunannya untuk 2014 dan 2015. PBB (UNDP/UNDEF) Program demokrasi dijadikan tumpuan PBB menerusi Deklarasi Vienna 1993, Deklarasi Warsaw 2000 dan terpentingnya Millenium Development Goals (MDG) pada tahun 2000. Dalam konteks MDG, Malaysia bagaimanapun tidak menyatakan isu-isu demokrasi eksplisit seperti hak asasi manusia dan keadilan sebagai tumpuan. Dokumen Malaysia: The Millennium

Development

Goals

at

2010:Overview

(2011)

yang

dikeluarkan oleh PBB Malaysia hanya menyatakan isu kesamaan gender dan pengupayaan wanita sebagai satu bidang tumpuan (United Nations 2011). Antara lima program yang dijalankan bagi isu gender, satu program

540

yang agak dekat dalam konteks demokrasi ialah pembabitan 30% wanita dalam pembuatan keputusan. Projek ini menerima dana UNDP berjumlah USD309,000 bagi tempoh 2007-2010 (my.undp.org). Melalui UNDEF pula, SIS menerima USD225,000 untuk tempoh 2014-2016. Selain itu, data UNDP juga menunjukkan yang pihak kerajaan menerima dua bantuan UNDP di bawah tema sektor awam. Pertama ialah bantuan sokongan terhadap

Program

Transformasi

Perkhidmatan

Awam

berjumlah

USD111,321 bagi tempoh 2013-2014. Program kedua pula ialah pengukuhan keupayaan agensi pencegahan rasuah melibatkan 57 negara Pertubuhan Negara-negara Islam (OIC). Untuk tempoh 2010-2011, program yang dikendalikan oleh Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia (SPRM) ini menerima sebanyak USD349,878,90 yang sebahagian besarnya ditaja oleh dana Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund (DGTTF). Kesimpulan Kertas kerja ini mendapati aktiviti dan operasi promoter demokrasi berprofil rendah di Malaysia adalah sejajar dengan pendirian umum mereka yang lebih menumpukan kepada program serasi-rejim dan bukan menjentik status quo. Antara isu-isu yang menjadi tumpuan mereka ialah hak asasi manusia, tadbir urus baik, kesetaraan gender, komuniti terpinggir, alam sekitar dan menggalakkan penyebaran idea-idea kebebasan dan pencerahan. Sumbangan terpenting aktor berprofil rendah di Malaysia dihujahkan ialah tumpuannya terhadap negeri-negeri di Malaysia Timur seperti Sabah dan Sarawak yang terkebelakang dari segi pembangunan

dan

lebih

terdedah

kepada

manipulasi

kumpulan

berkepentingan. Mereka juga cuba mendapatkan akses dan kepercayaan

541

yang lebih besar dari pemerintah dan masyarakat dengan mengamalkan polisi ketelusan dan mempertauti agensi pemerintah dalam program serasirejim seperti SUHAKAM, PAC dan mendanai beberapa program kerajaan. Seperti yang dilihat, kebanyakan promoter demokrasi berprofil rendah yang menyalurkan dana ke CSO Malaysia merupakan sekutu dan rakan rapat Malaysia. Perhubungan baik ini pastinya lebih dihargai oleh mereka bagi menjaga kepentingan nasional berbanding menjalankan aktiviti yang lebih menjentik sensitiviti seperti bantuan pilihan raya dan bantuan parti politik. Hal ini dapat menerangkan mengapa beberapa promoter demokrasi seperti Jepun, Kanada dan Australia memperuntukkan bantuan yang besar bagi kerjasama ketenteraan dan keselamatan.136Implikasi kepada CSO Malaysia pula ialah, mereka disarankan mengadakan pertautan yang lebih besar dengan promoter demokrasi berprofil rendah untuk memudahkan aktiviti mereka tidak dibayangi oleh retorik politik promoter berprofil tinggi seperti AS yang seringkali dilihat merugikan gerakan aktivisme Malaysia.

136

AS merupakan penyumbang terbesar bagi bantuan ketenteraan dan keselamatan dengan anggaran sumbangan berjumlah USD48 juta antara 2006-2015. Begitu pun, harus dibangkitkan yang bantuan demokrasi seperti ini masih menjadi satu debat akademik kerana sifatnya yang berbentuk strategik dan bukan berbentuk partisan atau ideological (Fukuyama & McFaul 2007:12; Abdul Razak Baginda, temubual, 19 Januari 2016)

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Rujukan Andersson. J.J (2014). Supporting Democracy Abroad – Sweden. Diakses di http://www.refworld.org/docid/5497f82e9.html Burnell, P. (2000). Democracy Assistance: The State of Discourse. Dalam Peter Burnell (pnyt.) Democracy Assistance: International Cooperation for Democratization (hlm. 3-33). Oxon: Routledge. Burnell, P. 2000b. Democracy Assistance: Origins and Organizations. Dalam Burnell, P (pnyt.) Democracy Assistance: International Cooperation for Democratization (hlm.34-66). Oxon: Routledge. Bush, S. (2015). The Taming of Democracy Assistance. Why Democracy promotion does not Confront Dictators. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Carothers, T. (1999). Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Carothers, Thomas. 2009. ―Democracy Assistance: Political vs Developmental‖, Journal of

Democracy 20 (1):5-19.

Chevallier-Govers. C. (2011). The Malaysia-EU Human Rights Dialogue. Dalam Marcinkowski, C., Chevallier-Govers, C., Ruhanas Harun (pnyt). Malaysia and the European Union: Perspectives for the Twenty-first Century (hlm.207-226). Zurich. LIT. Cornell, A. (2013). Institutional Impediments and Reluctant Actors: The Limited Role of Democracy Aid in Democratic Development. Göteborg Studies in Politics 132. University of Gothenburg. European Commission. (2006). Malaysia-European Community: Strategy Paper for

the

Period

2007-2013.

Diakses

http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/malaysia/csp/07_13_en.pdf

543

di

European Union Malaysia. (2013). EU-Malaysia Cooperation for Development 2013/2014. Diakses di https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquartershomepage/14876_en Foresti, M & Harris, D. (2011). Democracy Support through the United Nations: What have we learnt about donors‟ support for democratic development?. Report 10/2010- Evaluation. Oslo: Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation. FRIDE. 2010,. Democracy Assistance Factsheet: The Netherlands. Diakses di http://fride.org/download/Netherlands.pdf Fukuyama, F. & McFaul. (2007). Should Democracy be Promoted or Demoted?. Washington: The Stanle Foundation. High Commission of Canada in Malaysia. (2015). Canadian Advocacy in action – Supporting human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Diakses di http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/malaysia-malaisie/newsletterbulletin/2015-04-newsletter-bulletin-no7.aspx?lang=eng#Issue7-1 Hului. P. (2014, 14 Mei). Towards transparent forest management in Sarawak. The

Borneo

Post

SEEDS.

Diakses

di

http://seeds.theborneopost.com/2014/05/14/towards-transparent-forestmanagement-in-sarawak/ Ministry of Foreign Affairs Finland. (2001). Thinking StrategicallyAbout Democracy Assistance. Helsinki: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Finland. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.(2012). Country Assistance Policy for Malaysia.

Diakses

di

http://www.my.emb-

japan.go.jp/English/ODA/assistance_policy.pdf Mstar (2010, 6 Mei). Mafrel akui terima dana daripada Finland, Amerika Syarikat.

Di

akses

di

http://www.mstar.com.my/berita/berita-

semasa/2010/05/06/mafrel-akui-terima-dana-daripada-finland-amerikasyarikat/

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Santiso, C. (2001). International Co-Operation For Democracy And Good Governance:Moving Toward A Second Generation? European Journal of Develeopmental Research (13)1:154-180. Sato. Y. (2014). Supporting Democracy Abroad – Japan. Diakses di https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_Demo_Reports_Japan_f inal.pdf Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. (2008). Environmental Sustainable Support to Civil Society in Asia, Africa andLatin America. Sida

Evaluation

2008:38.

Stockholm:Swedish

International

Development Cooperation Agency. United Nations. (2011). Malaysia: The Millennium Development Goals at 2010:Overview.: Kuala Lumpur: United Nations. Youngs, R. (2008). ―What Has Europe Been Doing?‖, Journal of Democracy 19 (2):160-169.

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PENDANAAN ASING DI MALAYSIA: SISI KRITIKAL ORGANISASI MASYARAKAT SIVIL Abdul Muein Abadi & Muhamad Takiyuddin Ismail ABSTRAK Isu pendanaan asing terhadap organisasi masyarakat sivil (CSO) dan parti politik pembangkang merupakan antara isu yang mendominasi lanskap politik Malaysia khususnya semenjak 2011 hingga kini. Beberapa NGO telah didakwa menjalankan aktiviti pertukaran rejim dan mengakibatkan pemerintah meningkatkan tekanan terhadap NGO advokasi yang menerima dana asing dari pelbagai pendana antarabangsa. Artikel ini cuba meletakkan konteks terhadap isu ini dan berhujah bahawa pendanaan asing merupakan satu lagi isu yang diwujudkan bagi mewujudkan ancaman bayangan. Kecairan politik Malaysia sejak 2008 mengakibatkan pemerintah mula menghalakan perhatian mereka terhadap isu-isu yang boleh mencipta rally around the flag effect. Sentimen-sentimen yang dimainkan oleh pemerintah dalam memprojekkan ancaman pendanaan asing seringkali dikaitkan dengan unsur-unsur yang dilihat dekat dengan sentimen Melayu-Islam. Begitu pun, obsesi pemerintah terhadap isu ini turut dilorongkan oleh kelemahan yang wujud dalam gerakan masyarakat sivil Malaysia. Biarpun ramai pengkaji melihat gerakan masyarakat sivil di Malaysia berkembang subur selepas gerakan Reformasi 1999, kedekatan gerakan ini dengan kepentingan neoliberal dan pendana Barat telah menyebabkan kebebasan mereka diragui dan memudahkan pengkritik melabelkan mereka tidak lebih sekadar gerakan elit yang tidak mewakili kepentingan massa. Masyarakat sivil yang mendominasi politik Malaysia tidak mewakili middle power tetapi memperjuangkan nilai dan objektif yang eksklusif.

546

PENGENALAN

Sejak era kepimpinan Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003), organisasi masyarakat sivil (CSO) yang menerima pendanaan asing seringkali dipandang dengan kritikal oleh pemerintah dan didakwa sebagai instrumen bagi memajukan kepentingan Barat.137 Namun selepas berakhirnya era Mahathir, pendana antarabangsa mula melihat berlakunya political thaw di bawah

kepimpinan

Abdullah

Ahmad

Badawi

(2003-2009)

dan

menggiatkan kepentingan pendanaan mereka dalam isu-isu berkaitan demokrasi dan hak asasi manusia (Schier 2006). Bermula dari 2011 hinggalah kini, polemik pendanaan asing kepada CSO dan parti politik pembangkang merupakan antara isu yang mendominasi politik Malaysia. Artikel ini cuba meletakkan konteks terhadap isu ini dan berhujah bahawa pendanaan asing merupakan satu lagi isu yang diwujudkan bagi mewujudkan ancaman bayangan. Kecairan politik Malaysia sejak 2008 mengakibatkan pemerintah mula menghalakan perhatian mereka terhadap 137

Di Malaysia, istilah yang sering digunapakai dalam isu ini ialah ―pendanaan asing‖ walaupun isu ini lebih tepat diletakkan di bawah konteks bantun demokrasi. Kedua-dua istilah ini akan digunakan secara bersilih ganti memandangkan pendanaan asing yang banyak dipertikaikan ialah yang berbentuk pendanaan demokrasi. Begitu pun, harus ditekankan yang ―bantuan demokrasi‖ merupakan satu bentuk ―pendanaan asing‖ tetapi tidak sebaliknya kerana pendanaan asing boleh disalurkan ke bidang yang tidak berkaitan dengan demokrasi seperti kesihatan, pendidikan, khidmat sosial dan sebagainya.

547

isu-isu yang boleh mencipta rally around the flag effect. Begitu pun, kami berhujah bahawa obsesi pemerintah terhadap isu ini turut dilorongkan oleh kelemahan yang wujud dalam gerakan masyarakat sivil Malaysia. Biarpun ramai pengkaji melihat gerakan masyarakat sivil di Malaysia berkembang subur selepas gerakan Reformasi 1999, kedekatan gerakan ini dengan kepentingan neoliberal dan pendana Barat telah menyebabkan kebebasan mereka diragui dan memudahkan pengkritik melabelkan mereka tidak lebih sekadar gerakan elit yang tidak mewakili kepentingan massa. Masyarakat sivil yang mendominasi politik Malaysia tidak mewakili middle power tetapi memperjuangkan nilai dan objektif yang eksklusif. Dalam mana artikel ini berpendirian bahawa pemerintah dan pengkritik memperbesar-besarkan ancaman yang datang dari CSO yang menerima bantuan demokrasi, sebahagian dari kritikan-kritikan ini timbul kerana ia dilorongkan sendiri oleh CSO yang menerima dana asing. Dengan kata lain, berlakunya faktor penarik dan penolak yang menyumbang kepada keadaan ini. Kami mengemukakan enam hujah bagi mengkritik kelemahan yang berlaku dalam CSO Malaysia khususnya dalam isu pendanaan asing. Kelemahan-kelemahan ini telah mendorong pemerintah meningkatkan tekanan terhadap CSO dan menyebabkan kedudukan CSO sebagai middle power seringkali dipersoalkan.

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Pendedahan Umum dan Tadbir Urus Pendedahan umum dan tadbir urus yang baik merupakan antara masalah penting yang menyelubungi perbahasan mengenai pendanaan asing di Malaysia. Kebanyakan NGO Malaysia mempunyai pendedahan umum yang amat lemah. Alasan utama mereka ialah ia bukan merupakan satu keperluan memandangkan mereka telah menghantar laporan kewangan tahunan ke Registrar of Society (ROS) atau The Companies Commission of Malaysia (SSM). Kebanyakan NGO melihat bahawa penerima dana keberatan mengumumkan dana yang diterima kerana ia akan lebih mendedahkan kepada kritikan dan juga dimanipulasi oleh pengkritik (NST 2012). Ia dapat menjelaskan dapatan kajian Mike Nahan yang menyifatkan kebanyakan NGO Malaysia hanya mendedahkan data mengenai bantuan yang diterima apabila ditanya atau ditunjukkan bukti (Nahan 2003). Ahli akademik

yang

juga

aktivis

NGO,

Denison

Jayasooria

turut

membangkitkan ketiadaan ketelusan pendanaan dan laporan kewangan dalam kalangan CSO Malaysia. Hal ini menurutnya agak ironi dalam mana golongan ini antara penggesa utama kepada tindakan seperti perisytiharan harta oleh penjawat awam (Denison Jayasooria 2010). Penulis telah meneliti amalan pendedahan umum 31 buah CSO penting Malaysia yang diketahui menerima dana asing. Enam komponen yang diteliti ialah mempunyai laman sesawang rasmi, mendedahkan maklumat pengurusan, menyediakan laporan tahunan atau laporan kewangan yang boleh diakses, mendedahkan pendana, mendedahkan jumlah dana dan terakhir sekali mendedahkan aktiviti yang dijalankan menerusi dana yang diterima. Berdasarkan analisis yang dibuat, hanya

549

Transparency International-Malaysia memperolehi skor penuh iaitu 6 diikuti oleh Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS). Dua lagi CSO yang turut memperolehi skor yang baik ialah Women‘s Aid Organisation (WAO) dan Malaysiakini. Data berhubung pendedahan umum CSO Malaysia ini kelihatan tidak selari dengan amalan kebanyakan promoter demokrasi yang umumnya mendedahkan maklumat pendanaan mereka termasuklah promoter demokrasi berprofil tinggi seperti NED. Kecenderungan ini merupakan sebab mengapa ia melorongkan jalan kepada kritikan berikutan sifat kerahsiaan yang menyelubungi dana yang diterima dan juga kerjasama yang dijalankan dengan promoter demokrasi. Berkaitan

dengan

soal

tadbir

urus

ialah

korupsi

dan

penyelewengan. Kajian Holloway mengenai dana asing di Indonesia mendapati bahawa korupsi merupakan masalah besar bagi NGO yang menerima dana asing dan masalah ini menurutnya tidak mempunyai banyak perbezaan di negara-negara lain. Beberapa informan yang ditemubual penulis mengakui bahawa penyelewengan dan ketidaktelusan sememangnya berlaku dalam NGO di Malaysia (Holloway 2001). Malah, NGO adakalanya menghantar penyata kewangan yang telah diubahsuai ke ROS atau SSM untuk mengaburi perbelanjaan sebenar. Namun umumnya, perkara ini tidak akan diperbesarkan dalam kalangan aktivis atas faktor solidariti. Satu kes penyelewengan NGO yang didedahkan media massa ialah melibatkan HUMANA Sabah. NGO yang terkenal kerana program perlindungan dan pendidikan kepada kanak-kanak imigran dan pelarian tersebut merupakan NGO yang menerima dana dari pelbagai sumber luar seperti European Union, UNICEF, HSBC Foundation, CIMB Foundation

550

dan pelbagai lagi. Pada 2015, ia telah didakwa oleh akhbar Daily Express Sabah sebagai terlibat dalam penyelewengan melibatkan hampir RM4 juta ringgit. Walaupun kes tersebut telah ditutup kerana kekurangan bukti untuk siasatan selanjutnya, ia meletakkan konteks penting terhadap isu pendedahan umum dan tadbir urus baik sesuatu NGO (DailyExpress). Penggantungan Berlebihan Terhadap Dana Luar Penggantungan kepada dana asing lebih jelas berlaku kepada NGO baru yang berhadapan dengan masalah kemapanan. Penggantungan ini bukan sahaja menyebabkan CSO dituduh sebagai mengutamakan kepentingan pendana tetapi juga menyebabkan CSO gagal mempunyai ruang untuk terlibat dalam penggubalan dasar berikutan keraguan pemerintah mengenai kepentingan yang mereka wakili. (Gerard 2014:76). Tekanan yang dikenakan kepada CSO sebenarnya merupakan satu peringatan bagi CSO keluar dari paradigma lama iaitu bergantung sepenuhnya pada dana luar. Hal ini lebih mudah dilakukan dengan kemajuan teknologi maklumat yang mempunyai capaian yang lebih luas dan juga kaedah crowdsourcing (Carothers & Brechenmacher 2014). Namun salah satu ―tabiat‖ CSO Malaysia yang diakui ialah gemar memilih untuk bergantung pada dana luar disebabkan mudah diperolehi dan proses akauntabiliti yang secara relatifnya lebih rendah berbanding dana tempatan. Pendana seperti OSF conothnya menjadi tumpuan utama NGO mendapatkan dana berikutan ia lebih mudah dan tidak birokratik. Pengakuan OSF bahawa ia menyalurkan USD700,000 setahun kepada NGO Malaysia dapat dianggap merupakan jumlah tertinggi yang disalurkan pendana antarabangsa kepada CSO Malaysia.

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Realitinya, tumpuan kepada pendana domestik dan kaedah pengumpulan dana yang lain hanya dilakukan apabila sumber dana luar mengalami keterputusan. SUARAM merupakan contoh terbaik dalam hal ini. Selepas memutuskan untuk tidak memohon bantuan dari NED bermula pada 2012, pertubuhan itu mengalami kekurangan dana dan hanya bergantung pada beberapa dana lain seperti OSF dan Taiwan Foundation of Democracy. Akibatnya, SUARAM telah memulakan kembali kaedah pengumpulan dana melalui kaedah tradisional seperti menganjurkan majlis makan malam, kutipan derma dan sebagainya (K. Shan 2015: temubual; Tarmizi Anuwar 2016: temubual).i Beberapa contoh CSO lain yang kelihatan berjaya memaksimakan dana domestik menerusi berbagai-bagai kaedah ialah IDEAS, WCC dan WAO. CSO seperti ini bukan sahaja berjaya mendapatkan dana tempatan dalam jumlah yang besar tetapi juga berjaya mendapatkan dana dari syarikat korporat dan yayasan

berpengaruh.

Namun

tentu

sahaja

keberhasilan

mereka

mendapatkan dana seperti ini tidak sekadar didorong oleh faktor jaringan dan juga pengaruh individu tertentu tetapi juga ketelusan mereka dalam menyiarkan laporan operasi, laporan kewangan dan juga penghasilan input yang visible. Dengan berjaya menyeimbangkan jumlah dana yang diterima, sesuatu CSO berjaya meminimakan prejudis tertentu dan juga mengelakkan kebergantungan dengan agenda pihak luar.

Instrumen kepada Promoter Demokrasi Kritikan terhadap NGO yang menjadi instrumen kepada kuasa neoliberal dan menjadi agen tempatan bagi proses imperalisme telah meluas

552

diutarakan pengkaji (Petras 1999; Fletcher 2003; Storey 2003). Hal yang sama turut jelas kelihatan dalam kes Malaysia kerana kegagalan menjarakkan diri dengan kepentingan neoliberal. Kontroversi sokongan terbuka Naib Presiden AS, Al Gore terhadap gerakan reformasi dalam sidang APEC 1998 contohnya dilihat sebagai merugikan gerakan aktivisme Malaysia kerana dilihat mengabaikan konteks tempatan (Gurowitz 2000).ii Justeru, walaupun umum melihat wujudnya kemajuan dalam perjalanan masyarakat sivil di Malaysia mutakhir ini, konsep masyarakat sivil yang matang di Malaysia masih belum menjelma jelas. Banyak blog kritikal ditulis dalam Bahasa Inggeris, menyasarkan golongan yang berpendidikan tinggi dan ditulis oleh mereka yang berada di luar Malaysia. Hal yang sama turut terlihat dalam pergerakan NGO yang banyak didanai oleh kepentingan neoliberal dan dengan itu menyukarkan NGO menjadi instrumen penentangan yang mapan (SloaneWhite & Beaulieu 2010:385-386). Menurut aktivis anak muda berpengaruh Malaysia, Fathi Aris Omar: Kita tidak ada sejarah (masyarakat sivil yang bebas). Kerana sejarahnya ialah, framework kerja NGO ini terbatas. Selalunya ada backer, direct or indirectly, yang associated with the NGOs.….The idea (for independent civil society) is you have to stick in ―the middle power‖. Somewhere in between opposition and government and public. That‘s what we define as public sphere or civil society. You can convey whatever you like but you don‘t have to associate. Problem is here, there is no available channel to be independent (Fathi 2016: temubual). Hal ini dapat menerangkan mengapa beberapa NGO utama Malaysia seperti ALIRAN, NIEI dan CAP enggan menerima dana dari AS atau

553

pendana yang berprofil tinggi kerana dibimbangi akan menjejaskan legitimasi mereka (Mustapa 2015: temubual; Meenakshi Raman 2015: temubual; K.Shan 2015: temu bual; Tarmizi Anuwar 2016: temu bual). Bagi sesetengah NGO pula, kerapatan dengan promoter demokrasi adalah perlu kerana ia memberi satu bentuk perlindungan dan pengiktirafan. Promoter demokrasi AS adalah contoh penting dalam hubungan ini. AS memberikan sokongan moral terhadap tekanan yang diterima oleh CSO yang menerima bantuan demokrasi seperti ke serbuan terhadap Malaysiakini pada 2002, kes dakwaan terhadap Pengarah Tenaganita, Irene Fernandez pada 2003 dan yang terkini kepada pertubuhan yang memperjuangkan kepentingan LBGT seperti Justice for Sisters (JFS). Sokongan moral ini juga diberikan dalam bentuk pengiktirafan kerajaan AS seperti International Women of Courage Award yang diberikan pada Ambiga pada 2009 dan terbaru, kepada aktivis LBGT, Nisha Ayub yang pernah dipenjarakan kerana dakwaan berpakaian wanita. Fakta ini lebih dapat ditekuni jika melihat penyandaran US terhadap tokoh pembangkang, Anwar Ibrahim. Menurut Carothers antara kelemahan promosi demokrasi AS ialah penyandaran berlebihan pada individu tertentu untuk mempromosikan demokrasi atau menggunakan pendekatan Great Leader. Polisi ini menurut Carothers menyebabkan AS mengabaikan keperluan yang lebih penting untuk pendemokrasian iaitu perubahan sistemik, mengecewakan aktor politik lain dalam masyarakat dan masih bergantung pada pemimpin yang telah tidak mempunyai legitimasi di peringkat domestik (Carothers 1995). Dalam konteks Malaysia, situasi pasca 1998 kelihatan terus berlanjutan hingga kini apabila promoter demokrasi AS menyandarkan

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Anwar, PKR dan juga beberapa CSO berpengaruh sebagai bulatan penting bagi urusan promosi demokrasi. Ia menjadikan beberapa aktiviti bantuan demokrasi di Malaysia khususnya pemantau pilihan raya dan reformasi pilihan raya mudah dipersoalkan. Malah dalam dokumen mesyuarat OSF yang dibocorkan, mereka turut mengakui bahawa bantuan yang dihulurkan oleh OSF lebih banyak pergi ke sektor yang mempunyai hubungan simbiotis dengan pembangkang dan perlu difikirkan semula. Malah, apabila NGO yang dilihat lebih progresif seperti SIS disebut sebagai sasaran pertautan AS dalam dokumen RAND (2007), pertubuhan itu cuba menjarakkan diri kerana tidak mahu SIS dianggap ditubuh atau dipromosikan oleh kumpulan Barat untuk melakukan tugas bagi pihak mereka (cartercenter.org. 2007).

Pengabaian Konteks Tempatan dan Constructive Engagement CSO Malaysia perlu memberi perhatian kepada prinsip one size doesn‟t fit all yang sering menjadi isu dalam pendanaan asing. Adalah lazim bagi aktivis demokrasi menggarap dan mengambil inspirasi dari pengalaman negara-negara lain dalam soal pembangunan demokrasi. Pusat KOMAS contohnya mengambil model Amerika Latin dan model Norway juga dipakai oleh Borneo Resouces Institute (BRIMAS) dalam perjuangan membela hak peribumi di Sarawak. Namun penimbaan pengalaman ini harus disesuaikan dengan pengalaman Malaysia. Dalam mana proses pembangunan demokrasi dan penyebaran idea alternatif harus diberi sokongan dan diraikan, ia harus dilakukan dalam kerangka masyarakat Malaysia yang mempunyai bagasi sejarah tersendiri dan terinstitusi

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dengan konsep kebebasan positif (positive freedom) iaitu kebebasan yang tidak membelakangkan hak dan kepentingan kelompok lain138. Beberapa kajian telah membangkitkan bantuan asing yang memperjuangkan nilai dan norma yang spesifik dan bukan nilai yang universal akan kerap menemui kegagalan dan tentangan (Sundstrom 2005; Rakner, Menocal & Fritz 2008; Chahim & Prakash 2014). Malah Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association turut mengakui bahawa promoter dan CSO yang menerima dana asing harus berhati-hati dengan isu-isu sensitif, isu tidak popular dan memberi perhatian pada konteks tempatan (HRC 2013). Seperti yang dihujahkan Carothers & Brechenmacher, pemerintah tetap mempunyai hak atas soal kedaulatan politik dan berhak menentukan batasan terhadap apa yang aktor luar boleh lakukan dalam mempengaruhi proses politik domestik mereka (Carothers & Brechenmacher 2014:54). Dalam hubungan ini, satu isu penting yang menjadi tumpuan ialah isu hak wanita dan juga LGBT. Kerapkali tercetusnya pertentangan dalam mencari titik pertemuan antara nilai universal dan nilai tempatan dalam isu yang dibawa promoter demokrasi. Apabila nilai tempatan dilihat bertentangan dengan nilai universal, promoter demokrasi Barat umumnya enggan mengalah dengan keadaan ini dan menjurus pada kontroversi (Carothers 2016: komunikasi personal). Dalam mana kita boleh bersetuju dengan hujah bahawa penindasan, diskriminasi dan prejudis terhadap 138

Pembahagian idea kebebasan positif dan negatif ini adalah berdasarkan hujah tokoh liberalisme moden, TH Green (1836-1882) yang mencabar kebebasan individu tidak terhad yang dianjurkan tokoh liberalisme klasik seperti Isaiah Berlin.

556

golongan LGBT tidak harus berlaku, sikap NGO yang memperjuangkan isu ini secara terbuka dan konfrontasi adalah tidak produktif. Pembunuhan aktivis LGBT yang bertugas dengan USAID, Xulhaz Mannan pada April 2016 di Bangladesh kerana memperjuangkan secara terbuka LGBT boleh dianggap menghantar mesej kepada promoter demokrasi dan CSO untuk menanggapi isu ini secara lebih berhati-hati. Satu negara yang banyak disebut sebagai contoh terbaik penghormatan terhadap konteks tempatan ialah Indonesia. Indonesia bukan sahaja dijadikan rujukan dan jaringan penting oleh aktivis pro-demokrasi Malaysia termasuklah Anwar Ibrahim tetapi juga dianggap oleh beberapa aktivis sebagai negara yang lebih memberi penekanan terhadap konteks tempatan (K. Shan). Sejajar dengan kajian Bush yang melihat pendekatan mengusik status quo tidak lagi menjadi keutamaan dalam kebanyakan CSO yang menerima bantuan demokrasi (Bush 2015), antara langkah yang boleh dilakukan CSO ialah menumpukan pertautan terhadap enklaf demokratik (democratic enclave) yang berada dalam pemerintah. IRI yang sebelum ini dicurigai oleh pemerintah kini memperolehi semula lampu hijau untuk menjalankan aktiviti latihan kepada parti politik berikutan pertautan yang dilakukannya bersama-sama NGO seperti IDEAS untuk program berkaitan kerajaan (Informan X). Pertautan seperti ini adalah sesuatu yang menyegarkan berbanding pengeluaran kenyataan dan retorik berbau konfrontasi. Bukan menjadi rahsia beberapa tokoh masyarakat sivil seringkali memberikan kritikan yang keterlaluan dan tanpa hedging apabila berada di negara luar. Di sebalik retorik dan ancaman penghentaman yang berterusan, pemerintah pada umumnya masih bersikap rasional dalam beberapa perkara. Sebagai

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contoh, kerajaan Malaysia merupakan pendana terbesar program ACSC/APF berjumlah RM500,000 dan diberikan tanpa sebarang syarat kepada penganjur. Perlantikan Edmund Bon dari NGO hak asasi, Liberal Banter sebagai wakil Malaysia ke AICHR turut dapat menyarankan bahawa pemerintah masih memberi kepercayaan kepada NGO kritikal. Terpentingnya, masih tidak wujudnya satu undang-undang yang digubal kerajaan bagi mengetatkan peraturan penerimaan dana walaupun idea ini pernah diwar-warkan sewaktu kempen ancaman asing yang berlangsung (The Malay Mail Online 6 Disember 2016). Pengabaian Aktivisme Intelektual Beberapa kajian telah membangkitkan mengenai aktiviti bantuan demokrasi yang tidak mengambilkira keperluan sebenar, tertumpu pada kota besar dan tiada keseimbangan antara politik dan praktikal. Hal ini sebahagiannya berlaku berikutan kehendak pendana yang mahukan NGO melakukan aktiviti yang mereka mahukan dan bukannya berdasarkan keperluan (Sorpog Peou 2007; Youngs 2010). Hal ini dapat menjelaskan pandangan beberapa informan yang ditemubual mengenai kewujudan NGO Malaysia

yang melaksanakan sesuatu projek semata-mata

berdasarkan keperluan mendapatkan dana dan bukan berdasarkan kepakaran mereka. Kebanyakan CSO di Malaysia dianggap terlalu memfokuskan pada kerja-kerja advokasi tanpa dipimpin oleh kajian saintifik dan terputus dari segi konseptual. Kebanyakannya cenderung dimanifestasikan dalam bentuk kenyataan-kenyataan kecaman ke atas autoriti, mobilisasi, dan ekspresi. Kecenderungan ini berkait rapat dengan realiti sektor pendidikan

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dan pekerjaan di mana kebanyakan anak muda yang berpengetahuan dan berkemahiran sebahagian besarnya memilih untuk menyertai sistem pekerjaan arus perdana. Ditambah dengan fakta bahawa kebanyakan CSO advokasi berbentul sukarela dan tidak menjanjikan prospek karier, mereka lebih senang berkhidmat dengan sektor swasta (K. Shan : Lee 2011:80). Kekurangan (atau mungkin ketiadaan) kefahaman aktivis CSO Malaysia terhadap isu bantuan demokrasi contohnya telah menyukarkan mereka untuk memberi hujah balas terhadap isu pendanaan asing yang dibangkitkan oleh pemerintah secara ilmiah dan juga isu-isu berkaitan secara lebih kritis. K. Shan contohnya menjadikan karya-karya sarjana NGO, James Petra dan James Barber sebagai panduan penting dalam kerja aktivisme. Begitu juga Fathi Aris Omar yang cuba menyerap karya-karya ahli falsafah seperti Juergen Habermas, Pierre Bourdieu dan Louis Althusser.

Transparency

International-Malaysia

juga

mendapatkan

khidmat sarjana ekonomi politik terkemuka, Edmund Terence Gomez sebagai konsultan dalam program reformasi pembiayaan politiknya. Gomez berperanan penting dalam penghasilan laporan reformasi pembiayaan politik yang dikeluarkan TI-M dan malah banyak mengkritik sikap pihak pembangkang yang turut keberatan untuk melakukan pendedahan mengenai dana yang diterima. ALIRAN juga contohnya didominasi oleh saintis-saintis politik terkemuka dan hal ini dapat menjelaskan sikap berhati-hati mereka terhadap promoter demokrasi yang berprofil tinggi. Mereka menyedari agak sukar untuk memberikan pandangan yang bertentangan jika telah menerima dana dari sesuatu pihak dan kumpulan berkepentingan.

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Adunan aktivisme dan akademia seperti ini diyakini dapat memberi legitimasi yang lebih penting terhadap aktiviti yang dijalankan dan mengelakkan tanggapan bahawa NGO hanya berminat dengan kerja-kerja advokasi, demonstrasi dan mengumpulkan dana. BERSIH conothnya hanya menerima dana yang sedikit dari promoter demokrasi seperti IRI dan OSF untuk menjalankan aktiviti penyelidikan iaitu berjumlah RM90,000. Namun enerimaan dana ini seringkali dikaitkan pengkritik sebagai satu tindakan untuk menjatuhkan kerajaan berikutan aktiviti mereka yang berprofil tinggi dan retorik yang agresif. Malah, pendana seperti IRI yang menumpukan kepada bantuan pilihan raya tidak mempertauti BERSIH kerana reputasi NGO itu yang begitu panas (Informan X: 2016 temubual). Selepas perhimpunan BERSIH 5.0, beberapa penganalisis membangkitkan keperluan gerakan itu untuk lebih mempertauti masyarakat luar bandar dan menumpukan kepada pendidikan pengundi (The Malay Mail Online 23 November 2016).

Elitisme dan Jentera Sempit Parti Politik Kebanyakan CSO yang menerima dana asing berbentuk elitism (Carothers 1999; Petras 1999). Kebanyakan CSO Malaysia berbentuk centralistic dan urbanistik. Umumnya mereka diwakili oleh kelas menengah dan bukan berteraskan massa. Justeru, adakalanya sesuatu NGO ditubuhkan atas lantikan sendiri. Pejabat operasi mereka terletak di sekitar Petaling Jaya, Kuala Lumpur, Bangsar dan Georgetown atau negeri-negeri yang dikuasai pembangkang seperti Selangor dan Pulau Pinang. Umumnya, mereka terdiri dari bulatan kecil yang berpengaruh dalam soal pendanaan dan

560

disenangi oleh promoter demokrasi utama. Implikasi dari keadaan ini boleh dijelaskan kepada tiga keadaan. Pertama, komposisi keahlian yang agak eksklusif dan tidak terbuka pada massa. Kedua, penumpuan kepada isu-isu politik baru yang disenangi kelas menengah bandar dan kurang melakukan jangkauan terhadap kawasan luar bandar. Ketiga, keanggotaan yang sebahagian besarnya didominasi oleh golongan kelas menengah Cina atau India. Dihujahkan, ciri-ciri ini seringkali mendedahkan NGO-NGO terlibat kepada kritikan kerana memperjuangkan agenda yang khusus. Pengkritik seringkali mengaitkan bantuan demokrasi yang diterima hanya berperanan menjalankan aktiviti-aktiviti yang mempunyai kumpulan sasar yang khusus dan tidak mencerminkan hasrat mempertauti golongan luar bandar (seringkali dibaca secara longgar sebagai masyarakat Melayu) (Jayasooria 2010; Arphan 2016: temubual). Hal ini juga merupakan sebab mengapa definisi masyarakat sivil menjadi sempit seperti yang pernah dihujahkan Carothers (Carothers 1999).iii Jika media di Malaysia menggunakan istilah ‗masyarakat sivil‘ (seperti perjumpaan Obama dengan masyarakat sivil), ia seolah-olah menggambarkan bahawa masyarakat sivil hanya diwakili beberapa CSO berpengaruh, terletak di kawasan bandar dan didominasi oleh bukan Melayu. Dalam dua lawatan Obama ke Malaysia pada 2014 dan 2016, Obama hanya bertemu dengan beberapa CSO utama di Malaysia yang dipertauti AS dan menerima dana dari promoter demokrasi AS seperti Islamic Renaissance Front (IRF), BERSIH 2.0, Bar Council, Human Rights Society (HAKAM), Centre to Combat Corruption and Cronisym (C4), Malaysiakini, Justice for Sisters

561

(JFS), Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS) dan Good Shephard. Jika naratif ini diperpanjangkan pula kepada hubungan CSO dan parti politik, gambaran yang menonjol adalah tidak menggalakkan. Walaupun rasional pakatan antara parti politik dan NGO mempunyai merit, (Heaney 2012), ia menyukarkan usaha menjinakkan persepsi golongan majoriti utama iaitu kaum Melayu. Perkembangan selepas PRU 1999 memberi masalah tersendiri dalam pengkonsepsian masyarakat sivil di Malaysia kerana ia telah memulakan hubungan simbiotis yang dekat antara NGO advokasi dan parti pembangkang (Weiss 2009). Hubungan berselirat antara NGO dan parti politik memudahkan kebebasan dan konsep kuasa ketiga dipersoalkan. Carothers & Brechenmacher memberi contoh bagaimana pendidikan pengundi yang dijalankan beberapa CSO mungkin kelihatan nonpartisan. Namun hakikatnya, ia ditumpukan pada kawasan yang diketahui mempunyai sokongan kuat kepada pihak pembangkang dan dengan itu mempunyai sikap memihak (Carothers & Brechenmacher 2014). Mengambil kira banyak CSO utama Malaysia beroperasi di kawasan bandar seperti Petaling Jaya dan Kuala Lumpur yang menjadi pengkalan sokongan parti pembangkang, hujah ini mempunyai merit yang besar. BERSIH adalah contoh terbaik dalam memperkatakan kompleksiti NGO-parti politik. Sejak penubuhannya pada 2006, BERSIH dianggotai oleh parti-parti politik Pakatan Rakyat. Walaupun BERSIH memutuskan untuk bergerak sendirian tanpa parti politik sejak 2010, pengaruh parti politik amat jelas kelihatan membayangi gerakan tersebut sehinggakan banyak pengkritik melihat perhimpunan setiap perhimpunan yang

562

diadakan telah dirampas oleh ahli politik. Begitu juga apabila perhimpunan BERSIH 4.0 dan 5.0 yang lebih didominasi oleh kaum Cina, ia dengan mudah dieksploitasi oleh UMNO dan golongan konservatif Melayu yang melihat perhimpunan tersebut mewakili suara DAP. Pungutan suara Merdeka Centre yang menyatakan 70 peratus kaum Melayu tidak bersetuju dengan BERSIH 4.0 (Malaysiakini 29 Ogoss 2015) menyarankan yang BERSIH gagal meyakinkan etnik terbesar Malaysia mengenai dikotomi parti dan NGO.

KESIMPULAN Menurut Carothers & Brechenmacher, strategi playing the nationalist card merupakan sebahagian dari usaha yang sering diambil pelbagai negara dalam menekan masyarakat sivil bebas dan menutup ruang politik (Carothers & Brechenmacher 2014). Peningkatan sentimen konspiratorial dan deep politics di Malaysia turut menyebabkan isu ini telah ditanggapi secara sempit dan simplistik. Begitu pun, analisis telah menunjukkan bahawa kedudukan CSO Malaysia sebagai kuasa yang bebas

adalah

bermasalah dan kelemahan-kelemahan yang wujud dalam gerakan CSO pro-demokrasi dan hak asasi telah memudahkan pengkritik dan pemerintah

connecting the dots.

Dalam konteks kajian ini, penulis

menyimpulkan bahawa CSO Malaysia tidak seindah seperti yang digambarkan melalui naratif popular dan akademik yang menyifatkan peranan mereka sebagai unsur bebas yang berjuang demi kepentingan terbanyak dan tidak berbentuk partisan. Aktivisme NGO sudah menjadi

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satu bentuk ‗karier‘ dan dengan itu, soal pendanaan dilihat merupakan objektif terpenting dalam mengekalkan kelangsungan sesuatu CSO dalam lingkungan umum. Kesan dari keadaan ini, CSO berlumba-lumba mendapatkan dana luar atas nama demokrasi. Sejajar dengan objektif bantuan demokrasi yang bersifat progresif, ―masyarakat sivil‖ Malaysia juga sudah menjadi istilah yang sempit apabila ia hanya dikaitkan dengan segelintir CSO yang visible dan mendominasi naratif yang progresif. Ia telah dilihat meminggirkan persoalan-persoalan kelas pekerja dan menumpukan persoalan kelas menengah yang dilihat lebih eksklusif.

RUJUKAN Arphan 2016: temubual). Carothers, T. 1995. Democracy Promotion Under Clinton. Washington Quarterly 18 (4): 13-25. Carothers, T. 1999. Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve. Washington DC:

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Carothers, T. & Brechenmacher, S. 2014. Closing Space: Democracy and Human Rights Support Under Fire. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace.

Carothers 2016: komunikasi personal. Chahim, D. & Prakash, A. 2014. NGOization, Foreign Funding, and the Nicaraguan Civil Society. Voluntas 25:487–513.

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Denison Jayasooria. 2010. Civil Society Engagement in Malaysia. Dlm. Cheema. G.S. & Popovski, V (pnyt.). Civil Society: Emerging Trends in Democratic Governance, hlm. 214-231. Tokyo: United Nations University Press. Denison Jayasooria. 2010.. Civil Society engagement in Malaysia. Dlm Engagung

Civil Society: Emerging Trends in Democratic Governance.

Pnyt. G. Shabbir

Cheema & Vesselin Popovski. Tokyo: United

Nations University Press. 214 -231 Gurowitz. A. 2000. Migrant Rights and Activism in Malaysia: Opportunities and Constraints. The Journal of Asian Studies 59 (4), 863-888. HRC. 2013. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Humana's

Assembly and of Association, Maina Kai. missing

RM4m

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http://www.dailyexpress.com.my/news.cfm?NewsID=110565 K. Shan 2015: temubual; Malaysiakini 29 Ogoss 2015 Nahan, M. 2003. US Foundation Funding in Malaysia. NGO Project Report 1/2003.Melbourne. Institute of Public Affairs. Peou, S. 2007. International Democracy Assistance for Peacebuilding: Cambodia

and Beyond. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Petras, J. 1999. NGOs: In the Service of Imperialism. Journal of Contemporary Asia

29(4): 429-440.

Rakner, L., Menocal, A.R. & Fritz, V. 2008. Assessing International Democracy Assistance: Key Lessons and Challenges. London: Overseas Development Institute. Richard Holloway . 2001. Corruption and Civil Society Organisations in Indonesia A

paper delivered at the 10th International Anti-Corruption

Conference (IACC), Prague, Czech Republic, 7-11 October 2001. Sloane-White, P. & Beaulieu, I. 2010. Beyond 50 Years of Political Stability in

Malaysia: Rent and the Weapons of the Power Elite.

Canadian Journal of Development Studies 30(3-4): 381-402. Tarmizi Anuwar 2016: temubual Weiss, M. L. 2004. Transnational Activism in Malaysia: Foci, Tradeoffs and

Implications. Dlm. Piper, N. & Uhlin, A. Transnational Activism

in Asia. Hlm. 129-148. London: Routledge. Why

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suspended?,

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january

http://www.dailyexpress.com.my/read.cfm?NewsID=1471 Humana‘s panel

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february

http://www.dailyexpress.com.my/read.cfm?NewsID=1488

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2015, , 2015,

Media, Women and Elections II Of Media, Social Network and Openness in Political Conversations Sharifah Sophia Wan Shmad & Su-Hie Ting Universiti Malaysia Sarawak Abstract Democratic citizenship is an integral part of democracy. Citizens in a democracy need to have certain types of political knowledge which guide their behaviour and influence their attitudes and values towards issues and happenings on politics.Agents for political socialisation include family, educational institutions, peers and media. The study examines the influence of media, political knowledge, efficacy and social network on openness in political conversations. In this study, the word ―politics‖ is defined narrowly to encompass election issues. A questionnaire survey is conducted among an educated population with varying levels of political knowledge and engagement. The questionnaire, adapted from Moy and Gastil (2006), measured the respondents‘ willingness or reluctance to engage in political disagreements. The antecedent variables examined are network size and heterogeneity, media use, political knowledge and efficacy. The results which reveal openness to political views with respect to election issues will provide an indication of the perceived acceptance towards democracy of political views in the Malaysian society. Keywords: media, social network, political conversation, political knowledge, political socialisation Introduction Democratic citizenship is an integral part of democracy. Citizens in a democracy need to have certain types of political knowledge which guide their behaviour and influence their attitudes and values towards issues and happenings on politics. Attitudes and values towards political issues

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develop from childhood to adulthood. The agents for political socialisation include family, educational institutions, peers and media. The family is an important agent in political socialisation of children but the influence of peers on political views and attitudes begin in adolescence and goes on throughout adult life.

Political socialisation takes place through everyday conversations. ―Through everyday political talk, citizens construct their identities, achieve mutual understanding, produce public reason, form considered opinions, and produce rules and resources for deliberate democracy‖ (Kim & Kim, 2008, p. 51). Moy and Gastil (2006) argue that political discussions among fellow citizens enlarge perspectives about political matters and result in sound political judgements. They refer to political discussions characterised by ―openness to conflict, no- dominance, the use of clear and logical argument, and mutual comprehension‖ as deliberative conversation (p. 445).

The extent to which conflict is embraced in political conversations may vary with the network characteristics. The size of a social network does not influence deliberative conversation but the openness of political conversations depends on the network composition of peers (Moy & Gastil, 2006). Eveland and Hively (2009) view network heterogeneity as being divided into discussions with like-minded individuals (safe discussion) and nonlike-minded individuals (dangerous discussion). The like-mindedness of conversation partners on political issues influences the topics broached in the conversations and the openness in which issues are

568

discussed. It is expected that individuals are more open in their political views when conversing with like-minded individuals.

The frequency of political discussions and conversations also depends on political expertise. Political expertise refers to the level of political knowledge, which encompasses knowledge of historical contexts and contemporary issues. Frequency of political discussion and network size are positively correlated with political knowledge and participation (Eveland & Hively, 2009). In sum, the literature shows that some factors which influence quality of deliberative conversations are network size, network heterogeneity and political expertise because all these add up to the efficacy that citizens have on their ability to engage in deliberative conversations (Moy & Gastil, 2006). In this context, the role of the media in educating the citizens on political matters and building up their political expertise needs to be investigated. Little is known on whether greater exposure to media of various forms leads to increased frequency of deliberative conversations and openness in these conversations with other citizens. In the Malaysian setting, the influence of network on openness in political conversations is underexplored. The findings will be useful for the government to generate political interest and reduce political apathy among Malaysian youths. Purpose of study

The study examines the influence of media and social network on openness in political conversations. In this study, the word ―politics‖ is defined narrowly to encompass election issues.

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Method of study

A questionnaire survey was conducted among an educated population with varying levels of political knowledge and engagement. For this preliminary study, the political knowledge and political conversations of 47 university students in a Malaysian university were surveyed. Their average age was 22.4 (range of 21 to 27). There were more female participants (33 or 70.2%) compared to male participants (14 or 29.8%). Most of the participants were Malay (63.8%) and Indigenous from Sabah and Sarawak (31.9%). There was one Indian and one Chinese participant in the group. Most of the participants came from low socio-economic status backgrounds (72.3%) and most of their fathers were farmers or support staff in offices. Most of their mothers were homemakers. Most of the participants‘ parents had Form Five education or less (72.3% of fathers and 87.2% of mothers). The participants were from all over Malaysia but a majority of them were from Sarawak because the university where the study was conducted was located in Sarawak.

The questionnaire, adapted from Moy and Gastil (2006), measured the respondents‘

willingness

or

reluctance

to

engage

in

political

disagreements, considered as a dependent variable in this study. The antecedent variables examined were media use, knowledge, network size and heterogeneity, and efficacy. For this study, the participants‘ knowledge on four selected election issues was examined, namely, gerrymandering, 1MDB, Consumer Price Index (CPI) and BR1M. The justification for the selection of these four election issues are given below.

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Gerrymandering is a process of re-delineation of electoral boundary lines as a strategy by dominant political parties to ensure their advantage in an election. In Malaysia re-delineation reflects the preference towards certain ethnic group, namely, Malays who are thought to be a core supporter for the ruling political party UMNO. This makes gerrymandering an issue of contention for opposition parties as well as the non-Malay parties within the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition. This makes gerrymandering a hot topic in Malaysia especially in the year leading to the general election. There most recent re-delineation exercise was in 2013, with rumours abound on a possible exercise in 2016.

1 Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) is a sovereign wealth fund formed in 2009 under the Ministry of Finance. The fund issued sovereign bonds which were later invested in domestic and overseas market. Its investment portfolio covers commercial real-estate, hotel, Van Gogh‘s and Monet‘s paintings. oil and gas and energy. The company has been mired in controversy since 2013 mainly because of allegations of money laundering. It is claimed that more than USD 1 billion dollars are missing from the fund and instead moved to various bank accounts in multiple international locations. It is now under investigation by justice departments in Singapore, the USA and Switzerland.

Consumer Price Index (CPI) is an indicator of inflation in Malaysia. It captures the price level of a basket of goods and services consumed generally by consumers. The government often refers to CPI to devise current policies and annual budget. There, however, seems to be a gap

571

between the abstract CPI data and the hard reality of rising prices. For example, the CPI is reported to rise to 3.2% early this year which numerically looks like a small increase. On the ground, consumers are still reeling from the shock of the increased prices of petrol, cooking oil and sugar and white rice that are necessities. It is no surprise therefore, the parallel to price inflation is the rise in the household debt level. This has made Malaysia as the second highest household debt in Asia Pacific after South Korea.

Bantuan Rakyat 1Malaysia (BR1M) is a payment scheme to support individual and household earning lower income and middle income groups. It is also part of the Economic Transformation Programme to launch Malaysia into a high-income nation. There are four schemes: household income less that RM 1000, household income less than RM 3000, household income between RM 3000- RM4000, individual with income less than RM 2000 and elderly people. For each of these groups, the given pay-out is RM1,200, RM900, RM 450 and RM 1000 respectively. The BR1M payments have been made since 2012. While the hand-out is very popular among the Malaysians, there have been concerns over the usefulness of the scheme. The pay-out only increased income level for low-income household but not in terms of purchasing power especially given the CPI level is rising higher year on year. This has lead critics to conclude that the scheme is another strategy at vote-buying.

The questionnaire was in Malay because the university students were from a Malay educational background and were more familiar with Malay than English. The accuracy of the Malay translation from the English version

572

adapted from Moy and Gastil (2006) was verified by a lecturer teaching the Malay language.

The questionnaire was distributed after a lecture on research methodology and the students were told that their identity was anonymous and they were free not to participate in the study. Only one student did not return the questionnaire, and the data for the study were from 47 students. Results and Discussion

In this section, the results on openness in political conversations, frequency of media use, knowledge on selected election issues and efficacy are presented. The relationships of all these factors with openness in political conversations are also presented in each of the sub-sections of the results.

(1) Openness in political conversations

Table 1 shows that the participants were inclined towards avoiding conflict in political conversations, as shown by the average score of between 3 (Neutral) and 4 (Agree). The university students in this study often tried to keep political disputes with peers to themselves in order to avoid hard feelings.They also usually avoided open discussion of political differences with their peers and tried to stay away from political disagreements with their peers.

Table 1. Frequency of avoidance of conflict in political conversations among participants

573

Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Average Disagree 1. I try to keep political

Agree

(N=47)

1

6

8

25

7

3.660

1

4

12

25

5

3.617

1

6

10

26

4

3.553

disputes with my peers to myself in order to avoid hard feelings. 2. I usually avoid open discussion of my political differences with my peers. 3. I try to stay away from political disagreements with my peers. (Note: Likert scale comprising 1 for Strongly Disagree, 2 for Disagree, 3 for Neutral, 4 for Agree, 5 for Strongly Agree)

(2) Frequency of media use

The results in Table 2 show that printed media are going out of popularity with the participants of the study who were university students in their early twenties. Instead they were inclined towards reading news in online newspapers.

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Table 2. Frequency of use for different kinds of media among participants Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Average Disagree 1. I regularly read the

Agree

(N=47)

2

12

21

10

2

2.957

0

5

16

15

11

3.681

1

14

18

13

1

2.979

0

13

21

12

1

3.021

0

7

25

10

5

3.277

0

15

19

9

4

3.043

printed newspapers. 2. I regularly read the online newspapers. 3. I often read magazines addressing community or national issues. 4. I often read blogs addressing community or national issues. 5. I often watch discussions of community or national issues on the television. 6. I often watch of discussions of community or national issueson Youtube. (Note: Likert scale comprising 1 for Strongly Disagree, 2 for Disagree, 3 for Neutral, 4 for Agree, 5 for Strongly Agree)

For printed media, specifically printed newspapers and magazines, Table 2 shows that the average score for the participants was slightly below 3

575

(Neutral), that is 2.957 and 2.979 respectively. This shows that the participants

read

printed

newspapers

and

magazines

addressing

community or national issues some of the time but not regularly. There is also a balance in the number of participants who disagreed and agreed with the statements on whether they regularly read newspapers and magazines.

For non-printed media, the most popular source of news on national or community issues is online newspapers (average of 3.681). In fact, the popularity of online newspapers exceeded those of television (average of 3.277), Youtube (3.043) and blogs (3.021). The university students tended to seek information on current national or community issues from online newspapers, which is seen as a more reliable source of information than Youtube and blogs which are personal expressions of political views. Television offers equally reliable and updated information on national or community issues but the university students do not watch much television and they have better and constant access to online newspapers using their smartphones.

Among the various forms of mass media, the results point to online newspapers being the main agent in educating the citizens on political matters and building up their political expertise. In this context, the views propagated in online newspapers may influence the stance that the university students take in political conversations on issues prevailing in their community or the country.

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(3) Knowledge on selected election issues

Table 3 shows that among the four selected election issues, the participants were the most familiar with BR1M and did not know much about gerrymandering in elections. For BR1M, 31 out of 47 participants knew both the concept and its context in politics while 16 participants knew the concept but did not know its context in politics. The university students have received book vouchers amounting to RM250 under the BR1M programme of giving financial assistance to Malaysian citizens who had low income. In contrast, a majority (39 participants) did not know either the concept or the context of gerrymandering in elections. ―Gerrymandering‖ is a concept that has limited currency in Malaysian mainstream media. The word that reporters and media commentators prefer is a ―re-delineation‖ or the Malay equivalent of ―persempadanan semula‖. These terms are neutral words in the eyes of the public as well as students (who are not majoring in political science). They thought this is a normal readjustment procedure to meet the ever-changing nature of demography. ―Gerrymandering‖ as a term related to political manipulation is clearly well documented in alternative media but they are rarely challenged in the mainstream. Therefore, with very limited audience, the issue behind gerrymandering failed to capture the attention of university students.

577

Table 3. Level of knowledge on selected election issues among university students Concepts

I do not

I know

I know

Averag

know

the

the

the

followin

followin

followin

g

g

g

concept

concept

concept

but do

and

and

not

know its

know its

know its

context

context

context

in

in

in

politics

politics

politics

1. Gerrymandering

39

7

1

1.191

2. 1MDB

5

28

14

2.191

3. Consumer Price

29

9

9

1.574

0

16

31

2.660

e (N=47)

Index (CPI) 4. BR1M

(Note: For calculation of average, 1 for “I do not know the following concept and know its context in politics‖, 2 for ―I know the following concept but do not know its context in politics‖ and 3 for ―I know the following concept and know its context in politics‖)

As for 1MDB, much had been published in the newspaper since the issue emerged in 2014. This explains why more than half of the university students (28 out of 47 participants) reported that they knew the concept

578

but did not know its context in politics. However, 14 of the participants knew both the concept of 1MDB and its context in politics. This shows the confusing narrative surrounding the 1MDB which combined both economic and political angles. While the issue is a hot topic and have been played out in both mainstream and alternative sources, the students clearly did not perceive 1MDB as an issue beyond economics and financial management. It may be suggested here that the students‘ definition of politics is narrowly construed on the basis of elections, political parties and politicians.

Consumer Price Index (CPI) is also an unfamiliar concept to the participants. This is unsurprising since the news on CPI is typically positioned in Economy/Business section in a newspaper which reaches out to a specific target group. Among university students, with exception of Economics major, the topic of economy is seen to be less interesting and too difficult to fathom without technical knowledge about the topic.

(4) Efficacy in engaging in political conversations

The results (Table 4) showed that most of the participants reported low efficacy in forming considered political opinions and engaging in political conversations, as indicated by the average score of between 2 and 3 for Items 1 and 3.

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Table 4. Efficacy in political conversations among university students Strongl

Disagre

Neutra

Agre

Strongl

Averag

y

e

l

e

5

15

20

6

1

2.638

3

8

23

10

3

3.043

y Agree e

Disagre e 1. I am capable of particip ating effectiv ely in group discussi ons about importa nt politica l issues. 2. As an individual citizen, I am able to engage in political

580

action. 3. I can‘t

0

16

18

12

1

2.957

think straight about politics, regardle ss of how much I read or talk about the issues. (Note: Likert scale comprising 1 for Strongly Disagree, 2 for Disagree, 3 for Neutral, 4 for Agree, 5 for Strongly Agree)

However, the participants were slightly more confident about engaging in political action as shown by the average score of 3.043, which is neutral. The number of participants who chose the neutral option is higher than the other two options, and the number who disagreed with the statement ―As an individual citizen, I am able to engage in political action‖ is also lower than the number for the other two items. It is interesting that while the participants felt less efficacious about forming political opinions and expressing their views about political issues, they felt more confident about engaging in political action. This result suggests that university

581

students may engage in political action without fully understanding the issue or the context of the issue, and they may not be able to offer clear and logical arguments to justify their participation in political action. It is also possible that they may participate in political action as a form of crowd behaviour but this form of citizen engagement is not unique to Malaysia. Valenzuela et al. (2012) also concluded from their national survey of U.S. resident that frequency and level of reasoning in political conversations does not have much effect on Internet-based political participation.

(5) Network size and heterogeneity

For this study two aspects of network were examined, that is, network size and heterogeneity. To obtain an indication of network size, the participants were asked to state the number of friends they regularly discuss politics with. The results showed that the average number of friends was 4.767 (range of 1 to 10). On average, the participants engaged in political conversations with about five friends while those less interested or more reserved about their political views had political conversations with only one friend.

The heterogeneity of the network was detected from the language used for political conversations. The result showed that the peers were mostly from their own ethnic group as indicated by the large number of Malay participants and the high frequency of Malay being used. Sociolinguistic studies in Malaysia have shown that Malays speak their ethnic language (Malay) with members of their own community (e.g., Ting & Mahadhir,

582

2009). Out of 47 participants, 63.8% were Malay and 31.9% were Indigenous from Sabah and Sarawak and there was one Indian (2.1%) and one Chinese (2.1%). Table 5 shows that Malay accounted for 73.7% of the total number of languages stated by the participants and this shows that the Malay and Indigenous participants were speaking mainly Malay when they talked about political matters. Malay is the main language for political conversations.

Table 5. Languages used for political conversations among university students Language used for political

Number of

conversation

participants

Percentage

Malay

42

73.7

Sarawak Malay Dialect

7

12.3

English

3

5.3

Iban

3

5.3

Bidayuh

1

1.7

Dusun

1

1.7

57

100.0

(6) Antecedents of openness in political conversations

The antecedents of openness in political conversations examined were frequency of media use, knowledge on selected election issues, efficacy and peer network size, and the correlation values are shown in Table 6. The Pearson correlation test showed that there is a significantly strong

583

positive relationship between efficacy and openness in political conversations (r = 0.7891, p < .05). Participants with a higher level of efficacy in forming considered political opinions and engaging in political conversations were more likely to be open when talking about political matters.

Table 6. Correlation between frequency of media use, knowledge on selected election issues, efficacyand openness in political conversations Antecedents

Pearson Correlation value

Frequency of media use

0.0627

Not significant

Political knowledge

0.1025

Not significant

Efficacy in political

0.7891

Significant at p <

conversations Peer network size

.05 -0.140

Not significant

There is no significant relationship between openness in political conversations and other antecedents (Table 6). Contrary to past findings (e.g., Moy & Gastil, 2006), political conversation network characteristics (particularly size and heterogeneity) do not influence deliberative political conversations. These researchers reasoned that political sophistication develops from frequent political conversations and network heterogeneity leads to greater openness to conflicts in political conversations but supporting evidence was not found in the present study. Openness in political conversations is also not influenced by media use, possibly because the university students were not reading much of the political

584

news, not even those published in online newspapers – despite this being the most preferred mode of mass media.

Conclusion

The study on Malaysian university students showed that their perceived political efficacy influenced their openness in political conversations but not media, political knowledge and network size. Participants with a higher level of efficacy in forming considered political opinions and engaging in political conversations were more likely to be open when talking about political matters. The majority of university students tended to avoid conflict in political conversations. Agreements on political issues is

positively

correlated

with

political

participation

online

but

disagreements is negative correlated with political participation (Mutz, 2006; Valenzuela et al., 2012). While disagreement in political views leads to a better understanding of political affairs, when participants perceive that there will be conflicts, they avoid engaging in online political activities (Valenzuela et al., 2012). In the Malaysian setting, based on the findings of the preliminary study, it seems that the university students who are unsure of their views on political issues refrain from expressing their views to avoid potential conflicts and abstain from engaging in political action. To put it simply, they become apolitical.

The university students also reported infrequent behaviour of seeking information on national and community issues from the mass media. Despite the constant engagement of youth with Youtube and blogs, online newspaper was the main agent in creating awareness on political matters.

585

Supporting evidence for this is the familiarity of the university students with 1MDB and BR1M rather than Consumer Price Index (CPI) and gerrymandering in election because the former received much more newspaper attention than the latter.

The university students also did not engage in deliberative conversations on political issues with their peers because the average network size for political conversations was five, with a range of one to 10 conversation partners. Because of their infrequent information-seeking behaviour on political matters from the mass media and their peers, the university students did not feel confident about forming political opinions and expressing their views about political issues. What may be worrying is that despite their inadequate comprehension of political issues, they might engage in political action. The study has shown that political efficacy leads to more openness in political conversations but little is known about what might lead to increased efficacy and this is an area which needs further investigation. Such findings will bring about a better understanding of acceptance towards democracy of political views in the Malaysian society.

The findings demonstrated that there is a discrepancy between the students‘ actual knowledge of political process and their opinions. This may account for the lack of political education provided by interest groups and political parties in the university in Sarawak (where the study was conducted), unlike some other universities in the Peninsula where political education of undergraduates is more common. Political education allows debate and discussion from various political spectrum, thereby generating

586

interests and awareness to know more. Interestingly, while University and Colleges Act 2011 has been amended to allow (limited) political participation by university students, they remained largely on the side-line of discussion and debates pertaining to current issues. The tri-matrix of political education –debates - openness are the main cause of political apathy and political interest.

References ―1MDB

Scandal‖

(2016,

July

22).

Straits

Times.

http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/1mdb-scandal-a-quick-lookat-what-its-all-about Eveland, W. P., & Hively, M. H. (2009). Political discussion frequency, network size, and ―heterogeneity‖ of discussion as predictors of political knowledge and participation. Journal of Communication, 59(2), 205-224. Kim, J., & Kim, E. J. (2008). Theorizing dialogic deliberation: Everyday political talk as communicative action and dialogue. Communication Theory, 18(1), 51-70. ―Malaysia‘s consumer price Index up 3.2% in Jan.‖ (2017, February 23). The

Star.

http://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-

news/2017/02/23/cpi-up-32-in-january/ Moy, P., & Gastil, J. (2006). Predicting deliberative conversation: The impact of discussion networks, media use, and political cognitions. Political Communication, 23(4), 443-460.

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Mutz, D. C. (2006). Hearing the other side: Deliberative versus participatory democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Ting, S. H., & Mahadhir, M. (2009). Towards homogeneity in home languages. Australian Review of Applied Linguistics, 32(2), 11.111.22. Valenzuela, S., Kim, Y., & de Zúñiga, H. G. (2012). Social networks that matter: Exploring the role of political discussion for online political participation. International journal of public opinion research, 24(2), 163-184.

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Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and Nigeria’s Quest for Credible Election: A Study of 2015 General Election in Nigeria

By Bashir Muktar Prof. Dr. Mohd, Azizuddin bin Mohd Sani Dr. Ummu Atiyah binti Ahmad Zakuan School of International Studies, Universiti Utara Malaysia Abstract Different competing groups cannot guarantee participatory democracy without the presence of contested elections and such elections must be credible. Elections in developing countries like Nigeria has been characterized by all sorts of irregularities, ranging from ballot stuffing, under age voting, inflation of election results among others. However, the conduct of 2015 general elections has taken a different dimension being adjudged by both local and international observers as the freest in the history of the electoral process in the country. This happened not by accident, but because of the introduction of technology driven tools and such as the Permanent Voter‟s Card (PVC) and Smart Card Reader (SCR) machine that contributed to the conduct of relatively free, fair and credible elections in Nigeria. Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) serves as a guide in this paper with documentary sources employed. The study revealed that, ICT tools employed by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) have contributed positively in reducing the electoral fraud that characterized elections in the history of Nigeria. The paper recommends that subsequent elections should be technologically driven and challenges faced with the SCR and PVC should be addressed to strengthen future electoral democracy in the country. Keywords: Election, Permanent Voter’s Card (PVC), Smart Card Reader (SCR), TAM

589

Introduction There is no gainsaying the fact that election is one of the fundamental ingredients of democracy if a country needs global recognition, which is central to competitive politics. Democracy represents among other things such as the rule of law, freedom of speech and expression, fundamental human rights, equality before the law and more importantly, freedom to vote and participate through competitive free, fair and credible elections. In a true and virile democracy, elections should be a contest between and amongst different political parties without any form of intimidation, harassment or inducement. Thus, the need for credible election has been indispensable. As argued by Jinadu, (2003) the future of any liberal democracy to stand the test of time must depend heavily on the conduct of free and fair election and a responsible party system. However, election in the view of Bratton, (1998) empowers and guarantees the people to choose among the candidates contesting for top political offices with clearly specified rules. This signifies a process of selecting those that represents a particular organ at a particular time by prospective members of the group at regular interval to protect the collective interests of the people without fear or favor. Election guarantees political participation, competition, provide legal framework for smooth change of government between different competing groups (Omotola, 2010). In the context of emerging democracies, Africa inclusive, the issue of free, fair and credible elections has been contested at different points in time due to the pervasive irregularities that characterized these elections. These irregularities range from ballot stuffing, inflation of voter‘s register, intimidation of voters by political thugs, conniving with the Electoral management bodies (EMBs) by the ruling party to inflate election results among others have resulted into political conflicts instigated by the disputed elections ( Fisher, 2002; Kanyinga & Okello, 2007; Bratton, 2008) . Nigeria is however, not an exception from the above fact, considering the nature and character of elections in the country from colonial period to the present fourth republic, which have been full of malpractices (Awopeju, 2011; Kerr, 2013).

590

Therefore, the conduct of 2015 general election in Nigeria has totally changed the political orientation of the people. For the first time the opposition party accepted the outcome of the election result without resort to court battles (Dahiru, 2016). The election was termed as free and fair. In addition, it has conformed to democratic framework and the regional principle of best election in Nigeria (African Union Election Observer Mission, 2015). However, the election influenced the use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) resulting to the credible election in the country. This paper therefore, attempt to unravel the role of ICT tools in the conduct of 2015 general elections in Nigeria. Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) This paper intends to adopt Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) as a guide in explaining the role of ICT in addressing electoral fraud during the 2015 general elections in Nigeria. TAM came into being when most studies in the field of Information System (IS) in the seventies failed to provide a good model or theory that could explain system (Technology) acceptance or rejection in organizations (Davis, 1985). Davies (1985) built upon the previous related studies, most fundamentally the work of Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) who propounded the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) that serves as a good model for detail explanation and prediction of the true behavior of an individual in a specific situation. Davis (1985) built upon the TRA by adopting it in a different context (that is user acceptance of technology) which he considers as behavior and also came up with factors that determines individual‘s attitude and behavior toward adopting a system (technology). Davis (1985) re-shaped the TRA to formulate his conceptual model TAM as shown below.

591

Fig 1. Technology Acceptance Model by Davis (1985).

Davis proposes that individual‘s motivation could be situated within three determinant factors: Perceive Ease of Use (PEOU), Perceived Usefulness (PU) and attitude toward using the system. For him attitude of the user to either accept or reject the system is the major determinant factor among the three factors above. PU and PEOU can influence the attitude of the user to employ the system. For Davis (1985) Perceived Usefulness (PU) and Perceive Ease of Use (PEOU) of a system influences an individual‘s behavior to either accept to adopt or not to adopt a system (technology) that could assist him in performing his job. He further argues, ―Perceived usefulness is the degree to which an individual believes that using a particular system would enhance his/her job performance. On the other hand, perceived ease of use is the degree to which an individual believes that using a particular system would be free of physical or mental effort‖ (Davis, 1985). It is clear from the foregoing that perceived usefulness stands for the confidence a user has over the usage of a particular technology or system and such usage would no doubt improve the 592

quality and efficiency of his job performance. In addition, perceived ease of use means using a particular technology or system is considered easy and simple with high productivity which if employed will influence and encourage user to adopt in their job. In spite of the usefulness of the model in explaining and predicting system use by user. The model (TAM) has been criticized by scholars (Lee, Kozar, & Larsen, 2003; Sharp, 2006; Yousafzai, Foxall & Pallister, 2007). However, despites the criticism of the model it is still considered appropriate within the context of this paper. ICT when applied serves as a good improvement in reducing electoral fraud and enhances awareness between and among the stakeholders of election. Jefferson, Rubin, Simon, and Wagner (2004) argued that application of ICT in the organization of elections enhances accuracy of election results, convenience, reliability, consistency, timeliness, acceptability and privacy, which are central to the credibility of elections. Therefore, the role of ICT has been acknowledged globally in supporting the conduct of free, fair and credible election. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is the body saddled with the responsibility of organizing credible election in Nigeria and all reforms necessary within the ambit of the law ought to be employed in the organization and conduct of credible elections in the country. Considering the fraudulent nature of elections in Nigeria. ICT employed to improve the quality of elections in Nigeria. In 2015 general elections, INEC introduced Permanent Voter‘s Card (PVC), and Smart Card Reader (SCR). The reason for introducing these ICT was simply its usefulness and ease of use as an enabler of change in supporting the conduct of credible election in Nigeria. As argued by Davis (1985) that PU and PEOU determines the basis for adopting a system (technology) in an organization to assist in job performance with efficiency and less effort. The SCR and PVC stands for ICT tools employed during the election. They have contributed greatly in reducing the fraudulent nature of previous elections in Nigeria, as acknowledged by observers (African Union Election Observer Mission, 2015; National Democratic Institute, 2015)

593

The Nature and Character of Elections since 1999 Since the country returned to a democratic dispensation in 1999 marking as the beginning of the fourth republic, five consecutive elections took place at regular intervals (1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015) and of all the elections, only that of 2015 was considered free, fair and accepted by the opposition parties without court battles. This section examines the fraudulent nature that characterized these elections. On the eve of 1999 general election, precisely August 25, 1998, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) announced October 5-9, 1998 as the due date for voters registration. At the end of which election took place and three political parties participated during the election: the People Democratic Party (PDP), All People‘s Party (APP) later in 2002 renamed All Nigerian People‘s Party (ANPP) and the Alliance for Democracy (AD) (Omotola, 2010). The election started with Local government council elections of 5th December 1998, on the 9th January, 1999 Gubernatorial and State House of Assembly took place, the National Assembly elections February 20, 1999 and finally Presidential elections took place on February 27, 1999. At the end of the elections the PDP won 21 states, APP won 9 states while states was controlled by AD. The same trend manifested in the subsequent elections with PDP controlling the major seats, followed by APP then AD (Nwangwu, 2015). Considering the victorious pattern PDP had as shown above, it was equally opportune to win the Presidential election with a total of 18,738,154 votes (62.78 percent) over APP/AD‘s alliance candidate who scored 11,110, 287 (37.22 percent) (Akinboye, 1999). The 1999 general elections at the end of the day was contested and challenged by the opposition parties as not free and fair which was also attested by the reports of both Local and International observers that monitored the elections as well as the attendant protest that characterized the political atmosphere. (Omotola, 2010). However, since the major concern of the election was to seize power from the military and send the packing, much attention was not paid to the election credibility. It was argued that the election was rigged by INEC in favor of PDP whose Presidential candidate was a former Military head of state (Chief Olusegu Obasanjo) (Kew, 594

1999). In addition, the political elites were reported to have hijacked the election machinery by contributing enormously in rigging the election to the party (PDP) of their choice (Ojo, 2006). The 2003 general election followed the same trend of malpractices as captured by Omotola, (2004) ―the road to 2003 election was full of potholes, which were either left unfilled or filled haphazardly before the elections were held‖. Number of political parties increased from three to thirty, there was also inconsistency between the 2002 electoral Act that serve as a guide during the 2003 election and the 1999 constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria. Not only that, President Obasanjo of the ruling PDP through the Electoral bill changed the order of elections as what obtained during the 1999 elections from lower positions to that of the President but in 2003 the reverse was the case (from Presidential to the lower level). The opposition parties interpreted this as a calculated step by the ruling party to further actualize their dictatorial electoral policies by dominating and dictating the election should the party (PDP) wins the Presidential election. These among other controversies gave the impression that the 2003 election would be rigged in favor of the ruling PDP. However, with the incumbency factor of the PDP which monopolized all state machineries to its advantage, after the election was conducted and completed, the ruling party emerged victorious at all levels of governance from Presidential election to the Local government elections. This was done through connivance with some of the officials in charge of election through various illegal means of being in possession of voter‘s cards, ballot boxes, ballot papers and stuffing of ballot boxes as well as inflation of election results among others (Ezeani, 2005). Because of the fraudulent nature of the 2003 election, election observers condemned it locally and internally. In addition, all the political parties that participated during the election jointly condemned and rejected the election result as not credible and was contrary to the rule of the game. In 2007, another excellent opportunity presented before Nigerians to elect those that will represent them and improve the electoral process generally by participating in an orderly, free and fair election. However, that opportunity compromised by electoral fraud of an unprecedented manner. The incumbent president of PDP was reported to have lamented that wining 2007 595

election for him and his party (PDP) becomes ‗a do or die affair‘ (Adejumobi, 2007). This set the record straight about the expected nature and outcome of the election results as the President who is in charge of all public machineries (money, media , security agencies, INEC etc) is willing to compromise the credibility of the election for his selfish ends. Furthermore, in the current fourth republic, elections at all levels in Nigeria lack the credibility of being free and fair, this is on account of the fact that election results were challenged by the defeated candidates and opposition parties on several grounds. In line with this, Osuntokun (2011) argued that the 1999 general elections was however, considered better and fair compared to 2003 and 2007 general elections in terms of their credibility. Moreover, as pointed out by Aiyede, (2007) that the 2007 general elections was generally condemned, disputed and protested in an unprecedented manner. He further maintained that from the elections alone, 1, 250 election petitions emerged. The state Houses of Assembly had 656, the House of Representatives 331, the Senate 150, the gubernatorial elections 105 and finally the presidential election had eight. Besides, because of the fraudulent nature of 2007 election, results of gubernatorial elections was annulled in different parts of the country, including that of Ondo, Ekiti, Adamawa, Kebbi, Edo, Kogi and Sokoto State (Omotola, 2010). However, considering the fraudulent nature of the election both local and international observers condemned the elections, it reported that the 2007 general elections is the worst election ever observed in the history of election monitoring in the world (European Union, 2007). In the build up to 2011 general election, the president that emerged from the most controversial 2007 election admitted the fraudulent nature of the election that brought him into power and such constituted Justice Lawal Uwais Committee (rtd) to strengthen the system. In addition, a renounced Professor of political science and an activist (Attahiru Jega) replaced the former INEC boss (Prof. Maurice Iwu), which gave the people hope of conducting a credible election in 2011. As far back as 2009 preparations commenced by INEC in order to address some of the challenges faced during the 2003 and 2007 elections in the country. It was argued that ―the Commission significantly improved the conduct of the elections, creating a new voter‘s register,

596

improving transparency in reporting results, and publicly pledging to hold accountable those who broke the rules‖ (p.114) (Cited in Nwangwu, 2015). At the end of the day, elections held nationwide with few hitches here and there. However, despite the improvement there was still cases of irregularities, police harassment, stuffing ballot boxes illegally, vote buying, falsification of election results among others (Oladimeji, Olatunji, & Nwogwugwu, 2013). The worst part of the outcome of the election was the post-election violence that erupted after the Presidential contest leading to the death of more than 800 people and properties worth billions destroyed (National Democratic Institute, 2015a). Despite the post-election violence, the election was considered fair in terms of credibility than the previous elections in the country (Nwangwu, 2015). ICT and the conduct of 2015 general elections in Nigeria The previous elections in the current democratic dispensation in Nigeria was manually administered starting from registration of voters, accreditation of eligible voters, voting proper and counting of votes cast. It is on this basis that some observers were of the view that such manual administration of these elections resulted into so many challenges, ranging from ballot stuffing, double voting by the voters as well as lack of adequate record of the electorates as examined in the previous section (Awopeju, 2011). It is in view of this experts advocate for transition from manual to ICT based electoral process in Nigeria. The employment of ICT in the conduct of elections in Nigeria started prior to the 2015 general elections with the introduction of technologically based reforms to curtail the previous fraudulent nature of elections in the country. These paralyses include among other things such as biometric register of voters and advanced fingerprints identification system which have contributed tangibly in the 2011 elections (Piccolino, 2015). The SCR and PVC are the greatest innovation employed by INEC during the 2015 general elections were simply used to authenticate the information of the voters by swapping the PVC across the SCR and finger print to confirm and accredit the voter for voting. Therefore, multiple 597

registration of voters drastically reduced, as the ICT tools recognize only one fingerprint, which must be registered within a specified pulling units and as such reduces electoral fraud. Introduction of ICT necessitated the need for reliable register of voters and identification mechanism couple with high level of awareness through social media serves as some of the preconditions for credible elections in the country. During the 2015 general elections the newly introduced machine (SCR) was faced with some challenges especially during the Presidential election which was the first to be conducted in the country of not verifying voter‘s fingerprint despites authenticating their PVC‘s at different centers across the country. This resulted because of poor network connection particularly in remote areas, lack of required skills to handle the machine as well as lack of electricity are some of the challenges faced during the election exercise. It was reported that: Electronic readers of biometric PVCs failed to verify fingerprints in many instances and resulted in delays in voter accreditation in a high number of polling stations. Where fingerprint scanning failed, there did not appear to be uniform understanding of contingency planning among polling officials, including requirements for large-scale manual verification of voters‟ identities against the printed voter registry and the issuance of incident forms. When incident forms

were

diligently

completed

by

INEC

officials,

accreditation was often delayed even further due to the time required to fill out a form for each voter whose fingerprints could not be read (NDI, cited in Nwangwu, 2015 p. 14). At the subsequent gubernatorial and National Assembly elections, INEC addressed some of the challenges associated with the SCR and elections went smoothly in most parts of the country. Furthermore, both local and international observers acknowledged that the election was free and fair and has conform to the rules of the game globally (European Union Election Observer 598

Mission, 2015; NDI, 2015). In addition, for the first time in the history of Nigerian politics, opposition party accepted defeat in most part of the country without resort to court battles, starting with President Jonathan of PDP who called the newly elected President Buhari on March 31, 2015 to congratulate him on his victory. The populace in the country joyfully celebrated the outcome as well as the peaceful nature of the election contrary to the expectation of many people both within and outside the country. A former US Ambassador to Nigeria, Mr. John Campbell is constantly reported to have argued that the country (Nigeria) would break up in 2015 because the elections will plunge Nigeria into crisis (Yakub, 2015). Considering the peaceful nature of the election, Commonwealth EOM‘s report provided that the elections mark a step forward in the quality of democracy in Nigeria specifically and in Africa generally. Conclusion The foregoing analysis of the role ICT tools (PVC & SCR) played during the 2015 general elections in Nigeria brought to the fore the central role championed by these tools in contributing to a free, fair and credible election in the country. Previous elections in the current forth republic were manually administered resulting to the failure of the elections on several grounds. The paper employed Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) as a guide and it was observed that ICT tools is the greatest innovation during the last election which on its own could not bring the needed changes but helped in reducing some of the electoral irregularities that characterized the electoral atmosphere of the Nigerian state. For the first time in the history of the country, the opposition candidate (Muhammadu Buhari) unseated the incumbent President Jonathan of the ruling party. The election was termed by both local and international observers as free and fair and has conforms to the global standard. However, the introduction of PVC and SCR by INEC experienced some hitches during the electoral contest but nonetheless contributed immensely to the conduct of a credible election in the history of Nigeria. The paper recommends that the ICT tools should be employed and strengthen in the subsequent elections. In addition, training and re-training of INEC staff should be carried out to handle all newly ICT tools and equipment introduced by the Commission. 599

References Adejumobi, S. (2007). When votes do not count: The 2007 general elections in Nigeria. Nordic African Institute, 2, 12–15. African Union Election Observer Mission. (2015). Report on the Nigeria‟s 2015 General Elections. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Aiyede, E. (2007). Electoral Laws and the 2007 General Elections. Journal of African Elections, 6(2). Akinboye, S. O. (1999). Nigeria‟s 1999 multi-party elections: An overview of electoral conduct and results in Olurode and Anifowose. Issues in Nigeria‟s 1999 General Elections. Awopeju, A. (Joseph A. B. U. (2011). Election Rigging and The Problelms of Electoral Act In Nigeria. Afro Asian Journal of Social Sciences, 2(2.4), 1–17. Bratton, M. (1998). Second elections in Africa. Journal of Democracy, 9(3), 51–66. Retrieved from https://muse.jhu.edu/article/16894/summary Bratton, M. (2008). Vote buying and violence in Nigerian election campaigns. Electoral Studies, 27(4), 621–632. Retrieved from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379408000589 Dahiru, U. T. (2016). Supreme Court Dismisses PDP‘s Application to Remove Tambuwal ―Through the Back Door.‖ This Day. Retrieved from http://www.thisdaylive.com/ Davis, F. D. (1985). A technology acceptance model for empirically testing new end-user information systems: Theory and results. Management. https://doi.org/oclc/56932490 European Union Election Observer Mission. (2015). Reports on Nigeria‟s 2015 General election.

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Fisher, J. (2002). Electoral conflict and violence: A strategy for study and prevention (pp. 1–36). Jinadu, A. (2003). Democratic Reforms Since 1999. Guardian Newspaper. Kanyinga, K., & Okello, D. (2007). Tension and Reversals in Democratic Transitions: The Kenya 2007 General Elections. University of Nairobi. Retrieved from https://journals.uonbi.ac.ke/karutikanyinga/publications/tension-and-reversals-democratictransitions-kenya-2007-general-election Kerr, N. (2013). Popular evaluations of election quality in Africa: Evidence from Nigeria. Electoral Studies, 32(4), 819–837. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2013.02.010 Kew, D. (1999). Democrazy—Dem Go Craze, O: Monitoring the 1999 Nigerian Elections. Issue. Retrieved from http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1548450500005862 National Democratic Institute. (2015a). A Prelimnary Report on the 2015 General Elections in Nigeria. Washington DC. National Democratic Institute. (2015b). Statement of NDI‟s international observer mission to Nigeria‟s March 28 Presidential and Legislative Elections. Abuja, Nigeria. Nwangwu, C. (2015). Biometric Voting Technology and the 2015 General Elections in Nigeria. In Being a paper presented at two-day National Conference on “The 2015 general elections in Nigeria: The Real Issues” Organized by Electoral Institute between 27th and 28th July. (pp. 1–28). Ojo, E. O. (2006). Vote buying in Nigeria. (A. O. A. (eds) Victor, Ed.). Abuja, Nigeria: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). Oladimeji, A. D., Olatunji, A. E & Nwogwugwu, N. N. (2013). A crtical appraisal of the management of 2011 General Election and implications for Nigeria‘s future democratic development. Kuwait Chapter of Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review, 601

2(5), 109–121. Omotola, J. S. (2004). The 2003 Nigerian second elections: some comments. Political Science Review, 3(2), 130. Omotola, J. S. (2010). Elections and democratic transition in Nigeria under the Fourth Republic. African Affairs, 109(437), 535–553. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adq040 Osuntokun, J. (2011). Nigeria and the curse of elections. The Nation, p. 21. Piccolino, G. (2015). What other African elections tell us about Nigeria‟s bet on biometrics. Retrieved from www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp. Accessesd on October, 18 Yakub, D. (2015). Lessons of March 28, 2015. The News, p. 5.

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Internet Law in Indonesia: Conforming or Opposing Freedom of Expression?

Rahma Nur Aulia Departement of Political Science University of Indonesia Email: [email protected] Abstract Democracy can be practiced with digital instrument, one of it is internet. Hence comes the term digital democracy that increase information exchange between the government and societies. However, these conditions becomes paradox since internet also spread negative content like pornography, piracy, gambling, terrorism, etc. Indonesia as the fifth biggest internet user in the world also experiencing similar problems. The high number of internet abuse has made the Governments implement policies to protect users from the negative content. Since 2014, the Indonesian government was officially implement blocking policies namely TRUST + positive. However, this policy is considered potentially threatening freedom of expression in Indonesia. Moreover the country has ratified international human right instrument tha lead this country to have an obligation to implement those principles into domestic law.

This paper will discuss about internet law in Indonesia. The research question in this paper is "Whether Internet Laws in Indonesia is in conformity with freedom of expression?" Goal of the research is to analyze internet law which doesn‘t opposing freedom of expression. The paper was written based on research conducted with qualitative method. By using ICCPR Article 19 and Special Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression by Frank La Rue, this study shows that 1) lack of reason transparancy, 2) the assessment team that is not independent makes the author see that this law hasn‘t conform with freedom of expression.

Keyword: Internet, Blocking, Law, Indonesia, Freedom of Expression and Opinion

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INTRODUCTION In this modern era, democracy can be practiced with a variety of media, one of them with a digital device. Hence comes the term digital democracy, a goal and the practice of democracy through the use of any digital media in political communication online and offline. Digital democracy politiccs improve information exchange between the government, public administration, representatives, and political organizations as well as individual residents. This digital democracy supports public debate, deliberation, and the formation of a community; and increase the public participation in policy-making process. Internet became a part that can not be separated in the spectrum of this digital democracy. Indonesia as a the fifth largest democratic country in the world can not be separated from this phenomenon of digital democracy. In 2016, the country became the third most twitter user and facebook fourth most users in the world. Social media is used either government or societies. The government use social media to socialize their program. Now each ministry has their own twitter account. Ministry for Research, Technology, and Education have @kemristekdikti account, the Ministry of Communications and Information has @kemkominfo account, the Ministry of Education and Culture @kemdikbud_RI. Whereas the societies use internet to express their political aspirations. For example by providing support for a candidate or political party, the dissemination of political information, political education, the submission of protests and petitions, policy criticism, or text photos and video politic139. Unfortunately, this condition becomes a paradox of its own because the Internet also increases the spread of negative content such as pornographic content, gambling, piracy, etc. Each year, the government could find around 700.000 porn sites140. Therefore, the Indonesian government decided to make the adjustment to Internet content. 139

Andreas Priyo Adrianto, Jejaring media sosial sebagai media partisipasi politik = Social media as a political participation media . Thesis for Magister Program in Departement of Communication, Faculty of Social Science University of Indonesia Year 2013. Pg 19-20 140 http://www.cnnindonesia.com/teknologi/20161230084346-185-183040/setahun-kominfo-blokir-773-ribusitus-90-pornografi/ (accesed in February 12 2017, at 08.52 WIB)

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In 2014, the government officially issued a positive + Trust policy to control 'negative content' on the internet which is stipulated in the Regulation of the Minister of Communication and Information No. 19, 2014. Through this regulation, the government try to protect user, especially minorities like children from internet abuse. The internet content handling policy create public debate. Some group give positive vibes and support for this policy. Indonesian telematics expert and ex Minister of Sport and Youth said that this policy will make the control and prosecution of porn sites will much easier141. On the other hand, some groups are oppose this policy. They considered this policy as a tool of the state to control access to public information. Through these policies, only the government has the legality to determine which content is feasible and not feasible consumed by the public142. Whereas such authority could lead to bias because the government also has an interest in access to and information spread to the community. One of the oppose group of this policy is human right activist group. According to them, these conditions has been threaten the freedom of expression and opinion on the Internet143. In the human right discussion, on of the most important is right of people to express their opinion without interfere from others.Though the Internet has become an indispensable tool to practice this right. But freedom of expression on the Internet is now being hampered by applying criminal law or create a new law designed to criminalize the perpetrators of freedom of expression on the Internet144. Therefore, the policy of closure or blocking of sites is feared could reduce these freedoms. This issue is very important especially now ASEAN gives special attention to human right struggle and uphold. In 2009, ASEAN creates special commission for human right namely 141

http://arsip.gatra.com/2008-04-17/artikel.php?id=113345 Supriyadi Widodo Eddyono Anggara, Position Paper 1/2014 Menolak Rencana PerMen Sensor Sapujagat 20132014 “Menguji Pengaturan Bloking dan Filtering Konten Internet di Indonesia”, Pg 1 143 https://aji.or.id/read/press-release/574/pemblokiran-situs-harus-dapat-diuji-pengadilan.html (accesed in February 11 2017, at 10.11 WIB) 144 Frank Larue in http://referensi.elsam.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Internet-Kebebasan-Berekspresi-danHak-Asasi-Manusia-HAM.pdf (accesed on April 4th 2017, at 10.37 WIB) 142

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ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights or AICHR. Starting from 2011, AICHR has focused on the drafting of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD)145. In this human right sturggle, Indonesia rank thirds for media freedom after Timor Leste and Cambodia among South East Asia Countries in 2015146. As we see in other countries like Malaysia in where 91 people were arrested in 2015 in charged or investigated under Sedition Act147. Or Singapore in where 17 years old boy were arrested for giving critics to Lee Kwan Yew148. No wonder Indonesia mentioned as one of the lead in the media freedom. But at the fact, this democratic country also faces threat of freedom in media, especially expression and opinion. This paper attempts to answer how the government's policy governing the handling of negative content on the Internet based on human rights perspective. To answer this question, it should be parsed in advance; First, what kind of negative content and how the handling of negative content on the Internet are stipulated in Minister of Communications and Information Technology No. 19, 2014? Second, what kind of international human rights instruments ratified by the state as a reference in dealing with the practice of negative content handlers on the internet? Thirdly, this paper will analyze whether the government's efforts so far has been in accordance with the principles of human rights set out in the ICCPR and its General comment, and Report of the Special Rapporteur Frank Larue? This paper uses a qualitative approach in which the author tried to explain what and how the phenomenon can occur. The author uses literature as the primary data that is then analyzed to explain the phenomenon.

145

http://aichr.org/about/ (accesed in February 12 2017, at 12.03 WIB) p://shapesea.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Textbook-Vol2-complete.pdf (accesed in February 12 2017, at 08.47 WIB) 147 http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/critical-repression-freedom-of-expression-under-attack-inmalaysia (accesed in February 12 2017, at 08.00 WIB) 148 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/30/singapore-police-arrest-17-year-old-amos-yee-critical-leekuan-yew-video (accesed in February 14 2017, at 13.05 WIB) 146

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POLICY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SETTING NEGATIVE CONTENT ON THE INTERNET

The regulation of prohibited Content in Electronic documents mentioned Chapter VII of Law No. 11 of 2008 on Information and Electronic Transactions about Prohibited Acts. The first is Article 27 (1) Content that violates decency; (2) gambling content; (3) defamation and insult content (4) blackmailing and / or threatening content. Second is Article 28 (1) hoax content; (2) racial hatred content. Third is Article 29 about threats to catch or scare which aimed personally. With those regulation, government use it as the base to select the sites which allowed or not allowed. If the definition of the negative content that is prohibited on the internet can be seen in Law No. 11 of 2008 on Information and Electronic Transactions, the mechanisms for handling it can be seen in the Minister of Communications and Information Technology Constitution number 19 of 2014 on the Handling Negative Conent Internet sites. With these rules, the government tries to protect the public interest from various internet abuse. In this government regulation, the prohibited content with content related to pornography and other illegal activities reported by the public or government agencies. In certain cases such as privacy, child pornography, violence, racial intolerance, and connect with the community at large, the report is considered urgent. In brief, the complaint mechanism is as follows:

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No

Phase

Explanation

1.

Reporting parties

Societies, Ministry or Government Agency, Law Enforcement Institutions or Judiciary

2.

The contents of the report

a negative charge; or normalization demand of blocking sites

3.

The Assessment Report Team

Ministry of Communication and Information, or agencies associated with the address of the site, the type of negative charge, the type of violation and caption

4.

Follow-up Report

The Director-General provide a list of addresses that the negatively charged sites called TRUST + Positive and ask the provider or the owner of the site to block or remove negative

5.

Block Team

Blocking Service Providers and Internet Service Provider

In this mechanism, the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology is a party that provides an assessment of a site and categorized it to the list of Trust + positive. To perform these tasks, the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology form a team of panelists as stipulated in Decree Number 290 Year 2015 of Handling Negative Internet Site Forum (Forum Penanganan Situs Internet Bermuatan Negatif/FPSIBN). Panel Assessor of this team is as follows: 1. Panel for pornography, child abuse, and internet security 2. Panel for terrorism, racism, and hatred 3. Panel for illegal investigation, fraud, gambling, drugs and food, and drugs 4. Panel for wealth of intellectual property rights149

149

Decree Number 290 Year 2015 of Forum Handling Negative Internet Site (Forum Penanganan Situs Internet Bermuatan Negatif/FPSIBN

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Practice Complaint Negative Content in Mass Media Internet In 2015, 22 Islamic sites in wereblocked because it was considered to contain racial content. The closure of this site is done at the request of the National Counter Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulan Terorisme/BNPT) by letter Number 149 / K.BNPT / 3/2015 concerning the site / website radicals. According BNPT all sites are spreading and sympathizers of radicalism. One of those sites owner, Dakwatuna.com, then protested because there was no prior notice of the relevant blocking. Editor of the site make the complaint to Ministry of Communications and Information Technology and Commission I of the House of Representatives. They argue that the site Dakwatuna support radicalism. Finally, after coordinating with the ministry, the site was accessible again150. Another site that the closure was met with protests is Suarapapua.com site. In late October 2016, the chief editor of Suarapapua.com received information that the site is not accessible. He also revealed that there was no prior notice from the ministry related to these actions. The ministry just announced that 11 sites were blocked at the time, while there were three additional sites including Suarapapua.com blocked151.

150

https://nasional.sindonews.com/read/983899/14/dakwatuna-protes-dikategorikan-situs-radikal-dan-diblokir1427857565 (accesed in February 12 2017, at 08.47 WIB) 151 https://tirto.id/kami-tidak-pernah-mendapat-pemberitahuan-soal-pemblokiran-b5rL (accesed in February 12 2017, at 12.11 WIB)

609

The absence of notice made the media sites could only guess that the news about the critical conditions in Papua make their sites were blocked. Though media sites that journalists come from Papua has always sought an alternative media and providing the appropriate facts in the area. Furthermore, Suarapapua.com are news sites published by the "Society of Papua New Voice" and is based on Law Number 40 of 1999. Based on the Notarial Deed Oktorianti, SH. M.Kn. No. 11, c / o Jalan Raya Sentani 68, front Korem Padang Bulan, Abepura, Papua province. It has been getting Decree (SK) of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights of the Republic of Indonesia Number: AHU-00239.60.10.2014. Through their attorney, this media sent a letter to the Press Council about blocking Suarapapua.com. Complaints are also made to Telkom152 and the Ministry of Communication to seek clarification about the reason for blocking the site unilaterally. Beside those two sites, other that had suffered blocking by the government is Vimeo.com. Basically, this site is a video sharing service providers who facilitate its member to watch, upload, and share videos. Members can choose a free or paid service. Vimeo also provide a free services for its members to use creative tools to improve the quality of the video, add music, and other creative things. Vimeo also presents its videos school. A video production services to improve their long-term or other financial goals153. But since 2014, the site was blocked by the government on the grounds contained pornographic content. According to the Minister of Communications and Information Technology, wrapped up in January, Vimeo does not have a filter pornographic content as requested by the government. Vimeo does not guarantee the ability to block pornographic content without any leakage154. Other sites which are blocked by government is Ganool.com. Sites that are derived from the United States was closed due to film piracy. Mr. Rudiantara, Ministry of Communication and Information Technology Electronic said that such actions were in accordance with the Joint 152

Internet Service Provider that is used by Suarapapua.com http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/Vimeo (accesed on February 12th 2017, at 08.30 WIB) 154 http://tekno.kompas.com/read/2015/02/02/14193737/vimeo.masih.diblokir.ini.kata.menkominfo (accesed in February 12th 2017, at 08.47 WIB) 153

610

Regulation No. Ministry of Law in 2015. This site was finally closed along with dozens of other piracy sites155.

155

http://tekno.kompas.com/read/2015/02/02/14193737/vimeo.masih.diblokir.ini.kata.menkominfo (accesed in February 12 2017, at 08.47 WIB)

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THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND OPINION ICCPR (International Covenant Civil and Political Right) dan General comment No. 34 Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression The main framework regarding the right to freedom of opinion and expression stipulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) or commonly called the UDHR. In the covenant, the freedom of expression enshrined in article 19 as follows: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” That Freedom is then regulated in more detail within ICCPR (International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights), the document to confirm the specifics of human rights in the UDHR, in order to be legally binding and more detailed. As in the UDHR, the right of opinion and expression also governed by Article 19 as follows: 1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article 3carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:

(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. Articles 19, followed by General Comment, the UN Human Rights expert committee views that emerged as further guidance on these rights. This view is not a treaty nor binding so it does not

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need to be ratified by the state156. General comment on article 19 appear two times. The first is general comment number 10 issued on June 28, 1983. General comment consists of four chapters with an adequate explanation brief and general. But the need for interpretation in accordance with the times make the experts form the general comment further. That general comment No. 34 of 2011 which replaces general comment number 10's. Article 19 of the general comment 34 consists of 52 chapters that discussion can be divided into 4 parts. The first is a general explanation of the freedom of opinion, freedom of expression, civil and political rights, as well as its limits. As the foregoing, article 19 reiterated that every person has the right to maintain or change his opinions without interruptions, intimidation, coercion, or stigmatization, as well as imprisonment in any form. The opinion includes a variety of fields ranging from politics, science, history, morality, and religion.

9) Paragraph 1 of article 19 requires protection of the right to hold opinions without interference. This is a right to which the Covenant permits no exception or restriction. Freedom of opinion extends to the right to change an opinion whenever and for whatever reason a person so freely chooses. No person may be subject to the impairment of any rights under the Covenant on the basis of his or her actual, perceived or supposed opinions. All forms of opinion are protected, including opinions of a political, scientific, historic, moral or religious nature. It is incompatible with paragraph 1 to criminalise the holding of an opinion.[9] The harassment, intimidation or stigmatisation of a person, including arrest, detention, trial or imprisonment for reasons of the opinions they may hold, constitutes a violation of article 19, paragraph 1.[10] The second part of article 19 talks about freedom of expression in which the state must guarantee freedom of expression. These include freedom to seek, receive, and make information and ideas in any form. The scope ranging from political discourse, comments related to the public interest, human right, journalism, culture, art, teaching, and religion. All expressions of both written or

156

http://www.institut-fuer-menschenrechte.de/en/topics/development/frequently-asked-questions/9-what-aregeneral-comments/ (accesed in February 12th 2017, at 09.47 WIB)

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not must be protected. This point is important as before the advent of general comment No. 34, some countries provide different translation-related Distinct form of freedom of expression157. 11) Paragraph 2 requires States parties to guarantee the right to freedom of expression, including the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds regardless of frontiers. This right includes the expression and receipt of communications of every form of idea and opinion capable of transmission to others, subject to the provisions in article 19, paragraph 3, and article 20.[12] It includes political discourse,[13] commentary on one‟s own[14] and on public affairs,[15] canvassing,[16] discussion of human rights,[17] journalism,[18] cultural and artistic expression,[19] teaching,[20] and religious discourse.[21] It may also include commercial advertising. The scope of paragraph 2 embraces even expression that may be regarded as deeply offensive,[22] although such expression may be restricted in accordance with the provisions of article 19, paragraph 3 and article 20. The third part of this article discusses freedom of expression and media. The article explained that media censorship is forbidden. Besides the media belonging to minorities also need attention. This article also mandates that the state must also consider the independence of the media and ensure easy access of information for each individual. 13) A free, uncensored and unhindered press or other media is essential in any society to ensure freedom of opinion and expression and the enjoyment of other Covenant rights. It constitutes one of the cornerstones of a democratic society. [28] The Covenant embraces a right whereby the media may receive information on the basis of which it can carry out its function. [29] The free communication of information and ideas about public and political issues between citizens, candidates and elected representatives is essential. This implies a free press and other media able to comment on public issues without censorship or restraint and to inform public opinion.[30] The public also has a corresponding right to receive media output.[31] pers atau media lainnya yang bebas dari sensor sifatnya sangat esensia.

157

Michael O’Flaherty, Freedom of Expression: Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No 34. Human Rights Law Review 12:4 The Author [2012]. Published by Oxford University Press, Hlm 637-644.

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The fourth part of this article discusses the most important part in the discourse of freedom of opinion and expression, which limits both these rights. In paragraph 3 of article 19 states that freedom of expression and opinion is accompanied by certain obligations. That should respect other people's reputation, protect state security, the public interest, the interests of public health and morals. In addition, any restriction imposed should be based on the law. This article also confirms that the ban imposed must be accompanied by clear guidelines, related how the expressions are allowed or prohibited. 24) Restrictions must be provided by law. Law may include laws of parliamentary privilege[50] and laws of contempt of court.[51] Since any restriction on freedom of expression constitutes a serious curtailment of human rights, it is not compatible with the Covenant for a restriction to be enshrined in traditional, religious or other such customary law.[52] 25) For purposes of paragraph 3, a norm, to be characterised as a “law”, must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly[53] and it must be made accessible to the public. A law may not confer unfettered discretion for the restriction of freedom of expression on those charged with its execution.[54] Laws must provide sufficient guidance to those charged with their execution to enable them to 10

615

ascertain what sorts of expression are properly restricted and what sorts are not. Related to those international human rights instruments, Indonesia formally ratify the ICCPR rule on October 28, 2005. This ratification was passed through the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 12 Year 2005 on Ratification of the International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights (International Covenant On Civil Rights and Politics). With the ratification, Indonesia assume responsibility for aligning domestic human rights policies with the rules in the ICCPR.

Special Rapporteur A / HRC / 17/27 fields Freedom of Opinion and Expression Frank William La Rue This report discusses generally the key and challenge the right of all individuals to seek, receive, and make information or ideas via the Internet. This special report underlines the uniqueness and internet related transformation that not only allow individuals to exercise freedom of opinion and of expression, but also in the realm of human rights, and to promote the progress of society as a whole.

Arbitrary blocking or filtering of content on the Internet: 70. The Special Rapporteur is deeply concerned by increasingly sophisticated blocking or filtering mechanisms used by States for censorship. The lack of transparency surrounding these measures also makes it difficult to ascertain whether blocking or filtering is really necessary for the purported aims put forward by States. As such, the Special Rapporteur calls upon States that currently block websites to provide lists of blocked websites and full details regarding the necessity and justification for blocking each individual website. An explanation should also be provided on the affected websites as to why they have been blocked. Any determination on what content should be blocked must be undertaken by a competent judicial authority or a body which is independent of any political, commercial, or other unwarranted influences. 71. With regard to child pornography, the Special Rapporteur notes that it is one clear exception where blocking measures are justified, provided that the national law is sufficiently precise and 616

there are sufficient safeguards against abuse or misuse to prevent any “mission creep”, including oversight and review by an independent and impartial tribunal or regulatory body. However, the Special Rapporteur calls upon States to focus their efforts on prosecuting those responsible for the production and dissemination of child pornography, rather than on blocking measures alone. This special report explains that along with rising technological inventions, the Internet can be misused for things that are dangerous. Therefore, in some cases, restrictions are required by condition 1) based on law that is clear and accessible (principles of predictability and transparency), 2) in line with the purpose of article 19, paragraph 3 of the ICCPR which is to protect the reputations of others, national security or the public interest , public health or morals, 3) must be proven need and restrictive minimum possible effort. In addition, the legislation as a restriction on freedom of expression must be applied by independent bodies / independent of any political, commercial, or other parties that could lead to discrimination158.

ANALYSIS OF INTERNET NEGATIVE CONTENT CONTROL POLICY BASED ON HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES

From the foregoing description, it has been discussed Indonesian government's policy in dealing with negative content on the Internet is stipulated in Minister of Communications and Information Technology No. 19 of 2014 and Law No.11 of 2008 on Information Technology Electronic. Practice of these policies can be seen in some cases throughout the years 2013-2016. In this chapter, the author will analyze whether the legal basis of such policies and practices in line with international human rights instruments which have become the responsibility for Indonesia.

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http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf (accesed in February 12 2017, at 13.01 WIB)

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Lack of Transparency The case of blocking of dakwatuna.com and 21 other Islamic sites as well as sites Ganool.com on one side is right. It is in line with the Regulation of the Minister of Communications and Information Technology No. 19, 2014 that radical content and other illegal activities included in the negative content that must be followed. Moreover, article 19 of the ICCPR also mandates that any restrictions on freedom of expression and opinion can be done if it threaten the stability of the country's security and the public interest. But on the other hand, the mechanism of blocking still lack in some aspects. As disclosed that the owner of Dakwatuna didn‘t have notice of the blocking action. He also did not receive a description of why the site is categorized as radical sites. It is also similar to Ganool.com newly identified sites are blocked after the Ministry announced several sites that were closed because of piracy.

The condition indicates the problems of transparency and clarity reason for blocking. Although the ministry states that always be confirmed with the site owners that includes contacts, but some cases show that the reason can only be obtained by contacting the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. Transparency of information is also experienced by the public where a reason for blocking a site is not available. The reason can only be obtained if the ministry gives an official statement. However, such information only be done in certain cases. Though transparency is very important to ensure that the blocking action is not related to the interests of the government only, but also the needs of the public. In addition, transparency also needed as lesson learn for the public to not load similar content. The lack of transparency and clarity blocking is not in accordance with the special rapporteur Frank Larue 2011. In paragraph 70, explained that the lack of transparency on the measuring instrument filtering or blocking mechanism site makes it difficult to determine whether the policy is necessary for the country's needs. The Special Rapporteur urged the country to to provide a complete list of blocked sites in detail the needs and justification. The explanation should also be given to the relevant site. 618

―70) The Special Rapporteur is deeply concerned by increasingly sophisticated blocking or filtering mechanisms used by States for censorship. The lack of transparency surrounding these measures also makes it difficult to ascertain whether blocking or filtering is really necessary for the purported aims put forward by States. As such, the Special Rapporteur calls upon States that currently block websites to provide lists of blocked websites and full details regarding the necessity and justification for blocking each individual website. An explanation should also be provided on the affected websites as to why they have been blocked. Any determination on what content should be blocked must be undertaken by a competent judicial authority or a body which is independent of any political, commercial, or other unwarranted influences” The lack of transparency is also not in line with the general comment No. 34 Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression for the purposes of article 25, paragraph 3, of norms, which are marked as "law", should be formulated precisely so as to enable individuals to regulate or her behavior and should be accessible to the public ... [54] Laws must provide sufficient guidance that enables them to determine what kind of expression is restricted and which are not).

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“For purposes of paragraph 3, a norm, to be characterised as a “law”, must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly[53] and it must be made accessible to the public. A law may not confer unfettered discretion for the restriction of freedom of expression on those charged with its execution.[54] Laws must provide sufficient guidance to those charged with their execution to enable them to ascertain what sorts of expression are properly restricted and what sorts are not”

Independency of Panelist Assesment Team Another problem is the creation of panelists team who assess the negative content on the internet. At the start of the blocking of websites, the government involve the community from non governmental organization as an assessment team set out in Decree No. 290 of 2015. Some names public figures such as Elly Risman of Buah Hati Foundation, Din Syamsudin from Muhammadyiah, adan Asep Saefullah of AJI (Aliansi Jurnalis Independen/ Independent Journalist Aliance) included in the list of panelists. This shows that the government involve the community to assess the negatively charged sites. But the problem is that the Decree is only valid until December 31, 2015, or eight months of being passed on March 31, 2015. While blocking only involve elements of government ie Police, BNPT (National Agency for Counterring Terrorism), BIN (National Intellegent Agency), the Attorney General, Ministry of Communication, and the Ministry for Legal and Security (Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs). It is certainly dangerous because the decision of blocking could have been unilateral. In the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression by Frank La Rue in 2011, stated that the rule banning freedom of expression should be carried out by an independent body, free from political, commercial, or other influences that can lead to discrimination. In this case, a team of panelists which is only came from the Government can put the Governemnt political interest without any balance from actor or group beyond them. We can see in Suarapapua.com case, the official press media which always give critical news about Papua. No notice nor information about reason they blocked those sites. 620

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION Indonesian government's policy to set the negative content on the Internet is indeed right. This is because the rise in internet users that need protection and legal certainty.

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However, the policy outlined in the Minister of Communication and Information No. 19 of 2014 on the handling of negative content on the internet as well as Law No. 11 of 2008 on Information and Electronic transactions until now precisely intersect with freedom of expression and opinion. Arrangements through the Internet in Indonesia's policy-setting negative content on the internet oppose freedom of expression, yet democratic and transparent. First, in the Minister of Communications and Information Technology No. 19 2014 explained that blocking the site is always done by confirming the site owners that includes contacts. However, some cases indicate that the process is not executed. Not only the notifications, reason for blocking was not informed clearly by mechanisms that are easily accessible to both related and public sites. Meanwhile the ministry only give official information on specific cases only. Though transparency is very important to ensure that the blocking action is not related to the interests of the government only, but also the needs of the public. In addition, transparency also needed as learning for the public to not load similar content. Second, the latter is the independence of the panelist who assess the sites is only consists of the government element ie Police, BNPT (National Agency Penanggukangan Terrorism), NIA (National Intelligence Agency), the Attorney General, Ministry of Communication, and the Ministry for Legal and Security (Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and security. It is certainly dangerous because of the decision of blocking could have been unilateral. In the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression Frank La Rue in 2011, stated that the rule banning freedom of expression must carried out by an independent body, free from political, commercial, or other influences that can lead to discrimination. This team which is only came from the Government can put the their political interest without any balance from actor or group beyond them. Based on these conclusions, the authors provide recommendations to the government as follows: 1. Make a notification to relevant sites, include a reason for blocking a publicly accessible, as well as providing a list of blocked sites, as written by the Special Rapporteur A / HRC / 17/27 fields Freedom of Opinion and Expression Frank William La Rue.

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2. The blocking should be done on specific content that is in violation of the provisions. So that the public can still access the positive content contained within the same site. 3. Reincluding public figure in the team of panelists that a feasibility assessment of a site is not a unilateral government.

Bibliography Adrianto, Andreas Priyo. 2013. Jejaring media sosial sebagai media partisipasi. Thesis for Magister Program in Departement of Communication, Faculty of Social Science University of Indonesia. Abidin, Wahyudi Djafar Zainal. 2014. Membelenggu Ekspresi: Studi kasus mengenai praktik pemblokiran/penyaringan konten internet Dan kriminalisasi pengguna internet di Indonesia Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat (ELSAM). Adrianto, Andreas Priyo. 2013. Jejaring media sosial sebagai media partisipasi. Thesis for Magister Program in Departement of Communication, Faculty of Social Science University of Indonesia. Eddyono, Supriyadi Widodo dan Anggara. Position Paper 1/2014 Menolak Rencana PerMen Sensor Sapujagat 2013-2014 “Menguji Pengaturan Bloking dan Filtering Konten Internet di Indonesia‖. O‘Flaherty, Michael. Freedom of Expression: Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Human Rights Committee‟s General Comment No 34. Human Rights Law Review 12:4 The Author [2012]. Oxford University Press

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2017,

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08.47

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http://www.cnnindonesia.com/hiburan/20150819083659-220-73041/22-situs-diduga-pembajakfilm-diblokir-kemenkominfo/ (diakses pada tanggal 12 Februari 2017, Pukul 11. 47 WIB) http://www.institut-fuer-menschenrechte.de/en/topics/development/frequently-askedquestions/9-what-are-general-comments/ (diakses pada tanggal 12 Februari 2017, Pukul 09.47 WIB) http://referensi.elsam.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Internet-Kebebasan-Berekspresi-danHak-Asasi-Manusia-HAM.pdf (diakses pada tanggal 12 Februari 2017, Pukul 09.47 WIB) http://berkas.dpr.go.id/puslit/files/info_singkat/Info%20Singkat-VIII-21-I-P3DI-November2016-9.pdf (diakses pada tanggal 1 Februari 2017, Pukul 07.47 WIB) https://web.kominfo.go.id/sites/default/files/users/1536/SK%20MENKOMINFO%20NO%20290 %20%202015%20TTG%20%20%20%20%20%20FORUM%20PENANGANAN%20SITUS%20%2 0INTERNET%20BERMUATAN%20%20NEGATIF.pdf (diakses pada tanggal 4 Februari 2017, Pukul 09.15 WIB) https://www.kominfo.go.id/content/detail/8817/begini-mekanisme-pemblokiran-situs-versikemenkominfo/0/sorotan_media (diakses pada tanggal 25 Januari, Pukul 11.53 WIB) https://www.kominfo.go.id/content/detail/8817/begini-mekanisme-pemblokiran-situs-versikemenkominfo/0/sorotan_media (diakses pada tanggal 25 Januari 2015, pukul 07.50 WIB) 015, pukul 07.50 WIB)

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Media Construction of Patriotism in National Day News Reports

Su-Hie Ting Universiti Malaysia Sarawak Abstract

National day celebration is among the means for the government to promote a sense of national identity. What is interesting is how patriotism is displayed in national day celebrations and constructed in newspapers. The study examined newspaper reports of national day celebration in Malaysia to identify symbols of patriotism. The thematic analysis of the newspaper reports on national day celebrations revealed that patriotism must be mentioned and the primary symbols of patriotism are the flag and cultural performance. These represent public displays of patriotism. Less obvious, but not less important, is knowledge about the country and history of how independence is attained. In the event that the younger generation is not aware of the contributions of the nation‘s leaders, the newspapers play their role in educating their readers. There also seems to be a competition among organisers to outdo one another in their display of patriotism in national day celebrations, and the media feeds into this frenzy by means of the space given to the reports. ―The media‘s choice of patriotism has terribly important consequences for democratic life‖ (Waisbord, 2002) as deeper meanings of love of country give way to a narrow conception of nationalism displayed on national day. Keywords: media, patriotism, national day

Introduction

There is growing concern that young people are apathetic towards their citizenship, and lack concern for broader communal and national concerns as they become more centred on self and family interests (Morris & Sweeting, 1991). Youths become disenfranchised because they feel disconnected from events and movements in the community and the country, and they cannot be engaged to move along with the national agenda.

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To deal with youth disenfranchisement, some governments have embarked on programs to instil citizenship values through the school and the mass media (e.g., Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia). This means of political socialisation into the national identity have so far been based on authority-defined notions anchored in the past formed on the basis of dominant views. Because of the flux in local and international situations, socialisation processes are different from yesteryears, and new medias and international political movements are having a stronger influence than traditional socialisation agents. If the attention continues to be on dominant views and dissenting views are not investigated, disengagement will increase.

The key to understanding societal engagement is to examine how political socialisation takes place. For example, beliefs of what constitutes national identity are formed from messages communicated by politicians, intellectuals, media, school and other avenues (De Cillia, Reisigl, & Wodak, 1999). Because of the changes in the sociopolitical landscape worldwide which spill over to many national political landscapes, the previous understanding of socialisation is no longer applicable. For example, the purpose of institution to create ideological conformity among its citizens is challenged by new media and technologies, and the youths are mobilised by the alternative sources of information more than by conventional agents of socialisation.Empiricallyderived insights on how social forces of political economy mobilise Malaysian youths are important to ensure that policies and government actions do not result in the displacement of youth from the mainstream institutions inculcating citizenship ideals.

A very important way to understand political socialisation in multiethnic countries like Malaysia is to study how the media encouragesthe society to construct a particular form of national identity. Among the many spaces for the construction of the national identity is the national day. Every year the national day is celebrated in various countries in the world on a grand scale to inculcate patriotism, among others. It is also during the national day celebration that past heroes who fought for the country‘s independence are celebrated and the younger members of the

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society are reminded of their contribution. This knowledge of the country‘s history is considered an essence of being a citizen of the country. The national day celebrations are covered by the media, and the media shapes people‘s opinions about their sense of self and identity by conveying diverse messages and propagating stereotypes. The news articles on the national day celebration offer insight into the influence of the media on the development of national identity, particularly in the aspect of patriotism. Like any other social identities, the national identity has its markers – external (tangibles) and internal (untangible) markers of the national identity. Examples of external markers of the national identity in the Malaysian setting are the ability to sign the national anthem Negaraku, recite the national ideology Rukunegara, draw the national flag, and speak the national language Bahasa Melayu. Although it is known that the media conveys stereotypes, little is known about the construction of the national day by the media or the markers of patriotism in the specific context of the national day celebration. Purpose of study

The study examined newspaper reports of national day celebration in Malaysia to identify symbols of patriotism. Method of study

For the study on the media portrayal of the national day celebration in Malaysia, two English newspapers circulated in Sarawak, Malaysia were selected for analysis. Both newspapers, Sarawak Tribune and The Borneo Post, were Sarawak-based newspapers.

News articles on the national day published on 31 August 2016 were selected for analysis. For the selection, the headline, the article and photographs were examined to identify news articles that were related to the national day. Altogether 20 new articles were identified for analysis (8 from Sarawak Tribune; 12 from The Borneo Post). Table 1 shows the different types of news 627

articles on the national day in the two Sarawak-based newspapers. Sarawak Tribune had more feature articles but The Borneo Post had more news reports and photographs with caption only (without a news write-up). The two newspapers covered different events of the national day celebration and only one event was covered by both newspapers, which was a national day celebration in a kindergarten in Sibu.

Table 1 Types of news articles on the national day in the two Sarawak-based newspapers

Newspapers/Types of article Sarawak Tribune The Borneo Post Feature articles

4

1

Photograph and caption only 1

4

News reports

3

7

Total

8

12

The thematic analysis of the national day news articles focussed on the markers of the national day. For the coding, the news articles were read to identify the kinds of information included in the news articles. The common themes in the national day news articles are people, national day events and markers of national day celebration such as the flag. The most tangible marker of patriotism is the national flag, Jalur Gemilang. Besides the flag, the news articles generally mentioned the singing of the national anthem, the chant ―Merdeka Merdeka Merdeka‖, contributions of past heroes, changes in Malaysia since gaining independence on 31 August 1957 and some historical facts. An essential component of news articles on the national day celebration appears to be the mention of ethnic diversity and integration or unity in the country, along with other patriotic values.

The coding of themes in the national day news articles took place in stages. In the first level coding, the words or phrases used for different kinds of information in the news articles were 628

underlined and tentative codes were written at the side. In the second level coding, commonly used terms were used to group the themes, for example, pupils and students were regarded as the same. Concept maps of how the themes were linked to one another were drawn. It became apparent that the news reports on national day events were different from feature articles (which are not tied to any event). The third type of news article is a photograph with an informative caption, not accompanied by a news write-up – frequently used by The Borneo Post. The caption is so informative that it has the essential details which would appear in a full-blown news report on a national day event (e.g., place, participants, national day markers), except that it has less elaboration.

The third and final level of coding was to develop a hierarchy for the themes in the national day news articles. For participants, the school community is an overarching theme that comprises the headmaster/headmistress, teachers, children, pupils/students and their parents. However, if the headmaster/headmistress is mentioned by name, they are considered an VIP (Very Important Person) of the event, and coded under VIP rather than just a participant of the event. The generalised participants for the national day events included mention of ―people‖, ―participants‖, ―visitors‖ and ―Malaysians‖. At this stage of the coding, the NGOs and religious bodies were grouped together. The armed forces (often mentioned in feature articles) and medical personnel (mentioned in one particular Sarawak Tribune news report) were other groups of participants involved in the national day events. After the codes had stabilised, the coding was rechecked and some of the tentative codes used in the first level coding were refined. Any omissions were rectified but this was mainly for the participants of the national day events. The results of the analysis are presented next.

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Results and Discussion

The results section shows the media portrayal of the national day in news articles in two Sarawak-based English newspapers, Sarawak Tribune and The Borneo Post.

1. Events on national day

Organisations, be it government or private sector (including NGOs) seemed to be outdoing one another in the ingenuity of ideas for celebrating the national day. If the event is covered by the newspaper, it is kudos to the organisations because they may be seen as being more patriotic than other organisations which do not put in as much effort or creativity in celebrating the national day. If the events are graced by VIPs, then it is even grander. Table 2 shows the eventsin news articles on national day in the two Sarawak-based newspapers

Table 2 Events in news articles on national day in the two Sarawak-based newspapers

Events in national day news articles

Sarawak

The

Tribune

Post

Parade

3

2

Fireworks

1

Decoration in school/classroom/car with flags

1

Borneo Total

5 1

2

Spending time with family talking about exceptional 1

3 1

Malaysians Merdeka month

1

1

Fly Jalur Gemilang campaign

1

1

Bicycle competition

1

1

Merdeka costume/uniform competition

1 630

1

2

Colouring contest

1

1

2

Walk/Run for the nation

1

1

2

Bicycle fun ride (with flag)

1

1

2

Choral speaking/poem recitation

2

2

Singing patriotic songs/national anthem

4

4

Quiz

2

2

I love Malaysia formation

1

1

Assembly (school/Dataran Merdeka)

2

2

Hampers for people born on August 31 and September

1

1

1

1

21

34

16 Dance performance Total

13

Altogether there were 34 mentions of various types of national day celebrations in the 20 newspaper articles analysed. The most common is parades (in five news articles) usually accompanied by singing of patriotic songs (in four news articles). Other verbal markers of the national day are the Merdeka chant and ―Happy Merdeka Day‖ wish. The verbal marker of the national day shows up in choral speaking, poem recitation and quiz (in 4 news articles).

The Jalur Gemilang flags show up in different forms in 14 news articles: 

Buildings decorated with flags



Flying Jalur Gemilang campaigns



Bicycle riding competition and fun rides



Costume competition



Walking and running competition



I love Malaysia human formation



Colouring contest 631

By far, the most prominent symbol of the national day is the national flag, Jalur Gemilang which is featured on buildings, cars, bicycles, runners and clothing. It also appears in photographs of articles on the national day. The national flag is a symbol of the sovereignty of a nation. It is hung and flown in schools, government departments and private sector organisations in weeks leading up to the national day. The national flag is also displayed in international sports events and if Malaysian teams win either gold or silver, the national flag is hoisted and the national anthem is played.

2. Participants in news articles on national day

Altogether, there were 99 mentions of different kinds of participants in the 20 news articles on the national day in Sarawak Tribune and The Borneo Post (32 and 67 respectively). Table 3 shows the participants in news articles on national day in the two newspapers. In The Borneo Post, there were more mentions of the participants in national day news articles because of the larger number of news reports in The Borneo Post compared to Sarawak Tribune (7 and 4 respectively). Table 3 Participants in news articles on national day in the two Sarawak-based newspapers

Category

of Participants

participants VIP

Sarawak Tribune

VIP by name

5

Dignitaries School

The Borneo Post Total

15

20

1

1

School by name

1

3

4

Teachers

1

3

4

Children

1

1

2

Parents

3

2

5

632

NGO

Individuals

Pupils/students

4

5

9

NGO

1

6

7

Religious body

1

0

1

12

21

People

3

3

Participants

1

1

Visitors

1

1

Individuals (by 9 name in feature articles)

Generalised participants

Malaysians Age-specific

Younger

group

generation Post

1

1

Merdeka

1

1

1

1

children Sons

1

1

Mass media

Mass media

1

1

Medical

Medical team

1

1

Specialists

2

2

Doctors

1

1

Medical

1

1

Nurses

1

1

Ambulance

1

1

Sarawak rangers

1

1

Armed forces

1

1

personnel

assistants

drivers Armed forces

633

Iban trackers

Enemy

1

1

Soldiers

1

1

Corporal

1

1

Foreign

1

1

aggressors Communists

1

1

Enemy

1

1

Total

32

67

99

From the analysis, the most prominent people in national day celebrations are the school community (28%) and VIPs (24%) (Figure 1). Schools carry out large scale celebrations because of the sheer population size and VIPs of various levels are needed to grace the occasion to make it grand. At least the headmaster or the director of departments is needed to launch the ceremony for the celebration of the national day.

Generalised participants 7% Medical NGO personnel 9% 8%

School community 28% Named VIPs Named 24% individuals 24%

Figure 1. Percentage of mention of participants in news articles on national day in the two Sarawak-based newspapers

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In comparison, Sarawak Tribune has more feature articles than The Borneo Post (4 and 1 respectively). The only feature in the Borneo Post was taken from Bernama (The Borneo Post, 31 August 2016, p. 26). ―M‘sians hope for zero corruptions, better education‖ was a compilation of Facebook responses to the question, ―What is your hope for the nation in the coming National Day?‖ The issues brought up by the young people were corruption, appreciation of the Malaysian currency, integration, education, environment, early education, working mothers, clean toilets, Bahasa Melayu, food wastage, gardening culture, legal aid for the poor and cycling lanes. The people mentioned by name in feature articles are labelled as named individuals in Figure 3. Sometimes there are 5-10 persons in one feature article which makes the percentage of named individuals high (21% of 99 mentions of participants) in news articles on national day in the two newspapers.

In Table 3, the number of mention of participants associated with warfare (armed personnel and the enemy) are four each, but it needs to be noted that the mention of Sarawak rangers, armed forces and Iban trackers came from the same article in The Borneo Post but the four mentions in Sarawak Tribune were spread across a few feature articles. Reporters like to interview past fighters (e.g., ―Corporal‖ in Sarawak Tribune news article No. 9) because they are crucial in securing the independence of Malaysia and the national day celebrations commemorate their sacrifice for the nation. Sarawak Tribune is inclined towards interviewing people to get their views of national day.

3. Markers of the national day

Consistent with the results on the events in news articles on national day in the two Sarawakbased newspapers (Table 2), the display of the Jalur Gemilang, the newspaper articles make the most frequent mention of the flag as a tangible marker of the national day (14 out of 60 mentions), as shown in Figure 2. In Malaysia, the appearance of the national flag on buildings 635

(inside and outside) and cars signal the coming of the national day. The national flag is the most tangible marker of the national day.

National day markers

Merdeka chant

Tangible markers

Intangible markers

19

41

Flag

Anthem

14

2

3

Ethnic diversity /unity 11

Change in Msia 4

History 10

Values 13

Contribution

3

Figure 2. Number of tangible and intangible markers of the national day in news articles in the two Sarawak-based newspapers

In comparison, the verbal expressions of patriotism (national anthem and the Merdeka chant) are not frequently mentioned. By mentioning the repetition of Merdeka three times by Tunku Abdul Rahman who later became the first Prime Minister of Malaysia, readers are brought back to the historical moments when independence was declared for Malaysia. There are photographs and video recordings of this momentous event to keep the memory of independence alive for Malaysians who did not live through the era. As for the national anthem, the ability to sing Negaraku is one of the top two important defining characteristics of being Malaysian, the other being residence in Malaysia (Ting, 2016). The finding is based on a survey of Malaysian university students from different ethnic groups who agreed on the importance of these two characteristics.

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As for the intangible markers of the national day in news articles in the two Sarawak-based newspapers, values, ethnic diversity/unity and historical information reign supreme (Table 2). Some articles mention contribution of past and present heroes and leaders, and the changes in Malaysia since 1957 but these were not the essential elements to include in news articles on the national day.

Knowledge of history leads to development of patriotic values and openness to unity in diversity. A Malaysian should know the significance of events culminating in the declaration of independence for the then Malaya in 1957. A Malaysian should also know the contribution of heroes, sung and unsung, which is why writers of feature articles like to interview armed personnel who were involved in the fight for independence. The kinds of heroes highlighted in the news articles are different. Before independence, it is the armed personnel fighting against communist and aggressors, the enemy. After independence, the heroes are people who run the country and exceptional Malaysians who contribute to making Malaysia advance in one way or another to bring about change in Malaysia (highlighted in 4 news articles). The news articles construct these developments as crucial for the harmony and peace that prevail in multi-ethnic Malaysia. The VIPs invited to national day events ―never fail‖ (with some exaggeration) to mention the ethnic diversity in Malaysia (11 news articles), and some in the same breath mention the unity and integration. In fact, ―the appreciation for unity in diversity is also a hallmark of being Malaysian from the perspective of the non-Malay [university] students because they feel that it is important to know the culture of all races living in Malaysia‖ (Ting, 2016, p. 238).

The values that are highlighted in the news articles on national day events are patriotism, love for country and loyalty. These are individual values as compared to independence and peace and harmony which are associated with the country.

This leads to the question of whether

individuals and organisations are seen as more patriotic, loyal and showing more love for Malaysia if they display more tangible markers of national day. Can these values be felt in the heart and not displayed? The answer is ―yes‖ but the national day displays seems to intensify 637

over the years. Admittedly, this study is not longitudinal in design but my observation over the past half a century has shown that the variety of participants and appearance of the national flag has intensified. I do not remember bicycle, runs or walks organised on national day. Assemblies and parades were the order of the day in the 1970s. On this note, it should not be forgotten that media portrayal of national day is a lens for readers to view national day and it could very well be that the media has increased coverage on national day events – which gives the impression of more widespread public displays of national day patriotism. The values of patriotism, loyalty and love for the country have been taught in Civics and now Moral Education, and instilled through informal means by the teachers and parents, and the mass media. These are abstract values compared to the love for country that armed personnel in the past experienced. For these armed personnel who fought for the independence of Malaysia, their love for Malaysia translated to dying for Malaysia for many of them. The prevailing peaceful and harmonious situation in Malaysia does not call for armed combat, and it seems that the values of patriotism, loyalty and love for the country are now embodied in carrying of the national flag, Jalur Gemilang.

Whether it is media portrayal or reality, it seems that a narrow conception of nationalism revolving around the national flag and public assembles and parades have been evolved. In the 20 news articles analysed, there was only one youth who said she would spend time with her multiracial family talking about exceptional Malaysians (―Celebrating National Day‖, Sarawak Tribune, 31 August 2016, p. 9). She has personalised national day celebration. Personal significance of national day such as ancestors being involved in the fight for independence would make admonishments to appreciate the value of a sovereign nation unnecessary. However, presently VIPs invited to national day events and news writers make it a point to admonish the general public and readers respectively to learn to appreciate national day.

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Conclusion

The analysis of media portrayal of national day in news articles in two Sarawak-based English newspapers has shown that the national flag and public assemblies mark national day; with the most prominent coverage for school events. These events purportedly inculcate feelings of patriotism, love and loyalty. Newspapers play its role to educate readers on the history of national day and contribution of past Malaysians, as seen by the frequent inclusion of historical facts but usually in the form of superficial reference to 31 August 1957. Perhaps more background on the independence of Malaysia need to be included in different news articles, and the avenue for this is feature articles which have human interest appeal. Although national day celebration is very much in the fabric of Malaysian life and apparently intensifying over the years as organisations try to outdo one another and vie for media space, what is more important ultimately is the personal meanings of national day for individual Malaysians. The conventional practice of interviewing the public and the new practice of soliciting Facebook responses on personal meanings of national day is important to draw the society away from the tangible (and easy) display of patriotism to intangible markers of patriotism. This also allows a move away from a narrow conception of nationalism in the form of public displays. The question for other researchers to pursue is whether there are broader conceptualisation of national day, and what this may encompass.

References

De Cillia, R., Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (1999). The discursive construction of national identities. Discourse & Society, 10(2), 149-173. Morris, P., & Sweeting, A. (1991). Education and politics: The case of Hong Kong from an historical perspective. Oxford Review of Education, 17(3), 249-267.

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Ting, S. H. (2016). Being Malaysian: Identifying characteristics. In Kamsiah Ali, & Sharifah Sophia Wan Ahmad (Eds.), Researching Society and Culture in Sarawak (pp. 217-240). Kota Samarahan, Malaysia: Penerbit Universiti Malaysia Sarawak. Waisbord, S. (2002). Journalism, risk and patriotism. In B. Zelizer & S. Allan (Eds.), Journalism after September 11 (pp. 201-219). London: Routledge.

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